VOLUME 435 (JANUARY 1978)

(14)

THE ANNALS

of The American Academy of Political and Social Science

RICHARD D. LAMBERT, *Editor*
ALAN W. HESTON, *Assistant Editor*

AMERICA IN THE SEVENTIES: SOME SOCIAL INDICATORS

Special Editor of This Volume

CONRAD TAEUBER
Director
Center for Population Research
Georgetown University
Washington, D.C.

PHILADELPHIA

Library of Congress Card Number 77-22914

MARION M. WILLIAMS, *Copy Editor*

The articles appearing in THE ANNALS are indexed in the *Reader's Guide to Periodical Literature*, the *Book Review Index*, the *Public Affairs Information Service Bulletin*, *Social Sciences Index*, and *Current Contents: Behavioral, Social, Management Sciences* and *Combined Retrospective Index Sets*. They are also abstracted and indexed in *ABC Pol Sci*, *Historical Abstracts*, *United States Political Science Documents*, *Abstracts for Social Workers*, *International Political Science Abstracts* and/or *America: History and Life*.

International Standard Book Numbers (ISBN)

* ISBN 0-87761-223-4, vol 435, 1978; paper—$6 00
* ISBN 0-87761-222-6, vol. 435, 1978; cloth—$7.50

Issued bimonthly by The American Academy of Political and Social Science at 3937 Chestn St., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104. Cost per year: $18.00 paperbound, $23.00 clothboun Add $2.00 to above rates for membership outside U.S.A. Second-class postage paid at Phil dephia and at additional mailing offices.

Claims for undelivered copies must be made within the month following the regular mont of publication. The publisher will supply missing copies when losses have been sustained i transit and when the reserve stock will permit.

Editorial and Business Offices, 3937 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104.

* These prices are for this special issue only. See back cover for regular prices

CONTENTS

BOOK DEPARTMENT

PA

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND POLITICS

AFRICA, ASIA, AND LATIN AMERICA

EUROPE

UNITED STATES

SOCIOLOGY

CONTENTS

PREFACE*

This is the third time that THE ANNALS has devoted a special issue to the subject of social indicators. In May 1967, a two-volume edition appeared under the title, *Social Goals and Indicators for American Society*. In January 1971, a volume on *Social Information for Developing Countries* was published. The title of the present volume, *America in the Seventies: Some Social Indicators*, reflects a recognition of the fact that, though many new statistical series have been developed, it is not possible to set forth a single or even a small number of summary indicators of social welfare which would meet with general acceptance.

Robert Parke and David Seidman's contribution to this issue describes some of the efforts that have been devoted to the development of social indicators since Raymond Bauer, in 1966, issued his volume under that title and THE ANNALS devoted its May 1967 issue to an exploration of objectives and of data availability and data needs.

There has been a growing recognition that statistical reports are not normative indicators; that in fact they often are ambiguous. Ida Merriam illustrates this when she writes: "An increase in expenditures for unemployment insurance signals both a weakness in the economy that should disturb us and a strength in the protection of individuals and families that marks an effective social welfare system."

The report *Social Indicators, 1973*, issued by the Office of Management and Budget clearly recognized this ambiguity and made no effort to draw conclusions for policy from the numerous series which were presented. The successor report, *Social Indicators, 1976*, observed the same limitation.

Nevertheless the data presented have a significance that goes well beyond the description of trends and patterns which is given by the tables and charts in that report. The present issue of THE ANNALS was planned to provide insights into the significance of these patterns and trends. The authors were invited to interpret the data, to give their own views of the significance of the trends to American society, and to observe interrelations as well as implications for policy and for the future. They were not limited to the assumptions which underlay the choices of particular series presented in *Social Indicators, 1976*. They were encouraged to criticize the choices that had been made and to draw attention to other data, presented in the text of the article, if it was their conclusion that such data would have provided greater insights into significant developments.

The readers of these articles will want to refer to the recently issued *Social Indicators, 1976* for more detailed sets of data and for comments on the

* A grant from the National Science Foundation (SOC 76-80262) helped make publication of this volume of THE ANNALS possible The American Academy of Political and Social Sciences is grateful for this support However, any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Foundation.

methodology and limitations underlying the series.[1] The matching table and charts presented at the end of each article are drawn from that source. *SI, 1976*, was intended to provide a body of comprehensive statistical information from which individual readers could draw their own conclusions. It is the hope of the editors of this volume that these articles will assist readers to arrive at their own assessments of the trends which are portrayed.

The cooperation of the editors of *SI, 1976*, in providing advance copies of the data presented in that volume and in facilitating the preparation of these articles in other ways, is gratefully acknowledged.

Selecting from the large body of statistical information which is available from official and nonofficial sources is a major task. But many readers will feel that the available data are not sufficiently comprehensive or that they are not appropriate to the current needs and perceptions of problems. If these articles help to direct future data gathering and to initiate efforts for a clearer and more relevant portrayal of current conditions and trends, they will have served to improve future efforts to present social indicators for the United States.

CONRAD TAEUBER

1. U.S Department of Commerce, Office of Federal Statistical Policy and Standards and Bureau of the Census, *Social Indicators, 1976* For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Washington, D.C., 20402. Price: $7.00, Stock #041-001-00156-5.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 435, Jan. 1978

Social Indicators and Social Reporting*

By ROBERT PARKE and DAVID SEIDMAN

ABSTRACT: Doubts about the easy equation of economic growth and social progress led, in the 1960s, to a renewed interest in social measurement and to the birth of the "social indicators movement." *Social Indicators, 1976*, a product of that interest, can be read as both a report on social conditions and trends in the United States and a progress report on social indicators research. The volume is best understood against the background of the social indicators movement and of the research it has stimulated.

Several research traditions are joined together in the social indicators movement, but they share a concern for measurement, analysis, and the reporting to a general audience of aspects of social conditions. The tradition best reflected in *Social Indicators, 1976* stresses the monitoring and reporting of social change. Research work in this tradition emphasizes conceptual and methodological development of measures, improvements in the available data base, the development of social indicator models, and social reporting. In its data selection, treatment of data, organization, and commentary, *Social Indicators, 1976* is an improvement over its predecessor, *Social Indicators, 1973*, though the analysis it contains is notably insufficient. Most of the improvements which should be found in future editions depend upon continued progress in the development of social indicators.

Robert Parke, M.A., Washington, D.C., is Director of the Social Science Research Council's Center for Coordination of Research on Social Indicators. A de-

* This article draws on Eleanor Bernert Sheldon and Robert Parke, "Social Indicators," *Science 188* (May 1975), pp. 693–99. The views expressed are not necessarily those of the Social Science Research Council or its Center for Coordination of Research on Social Indicators. Preparation of this article was supported by Grant No SOC 74-07148 from the National Science Foundation.

mographer, he taught at Brown University and Muhlenberg College, served in the Population Division and as Program Planning Officer, U.S. Bureau of the Census, and was Deputy Director of the U.S. Commission on Population Growth and the American Future. He is Chairman of the Joint Ad Hoc Committee on Government Statistics and has published articles on demographic aspects of marriage and the family and on social indicators.

David Seidman, Ph.D., Washington, D.C., is a Staff Associate of the Social Science Research Council, at the Council's Center for Coordination of Research on Social Indicators. A political scientist, he taught at Princeton University and has published articles on social indicators, crime statistics, administrative structure, statistical methodology, and the regulation of pharmaceuticals.

IN THE 20 years between 1949 and 1969, median family income in the United States doubled and the Gross National Product more than doubled (in constant dollars). Yet the same period was marked by crime, drugs, racial unrest, demonstrations, the urban crisis, the discovery of environmental degradation, and the rediscovery of poverty in America. These events prompted doubts about the easy equation of economic growth and social progress and a widening sense that economic indicators alone no longer sufficed to measure that progress. Among social scientists and public administrators there arose a renewed interest in social measurement more broadly conceived. In the mid-1960s this interest emerged in the writings and speeches of social scientists, social commentators, and policymakers in the form of calls for the development of "social indicators," "social accounting," "social reporting," "measuring the quality of life," and "monitoring social change."

Impetus toward the development of social indicators was provided by a handful of social scientists and public administrators. Their enthusiasm elicited responses from economists, who saw a role for their skills as theorists and measurers of welfare, sociologists, who saw the relevance of their own research tradition in the measurement of social trends, political scientists, who sought ways to rationalize government programs, social workers, bureaucrats, and other researchers and practitioners. Their collective efforts came to be known as the "social indicators movement," an apt designation in that, as in other movements in their early stages, the participants were ill-defined as to membership, had little organization, and shared few specific objectives, but sensed great needs and opportunities for change and celebrated shared but necessarily ambiguous ideas.

Social Indicators, 1976, the subject of this special issue of THE ANNALS, is one of many concrete manifestations of the efforts to measure and report social change resulting from that movement. A brief review of the field of social indicators will serve to place *Social Indicators, 1976* in perspective.

SOCIAL INDICATORS

Many of the concerns of the social indicators movement are not new. An important precursor of much that is valuable in social indicators today is the work of William F. Ogburn, research director of President Hoover's Research Committee on Social Trends, which in 1933 pub-

lished the monumental *Recent Social Trends.*[1] Ogburn was fascinated by social change and committed to the application of social science to the elucidation of social trends and thus to the guidance of social planning. In 1929 he set forth his view of the significance of research on social trends:

> . . . there is a continuity in cultural change; one event grows out of another . . . the knowledge of what has occurred and of what is happening is the safest guide we have. With more complete statistics and with better measurement we shall obtain fuller knowledge of what is happening to us and where we are going. Only with these shall we be in a position even to begin to speak of control.[2]

The term "social indicators" became widespread following publication in 1966 of a book by that title edited by Raymond A. Bauer.[3] Seeking to find ways to assess the social impacts of the space program, Bauer brought together several prominent social scientists whose work came to be focused instead on broader questions of social measurements and their use in assessing the state of society relative to national goals. A chapter by Albert D. Biderman showed that pertinent statistical indicators were available for only about half of the goals identified by the President's Commission on National Goals in 1960. Bertram Gross's influential chapter on "Social Systems Accounting" called for the development of comprehensive models describing the structure and performance of entire social systems. Such models might serve to counter what Gross called the "new Philistinism," the tendency of hard measurements, usually in dollars, to dominate equally important, but softer, measurements.

In the same year, the President's Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress called for the development of a system of social accounts that "would give us a broader and more balanced reckoning of the meaning of social and economic progress . . . that would enable us to record not only the gains of social and economic change but the costs as well . . . ," and eventually might provide a "balance sheet" useful in "clarifying policy choices."[4] A proposal by (then) Senator Mondale for a council of social advisers and an annual social report from the President to Congress, contained in several versions of his "Full Opportunity and Social Accounting Act," likewise relied on this analogy to the national income accounts and their role in the policy process. In 1967, two issues of THE ANNALS were devoted to discussions of social indicators.[5]

These early documents present diverse views of what social indicators are or should be. But they share common themes: concern for the de-

1. President's Research Committee on Social Trends, *Recent Social Trends in the United States* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1933)

2. William F. Ogburn, "The Responsibility of the Social Sciences," in *William Ogburn on Culture and Social Change*, ed Otis Dudley Duncan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964), p. 101.

3. Raymond A. Bauer, ed., *Social Indicators* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966).

4. President's Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress, *Technology and the American Economy* (Washington, D.C: USGPO, 1966), quoted in Daniel Bell, "The Idea of a Social Report," *The Public Interest*, no. 15 (Spring 1969), p 78

5. Bertram M. Gross, ed., *Social Goals and Indicators for American Society,* vols. I and II; *The Annals* of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, vol. 371 (May 1967) and vol. 373 (September 1967).

velopment and use of statistics measuring the social state of the nation, emphasis on measures of noneconomic dimensions of well-being, and commitment to the idea that better social information will improve public policy.

These ideas were noticed throughout the federal government. Under the supervision of Assistant Secretary William Gorham and his successor, Alice Rivlin, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare produced *Toward a Social Report*,[6] an influential statement of the need for social indicators. Not a social report, but rather "an attempt, on the part of social scientists, to look at several important areas and digest what is known about progress toward generally accepted goals," the volume treated the areas of health, social mobility, the physical environment, income and poverty, public order and safety, and learning, science, and art. It was not a social report because, the authors said, the data needed for one did not then exist. For example, "We have measures of death and illness, but not measures of physical vigor or mental health. We have measures of the level and distribution of income, but no measures of the satisfaction that income brings."[7]

In outlining the need for social indicators in future reports, *Toward a Social Report* stressed the usefulness of statistics capable of being aggregated to allow diversity to be summarized into manageable form, and allowing disaggregation for purposes of more detailed analysis. It defined social indicators as "in all cases . . . direct measure[s] of welfare," and contrasted them with the more readily available measures of government expenditures and other "inputs" of various kinds (crime rates versus number of policemen, for example).[8] This distinction, roughly that between outputs and inputs, has been influential but controversial, because it is neither exhaustive nor unambiguous: the output of one social process is the input to another. Further, "direct measures of welfare" do not include many of the variables central to an understanding of social process. A broader definition of social indicators may be more useful.

The intellectual backgrounds of the participants in the social indicators movement are diverse. Not surprisingly, then, diverse types of work have been associated at one time or another with social indicators. The major research traditions are sketched briefly below.[9]

Evaluation research and social experimentation

Disappointment with the results of domestic social programs in the 1960s directed attention to the need for a more scientific approach to program testing and evaluation, as illustrated in the New Jersey Income Maintenance Experiment[10] and the evaluation of the Head Start Pro-

6. U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, *Toward a Social Report* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1969).

7. Ibid., p. xiv.

8. Ibid., p. 97.

9. A typology of work on social indicators is presented in Wolfgang Zapf, "Systems of Social Indicators: Current Approaches and Problems," *International Social Science Journal* 27, no. 3 (1975), pp. 479–98.

10. David Kershaw and Jerliyn Fair, *The New Jersey Income-Maintenance Experiment*. Vol. 1. *Operations, Surveys, and Administration* (New York: Academic Press, 1976); Harold W. Watts and Albert Rees, eds., *The New Jersey Income-Maintenance Experiment*. Vol. 2: Labor-Supply Responses (New York: Academic Press, 1977).

gram.[11] In early discussions of social indicators, it was suggested that they could be used as a basis for program evaluation. Donald T. Campbell has long advocated this position.[12] But social indicators research and evaluation research have increasingly diverged, and recent thinking emphasizes the need for experimental design in program evaluation.[13] Nor is the direct use of social indicators likely to be fruitful for evaluation in the absence of experimental design because of the difficulty of showing that specific government programs, rather than uncontrolled exogenous variables, determined the outcomes measured by indicators.

Net national welfare measurement

The image of the national income accounts lay behind *Toward a Social Report*. Mancur Olson, principal author of that document, has written, "for all their virtues, the national income statistics don't tell us what we need to know about the condition of American society. They leave out most of the things that make life worth living."[14] One response to this possible shortcoming of the national accounts is to make them more inclusive. Economists in the United States and Japan have experimented with adjustments to the accounts to improve their adequacy as measures of welfare. Nordhaus and Tobin have incorporated into GNP such things as the costs of pollution and the benefits of leisure, and other economists have proceeded along related lines.[15] While this has been an area of major social indicators activity, there are limits to what the national accounts can absorb. *Toward a Social Report* noted that "the goal of a grand and cosmic measure of all forms or aspects of welfare must be dismissed as impractical. . . ."[16] There may also be costs to treating social indicators work as concerned with what "the national accounts don't tell us." The approach may lead to viewing the "social" aspects of life as a homogeneous residual category consisting of whatever is outside the realm of economics. In fact, of course, the economy is but one part of a complex society whose other parts—the educational system, the political system, or the family, for example—differ one from another as much as they differ from the economic system. They must be under-

11. Lois-ellin Datta, "Design of the Head Start Planned Variation Experiment," pp. 79–100; Marshall S. Smith, "Evaluation Findings in Head Start Planned Variation," pp. 101–12; and Carol Van Deusen Lukas, "Problems in Implementing Head Start Planned Variation Models," pp. 113–26, in *Planned Variation in Education: Should We Give Up or Try Harder?*, eds. Alice M Rivlin and P. Michael Timpane (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975).

12. Donald T. Campbell, "Focal Local Indicators for Social Program Evaluation," *Social Indicators Research* 3 (September 1976), pp. 237–56.

13. Alice M. Rivlin, *Systematic Thinking for Social Action* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971); Henry W. Riecken and Robert F. Boruch, *Social Experimentation: A Method for Planning and Evaluating Social Intervention* (New York: Academic Press, 1974).

14. Mancur Olson, "The Plan and Purpose of a Social Report," *The Public Interest*, no. 15 (Spring 1969), p. 86

15. Economic Council of Japan, NNW Measurement Committee, *Measuring New National Welfare of Japan* (Tokyo: Economic Council of Japan, 1973); William D. Nordhaus and James Tobin, "Is Growth Obsolete?," in *The Measurement of Economic and Social Performance*, ed. Milton Moss (New York: NBER, 1973), pp. 509–31; National Bureau of Economic Research, *Annual Report, 1975* (New York: NBER, 1975), pp. 14–23.

16. U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, *Toward a Social Report*, p 99.

stood on their own terms, and not simply viewed as "the rest."

National goals accounting

An early concern of some social indicators theorists was measurement and analysis of the achievement of national goals. Work in this tradition takes the form of national goals accounting—attempts to give explicit definition to national goals and priorities, to estimate progress towards the achievement of these goals, and to measure the cost of further achievement. Nestor E. Terleckyj, whose work is the principal current exemplar of this tradition, has developed a framework for estimating the possibilities for planned improvement in the quality of life in the United States. It includes (1) identification of social concerns and of indicators to measure relevant conditions; (2) projection of baseline trends in these conditions and in resources potentially available for altering them; (3) identification of the costs and effects of discretionary programmatic activities affecting social conditions; and (4) calculation of the maximum feasible impact of combinations of discretionary activities that can be undertaken, given resource constraints, taking into account multiple consequences of programs, nonadditivity of effects, and other complications. Estimates to date are highly tentative, in large measure because of data limitations. Following the publication in 1975 of Terleckyj's *Improvements in the Quality of Life: Estimates of Possibilities in the United States, 1974–1983,*[17] a consortium was organized to pursue related work.

Measurement of social change

A broader view of social indicators, advocated by many leading theorists and practitioners, sees the task as one of social measurement and analysis designed to improve our understanding of what the main features of society are, how they are interrelated, and how these features and their relationships change. Otis Dudley Duncan states the case well:

> What we must have, minimally, are quantitative statements about social conditions and social processes, repeatedly available through time, the reliability and validity of which are competently assessed and meet minimal standards. If such statements—"social measurements"—can be organized into accounts . . . so much the better. If some combination of measurements or quantities derived from elementary magnitudes can be shown to serve a clear interpretive purpose as "indicators," so much the better. As accounting schemes, models of social processes, and indicators are developed and tested, our idea of what to measure will, of course, change. But that does not alter the principle that the basic ingredients are the measurements themselves. We are talking about information, the processing of information, and the reporting of processed information.[18]

This view of social indicators has its roots in Ogburn's work and has been prominent since the early days of the social indicators movement. Social indicators as measures of changes in social conditions had

17. Nester E. Terleckyj, *Improvements in the Quality of Life. Estimates of Possibilities in the United States, 1974–1983* (Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, 1975).

18. Otis Dudley Duncan, quoted in Eleanor Bernert Sheldon, "Social Reporting for the 1970's," in *Federal Statistics*, Report of the President's Commission on Federal Statistics (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1971), vol. 2, p. 430.

been discussed in Biderman's essay in the Bauer book[19] and in a few of the papers in the 1967 volumes of THE ANNALS.[20] Detailed reviews of conceptual and measurement problems in the delineation of demographic, social structural, and other types of change in the United States appeared in the late 1960s in work edited by Eleanor Bernert Sheldon and Wilbert E. Moore, and in other work sponsored by the Russell Sage Foundation.[21] These reviews, dealing with hard data, were followed in 1972 by similar treatments of subjective data on public aspirations, expectations, and satisfactions, which appeared in a volume edited by Angus Campbell and Philip E. Converse.[22]

Given the view of the social indicators enterprise as the measurement of social conditions and social change, development of the data base, and the development of social work toward the definition of measures of social conditions and social change, development of the data base, and the development of social indicator models. Social reporting is a fourth major task, implied not by the view of social indicators as the measurement of social change, but rather by the belief that one of the purposes of social indicators is to contribute to public enlightenment.

Conceptual and methodological development of measures

Social indicators work must extend to topics for which measures are now either inadequate or nonexistent, and so considerable attention is being paid to the development of new measures. Efforts to develop subjective measures of the quality of life, a topic central to the concerns of many social indicators researchers, are illustrative. Pioneering work in this area by Campbell and Converse[23] was followed by a study by Frank M. Andrews and Stephen B. Withey, who reported progress toward the development of "a rational empirical basis for measuring perceived quality of life."[24]

Recently, Campbell, Converse, and Willard L. Rodgers have published a major new work on measuring perceptions and assessments of the quality of life, in which they report the results of another survey-based investigation of perceived satisfaction, this one designed to

19. Albert D. Biderman, "Social Indicators and Goals," in Bauer, ed., *Social Indicators*, pp. 68–153.

20. Gross, ed., *The Annals*, vol. 371 and vol 373

21. Eleanor Bernert Sheldon and Wilbert E. Moore, eds., *Indicators of Social Change. Concepts and Measurements* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969), Abbott Ferriss, *Indicators of Trends in American Education* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969); *Indicators of Change in the American Family* (New York. Russell Sage Foundation, 1970), and *Indicators of Trends in the Status of American Women* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1971). An outline of a program for monitoring social change was given in Sheldon and Moore, "Toward the Measurement of Social Change: Implications for Progress," in *Economic Progress and Social Welfare*, ed. Leonard H. Goodman (New York: Columbia University Press, 1966).

22. Angus Campbell and Philip E. Converse, eds., *The Human Meaning of Social Change* (New York. Russell Sage Foundation, 1972).

23. Ibid.

24. Frank M. Andrews and Stephen B. Withey, "Developing Measures of Perceived Life Quality. Results from Several National Surveys," *Social Indicators Research* 1 (May 1974), p. 24; see also Frank M. Andrews and Stephen B. Withey, *Social Indicators of Well-Being: Americans' Perceptions of Their Life Quality* (New York: Plenum Press, 1976).

serve as a baseline for trend studies.[25] The authors carefully consider the relationship between satisfaction in various domains and more global life satisfaction and examine the relation between objective conditions and subjective satisfactions. If, as Campbell suggests, "the quality of life lies in the experience of life,"[26] further developmental work will be required along similar lines. Such work is being done in a series of Canadian surveys by the Institute for Behavioural Research of York University, Toronto,[27] and in comparative studies of well-being based on surveys taken in various countries.[28]

Data development

While social indicators work requires data of many kinds, many of the necessary data come from sample surveys. Much of the developmental work, therefore, has been devoted to new surveys, to increasing the utility of old surveys through replication, and to making existing surveys more accessible for analysis.

New Surveys. In recent years, the federal government has begun major new survey programs which produce new kinds of data particularly suitable for social indicators purposes. For example, our knowledge of the levels and trends of crime in the United States has traditionally come from data on crimes reported to the police and by them to the Federal Bureau of Investigation for publication in the *Uniform Crime Reports*. But many crimes are not reported to the police, with the percentage of unreported crime varying widely for different types of crime; and police recording procedures are not always uniform. Furthermore, administrative records of this kind do not reveal much about the nature of public experience with crime, the experience of victimization. In recent years the National Crime Survey,[29] a continuing program which each month asks respondents in 10,000 households around the United States about their experiences as victims of crime, has been conducted by the Bureau of the Census for the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the Department of Justice. Analyses of the resulting data, as recommended by a National Research Council panel,[30] should substantially increase our under-

25 Angus Campbell, Philip E Converse, and Willard L. Rodgers, *The Quality of American Life: Perceptions, Evaluations and Satisfactions* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1976).

26. Angus Campbell, "Subjective Measures of Well-Being" (Paper presented at the Joint Seminar on Subjective Measures of the Quality of Life, sponsored by the Social Science Research Councils of the United States and Great Britain, Cambridge, England, September 1975), see also his "Poor Measurement of the Right Thing" (Paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Statistical Association, Chicago, August 1977).

27. Tom Atkinson, "Is Satisfaction a Good Measure of the Perceived Quality of Life?" (Paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Statistical Association, Chicago, August 1977).

28. Frank M. Andrews and Ronald F. Inglehart, "The Structure of Subjective Well-Being in Nine Western Societies" (Paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Statistical Association, Chicago, August 1977).

29 U.S. National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service, *Criminal Victimization in the United States: A National Crime Panel Survey Report* (issued irregularly). Other periodic publications of the National Crime Panel Survey report on victimization rates in selected cities.

30. National Research Council Panel for the Evaluation of Crime Surveys, *Surveying Crime*, Betty K. Eidson Penick, ed., Maurice E. B. Owens III, assoc. ed. (Washington D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1976)

standing of the social reality of crime as well as of changes in the level of crime in society.

A similar concern for the experiences of individuals is in part responsible for the National Assessment of Educational Progress.[31] For years we have had abundant data on school attendance, school years completed, teacher-pupil ratios, bonded indebtedness of school districts, and the like. But who knew how much the children were learning? The National Assessment now provides this information, obtained by periodically administering a series of tests to probability samples of school children aged 9, 13, and 17, and of young adults and school dropouts. Changes in performance in such tests can tell us about overall changes in how much the students are learning.

The Annual Housing Survey,[32] conducted by the Census Bureau for the Department of Housing and Urban Development, devotes a major fraction of its interviewing effort to investigating how people feel about their housing and neighborhood, in addition to finding out about matters more traditionally investigated, such as structural and financial characteristics of housing. With this survey, we now have a means for learning, on a regular basis, how individuals themselves assess their residential environments.

Replication. Although new data sources such as these promise to improve the measurement of social change in the future, other means must be devised to measure past and current changes. Investigators have therefore adopted a strategy which Duncan calls "replication of baseline studies"[33]—the faithful repetition of important earlier surveys or of questions from earlier surveys. Duncan's own work has illustrated this approach: in 1971, at his request, the Detroit Area Study re-asked a number of survey questions originally asked in the 1950s. The results provide data on changes in the division of responsibility within families, racial attitudes of both whites and blacks, religious participation of the population, and school participation.[34] The General Social Survey of the National Opinion Research Center[35] uses periodic surveys to repeat questions selected from those asked in national surveys extending back to the early 1950s, thereby producing trend information on many significant aspects of the society. Perhaps the most notable example of this technique is the 1973 replication of the 1962 Survey of Occupational Changes in a Generation,[36] conducted by the

31. *Questions and Answers about the National Assessment of Educational Progress* (Denver: Education Commission of the States, June 1974), (National Assessment) *General Information Yearbook* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, annual).

32. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Housing Reports* (Series H–150); for occupants' subjective assessments of housing conditions, see *Indicators of Housing and Neighborhood Quality*, Annual Housing Report Series H–150–73B (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1975).

33. Otis Dudley Duncan, *Toward Social Reporting: Next Steps* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969)

34. Otis Dudley Duncan, Howard Schuman, and Beverly Duncan, *Social Change in a Metropolitan Community* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1973).

35. National Opinion Research Center, *The NORC General Social Survey, Questions and Answers* (Chicago: March 1973).

36. David L. Featherman and Robert M. Hauser, "Design for a Replicate Study of Social Mobility in the United States," in *Social Indicator Models*, ed. Kenneth C. Land and Seymour Spilerman (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1975), pp. 219–51, Featherman and Hauser, "Changes in the Socioeconomic Stratification of the Races, 1962–

Census Bureau for Robert M. Hauser and David L. Featherman. It will result in measures, embedded in models, of trends in inequality of opportunity in the United States and the factors responsible for it.

Access to Data. Many existing data sets could be used for social indicators analysis if they were more readily available to researchers. The archives of the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research provide a useful model of data accessibility.[37] A National Science Foundation grant will permit the existing files of the Current Population Survey to become more readily available for analysis, and a proposal for reconstructing public use samples from the 1940 and 1950 decennial censuses is under consideration.[38] Under a grant from Russell Sage Foundation, the Social Science Research Council's Center for Coordination of Research on Social Indicators, in cooperation with the Roper Public Opinion Research Center, produced an index to repeated questions in the Roper Center's archives, in order to facilitate social indicators uses of the data from early surveys.[39]

Development of models

This emphasis on data may leave the impression that the point of social indicators work is the production of masses of social statistics and nothing more, but this is not correct. Kenneth C. Land would require that the social statistics be placed and interpreted in the context of theories and models: "I propose that the term social indicators refer to social statistics that . . . are components in a social system model (including socio-psychological, economic, demographic, and ecological) or of some particular segment or process thereof. . . . The important point is that the criterion for classifying a social statistic as an indicator is its *informative value* which derives from its empirically verified nexus in a conceptualization of a social process."[40] A less

---

73," *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (November 1976), pp. 621–51.

37. Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research, *Guide to Resources and Services, 1976–1977* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Institute for Social Research, 1976). There is a vast literature drawing on the resources of the ICPSR. A recent example, which validates certain of the data as measures of political alienation, is James S. House and William M. Mason, "Political Alienation in America, 1952–1968," *American Sociological Review* 40 (April 1975), pp 123–47.

38. "Planning, Pretesting, and Monitoring Production of Public Use Sample Files from the 1940 and 1950 Censuses of Population" (Proposal to the National Science Foundation from the University of Wisconsin. Co-principal investigators: Halliman H. Winsborough, Karl E. Taeuber, and Robert M. Hauser [January 1, 1977–December 30, 1980]); "Reconstructing, Redocumenting, Restructuring, and Archiving March Current Population Surveys from 1960 Forward" (Proposal to the National Science Foundation from the University of Michigan. Principal investigator: William M. Mason [Starting date. September 1, 1977]); and William M. Mason, Karl E. Taeuber, and Halliman H. Winsborough, eds., "Old Data for New Research" (Report of a Workshop on Research Opportunities and Issues in the Design and Construction of Public Use Samples from the 1940 and 1950 Censuses and from Current Population Surveys from 1960 forward, held in Madison, Wisconsin, June 28–30, 1976. Madison: University of Wisconsin Center for Demography and Ecology, October 1976).

39. Philip K. Hastings and Jessie C. Southwick, eds., *Survey Data for Trend Analysis: An Index to Repeated Questions in U.S. National Surveys Held by the Roper Public Opinion Research Center* (Williamstown, Mass.: The Roper Public Opinion Research Center, in cooperation with the Social Science Research Council, 1975).

40. Kenneth C. Land, "On the Definition of Social Indicators, *American Sociologist* 6 (November 1971), pp. 322–25.

formal statement would be that the transformation of social statistics into social indicators requires the development of greater understanding of the meaning of changes in indicators and a selectivity—inspired by theory and analysis—which reduces the mass of social statistics to a structured set of series and ultimately to a smaller number of important series worth monitoring. On either view, the development of analytic models is central to the social indicators enterprise.

Land's own work on an aggregate model of the American social process[41] illustrates this aspect of social indicators work. An example of social indicators modeling and analysis work, using crime data, has recently been published by Land and Marcus Felson.[42] Path analytic models of occupational mobility, as developed by Peter Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan, are another.[43] Further examples can be found in *Social Indicator Models*.[44]

A modeling approach closely linked to the notion of social accounting has been developed by Richard Stone under the auspices of the United Nations Statistical Office and the Conference of European Statisticians.[45] Stone's work applies notions of input-output analysis to the description of the processes by which people move into and out of various significant social states. The scheme is both a way of organizing data and an approach to analysis, particularly in a life cycle framework. Coleman has applied related models to a study of the achievement of occupational status by blacks.[46]

SOCIAL REPORTING

The full value of social indicators will not be realized if the results of data collection and analysis remain known only to professional social scientists, technical specialists, and other cognoscenti. Since Ogburn's time, social reporting has been central to social indicators work. In recent years, at least 29 nations have issued or have in preparation statistical compliations which in some sense are social indicators reports.[47] *Social Indicators, 1976*, like its pred-

41 Kenneth C. Land and Marcus Felson, "Towards a Macro Social Indicator Model of American Society, 1947–1974" (Paper presented at the Annual Meetings of the American Sociological Association, San Francisco, August 25–29, 1975).

42. Kenneth C. Land and Marcus Felson, "A General Framework for Building Dynamic Macro Social Indicator Models: Including an Analysis of Changes in Crime Rates and Police Expenditures," *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (November 1976), pp. 565–604.

43. Peter M. Blau and Otis Dudley Duncan, *The American Occupational Structure* (New York: Wiley, 1967).

44. Kenneth C. Land and Seymour Spilerman, eds., *Social Indicator Models* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1975).

45 United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *Towards a System of Social and Economic Statistics*, Studies in Methods Series F, no. 18 (New York: United Nations, 1975), Richard Stone, "Transition and Admission Models in Social Indicator Analysis," in Land and Spilerman, eds., *Social Indicator Models*, pp. 253–300.

46. James S. Coleman, "Analysis of Occupational Mobility by Models of Occupational Flow," in Land and Spilerman, eds., *Social Indicator Models*, pp. 319–34.

47. United Nations Statistical Office, *Report on National Practices and Plans in Reporting Statistics of Levels of Living*, March 1, 1976, document ESA/STAT/AC.4/2. The list of country reports is reproduced in the introduction to *Social Indicators, 1976*. Overviews of social indicators work in several European countries are presented in articles by Stein Ringen, "Social Indicators Research in Nordic Countries," (March 1976) and Wolfgang Zapf, "International, Public, and Private Actors in Social Reporting," (September 1976), in *Social Indicators Newsletter*.

ecessor volume, *Social Indicators, 1973*,[48] is the American equivalent, produced by the Office of Management and Budget. Numerous more narrowly focused efforts have also appeared: the National Science Board produces a biennial, *Science Indicators*; the Department of Housing and Urban Development, an annual report on *Indicators of Housing and Neighborhood Quality*; the National Center for Health Statistics, *Health: United States*; and the National Center for Education Statistics, an annual report on the *Condition of Education*. *STATUS*, published from July to October 1976 by the Bureau of the Census and the Office of Management and Budget, was a short-lived experiment with monthly social reporting. All these reports are government products, but such reports are also produced in the private sector, an excellent example of the latter being a recent report about West Germany.[49]

The social reporting process has been the subject of much analysis and comment. The Social Science Research Council's Center for Coordination of Research on Social Indicators organized a critical review of *Social Indicators, 1973*,[50] and Statistics Canada organized a symposium on its social indicators report, *Perspective Canada*. There have been several sessions at mee ings of academic professional soci ties devoted to commentary on tl various American social indicat reports.[51] The National Scien Foundation's program of resear support for social indicators h funded a project designed to ii prove graphical presentation aı communication of statistical infc mation,[52] and has provided parti support for the publication of th volume of THE ANNALS.

Social Indicators, 1976

The publication with which th special issue of THE ANNALS concerned, *Social Indicators, 197* is a report on "current social conc tions and trends in the Unite States," and most of this volume devoted to discussion of conditio and trends. But *Social Indicatoı 1976* may also be viewed as an inc cator of current conditions and tren in social indicator reporting an to an extent, of the state of soci indicators. We will examine it fro this perspective, though we a handicapped by not having seen tl final version, but only the table contents, the introductory materi: and two chapters in draft.

Social Indicators, 1976 is typic of government social indicators r ports in that it consists mainly tabular or graphical displays standard social statistics, with mir

48 U.S. Office of Management and Budget, *Social Indicators, 1973* (Washington, D.C.. USGPO, 1974).

49. Eike Ballerstedt und Wolfgang Glatzer, unter Mitwirkung von Karl-Ulrich Mayer und Wolfgang Zapf, *Sociologischer Almanach. Handbuch Gesellschaftspolitischer Daten und Indikatoren für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland* (Frankfurt: Herder and Herder, 1975).

50. Roxann A. Van Dusen, ed., *Social Indicators 1973: A Review Symposium* (New York: Social Science Research Council, 1974).

51. The most recent example is a sessi on social indicators, chaired by Abb Ferriss, at the 1977 Annual Meetings of t American Sociological Association held Chicago in September 1977. The pape reviewed *Health United States, 1975, T Condition of Education, 1976, Science In cators, 1974*, and the criminal justice chapt of *Social Indicators, 1976*.

52. Barry M. Fienberg and Carolyn Franklin, eds. *Social Graphics Bibliograp* (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Social Scien Research, 1975).

mal commentary. The questions to be considered are the adequacy of the data selection, the appropriateness of the treatment of the data, the usefulness of the overall organization, and the sufficiency of the commentary.

Data Selection. Like its predecessor, *Social Indicators, 1976* relies mainly on standard statistical products of the federal government. But as Otis Dudley Duncan noted, the 1973 volume also drew extensively on data that were either nonfederal, nonstandard, or both.[53] The new volume continues and extends this practice, drawing on the results of social science research, for example the Michigan research on subjective perceptions of the quality of life (Introduction), the General Social Survey data on attitudes toward marriage and divorce (chapter 2), James N. Morgan's longitudinal studies of poverty (chapter 8), John Robinson's data on time use (chapter 10), and the measures developed by Robert M. Hauser and David L. Featherman of trends in occupational mobility in the United States (chapter 11).

The new volume has a less constricted focus than its predecessor. *Social Indicators, 1973* selected data according to two main criteria: "That the indicators measure individual and family (rather than institutional or governmental) well-being and that they measure end products of, rather than inputs into, social systems." The volume was "restricted almost entirely to data about objective conditions."[54] *Social Indicators, 1976,* however, incorporates limited data on "system performance" and takes advantage of the increased availability of data on public perceptions.

These are encouraging developments, and they are perhaps in part attributable to a subtle shift in the definition of social indicators which has occurred between *Social Indicators, 1973* and *Social Indicators, 1976.* In the earlier volume, the notion of indicators was explicitly linked to that of "social objectives": "Ideally . . . an indicator would reveal . . . the status of the population in relation to a perceived social objective. . . ."[55] This parallels the idea of indicators as "direct measure[s] of welfare" found in *Toward a Social Report*, and it raises some difficult questions. For example, does a rising divorce rate move us closer to or further from a social objective? Divorce, after all, "may be an undesirable disruption in the continuity of development for the child of the marriage while it signifies the freedom of the spouses to terminate an unrewarding relationship."[56] *Social Indicators, 1976* removes the constraint of direct normative relevance and defines indicators simply as "statistics or statistical measures . . . which indicate the general status of the population with respect to certain aspects" of "certain topics of broad social interest. . . ." It has therefore become legitimate to include a broader range of statistical material concerning social conditions and trends.

Treatment of Data. To the professional social scientist, the language of tables and charts is familiar and easily understood, but this re-

53. Otis Dudley Duncan, "Developing Social Indicators," *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences* 71 (December 1974), pp 5096–5102.

54. U.S. Office of Management and Budget, *Social Indicators, 1973*, p. xiii.

55 Ibid.

56. Otis Dudley Duncan, "Social Indicators, 1973: Report on a Conference," in Van Dusen, ed., *SI'73: Review Symposium*, p. 9.

port is intended for a broader audience. *Social Indicators, 1976*, unlike its predecessor, contains a useful section on how to read statistical tables and charts. It also provides considerably more discussion of problems of data quality and their implications for interpretation of data than did the earlier volume. This is progress, but we are still a long way from the "detailed discussion of the error structure associated with each of the indicators reported" advocated by Stephen E. Fienberg and Leo A. Goodman.[57]

Many of the indicators in *Social Indicators, 1976* are highly aggregated, referring to the entire population. Understanding of social conditions is increased when the data are disaggregated by characteristics of the population. Like its predecessor, and like American governmental statistical reports generally, *Social Indicators, 1976* disaggregates most frequently by age, sex, and color, and rarely in any other way. Natalie Rogoff Ramsøy[58] has noted that this practice contrasts with that of European reports, which frequently disaggregate data by some indicator of socioeconomic status as well—social class, social group, or occupation. The difference, as she points out, has consequences. Color and sex are relatively immutable characteristics of individuals, and age changes only at its own pace, beyond the reach of human intervention. The categories of disaggregation used by the Europeans, in contrast, embody the structural features of a society and invite speculation on "how things might be different if structural features of society were to change—occupational distributions, the relative positions of diverse occupational categories, productivity or prestige differentials, and so on."[59] Dynamics that work through the changing social definitions of fixed biological characteristics are less easy to visualize when examining charts and tables.

The choice of categories for disaggregation was determined not by the predilections of the editor of *SI, 76*, but rather by the normal operations of the federal statistical system, and it is to that system that calls for change must be addressed. If the claim to be working toward a system of social indicators announced in *Social Indicators, 1973* means anything, surely it suggests the desirability of altering standard statistical practice so as to incorporate disaggregations that tell us more than the current ones do about the nature of the society, how it has changed, and how it might be different in the future.

Overall Organization. Social Indicators, 1976 follows the by now conventional practice of national social indicator reports of dividing the full array of social conditions into a number of different "major social areas." With minor differences in titles, all the chapters of *Social Indicators, 1973* appear again, and there are three additions: the family, social security and welfare, and social mobility and participation. The additions, perhaps a result of the altered definition of social indicators, are to be applauded. But the conventional mode of organization, with chapters for the most part reflecting the policy

57. Stephen E. Fienberg and Leo A. Goodman, "Statistical Considerations," in Van Dusen, ed., *SI'73: Review Symposium*, p. 82.

58. Natalie Rogoff Ramsøy, "Social Indicators in the United States and Europe: Comments on Five Country Reports," in Van Dusen, ed., *SI'73. Review Symposium*, p. 47.

59. Ibid.

concerns and even the functional organization of governments, has its limitations even when so expanded. It serves to provide useful information in categories we are all used to. But it does not help us to develop understanding of social process, alert us to relationships across social areas, or introduce us to new concepts. Perhaps alternative organizational schemes for social indicators reports should be considered.

Within social areas, indicators have been organized by "social concerns," so that the volume has a residue of normative flavor and a sense of policy relatedness. The focus on social concerns presents some difficulties. Some social concerns are no doubt continuing, but others come and go. What is salient today may not be so next year, and vice versa. If only statistics related to current social concerns are reported, emerging problems that are likely to become matters of social concern may remain invisible until too late. A volume organized around social concerns will slight matters which either are not subject to policy manipulation or are not yet matters of concern, but which are important to an understanding of social process and change. Again, the method of organization is convenient, conventional, and useful. But it would be worth considering some alternatives.

Commentary. A study of the use of *Social Indicators, 1973* by federal executives found that "Practically all respondents stated that the SI'73 information was stark . . . and that the report needed commentary and interpretation to increase its usefulness. . . ."[60] *Social Indicators, 1976* gives the reader more guidance than did the earlier volume. There are now brief chapter introductions which comment on inadequacies in the data, offer cautions on interpretation, and provide limited summaries of findings. And the reader who wishes to pursue matters further is referred to a list of references.

What *Social Indicators, 1976* does not do is go beyond general descriptions of data characteristics and limitations to draw specific conclusions about the trend evidence; explain why a series behaves as it does, and how this knowledge affects interpretation; highlight important relationships among series; and suggest the consequences that may reasonably be attributable to changes in a series. Data rarely speak for themselves, and this volume of THE ANNALS has been prepared in explicit recognition of this fact. But it is awkward to so separate data and analysis; *Social Indicators, 1976* would be a more useful volume if it contained more than the very limited text it now contains.

Improving social reporting

While *Social Indicators, 1976* is a useful and important publication, future social indicator reports should be better. Two kinds of developments must occur if we are to have better reports in the future.

First, there must be further development of social indicators. As the discussions in this volume make clear, we do not now have all the data required for description and analysis of important aspects of

60. Nathan Caplan and Eugenia Barton, "Social Indicators 1973: A Study of the Relationship Between the Power of Information and Utilization by Federal Executives," mimeographed (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Institute for Social Research, 1976), pp. 22–23.

social conditions and trends. New data are necessary. Beyond that, however, social statistics must be transformed into good social indicators, through analysis, modeling, and use of the data. What is needed is the scientific work that alone can produce the infrastructure of consensual meaning about particular series that makes their presentation a self-evident necessity and their behavior over time laden with meaning for other related aspects of the society.

Second, there must be further development of the process of social reporting. *Social Indicators, 1976* represents the conventional format, and we have sketched its inadequacies. Two should be emphasized: First, the tables and charts of the conventional format do not communicate a scientific understanding of social change; there must be experimentation with ways of communicating the results of social scientific research on these matters to a broad audience; second, the overall organization of such volumes may not be ideal. There should be further experimentation with alternative forms of organization—forms which reflect a social scientific understanding of society rather than the administrative organization of government, and which link, rather than compartmentalize, social areas.

CONCLUSION

Considerable progress has been made since the mid-1960s toward achieving the diverse goals of the social indicators movement. The contrast between the statement of needs in *Toward a Social Report* and the solid accomplishments of *Social Indicators, 1976*, particularly when the latter volume is read together with this special issue of THE ANNALS, makes clear just how far we have come. But it should not be expected that we could move, in a single decade, from calls for a system of social indicators which would accomplish for the broad spectrum of social life more or less what economic indicators have accomplished for that relatively narrow area of the society, to the full blown operation of such a system. As de Neufville notes, the development of social indicators is a far more lengthy and complex process than many who advocate new indicators recognize.[61]

Social Indicators, 1976, then, is a progress report on both American society and the development of social indicators and social reporting. Both have a long way to go.

61. Judith Innes de Neufville, *Social Indicators and Public Policy: Interactive Processes of Design and Application* (New York: Elsevier, 1975), p. 10.

Table H
FEELINGS ABOUT PRESENT LIFE: 1971


Range of Feelings	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	Total	Mean	N
Boring to interesting	2%	2	6	16	17	21	36	100%	5.52	2151
Miserable to enjoyable	1%	1	4	13	16	27	38	100%	5.74	2147
Hard to easy	8%	7	11	29	15	13	17	100%	4.43	2149
Useless to worthwhile	2%	2	3	10	13	24	46	100%	5.87	2146
Lonely to friendly	3%	2	4	10	11	21	49	100%	5.85	2144
Empty to full	1%	2	4	12	15	22	44	100%	5.79	2143
Discouraging to hopeful	3%	2	3	11	13	23	45	100%	5.77	2146
Tied down to free	5%	4	6	17	12	20	36	100%	5.31	2148
Disappointing to rewarding	3%	2	4	13	16	25	37	100%	5.60	2148
Doesn't give me much chance to brings out the best in me	3%	3	6	21	18	23	26	100%	5.18	2147

Source: Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, and Willard L. Rodgers, *The Quality of American Life*, New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1976, table 2-2, p. 38, (c) used by permission.

Note: Respondents were asked to check one of a row of seven boxes between each adjective pair. The percent checking either of the two boxes nearest the left-hand adjective are so classified; those checking either of the two boxes nearest the right-hand adjective are so classified; those checking any of the three middle boxes were classified in the "in between" category.

Chart H — Social Indicators, 1976—Introduction

FEELINGS ABOUT PRESENT LIFE, 1971



Source: see table H

Table K
MEANS AND DISTRIBUTIONS ON IMPORTANCE RATINGS OF DOMAINS, 1971


	Total	Extremely important 1	Very important 2	Quite important 3	Somewhat important 4	Not at all important 5	Mean	Proportion naming this as one of two most important domains
Being in good health and in good physical condition	100%	70%	24%	5%	1%	—%	1 37	35%
A happy marriage	100	74	17	3	2	4	1 44	55
A good family life—having family members you can enjoy being with	100	67	24	6	2	1	1.46	36
A good country to live in—a country with a good government	100	62	26	8	3	1	1.54	17
Having good friends, and the right number of friends	100	34	36	19	10	1	2 08	6
A house or apartment that you like to live in	100	35	34	19	10	2	2.10	8
An interesting job	100	38	32	13	7	10	2 19	9
A city or place where you like to live	100	28	40	20	9	3	2.21	3
Having a strong religious faith	100	38	22	16	16	8	2 35	23
Things you like to do when you are not working—hobbies, and things like that	100	14	28	28	25	5	2 79	2
A large bank account, so that you don't have to worry about money	100	16	19	17	30	8	2 94	6
Organizations you want to belong to	100%	3%	8%	13%	35%	41%	4 01	—%

Source: Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, and Willard L. Rodgers, *The Quality of American Life: Perceptions, Evaluations, and Satisfactions*, table 3–4, (c) 1976 by Russell Sage Foundation, New York, used by permission.

— Represents zero.

Chart K | Social Indicators, 1976—Introduction

Importance Ratings of Domains: 1971



Source: see table K


Table U
ESTIMATED POPULATION AND PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP), MID-1973 AND PER CAPITA ENERGY CONSUMPTION, 1972, SELECTED COUNTRIES

Region and country		Population (mid-1973) in 1,000's	Per capita G.N.P. (mid-1973) (U.S. $)	Per capita energy consumption (1972)[1]
AFRICA	Nigeria	71,262	$ 210	66
	Egypt	35,619	250	324
	Ethiopia	26,550	90	35
	South Africa	24,265	1,050	2,770
	Zaire	23,438	140	86
ASIA	China	811,350	270	567
	India	581,911	120	186
	Indonesia	124,415	130	133
	Japan	108,350	3,630	3,251
	Bangladesh	74,000	80	32
	Pakistan	66,230	120	158
	Philippines	40,219	280	311
	Thailand	39,400	270	305
	S. Korea	32,905	400	827
	Iran	32,136	870	954
EUROPE	U.S.S.R.	249,750	2,030	4,767
	Germany (Fed. Rep.)	61,970	5,320	5,396
	United Kingdom	56,000	3,060	5,398
	Italy	54,890	2,450	2,796
	France	52,160	4,540	4,153
	Turkey	37,930	600	564
	Spain	34,740	1,710	1,765
	Poland	33,360	2,090	4,556
	Yugoslavia	20,960	1,060	1,610
	Hungary	10,430	1,850	3,279
	Greece	8,930	1,870	1,607
	Sweden	8,140	5,910	5,739
N AMERICA	United States	210,400	6,200	11,611
	Canada	22,130	5,450	10,757
L AMERICA	Brzail	101,051	760	532
	Mexico	56,047	890	1,318
	Argentina	24,282	1,640	1,728
	Colombia	22,500	440	610
OCEANIA	Australia	13,130	4,350	5,701
	New Zealand	2,960	3,680	2,887
	Papua, New Guinea	2,596	410	188

Source: World Bank, *World Bank Atlas, 1975* (for population and per capita GNP); The Environmental Fund, *World Population Estimates, 1975* (for per capita energy consumption).
[1] Quantities of energy consumption are in kilograms of coal equivalent. Data from United Nations *Statistical Yearbook, 1973*, table 137, (c) used by permission.

Chart U

ESTIMATED PER CAPITA GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT (GNP) AND PER CAPITA ENERGY CONSUMPTION, SELECTED COUNTRIES, 1972–1973



Source: see table U

ANNALS, AAPSS, 435, Jan. 1978

Getting and Spending

By SHELDON H. DANZIGER AND ROBERT J. LAMPMAN

ABSTRACT: The selected time series on income and consumption appear to give a clear picture of postwar change along the following lines: family incomes have grown substantially; consumption patterns have shifted away from necessities; income inequality has not increased; and poverty and intergroup income differences have declined. However, the broad indicators on which these conclusions are based do not illuminate the processes by which income is generated, consumption is shared, and costs are borne. The authors raise a set of questions related to the measurement and interpretation of the indicators. The answers to these questions suggest that a time series does not speak for itself and that a careful analysis of postwar changes awaits specification of the socioeconomic processes that generate the indicators.

Sheldon H. Danziger is Assistant Professor of Social Work at the University of Wisconsin-Madison where he is also a Research Associate of the Institute for Research on Poverty. His primary fields of research are the distribution of income, human resources, and public finance. His recent articles have analyzed the effects of government programs on the trend in poverty and income inequality.

Robert J. Lampman is Vilas Professor of Economics at the University of Wisconsin-Madison where he is also a Fellow of the Institute for Research on Poverty. He is the author of The Share of Top Wealth-holders in National Wealth *and* Ends and Means of Reducing Income Poverty. *He has also been a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research and a staff member of the Council of Economic Advisers.*

MOST presentations of social indicators put special emphasis on total money income received, and consumption outlays made, by households. This information about income and consumption constitutes the major overlap of social accounts and national economic accounts.

FIRST IMPRESSIONS

On first reading, the selected series on income and consumption seem to give a clear picture of postwar change along the following lines.

1. The median total money income, adjusted for inflation, rose by 88 percent for families and 104 percent for unrelated individuals. This would suggest that people are, on average, about twice as well-off now, in economic terms, as they were in 1947.

2. The pattern of consumption has altered over time, with the typical family spending a smaller proportion of its income on food and clothing and more on other items. This would seem to indicate that most people have more money to spend on nonessential or discretionary items, and to confirm the impression we get from income data that living standards are indeed rising.

3. The inequality of money income is slightly smaller than it was, that is, the top fifth of families now gets a somewhat smaller share of the national total, and the bottom fifth gets a somewhat larger share. The same change is apparent for the top and bottom fifth of unrelated individuals. This would seem to indicate that the disparity in living conditions and in opportunities between rich and poor is at least not increasing.

4. The number of people counted as having total money income below the official poverty lines—which are adjusted for price change and vary by family size—has fallen substantially. In 1947, 32 percent of the population was below these lines, but in 1976, only 12 percent was. Again, the impression is one of improvement in economic well-being.

5. Certain long-standing class or group differences in total money income were modified during this period. For example, the median income for nonwhite families increased from 52 to 62 percent of that of white families, and the median income of southerners, which used to be 78 percent of that of the nation, is now 89 percent. These examples support the impression of a trend toward equalization of income, and of consumption and satisfactions thereof.

Are these five impressions warranted, or do they fall apart when tested against other economic and social data? Are money income and consumer spending reliable indicators of changes that have normative significance, or do we need a broader set of indicators that reflect the process whereby production is managed, income is generated, consumption is shared, and costs are borne? In this paper, we seek to illuminate these questions and to point out some possible improvements in the reporting of income and consumption status. We proceed by asking how the sources, uses, and sharing of income changed during the period 1947 to 1975.

ARE PEOPLE TWICE AS WELL OFF NOW AS THEY WERE IN 1947?

"Total money income," as defined by the Bureau of the Census, in-

cludes money payments in return for the supply of work or the use of property, government cash transfers, such as social insurance and public assistance, and private cash transfers, such as pensions and alimony. This definition is both narrower and broader than what some would consider ideal. It is narrower in the sense that it leaves out undistributed corporate profits and their resultant capital gains and losses. It also leaves out, as its title implies, nonmoney income. Among the more important items of nonmoney income are imputed rent from owner-occupied housing, do-it-yourself home production and leisure. Also important are employer-paid fringe benefits, such as health insurance, and government-financed noncash benefits, such as education, health care, and food stamps. The total money income definition is broader than ideal in the sense that it makes no deduction for taxes paid, contributions made to other families, or certain expenses of earning income, such as payments for child care.

In table 1 we show some of the relationships between total money income and other concepts of income. Total money income is represented in this table by items 1, 2, 3, 8, and 9. It takes no account of nonmoney primary income. Most awkwardly, it combines "redistributed income" with "primary income," without accounting for payment for the redistribution.[1] By definition, redistribution, or transferring, means that what is received by some is given by others, and the giving up is not reflected in total money income.

The ratio of the 1975 to the 1947 amount of each component of primary and redistributed income is shown in the far column of the table. To the extent that redistributed money income has increased faster than primary income in money and nonmoney forms—and that it has is shown by the higher ratios for items 8 and 9 than for items 1–7—total money income overstates the gain in "income." At the same time, total money income does not reflect the total redistribution of income that occurs because it ignores nonmoney transfers, indicated by items 10 and 11. These transfers increase the consumption possibilities of households and should be accounted for in measuring the median level and distribution of income.

To know whether the median household is twice as well off now as it was in 1947, we need to know not only about taxes and in-kind transfers, but also about possibly offsetting reductions in home production and leisure (item 6—for which reliable estimates are unavailable) which result when work effort increases. Because of the expansion in the average number of earners per family (from 1.5 in 1954 to 1.7 in 1975), and the failure to account for this additional work effort, the trend in median income overstates the growth in economic well-being. For example, both a family whose income has doubled because the wage of a single earner has doubled, and a family whose income has doubled because an additional earner is now employed at the initial wage, experience equal increases in money income. But the second family had to reduce its leisure and/or consumption of home-

1. For a more complete discussion of this point, see Robert J. Lampman, "Social Accounting for Transfer," in *The Personal Distribution of Income and Wealth*, ed. James D. Smith (New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1975), pp. 31–44.

TABLE 1

SOURCES OF INCOME, 1947 AND 1975

	1947 (BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)	1975	RATIO OF 1975 TO 1947
PRIMARY INCOME			
Money			
1. Wages and salaries	$ 191	$ 807	4.2
2. Proprietors' incomes	35	90	2.6
3. Property income	17	152	8.9
Nonmoney			
4. Employer contributions to public and private transfers	10*	97	9.7
5. Net imputed rent of owner-occupied homes	4	13	3.2
6. Home production and leisure	n.a.	n.a.	
7. Corporate profits less dividends	25	70	3.1
REDISTRIBUTED INCOME (financed largely out of primary income)			
Money			
8. Public cash transfers	12	175	14.6
9. Private cash transfers (pensions and annuities)	1*	13	13.0
Nonmoney			
10. Public transfers (medical care and education)	7	133	19.0
11. Private transfers (employer paid health insurance)	3*	26	8.7

SOURCES: U.S. Department of Commerce, *The National Income and Product Accounts of the United States, 1929–1965* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1966); U.S. Department of Commerce, *Survey of Current Business*, vol. 56, no. 11 (Washington, D.C. USGPO, November 1976), Emil Sunley, "Employee Benefits and Transfer Payments," in *Comprehensive Income Taxation*, ed. Joseph Pechman (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977)

*Estimates for 1955 by Emil Sunley

produced goods and services when the second family member began working. In this example (and in actuality), the failure to measure the reduction in a source of nonmoney income—leisure and/or home production—means that economic well-being grows at a slower rate than money income.

On the other hand, it can be argued that median total money income understates the gain in per capita income since household size has been declining. There are now 2.7 times as many one-person households as there were in 1947, but only 1.2 times as many six-person households. Because median family income does not adjust for the composition of families, the trend in family income understates the trend in economic well-being.[2]

2. Some authors have argued that the changing composition of living units results from changes in available sources of income. In particular, they assert that the growth of government transfers has caused some families, that otherwise would have remained intact, to break apart. See Alice Rivlin, "Income Distribution: Can Economists Help?" *American Economic Review* 65 (May 1975), pp. 1–15, and Simon Kuznets, "Demographic Aspects of the Distribution of Income Among

TABLE 2

SELECTED USES OF INCOME, 1947 AND 1975

	1947 (BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)	1975	RATIO OF 1975 TO 1947
Purchases by households			
1. Food	$ 52	$ 210	4.0
2. Clothing	19	70	3.7
3. Housing services	12	137	11.4
4. Medical care	5	48	9.6
5. Education	1	14	14.0
6. Other	67	458	6.8
Nonmarketed consumption			
7. Net housing services of owner-occupied homes	4	13	3.3
8. Home production and leisure	n.a	n.a.	
Purchases of medical care and education by governments and employers			
Governments			
9. Medical care	2	51	25.5
10. Education	5	82	16.4
Employers			
11. Medical care*	2*	23	11.5
Savings by households	7	84	12.0

SOURCES: Same as for table 1.
* Estimate for 1955

Assume, for example, that there are two families. The first is composed of a couple with two children; a single member earns $5,000. The second is composed of a couple with two children and the aged parents of the family head; a single member earns $4,000, and the aged couple receives $1,000 of social security benefits. Median family income is $5,000. Now suppose that benefits are raised to $2,000, and that as a result, the aged parents can afford an apartment of their own. The behavioral response to the increased income actually lowers median family income to $4,000—there are now three families, with incomes of $2,000, $4,000, and $5,000. The increased social security benefits increase economic well-being, but produce a spurious decline in the economic indicator.

Families: Recent Trends in the United States," in *Econometrics and Economic Theory*, ed. Willy Sellekaerts (London: MacMillan Press, 1974), pp. 223–47.

How Has the Pattern of Consumption Changed?

Table 2 offers a broad view of how consumption patterns have changed in the postwar period. The standard method for reporting these changes confines attention to purchases by households, as shown in items 1–6. But total consumption by households exceeds what they personally purchase, since governments and employers also make purchases on behalf of households. Because these purchases are concentrated on a narrower range of goods and services, the actual distribution of consumption among categories differs from the distribution shown in items 1–6.

TABLE 3

PERCENTAGE OF POPULATION IN INCOME POVERTY, BEFORE AND AFTER TRANSFERS, SELECTED YEARS

	1947	1965	1976*
1. Before Transfer		21	21
2. After Cash Transfers	32	16	11
3. After Cash and In-kind Transfers		12	7

SOURCES: 1976: Harold Watts and Felicity Skidmore, "An Update of the Poverty Picture Plus a New Look at Relative Tax Burdens," *Focus: Institute for Research on Poverty Newsletter*, vol. 2, no. 1 (Fall 1977).
1965 Robert D. Plotnick and Felicity Skidmore, Progress Against Poverty (New York: Academic Press, 1975).
1947 Council of Econonic Advisers, *"The Problem of Poverty in America"* in Economic Report of the President (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1964).
*Fiscal year.

Items 9, 10, and 11 reveal the magnitude and growing importance of such purchases for medical care and education. A more comprehensive reporting (items 4 plus 9 plus 11; and 5 plus 10) underlines the significance of the shift toward spending on medical care and education. The increased importance of government spending for medical care suggests that the distribution of this service may have become less unequal among income classes.

HAS THE DISTRIBUTION OF INCOME BECOME LESS UNEQUAL?

As we mentioned earlier, the top fifth of families now gets a somewhat smaller share, and the bottom fifth gets a somewhat larger share of the national total of money income. Whether this trend remains after consideration of all taxes, contributions, and the receipt of nonmoney income is subject to some dispute. There is consensus, however, that these aggregate indicators obscure the processes that generate inequality. Increased government transfer payments and the earnings of married women contributed to a reduction in family income inequality. The declining progressivity in the tax system, increased inequality in the earnings of men, and the increase in the percentage of households headed by the young, the old, and women all contributed to increased inequality.[3] The stability of the trend results from these offsetting changes in socioeconomic relationships.

HOW MUCH HAS INCOME POVERTY BEEN REDUCED?

The official indicator for income poverty is total money income adjusted for family size. The guidelines for each family size are based on an arbitrarily selected base of $3,000 of 1962 purchasing power, or about $6,000 at today's prices. Table 3, line 2 shows that progress against poverty, thus defined, has been made, with the percentage of the population that is poor falling by about one percentage point a year up to the middle 1960s, and by about one-half a percentage point a year since then.

3 See Morgan Reynolds and Eugene Smolensky, *Public Expenditures, Taxes, and the Distribution of Income* (New York: Academic Press, 1977), Michael Taussig and Sheldon Danziger, *Conference on the Trend in Income Inequality in the U.S.* (Madison: Institute for Research on Poverty, 1977).

The slowdown in progress against poverty in recent years is explained in part by the failure of pretransfer poverty to fall at all after 1965 (see line 1). This concept is based upon what is called primary money income in table 1. We get another impression of progress against poverty, however, if we look at money income plus in-kind transfers (line 3), which shows that if food stamps, housing subsidies, and medical care are counted as income, then the frequency of poverty may be said to have declined sharply in the last decade.[4]

Poverty has declined for most socioeconomic groups, but there are significant variations in the rates of decline. Persons living in families with male heads (especially black male heads) or with aged heads, and persons living in the South have experienced the largest reductions in poverty. The group with the highest incidence of poverty, persons living with female heads, has experienced the smallest decline, despite increased government assistance.

HAVE LONG-STANDING INTERGROUP INCOME DIFFERENCES NARROWED?

Total money income measures indicate a narrowing of the difference between black and white families. Most of this narrowing occurred prior to 1967. However, once again the aggregate statistics obscure underlying changes. Consider the data in table 4 on the ratio of black median family income to white median family income for 1967 and 1976. The first row in panel 1 reveals that for all families the ratio remained at 59 percent during this period—the economic status of blacks did not improve relative to that of whites. But the rest of the data reveal that this stability results from two dramatic, but counterbalancing, changes in the relative situation of black families. First, black families with male heads gained relative to similar white families; the ratio of medians increased from 67 to 78 percent. Had other factors remained constant, the ratio of medians for all families would have increased. Second, the percentage of all black families with female heads increased rapidly from 28 percent to 37 percent. Had other factors remained constant, the ratio of medians for all families would have decreased. The ratio of medians remained constant only because of the coincidence that these two effects exactly offset each other.

But even the disaggregation shown in table 4 does not provide an answer to the more basic question: Has the economic well-being of black families increased relative to that of white families? Such an answer requires a model that can explain the changes both in incomes and family types. For example, if poor black males deserted their families so that their children could receive welfare benefits, then the median income of black families would rise relative to that of white families. Similarly, if black men received higher wage increases than white men, the ratio of the medians would rise. Which of these (or other) hypotheses explains the trend in the ratio can only be ascertained with a well-specified model.

Understanding the trend in other intergroup differences also requires

4. Since expenditures for in-kind transfers were small in 1947, we estimate that the entry in line 3 for that year would have been about 30 percent. Line 3, then, gives an impression of a substantial decline in poverty over the entire period.

TABLE 4

MEDIAN INCOME OF BLACK AND WHITE FAMILIES, 1967 AND 1976

	1967	1976
1. Ratio of Black to White Median Family Income.		
All families	59%	59%
Families with male head	67	78
Families with female head	62	62
2. Percentage of Families with Female Heads·		
Black families	28%	37%
White families	9	11

SOURCES· 1967· U.S Bureau of the Census, *The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the United States, 1974*, Current Population Reports, Series P–23, no. 54 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1975)
1976· U S Bureau of the Census, *Money Income and Poverty Status of Families and Persons in the United States*, 1976, Current Population Reports, Series P-60, no 107 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1977).

a disaggregation of underlying socioeconomic relationships. The incomes of prime-age heads of household (ages 45–54) have increased relative to those of other cohorts, but especially relative to those of the youngest (ages 14–24) and oldest (ages 65 and over) cohorts.[5] At first glance, then, these income changes suggest increasing inequality among age groups. But in this period there have been dramatic declines in labor force participation (hence, increases in leisure) as the young remained in school longer and the elderly retired earlier. Because these changes are not measured, the relative economic position of the elderly and the young is understated.

WHAT THE INDICATORS DO NOT INDICATE

Although we did not explicitly attach normative content to the five trends, we proceeded as if income growth, a shift in consumption away from necessities, and reductions in inequality, poverty, and intergroup income differences were desirable goals. We did argue that the trend in these indicators could not be understood without a specification of the processes by which they are generated.

There is, however, a further complication, which makes normative interpretations even more difficult. We have proceeded as if the indicators were independent of one another, and have neglected the possibility that an improvement in one indicator may lead to a decline in another. A familiar example of such a case is the presumed tradeoff between greater income equality and faster economic growth—that the higher taxes needed to redistribute more income would cause a decline in savings and work effort, and a consequent reduction in aggregate income.[6]

A similar conflict may exist between the goals of reducing income inequality and narrowing intergroup income differences. During the

5. The ratio of the median income of a specific cohort to the median income for all families fell from .77 to .67 between 1947 and 1974 for the youngest cohort and from .60 to .57 for the oldest cohort, but rose from 1.14 to 1.30 for the prime-age cohort

6. See Arthur Okun, *Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1975)

period, the average earnings of females declined relative to those of males, and the income differences between families with female heads and male heads increased. The proportion of wives who worked increased, and the most rapid increases occurred for wives of men at the lower-middle and middle income ranges. The changes in labor force participation of wives, who now earn 15 percent of total family income, despite the growing male-female wage differential, contributed to the reduction in family income inequality.

It is possible that reductions in earnings differences by sex will induce increases in family income inequality. Because of assortative mating, high income men are likely to marry women with high earnings potentials. These women are now less likely to be in the paid labor force because of their husbands' high incomes and because discrimination against women denies them access to certain jobs (especially high income jobs). If full economic opportunity for women were to be achieved, these women would enter the labor market, acquire those jobs, and the male-female wage differential would be eliminated. The reduction of intergroup earnings differences would lead to an increase in family inequality.

To resolve this paradox we need an explicit ranking of goals and an equation that can weight a growth in family income, a reduction in intergroup differences, and an increase in inequality (or any other set of changes in the indicators). With such a weighting, the data could better be used to suggest whether economic well-being has increased or decreased.

CONCLUSION

Social Indicators, 1976 provides a set of time series that reveal a trend toward greater economic well-being over the past 30 years. The issues we raised concerning the measurement and interpretation of the data suggest that the indicators on income and expenditures are inputs for an analysis of social change, not outputs which can stand alone. Our first impressions of the trends, however, were generally confirmed even when confronted by the issues we raised. Income and expenditure data tell us what has happened, but not how or why.


Table 9/1
MEDIAN INCOME OF FAMILIES AND UNRELATED INDIVIDUALS, BY RACE: 1947–1975
(1974 constant dollars)

Year and period	Families				Unrelated individuals		
	Total	White	Black and other races	Ratio of black and other races to white	White	Black and other races	Ratio of black and other races to white
1947	6,691	6,970	3,563	0.51	2,286	1,647	0.72
1948	6,529	6,781	3,622	.53	2,157	1,616	.75
1949	6,427	6,686	3,413	.51	2,345	1,695	.72
1950	6,800	7,057	3,828	.54	2,283	1,673	.73
1951	7,041	7,326	3,858	.53	2,387	1,764	.74
1952	7,227	7,643	4,344	.57	2,821	1,952	.69
1953	7,805	8,099	4,538	.56	2,716	2,136	.79
1954	7,657	7,961	4,422	.56	2,414	1,602	.66
1955	8,137	8,495	4,685	.55	2,579	1,722	.67
1956	8,679	9,060	4,768	.53	2,656	1,972	.74
1957	8,710	9,051	4,843	.54	2,799	1,779	.64
1958	8,676	9,039	4,624	.51	2,715	1,841	.68
1959	9,165	9,547	4,935	.52	2,815	1,818	.65
1960	9,358	9,716	5,379	.55	3,096	1,778	.57
1961	9,457	9,859	5,260	.53	3,108	1,908	.61
1962	9,710	10,168	5,429	.53	3,058	2,042	.67
1963	10,065	10,547	5,581	.53	3,040	2,086	.69
1964	10,444	10,903	6,102	.56	3,320	2,275	.69
1965	10,874	11,333	6,242	.55	3,509	2,559	.73
1966	11,445	11,890	7,128	.60	3,659	2,301	.63
1967	11,717	12,162	7,524	.62	3,648	2,696	.74
1968	12,236	12,668	7,924	.63	4,184	2,834	.68
1969	12,689	13,175	8,328	.63	4,140	2,919	.71
1970	12,531	13,000	8,275	.64	4,169	2,849	.68
1971	12,523	12,995	8,175	.63	4,219	2,831	.67
1972	13,103	13,614	8,376	.62	4,334	3,219	.74
1973	13,373	13,977	8,429	.60	4,738	3,541	.75
1974	12,836	13,356	8,265	.62	4,636	3,149	.68
1975[1]	12,570	13,073	8,540	.65	4,672	3,012	.64
Average annual percent change							
1947–1975	2.2	2.2	3.1	(X)	2.6	2.2	(X)
1947–1957	2.6	2.6	3.1	(X)	2.0	.8	(X)
1957–1967	3.0	3.0	4.4	(X)	2.6	4.2	(X)
1967–1975	.9	.9	1.6	(X)	3.1	1.4	(X)

Source U S Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-60, No 101.
(X) Not applicable
[1] Figures for unrelated individuals of black and other races relate to blacks only

Chart 9/1A — Social Indicators, 1976

MEDIAN TOTAL MONEY INCOME OF FAMILIES AND UNRELATED INDIVIDUALS, FOR WHITES, BLACKS AND OTHER RACES, IN CONSTANT 1974 DOLLARS, 1947 TO 1975



Source: see table 9/1

Table 9/3

MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME, BY AGE OF FAMILY HEAD: 1947–1974

(1974 constant dollars)

YEAR	ALL FAMILIES	AGE OF HEAD: 14 to 24 years	25 to 34 years	35 to 44 years	45 to 54 years	55 to 64 years	65 years and over
	MEDIAN INCOME						
1947	6,691	5,177	6,470	7,269	7,594	7,068	4,035
1948	6,529	5,355	6,463	7,057	7,389	6,662	3,908
1949	6,427	4,894	6,619	6,892	7,176	6,518	3,899
1950	6,800	5,355	6,895	7,467	7,549	6,676	3,900
1951	7,041	5,854	7,269	7,721	7,715	6,934	3,712
1952	7,227	5,704	7,491	8,065	8,095	7,072	4,230
1953	7,805	5,830	8,050	8,487	8,987	7,640	4,124
1954	7,646	5,754	7,807	8,545	8,828	7,435	4,209
1955	8,137	6,112	8,278	9,055	9,370	8,057	4,284
1956	8,679	6,877	8,947	9,728	9,820	8,290	4,628
1957	8,710	6,813	9,054	9,730	9,760	8,359	4,361
1958	8,676	6,456	8,886	9,734	9,792	8,794	4,549
1959	9,165	6,540	9,347	10,391	10,384	9,203	4,790
1960	9,358	6,679	9,468	10,682	10,779	9,288	4,820
1961	9,457	6,970	9,593	10,750	11,058	9,586	4,985
1962	9,710	6,976	9,628	11,137	11,485	10,145	5,227
1963	10,065	6,758	10,184	11,403	11,940	10,435	5,398
1964	10,444	7,625	10,456	11,943	12,324	10,645	5,367
1965	10,874	8,388	11,056	12,489	12,933	10,977	5,491
1966	11,445	8,634	11,533	13,204	13,669	11,620	5,763
1967	11,717	8,616	11,911	13,572	14,195	11,827	5,773
1968	12,236	8,828	12,370	14,241	14,799	12,502	6,513
1969	12,689	8,970	12,785	14,754	15,607	12,985	6,464
1970	12,530	8,942	12,520	14,498	15,402	13,191	6,421
1971	12,523	8,415	12,509	14,473	15,708	13,385	6,642
1972	13,103	8,782	13,162	15,471	16,575	13,768	7,038
1973	13,373	8,895	13,547	15,879	16,896	14,185	7,132
1974	12,836	8,618	13,000	15,117	16,709	13,645	7,298

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-60, No. 101.

Table 9/3 (*Continued*)

YEAR	ALL FAMILIES	AGE OF HEAD: 14 to 24 years	25 to 34 years	35 to 44 years	45 to 54 years	55 to 64 years	65 years and over
	RATIO OF MEDIAN INCOME OF AGE GROUP TO ALL FAMILIES						
1947	1.00	0.77	0.97	1.09	1.14	1.06	0.60
1948	1.00	.82	99	1.08	1.13	1.02	.60
1949	1.00	.76	1.03	1.07	1.12	1.02	.61
1950	1.00	.79	1.01	1.10	1.11	.98	.57
1951	1.00	.83	1.03	1.10	1.10	.99	.53
1952	1.00	.79	1.04	1.12	1.12	.98	.59
1953	1.00	.75	1.03	1.09	1.15	.98	.53
1954	1.00	.75	1.02	1.12	1.15	.97	.55
1955	1.00	.75	1.02	1.11	1.15	.99	.53
1956	1.00	.79	1.03	1.12	1.13	.96	.53
1957	1.00	.78	1.04	1.12	1.12	.96	.50
1958	1.00	.74	1.02	1.12	1.13	1.01	.52
1959	1.00	.71	1.02	1.13	1.13	1.00	.52
1960	1.00	.71	1.01	1.14	1.15	.99	.52
1961	1.00	.74	1.02	1.14	1.17	1.01	.53
1962	1.00	.72	.99	1.15	1.18	1.04	.54
1963	1.00	.67	1.01	1.13	1.19	1.04	.54
1964	1.00	.73	1.00	1.14	1.18	1.02	.51
1965	1.00	.77	1.02	1.15	1.19	1.01	.51
1966	1.00	75	1.01	1.15	1.19	1.02	.50
1967	1.00	.74	1.02	1.16	1.21	1.01	.49
1968	1.00	.72	1.01	1.16	1.21	1.02	.53
1969	1.00	.71	1.01	1.16	1.23	1.02	.51
1970	1.00	.71	1.00	1.16	1.23	1.05	.51
1971	1.00	.67	1.00	1.16	1.25	1.07	.53
1972	1.00	.67	1.00	1.18	1.26	1.05	.54
1973	1.00	.67	1.01	1.19	1.26	1.06	.53
1974	1.00	.67	1.01	1.18	1.30	1.06	.57


Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-60, No. 101.

Chart 9/3C

Social Indicators, 19

MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME IN CONSTANT 1974 DOLLARS FOR SELECTED COHORT GROUPS 14–24 TO 35–44 YEARS OLD, 1949–1974

Cohort group 14–24 years old in 1949, 35–44 years old in 1969
Cohort group 14–24 years old in 1954, 35–44 years old in 1974
Cohort group 14–24 years old in 1959, 25–34 years old in 1969
Cohort group 14–24 years old in 1964, 25–34 years old in 1974




Source: see table 9/3

Chart 9/23

Social Indicators, 1976


CONSUMER PRICE INDEXES (1967 = 100) SELECTED YEARS, 1961–MAY, 1976—ANNUAL AVERAGES, EXCEPT FOR MAY, 1976



Source: see table 9/23

Chart 9/23

Social Indicators, 1976



Source: see table 9/23

Chart 9/23

Social Indicators, 1976




Table 9/23

CONSUMER PRICE INDEXES: 1940–1976

(Index: 1967 = 100; yearly data are annual averages)

Period	All items	All items less medical care	Medical care	Food	Apparel and upkeep	Housing	Transportation	Personal care	Reading and recreation	Other goods and services	All services
1940	42 0	(NA)	36 8	35.2	42 8	52 4	42 7	40 2	46 1	48 3	43.6
1945	53.0	(NA)	42 1	50 7	61 5	59.1	47 8	55.1	62.4	56 9	48.7
1950	72.1	(NA)	53 7	74.5	79 0	72 8	68 2	68 3	74.4	69 9	58.9
1955	80 2	(NA)	64 8	81 6	84.1	82.3	77 4	77 9	76.7	79.8	70.5
1960	88 7	89.4	79 1	88 0	89 6	90 2	89.6	90 1	87.3	87.8	83.8
1961	89.6	90 3	81 4	89 1	90 4	90 9	90 6	90 6	89.3	88.5	85.2
1962	90.6	91 2	83 5	89 9	90 9	91 7	92 5	92 2	91.3	89.1	86.2
1963	91 7	92.3	85 6	91 2	91 9	92 7	93 0	93.4	92 8	90.6	88.5
1964	92.9	93.5	87.3	92 4	92 7	93 8	94 3	94 5	95 0	92 0	90.2
1965	94.5	94 9	89 5	94 4	93 7	94 9	95.9	95.2	95.9	94.2	92.2
1966	97.2	97 7	93 4	99 1	96.1	97 2	97 2	97.1	97.5	97.2	95.8
1967	100 0	100.0	100 0	100 0	100.0	100 0	100.0	100.0	100 0	100.0	100.0
1968	104.2	104 1	106 1	103.6	105 4	104.2	103 2	104 2	104.7	104 6	105.2
1969	109.8	109 7	113 4	108.9	111 5	110 8	107.2	109 3	108.7	109 1	112 5
1970	116.3	116 1	120 6	114.9	116.1	118.9	112 7	113 2	113.4	116.0	121.6
1971	121.3	120 9	128 4	118 4	119 8	124 3	118 6	116 8	119.3	120 9	128 4
1972	125 3	124.9	132 5	123 5	122 3	129 2	119 9	119 8	122.8	125.5	133.3
1973	133.1	132.9	137 7	141 4	126 8	135 0	123.8	125.2	125.9	129.0	139.1
1974	147 7	147.7	150 5	161 7	136 2	150.6	137 7	137 3	133.8	137.2	152.0
1975	161 2	160 9	168 6	175 4	142 3	166 8	150 6	150.7	144 4	147.4	166.6
1976											
May	169.2	168 4	182 6	179 9	146 8	175.6	163 5	158.9	150.3	152 9	178.4

Source: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Social Security Administration, *Social Security Bulletin*, April 1976.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 435, Jan. 1978

Baby Boom to Birth Dearth and Beyond

By ARTHUR A. CAMPBELL

ABSTRACT: The processes of fertility change in the United States are structured in a way that exaggerates the upward and downward trends in annual measures of fertility, relative to underlying trends in the average number of children that women have during their reproductive years of life. In the 1950s, we witnessed a period of relatively inflated fertility; in the 1970s we are apparently going through a period of relatively depressed fertility. The childbearing expectations of young women suggest that annual fertility rates will rise in the near future, but do not provide any reason to believe that there will be a substantial increase in fertility comparable to that occurring between the 1930s and the 1950s. The causes of swings in fertility rates are not yet fully known, but some promising hypotheses have been proposed and are being tested.

Arthur A. Campbell is the Deputy Director of the Center for Population Research, National Institute of Child Health and Human Development, National Institutes of Health. He attended Antioch College as an undergraduate and did graduate work at Columbia University. Since 1955, his research efforts have been largely devoted to an understanding of trends and differentials in fertility-related behavior in the United States.

THE RATE of childbearing among women of reproductive age in 1976 was less than half the level recorded 19 years earlier in 1957. The decline over the intervening years was more rapid than that experienced by the United States in the 1920s and more rapid than any recent declines reported by other countries in the developed world. It brought the birth rate from 25 births per 1,000 population in 1957 to 15 in 1976. The annual number of births dropped from 4.3 million to 3.2 million in the same period. Both the decline in the birth rate and that in the number of births would have been greater if the population of childbearing age had not been rising at the same time.

These changes in the fertility of the United States population and their implications for future birth rates cannot be understood fully without considering the dynamic processes that gave rise to them and that will continue to affect fertility rates in the future. The description of these processes can be most easily accomplished by referring to two different measures of fertility: the completed fertility rate and the total fertility rate.

MEASURES OF FERTILITY

The completed fertility rate is the number of births that occur per 1,000 women during their reproductive years of life (generally taken as ages 14–49). A completed fertility rate of 3,000, for example, means that a group of women had three births each, on the average, by the time they reached age 50. The groups to which this measure refers are called birth cohorts; they comprise women born in a specified 12-month period. For technical reasons, cohorts are defined in terms of 12-month periods ending on June 30 of the year by which the cohort is identified. For example, the 1920 cohort includes all women who were born between July 1, 1919 and June 30, 1920. This cohort was assumed to have completed its childbearing by January 1, 1970, at which time its completed fertility rate was 2702.3 births per 1,000 women.[1]


Unlike the completed fertility rate, the total fertility rate is a hypothetical measure that expresses the level of fertility observed in a given calendar year. It can be interpreted as the number of births that 1,000 women would have if they continued to bear children at the rates observed for each single year of age during the year for which the rate is computed. For example, the total fertility rate for 1975 was 1770.3. This means that if a group of women were to bear children at the rates observed at each age in 1975, they would complete their fertility with 1770.3 births per 1,000 women. In brief, the completed fertility rate expresses the level of childbearing experienced by actual groups of women who have reached the end of their reproductive years of life. The total fertility rate expresses the level of childbearing observed in a particular calendar year.

It is often convenient to contrast the level of the total fertility rate with the presumed level of the completed fertility rates of cohorts currently in the reproductive years of

1 The total fertility and completed fertility rates cited in this paper are from the following source, National Center for Health Statistics, *Fertility Tables for Birth Cohorts by Color: United States, 1917–73*, DHEW Publication no (HRA) 76-1152, April 1976. Rates for 1974 and 1975 are from unpublished tabulations by the National Center for Health Statistics.

FIGURE 1

Comparison of Completed Fertility Rates and Total Fertility Rates: United States, Cohorts of 1867–1958, and Calendar Years 1917–75.



life. For example, in 1957, when the total fertility rate was 3,682, it did not appear likely that any cohort then in the reproductive years of life (which included the cohorts of 1908–43) would complete childbearing with such a large number of children. Therefore, we say that the total fertility rate in 1957 was distorted upward, which means that it overstated the level of fertility that women then in the childbearing ages would experience over their reproductive lives. In more recent years the total fertility rate appears to be distorted downward—that is, it understates the number of children that women in the main reproductive ages will eventually have.

THE DYNAMICS OF FERTILITY CHANGE

Figure 1 contrasts the levels of the total fertility rate and the completed fertility rate for the historical series available from official statistics of the United States. The completed fertility rates go back to the cohort of 1867 which had over 4,000 births per 1,000 women. This measure reached a low turning point of 2,270 for the 1908 cohort, rose to a high turning point of about 3,220 for the 1933 cohort (an estimate based on reported births up to age 43), and appears to be reaching a new low around 2,000 for the cohorts born in the 1950s. The latter estimate is

based on the number of births expected by women responding to a Census Bureau Survey in 1976.[2] Whether or not they will actually have this number of births is, of course, open to question.

The dotted line on figure 1 represents the trend in the total fertility rate from 1917 (the earliest year available) to 1975. The calendar years for the total fertility rate are plotted 25 years beyond the points for which the completed fertility rates for cohorts are plotted. This interval was chosen because the median age of childbearing in the United States in recent years has been about 25. Therefore, the observations for the total fertility rate appear at that point in the chart closest to the completed fertility rates of cohorts then in their 20s, which comprise the main childbearing ages. In this way, it is possible to estimate the extent to which the total fertility rate overstates or understates the completed fertility of cohorts then in the main reproductive ages of life.

Figure 1 shows that the amplitude of the total fertility rate is considerably greater than that of the completed fertility rate. For example, between the low of 1936 and the high of 1957 the total fertility rate rose by 72 percent. However, between the low and high cohorts of 1908 and 1933, the rise was only 42 percent. Similarly, the total fertility rate fell by 52 percent between 1957 and 1975, but the completed fertility rate will fall by an estimated 36 percent between the high cohort of 1933 and the cohorts of the late 1950s.

The reason for the greater swings in the total fertility rate is that the age distribution of childbearing is constantly changing from one cohort to the next. The unusually rapid rise in the total fertility rate between the 1930s and the 1950s was due to a combination of three factors: (1) the underlying rise in the completed fertility rate of cohorts; (2) the relatively late ages of childbearing of the cohorts of 1910–25; (3) the shift to relatively early ages of childbearing among the cohorts of 1925–40.

The relatively late ages of childbearing of the cohorts of 1910–25 was due to the fact that the women born in these years reached the main reproductive years of life in the period 1930–45 when young couples tended to delay marriage and childbearing, possibly because of depressed economic conditions and the absence of young men during World War II. After the war, these couples compensated for their previously low fertility by having relatively high birth rates at the later childbearing ages.

The cohorts of 1925–40, in contrast, reached the main ages of childbearing in the period 1945–60 when couples were tending to marry and have children at younger ages. Since both sets of cohorts were in the reproductive ages of life in the period 1945–60, relatively high rates at the older and younger ages combined with rising completed fertility rates to produce a strong upward trend in the total fertility rate.

In the 1960s and 1970s the three factors that caused the earlier rapid increase in the total fertility rate were reversed to bring about a rapid decline: (1) the completed fertility rates of the cohorts of 1935–55 were declining; (2) the cohorts of 1925–40 reached the older ages of childbearing by 1965 and were having relatively low rates at these ages

2. U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Fertility of American Women: June 1976," in *Current Population Reports*, ser. P–20, no. 308 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1977), p. 9

because they had had such high rates at the younger ages; (3) the cohorts of the 1940s and the 1950s were marrying and having children at later ages, which reduced their fertility at the younger childbearing ages. Thus, declining completed fertility and relatively low rates at the older and younger childbearing ages combined to bring about a sharp decline in the total fertility rate.

What will happen in the later 1970s and the 1980s is impossible to predict with any certainty. Future trends depend in part on whether the cohorts of the 1940s behave in a manner similar to that exhibited by the cohorts of 1910–25 and begin to show some increases in fertility as they reach the later childbearing ages. This would tend to raise the total fertility rate and may account for the tendency for fertility rates to have begun rising in 1977. In addition, there is a great deal of uncertainty about the trend in the completed fertility rates of cohorts now in the younger reproductive ages of life. Since these two issues are so important for forming an opinion about possible future trends in fertility, they will be examined separately in the next two sections.

THE TREND IN COMPLETED FERTILITY AMONG YOUNG COHORTS

Although it is impossible to predict with certainty how many children women now in the earlier reproductive years of life will bear, we can get some idea of the future trend in completed fertility rates from responses to questions on number of births expected. Such questions have been included in various surveys in the United States since 1955, and although the responses do not provide an accurate description of future trends, the general tendencies to have more or fewer children do seem to be reflected in the survey results.

Table 1 shows the number of births expected by currently married women in surveys conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census in 1967 and each year from 1971 to 1976. The rates shown for currently married women are not precisely comparable with the completed fertility rate because this rate is based on all women, rather than on married women only. In 1976, the Census Bureau included single and previously married women among those to whom it asked the questions on total number of children expected. The numbers based on the responses of all women are shown on the top line of table 1. These rates are directly comparable to the completed fertility rate. In general, they are 4 to 7 percent below the averages based on the responses of currently married women.

Table 1 provides strong evidence that the completed fertility rate is falling among the cohorts of the 1940s and 1950s. The high values of birth expectations are reported by women who belong to the cohorts of the late 1920s and the 1930s. For example, the 35–39-year-old women in 1967 belong to the cohorts of 1928–32. They expected to have 3,300 births per 1,000 women, on the average. In contrast, the 18–19-year-old women interviewed in 1976 belong to the cohorts of 1957–58. The married women among them expected only 2,163 births per 1,000 women, and all women interviewed in this cohort expected only 2,087 births per 1,000 women.

Table 1 also shows a tendency for currently married women in some cohorts to reduce their childbearing expectations as they become older. For example, in 1967, the 18–

TABLE 1

TOTAL NUMBER OF BIRTHS EXPECTED PER 1,000 WOMEN 18–39 YEARS OLD FOR ALL WOMEN IN 1976 AND CURRENTLY MARRIED WOMEN IN 1967 AND 1971–76: UNITED STATES

YEAR	AGE 18–19	20–21	22–24	25–29	30–34	35–39
			All women			
1976	2,087	1,989	2,022	2,098	2,445	n.a.
			Currently married women			
1976	2,163	2,122	2,145	2,202	2,536	2,994
1975	2,189	2,183	2,163	2,260	2,610	3,058
1974	2,189	2,142	2,170	2,335	2,724	3,090
1973	2,267	2,276	2,254	2,387	2,804	3,234
1972	2,229	2,210	2,282	2,452	2,915	3,218
1971	2,256	2,373	2,404	2,619	2,989	3,257
1967	2,719	2,916	2,856	3,037	3,288	3,300

SOURCES: 1973: U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Fertility Expectations of American Women: June 1973," in *Current Population Reports, ser. P-20, no. 265 (Washington, D.C. USGPO, 1974), p. 17.*

1974: U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Fertility Expectations of American Women: June 1974," in *Current Population Reports*, ser P-20, no. 277 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1975), p. 15.

1975: U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Fertility of American Women: June 1975," in *Current Population Reports*, ser. P-20, no. 301 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1976), p. 13.

1967, 1971 and 1976. U S. Bureau of the Census, "Fertility of American Women: June 1976," in *Current Population Reports*, ser. P-20, no 308 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1977), pp 9 and 17

19-year-olds, who belong to the cohorts of 1948–49, said that they expected to have 2,719 births per 1,000 women. However, when the 1948–50 cohorts were interviewed at ages 22–24 in 1972, they expected only 2,282 births per 1,000 women. Part of this reduction was due to the inclusion in the later survey of women who had married at later ages and expected fewer births, but part of it was due to the fact that women reduced their family size goals during this period of time. This simply demonstrates that the childbearing expectations of young women are not immutable.

Since 1974, the birth expectations for the cohorts of 1950 and later have varied in the narrow range between 2,122 and 2,189 births per 1,000 currently married women. These values are consistent with completed fertility rates around 2,000 to 2,100. If such a low completed fertility rate were to be attained and continued indefinitely, it would, assuming no immigration, eventually result in the cessation of population growth because it would allow for the replacement of two parents by two children, on the average, and thus maintain successive generations at approximately the same size.

In the United States the cohorts of 1906–14 provide a historical precedent for low completed fertility rates. Although none of these cohorts had as few as 2,100 births per 1,000 women, the 1908 cohort did achieve the lowest recorded level of 2,270. However, this low rate was achieved in part by a high prevalence of childlessness among its members, 22 percent of whom had no births. This compares with a low of 8 percent childless among cohorts of the 1930s.

Unlike the cohorts of 1906–14,

TABLE 2

PERCENTAGE OF WIVES 18–39 YEARS OLD EXPECTING NONE, ONE, TWO, AND THREE OR MORE BIRTHS, BY AGE: UNITED STATES: 1967 AND 1971–76

AGE	1976	1975	1974	1973	1972	1971	1967
			Percentage of wives expecting no births				
18–19	3.7	2.4	4.1	3.4	3.4	5.5	1.0
20–21	4.0	4.3	4.8	4.3	3.5	3.0	0.4
22–24	5.3	4.5	5.4	4.0	3.6	4.1	1.7
25–29	6.4	4.9	4.7	4.1	4.0	3.2	2.2
30–34	5.5	5.2	4.9	4.6	4.1	4.7	3.8
35–39	4 7	4.2	5.4	4.4	5.0	4.8	5.0
			Percentage of wives expecting one birth				
18–19	12.4	12.4	13.1	10.7	12.0	8.6	10.9
20–21	11.4	11.9	13.8	10.4	10.0	9.0	5.4
22–24	12.2	10.6	10.7	9.0	9.2	8.1	5.2
25–29	11.2	11.7	9.5	9.1	7.9	6.8	5.1
30–34	10.3	9.8	9.0	7.8	7.3	6.6	5.8
35–39	9 3	9.3	8.7	8.2	7.1	7.6	7.8
			Percentage of wives expecting two births				
18–19	58.2	59.8	56.9	56.6	54.9	54.5	33.8
20–21	59.9	57.6	55.3	53.9	59.0	53.0	36.3
22–24	55.8	58 1	55.7	57.1	55.8	50.2	38.2
25–29	51.5	50 4	51 7	49.9	48.5	44.1	29.3
30–34	40.4	38.3	36.4	34.9	33.6	29.2	25.3
35–39	28.8	26.4	24.9	24.9	24.5	24.2	25.0
			Percentage of wives expecting three or more births				
18–19	25 7	25.4	25.9	29.3	29 7	31.4	54.3
20–21	24.7	26.2	26.1	31.4	27.5	35.0	57.9
22–24	26.7	26.8	28.2	29.9	31.4	37.6	54.9
25–29	30.9	33.0	34.1	36.9	39.6	45.9	63.4
30–34	43.8	46.7	49 7	52.7	55.0	59.5	65.1
35–39	57.2	60.1	61.0	62 5	63.4	63.4	62.2

SOURCES: 1967, 1971 and 1972 U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Birth Expectations and Fertility June 1972," in *Current Population Reports*, ser. P–20, no. 248 (Washington, D.C : USGPO, 1973), p. 19.

1973 U S. Bureau of the Census, "Fertility Expectations of American Women June 1973," in *Current Population Reports*, ser P–20, no. 265 (Washington, D.C. USGPO, 1974), p. 19.

1974 U S Bureau of the Census, "Fertility Expectations of American Women June 1974," in *Current Population Reports*, ser. P–20, no. 277 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1975), p 17.

1975: U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Fertility of American Women June 1975," in *Current Population Reports*, ser P–20, no 301 (Washington, D.C USGPO, 1976), p. 20

1976. U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Fertility of American Women June 1976," in *Current Population Reports*, ser P–20, no 308 (Washington, D C USGPO, 1977), p 25

NOTE Data are limited to currently married women reporting on birth expectations.

the cohorts of the 1940s and 1950s are not counting on childlessness to achieve low fertility, according to the Census Bureau Surveys shown in Table 2. Since 1974, only 2 to 5 percent of the currently married women in the cohorts of the 1950s expect to have no children. Between 11 and 14 percent of them expect to have only 1 child, 55 to 60 percent expect two children, and 25 to 28 percent expect three or more children.

The main difference between the

low fertility cohorts of the 1950s and the high fertility cohorts of the 1930s is in the proportion expecting two births and three or more births. Whereas over 60 percent of the women of the cohorts of the 1930s expected to have three or more births, only a quarter of the members of the cohorts of the 1950s expect that many births. In summary, the younger cohorts do not foresee any widespread return to childlessness. They expect more one-child and two-children families and far fewer larger families than were produced by the cohorts of the 1930s.

Table 3 compares the proportions of women expecting various numbers of births for all women and for currently married women interviewed in 1976. Between the cohorts of 1942–46 (ages 30–34 in 1976) and the cohorts of 1957–58 (ages 18 and 19 in 1976), the proportion expecting no births or only one changes very little; the proportion expecting two increases substantially; and the proportion expecting three or more declines.

Table 4 shows the completed fertility rates, by order of birth, that are consistent with these birth expectations. To summarize them briefly, the cohorts of the 1950s expect to have about 1,700 first and second births and 400 third and higher order births to give them a completed fertility rate of 2,100 births per 1,000 women. The number of first and second births is about the same as that recorded for the cohorts of 1931–35 (1,729). However, the number of third and higher order births (about 400) is only a fraction of the number reported by the cohorts of the early 1930s (1,473). The main areas of doubt about the birth expectations of the younger cohorts are (1) whether they will have as many

TABLE 3

PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN 18–34 YEARS OLD EXPECTING NONE, ONE, TWO, AND THREE OR MORE BIRTHS, BY AGE AND MARITAL STATUS: UNITED STATES, 1976

MARITAL STATUS	AGE 18–19	20–21	22–24	25–29	30–34
	Percentage expecting no births				
All women	11.6	11.0	9.8	10.2	9.0
Currently married	3.7	4.0	5.3	6.4	5.5
	Percentage expecting one birth				
All women	10.5	12.5	13.4	13.0	11.6
Currently married	12.4	11.4	12.2	11.2	10.3
	Percentage expecting two births				
All women	50.8	53.0	51.6	47.4	37.5
Currently married	58.2	59.9	55.8	51.5	40.4
	Percentage expecting three or more births				
All married	27.1	23.5	25.2	29.4	41.9
Currently married	25.7	24.7	26.7	30.9	43.8

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Fertility of American Women. June 1976," in *Current Population Reports*, ser. P-20, no. 308 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1977), pp. 13 and 25.

TABLE 4

TOTAL NUMBER OF BIRTHS EXPECTED AND NUMBER OF BIRTHS TO DATE PER 1,000 WOMEN 18–34 YEARS OLD, BY AGE OF WOMAN AND ORDER OF BIRTH: UNITED STATES, 1976

ORDER OF BIRTH	AGE 18–19	20–21	22–24	25–29	30–34
	Approximate cohort				
	1957–58	1955–56	1952–54	1947–51	1942–4
	Expected number of births per 1,000 women				
Total	2,087	1,989	2,022	2,098	2,445
1st	884	890	902	898	910
2nd	779	765	768	768	794
3rd	271	235	252	294	419
4th	102	69	68	92	185
5th	33	19	20	28	77
6th or higher	18	11	12	18	60
Summary:					
1st & 2nd	1,663	1,655	1,670	1,666	1,704
3rd or higher	424	334	352	432	741
	Births to date per 1,000 women				
Total	219	454	774	1,442	2,266
1st	179	327	486	725	876
2nd	n.a.	101	219	469	718
1st & 2nd	n.a.	428	705	1,194	1,594
3rd or higher	n.a.	26	69	248	672
	Percentage of expected births that have occurred				
Total	10.5	22.8	38.3	68.7	92.7
1st	20.2	36.7	53.9	80.7	96.3
2nd	n.a.	13.2	28.5	61.1	90.4
1st & 2nd	n.a.	25.9	42.2	71.7	93.5
3rd or higher	n.a.	7.8	19.6	57.4	90.7

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Fertility of American Women: June 1976," in *Current Population Reports*, ser. P-20, no. 308 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1977), pp. 12 and 14.

first and second births as they now think they will have and (2) whether they will be able to limit third and higher births to such a low number, in view of the fact that, even with improved fertility control, excess births are still reported.

In the next section we shall examine the recent experience of the cohorts of the 1940s and 1950s to see how consistent it has been with their reported birth expectations.

RECENT CHILDBEARING RECORD OF THE COHORTS OF THE 1940s AND 1950s

The various cohorts of the 1940s and 1950s are now at very different stages of their reproductive lives. As shown in table 4, the cohorts of 1942

46 (aged 30–34 in 1976) had borne 93 percent of their expected total of 2,445 births per 1,000 women. However, members of the younger cohorts, who expect to have 2,000–2,100 births per 1,000 women, had borne a substantially smaller proportion of their expected total number of births by 1976.

If the cohorts of the late 1940s and the 1950s have as many births as they expect to have, they will have to increase their fertility rates at the later childbearing ages in comparison with rates observed for earlier cohorts. An approximate idea of the extent to which they will have to compensate for low fertility at the younger childbearing ages can be gained from figures 2 and 3, which show the age pattern of childbearing reported for the cohorts of 1931 to 1960, for first and second births separately.

Figure 2 shows that the cohorts of 1936–40 had the youngest age distribution of first births. By 1960, when they had reached ages 20–24, they had borne 525 first births per 1,000 women. The next set of cohorts (1941–45) had only 486 first births per 1,000 women by 1965 when they also reached ages 20–24. However, they had almost as many first births in the next five-year period as the earlier cohort group had at the same ages and actually had more first births between ages 25–29 and 30–34 than did the 1936–40 cohorts. In other words, after 1970 the 1941–45 cohorts began compensating for having had fewer first births at the younger childbearing ages.

Figure 2 also shows that the cohorts of 1946 and later will have to compensate to an even greater extent than did the 1941–45 cohorts for low first birth rates at the younger childbearing ages. For example, the 1951–55 cohorts had borne only 375 first births per 1,000 women by 1975, when they reached ages 20–24. This was 150 births fewer than the cohorts of 1936–40 had borne by the same ages. If the cohorts of 1951–55 complete their fertility with 900 or more first births per 1,000 women, they will have to distribute this deficit of 150 births over the remainder of the childbearing years of life. This is not impossible from a physiological point of view; but the major question is whether women who have postponed first births before age 25 will want to have them as they reach the later childbearing years. It is entirely possible that some of these "postponements" will become "cancellations."

Approximately the same observations apply to second births, as shown in figure 3. Again, the 1936–40 cohorts had the largest number of second births in the early childbearing years, and again the 1941–45 cohorts began to compensate for their earlier low fertility rates in the 1970s.

The main question emerging from these comparisons is whether the cohorts of 1946–60 will catch up with the earlier cohorts after recording such low fertility rates in the late 1960s and 1970s. We do not yet have data to demonstrate conclusively whether a compensatory rise in fertility at the later childbearing ages is or is not occurring among the members of these cohorts, but such data will become available in the years immediately ahead. If annual birth statistics continue to show increases in rates for first and second births at ages 25–29 and 30–34, it will mean that the compensation for low fertility rates at the younger ages is proceeding. In fact, this may account for the slight rise in monthly

FIGURE 2

Cumulative Birth Rates and Additions to Cumulative Birth Rates up to Jan. 1, 1975, First Births to Cohorts of 1931–35 to 1956–60.





FIGURE 3

Cumulative Birth Rates and Additions to Cumulative Birth Rates up to Jan. 1, 1975, Second Births to Cohorts of 1931–35 to 1956–60



fertility rates that has been going on since the latter half of 1976. It is impossible to verify this interpretation because fertility rates by age and order of birth are not yet available for 1976.

THE IMMEDIATE FUTURE

If women do have more children at the later ages to make up for previously postponed births, how much will the total fertility rate rise? In 1975, the total fertility rate was 1,770. The component of this rate representing first and second births was 1,256 and the component representing third and higher order births was 514. If the completed fertility rate for first and second births rises to 1,700, in accordance with the stated expectations of young women, the total fertility rate for first and second births will also eventually rise to this level, resulting in an increase of over 400 in the total fertility rate. However, if young cohorts eventually have only 400 third and higher order births per 1,000 women, this will take away about 100 births from the total fertility rate. Therefore, if current expectations are achieved, the total fertility rate would rise about 300 points to a level near 2,100, bringing about an increase of 15 to 20 percent in the total fertility rate.

This outcome is approximately consistent with the "Series II" projections of the total fertility rate prepared by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, which assume that the total fertility rate will rise to approximately 2,100 by the end of this century.[3] It is possible that this change will occur more rapidly than assumed in Series II, but the Census Bureau projections provide a reasonable model of what might be expected to occur. Series II shows the annual number of births rising from a current level of around 3.2 million to 4 million by the 1980s. It also shows the birth rate rising from 15 births per 1,000 population to about 17 in the 1980s.

However, it is still entirely possible that young women of reproductive age will not meet their current goal of 1,700 first and second births per 1,000 women. If they return to the levels of childlessness and one-child families reported by the cohorts of the early 1900s, they may complete their fertility with as few as 1,300 or 1,400 first and second births per 1,000 women. If, in addition, they limit third and higher order births to the expected level of 400, the total fertility rate could remain at the low levels recorded in recent years.

THE LONG-TERM FUTURE

The preceding description of trends and projections shows that fertility patterns in the United States are structured in such a way as to bring about large fluctuations in annual and cohort rates. At no time in the past has either the completed fertility rate or the total fertility rate remained constant over a long series of cohorts or a long period of time. Furthermore, in the experience of the United States and of other countries, changes in the age distribution of fertility rates have tended to reinforce changes in completed fertility rates. That is, increases in completed fertility rates have been accompanied by high rates at both the younger and older reproductive ages and declining completed fertility rates

3. U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Projections of the Population of the United States: 1977–2050," in *Current Population Reports*, ser. P-25, no. 704 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1977).

have been accompanied by relatively low rates at the younger and older reproductive ages. Hypothetically, rates could be constructed that would dampen, rather than intensify, trends in annual measures of fertility, but this is not what has happened in the real world. Therefore, it would seem reasonable to expect fairly substantial fluctuations to continue in the future.

For the following reasons it seems doubtful, however, that we will again witness as large a rise in the completed fertility rate as occurred between the cohorts of 1908 and 1933. First, any future rise cannot simulate the rise between the cohorts of the early 1900s and those of the early 1930s because these increases in completed fertility rates were brought about, in part, by the widespread rejection of childlessness. At the present time, it does not appear likely that cohorts now in the younger reproductive years of life will accept childlessness to the extent that the cohorts of 1906–15 did. Secondly, even during the rise in completed fertility in the United States, about one-third of third and higher order births were reported as unwanted.[4] With improvements in fertility control, such births need no longer occur. In fact, as of 1973, only one-sixth of third and higher order births were reported as unwanted.[5] Third, even during the rise in completed fertility rates, the probability of having sixth a higher order births continued to cline, signifying the continued d away from large families. In su mary, the only way to reverse trend toward low completed fertil rates is for third and higher or births to rise, because the expect rates for first and second births close to the highest levels ever corded in the United States. At present time the prospects for an crease in third and higher or births do not appear to be great.

SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CAUSES CHANGES IN FERTILITY

A number of hypotheses h been developed to account changes in levels of fertility various societies. Perhaps the b known is associated with the "der graphic transition," during which clines in birth rates followed clines in death rates as societ became industrialized. The declin in birth rates were thought to h been due, in part, to the fact t children lost their economic util as societies became less rural-a cultural and more urban-industr It has also been hypothesized t as the mortality of children clined, with improvements in san tion and living conditions, coup tended to reduce their fertility cause it was not necessary to h as many births as previously to sure the survival of a given numl of children.

Such hypotheses applied only the long-term decline in fertility t began over a century ago in dev oped countries. When fertility rose the United States and other countr after World War II, new hypothe were introduced to explain the ri The most prominent of these v developed by Richard A. Easter

4. This estimate is based on unpublished tabulations from the 1960 Growth of American Families Study reported in: Pascal K. Whelpton, Arthur A. Campbell, and John E. Patterson, *Fertility and Family Planning in the United States* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1966).

5. National Center for Health Statistics, "Wanted and Unwanted Births Reported by Mothers 15–44 Years of Age: United States, 1973," *Advance Data from Vital and Health Statistics*, no. 9, (August 10, 1977), p. 4.

who saw the postwar rise in fertility as the result of economic conditions and aspirations that made it possible for young couples to find relatively well-paying jobs, to marry, and to have children early in marriage.[6] Easterlin also points out that the cohorts that were in the younger portion of the labor force between 1945 and 1960 were born in the late 1920s and 1930s, when annual numbers of births were the lowest recorded in the United States since the nineteenth century. Because the members of these cohorts were so limited in number, there was relatively little competition for jobs among them, and they felt economically secure at an early stage in their marriages. Also, they were born during the Depression or spent their early childhood years in the 1930s, when they formed relatively modest material aspirations that did not interfere with their desire for children.[7]

Easterlin has also hypothesized that the low fertility of the cohorts of the 1940s and 1950s is related to their relatively large numbers, which increases competition for available jobs when they enter the labor force, and that since they developed their material aspirations during a period of economic expansion, they would not be as willing as earlier cohorts to forego the levels of living consistent with these aspirations simply to have children.[8]

Another hypothesis, developed by Larry Bumpass, relates specifically to the recent decline in fertility. He proposes that with improved methods of contraception, such as the pill, childbearing has become voluntary to an extent that it was not in the past, and that as a result decisions regarding when to have children and how many to have are becoming more deliberate.[9] In the process of arriving at such decisions, couples will count not only the benefits of having children but also the costs—in terms of the limitations imposed by parenthood as well as economic costs. These calculations will lead them to decide to have no children or very few.

If Easterlin is correct, the completed fertility rate, as well as the total fertility rate, will continue to rise and fall as cohort size and economic conditions vary, though perhaps the fluctuations will not be as great as those in the past. If Bumpass is right, the completed fertility rate will continue relatively unchanged at levels near or below replacement (that is, at 2,100 or below), and fluctuations in the total fertility rate will be limited to those arising from changes in the age distribution of childbearing.

Hypotheses linking changes in fertility with changes in economic and social conditions are necessarily tentative. We can only hope that further research will provide more substantial knowledge about the social and economic factors affecting trends in fertility.

6. Richard A Easterlin, "The American Baby Boom in Historical Perspective" (Occasional paper no. 79, National Bureau of Economic Research, 1962).

7. Richard A. Easterlin, "Relative Economic Status and the American Fertility Swing," in *Social Structure, Family Life Styles, and Economic Behavior*, ed. Eleanor B. Sheldon (Philadelphia, Pa. Lippincott, 1972).

8. Richard A. Easterlin, "The Conflict Between Aspirations and Resources," *Population and Development Review*, vol 2, nos 3 and 4 (September/December 1972) pp. 417–26.

9 Larry L Bumpass, "Is Low Fertility Here to Stay?," *Family Planning Perspectives*, vol 5, no. 2 (Spring 1973) pp. 67–69.

Table 1/1
POPULATION GROWTH: 1790–2040

YEAR AND SERIES[1]	Population[2] (thousands)	Average annual rate of change (percent)	YEAR AND SERIES[1]	Population[2] (thousands)	Averag annual rate of change (percen
1790	3,929	(X)	1980 (Series I)	225,705	0.97
1800	5,297	2.99	1980 (Series II) ...	222,769	.84
1810	7,224	3.10	1980 (Series III) ...	220,356	.73
1820	9,618	2.86	1990 (Series I)	257,663	1.32
1830	12,901	2.94	1990 (Series II) ...	245,075	.95
			1990 (Series III) ...	235,581	.67
1840	17,120	2.83	2000 (Series I)	287,007	1.08
1850	23,261	3.07			
1860	31,513	3.04	2000 (Series II) ...	262,494	.69
1870	39,905	2.36	2000 (Series III) ...	245,098	.40
1880	50,262	2.31	2010 (Series I)	322,049	1.15
			2010 (Series II) ...	278,754	.60
1890	63,056	2.27	2010 (Series III) ...	250,193	.21
1900	76,094	1.88	2020 (Series I)	362,348	1.18
1910	92,407	1.94	2020 (Series II) ...	294,046	.53
1920	106,461	1.42			
1930	123,077	1.46	2020 (Series III) ...	251,884	.07
			2030 (Series I) ...	402,592	1.05
1940	132,594	74	2030 (Series II) ...	304,328	.34
1950	152,271	1.38	2030 (Series III) ...	247,347	– 18
1960	180,671	1.71	2040 (Series I)	448,872	1.09
1970	204,879	1.26	2040 (Series II) ..	312,035	.25
			2040 (Series III) ...	237,926	–.39

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics of the United States, Colonial Times to 1970*, and *Current Population Reports*, Series P-25, No 601.

X Not applicable.

[1] Series I presumes a fertility level of 2.7 children born per woman; Series II 2.1 children; Series III, 1.7 children.

[2] Beginning in 1940, data include U.S. Armed Forces oversease. Data prior to 1940 exclude Alaska, Hawaii, and the Armed Forces overseas.

Chart 1/1A

Social Indicators, 1976

POPULATION GROWTH: 1790–2040





Chart 1/1B

AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF POPULATION CHANGE BETWEEN DECENNIAL CENSUS YEARS: 1790–2040



Source: see table 1/1

Table 1/5
COMPONENTS OF POPULATION CHANGE: 1930–2000
(Thousands)

CALENDAR YEAR	NET CHANGE[1]	BIRTHS[2]	DEATHS[3]	NET CIVILIAN IMMIGRATION
1930	1,128	2,618	1,419	113
1931	871	2,506	1,395	−16
1932	775	2,440	1,382	−62
1933	753	2,307	1,369	−34
1934	860	2,396	1,425	−7
1935	853	2,377	1,421	−2
1936	754	2,355	1,509	12
1937	864	2,413	1,480	33
1938	1,066	2,496	1,410	50
1939	1,039	2,466	1,416	53
1940	1,221	2,570	1,432	77
1941	1,382	2,716	1,415	60
1942	1,714	3,002	1,407	83
1943	1,799	3,118	1,503	148
1944	1,597	2,954	1,582	202
1945	1,462	2,873	1,549	162
1946	2,165	3,426	1,409	151
1947	2,653	3,834	1,455	238
1948	2,533	3,655	1,453	280
1949	2,556	3,667	1,452	323
1950	2,486	3,645	1,468	299
1951	2,588	3,845	1,501	335
1952	2,663	3,933	1,512	242
1953	2,717	3,989	1,531	261
1954	2,898	4,102	1,489	287
1955	2,925	4,128	1,537	337
1956	3,058	4,244	1,572	387
1957	2,961	4,332	1,641	272
1958	2,915	4,279	1,655	292
1959	2,939	4,313	1,663	292
1960	2,901	4,307	1,708	327
1961	2,955	4,317	1,703	373
1962	2,771	4,213	1,758	351
1963	2,655	4,142	1,815	361
1964	2,555	4,070	1,799	317
1965	2,315	3,801	1,830	373
1966	2,197	3,642	1,869	455
1967	2,072	3,555	1,861	414
1968	1,952	3,535	1,948	398
1969	2,089	3,630	1,934	453
1970	2,227	3,739	1,927	438
1971	2,012	3,556	1,930	387
1972	1,623	3,258	1,965	325
1973	1,494	3,137	1,974	331
1974	1,591	3,166	1,933	360

Table 1/5 (*Continued*)

CALENDAR YEAR	NET CHANGE[1]	BIRTHS[2]	DEATHS[3]	NET CIVILIAN IMMIGRATION
PROJECTIONS (Series II[4])[5]				
1975	1,582	3,232	2,050	400
1976	1,682	3,355	2,073	400
1977	1,802	3,500	2,098	400
1978	1,926	3,648	2,122	400
1979	2,045	3,792	2,147	400
1980	2,155	3,926	2,171	400
1981	2,220	4,014	2,194	400
1982	2,259	4,076	2,217	400
1983	2,284	4,124	2,240	400
1984	2,292	4,156	2,264	400
1985	2,284	4,172	2,288	400
1986	2,264	4,174	2,310	400
1987	2,232	4,164	2,332	400
1988	2,188	4,144	2,356	400
1989	2,134	4,114	2,380	400
1990	2,068	4,072	2,404	400
1991	1,996	4,025	2,429	400
1992	1,920	3,974	2,454	400
1993	1,844	3,922	2,478	400
1994	1,772	3,874	2,502	400
1995	1,706	3,832	2,526	400
1996	1,650	3,799	2,549	400
1997	1,606	3,778	2,572	400
1998	1,575	3,769	2,594	400
1999	1,556	3,774	2,618	400
2000	1,550	3,792	2,642	400

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-25, Nos. 521 and 541.

Note: Includes Alaska and Hawaii and Armed Forces abroad after 1939.

[1] Includes estimates of overseas admissions into and discharges from the Armed Forces and the error of closure between censuses.

[2] Adjusted for underregistration through March 1970.


[3] Deaths occurring in the United States plus estimated deaths occurring in the Armed Forces abroad except for 1930 through 1939 where the estimates are for the resident population of the conterminous United States only. Infant deaths adjusted for underregistration through March 1960.

[4] Series II presumes a fertility level of 2.1 children born per woman.

[5] *Obtained by linear interpolation between successive fiscal year projections.*

Chart 1/5 Social Indicators, 197

COMPONENTS OF POPULATION CHANGE: 1930–2000



Source: see table 1/5

Table 1/6

FERTILITY RATES, BY RACE: 1940–1974


(Data relate to births adjusted for underregistration, 1940 to 1959; after 1959, data relate to registered births without further adjustment)

YEAR	TOTAL	WHITE	BLACK AND OTHER RACES	YEAR	TOTAL	WHITE	BLACK AND OTHER RACES
1940	2,301.3	2,229.1	2,870.2	1958	3,700.5	3,559.9	4,726.9
1941	2,399.1	2,328.0	2,956.3	1959	3,712.4	3,567.4	4,774.3
1942	2,628.3	2,577.3	3,022.1	1960	3,653.6	3,532.9	4,522.1
1943	2,718.3	2,664.3	3,128.2	1961	3,629.0	3,501.9	4,532.6
1944	2,567.6	2,500.5	3,075.0	1962	3,473.5	3,347.5	4,395.8
1945	2,491.2	2,421.2	3,016.7	1963	3,333.2	3,201.2	4,268.7
1946	2,942.7	2,900.9	3,238.3	1964	3,207.5	3,073.7	4,153.4
1947	3,273.5	3,229.5	3,575.3	1965	2,928.0	2,790.3	3,891.4
1948	3,108.5	3,021.7	3,742.1	1966	2,736.1	2,609.2	3,614.9
1949	3,110.1	3,008.7	3,854.8	1967	2,572.6	2,453.1	3,385.3
1950	3,090.5	2,976.8	3,928.3	1968	2,476.8	2,368.4	3,196.9
1951	3,269.3	3,156.9	4,091.2	1969	2,465.0	2,360.3	3,150.5
1952	3,358.4	3,249.9	4,146.9	1970	2,480.0	2,385.0	3,066.5
1953	3,424.1	3,306.4	4,283.4	1971	2,274.6	2,168.5	2,933.0
1954	3,542.6	3,415.1	4,473.9	1972	2,021.9	1,918.5	2,650.5
1955	3,579.7	3,446.0	4,549.7	1973	1,895.6	1,799.0	2,474.0
1956	3,689.0	3,545.5	4,729.9	1974	1,856.6	1,768.0	2,377.0
1957	3,767.0	3,625.2	4,797.8				

Source: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, National Center for Health Statistics, *Vital Statistics of the United States, 1968*, Vol. I; *Vital Statistics of the United States, 1969*, Vol. I; and *Monthly Vital Statistics Report*, Vol. 23, No. 11.

Chart 1/6 Social Indicators, 1

FERTILITY RATES, BY RACE: 1940–1974



Source: see table 1/6

ANNALS, AAPSS, 435, Jan. 1978

Finally the Family

By MURRAY S. WEITZMAN

ABSTRACT: The family makes a belated but welcome appearance in *Social Indicators, 1976* after being all but ignored in *Social Indicators, 1973*. In recent years, statistics on the family have recorded a steady increase in the divorce rate, a decline in both the marriage and birth rates, and a rising proportion of premarital births to total births. These trends translate into family structures in which an increasing proportion of children are members of single-parent families. Although not inevitable, on balance some harmful spillover effects are probably generated such as less attractive human personal qualities, declining domestic tranquility in the community, and decreasing individual capability for educational achievement, work accomplishment, and earning power. After this second run through of social indicators, there seems to be sufficient evidence that, while the work was conducted by very competent people, the operational structure is far from optimal for achieving sustained progress in this field. Producing social indicators requires more than a process of searching and soliciting statistical tables from the statistical networks, assembling them in packages of charts, tables, and texts and marketing them in attractive publications. In the end it may come down to the fact that insufficient resources have been committed to these social indicator projects, precluding the formation of proper operational goals, rather than concluding that social indicator efforts are bereft of potential.

Murray S. Weitzman was Assistant Division Chief of the Population Division, U.S. Bureau of the Census in charge of Socioeconomic Statistics Programs from 1962 to 1977, and is now a Senior Researcher and Advisor on these subjects. He received a Doctorate in Economics from the University of Paris in 1950, and a masters degree from Columbia University in 1948. Prior research experience includes work

on manpower and other economic aspects of the U.S.S.R. at the Bureau, parti tion in the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics' Interindustry Study of the Ame Economy for 1947 and its Long Range Economic Projections of the Ame Economy.

I am deeply grateful and indebted to two distinguished colleagues in the Population sion, U.S. Bureau of the Census, Dr Paul C. Glick and Mr. Arthur J. Norton for their con tions to whatever measure of expertise I may have acquired with respect to the family and f statistics. Remaining shortcomings and personal perceptions in this paper are my own.

THE SECRET is out in *Social Indicators, 1976*. The family in this country continues to occupy a central and critical role in meeting many of the compelling needs of the young and not-so-young alike. Most would agree with this observation, including the people who assembled and issued *Social Indicators, 1973*. However, if there had been a request from this journal, or a similar one, for a set of interpretive papers in connection with the earlier social indicator report, a paper on the family would not have been required because the family was not of major significance in that volume. The family had become a noninstitution, deprived of its own proper identity, and was to be found only as a classification variable in *Social Indicators, 1973*, primarily in chapter 5 dealing with income.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, statistics on the family have recorded a steady increase in the divorce rate, a decline in both the marriage and birth rates, and a rising proportion of premarital births to total births. These statistics translate into family structures in which an increasing proportion of children are members of single-parent families, primarily headed by women. Although not inevitable, on balance some harmful spillover effects rising social and economic cost probably generated; for exan less attractive human personal (ities and interpersonal relations. domestic tranquility in the con nity and less individual capak for educational achievement, accomplishment, and earning po Whether the population's ex ences involving marriage, div births, and living arrangements to stabilize, turn around, or cont current trends is a matter of in tance to all in every walk of life endeavor. From stuff such as significant social indicators sh emerge.

FAMILY INDICATORS

It should be pointed out tha census defines a family as all per related by blood, marriage, or a tion who live in the same hou unit. This is a narrow defin which diminishes to some exte value for purposes of social in tors. Working within its traditi operational framework of cour persons, assigning them to ho holds, and identifying and com ing them into families where ap priate, the Census Bureau has been in a position to date to exp systematically more extensive intricate family relationships,

the support and communication systems developed among kin networks. Ignoring behavioral patterns nurtured through affection, tradition, and family duty because of a lack of kinship information, not only removes a significant factor from consideration in the assessment of family life, but can affect the interpretation accorded family developments within a social indicator context. As an example of the limiting nature of the census definition of the family, part of a statement in *Social Indicators, 1976* seems to be unwarranted. The statement reads as follows:

> . . . the proportion of older men who are heads of their own households (either heads of primary families or primary individuals) has risen from 80 percent in 1955 to 95 percent in 1975—a clear indication of both growing independence and growing isolation of this population group.[1]

Although one can conjecture about the socioeconomic status of older men, it is not possible to infer solely from census data on living arrangements that there is a growing isolation of older men in the population—a negative social indicator in contrast to growing independence—a positive one.

Trends in family size and composition

The complement of charts and data in *Social Indicators, 1976* that serve to depict family size and composition catch many of the significant movements of the past decades and miss others. This is probably inevitable in the sort of statistical anthology that *Social Indicators, 1976* represents. The prose accompanying the statistical material is so calm and considered that the full impact of some of the profound developments changing the nature, characteristics, roles, and functions of the family and family members can go unrecognized. Although some enlightenment may be expected from review articles such as this one, further improvements may still be possible in Social Indicators' publications without the need to resort to editorializing. The reservations here expressed are well illustrated in the paragraph which begins the *Social Indicators, 1976* section on trends in family size and composition:

> The general trend during the past three decades in the growth of the number of families in the U.S. has been relatively stable. Projections of the number of families to the year 1990 reflect this stability and provide some insight into future demands in the area of family needs. While the husband-wife family group (over four-fifths of all families) remains the basic core of family types, the family headed by a female (with no husband present) will continue to be an important group affecting family and child care-related decisions.[2]

The distinct impression conveyed is that very little dynamic development has occured in the family during the past three decades. Although this impression is modified somewhat in the succeeding paragraphs, the tenor of the family conditions described in *Social Indicators, 1976* leads me to conclude that any overall summary would have to stress the thought that family composition, on balance, has been relatively stable during the past decades.

1. U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Federal Statistical Policy and Standards and Bureau of the Census, *Social Indicators, 1976* (Washington, D.C. USGPO, 1977), chap 2, sec. II: "Living Arrangements."

2. *Social Indicators, 1976*, chap. 2, sec. I: "Trends in Family Size and Composition."

1. Family Growth and Composition

For the period 1960 to 1975, families as a group have been increasing more rapidly than husband/wife families with spouse present. All families increased from 45,149,000 in 1960 to 51,237,000 in 1970, an increase of 13.5 percent.[3] For the same period, the percent increase for husband/wife families was 12.1 percent, slightly lower than for all families. However, the disparity increased considerably from 1970 to 1975. Comparable estimates, which are multiplied by two to compare with those from 1960 to 1970, are 17.4 percent for all families and 11.4 percent for husband/wife families. Among black families, the 1970 to 1975 percent change on a decade basis is 30.4 percent for all families and 6.0 percent for husband/wife families.

All told, husband/wife families registered a sluggish increase of 2.2 million units between 1970 and 1975 on a 1970 base of 44.8 million families. In contrast, families headed by a female registered a strong 1.6 million gain from 5.6 million in 1970 to 7.2 million in 1975. Divorced women maintaining families were up 850 thousand from 1,260 thousand in 1970, while separated were up 400 thousand and single women heading families were up 300 thousand over 1970. Surely something more than relative stability has been occurri in family composition, somethi which can be extracted from the d: included in *Social Indicators, 19*

The combination of sharp increa: in the numbers and proportions female heads of families, no spou present, and wives in the paid lab force represent one of the m striking modifications in the comp sition of families. Not only is the t ditional type of family, the husba wife family, with wife not in the pa labor force, in decline, it may also in disrepute among some memb of the population. More than o wife has felt the need to defend a justify herself when, in respondi to the question What do you d answers that she is a homemak seeing to the welfare of her husba and children.


In 1960, 62 percent of all families the United States consisted of hu band/wife families with wife not the paid labor force, 25 percent hu band/wife families with wife in t paid labor force, and 10 percent male heads of families (figure 1). 1970, the leading family group re resented only 52 percent of all fa ilies as the other two family comp nents under discussion increas their proportions of all families to and 11 percent, respectively. Som time between 1973 and 1974, hu band/wife families with wife not the labor force dipped below 50 pe cent. The reading for this group as March 1975 was 48 percent of families and by March 1976 it h further declined to 47 percent.

2. Marital Status

The text in *Social Indicators, 19* that relates to marital status of t population 14 years old and over sex, standardized on the basis of t age distribution in 1960, is a clas

3. Adjustments following revisions to 1970 census-based population controls result in the following revised estimates in parentheses, 13.5 percent (14.4 percent), 12.1 percent (13.8 per cent) 17.4 percent (16.0 percent) and 11.4 percent (10.0 percent). Estimates based on the Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Survey* are subject to sampling variability, nonresponse, and respondent bias. Therefore, it is possible that not all comparisons made in this paper, and based on the *Current Population Survey*, are statistically significant at designated standard errors of estimate.

FIGURE 1: TYPE OF FAMILY AS A PERCENT OF ALL FAMILIES: 1960, 1975



SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Survey*.

illustration of the danger of over looking the many significant changes taking place among the various components by presenting the data in terms of a general average. It states:

> Taking the changing age distribution of the adult population into account, it is evident that the proportion of married persons has remained remarkably stable over the 25-year span from 1950 to 1975. The only major changes in these proportions have occurred among the ("divorced") categories which have risen among both men and women.[4]

This "remarkably stable" proportion of married persons in the population, when standardized for age distribution, masks some significant developments. It is true that the percent of the married female population was 63.9 in 1950 and 63.5 in 1975, but the intermediate years include estimates of 65.6 percent in 1960 and 64.9 percent in 1970. In this instance, the stability referred to in the married component of the marital status of the population diverts attention from significant developments occurring among the different age groups at various stages of life. It tends to be the exception rather than the rule when many components of an aggregate or summary statistic move in the same direction and within a narrow range. It has been observed that prices in specific product markets do not move or mirror average price movements, but rather tend to adjust to specific supply and demand conditions, although general economic conditions undoubtedly do influence such markets.

Although those eligible for marriage can be drawn theoretically from the entire eligible population, generally, specific marriage markets neither encompass the entire age spectru nor run the gamut of persons wi widely varying backgrounds. B it should be possible, and such a effort is made in the following par graphs to demonstrate that there some merit in the criticisms raise with respect to the particular obse vation cited in *Social Indicator 1976* about the "remarkable stabi ity" in the proportion of marrie persons.

A bit of detective work into th basic marriage data for the yea 1950, 1960, 1970, and 1975, and e tending the review to some oth years not shown in the report— 1959, 1965, 1977—reveals differe timing patterns of peaks and troug with respect to the percent of wome married by age groupings. If we co sider marriage to be the preferr living arrangement for adults of th opposite sex, then we can formula the following propositions with r spect to the occurrences of peak an trough years for the percent women married by age group:

1. The more recent the peak yea the more positive the social i dicator;
2. The less recent the peak year, th less positive the social indicato
3. The more recent the trough yea the less positive the social indic tor; and
4. The less recent the trough yea the more positive the social i dicator.

It is possible to limit the descriptic of the changes that have occurred i the percent of married women b age group to the years cited in *Soci Indicators, 1976* without distortir the basic trends. However, the add tion of three years to the analysis, compromise to showing consecutiv years of annual data, lends a bit mor

4. *Social Indicators, 1976*, chap. 2, sec. III: "Family Stability."

TABLE 1

PERCENT OF WOMEN MARRIED BY AGE GROUP: IDENTIFICATION OF PEAKS AND TROUGHS FOR SELECTED YEARS: 1950–77

	PEAK YEAR—PERCENT MARRIED							TROUGH YEAR—PERCENT MARRIED							
	Positive Tendency in Terms of a Social Indicator ←							Negative Tendency in Terms of a Social Indicator ←							
	Negative Tendency in Terms of a Social Indicator →							Positive Tendency in Terms of a Social Indicator →							
AGE OF WOMEN	MOST RECENT YEAR (1977)	1975	1970	(1965)	1960	(1959)	LEAST RECENT YEAR 1950	MOST RECENT YEAR (1977)	1975	1970	(1965)	1960	(1959)	LEAST RECENT YEAR 1950	AGE OF WOMEN
14–17							5.9	2.5 ←		2.7					14–17
18–19						33.7 ←	31.6	19 8 ←	21.6						18–19
20–24					69.3 →	69 7		51.3 ←	55.9						20–24
25–29					87.4 →	87 8		75.8 ←	79 3						25–29
30–34				90.5 ←	88.8			82.8 ←	84.8						30–34
35–44				87.9 ←	87.4			83.1 ←						83.7	35–44
45–54			82.2											77.3	45–54
55–64	70.1 ←	69 3												65.1	55–64
65–74	49.5 ←	49.0								45.1					65–74
75+		23.4									20.2 ←	21.0			75+

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Survey* and table 2.
NOTE: Years in parentheses represent additional years not included in table and chart 2/3, *Social Indicators, 1976*.

currency to the data; it also suggests that data shown only for selected years may miss the actual peaks and troughs and, therefore, understate the degree of change that has actually taken place. In table 1, whenever the peak or trough year did not occur in the year cited in *Social Indicators, 1976*, there are two percents entered, one for the year cited in the report and the other for the year in which the peak or trough is indicated. The basic background data are presented in table 2 and show the variability and trends in percent married by age group.

From the data in table 1, it is apparent that for the selected years shown, marriage as a positive social indicator has had a checkered performance record when disaggregated by age. In contrast to the statement in *Social Indicators, 1976* noting the remarkable stability of the production of married persons, performance has tended to be negative for groups of women under 44 years of age, with poorer records for the younger women in this group. The latter tended to peak earlier and to trough later. For women 45 years and older, the trough years occurred at an earlier time than did the peak ones.

Marital status data in an age cohort format by race (black and white) and sex are intrinsically interesting in that they represent an historical tracing of people in the same chronological age group who have been exposed to generally common experiences under fairly comparable conditions. The effects of particular historical experiences tend to linger and influence current and future actions. Generally the analytic potential of the data is increased and the forecasting potential enhanced when it is feasible to combine a series of age cohorts into a single system and display it in tables and charts. The potential of this type of presentation is illustrated in table 2, in which se-

TABLE 2

PERCENT OF WOMEN MARRIED BY AGE GROUP: SELECTED YEARS 1950–77

AGE OF WOMEN	(1977)	1975	1970	(1965)	1960	(1959)	1950	AGE OF WOMEN
Total	59.3	60.4	61.9	63.9	65.6	66.3	66.1	Total
14–17	2.5	2.8	2.7	3.4	4.5	4.2	5.9	14–17
18–19	19.8	21.6	24.0	26.0	28.1	33.7	31.6	18–19
20–24	51.3	55.9	61.6	65.6	69.3	69.7	66.2	20–24
25–29	75.8	79.3	84.7	87.2	87.4	87.8	85.5	25–29
30–34	82.8	84.5	88.4	90.5	88.8	89.1		30–34
35–44	83.1	84.8	87.0	87.9	87.4	87.1	83.7	35–44
45–54	80.5	79.9	82.2	81.8	78.9	78.4	77.3	45–54
55–64	70.1	69.3	67.4	66.8	65.7	65.2	65.1	55–64
65–74	49.5	49.0	45.1	45.7	45.4	46.6	36.0	65–74
75 and over	21.5	23.4	21.0	20.2	21.0	20.8		75 and over

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Survey*.

NOTE: Years in parentheses represent additional years not included in table and chart 2/3, *Social Indicators, 1976*

lected comparable age cohorts are linked by arrows from earlier years to later years.

Family stability

The section in *Social Indicators, 1976* dealing with family stability (Section III) concentrates on the formation and dissolution, via divorce, of husband/wife families and subsequent impact on the living arrangements of children. Although about 85 percent of all families are husband/wife families, a more apt title might be marital stability rather than family stability. There are, after all, many single-parent families headed by women or men that surely qualify as stable irrespective of the parents' martial status. In this context, the lead sentence in Section III seems less than precise: "Trends in the number of first marriages, divorces, and remarriages provide measures of family stability."[5]

Examining the information contained in the tables in this section and conceding that the term family stability is tantamount to husband/wife family stability, it is still questionable whether trends in marriage, divorces, and remarriages measure family stability. At best, it would seem that such trends and accompanying rates are suggestive of changes taking place in family stability and can possibly provide some intermediate inputs or corroborative information in estimating the duration of marriages and intervals between marriages.

As used in this section on family stability, data on marriages and divorces seem to be more appropriate in connection with husband-wife family growth and composition (Section I) than in connection with overall family stability. Data on marriages, divorces, and remarriages could be employed in preparing estimates of components of husband/wife family change paralleling estimates of components of population change for specific years, that is, the number of births, deaths, and net immigration. This latter series makes it possible to examine the amount that each element contributes to the change in population between two successive years. Similarly, for components of family change, it would be possible to estimate the major factors contributing to changes in husband/wife family numbers between successive periods, subject to errors of closure. In constructing this type of series, it would be necessary, in addition to marriage and divorce data, to introduce data on dissolution of marriage by the death of at least one marital partner. Also required would be adjustments for the net increase or decrease in husband/wife families arising from entries and exits from the country.

Because of the interrelationships between marital status and living arrangements of the population, estimates of component changes of husband/wife families during the period influence the number and average size of other family types and unrelatedness—the number, age, and sex of unrelated individuals. In effect the procedure would have many of the elements of a double entry system and would be geared to measure gross flows in reconciling and understanding net changes for specific family and unrelated individual groups. For example, families headed by a female are added during a period to the number of such families that were in existence at the beginning of the period as a result of the temporary absence of the husband, divorce, or the death of the husband which, of course, represent major attrition elements from the number of

5. Ibid.

husband/wife families in existence at the beginning of the period. Subtractions from the number of female heads of families during the course of the period arise for such reasons as the return of the husband, remarriages, death of the female head, or exit of all family members from the home resulting in the reclassification of the female head to that of an unrelated individual.

If in this instance the use of marriage and divorce data is less than satisfactory as a social indicator for measuring the stability of husband/wife families, are there any kinds of data available or on the horizon that can better meet this objective? One worthwhile approach may be the actuarial type of statistical statement that is used in life expectancy estimates: the number of children of given age cohort of women are likely to have by the end of their childbearing years, and length of working life.

Table 3 illustrates a probability approach to measure husband/wife family stability. The table displays the percent of ever-married persons by sex and year of birth whose first marriage had already ended in divorce in June 1975 and also the per-

TABLE 3

PERCENT OF EVER-MARRIED PERSONS WHOSE FIRST MARRIAGE MAY EVENTUALLY END IN DIVORCE AND WHOSE SECOND MARRIAGE MAY EVENTUALLY END IN REDIVORCE BY YEAR OF BIRTH AND SEX: JUNE 1975

Sex and Year of Birth	Percent of Ever-Married Persons Whose First Marriage—		Percent of Persons Married Twice Whose Second Marriage—	
	Had Ended in Divorce by 1975	May Eventually End in Divorce*	Had Ended in Redivorce by 1975	May Eventually End in Redivorce*
MALE				
1945–1949	13	34	5	35
1940–1944	17	31	6	32
1935–1939	20	29	5	28
1930–1934	18	24	8	24
1925–1929	18	22	7	20
1920–1924	18	20	9	18
1915–1919	17	18	9	13
1910–1914	17	17	7	9
1905–1909	15	15	7	8
1900–1904	13	13	6	6
FEMALE				
1945–1949	17	38	8	44
1940–1944	20	34	12	40
1935–1939	21	31	10	31
1930–1934	21	26	11	26
1925–1929	21	24	14	23
1920–1924	18	20	8	15
1915–1919	16	17	11	16
1910–1914	16	16	10	12
1905–1909	15	15	9	9
1900–1904	13	13	5	5

SOURCE. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, ser. P–20, no. 297 (October 1976).
* If their future divorce experience is similar to that of persons in older age groups between 1969 and 1974.

cent of persons whose marriages may eventually end in divorce. This presentation is repeated in the table for persons married twice. As of June 1975, estimates indicate that the younger the ever-married person, the more likely the first marriage will eventually end in divorce. For those ever-married persons who were between 25 and 35 years old in 1975, about one-third will eventually have their first marriages terminated by divorce.

A variant of the estimates of marriages that may eventually end in divorce is table 4, recently prepared by Dr. Paul C. Glick. It is suggestive of what can be done periodically with the materials on hand regarding family dissolution (divorce and death) by skilled researchers on the family. The table approximates the estimated proportions of couples married only once, or more than once, reaching selected wedding aniversaries.

TABLE 4

ESTIMATED MARRIAGE SURVIVAL RATES TO SELECTED WEDDING ANNIVERSARIES BY FIRST MARRIAGE AND REMARRIAGE: CIRCA 1971

WEDDING ANNIVERSARY	FIRST MARRIAGE	REMARRIAGE
5th	5 of every 6	4 of every 5
10th	4 of every 5	3 of every 4
20th	3 of every 4	1 of every 2
30th	2 of every 3	1 of every 3
35th	1 of every 2	1 of every 5
40th	2 of every 5	1 of every 8
45th	1 of every 3	1 of every 15
50th	1 of every 5	1 of every 20
55th	1 of every 10	1 of every 50
60th	1 of every 20	1 of every 100
65th	1 of every 50	Very rare
70th	1 of every 100	Very rare

SOURCE: Unpublished estimates prepared by Dr. Paul C Glick.

Marital history surveys yield data on the duration of current marriage, the interval between first marriage and divorce, and other marital and vital events. As social indicators for measuring husband/wife family stability, these statistical formulations may be more relevant than the mere presentation of data on marriages and divorces, numbers and rates found in *Social Indicators, 1976*.

Statistics on children in families (i.e., never married persons under 18 years of age) have interesting applications in a social indicator context. The living arrangements of children, obviously products of past events (marriages, births, divorces, deaths, premarital births), describe current child-parent relationships, and hint at future developments along a broad front of social and economic concerns. As employed in *Social Indicators, 1976*, children's living arrangements shown for both white and black children, are linked to family stability and reflect previous events associated with parental actions.

Indicative of the substantial decline in family stability in recent years is the sharp increase in the proportion of children in families living with single parents, primarily the mother. The percent of children living with only the mother increased from 8.1 percent in 1960 to 15.6 percent in 1975, and reached 15.9 percent in 1976. Only one-half of all black children in 1975 and 1976 lived with both parents, down from nearly 70 percent in 1960 and nearly 60 percent in 1970. Although the total number of children living in families declined from 68.7 million in 1970 to 65.7 million in 1975, the number in families living with mother only actually increased from 8 million in 1970 to 10 million in 1975.

Linkages also can be established between the living arrangements for

children and the increasing socioeconomic phenomenon of wives in the paid labor force that was described previously. Among husband/wife families, the proportion of children with mothers in the labor force was 37.6 percent in 1970, 42.9 percent in 1975 and 44.3 percent in 1976. For children under 6 years of age, comparable percentages were 27.6 percent in 1970, 34.5 percent in 1975, and 35.1 percent in 1976. The generally noted development of the increasing participation of women in the labor force has also occurred for mothers who are the only parent rearing the children.

More than one-half of all children in 1970 (52.5 percent), lived with both parents and with the mother not in the labor force. By 1975, this percentage was down to 46.1 percent and in 1976 to 44.8 percent. Reflecting the strong pull of wives into the labor force, the percent of all children living with both parents, and with the mother in the labor force, has increased since 1970 (31.6 percent—1970; 34.7 percent—1975; and 35.7 percent—1976), notwithstanding the percent decline of all children living with both parents (84.1 percent—1970; 80.8 percent—1975; and 80.5 percent—1976).

As social indicators, the type of developments described here seem to be more open to normative interpretation than some types of economic indicators such as those relating to unemployment (low better than high), price change (small better than large), and gross national product (sustainable growth with low unemployment and relatively stable prices). In the case of working mothers there are many questions to be asked. What kind of care do children receive when the mother is working, and is it acceptable on the average as compared to that received from a mother who is not in the labor force? To what extent does the mother's income contribute to the welfare of the child and family structure? Is it worth it when all costs, both current and future, are considered?

Again focusing on the probability approach as a useful strategy in preparing social indicators, analytic estimates can be developed that are directed to answering the following type of question: What proportion of babies born in given years and surviving to age 18 will (or will not) experience growing up with both of their natural parents, or parents who adopted them very shortly after birth? Preparing such estimates for periodic intervals certainly can serve to summarize some of the major natural and social factors occurring in the population.

As an example of this probability approach, Arthur J. Norton recently performed a computational exercise to guesstimate an "expected" single-parent situation for a hypothetical 100 babies born in 1977. After making reasonable adjustments for statistics and conditions relating to premarital births, divorce, separation, and death of a parent, Norton found it conceivable that 45 percent of the babies born in 1977 will experience a single-parent situation before they reach 18. In order of descending contribution to the 45 percent guesstimate are divorces (27 percent), premarital births (10 percent), separations (5 percent), and death of a parent (3 percent). At about the turn of the century, the probability of a child experiencing a single-parent situation was less than it is now, with the death of a parent, rather than divorce, being the principal contributing factor. Norton speculates that children in the near future will be much younger when they experi-

ence a single-parent situation than was the case in the past.

Living arrangements

Changes in the living arrangements of persons since 1955 have been significantly affected by, and have had a significant effect on, changing social standards, expanding economic opportunities, and increasing government participation in all kinds of social programs. The text and some of the tables accompanying Section I of the family chapter of *Social Indicators, 1976* do capture and highlight the extraordinary changes that have occurred in living arrangements and in household composition in recent years, especially in the proportion of persons classified as primary individuals. In 20 years, from 1955 to 1975, this proportion increased from about 13 percent to 22 percent, corresponding to an increase in the number of primary individuals of from 6.1 to 15.6 million. There may be some doubt as to whether on balance the changing living arrangement patterns for a specific age and sex group represent positive or negative social phenomena. Undoubtedly, the developments are positive for persons engaged in construction, housing, and the other industries that benefit from household formations increasing at a much faster rate than the population. If one can infer that the evolving living arrangement patterns represent predominantly personal preferences, then the positive side of the equation comes out ahead. There have been some very positive factors supporting more independent living arrangements for the elderly population. These factors include increases in annual and lifetime income in a growing economy spurred on by productivity increases and wealth accumulations in the form of dollar savings, life insurance policies, home ownership, and private and public pensions. To these, it is necessary to add the supporting contributions from government programs such as social security, health care, housing subsidies, food stamps, and various other income supporting strategies.

CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

Social Indicators, 1976 represents the first effort in this program at organizing statistical material to describe family developments. It does not appear that a shotgun approach was used in the hope that some of the charts and tables would hit the target. At the same time the selection process should not be akin to shopping at the statistical supermarket and then trying to determine how many of the purchases were planned and how many the result of impulse selection. Choosing and presenting materials for the family chapter would benefit from establishing criteria that are explicit both in terms of placement of subject matter and the purpose of each chart and table. The suggestions made in the course of reviewing the family chapter can be modified or rejected outright, but stating them explicitly should give people the opportunity to examine the propositions without having to infer what was in the minds of the authors at the time the materials were brought together.

Producing social indicators requires more than a process of searching and soliciting statistical tables from the statistical network, assembling them in packages of charts, tables and texts, and marketing them in attractive publications. In the normal course of events, it is too much to expect that statistical suppliers, even with solid instruction on the pur-

poses and uses of social indicators, will provide data that can be effectively employed as submitted in preparing social indicators. After this second runthrough of social indicators, there is proof positive that, *while the work was conducted by very competent people, the operational structure is far from optimal for achieving sustained progress in the development of social indicators.* Additional inspiration, expertise, and perspiration by a staff geared to a more structured effort of research and exploration, rather than to assembly and editing, seems to be required to produce a satisfactory product. In the end it may come down to the fact that insufficient resources have been committed to the projects, precluding the formation of proper operational goals.

The following questions have been asked before but should be asked again. (1) What is so new and different about social indicators and their potential usefulness, as compared with social statistics, that resources should be extended in their pursuit? (2) What kind of model or models can be constructed that give form to goals and at the same time are structured that they facilitate the e ploitation of ideas and relationshi (3) Are there any separate statisti series that already exist which a serviceable? (4) Which data can l modified to improve their relevan for future social indicators unde takings? and (5) *What data are miss ing that should be collected or ca be assembled from existing series?*

Representing as it does, the pri mary social unit to which the vas majority of people are linked anc on which they depend for so many human wants, the family and its members' positions and activities in it should occupy a central place in summarizing and describing individuals' experiences. Without constructing proper frames of reference for various social and economic phenomena that incorporate the family, and that hopefully can be extended to include information on kin networks, our heritage is many statistical sets of data that can impress users more than they can increase their perceptions of changes in social conditions and performance.

Table 2/1
FAMILIES, BY TYPE AND SIZE: 1950–1990


YEAR AND PROJECTION SERIES	TOTAL FAMILIES (THOUSANDS)	TYPE OF FAMILY: Husband-wife, husband head: Number (thousands)	Percent	Other male head, no wife present: Number (thousands)	Percent	Female head, no husband present: Number (thousands)	Percent	AVERAGE SIZE OF FAMILY: Total	Members under 18 years old	Members 18 years old and over
1950	39,303	34,440	87.6	1,184	3.0	3,679	9.4	3.54	1.17	2.37
1955	41,951	36,378	86.7	1,339	3.2	4,234	10.1	3.59	1.30	2.29
1960	45,111	39,329	87.2	1,275	2.8	4,507	10.0	3.67	1.41	2.26
1965	47,956	41,749	87.1	1,181	2.5	5,026	10.5	3.70	1.44	2.26
1970	51,586	44,755	86.8	1,239	2.4	5,591	10.8	3.59	1.34	2.25
1975										
Series A	56,231	47,783	85.0	1,449	2.6	6,901	12.3	3.39	1.17	2.23
Series B	56,219	47,784	85.0	1,449	2.6	6,888	12.3	3.39	1.17	2.23
Series C	56,197	47,785	85.0	1,447	2.6	6,863	12.2	3.40	1.17	2.23
Series K	56,185	47,786	85.1	1,446	2.6	6,851	12.2	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)
1980										
Series A	61,312	51,806	84.5	1,566	2.6	7,858	12.8	3.21	1.02	2.19
Series B	61,234	51,825	84.6	1,561	2.5	7,758	12.7	3.22	1.02	2.20
Series C	61,080	51,864	84.9	1,550	2.5	7,560	12.4	3.24	1.02	2.22
Series K	61,004	51,885	85.1	1,543	2.5	7,463	12.2	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)
1985										
Series A	66,440	55,715	83.9	1,723	2.6	8,942	13.5	3.09	.96	2.12
Series B	66,255	55,757	84.2	1,713	2.6	8,711	13.1	3.11	.96	2.14
Series C	65,894	55,845	84.8	1,686	2.6	8,260	12.5	3.15	.97	2.18
Series K	65,718	55,891	85.0	1,668	2.5	8,040	12.2	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)
1990										
Series A	70,943	59,033	83.2	1,893	2.7	9,983	14.1	3.00	.94	2.06
Series B	70,606	59,073	83.7	1,877	2.7	9,601	13.6	3.04	.95	2.09
Series C	69,947	59,163	84.6	1,830	2.6	8,857	12.7	3.10	.96	2.14
Series K	69,622	59,209	85.0	1,798	2.6	8,495	12.2	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, Nos. 266 and 282, and Series P-25, No. 607

NA Not available.

Chart 2/1 Social Indicators, 1976

NUMBER OF FAMILIES, BY TYPE, SELECTED YEARS, 1950 TO 1990 (SERIES B)



Source see table 2/1

Table 2/2
SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF FAMILIES: 1960, 1970, AND 1975

SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS	1960			1970			1975		
	Total	White	Black[1]	Total	White	Black	Total	White	Black
All families...thous	45,149	40,887	4,262	51,237	46,022	4,774	55,712	49,451	5,498
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Husband-wife	87.8	89.2	74.9	86.7	88.7	68.1	84.3	86.9	60.9
Other male head, no wife present	2.9	2.7	4.2	2.4	2.3	3.7	2.7	2.6	3.9
Female head, no husband present	9.3	8.1	20.9	10.9	9.1	28.3	13.0	10.5	35.3
Single, never married	1.1	1.0	2.3	1.2	.8	4.6	1.7	1.0	7.7
Widowed	4.6	4.2	8.4	4.7	4.3	8.4	4.6	4.2	8.7
Divorced	1.6	1.5	2.4	2.5	2.3	4.0	3.8	3.5	6.7
Married, husband absent	2.0	1.4	7.8	2.6	1.7	11.2	3.0	1.9	12.3
OWN CHILDREN UNDER 18									
None under 18	43.1	43.0	43.8	44.1	44.7	38.6	46.0	47.2	36.8
1 own child	18.4	18.7	15.6	18.2	18.2	17.9	19.7	19.4	22.0
2 own children	18.0	18.5	12.8	17.4	17.6	14.9	18.0	18.0	17.0
3 or more own children	20.5	19.7	27.9	20.3	19.4	28.7	16.2	15.4	24.2
Mean number per family	1.33	1.29	1.66	1.30	1.25	1.77	1.13	1.08	1.47
SIZE OF FAMILY									
2 persons	32.7	33.1	28.5	34.5	35.2	28.7	37.4	38.5	29.[illegible]
3 persons	21.6	21.9	19.1	20.9	20.9	19.9	21.8	21.6	22.7
4 persons	19.9	20.4	15.0	19.3	19.7	16.1	19.7	19.9	17.8
5 persons	12.8	12.9	11.6	12.5	12.6	11.7	11.3	11.3	11.3
6 or more persons	13.0	11.7	25.7	12.8	11.6	23.6	9.8	8.8	18.3


Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of Population*, Vol II, Part 4A, and *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, Nos 218, 226, and 291.

[1] Black and other races in 1960

Chart 2/2

Social Indicators, 1976

TYPES OF FAMILIES BY RACE OF HEAD, 1960, 1970 AND 1975



1. Black and other races in 1960

Source: see table 2/2


Table 2/4
MARITAL STATUS OF THE POPULATION, BY RACE AND SEX, FOR SELECTED COHORT GROUPS: 1950–1970
(Percent)

RACE, SEX, AND AGE	TOTAL	SINGLE	MARRIED	WIDOWED	DIVORCED
White male aged—					
25 to 34 in 1950	100.0	18.5	79.4	0.3	1.9
35 to 44 in 1960	100.0	7.7	89.3	.5	2.5
45 to 54 in 1970	100.0	6.1	88.8	1.4	3.6
White female aged—					
25 to 34 in 1950	100.0	11.3	85.1	1.0	2.6
35 to 44 in 1960	100.0	6.0	87.9	2.6	3.6
45 to 54 in 1970	100.0	5.4	82.2	7.2	5.2
Black male aged—					
25 to 34 in 1950	100.0	20.1	77.0	.9	2.0
35 to 44 in 1960	100.0	11.0	83.5	1.9	3.7
45 to 54 in 1970	100.0	8.9	81.1	4.3	5.7
Black female aged—					
25 to 34 in 1950	100.0	11 7	81.6	3 1	3.6
35 to 44 in 1960	100.0	7.0	79.9	7 1	5.8
45 to 54 in 1970	100.0	6.7	70.5	14.5	8.3

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *1950 Census of Population*, Vol. II; *1960 Census of Population*, Vol. I; and *1970 Census of Population*, Vol. I.

Chart 2/4 Social Indicators, 1976

MARITAL STATUS OF THE POPULATION FOR SELECTED COHORTS, 1950, 1960 AND 1970, FOR WHITES AND BLACKS, BY SEX



Source: see table 2/4


Table 2/7
PRIMARY INDIVIDUALS, BY SEX AND AGE: 1974–1990
(Thousands)

YEAR[1]	Male					Female				
	Under 25 years	25 to 54 years old	55 to 64 years old	65 to 74 years old	75 years and over	Under 25 years	25 to 54 years old	55 to 64 years old	65 to 74 years old	75 years and over
1974	905	2,703	715	709	622	749	2,073	1,799	2,578	2,089
1975	970	2,836	734	741	633	795	2,126	1,842	2,697	2,190
1976	1,022	2,958	749	765	639	836	2,172	1,879	2,792	2,271
1977	1,078	3,074	767	792	642	877	2,208	1,919	2,899	2,334
1978	1,130	3,204	782	818	649	916	2,250	1,954	3,001	2,412
1979	1,181	3,344	797	843	659	954	2,298	1,988	3,096	2,496
1980	1,228	3,498	812	867	671	989	2,348	2,021	3,187	2,590
1981	1,276	3,661	826	889	684	1,023	2,406	2,050	3,267	2,688
1982	1,313	3,832	841	910	697	1,048	2,467	2,075	3,341	2,793
1983	1,345	4,011	854	931	715	1,070	2,530	2,094	3,411	2,912
1984	1,372	4,200	864	955	733	1,086	2,592	2,102	3,492	3,036
1985	1,390	4,394	873	984	754	1,099	2,653	2,103	3,584	3,173
1986	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)
1987	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)
1988	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)
1989	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)
1990	1,430	5,415	882	1,123	838	1,129	2,996	2,034	4,053	3,820

Source U S Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-25, No 607
NA Not available
[1] Data for 1975 and later years are Series B projections

Chart 2/7 Social Indicators, 1976

NUMBER OF PRIMARY INDIVIDUALS, BY AGE AND SEX, 1974 AND PROJECTED 1980, 1985 AND 1990 (SERIES B)



Source: see table 2/7

ANNALS, AAPSS, 435, Jan. 1978

Changing Work Life Patterns: A Twenty-five Year Review

By ANN R. MILLER

ABSTRACT: Over the past 25 years there have been substantial changes in the proportion of population engaged in market work and in the age and sex composition of the work force. The nonworker-worker ratio has fluctuated widely, primarily as a reflection of the dramatic fluctuations in birth rates, while the long-term trends of increasing participation by women and declining years of work by men have accelerated. Recent developments indicate that this acceleration of long-term trends has taken on certain new characteristics: young women appear to be returning to the labor market much more quickly after the birth of children, with a consequent reduction of time out of the work force; and the customary retirement age of men is falling. As a result, work life patterns are becoming increasingly similar for men and women and much higher proportions of the population in the age range 20–54 are working than has been true in the past. In a broader context, it is suggested that the rapid decline in average annual worker hours characteristic of the first part of the twentieth century may be transformed into a decline in average worker years in the last part.

Ann R. Miller is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Pennsylvania and Senior Research Associate in its Population Studies Center. She received her A.B. degree from Bryn Mawr College, her Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania. Over the past several years she has served on advisory committees to the U.S. Bureau of the Census and the National Institutes of Health and acted as consultant to the Statistical Policy Division of the Office of Management and Budget.

CHAPTER 8 of *Social Indicators, 1976* is concerned with work, the extent to which different groups in the population participate in this work, the kind of work done, and the rewards and satisfactions (or lack thereof) of work. It brings together a number of series, particularly in the section on "The Conditions and Quality of Work," that have not previously been assembled in one place and that provide the user with the opportunity to view the complexities of current issues in some perspective.

The present paper concentrates on the broad framework of the place of work in the life history of the individual. The availability of 25 years of data from the federal government's *Current Population Survey* enables us for the first time to monitor developments over a generation and it is this aspect of work that is preeminent as a social indicator, that is, that tells us most about the relation between work and the lives of people in this country.

LABOR FORCE AND POPULATION

It is a truism that, at any given time, the size and characteristics of the work force of a country are a joint product of its demographic history and of the probabilities that specific components of its population participate in market work. But it is only recently that the full significance of these two aspects of growth have emerged.

Table 1 presents summary indicators of the aggregate relation between population and labor force that reveal some of the long-term effects of our ability to control the basic demographic processes, that is, international migration, mortality, and fertility; less obvious, but also imbedded in the measures presented, are the effects of cumulative changes in the role of work in the individual's life.

The number of nonworkers per 100 workers rose sharply from 1950 to 1960, primarily as a result of the rapid increase in population below the working ages arising from the postwar "baby boom." Nonworkers in the older ages also increased in this period, but the rise was more than offset by the relative decline of nonworkers among those in the central ages, that is, 16–64. Since 1965, the ratio of nonworkers to workers has fallen precipitously, from 152 nonworkers for every 100 workers in 1965 to 125 in 1975; again the primary compositional factor has been the birth rate, which fell so sharply that in absolute terms there were almost 5,000,000 fewer persons below the age of 16 in 1975 than there had been in 1965.

If one makes the assumption that the nonworker-worker ratio is a crude approximation of a dependency ratio—and it is certainly only a crude approximation, since many nonworkers contribute essential services to the total national product—then the dependency burden is probably lower now than at any time in the previous history of the United States, and, as table 1 indicates, it is projected to fall to even lower levels. Its composition, however, is changing. Only slightly over 1 in 10 nonworkers was past 65 in 1950; by 1960 the proportion was 1 in 8; by 1975 it had risen to 1 to 6; and it is projected to reach 1 in 5 by 1990. This rising proportion does not occur because of a spurt in the growth of the older population. In terms of rates of increase, the major growth period for the population over 65 was the decade 1950–60, the years in which many of the large pre-World War I immigrant cohorts

TABLE 1

RATIO OF NONWORKERS TO WORKERS AND GROWTH RATES OF THE POPULATION AND LABOR FORCE, 1950–1990

	A. Nonworkers per 100 Workers				B. Average Annual Rate of Change*			
		Proportion by Age				Labor Force‡		
	Total	Under 16	16–64	65 and Over	Population†	Total	Male	Female
1950	138	68	56	15	—	—	—	—
1955	144	75	52	16	1.72	1.28	.88	2.23
1960	150	82	50	19	1.70	1.16	.57	2.46
1965	152	81	50	20	1.46	1.35	.83	2.40
1970	138	72	47	20	1.06	2.14	1.29	3.70
1975	125	61	44	20	.84	1.97	1.20	3.23
1980	115	53	41	21	.84	1.81	1.43	2.38
1985	111	52	38	21	.99	1.29	.92	1.84
1990	111	53	36	22	.92	.92	.70	1.24

* Average over 5 previous years.
† All ages.
‡ 16 years of age and over.
SOURCE. *Social Indicators, 1976*, table 8/1

attained this age. In the future, the growth rate for the population over 65 will be generally stable, or slightly downward, until well into the next century when the baby boom cohorts of 1947–62 reach this age. Although declines in mortality, and the concomitant increases in the average length of life, have obviously affected the size of the older population, their impact is gradual; the major determinants of rapid changes in this age group lie primarily in the previous migration and fertility history of the country. What accounts for the rising proportion of older persons in the nonworker group, then, is the relative decline in the other two components of nonworkers distinguished in table 1, that is, the population below working age and nonactive persons in the central ages.

The direct impact of the country's demographic history on the labor force is visible in another of the measures shown in table 1—the fluctuations in the average annual growth rate of the male labor force. Although many factors are associated with the changing size of the male labor force, fluctuations of the magnitude shown here are primarily reflecting fluctuations in past fertility levels. Most men enter the labor force between the ages of 18 and 24: the sharp fall in the growth rate in 1955–60 quinquennium (from 0.88 to 0.57 per annum) arises from the entry into these ages of the low birth cohorts of the Great Depression; the high growth rate starting in the 1965–70 period (1.29) and continuing through 1975–80 represents the coming of age of the baby boom cohorts; the rapid drops projected for the 1980s are the long-term effect of the very low levels of fertility prevalent during the past ten years. A considerable literature has developed on the effect of these fluctuations in the size of the entering cohort on the overall state of the labor market, and particularly on the rise in unemployment rates since 1970. But it is interesting to note in this

connection that the period in which the annual growth rate of the total labor force was highest, 1965–70, was one in which unemployment was generally below 4 percent.

The size of the female population in any given age group is obviously affected by the same past fertility fluctuations that affect males. But it is clear from table 1 that the growth rate of the female labor force since 1950 has not been as sensitive to these variations in past birth rates as the growth of the male labor force has. The experience of the 1950s suggested to some that the opposite response, in fact, took place—that is, that the female labor force expanded rapidly precisely because of the slow growth rate for males, so that fluctuations in the overall growth rate for both sexes combined were minimized. Here again, however, the experience since 1965 raises questions on the general applicability of this hypothesis, since both male and female growth rates reached their highest postwar points during this period.

Although fertility and immigration history are the dominant demographic variables in short-term fluctuations of growth rates, the subtle effects of the increase in average length of life over the last 80 years may be associated with certain of the changes in work life history that have occurred. As more people reach the older ages with their health and resources sufficiently intact to permit them to enjoy leisure, the image of the retirement years has changed; and the prospect of retirement as a life cycle stage, characterized by freedom rather than fear, may be inducing many to hasten this step.

Such subtle associations cannot be measured directly by the indicators presently available. We can, however, look at trends in the relat between work and nonwork in lifetime of the American people : it is to this that we turn now. cause both traditional patterns : current trends are quite different men and women, we will initi: deal with each sex separately; concluding section will attempt bring the two strands together terms of their joint impact on country's work force.

THE FEMALE LABOR FORCE

Probably the most dramatic, : certainly the most widely publici. change in the post-World War II la force has been the rapid increase the proportion of women engage market work. In fact, this has b the continuation of a gradual tr that can be observed over the p 100 years, but the pace accelera after the War and has generally c tinued to accelerate over e. succeeding decade. Two views this development are presented table 2. The upper panel indic: changes in the proportion of work among women in each age group the immediate postwar period increase was concentrated am older women, those past 40, wl the proportions of younger wome work remained stable. Since 19 however, the preponderance of increase has shifted to youn women and rates for older won have stabilized and even decli slightly among those past 55. A consequence, whereas in 1950 o among 18 and 19 year olds wer majority of women working, by 19 well over half the women in ev age group between 18 and 55 w in the labor force, and the dif ences among age groups within t range were much reduced.

The lower panel of table 2 follc

TABLE 2

TWO VIEWS OF THE RISING PROPORTION OF WORKING WOMEN

A THE CROSS-SECTIONAL VIEW

AGE AT DATE OF SURVEY	PERCENT OF WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE, 1950	NET CHANGE IN PERCENT BETWEEN 1950–1960	1960–1965	1965–1975	PERCENT OF WOMEN IN THE LABOR FORCE, 1975
16 years and over	33.9	+3.9	+1.5	+7.1	46.4
16–17	30.1	−1.0	−1.4	+12.5	40.2
18–19	51.3	−0.2	−1.7	+8.9	58.3
20–24	46.1	+0.1	+3.8	+14.3	64.3
25–34	34.0	+2.0	+2.6	+16.0	54.6
35–44	39.1	+4.4	+2.6	+9.7	55.8
45–54	38.0	+11.8	+1.1	+3.7	54.6
55–64	27.0	+10.2	+3.9	−0.1	41.0
65 and over	9.7	+1.1	−0.8	−1.7	8.3

B THE COHORT VIEW

YEAR OF BIRTH	PERCENT OF COHORT IN LABOR FORCE AT AGE 20–24	NET CHANGE IN PERCENT OVER 5 YEAR PERIOD BETWEEN AGES 20–24 TO 25–29	25–29 TO 30–34	30–34 TO 35–39	35–39 TO 40–44	40–44 TO 45–49	45–49 TO 50–54	50–54 TO 55–59	55–59 TO 60–64	60–64 TO 65–69	PERCENT OF COHORT IN LABOR FORCE AT AGE 65–69
1891–1895	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	−11.4	17.6
1896–1900	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	−4.2	−14.0	17.4
1901–1905	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	+0.7	−8.2	−16.7	17.3
1906–1910	*	*	*	*	*	*	+2.8	−1.6	−11.0	−21.6	14.5
1911–1915	*	*	*	*	*	+6.6	−0.6	−1.1	−15.7	(−18.7)	(14.6)
1916–1920	*	*	*	*	+7.1	+5.4	+2.1	−5.9	(−14.2)	(−19.4)	(14.3)
1921–1925	*	*	*	+6.1	+7.7	+6.5	−1.7	(−4.1)	(−15.5)	(−19.5)	(14.2)
1926–1930	46.1	−10.8	+1.0	+7.3	+9.3	+3.0	(+0.7)	(−6.2)	(−16.7)	(−)	(−)
1931–1935	46.0	−10.3	+2.5	+11.0	+7.6	(+0.8)	(+1.2)	(−7.8)	(−)	(−)	(−)
1936–1940	46.2	−7.3	+5.8	+10.2	(+3.8)	(+0.7)	(+0.9)	(−)	(−)	(−)	(−)
1941–1945	50.0	−4.8	+6.5	(+6.3)	(+3.2)	(−0.5)	(−)	(−)	(−)	(−)	(−)
1946–1950	57.8	−0.7	(−2.9)	(+6.9)	(+1.7)	(−)	(−)	(−)	(−)	(−)	(−)
1951–1956	64.3	(−3.9)	(−2.9)	(+5.7)	(−)	(−)	(−)	(−)	(−)	(−)	(−)

SOURCES Panel A: *Department of Labor, Employment and Training Report of the President, 1976.* Panel B: *Social Indicators, 1976*, table 8/3.
NOTE: Figures in ( ) are projections; (−) projection not available (post 1990 dates).
* Comparable data not available.

each birth cohort of women over time, tracing changes in the proportion of workers as the group ages, the perspective presented in *Social Indicators, 1976*. Here it is clear that proportions are falling much less during the twenties for the younger cohorts than was previously true, and are rising more rapidly during the thirties.

For the central ages the net increase for successive cohorts is not changing much as they move from ages 35–39 to 45–49. Beyond age 45 there has been little increase in average participation for any of the cohorts, and each has shown a decline as its members entered their fifties. What appears as a major increase during these years in the cross-sectional picture in panel A is, of course, reflecting differences in the levels attained by successive cohorts when they reach the age of 45–54 rather than the behavior of specific cohorts.

The peak age of participation, then, for each of the cohorts is, roughly, 45–54. Beyond age 55 declines are clear, and clearly accelerating as we come forward in time. For the cohort entering the 55–59 age group most recently, there has already been a sharp drop. These declines parallel those for men and are substantial enough to indicate that they approach a "gross retirement" rate, that is, are unlikely to be a balancing of inflows and outflows to any considerable extent.

What the cohort view suggests is that young women are now less likely to leave the labor force in their twenties and, if they do leave, are returning at progressively younger ages. Since the age at which cohort rates reach their maximum has remained the same, the implication of such an inference is that working women will be spending a much higher proportion of their lifetimes in the labor force than has previously been the case. Unfortunately, however, cohort data cannot tell us the extent to which the net changes they show are a balance between substantial inflows and substantial outflows.

In general the *Social Indicators, 1976* projections, also included in panel B of table 2, take a quite conservative view of the behavior of cohorts whose future work life is estimated, with net declines postulated for the youngest cohorts as they move through their twenties and into their early thirties, and more modest increases as they enter the late thirties and forties. The basic assumption underlying these projected changes is that fertility levels for young women will increase and the consequent net effect will be to dampen their labor force participation.

Because marital status and child care responsibilities are so closely associated with women's labor force status and because the increase in the age at marriage and the precipitous decline in fertility after 1965 have obviously had their greatest impact on the age groups experiencing the sharpest labor force increases in the last decade, it is desireable to disaggregate the groups of women aged 20–24 and 25–34 by marital status and by the presence of children in their households. Clearly, if the striking increases in work rates for these young women are associated primarily with changes in the nature of their household commitments, the long-term significance of these increases is quite different from a situation in which the increases are occurring independently of these commitments. In the former case, a sharp reversal in the downward course of fertility, particularly, can

TABLE 3

CHANGES IN THE MARITAL STATUS AND CHILD CARE RESPONSIBILITIES AND IN THE PROPORTIONS WORKING FOR YOUNG WOMEN AGED 20–34 1965–75

MARITAL STATUS AND AGE OF YOUNGEST CHILD	A. DISTRIBUTION OF THE POPULATION				B PERCENT IN THE LABOR FORCE					
	AGE 20–24		AGE 25–34		AGE 20–24		AGE 25–34		NET CHANGE 1965–1975	
	1965	1975	1965	1975	1965	1975	1965	1975	20–24	25–34
Total*	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	49.1	62.9	38.7	54.2	+13.8	+15.5
Never married	32.5	40.3	6.8	10.9	72.3	69.3	83.4	80.0	−3.0	−3.4
Previously married	6.9	8 7	10.0	12.9	58.6	67 6	62.8	67.4	+9.0	+4.6
Currently married	60.7	50.9	83.1	76.2	35.6	57.1	32.1	48.3	+21.5	+16.2
No child under 18	17.8†	22.9†	7.9	11.7	66.1†	79.2†	68 7	79.6	+13.1†	+10.9
Youngest child 6–17			16.0	18.4			43 6	57.1		+13.5
Youngest child 3–5	5.1	6.5	22.2	21.0	33.8	52.0	31.5	42.1	+18.2	+10.6
Youngest child under 3	37.8	21.6	37.0	25.0	21.5	35.2	19.6	32.4	+13.7	+12.8

SOURCES. Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Special Labor Force Reports*, nos. 64 and 183.

* These data are for the month of March and therefore differ somewhat from the annual averages shown in table 2.

† Data for women aged 20–24 refer to those with no children under 18 plus those whose youngest child is 6–17; the latter group is very small for women of this age, so the combined figure essentially represents women with no children.

be expected to bring a concomitant fall in labor force activity; in the latter case, the effect of a rise in fertility will probably be much more muted.

Fortunately, *Current Population Survey* data allow us to examine the marital and child care status of these women more closely and to obtain some insight into the extent to which the cohort behavior shown in table 2 is independent of these factors. Table 3 presents the broad outline of the 1965–75 changes for selected components of the two groups. Panel A supports the statement that striking changes have occurred in the composition of both groups. Although noteworthy declines in the proportion who are currently married have occurred, by far the most impressive change is the decline in the proportion of young married women with preschool age children in their households. In 1965, 43 percent of all women aged 20–24 were in this category; by 1975, the figure is 28 percent. Among those in the 25–34 category, the percentage is 59 in 1965; 46, in 1975.

For purposes of the present review, however, it is the second panel of table 3 that is of most interest. Here it is clear that the major determinant (arithmetically) of the increase in economic activity among these women has been the rapid entrance of currently married women. Rates for widowed, divorced, and separated women, always higher than those for the currently married, have also risen but much more moderately; rates for single women, on the other hand, have fallen slightly and therefore, in view of their rising proportion of the total, have had a dampening effect on the aggregate increase.

Within the group of currently married women, those with no children in the household are now as likely to be working as are single women among those aged 25–34, and are considerably more likely to be in the labor market than the single among the younger group, presumably because young single women are more likely to be continuing their education than are the married. In effect, then, these data suggest that marital status per se no longer has any effect on the probability that a young woman is in the labor force; it is only the presence of children in the household that lowers the activity rate for currently married women.

That the presence of children and the age of the youngest child continue to affect labor force participation is obvious in table 3. What is more striking, however, is the rapid change in the impact of this effect. Viewed from the cohort perspective, what table 3 shows is that married women in the 1941–50 cohort (aged 25–34 in 1975) were about as likely to be working if their youngest child were aged 3–5 years (42.1 percent) as women with school age children in the previous (1931–40) cohort (43.6 percent); and women whose youngest child was under 3 were as likely to be in the labor force (32.4 percent) as those with children aged 3–5 were earlier (31.5 percent). Comparison of the younger cohorts shows a similar pattern—the proportion in the labor force among those with children under 3 in the 1951–55 cohort (35.2 percent) is as high as that for women with youngest child age 3–5 in the 1941–45 cohort (33.8 percent).

A crude indicator of the relative effects of composition versus participation rate changes can be obtained by standardization; that is, by looking at the effect on the general participation rate if one applies the

labor force proportion for each component in 1975 to the distribution of population among the components shown for 1965 in panel A (or vice versa). This procedure indicates that about half of the 14.3 percentage point increase shown for women aged 20–24 in table 2 (panel A) can be attributed to changes in marital and child care status, and about half to the increase in labor force activity on the part of most components. For the 25–34 age group, roughly 60 percent of the 16 percentage point increase is attributable to activity rate changes, 40 percent to composition.

If one confines the standardization to currently married women, the category showing the greatest increase in labor force proportions for both age groups, the effect of changed activity rates is considerably greater: among women aged 20–24, 65 percent of the increase arises from increases in the rates for each category, only 35 percent from the decline in their child care responsibilities; and among those aged 25–34, 75 percent is associated with the rise in the rates, 25 percent with the lessening burden of preschool age children.

Beyond the age of 35, interdecade changes between 1965 and 1975 in the marital status and child care responsibilities of successive cohorts appear to play little part in the net changes in labor force proportions shown in table 2. Basically, the sharp upward shift in the cohort curves for women in the central working ages is accounted for by the increase in the proportions of currently married women, with children in their households, who are in the labor market.

The major factor differentiating the labor force behavior of recent cohorts, that is, those born after World War II, from that of those born before the War is the extent to which women with preschool children in the household are at work. This is an indicator of obvious importance in the structure of American family life. For the purpose of this paper, however, its significance lies in the suggestion that the average mother is returning to the labor market much sooner after the birth of her children than was true in the early postwar years. She is therefore more likely to have maintained contact with her previous work-life associates, her knowledge of the nature of the work world is fresher, and her work skills are not as likely to be obsolete. For these, and other reasons, the ease with which she reenters the labor market is likely to be improved over the experience of older cohorts.

MALE LABOR FORCE

Although there is growing evidence that neither entrance into nor exit from the labor force are simple one way processes for all men, on the whole the great majority have entered by their early twenties and remain in steadily for a number of years—that is, we do not have the problem of labor force turnover within the central and early working years that make both cohort and cross-sectional rates for women difficult to interpret. For the period covered by *Social Indicators, 1976* the pattern of delayed entrance associated with continued schooling is well established; cohort differences in labor force participation at ages 20–24 are generally abated by compensating differences in net entries for the succeeding five years, so that by ages 25–29, 95 percent or more of each cohort are in the labor force.

At the other end of the spectrum, however, the patterns of cohort change (shown in table 4) make it

TABLE 4

THE TREND TOWARD EARLY RETIREMENT FOR MEN 1955–1975

YEAR OF BIRTH	PERCENT OF COHORT IN LABOR FORCE AT AGE 45–49	NET CHANGE IN PERCENT OVER 5 YEAR PERIOD BETWEEN AGES 45–49 TO 50–54	50–54 TO 55–59	55–59 TO 60–64	60–64 TO 65–69	PERCENT OF COHORT IN LABOR FORCE AT AGE 65–69
1891–1895	*	*	*	*	−35.7	46.8
1896–1900	*	*	*	−11.3	−38.2	43.0
1901–1905	*	*	−4.1	−13.6	−36.4	41.6
1906–1910	97.1	−2.3	−4.6	−15.2	−43.3	31.7
1911–1915	96.6	−1.6	−5.5	−23.8	(−35.6)	(30.1)
1916–1920	96.1	−3.0	−8.7	(−21.3)	(−35.1)	(28.0)
1921–1925	95.4	−5.3	(−6.4)	(−23.8)	(−33.3)	(26.6)
1926–1930	94.1	(−4.7)	(−6.9)	(−24.8)	(−)	(−)
1931–1935	(93.3)	(−4.9)	(−6.8)	(−)	(−)	(−)
1936–1940	(92.7)	(−4.9)	(−)	(−)	(−)	(−)

SOURCE: *Social Indicators, 1976*, table 8/3.
NOTE: Figures in ( ) are projections; (−) projections not available (post 1990 dates).
* Comparable data not available.

clear that a significant and accelerating trend towards earlier retirement has been occurring; the 1911–15 cohort was twice as likely to leave the labor force between ages 55–59 and 60–64 as its predecessors born 15 years earlier (−23.8 versus −11.3 percent); the rate of decline for the 1916–20 cohort as it moved from 50–54 to 55–59 was also double that for the cohort 15 years older; even the 1921–25 cohort shows such a doubling of exit rates in the age range 45–49 to 50–54.

Is this acceleration a transitory phenomenon or does it represent emergence of the cumulative effect of long-term factors? These three cohorts are, of course, those which bore the brunt of World War II and perhaps a part of the rapid rise in their exit rates may represent the delayed impact of this experience. A second unique factor that may be associated with accelerated exits is the high unemployment rate prevailing in 1975. Although seniority rights usually protect older workers from the full immediate impact of a recession, once they lose their jobs they have more difficulty than younger persons in locating new employment, and it has often been suggested that they are therefore, in effect, "forced" into retirement. In the present case the acceleration of the gradual long-term trends in table 4 has been evident since 1970, and the general unemployment rate has been consistently higher during this period than in the late 1960s.

In this context, a demographic factor that may be relevant to the decision of older men to retire early is the rapid increase in the size of the male civilian labor force aged 20–34 over the last 15 years, and particularly among those aged 25–34, probably the group most competitive with older men for scarce jobs. Between 1970 and 1975, the number increased by 2.5 million, in contrast to a 1.4 million increase over 1965–70, and an absolute decrease of 350,000 between 1960 and 1965, the previous period of high unemployment rates (when the trend toward early retirement was much more moderate).

Such variations in the size of successive labor force cohorts among males are, as noted above, primarily a reflection of past fertility fluctuations. The effect of these fluctuations on the base populations from which the labor force is drawn will begin to be apparent for the population over 45 only after 1975 (men over 45 in 1975 were, of course, all born before the Depression decade). Whether, as these older men become a scarce resource their rates of retirement will level off or even decline, as the *Social Indicators, 1976,* projections imply, is a matter of conjecture.

Demographic factors may also be playing a part in the secular trend toward earlier retirement. The relation between fertility experience and women's labor force behavior has been extensively discussed in many studies; but the association between these two variables in men's life histories has been ignored. Nevertheless, one may expect that early completion of childbearing by wives has had the complementary effect of reducing the age for men at which the last dependent child becomes self-supporting. The trend towards higher levels of education for adult children—and therefore prolonged dependency—may have counterbalanced this development for some, and the aging of the baby-boom fathers may reduce the effect temporarily. But it is interesting to note that in 1975, 27 percent of husbands aged 45–54 had no children of any age in their households and 44 percent had none under 18. Such a situation may make early reduction in labor force participation a more feasible option than it was for earlier cohorts.

The adequacy of retirement income is, of course, a prime factor to be considered. Although Social Security benefits are often at or below the poverty level, recent beneficiaries probably do considerably better than previous cohorts; benefits, at a reduced level, are now available at age 62; and disability provisions permit earlier retirement for those who qualify. Moreover, the long-range effect of the rapid post-war increases in women's labor force participation probably means that, in an increasing proportion of families, both husband and wife are entitled to independent benefits, providing a larger total income than when the wife's benefit was tied to her dependent status.

The proportion of total employment in federal, state, and local governments increased substantially in the post-World War II period and most such employees are covered by pension schemes that provide more adequate benefits than Social Security; an increasing proportion of private employees are also covered by various pension arrangements which supplement Social Security benefits. Perhaps most important from the viewpoint of our present interest in early retirement, many government and private pension plans are tied to years of service, rather than to a specific retirement age; consequently, workers may become eligible for benefits long before what we have customarily thought of as retirement age. Such pensioners may not be prohibited from taking other employment, but they are certainly more able to make the decision to retire than were previous cohorts not covered by such schemes. What we may be seeing, then, is a first flowering of the cumulative effect of pension plan development over the last 30 years.

A less optimistic view of early retirement is raised by the possibility that it is a structural effect; that is,

a change in the demand for labor that puts some workers at a disadvantage in the labor market because their skills are perceived to be less adequate (or obsolete) by employers in relation to current needs. The operation of this phenomenon is extraordinarily complex and its measurement in any precise manner is probably impossible. Nevertheless, one identifiable aspect of the recent trend toward early retirement suggests its impact, namely, the negative association between exit rates and levels of education shown in table 5. The cohort represented there, men aged 45–54 in 1965 and 55–64 in 1975, is the last of the cohorts reaching maturity before the second World War. About 50 percent had not completed high school and 16 percent had less than 8 years of schooling. As table 5 indicates, even at ages 45–54 some differential in labor force participation can be observed; but the substantial differences in retirement, particularly between those completing high school or higher levels and those with less than 12 years of school, exacerbates these differentials very considerably by ages 55–64.

Educational differences in retirement rates are undoubtedly associated with occupational differences, in particular with a white-collar–blue-collar dichotomy, and therefore may be very broadly associated with the long-term structural change in the labor market which has seen a continuing increase in the share of white-collar occupations in the total. Men whose work lives have been spent in the contracting blue-collar sector are perhaps more likely to be forced out through job loss and/or through greater difficulty in locating similar, scarce jobs than those whose experience is in the expanding white-collar sector.

The relation between these structural effects and the institutional effects, specifically, the availability of pensions at preretirement ages discussed above, raises some problems of reconciliation. A priori, one expects that the higher earner, higher education white-collar worker is more likely to be covered by such pensions than those who, as table 5 shows, are more likely to be retiring early. Recent studies by the Social Security Administration offer indirect evidence that this expectation is correct. So the question of whether the individual retiring early

TABLE 5

EARLY RETIREMENT AND EDUCATIONAL LEVEL AMONG MEN BORN 1911–1920

Years of School Completed	Percent in Labor Force at Age 45–54 (1965)	Percent in Labor Force at Age 55–64 (1975)	Net Change in Percent
Total	95.5	75.4	−20.1
Less than 5	86.0	52.0	−34.0
5–7	93.4	67.0	−26.4
8	94.8	71.6	−23.2
9–11	94.9	74.3	−20.6
12	97.2	79.3	−17.9
13–15	98.0	83.4	−14.6
16	98.2	83.3	−14.9
17 and over	99.4	88.1	−11.3

SOURCE Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Special Labor Force Report* nos. 65 and 186.

TABLE 6

THE CONVERGING LIFE PATTERN: RATIO OF MALE TO FEMALE LABOR FORCE RATES

YEAR OF BIRTH	RATIO OF MALE TO FEMALE LABOR FORCE RATES AT AGE									
	20–24	25–29	30–34	35–39	40–44	45–49	50–54	55–59	60–64	65–69
1891–1895	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	284	266
1896–1900	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	260	259	247
1901–1905	*	*	*	*	*	*	231	217	229	240
1906–1910	*	*	*	*	*	212	195	192	208	219
1911–1915	*	*	*	*	222	191	190	183	197	(206)
1916–1920	*	*	*	251	211	186	173	176	(187)	(196)
1921–1925	*	*	283	240	200	173	169	(170)	(178)	(187)
1926–1930	193	275	271	225	182	168	(158)	(164)	(171)	(–)
1931–1935	197	272	257	198	168	(162)	(150)	(160)	(–)	(–)
1936–1940	195	249	218	175	(161)	(156)	(146)	(–)	(–)	(–)
1941–1945	176	212	186	(166)	(154)	(152)	(–)	(–)	(–)	(–)
1946–1950	150	166	(178)	(157)	(150)	(–)	(–)	(–)	(–)	(–)
1951–1955	134	(156)	(167)	(151)	(–)	(–)	(–)	(–)	(–)	(–)

SOURCE: *Social Indicators, 1976*, table 8/3; computed by dividing male activity rate by female activity rate and multiplying by 100.

NOTE: Figures in ( ) are projections; (–) projection not available (post 1990 date).

* Comparable data not available.

is choosing or being forced into this decision remains unanswered.

TOTAL LABOR FORCE

The previous discussion has focused on two of the most dramatic recent changes in labor force activity: the increased propensity among cohorts of young women to work even when young children are in the household; and the shift towards earlier retirement among men in their 50s.

One important social effect of these changes has been that the life history pattern of market work has apparently become much more similar for men and women in the United States. Whether viewed cross-sectionally or by cohort, it is clear from the ratios of male to female participation rates in table 6 that there has been a substantial convergence between the sexes over the last 20 years. In 1955, male rates were two to three times as great as female rates in every 5 year age group; by 1975, only past the age of 60 were men twice as likely to be in the labor force as women. The truncated cohort data suggest an increasing narrowing of the age range in which the ratio exceeds 200 and an increasing convergence of rates for each successive cohort.

By 1975, over 70 percent of the population in the age range 20–54 were engaged in market work, and there is every indication that this percentage will continue to increase. Beyond age 55 the trend appears to be downward. The aggregate effect of these developments constitutes what may be termed a "social revolution." For the trend is towards more equal participation by men and women in the economic work of the country and a concentration of this activity within about half the total life span. A substantial part of the economic growth of the country in the first years of the twentieth century went towards reduction of the annual hours of labor supplied by the average worker; perhaps a substantial part in the last years will go to the reduction of the total years of work.

Table 8/1
TOTAL POPULATION, WORKERS AND NONWORKERS, BY AGE: 1950–1990

AGE	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975	1980[1]	1985[1]	1990[1]
Total population, all ages	152,271	165,931	180,671	194,303	204,878	213,631	222,769	234,068	245,075
Under 16 years	43,131	51,248	58,836	62,761	61,922	57,872	55,110	57,535	61,330
16 to 64 years	96,743	100,156	105,160	113,091	122,869	133,359	143,136	149,874	154,812
65 years and over	12,397	14,527	16,675	18,451	20,087	22,400	24,523	26,659	28,833
WORKERS[2]									
Total	63,858	68,072	72,142	77,178	85,903	94,793	103,761	110,690	115,927
Male	45,446	47,488	48,870	50,946	54,343	57,706	61,990	64,893	67,210
Female	18,412	20,584	23,272	26,232	31,560	37,087	41,771	45,797	48,717
16 to 64 years, both sexes	60,821	64,766	68,948	74,071	82,683	91,854	100,754	107,673	112,825
65 years and over, both sexes	3,037	3,306	3,194	3,107	3,220	2,939	3,007	3,017	3,102
NONWORKERS[3]									
Total	88,413	97,859	108,529	117,125	118,975	118,838	119,008	123,378	129,148
Under 16 years	43,131	51,248	58,836	62,761	61,922	57,872	55,110	57,535	61,330
16 to 64 years	35,922	35,390	36,212	39,020	40,186	41,505	42,382	42,201	41,987
65 years and over	9,360	11,221	13,481	15,344	16,867	19,461	21,516	23,642	25,831
NONWORKER/WORKER RATIO[4]									
Total	138	144	150	152	138	125	115	111	111
Under 16 years	68	75	82	81	72	61	53	52	53
16 to 64 years	56	52	50	50	47	44	41	38	36
65 years and over	15	16	19	20	20	20	21	21	22

	1950–55	1955–60	1960–65	1965–70	1970–75	1975–80	1980–85	1985–90
AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF CHANGE								
Total population, all ages	1.72	1.70	1.46	1.06	0.84	0.84	0.99	0.92
Total labor force, 16 years and over	1.28	1.16	1.35	2.14	1.97	1.81	1.29	92
Male	88	57	83	1.29	1.20	1.43	92	70
Female	2.23	2.46	2.40	3.70	3.23	2.38	1.84	1.24

Source U S Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-25, Nos 311, 321, 470, and 601, U S Department of Labor, *Employment and Training Report of the President*, 1976, and Bureau of Labor Statistics, "New Labor Force Projection to 1990," *Monthly Labor Review*, December 1976

[1] Series II projections

[2] Workers are persons 16 years old and over in the civilian labor force or Armed Forces


[3] Nonworkers are persons under 16 years and persons 16 years and over not in the labor force

[4] Number of nonworkers per 100 workers

Chart 8/1B

Social Indicators, 1976

NONWORKER/WORKER RATIOS, 1950–1990



Source: see table 8/1

Table 8/2
TOTAL LABOR FORCE, BY AGE AND SEX: 1965–1990
(Annual averages, in thousands)


AGE GROUP AND SEX	1965	1970	1975	1980[1]	1985[1]	1990[1]
Total, both sexes	77,178	85,903	94,793	103,761	110,690	115,927
Total male, age 16 and over	50,946	54,343	57,706	61,990	64,893	67,210
16 to 24 years	9,757	11,773	13,313	14,092	13,094	11,765
25 to 34 years	10,653	11,974	14,456	16,926	18,578	19,102
35 to 44 years	11,504	10,818	10,583	11,878	14,470	16,849
45 to 54 years	10,131	10,487	10,464	9,929	9,746	10,938
55 years and over	8,899	9,291	8,890	9,165	9,005	8,556
Total female, age 16 and over	26,232	31,560	37,087	41,771	45,797	48,717
16 to 24 years	5,894	8,143	10,175	11,362	11,161	10,375
25 to 34 years	4,336	5,704	8,473	10,417	12,233	13,100
35 to 44 years	5,724	5,971	6,496	7,638	9,728	11,683
45 to 54 years	5,714	6,533	6,667	6,609	6,761	7,795
55 years and over	4,563	5,209	5,277	5,745	5,914	5,764

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, *Employment and Training Report of the President, 1976*; and Bureau of Labor Statistics, "New Labor Force Projections to 1990," *Monthly Labor Review*, December 1976.

[1] Based on Series II projections of population.

Chart 8/2 Social Indicators, 1976

TOTAL LABOR FORCE 16 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY AGE AND SEX, 1965, 1970, 1975, 1980, 1985 AND 1990



Source: see table 8/2

Table 8/7

LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION OF EVER-MARRIED WOMEN, BY PRESENCE AND AGE OF CHILDREN: 1954–1975

(Civilian noninstitutional population in the civilian labor force)

YEAR[1]	ALL EVER-MARRIED WOMEN[2]: Number in labor force (thousands): Total	No children under 18 years	Children 6 to 17 years old	Children under 6 years old	Labor force participation rates: Total	No children under 18 years	Children 6 to 17 years old	Children under 6 years old	MARRIED WOMEN, HUSBAND PRESENT: Number in labor force (thousands): Total	No children under 18 years	Children 6 to 17 years old	Children under 6 years old
1954	14,314	8,296	3,795	2,223	29.5	33.1	36.7	17.0	9,923	5,096	3,019	1,808
1955	15,066	8,543	4,048	2,474	30.6	33.9	38.4	18.2	10,423	5,227	3,183	2,012
1956	15,675	8,942	4,245	2,488	31.4	35.3	39.9	17.9	11,126	5,694	3,384	2,048
1957	16,146	9,046	4,458	2,643	32.1	35.8	40.5	18.8	11,529	5,805	3,517	2,208
1958	16,636	9,142	4,647	2,847	32.6	35.8	41.1	20.1	11,826	5,713	3,714	2,399
1959	17,214	9,250	5,007	2,957	33.3	35.9	43.0	20.7	12,205	5,679	4,055	2,471
1960	17,114	9,096	5,120	2,898	32.7	35.0	42.5	20.2	12,253	5,692	4,087	2,474
1961	18,536	9,824	5,529	3,183	34.9	37.2	45.3	22.1	13,266	6,186	4,419	2,661
1962	18,497	9,662	5,501	3,334	34.2	35.6	44.9	22.8	13,485	6,156	4,445	2,884
1963	19,061	9,784	5,718	3,559	34.8	35.8	44.6	24.4	14,061	6,366	4,689	3,006
1964	19,618	10,091	5,934	3,593	35.4	36.3	45.8	24.5	14,461	6,545	4,866	3,050
1965	20,040	10,358	6,000	3,682	35.7	36.5	45.7	25.3	14,708	6,755	4,836	3,117
1966	20,714	10,864	6,043	3,807	36.4	37.0	46.5	26.2	15,178	7,043	4,949	3,186
1967	21,630	11,048	6,443	4,139	37.5	36.7	48.6	28.7	15,908	7,158	5,269	3,481
1968	22,421	11,343	6,955	4,123	38.5	37.6	49.7	29.2	16,821	7,564	5,693	3,564
1969	23,397	11,798	7,376	4,223	39.5	38.3	50.7	30.4	17,595	7,853	6,146	3,596
1970	24,268	12,146	7,567	4,555	40.4	38.8	51.5	32.2	18,377	8,174	6,289	3,914
1971	24,494	12,293	7,874	4,327	40.2	38.4	52.0	31.4	18,530	8,432	6,424	3,674
1972	25,462	12,780	8,244	4,438	41.1	39.5	52.6	31.9	19,249	8,797	6,706	3,746
1973	26,165	13,148	8,253	4,764	41.6	39.3	52.8	34.2	19,821	9,107	6,658	4,056
1974	27,090	13,523	8,495	5,072	42.5	39.7	53.8	36.6	20,367	9,365	6,792	4,210
1975	28,043	13,896	8,754	5,393	43.4	40.0	54.8	38.9	21,111	9,701	6,971	4,437

YEAR[1]	MARRIED WOMEN, HUSBAND PRESENT—*CONTINUED*: Labor force participation rates: Total	No children under 18 years	Children 6 to 17 years old	Children under 6 years old	OTHER EVER-MARRIED WOMEN[2]: Number in labor force (thousands): Total	No children under 18 years	Children 6 to 17 years old	Children under 6 years old	Labor force participation rates: Total	No children under 18 years	Children 6 to 17 years old	Children under 6 years old
1954	26.6	31.6	33.2	14.9	4,391	3,200	776	415	39.4	35.8	61.7	42.9
1955	27.7	32.7	34.7	16.2	4,643	3,316	865	462	39.6	36.0	63.4	40.3
1956	29.0	35.3	36.4	15.9	4,549	3,248	861	440	39.4	35.3	64.9	43.6
1957	29.6	35.6	36.6	17.0	4,617	3,241	941	435	40.4	36.1	66.6	41.2
1958	30.2	35.4	37.6	18.2	4,810	3,429	933	448	40.8	36.6	65.8	45.1
1959	30.9	35.2	39.8	18.7	5,009	3,571	952	486	41.2	37.1	66.4	44.7
1960	30.6	34.7	39.0	18.6	4,861	3,404	1,033	424	40.0	35.7	66.2	39.8
1961	32.7	37.3	41.7	20.0	5,270	3,638	1,110	522	42.0	37.0	68.4	46.9
1962	32.7	36.1	41.8	21.3	5,012	3,506	1,056	450	39.1	34.8	64.6	40.9
1963	33.7	37.4	41.5	22.5	5,000	3,418	1,029	553	38.5	33.3	67.5	46.1
1964	34.4	37.8	43.0	22.7	5,157	3,546	1,068	543	38.7	33.9	65.3	44.1
1965	34.7	38.3	42.7	23.3	5,332	3,603	1,164	565	38.9	33.5	65.2	47.8
1966	35.4	38.4	43.7	24.2	5,536	3,821	1,094	621	39.5	34.7	65.9	46.3
1967	36.8	38.9	45.0	26.5	5,722	3,890	1,174	658	39.4	33.4	75.0	50.7
1968	38.3	40.1	46.9	27.6	5,600	3,779	1,262	559	39.0	33.4	67.8	47.6
1969	39.6	41.0	48.6	28.5	5,802	3,945	1,230	627	39.2	33.9	65.1	49.5
1970	40.8	42.2	49.2	30.3	5,891	3,972	1,278	641	39.1	33.4	67.3	50.7
1971	40.8	42.1	49.4	29.6	5,964	3,861	1,450	653	38.5	32.2	67.6	47.8
1972	41.5	42.7	50.2	30.1	6,213	3,983	1,538	692	40.1	34.0	66.5	47.4
1973	42.2	42.8	50.1	32.7	6,344	4,041	1,595	708	39.6	33.2	68.3	46.6
1974	43.0	43.0	51.2	34.4	6,723	4,158	1,703	862	40.9	33.9	67.3	53.6
1975	44.4	43.9	52.3	36.6	6,932	4,194	1,784	955	40.7	33.2	67.2	55.0


Source U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-50, Nos 11, 22, and 29; U.S. Department of Labor, *Manpower Report of the President, 1974*, and Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Special Labor Force Reports*, Nos 7, 13, 20, 26, 40, 50, 64, 80, 94, 120, 130, 144, 153, 164, 173, and 183

[1] Data for 1954–1966 include women 14 years old and over; data for 1967–1975 include women 16 years old and over

[2] Includes women who are separated, widowed, or divorced

Chart 8/7 Social Indicators, 1976

ECONOMIC ACTIVITY RATES OF WIVES ACCORDING TO THE PRESENCE AND AGE OF CHILDREN, 1954–1975



Source: see table 8/7

ANNALS, AAPSS, 435, Jan. 1978

A Decent Home and Suitable Living Environment

By DORIS B. HOLLEB

ABSTRACT: *Social Indicators, 1976* documents the success of the nation in solving the housing problems of the 1950s, in eliminating both a severe housing shortage and large numbers of substandard dwellings. Housing has improved greatly for all income classes, including the poor, for all races, and by all standards of measurement, but wide disparities remain. This suggests great relative deprivation in a society with such universally high standards.

A massive upsurge in housing construction, greater than rising demand, brought changes not only in the quality of the housing stock but in its location as well. The transformation of residential settlement patterns and the growth of extensive metropolitan cities have had profound effects on housing and community life. Because of racial and social barriers in local housing markets, polarities among metrpolitan neighborhoods have increased.

None of these pervasive changes emerge in the indicators. Nor do they address such contemporary concerns as rising housing costs, deteriorating neighborhood conditions in poverty areas, and the environmental and energy implications of emerging low density housing patterns. Thus, readers are likely to underestimate the scale and nature of housing deprivation and misread the direction of future trends.

Doris B. Holleb is Director of the University of Chicago's Metropolitan Institute and Research Associate at its Center for Urban Studies. She is a Commissioner and Secretary of the Northeastern Illinois Planning Commission. Economist and urban affairs specialist, she has served as a consultant to numerous public and private agencies, including HEW, HUD, and NSF. She is the author of Social and Economic Information for Urban Planning *and* Colleges and the Urban Poor *as well as many shorter works on urban issues.*

WHERE and how Americans live has changed dramatically since World War II. The metropolitan city with its downtown towers and ethnic neighborhoods, its suburban shopping centers, subdivisions, franchised food chains, and factories, tied together with ribbons of highways, is home to nearly three-fourths of all Americans. From the mountains to the prairies to the waving fields of grain, so universal a feature on the landscape is the low-slung, far-flung, multicentered regional metropolis that one can scarcely remember how new and distinctive it is.

Looking back at the last three decades, two sweeping changes have profoundly altered the quality and nature of housing and community life. First, residential settlement patterns have been transformed. Second, a massive increase in new housing construction and support systems facilitated the changes.

RESIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT PATTERNS

The urbanization of the nation and the growth of extensive clusters of regional cities is doubtless the single, most significant influence on housing and neighborhood life in the past quarter century. By 1974, 151.3 million persons lived in the 264 metropolitan areas (SMSAs) of the nation, approaching three-fourth (72.8 percent of the total population. Looking back to 1950, 84.5 million persons lived in 168 SMSAs, over half (56.1 percent) of the nation's population.[1] During this period, the territory within metropolitan boundaries doubled in size and densities of settlement declined sharply as highways and motor vehicles penetrated into open country.

Metropolitan cities are a mosaic of socially distinctive neighborhoods and local governments. They are separated, on the one hand, by increasing physical and social distances as the population and territory of metropolitan settlement has gradually enlarged. They are linked, on the other hand, by complex economic, communication, and transport networks. By 1975, suburbia, with its rows of single-family homes, was the dominant place of abode. In 1974, 39 percent of the nation's population lived in the suburbs of metropolitan areas, 29 percent in their central cities, and 32 percent in rural areas. In 1950, only 27 percent lived in suburbs, with 36 percent in central cities and 38 percent outside metropolitan areas.[2]

Even old suburban towns, from an historical standpoint, smack of newness. Half of the entire housing inventory of the United States in 1973 has been built since 1950. But two-thirds of all new dwellings built in metropolitan areas since 1950 have been constructed in suburbs.[3]

Low-density, single-family homes (attached and detached) are by far the most common type of housing in the nation, accounting for 68 percent of all year-round dwelling units. But single-family units comprise three-fourths of all housing in the suburbs. Multiunit structures account for only 28 percent of the total housing inventory. Yet they comprise half of all dwelling units in central cities. The remaining

1. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States. 1976* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1976), p 15

2. Ibid p. 16

3. U S. Bureau of the Census, *Annual Housing Survey. 1973*, Current Housing Reports, ser. H-150-73A (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1975) p. xvii.

4 percent of the housing stock consists of occupied mobile homes and trailers, the low cost housing of the nation.[4]

The rise of the suburbs in the postwar years dealt a heavy blow to the compact cities of the northeastern and midwestern industrial belts and to their aging walk-ups and tenements. Then after 1970, the rapid growth of exurbs and rural centers and migrations South and West have further siphoned off demand for housing in old city and suburban neighborhoods. Meanwhile, other countervailing sources of urban growth, that in the past supported population increases, have also diminished since 1970. Birthrates were at historic low points; legal immigration was limited; and rural-to-urban migration was completed, in fact reversed, with a farm population reduced to only 4 percent of the nation's total. Further, new employment centers have also mushroomed most rapidly in outlying areas, particularly in the Sunbelt, to provide jobs for new settlers from old cities.[5]

Nowhere in *Social Indicators, 1976* is the transformation of national settlement patterns delineated. Nor are its neighborhood implications spelled out in the light of racially and socially segregated, local housing markets. On balance, more families, and families with higher incomes, both black and white, are leaving the cities than are moving in. Thus, the number and proportion of dependent households have increased in the backwater neighborhoods of central cities.[6]

No geographic points of reference are presented in the chapter devoted to housing (chapter 3), not even broad-brushed summaries of regional patterns or urban-suburban-rural differences. This is a grave lack in tracing trends in housing and community development since housing conditions can never be evaluated apart from a neighborhood setting. Without perspectives on urbanization, critical changes over the past three decades in the nation's highly segmented, yet interconnected, housing markets are lost. Nor can one think sensibly about the future since decentralized housing trends have not yet spent their force.[7] And trends toward urban deconcentration are common to the industrial democracies of the world.[8]

New Housing Construction

The driving force of the transformation, and the second key to housing trends after World War II, was the unprecedented expansion of new housing construction. As a result of the expansion, the nation's

4. Ibid. p. xvii

5. For an analysis of these trends see George Sternlieb and James W. Hughes, "New Regional and Metropolitan Realities of America," *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, vol. 43, no. 3 (July 1977); Brian J. L. Berry and Donald C. Dahmann, *Population Redistribution in the United States in the 1970's* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1977); Doris B. Holleb, "The Direction of Urban Change," in *Agenda for the New Urban Era*, ed. Harvey S. Perloff (Chicago, American Society of Planning Officials, 1975)

6. Sternlieb and Hughes, "New Regional and Metropolitan Realities," pp. 238–39.

7. A recent Gallup Poll, for example indicates that only a small proportion (13 percent) of all Americans in 1976 would prefer to live in a "large city" than a small city or town and that the largest proportion (38 percent would prefer to live in a "rural area." *Los Angeles Times*, 21 November 1976, p. 8.

8. *Success Abroad. What Foreign Cities Can Teach American Cities Hearings*, U.S. Congress, House, Subcomittee on the City, 95th Cong., 5 April 1977, pp. 2–11.

housing stock improved greatly over the years for all income classes, including the poor, for all races, and by all common standards of measurement.[9] Until the recent upward spiral in costs, housing, per se, was no longer among the first ranking issues of widespread national concern.

The level of new residential construction was escalated during the 1960s, reaching new peaks in the early 1970s. Then with recession, the bottom fell out of private housing markets; a moratorium was also imposed on federal subsidies for lower income housing. After the severe 1975 recession, the production of single-family homes and mobile homes once again picked up steam, but construction of multifamily units continued to lag below earlier levels.[10]

What matters most about the upsurge in housing production is that it more than surpassed rising demand, generated by rapid population growth and new household formations. By 1973, there were 75.9 million housing units in the United States, a net increase of 65 percent over the 46.1 million units in 1950. During the same period, the nation's population shot up 38.2 percent and the number of households 56.7 percent. Thus, during these years, for every two more persons in the nation, roughly three more new housing units were built.[11]

A rate of new housing construction, higher than growing demand, brought remarkable changes not only in the quantity of available housing, not only in its location, but in its overall quality as well. Abandonments and demolitions of the least desirable units, largely in central cities, were speeded up as the new supply filtered into the local housing markets.[12] These changes in the quality and location of housing altered the daily lives of millions of families.

In effect, the severe housing shortage left in the wake of the Great Depression and war years was wiped out. Furthermore, the number and proportion of substandard units, as variously defined by the Census Bureau, were also sharply and progressively reduced. Consequently there was demonstrable progress on two fronts, towards solving both the "too little housing problem" and the "bad housing problem," to borrow Henry J. Aaron's terminology.[13]

"Is this not the best of all possible worlds," Candide might ask, "with so few housing problems left in the United States?" Dr. Pangloss would then reply, "Yes, in only 25 years they have all but resolved the housing problems of the '50s."

HOUSING QUESTIONS

Social Indicators, 1976 documents the success of the nation in solving the housing problems of the 1950s. More than half the indicators in the chapter dealing with housing chart unwavering improvements in the nation's housing in-

9 Frank de Leeuw, Ann B Schnare, and Raymond J Struyk, "Housing," in *The Urban Predicament*, eds William Gorham and Nathan Glazer (Washington, D C The Urban Institute, 1976), pp. 119-73

10. *Ninth Annual Report on the National Housing Goal*, (Washington, D.C., 19 January 1977), p. 11.

11 Based on data from the U.S Bureau of the Census and the *Annual Housing Survey, 1973*.

12. For a good description of the "filtering process" in local housing markets, see Anthony Downs, *Opening Up the Suburbs* (New Haven, Conn. Yale University Press, 1973), pp. 2-12.

13 Henry J Aaron, *Shelter and Subsidies*, (Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institution, 1972), p. 2

ventory and facilities, and exclusively in terms of decreasing numbers of persons per room in dwelling units and of units lacking complete plumbing facilities. The question is whether housing objectives and trends of the 1970s have much to do with these deficiencies. If not, what indicators would best depict the past sweep of change and provide yardsticks reflecting contemporary concerns and goals?

The selection of a few sturdy, valid "social indicators" of housing is extremely difficult. So many aspects of contemporary life come into focus in the home. Most of the other subjects in this volume bear on it: income and employment, social stratification, family structure, crime, education, health, welfare, recreation, and more. Furthermore, because of great variations among local housing markets, nationwide summary indicators should be built ideally from the bottom up.

Housing is also unique among durable consumer goods. It is by far the most durable, often lasting beyond the lifetimes of its original inhabitants. Housing and related expenditures usually absorb the single largest share of the family budget, always for lower income families. And a house is often a family's most valuable asset. Home ownership also has symbolic value, especially for working class families, and upward social mobility is frequently expressed in physical mobility, by moving to a better neighborhood. For families with higher incomes, there are tangible financial tax benefits as well.

Above all, housing is always rooted in a particular place, a neighborhood setting. As a building ages, the incomes, social characteristics and lifestyles of successive occupants will influence its maintenance and the fate of the neighborhood. Consequently, neighborhoods often reflect the age, ethnic, racial, and class differences in our society in clear geographic patterns.

The mini-neighborhood, in turn, is always part of a larger political entity in a specific area, state, and region. Its location greatly influences the cost and quality of public services, housing expenditures relative to income, and other neighborhood amenities or deficiencies, such as good schools, crime levels, or proximity to job opportunities. Since all these factors are critical to the quality of daily life, housing conditions must be appraised in a neighborhood context.

Thus, the term "housing" usually embraces at least four distinctive sets of questions, about which voluminous statistics are provided. These relate to: (1) the economic aspects of construction and investment in residential buildings; (2) the physical unit that provides shelter; (3) the characteristics of its occupants, (4) the location of the dwelling, both its immediate neighborhood and the larger geopolitical environs.

In attempting to fulfill the overarching goal of a "decent home and suitable living environment for every American family," federal housing and community development objectives have shifted over the years.[14] They have emphasized one or another of the above aspects of housing, and sometimes in conflicting ways. Federal and local transportation, education, criminal justice, environmental, banking, and fiscal policies are no less significant influences on housing patterns. But

14 This goal was first articulated by the Congress soon after World War II in the 1949 Housing Act and subsequently reaffirmed by Congress in the 1968 housing legislation

the flow of private investment (and disinvestment) in residential buildings is doubtless the most powerful single determinant of changing housing conditions.

However important statistics might be about the housing industry, the balance wheel of the economy, or about shifting public policies, they are inappropriate "social indicators," which ostensibly reflect the effects of these forces. Of the three other dimensions of housing questions, what do the indicators in the chapter tell us and what do they omit?

HIGH NATIONAL STANDARDS

Social Indicators, 1976 provides broad-gauged information about four aspects of housing: (1) trends in the future demand for housing; (2) the condition and occupancy of the nation's housing stock; (3) international comparisons; and (4) public perceptions of neighborhoods. Information about future trends and international comparisons are both new and welcome additions, compared to the coverage of housing in the 1973 volume.

As for future trends, expected population changes that will most influence housing demand are presented. Projections of declining average household size, rising numbers of one-person households, largely females, and demand for single-family units are charted. Standing alone however, the demographic projections are of limited use in assessing future national housing and construction needs since other significant factors are uncharted, as for example, costs of interregional and intrametropolitan migrations.

The bulk of the chapter, as in 1973, documents the impressive past performance of the economy in providing basic shelter for a growing nation. Relying only on the chapter's charts, a reader might conclude that a decent home, if not always a suitable living environment, would seem within easy reach of all Americans, certainly by world standards.

International perspectives are offered in two series. For selected countries, *Social Indicators, 1976* measures the proportion of dwelling units with indoor piped water and toilet facilities and the number of persons per room occupying the units. International comparisons, are a particularly useful addition. They tell us how ample and spacious are the worst of the nation's dwellings. They remind us that housing standards are relative matters, time- and culture-bound, varying with lifestyles, general levels of living, and expectations.

Housing deprivation in the United States is no longer a simple question of physical shelter from the elements, sanitation or crowding, a giant step in 40 years when "one-third of a nation" was ill-fed, ill-clothed and ill-housed." Recent Census Bureau surveys of household appliances, not included in *Social Indicators, 1976*, confirm the extraordinarily high standards of living that for Americans "make a house a home." So high are our current standards that it is now assumed that all year-round housing units, even decrepit shacks and vermin ridden tenements, have running water, heating, cooking, sanitary facilities, and electricity. These basic, commonplace items are scarce luxuries in the shanty towns of developing nations, for hundreds of millions of the four billion people on earth.[15] In the People's Republic

15. No really poor nation was among the countries selected, perhaps in the spirit

of China, home to over a fifth of the world's population, for example, standard housing consists of two rooms for an average household of five persons, with shared toilet and cooking facilities. The prime objective is to provide all homes with electricity, cold piped water, sanitary facilities, and cooking fuels.[16]

Our censuses count other refinements in the housing stock, spelling out specific plumbing fixtures and living arrangements. After all, by 1975, more than 95 percent of all homes were equipped with TVs, radios, refrigerators, vacuum cleaners, electric coffee makers, irons, toasters, telephones and more. Over half of all households had airconditioners, clothes washers and dryers, and 83 percent owned at least one automobile, the "second home" of many Americans.[17]

Social Indicators, 1976 tells us that in 1974 only 3.2 percent of all dwellings in the United States still were without complete, private plumbing facilities. In France, for example, almost half of all dwelling units lack inside toilets as do three-fourths of all Japanese homes. Further, in 1974, only 5.3 percent of all United States housing units were occupied by more than one person per room. Of these, only 1.1 percent were occupied by more than 1.5 persons per room, the density standard of the Census Bureau as recently as 1940. Few nations in the world would view this standard as crowded.

Additional charts fill out the picture of who lives in the nation's physically deficient dwellings. As might be expected, they are occupied principally by families with low incomes, a disproportionate number of which are black. Blacks are far more likely to live in crowded housing conditions than are whites. More than one person per room occupied 12.6 percent of all black households in 1974; the comparable proportion for whites was 4.5 percent. But improvements in living space have been dramatic for blacks as well as whites. In 1940, 40 percent of black households occupied dwelling units with more than one person per room as did 18.2 percent of white households.

A disproportionately high number of black households also occupy the few remaining housing units with incomplete, private plumbing facilities. Most of the latter are found in rural areas where rapid economic and population growth since 1970 suggest that deficient dwellings will soon be phased out. The speedy disappearance of substandard housing in core cities is far more problematic. At this juncture, poor maintenance and vandalism are decimating much of the formerly standard housing stock in urban poverty areas.

Apart from statistical problems of reliability, error and undercounting in black neighborhoods, how valid or useful are the two principal measures of housing quality (and, by inference, of housing deprivation) employed throughout the chapter? Granted, that as long as 3.2 percent of all dwellings lack complete plumbing facilities, and 5.3 per-

---

of noblesse oblige or because those nations with the poorest housing are also poor in statistics Comparisons with a few developing nations would have highlighted our extraordinarily high housing standards.

16. Doris B Holleb, "Regional Self-Sufficiency in China," *World Issues*, vol 11, no. 1 (Santa Barbara, Calif.: Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions, March 1977), pp 22–24

17. *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1976*, pp. 751 and 597.

cent are occupied by more than one person per room, these indicators are not irrelevant. These small proportions do stand for large numbers of people and homes. They mean that 2.3 million dwellings have incomplete plumbing facilities and that 3.8 million dwellings are rather densely occupied. The chief conclusion to be drawn from the tiny, dwindling percentages is that they suggest great *relative* deprivation in a society with such universally high housing standards.

Nonetheless, as the proportions decline over the years, so does the serviceability of the indicators. Not only are these measures becoming blunt as surrogates for housing quality, but above all, they are incomplete and therefore insensitive to other contemporary concerns.

CURRENT TRENDS

Missing from the chapter is information about three aspects of housing that have overshadowed the "too little housing problem" and the "bad housing problem." They revolve mostly around (1) disproportionately high housing expenses; (2) what might be called the "bad neighborhood problem;" and (3) environmental and energy conservation.

Housing costs, relative to other expenditures and incomes, skyrocketed midway in the decade, with two chief effects. First, an increasing number of families, more than the number living in physically substandard units, remain in adequate housing only by budgeting inordinate amounts for shelter. In 1975, for example, 44.8 percent of all renters spent more than a quarter of their incomes for housing. But for renters with incomes under $5,000, the comparable proportion was 84 percent.[18] Federal subsidy programs reach only a small fraction of eligible households.[19]

Second, homeowners are also devoting a rising proportion of their budgets to housing expenditures, and a growing number of families seeking to purchase homes for the first time are priced out of the market entirely.[20] Others sustain high housing costs only with the second income of a working wife. Soaring costs relative to incomes, after decades of stability, can have pervasive effects on family and community life, and relative cost information should be included.[21]

As for the "bad neighborhood problem," it is a hoary issue, limited mostly to poverty and older working class neighborhoods in central cities and industrial suburbs. Since 1970, conditions have deteriorated badly in these neighborhoods; and the outward trek from aging neighborhoods to newer, racially and socially selective, suburban and rural sites has accelerated. The slackening demand for housing in cities and towns with declining populations has resulted in increasing concentrations of the dependent poor, particularly female-headed households, in old central city neighborhoods. The lines of racial and socioeconomic separation

18 Based on data from the *Annual Housing Survey, 1975* These surveys provide detailed data, heretofore lacking, not only about relative costs but about the actual condition of the housing stock and neighborhoods.

19 Arthur P Solomon, *Housing the Urban Poor* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1974), pp 76–91

20. U S Congressional Budget Office, *Homeownership The Changing Relationship of Costs and Incomes, and Possible Federal Roles* (Washington, D C , January 1977) pp. 7–22.

21 These data are now available in the *Annual Housing Survey*

among metropolitan neighborhoods have hardened in the 1970s.

In declining poverty areas, it is impossible to maintain or restore housing by focusing exclusively on physical improvements; the social and economic problems of their inhabitants are far more overwhelming. Formerly standard housing has been ravaged by poor maintenance, abandonments, fire, and vandalism, and at a much faster rate than rehabilitations and additions. Some urban neighborhoods have become jungles, inhabited largely by predators and their victims. Neither their housing problem, nor its solution, is reflected in aggregate indicators measuring crowding or plumbing.

At the other end of the continuum, in growing, sprawling, suburban and exurban towns, emerging housing patterns give rise to quite different problems. As highways, sewer, water and utility lines reach out into open country, issues relating to preserving environmental quality and productive agricultural land, to rising automobile dependency and energy consumption are of foremost concern.[22] Although these issues may seem beyond the scope of a "housing" chapter, they are nonetheless high on the national agenda and are covered nowhere else in the volume.[23]

In short, because socioeconomic disparities among neighborhoods appear to be increasing and because these differences are essential to understanding changing housing issues and trends, insufficient information is provided about the characteristics of residents of neighborhoods in different national locales.

The only information about neighborhoods presented in the chapter is based on opinion polls. These subjective indicators record the attributes of neighborhoods as perceived by their inhabitants.[24] Most Americans are satisfied with their places of residence, rating their neighborhoods as good or excellent. Only 12.4 percent of all homeowners and 27.9 percent of renters view their neighborhoods as fair or poor. Even fewer wish to move, perhaps because the least satisfied recognize how limited are the alternatives within their means.

Since the chapter stops short with these subjective indicators, one can only surmise the actual situation of the neighborhoods in which, for instance, respondents are satisfied or dissatisfied with public transportation, shopping, or schools. One might guess, for example, that the high proportion of "satisfied" homeowners in 1974 who nonetheless rate public transportation in their neighborhoods as inadequate—some 47 percent of homeowners in contrast to 29.5 percent of renters—must live, by choice, in unserved suburban and rural communities.[25]

22. *The Annual Housing Survey* and the *1970 Census of Population and Housing* provided "journey to work" data indicating the progressive rise in the frequency and distance of automobile travel.

23. In a comparable volume for Japan, for example, indicators of environmental quality and housing are both provided and subsumed under the heading, "Material Environment." See Research Committee, Council of National Living, *Social Indicators of Japan* (Tokyo, September 17, 1974). For a review of the "social reports" of other nations, see also Roxann A. Van Dusen, ed., *Social Indicators, 1973: A Review Symposium* (Washington, D.C.: Social Science Research Council, 1974), pp. 20–62.

24. For a discussion of the problems associated with relying on "subjective" indicators of "objective" conditions, see Leo A. Goodman and Stephen E. Fienberg, "Social Indicators, 1973: Statistical Considerations," in *Social Indicators, 1973: A Review Symposium*, pp. 74–76.

25. For another view, see statement by Harvey S. Perloff in *Public Policy Decision*

CONCLUSION

With such major omissions, readers are likely to grossly underestimate the scale and nature of housing problems. Nor can they easily discern the direction of future housing trends.

A recent study by Bernard J. Frieden and Authur P. Solomon, for example, estimates the extent of housing and neighborhood deprivation at nearly triple the amount implied in *Social Indicators, 1976* because it takes into account the full range of housing problems that may impinge on families.[26] In addition to the six million households living in crowded units with inadequate plumbing, highlighted in the *Social Indicators* chapter, those households whose plumbing, heating, or electrical equipment no longer works because of poor maintenance are included in the Frieden-Solomon estimate as are households living in neighborhoods with inadequate public services. Finally, Frieder and Solomon also consider those who pay excessive costs for housing according to conventional yardsticks. The grand total comes to 17 million households: roughly one out of four of all households in the nation experienced one kind of housing problem or another in 1973.

In sum, despite the modest intention in *Social Indicators, 1976* of providing only "the warp and woof into which a comprehensive picture can be woven," there are major missing threads. Because of them readers are left with an incomplete canvas of "the direction in which we appear to be evolving." The dynamic relationship of the physical aspects of housing and the economic and social needs of its inhabitants remain confused, a confusion that has bedeviled federal housing policies from the beginning. Nor does the chapter illuminate the links among seemingly divergent national policy objectives of preserving urban neighborhoods and conserving environmental resources and energy

Housing is a hydra-headed beast After three decades, "a decent home and suitable living environment for every American family" is still an elusive goal.

Calif., Urban and Regional Information Systems Association, 28 March 1974), pp 87–94

26 Bernard J. Frieden and Arthur P Solomon, *The Nation's Housing, 1975 to 1985* (Cambridge, Mass., Joint Center for Urban Studies, April 1977), pp 131–41

Table 3/6
HOUSING UNITS, BY AVAILABILITY OF PLUMBING FACILITIES: 1940–1974

Availability of plumbing facilities	1940	1950	1960	1970	1974
NUMBER (thousands)					
Total, occupied units	34,855	42,826	53,024	63,450	70,831
Lacking some or all plumbing facilities	15,547	14,575	7,785	3,773	2,274
With all plumbing	19,308	28,251	45,239	59,677	68,557
PERCENT					
Total, occupied units	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Lacking some or all plumbing facilities	44.6	34.0	14.7	5.9	3.2
With all plumbing	55.4	66.0	85.3	94.1	96.8

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *1940 Census of Housing*, Vol. II; *1950 Census of Housing*, Vol. I; *1960 Census of Housing*, Vol. I, *1970 Census of Housing*, Vol. I; and *1974 Annual Housing Survey*, Series H-150, Part A

Chart 3/6

Social Indicators, 1976

HOUSING UNITS, BY AVAILABILITY OF PLUMBING FACILITIES: 1940–1974




Chart 3/8 — Social Indicators, 1976

PERCENT OF HOUSING UNITS LACKING SOME OR ALL PLUMBING FACILITIES, BY LOCATION: 1970 AND 1974




Table 3/8
HOUSING UNITS LACKING SOME OR ALL PLUMBING FACILITIES, BY LOCATION: 1970 AND 1974

Location	1970		1974	
	Number (thousands)	Percent of all housing units	Number (thousands)	Percent of all housing units
All housing units lacking some or all plumbing facilities	3,773	5.9	2,274	3.2
Inside SMSA's	1,387	3.2	807	1.7
Inside central cities	683	3.2	416	1.8
Outside central cities	704	3.1	392	1.5
Outside SMSA's	2,386	12.2	1,467	6.6

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of Housing*, Vol. II, and *1974 Annual Housing Survey*, Series H-150, Part A.

Chart 3/10 Social Indicators, 1976

HOUSEHOLDS LIVING IN UNITS LACKING SOME OR ALL PLUMBING FACILITIES, BY RACE AND INCOME, 1974




Table 3/10

HOUSEHOLDS LIVING IN UNITS LACKING SOME OR ALL PLUMBING FACILITIES, BY RACE AND INCOME: 1974

INCOME	ALL RACES		RACES OTHER THAN BLACK		BLACK	
	Number (thousands)	Percent of all households	Number (thousands)	Percent of all households	Number (thousands)	Percent of all households
All housing units lacking some or all plumbing facilities. .	2,274	3.2	1,580	2.5	695	9.6
Less than $3,000	979	12.1	648	10.1	331	20.1
$3,000 to $4,999	493	6.5	349	5.5	144	12.0
$5,000 to $6,999	292	4.2	196	3.2	96	10.0
$7,000 to $9,999	254	2.6	189	2.2	65	5.9
$10,000 to $14,999 ...	173	1.1	128	.9	45	3.8
$15,000 and over	84	.4	70	.3	14	1.2

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *1974 Annual Housing Survey*, Series H-150, Part B.

Chart 3/11

Social Indicators, 1976

PROJECTIONS OF THE NUMBER OF PRIMARY INDIVIDUALS, BY SEX: 1980, 1985, 1990




Table 3/11

PROJECTED NUMBER OF OCCUPIED HOUSING UNITS AND PRIMARY INDIVIDUALS: 1980, 1985, AND 1990

(Thousands) YEAR AND SERIES		Occupied housing units	PRIMARY INDIVIDUALS Male	PRIMARY INDIVIDUALS Female
1974		69,859	5,654[1]	9,288[1]
1980	Series A	79,953	7,331	11,393
	Series B	79,356	7,076	11,135
	Series C	78,159	6,565	10,620
1985	Series A	88,456	8,932	13,144
	Series B	87,188	8,395	12,612
	Series C	84,655	7,320	11,545
1990	Series A	96,318	10,541	14,868
	Series B	94,270	9,688	14,032
	Series C	90,185	7,981	12,354

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-25, No. 607.

[1] Estimated.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 435, Jan. 1978

Social Security and Social Welfare Indicators

By IDA C. MERRIAM

ABSTRACT: The proportion of its total resources that a society devotes to social welfare is a useful general measure related to social policy. In fiscal 1976, the United States spent 21 percent of Gross National Product (GNP) for public social welfare programs, including health and education as well as social insurance (the largest segment) and assistance. Program developments, inflation, population growth, and the level of economic activity affect trends. The United States spends relatively less for social security than most industrial countries. Income maintenance programs now touch most families in the United States. More than 90 percent of all persons over age 65 get social security benefits. The extent of social security protection for survivors and disabled persons, the relative importance of private pensions, social security benefit replacement rates (the relation to previous earnings), and the income situation of aged persons are reviewed. There is brief reference to sickness insurance, unemployment insurance, and public assistance. Some possible directions of future change are noted. The interweaving of social welfare objectives and systems into the fabric of modern life cannot be undone. The attempt to develop clearer indicators of need and accomplishment is worth pursuing.

Ida C. Merriam was formerly an Assistant Commissioner and Director of Research in the Social Security Administration. She received a Ph.D. in economics from the Brookings Graduate School of Economics and Government in 1928. She has served as a technical advisor or consultant on social security with the International Labour Organization and the United Nations, and helped organize and served as the first chairman of an advisory committee on Social Security Research of the International Social Security Association.

LIKE most social indicators, statistics relating to social welfare are ambiguous. An increase in expenditures for unemployment insurance signals both a weakness in the economy that should disturb us and a strength in the protection for individuals and families that marks an effective social welfare system. Rising health costs attributable to price inflation are negative indicators; rising health costs due to better health care more equitably provided to all groups in the population are, up to some point, good. The questions "when is *more* useful" or "when is *little* wasted effort" are difficult to answer in relation to individual social programs. They probably cannot be answered at all in relation to the totality of social welfare measures.

Good program research has always provided, and effective planning has always used, a variety of indicators of both need and accomplishment. By their very nature, general social indicators give only gross and generalized information. They can clarify for us what have been the overall results of the multitude of decisions made in earlier years. Their ability to point directions for the future is more limited. It is easier to identify what is wrong in terms of general problems and needs than it is to visualize alternative patterns of change or to be sure about cause and effect relationships that would make the achievement of one or another pattern realistic. Nevertheless, the attempt to see and understand the general movement of social change is basic to efforts to achieve a more satisfactory social order.

SOCIAL WELFARE EXPENDITURES

One general measure which provides a useful framework for analysis is the proportion of its resources that a society devotes to social welfare. Broadly defined, social welfare programs include all programs directed specifically to the well-being of individuals and families, as distinct from expenditures for law and order or general community facilities and services. The range of such programs is much the same in all industrialized countries, although with significant variations in emphasis and priorities. Socially organized provision for income maintenance, health services, education, housing, and protective and personal services is an established and necessary feature of the modern world.

In fiscal 1976, the United States spent some $330 billion, or 20.6 percent of that year's gross national product (GNP) for public social welfare programs. (See table 1.) The largest amount, 44 percent of the total, went for social insurance—old age, survivors, disability and health insurance; railroad and public employee pension systems; unemployment insurance; temporary disability insurance; workmen's compensation.

Health and medical programs—public health activities, public hospitals, and other public civilian and military health services—accounted for only 6 percent of all public social welfare spending. This figure, however, gives a misleading impression of the extent of public expenditures for health services. A significant portion of such expenditures are made through other programs—social insurance (primarily Medicare and workmen's compensation), public assistance (Medicaid), and veterans' programs. In fiscal 1976 all expenditures from public funds for health and medical services were three times as large as those under programs specifically identified as health programs.

Public assistance for needy peo-

TABLE 1

SOCIAL WELFARE EXPENDITURES UNDER PUBLIC PROGRAMS AS A PERCENT OF GNP, SELECTED FISCAL YEARS 1929–1976

TYPE OF PROGRAM	1929	1935	1945	1950	1960	1970	1976
Total expenditures (millions)	$3,921	$6,548	$9,205	$23,508	$52,293	$145,856	$331,366
Percent of GNP							
Total	3.9	9.5	4.4	8.9	10.5	15.2	20.6
Social Insurance	.3	.6	.7	1.9	3.9	5.7	9.1
Medical benefits	(.07)	(.09)	(.06)	(.07)	(.09)	(.85)	(1.2)
Public Aid	.1	4.4	.5	.9	.8	1.7	3.0
Medical benefits				(.02)	(.10)	(.54)	(.95)
Health and medical programs	.3	.6	1.1	.8	.9	1.0	1.2
Veterans programs	.7	.9	.5	2.6	1.1	.9	1.2
Medical benefits	(.05)	(.07)	(.05)	(.28)	(.19)	(.19)	(.25)
Education	2.4	2.9	1.5	2.5	3 5	5.3	5.4
Other social welfare	.1	.1	.1	.2	.2	.4	.5
All health and medical expenditures	.5	.8	1.2	1.2	1.3	2.6	3.6
Federal funds as percent of total welfare expenditures	20.4	49.0	47 1	44.8	47.7	53.0	59.9
Social welfare expenditures as percent of all government expenditures	37.4	49.6	8.6	37 4	38.4	48.2	59.7

SOURCE: For years 1950–76, Alfred M Skolnik and Sophie R Dales, "Social Welfare Expenditures, Fiscal Year 1976," *Social Security Bulletin*, vol 40, no 1 (January 1977), pp. 3–19. For years 1929–45, Ida C Merriam and Alfred M Skolnik, "Social Welfare Expenditures Under Public Programs in the United States, 1929–66," DHEW, SSA ORA Research Report no 25 (Washington, D.C: USGPO, 1968).

ple, after an upsurge in the Depression of the 1930s and a decline in the war years, remained at a level of less than one percent of the GNP until 1965. By 1976, it amounted to three percent of GNP. Major factors in this increase were the very substantial rise of expenditures for medical care under Medicaid, and the introduction of the food stamp program, which by fiscal 1976 was paying subsidies of $5.7 billion, almost one-third as much as was paid in cash assistance in that year. The number of persons applying for cash assistance also increased under the impetus of the aggressive welfare rights movement and concern with poverty in the 1960s. It should be noted that all these figures relate to direct expenditures only. Public support through tax subsidies, important as it is, is not included in this method of accounting.

A number of factors in addition to program development underlie the growth of social welfare expenditures in the United States in recent years. A large part of the increase represents price inflation. Between 1950 and 1976, total social welfare expenditure in current dollars in-

creased 1,312 percent, but in purchasing power (1976 dollars) the increase was 507 percent, less than half as much. When population growth also is taken into account, the increase in per capita expenditures in 1976 dollars was 327 percent. Demographic changes, such as the aging of the population, are also important, especially as they have been compounded by the lowering of the age (to 62) at which retirement benefits can be drawn under the basic social security system. The gradual maturing of that system, as well as the extension of the program to cover almost all employed persons and to provide disability benefits and health insurance for aged persons and disabled beneficiaries, was the major program expansion during these years.

The share of national output devoted to social welfare is affected not only by national priorities but also by the size of the national product at a particular time. Social programs have built-in stabilities—old age pensions continue to be paid, and indeed become more essential in recessions. Many programs—notably unemployment insurance, public assistance, food stamps—expand in bad times. While the statistic used in table 1—expenditure as a percent of GNP—is perhaps the best general measure of changes in welfare effort, there is still need for care in interpretation. The high totals in table 1 for 1935 and 1976, for example, reflect not only large expenditures for public aid and social insurance, but low (relatively) national output.[1]

It is useful to look also at the magnitude of private expenditures fo social welfare purposes. Private pensions and other employee benefits when added to cash social insurance and related public payments, brought total organized expenditures for income maintenance to 11 percent of GNP in fiscal 1976. (See chart 4/1A at the end of this article for earlier years.) Public programs have accounted for between 85 and 90 percent of all such direct expenditures since 1950. About 85 percent of all expenditures for education in the United States have also been from public funds, a larger proportion (93 percent) for elementary and secondary education, a smaller proportion (63 percent) for higher education. In the case of health and medical care, on the other hand, private expenditures still predominate. Public expenditures for health purposes (under all types of programs) amounted to 42 percent of all health expenditures in 1976. In this overall accounting, the costs of medical education are classified as educational, not health, expenditures. On this basis, total public and private health expenditures in the United States in fiscal 1976 amounted to 8.6 percent of GNP. This is a considerably larger proportion of GNP than other industrialized countries appear to spend in total for health, although many spend more than the United States on public health programs.

Some international comparisons

The social welfare expenditure series for the United States was first developed in response to an attempt at international comparisons of welfare spending. At a meeting of the United Nations Economic and Social Council (UNESCO) in the late summer of 1951, the United States was being attacked for its capitalist

1. Detailed data on individual program expenditures from federal, state, and local funds can be found in the sources cited in table 1. See those sources and tables 4/1 and 4/2 in *Social Indicators, 1976* for a regrouping of the data by major function (cash income maintenance, health, education, other welfare) and estimates of comparable private expenditures.

disregard of the welfare of its citizens, and figures that were cited in the debate did imply a very limited governmental commitment to welfare goals. A quick check showed that the figures in question had been accurately read from United States budget documents. The budget classifications, however, were not easily adjusted to reflect a broad definition of social welfare. Even more important, the large state and local government expenditures for welfare purposes ($14.5 billion compared with $9.6 billion from federal funds in fiscal 1950) had been completely forgotten.

The Research Office of the Social Security Administration provided data and analyses that proved illuminating in the U.N. debates.[2] The scope of the social welfare expenditure series that was published in the *Social Security Bulletin* first in 1951 (and annually since 1953) was very much influenced by this special use of the material, particularly in the inclusion of public education as a social welfare program.

There is no continuing statistical series for other countries with precisely the same scope, although occasional parallel compilations have been made. Social planning budgets or accounts in a number of countries cover the same general area. For a number of years the International Labor Office has compiled statistics obtained from its members on a uniform basis covering expenditures under social security programs, including social insurance, public assistance, health insurance and public health programs, and family or children's allowances. The most recent figures are for the year 1971.[3] Overall, the United States devotes a considerably smaller share of its GNP to social security, thus defined, than do most industrial countries: 11 percent in 1971, as compared with 18 or 19 percent in most of northern Europe and Canada and 22 percent in the Netherlands and Sweden. The difference results largely from the fact that we have neither family allowances nor a national health insurance or health service program covering the entire population. Even for old age, survivors, and disability insurance, however, United States expenditures as a percent of GNP (3.4 percent were about half those in the Federal Republic of Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden (7.6 percent, 6.3 percent, and 6.0 percent).[4] The 1972 Social Security amendments substantially increased benefit levels in this country, and while benefits in other countries have also been liberalized and adjusted to price changes, the gap between us and other countries is certainly not as great in 1977 as it was in 1971.

A recent OECD study[5] analyzes trends in income maintenance in the member countries. The program def-

2. U.N. Economic and Social Council, 13th Session, E/L 186, "Report of the Social Commission," (9 August 1951). See also *Social Security Bulletin*, vol. 14, no. 10 (October 1951), pp. 14–16.

3. International Labor Office, "The Cost of Social Security—Basic Tables, Eighth International Inquiry, 1967–1971," duplicated (Geneva 1976).

4. Max Horlick, "National Expenditures on Social Security in Selected Countries, 1968 and 1971," DHEW, SSA Research and Statistics Note no. 29–1974 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 18 October 1974). The figures for total social security expenditures in the Note and in this article differ from those used in *Social Indicators, 1976* chart 4/21 because the *Social Indicators* report omits family allowances, cash sickness benefits, unemployment benefits, and public employee and veterans benefits.

5. "Public Expenditure on Income Maintenance Programs" (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development Studies in Resource Allocation, no. 3, July 1976).

initions are slightly different than those used by the International Labor Office, but the general relationships found among countries are similar. One factor contributing to the differences among countries in the amounts spent on retirement benefits is the proportion of the population aged 65 and over—10 percent in the United States in 1972, as compared with 13 or 14 percent in most European countries. The length of time a pension plan has been in operation also is an important factor—the older and more mature the system, the larger the proportion of now aged persons will be who have had the opportunity to qualify for full benefits.

INCOME MAINTENANCE

With this background we can take a closer look at the income maintenance programs. Almost two-fifths of the social welfare expenditures under public programs in the United States in fiscal 1976 were for cash social insurance benefits. These benefits plus veterans compensation amounted to 10 percent of aggregate personal income. Cash public assistance plus the value of food stamp bonuses accounted for another 1.7 percent.

There are many ways of evaluating these programs and measuring their impact. Here the focus is on the extent of the protection against earnings loss afforded to individuals.

In an industrial society, most families depend on current earnings to cover their immediate consumption needs and an alternative source of continuing income is necessary when earnings cease or are interrupted. Long-term social insurance benefits for the aged, the permanently disabled, and for survivors account for the bulk of income maintenance payments.

Population with benefits

Retired Aged—Virtually all persons reaching age 65 in the United States now have a claim to a continuing income, under social security or another federal program. At the end of 1976, there were 15.4 million retired workers age 65 and over on the social security benefit rolls. Another 1.8 million persons aged 62–64 were drawing early retirement benefits. Women make up what has been an increasing proportion of retired workers (now 45 percent). Including persons receiving benefits as wives or husbands, widows or widowers, and a few aged parents, some 21.2 million persons age 65 and over, or more than 90 percent of that age group, were getting cash social security benefits. (Twenty years earlier, the proportion had been 40 percent.) Of the remainder of those over age 65, about half a million were working essentially full-time but could draw benefits if they retired; most of the others were drawing government employee pensions or veterans benefits.

In addition to social security benefits, a substantial number of aged persons have other sources of retirement income. Private pensions were paid to about 6.4 million persons (including some disabled and early retirees) at the end of 1976. Persons in military service and many state and local government employees are covered by social security and have both the basic social security benefit and their special pensions. Federal civilian employees are still not covered by social security but some former federal employees who have also worked elsewhere draw both civil service and social security benefits.

About 8 percent of Old Age, Survivors and Disability Insurance (OASDI) beneficiaries aged 65 and

over (some 1.7 million persons) have incomes so low that they get cash income-tested assistance as well. Some 600,000 persons age 65 and over get only public assistance.

Survivors—More than 90 percent of all orphans or half orphans are now entitled to social security benefits based on the earnings of either the father or the mother. The surviving parent can also receive a benefit while caring for the child if he or she is not earning more than the amounts allowed under the retirement test. At the end of 1976, almost 3 million children were receiving survivor benefits. Including aged widows and widowers, the number of persons benefiting under the survivor provisions of the social security program was more than one third as large as the number of retired workers and their dependents. (See table 2.)

Disabled Workers—Some 2.7 million former workers with severe and long-continuing disabilities were drawing social security benefits at the end of 1976. Most workers injured in the course of their employment or in military service have long had recourse to workmen's compensation or military or veterans benefits. The increase in automobile accidents and in chronic disabilities linked to environmental pollution or other causes has given additional importance to the general disability benefits under the social security system.

The determination of inability to work or carry on one's usual occupation involves subjective factors not easy to measure. A special survey counted 8.6 million severely disabled adults aged 18–24 and not in institutions in 1972. Some 42 percent were receiving OASDI benefits; 22 percent were getting benefits under other long-term disability benefit programs—veterans, workmens compensation, railroad and public employee pension systems. A little less than 10 percent had income from private pensions.

The severely disabled include persons who are mentally retarded and others disabled at birth or in childhood who have never been able to work. Dependents or survivor benefits under OASDI are payable to such disabled "children" of any age when the parent is a beneficiary or dies, but there is no social insurance benefit for disabled children of working parents. One-fifth of all those counted as severely disabled in 1972 were getting public assistance.

Benefit levels and replacement rates under social security

Social security benefits reflect the range of incomes earned in the working years, with a floor in the form of a minimum benefit, a higher proportion of earnings replaced at lower earning levels and a ceiling on the maximum amount of earnings taxed and the maximum benefits paid. They also reflect the continuity of earnings.

The average monthly benefit amounts that were being paid in December 1976 under the OASDI program are shown in table 2. Benefit amounts are now automatically adjusted to increases in the cost of living. A 5.9 percent cost of living increase in benefits went into effect in July 1977. The minimum benefit then payable to a retired worker at age 65 (with no reduction for early retirement) was $114.30; the maximum for a retired worker was $437.10.

One of the most meaningful measures of the relative adequacy of benefits is the extent to which they replace previous earnings. The concept of the replacement rate is,

TABLE 2

OLD AGE, SURVIVORS AND DISABILITY INSURANCE: NUMBER OF BENEFICIARIES IN CURRENT PAYMENT STATUS AND AVERAGE MONTHLY BENEFIT AMOUNTS, DECEMBER, 1976

TYPE OF BENEFICIARY	NUMBER OF BENEFICIARIES (IN THOUSANDS)		AVERAGE MONTHLY BENEFIT AMOUNT
TOTAL*	33,024		—
Retired workers and their dependents	20,745		—
Retired workers		17,165	$225
Men		9,421	248
Benefits not reduced for early retirement		4,633	270
Benefits reduced for early retirement		4,788	226
Women		7,745	197
Benefits not reduced for early retirement		2,670	224
Benefits reduced for early retirement		5,075	183
Wives and husbands		2,896	114
Children		684	88
Disabled workers and their dependents	4,624		—
Disabled workers		2,670	245
Men		1,824	266
Women		846	200
Wives and husbands		474	73
Children		1,480	68
Survivors	7,446		—
Aged widows and widowers		3,995	207
Survivor children		2,872	152
Widowed mothers and fathers		579	160

SOURCE. *Social Security Bulletin*, vol 40, no. 6 (June 1977), tables M10, M12, M13, M14, Q4 and Q8

* Includes parents of workers and persons with special age 72 benefits not shown separately Of the total number of beneficiaries, 21.2 million were aged 65 and over, 3 3 million were aged 62–64 (1.8 million drawing early retirement benefits, .6 million disability benefits and 9 million dependent or survivor benefits) and 8 5 million were under age 62 (5 million were children under age 18 or age 22 if fulltime students or of any age if disabled before age 18)

however, much more complicated than might at first appear. Should benefits be based on, and compared with, earnings in the year before retirement, which will be high relative to earlier years for most professionals and low for many low paid, irregularly employed workers? Or should the comparison be with earnings in the most recent five or ten year period—which, unless revalued, will be distorted by inflation as a measure of living standards? Or is the fairer measure earnings averaged over the individual's entire working career, a figure which generally will not only be much lower than either of the other measures but which will also change the relative position of different workers?

The formula in the United States is a modified career average, with

the lowest five years of earnings omitted from the calculation. An analysis of the actual replacement ratio of benefits newly awarded in the period July–December 1974, showed a median replacement rate for men of 59 percent of career average taxable earnings (as defined in the law), but only 37 percent of taxable earnings in the three highest years of the preceding ten (1964–73). For women workers, because of their generally lower earnings and the weighted benefit formula, the replacement ratios based on these measures were 79 and 44 percent respectively. For persons who reached the taxable maximum in at least one of the three years of highest earnings (40 percent of the men, 11 percent of the women), total wages were estimated. Median replacement ratios in relation to total earnings in the three highest years were 29 percent for men and 31 percent for women.[6] Many of those with earnings above the taxable maximum were also receiving private pensions. An earlier study (in 1970) showed that for persons receiving private pensions the median replacement rate of social security benefits plus private pensions, based on estimated total earnings in the three best years, was about twice the replacement rate of social security benefits alone. The ten percent of newly-entitled beneficiaries who were also receiving railroad retirement or public employee pensions (civilian or military) similarly had combined replacement ratios about twice the rate for social security benefits alone.[7]

These replacement ratios are for individual workers. Private pension systems almost never pay benefits for wives. Under social security the wife's benefit is basically fifty percent of the husband's, unless reduced by his early retirement. The wife may, of course, qualify for a higher benefit as a retired worker. Unfortunately, the data are not yet available from which to compute actual replacement ratios for couples, relating the combined benefits to the combined preretirement earnings of both spouses.

One can evaluate benefit levels and replacement rates in several ways. Clearly some expenses are less in old age—most of the costs of childrearing and expenses in connection with going to work, for example. On the other hand, medical care costs increase—in the absence of really comprehensive health insurance or a national health service—and under inflationary conditions, housing costs (including property taxes, utilities, repairs, etc.) may rise significantly for the many old people who own their homes. Housing, medical care, and special homemaker services, or institutional care at later ages, may call for specific remedies or programs. For the ordinary expenses of living, pension benefits can be appropriately compared with previous earnings levels. Private pension plans frequently aim at a combined (social security and the private pension) replacement rate of 70–75 percent of previous earnings (meaning usually recent earnings). The fact that in the United States social security benefits are not taxable also has to be taken into account. This tax treatment of benefits is, of course, relatively much more valuable to those in the higher income brackets than it is to the many social security beneficiaries with low to moderate incomes.

6 Alan Fox, "Earnings Replacement from Social Security Benefits Newly Entitled Beneficiaries, 1974," SSA RS Note no 13 (Washington, D C.: USGPO, 15 June 1976).

7. "Reaching Retirement Age," USDHEW, SSA, ORA Research Report, no 47 (Washington, D.C. USGPO, 1976) pp. 145–49 and chapter 14.

Income of the aged

Judgments as to what would be the desirable replacement rate—however the rate is defined—reflect general assumptions about what other resources retired or disabled persons have in addition to their benefits. In order to find out, and to answer other questions relating to the characteristics and circumstances of persons who in any period were or were not drawing benefits, one has to turn to survey data. A large amount of such data is now available, most of it based on surveys undertaken by the Social Security Administration, with the Census Bureau usually responsible for data collection.[8]

Social Indicators, 1976 shows a few measures derived from these surveys. In the brief space of a general article it is impossible to do more than list some of the major conclusions that emerge from this growing mass of material. The analysis focuses on the aged, the largest group and the one for which most information is available. While certain relationships—and, of course, absolute numbers of persons or dollars—have changed since the 1950s, other relationships have remained remarkably stable.

1. For many in the age group 65–69, earnings remain an important source of income.

2. For those over 70, and for all who have fully retired, social security benefits constitute the major source of continuing income. A little more than half the married couples aged 65 and over and almost three-fourths of the nonmarried beneficiaries had less than $1,000 of other continuing retirement income in 1971. (See chart 4/10 at the end of this article.)

3. Private pensions provide an important supplement to social security benefits for an increasing number of beneficiaries but still a minority even of the men. Private pensions go disproportionately to workers with the higher benefits. They partially offset the effect of the weighted benefit formula in social security. Women and blacks and low paid workers generally are unlikely to have private pensions. Nor are such pensions usually available to survivors or dependents. Of the 6.3 million married couples in the 1971 survey, some 23 percent were receiving private pensions in addition to social security, while 6 percent were getting public assistance. In the case of nonmarried women beneficiaries (7.3 million, mostly widows) only 10 percent had additional income from private pensions, while 14 percent were on public assistance. In both cases, the median incomes of beneficiaries who were also receiving private pensions were more than twice as large as those of beneficiaries getting public assistance. (See chart 4/7 at the end of this article.)

4. Aged widows have been and remain the most disadvantaged group

8 The major survey reports published to date are: Lenore A. Epstein and Janet H. Murray, "The Aged Population of the United States," USDHEW, SSA, ORS Research Report no. 19 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1967); "Demographic and Economic Characteristics of the Aged. 1968 Social Security Survey," USDHEW, SSA, ORS Research Report no. 45 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1975); "Reaching Retirement Age: A Survey of Newly Entitled Workers 1968–70," USDHEW, SSA, ORS Research Report no. 47 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1976); "Income of the Population Aged 60 and Older, 1971," DHEW, SSA, ORS, staff paper no. 26 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, April 1977). Findings from surveys of disabled persons, children living with widowed mothers, student beneficiaries, and a longitudinal survey of men and nonmarried women aged 58–63 in 1969 who will be reinterviewed at two year intervals for ten years, have been presented in preliminary reports and in articles in the *Social Security Bulletin*.

in the older population. This situation is changing somewhat as women who were too old to qualify for benefits as workers or dependents when the program started are replaced by younger cohorts, an increasing number of whom are entitled to benefits as former workers. The Social Security Act has also been amended (in 1972) to raise the level of widow's benefits to equal that of a worker. A disproportionately large number of widows and older, unmarried men and women are still getting public assistance, however.

5. Asset income is very unequally distributed. For most aged beneficiaries the only significant asset is an owned home. More than three-fourths of the married couples and more than one-third of the nonmarried beneficiaries aged 65 and over do own their homes, in about four-fifths of the cases, mortgage free. Few beneficiaries, however, have income-yielding assets of any consequence.

6. Early retirement poses increasing problems. Some persons retire before the age of 65 and take reduced social security benefits because they have adequate private pensions or other income. Many more are forced out of the labor market by ill health or continuing unemployment. They are not sufficiently disabled to qualify for disability benefits; unemployment insurance does not cover such long-continued inability to find a job, and public assistance is also available only for persons aged 65 and over or with severe disabilities. Early retirement benefits under social security rescue many, but at the price of continuing low benefits. The problem of assuring acceptable income support to those who cannot work, without discouraging those who can work from doing so, is far from resolved for this age group as well as for younger persons.

Income loss from short-term sickness

Protection against income loss from short-term illness presents somewhat different problems than long-term disabilities. The connection with the job may not be broken immediately and other adjustments in family living may not occur or be feasible (hence, sickness benefits are usually set at a higher level in relation to current earnings than are long-term disability benefits). On the other hand, it is not always possible to tell at the outset of an illness or injury how long it will last. Some countries combine short- and long-term disability protection in one system. In this country we have not. The OASDI program picks up only after an individual has been continuously disabled for five months. Sick leave or voluntary private insurance cover the early (but not always the first) weeks of wage loss due to illness for many workers, but the protection is, of course, uneven. Four states—California, New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island—plus Puerto Rico and the railroad retirement system make statutory provisions for benefits during the first 26 weeks of disability. Overall, it is estimated that public and private insurance together replaced about 35 percent of the total wage loss from short-term (up to 26 weeks) disability in 1974. Excluding the relatively more generous sick leave payments and the corresponding earnings loss for government workers, the aggregate replacement for wage and salary workers was 25 percent. This was, nevertheless, almost double the protection that had been provided in 1950.[9]

9 Daniel N. Price, "Cash Benefits for Short-Term Sickness, 1948–74," *Social Security Bulletin*, vol. 39, no. 7 (July 1976), pp. 22–34

Unemployment insurance

Unemployment insurance is more directly responsive to fluctuations in business and economic activity than any of the other social insurance programs. Since the early 1940s it has been—for workers with substantial attachment to the labor force—a source of continuing income between jobs and in bad times. The program has never covered all unemployment. Young persons without employment experience or older women or men trying to enter or reenter the labor force, as well as workers who remain unemployed for very long periods, have been outside its scope.

Continuing high and pervasive unemployment in the past few years has led to a significant extension of benefit duration under most state laws and additional federal supplemental benefits for unemployed workers who had exhausted state benefits, thus providing a maximum of 65 weeks of benefit payments. During 1975, over four million persons exhausted their benefit rights while still remaining unemployed. Total expenditures for unemployment insurance in fiscal 1976 were just under $20 billion, or 16 percent of all cash social insurance benefits.

Public assistance

However adequate job opportunities may be, and however comprehensive and effective the social insurance program, there will probably always remain some persons who, at any given time, have less than enough to live on at accepted standards. Public assistance for aged and disabled persons became largely a federal responsibility beginning in 1974, although many states still find it necessary to supplement the federal payment. General assistance for persons in need, regardless of cause, is provided by most local governments, often with state financial aid, but at greatly varying levels of support. The largest assistance program is the federal-state program of aid to families with dependent children generally referred to as "the welfare program." A very few orphans and some children with disabled fathers or mothers are on the rolls, as are some children with unemployed parents in about half the states. The great majority of the 12 percent of all children under 18 who were receiving AFDC in 1975, however, lived in fatherless families. Analysis of the underlying social problems and of alternative methods of meeting society's responsibilities to such children and their parents could fill an entire issue of THE ANNALS. There is, as yet, no consensus on a preferred alternative or even on what would be the signs of improvement in the situation.

FOR THE FUTURE

Quite clearly, our social security system has largely achieved the goal of universal protection for income security in old age; but there remain both gaps and overlaps that could be corrected. Some liberalization of the permanent disability provisions for older workers under social security would ease the pressure for early retirement and provide protection for individuals now without real security. Social security benefit levels are now more than minimal, but still do not provide a level of living relative to that of the working population that is desirable for the large number of middle-income beneficiaries who have no other continuing income. Benefit levels and the maximum benefit amount could more justifiably be raised if benefit income were taxable. Judgments as to what is de-

sirable will, of course, always be subject to change. Equity in the benefit structure for different groups —women who work for pay and women who do not, low wage and high income earners—is also a concept that will be redefined from time to time.

The low rate of wage loss replacement for temporary disability signals another area for potential improvement. The optimum mix of public job programs and unemployment insurance remains a matter of sharply differing opinions, as does the question of assistance to the working poor.

This analysis has not dealt with the economic impacts of the programs or with the question of alternative methods of financing social security. Current discussions of the future costs of OASDI invoke projections of the ratio of the retired to the working population in the next century that may be somewhat unrealistic. There is no doubt that the number and proportion of aged persons will increase. How many of them will continue working, how many women will be in the labor force for large parts of their lives, and whether the birth rate will remain at its present very low level are all matters about which there can be no assurance.

One factor that does stand out in the summary indicators is the critical importance of general economic conditions. The availability of jobs directly affects the number who need unemployment insurance or public assistance; it also determines how many older persons can continue to work and earn when they want to do so, and how many disabled will be successfully placed. The availability of enough jobs to go around also means fewer jobs at substandard wages and fewer workers with incomes below the poverty standard and in need of assistance. At the same time, a strong economy makes it easier to finance the cost of the income maintenance and income support that is provided.

Whatever the degree of success of general economic policy, the importance of social security as an institution will remain. The interweaving of social welfare objectives and systems into the fabric of modern life cannot be undone without a major breakdown of the whole society. Clearer general indicators of changing circumstances and potential areas of improvement can help promote public understanding and lay a basis for the detailed analysis of alternatives that is essential to the continuing achievement of social welfare objectives.

Table 4/1

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EXPENDITURES FOR SOCIAL WELFARE PURPOSES: 1950–1975

(Fiscal years; in millions of current dollars)

Type of expenditure	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975[1]
Total, net[2]	35,337	49,957	78,704	117,871	211,033	388,695
Public	23,508	32,640	52,293	77,175	145,761	286,547
Private	12,160	17,997	27,790	42,766	67,995	107,752
Income maintenance	10,723	17,304	29,827	42,530	72,399	152,794
Public	9,758	15,409	26,292	36,575	60,814	132,094
Private	965	1,895	3,535	5,955	11,585	20,700
Health	12,027	17,330	25,856	38,892	69,201	118,499
Public	3,065	4,421	6,395	9,535	25,237	49,947
Private	8,962	12,909	19,461	29,357	43,964	68,552
Education	10,914	14,206	21,742	34,228	62,368	98,359
Public	9,366	11,863	18,036	28,149	51,922	82,859
Private	1,548	2,343	3,706	6,079	10,446	15,500
Welfare and other services	2,004	1,797	2,658	4,291	9,788	24,647
Public	1,319	947	1,570	2,916	7,788	21,647
Private	685	850	1,088	1,375	2,000	3,000
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENT OF ALL EXPENDITURES						
Total[3]	65.9	64 5	65.3	64.3	68.2	72.7
Income maintenance	91.0	89.0	88 1	86 0	84 0	86 5
Health	25.5	25.5	24.7	24.5	36.5	42.1
Education	85.8	83 5	83 0	82.2	83 3	84.2
Welfare and other services	65.8	52.7	59.1	68 0	79.6	87.8
ALL EXPENDITURES AS A PERCENT OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT						
Total, net[2]	13 4	13.2	15 9	18.0	22 1	27.3
Income maintenance	4 1	4.6	6.0	6.5	7 6	10.7
Health	4 6	4 6	5.2	5 9	7.2	8.3
Education	4.1	3 7	4.4	5 2	6.5	6 9
Welfare and other services	.8	.5	.5	.7	1 0	1.7
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES						
Total	23,508	32,640	52,293	77,175	145,761	286,547
Percent	100.0	100 0	100.0	100.0	100 0	100 0
Income maintenance	41 5	47 2	50 3	47 4	41.7	46 1
Health	13 0	13.5	12.2	12.4	17.3	17.4
Education	39 8	36.3	34.5	36.5	35 6	28.9
Welfare	5.6	2.9	3.0	3.8	5 3	7.6

Table 4/1 *(Continued)*

Type of expenditure	1950	1955	1960	1965	1970	1975[1]
PRIVATE EXPENDITURES						
Total	12,160	17,997	27,790	42,766	67,995	107,752
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Income maintenance	7.9	10.5	12.7	13.9	17.0	19.2
Health	73.7	71.7	70.0	68.6	64.7	63.6
Education	12 7	13.0	13.3	14 2	15.4	14.4
Welfare	5 6	4 7	3.9	3.2	2.9	2.8
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EXPENDITURES IN CONSTANT (1975) DOLLARS						
Total, net[2]	73,772	91,833	130,955	185,332	283,266	388,695
Public	49,077	60.000	87,010	121,344	195,652	286,547
Private	25,386	33,082	46,240	67,242	91,268	107,752
Price deflators	47 9	54.4	60.1	63.6	74.5	100.0
	1950–75	1950–55	1955–60	1960–65	1965–70	1970–75
AVERAGE ANNUAL PERCENT CHANGE IN CONSTANT (1975) DOLLAR EXPENDITURES						
Total, net	6.64	4.38	7 10	6.95	8.48	6.33
Public	7.06	4.02	7.43	6.65	9 55	7.63
Private	5 78	5.30	6.70	7.49	6 11	3.12

Source: U S Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Social Security Administration, *Social Security Bulletin*, January 1976.

[1] Preliminary data


[2] Total expenditures adjusted to eliminate duplication resulting from use of cash payments received under public and private social welfare programs to purchase medical care and educational services.

[3] Before adjustment for elimination of duplication.

Chart 4/1A

Social Indicators, 1976

PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EXPENDITURES FOR SPECIFIED SOCIAL WELFARE PURPOSES AS A PERCENT OF GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT: 1950–1975




Source. see table 4/1

Chart 4/1B

Social Indicators, 1976

PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE EXPENDITURES FOR SOCIAL WELFARE PURPOSES: 1950–1975



Source: see table 4/1

Table 4/2
TOTAL AND PER CAPITA SOCIAL WELFARE EXPENDITURES UNDER PUBLIC PROGRAMS: 1950–1975

FISCAL YEAR	Total social welfare expenditures[1] (millions of constant 1975 dollars)	Total[2]	Social insurance	Public aid	Health and medical programs	Veterans' programs	Education	Other social welfare[2]	All health and medical care (constant dollars)
		PER CAPITA SOCIAL WELFARE EXPENDITURES[3] (constant dollars)							
1950	48,895.3	318 50	67 20	33.95	28.06	92 23	90 75	6 10	41 69
1955	59,764 3	357.83	107 92	33 05	34 15	52 32	122 57	6 82	49 58
1960	86,699 3	474.91	175 29	37 37	40 68	49 12	160 45	10 38	58 29
1965	120,956 9	615 02	223 73	50 24	49 94	47 64	224 42	16 51	76 23
1970	195,153 4	940 70	352 31	106 68	63 10	58 08	329 17	26 82	163 29
1975[p]	285,819.1	1,319 42	567 32	187 13	76 80	76 23	361 95	36.36	230 57
		PERCENT DISTRIBUTION							Percent
1950	48,895 3	100 0	21 0	10 6	8 8	29 2	28 4	1 9	13 1
1955	59,764 8	100 0	30 1	9 2	9 5	14 8	34 2	1 9	13 9
1960	86,699 3	100 0	36 9	7 8	8 5	10 5	33 7	2 2	12 3
1965	120,956 9	100 0	36 4	8 1	8 1	7 8	36 4	2 7	12 4
1970	195,153 4	100 0	37 5	11 3	6 7	6 2	34 9	2 9	17 4
1975[p]	285,819 1	100 0	43 1	14 2	5 8	5 8	27 4	2 8	17 5
		FEDERAL FUNDING AS PERCENT OF TOTAL PUBLIC EXPENDITURES							
1950	44 8	(X)	42 5	44 2	29 2	93 0	2 4	40 8	(NA)
1955	44 8	(X)	64 9	50.1	37 1	98 7	4.4	46 1	(NA)
1960	47 7	(X)	74 1	51 6	38 9	98 0	4 9	42 6	(NA)
1965	48 9	(X)	77 5	57 2	44 5	99 7	8 8	44 1	(NA)
1970	53 1	(X)	82 7	58 5	49 0	98 6	11 5	58 6	(NA)
1975	57 9	(X)	80 4	65 7	50 5	99 1	11 0	60 2	(NA)

Source U S Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Social Security Administration, *Social Security Bulletin*, January 1976

[p] Preliminary X Not applicable NA Not available

[1] Excludes expenditures within foreign countries for education, veterans' payments, and OASDHI and civil service retirement benefits


[2] Includes housing, not shown separately

[3] Based on January 1 Bureau of the Census data for total U S population including Armed Forces and Federal civilian employees and their dependents overseas, and the civilian population of territories and possessions

Chart 4/2A

Social Indicators, 1976

DISTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL WELFARE EXPENDITURES UNDER PUBLIC PROGRAMS: 1950–1975



Source: see table 4/2

Table 4/7
MEDIAN INCOME OF SSI BENEFICIARIES AGE 65 AND OVER, BY TYPE OF INCOME: 1962, 1967, AND 1971

PERSONS AND INCOME	1962		1967		1971 current and constant dollars
	Current dollars	Constant 1971 dollars	Current dollars	Constant 1971 dollars	
Married couples—					
With private pensions ..	3,400	4,551	4,040	4,904	6,408
With public assistance ..	1,730	2,316	2,010	2,440	2,769
Nonmarried males—					
With private pensions ..	2,280	3,052	2,550	3,095	3,979
With public assistance ..	1,100	1,472	1,360	1,651	1,730
Nonmarried females—					
With private pensions ..	2,115	2,831	2,300	2,792	3,475
With public assistance ..	1,195	1,600	1,355	1,645	1,826


Source: U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social Security Administration. For 1962, Research Report No. 19, *The Aged Population of the United States: The 1963 Social Security Survey of the Aged*, 1967. For 1967, Research Report No. 45, *Demographic and Economic Characteristics of the Aged: 1968 Social Security Survey*, 1968, and unpublished data on total income of beneficiaries receiving assistance. For 1971, Unpublished data from the 1972 Social Security Survey of the Status of the Elderly.

Note: See technical notes for explanation of current vs. constant dollars.

Chart 4/7

Social Indicators, 1976

MEDIAN INCOME OF SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFICIARIES AGED 65 AND OVER, BY TYPE OF INCOME: 1962-1971



Source: see table 4/7

Table 4/10

RETIREMENT INCOME, OTHER THAN OASDHI BENEFITS, OF BENEFICIARIES AGE 65 AND OVER, BY MARITAL STATUS: 1962, 1967, AND 1971


Retirement income other than OASDHI benefits	1962		1967		1971	
	Married couples	Non-married persons	Married couples	Non-married persons	Married couples	Non-married persons
Total percent	100	100	100	100	100	100
None	25	44	30	43	26	35
$1 to $149	14	19	12	14	8	14
$150 to $299	5	6	5	6	4	5
$300 to $499	7	6	5	6	4	5
$500 to $999	16	14	13	15	11	14
$1,000 to $1,499	9	6	11	7	9	8
$1,500 to $1,999	7	2	7	3	7	5
$2,000 to $2,499	5	1	4	2	6	3
$2,500 to $2,999	3	([2])	3	1	5	2
$3,000 to $3,999	3	1	4	1	6	3
$4,000 to $4,999	2	([2])	2	([2])	4	2
$5,000 or more	4	1	4	2	10	4

Source: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Social Security Administration. For 1962, Research Report No. 19, *The Aged Population of the United States: The 1963 Social Security Survey of the Aged*, 1967. For 1967, Research Report No. 45, *Demographic and Economic Characteristics of the Aged: 1968 Social Security Survey*, 1975. For 1971, *Income of the Population Age 60 and Older, 1971*, by Susan Grad and unpublished detail on type of pensions received.

[2] 0.5 percent or less.

Chart 4/10 | Social Indicators, 1976

RETIREMENT INCOME, OTHER THAN OASDHI BENEFITS OF BENEFICIARIES, AGE 65 AND OVER, BY MARITAL STATUS: 1962, 1967 AND 1971



Source: see table 4/10

ANNALS, AAPSS, 435, Jan. 1978

Continuing Trends in Health and Health Care

By RONALD W. WILSON, JACOB J. FELDMAN, and MARY GRACE KOVAR

ABSTRACT: Current trends in health and health care that were identified in *Social Indicators, 1976* are discussed, including the recent and, in some cases, dramatic declines in mortality, increases in health expenditures, increases in health resources, and changes in health habits. These trends are compared with strikingly similar trends identified almost a half a century ago by The Research Committee on Social Trends established by President Hoover. The significance of the current data and some of their possible causes and implications for the future are addressed, as well as some of the potential pitfalls in interpreting the data.

Ronald W. Wilson is Chief of the Health Status and Demographic Analysis Branch of the Division of Analysis, National Center for Health Statistics, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare.

Jacob J. Feldman is the Associate Director for Analysis, National Center for Health Statistics, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. Prior to coming to the Center in 1974, he was professor of Biostatistics, School of Public Health, Harvard University. He also served as Director of Research at the National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, where he received his Ph.D. in sociology.

Mary Grace Kovar is Chief of the Analytic Coordination Branch of the Division of Analysis, National Center for Health Statistics.

IT IS appropriate to begin the discussion of recent trends in the health sector by reviewing a similar, but more comprehensive, effort undertaken nearly a half century ago. In 1929 President Hoover established The Research Committee on Social Trends. The chapter, "Health and Medical Practice" by Harry H. Moore, in the final report addressed, among other things, the most noteworthy trends in the health area at that time.[1] There are striking similarities in what were then considered and are now considered as significant trends in health. Moore identified six trends: (1) growth in personnel and institutions; (2) militant advances in the control of specific diseases; (3) recent trends toward more effective organization; (4) growth of government participation; (5) development of methods of spreading the cost; and (6) the beginnings of coordination.

The trends presented in the health chapter of *Social Indicators, 1976* can be viewed as reflecting tendencies very similar to those identified almost a half a century earlier. Two phenomena that were not addressed by Moore as particularly characteristic of the early 1930s, but which are currently viewed as very important, are the proliferation of new technology and the rapid increase in the cost of health care. Only the latter is covered in *Social Indicators, 1976*.

MORTALITY

The first major set of trends presented in *Social Indicators, 1976* are those related to the continued decline in mortality. This trend is similar to the one identified by Moore as "militant advances in the control of specific diseases." While mortality rates have certainly been declining, there is less evidence of declines in the incidence or prevalence of many of the major diseases.

Life expectancy at birth, one of the more widely accepted indicators of health status, has increased dramatically since the turn of the century. A child born in 1975 could expect to live 72.5 years if the age-specific mortality rates prevailing in 1975 continued over his lifespan. However, the gap in life expectancy between males and females has increased over the period, while the difference between the life expectancy of the white population and all others has decreased. Given the 1975 mortality rates, white females born in 1975 could expect to live 4.9 years longer than females of all other races, 7.8 years longer than white males, and 13.6 years longer than all other males. Much of the increase in life expectancy can be attributed to the marked reduction in infant and childhood mortality. Increases in life expectancy at the older ages have not been as great. For example, a white male at age 60 in 1900 could have expected to live another 14.3 years, while a white male at age 60 in 1975 could expect to live 16.8 years, a gain of only 2.5 years. The greatest increase at the older years has occurred among nonwhite females, for whom approximately 7 years were added to life expectancy at age 60 between 1900 and 1975, that is, 13.6 years in 1900 and 20.7 in 1975. Recently, impressive increases in life expectancy at age 60 have begun to occur in both sex and color groups.

Heart disease is still the leading

1 Harry H. Moore, "Health and Medical Practice," in *Recent Social Trends in the United States. Report of the President's Research Committee on Social Trends* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1933), pp. 1061–1113.

cause of death in the United States. However, the death rates from heart disease and cerebrovascular disease began to drop dramatically a decade ago. The explanation for this unforeseen drop has still not been determined, although reduced cigarette consumption, particularly among males, dietary changes, hypertension control, and improvements in life saving medical technologies have all been suggested. On the other hand, the cancer death rates, the second major cause of death, have continued to increase. The cancer mortality rate for males 45–64 years of age is almost 25 percent higher than it was 25 years ago. The rise in lung cancer mortality rates has been particularly great, having more than doubled since 1950 for this age group.

Another common indicator of a population's general health status is the infant mortality rate. The infant mortality rate had leveled off at about 26 deaths per 1,000 live births during the 1950s, but it has been declining every year since 1962, reaching 15.1 in 1976. The specific reasons for this decline are not clear, but factors that may be involved include: (1) more women receiving prenatal care in early pregnancy; (2) the declining proportion of births to older women, resulting in fewer higher risk births; (3) the establishment and use of regional perinatal centers; (4) increasing legal abortion rates; and (5) improved nutrition of pregnant women and infants. However, there are still marked differences between the white and black infant mortality rates, with the black rate 85 percent higher than the white in 1975. The declining infant mortality rate is not unique to the United States. The rates have been falling in many countries, even in countries which have had infant mortality rates considerably lower than the United States.

It has been suggested that the reduction in infant mortality and in deaths from certain diseases of childhood may result in more children surviving who will require relatively more intensive care, either in institutions or in the home. For example the life expectancy of a mongoloid child has increased to the point where many survive into adulthood and even old age.[2] These changes in survival patterns will have an impact on the immediate family as well as on the larger community.

More significantly, the declining mortality rates will have a major impact on the age distribution of the population. In 1975, there were 22.4 million Americans 65 years of age and older. Assuming the current mortality rates do not drop further, although there is no reason to assume they will not, by the year 2000, there will be almost 32 million elderly and by 2030, when the last of the post-World War II baby boom population reaches the age of 65, there will be 55 million elderly Americans. This increasing number of elderly persons in our population will present a challenge to the health care system, as the use of health services by this age group is considerably greater than by the younger segments of the population.

Furthermore, the application of new life-saving technology may result in increasing prevalence of highly impaired individuals. Resource requirements for the purposes of life maintenance and custoldial care can be expected to rise

2. Ernest M. Greenberg, "The Failures of Success," *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, vol. 55, no. 1 (Winter 1977), pp. 3–24.

appreciably. Ethical issues, in terms of the rights of individuals to a dignified demise, and competing claims for scarce resources, are already being hotly debated.

HEALTH HABITS

Data presented in *Social Indicators, 1976* on changes in dietary habits show several marked shifts in consumption patterns, such as increases in meat consumption and decreases in fluid milk and cream consumption. However, these data reflect total consumption patterns but they do not indicate changes within specific age groups. For example, since the proportion of children in the population has been declining in recent years, and children drink considerably more milk than do adults, a part of this shift could be explained by changes in the population distribution. Also, the increase in the consumption of meat has been accompanied by a shift in the kinds of meat products eaten, with hamburger, with its generally higher fat content, accounting for an increasing proportion of total meat consumption. Traditionally there has been considerable concern about the possibility of undernutrition among certain segments of our population, but as more data become available from the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey of the National Center for Health Statistics, much of the concern has shifted to dietary balance and overnutrition. There is also concern about the possible deleterious effects on health of various food additives, including the relation of salt intake to blood pressure.

There has been a growing interest in the overall role of health habits and their impact on personal health status as compared to the role of medical care. While there have been major decreases in the proportion of adults who smoke cigarettes, especially among middle-aged males, as well as a marked trend toward low tar and nicotine cigarettes, it is disturbing to see continued increases in the proportion of cigarette smokers among teenage females. As indicated earlier, the impact of the changes in dietary and other health habits on our falling mortality rates, particularly on the cardiovascular rates, is unclear.

HEALTH EXPENDITURES

The growth of government participation in the health field has continued to be a significant trend since it was identified by Moore almost a half a century ago. In 1929 the total national expenditures for health were $3.6 billion, of which less than one-half billion dollars, or 13 percent, were from public funds. In 1976 total national health expenditures for health had increased to $139.3 billion, of which $58.8 billion, or 42 percent, were from public funds. Public expenditures were predominantly from state and local government sources during much of the period but, at least since the Medicare and Medicaid programs went into effect in July 1966, this balance has shifted markedly to federal expenditures.

While efforts are underway in both the public and private sector to control the rapidly rising health care costs, it is almost certain that the governmental share of health care costs will continue to increase. How the impact of the drive to control rising health costs will affect quality of medical care and the accessibility of care is still unknown, but it is probably safe to assume that as the federal government provides a

greater and greater proportion of the total dollars for health care, its impact on the system will also increase.

The increased share of health care costs paid by both the government and private health insurance (although the major increase in the proportion paid by health insurance occurred before 1970) illustrates another one of the six trends identified by Moore, that of developing methods of spreading the cost. Nearly 90 percent of personal health care expenditures were paid directly by the consumer in 1929. Twenty years ago, direct private payments still accounted for nearly 60 percent of personal health care expenditures, while by 1975 direct payments accounted for only 33 percent of all personal health care costs.

The data presented in *Social Indicators, 1976* regarding the public's attitude toward government expenditures for health care are consonant with the growth of government participation. In recent years about 65 percent of those polled indicated that the government was spending too little for health care and only about 5 percent said the government was spending too much. These figures must, of course, be considered in the context of attitudes towards spending on other federal programs. Respondents were also asked about spending priorities for such programs as space, environment, crime, education, big city problems, drug abuse, foreign aid, military, and welfare. For the three years 1973–75, the only other programs for which 60–70 percent said "too little" was spent were environment, crime and drugs abuse, with crime the only one that consistently ranked higher than health, about 70 percent.[3]

The same survey inquired about the public's confidence in the leadership of several institutional domains of our society—education, major companies, organized religion, executive branch of the federal government, organized labor, the press, medicine, Congress, the military and the Supreme Court. The health leaders scored considerably higher than any other sector. However, it should be remembered that these polls were taken during the Watergate Era when the public's confidence in a number of areas was badly shaken.

HEALTH CARE RESOURCES

Another one of the trends identified by Moore was the growth in health personnel and institutions. Although only one table in *Social Indicators, 1976* is devoted to examples of this trend, it is nevertheless an important issue today. In 1975 there were well over 5 million persons working in the health field. In the last 25 years the number of physicians in the United States increased by almost 70 percent and the ratio of physicians to population increased by 22 percent. There are projections that the number of physicians per 100,000 in 1990 could be as much as 50 percent higher than it was in 1975. There is now considerable concern over a surplus of physicians in the near future.

Some believe that there are excessive hospital bed population ratios in certain geographic areas. The number of hospitals providing specialized services, such as intensive coronary care and radioisotopic diag-

3 National Opinion Research Center, University of Chicago, *National Data Program for the Social Services, Codebook for the Spring 1973 General Social Survey* Data was distributed by Roper Public Opinion Research Center, Williams College, July 1973. Also, 1974 and 1975 *Codebooks*, July 1974 and July 1975, respectively

nosis, has been increasing rapidly resulting in excess capacity and inefficiency in the provision of such services. The number of nursing homes has been rising and the number of beds in nursing and personal care homes increased over 40 percent between 1969 and 1973. The aggregate numbers of beds in tuberculosis and psychiatric hospitals have been decreasing at a rapid rate during recent years. The decrease in tuberculosis beds reflects, in part, decreasing incidence and decreasing prevalence of active tuberculosis cases. The decrease in psychiatric beds is the result of advances in drug therapy, the transfer of psychiatric patients to nursing homes, and a great increase in the availability of out-patient services.

Maldistribution of health manpower and health facilities remains a major problem. Thus for example, in the core counties of the largest metropolitan areas there are over 200 physicians per 100,000 population, while in the most thinly populated counties outside metropolitan areas there are fewer than 40 physicians per 100,000 population. The problem of maldistribution points toward the two last trends identified by Moore in the late twenties, more effective organization and the beginning of coordination. Even after five decades these are, at best, goals rather than well-established tendencies. The concept of planning has become widely enough accepted to have permitted passage of the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 1974 (P.L. 93-641). The laissez faire principles of the earlier era are less frequently put forward as an argument against regulation of the health care system. However, the various interest groups involved in the health care domain remain in intense competition, and we do not as yet have effective mechanisms for resolving the many issues that confront us.

TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATIONS

William F. Ogburn, the Director of The Research Committee on Social Trends, assigned a primary role to technological developments in accounting for change in a variety of social spheres. It is appropriate here to examine current views of the role of technology with respect to changes in the health area.

Ogburn assumed that technological innovations were at least technically efficacious: by using an automobile, one could transport people or goods from one place to another more rapidly than by using a horse. In the health and medical sphere, there are frequently serious doubts concerning the efficaciousness of newly adopted therapeutic procedures and organizational arrangements. While in Ogburn's day barriers and resistance to the adoption of new practices were seen as major problems, today there are many observers who see the premature adoption of new technology as being most problematic. The availability of public and private insurance financing, in combination with a driving desire to control disease and uncritical confidence in medical developments, has frequently led to the diffusion of new practices that increase the cost of medical care without concomitant benefit. Some of the new procedures are inefficacious, others may actually be harmful. On the other hand, with the growing concern over premature adoption, there is a danger that regulatory activities will retard for too long the availability of efficacious innovations.

In addition to problems related to the rapidity of diffusion, there are

also those related to the extensiveness of diffusion. As was indicated above, there is a marked tendency for the redundant proliferation of specialized facilities and services. Regionalization, involving a referral network through which primary health centers feed patients with more complex conditions to secondary and tertiary centers for specialized diagnosis and treatment, has long been viewed as the rational model for the medical care system. However, few organizations and communities are willing to play the supporting roles. Nearly every unit sees the need for the availability of the newest, complex technology within its own purview. This tendency further contributes to the escalation of medical care costs and sometimes diminishes the quality of medical care.

DISABILITY AND MORBIDITY

A number of tables in *Social Indicators, 1976* are devoted to data on levels of illness, injury, and associated disability. While there are some marked differences between certain subgroups of the population with respect to illness and disability, it is difficult to detect significant trends. The general stability of these measures could well be the most important datum. The major exception to the general stability of measure of disability is an apparent rise in the proportion of males 45–64 years of age who are unable to carry on their major activity (usually gainful employment) because of a chronic condition. This rate has almost doubled over the past ten years. Some part of this increase may be due to improvements in survey techniques; however, it is possible that it is also related to the declining mortality rate. For example, a man who might have died from a heart attack in the past, is now surviving the initial incident, but with some degree of long-term disability. There is also some evidence that more liberal disability benefits, particularly those programs that facilitate earlier retirement for reasons of severe impairment, have resulted in an increasing number of workers leaving the labor force at earlier ages than in the past and reporting themselves as disabled.[4]

The text of *Social Indicators, 1976* comments on the downward trend of acute conditions over the past 20 years. This apparent trend is based on the observation of an unusually high level of acute illness in 1957–58 and very low levels in 1973–74. The 1957–58 rate resulted from the high rate of respiratory illness during that winter, primarily a reflection of the first Asian flu epidemic. On the other hand, the low rates in 1973–74 were the unanticipated consequences of technical changes in the questionnaires used during those two years. In 1975, the standard questionnaire was again used and the rate of acute illness returned to normal levels, obscuring the signs of any trend.

In the past, inferences regarding changes in the incidence and prevalence of mental disorders have been based on institutionalization rates. Given the previously discussed trend toward psychiatric deinstitutionalization, more direct measures of mental health status are very much needed. Data are presented in *Social Indicators, 1976* showing a decline, at least for females between the ages of 45 and 74, in the percent who claim to have had or to have felt near having a nervous breakdown. Whether this decline is due to

4. Lenore E. Bixby, "Retirement Patterns in the United States. Research and Policy Interactions," *Social Security Bulletin*, vol. 29, no. 8, (August 1976), pp. 3–19

increased tolerance of adversity, a lower incidence of problematic situations, better supportive services, or changes in the use of the term "nervous breakdown" is not fully understood.

CONCEPTUAL PROBLEM OF HEALTH INDICATORS

The use of measures of disability and illness as indicators of health status presents a rather unique problem of interpretation, particularly if these measures are used to assess the impact of programs designed to improve health status. Under the usual concept of health, the existence of fewer conditions is "better" than more conditions, and minimum disability or impact, such as days in bed due to illness or days lost from work, is "better" than more disability. Thus health status is generally viewed as a continuum. One criterion of a good indicator measure is that changes in the indicator are consonant with changes in the phenomenon being measured. However, programs to improve health status, such as those designed to improve access to medical care, could have the opposite effect on many of the current "indicators" of health status, that is, health status as measured by those indicators would appear to have deteriorated rather than improved. For example, in a medically underserved area, data may be available from household surveys on the incidence and prevalence of certain illnesses and levels of disability. Improved accessibility to care tends to result in increased use of services. It is likely that a person who sees a doctor more frequently will be more likely to be diagnosed as having, for example, three specific conditions rather than one rather vague, ill-defined condition. Thus, the number of conditions people have, as reported in surveys, increases as health care becomes more readily available. At the same time the increased utilization and diagnosis can result in the physician telling the patient to stay home from school, work, or reduce other activities, therefore, causing the customary measures of disability to increase. The expanded and improved health care system in the area may have actually had a positive impact on health status, but this positive impact is not reflected in the usual indicators.

The levels of utilization of medical services are sometimes used as health indicators themselves, for example, the number of doctor visits per person per year, or levels of hospitalization. If utilization is used as a proxy measure for health status, it is assumed that sick people see a doctor more frequently than well people and therefore more visits mean poorer health status. However, measures of the use of health services may only be an indication of accessibility of services, and in no way reflect actual health status or need for medical care.

In the absence of more valid measures of health, or perhaps more importantly measures of "quality of life," it is not suggested that these old measures be discarded, but that caution be used in interpreting them. This is particularly true when interpreting trends in health indicators.

CONCLUSION

Social Indicators, 1976 has identified many of the current health trends, including (1) the recent and, in some cases, dramatic declines in the mortality rates; (2) increases in health expenditures; and (3) increases in health resources. Recent trends in illness and disability levels

have been more difficult to identify. Even when these latter trends can be discerned, either from current or from future data, great caution must be exercised in interpreting them. The effects of changes in the provisions of social insurance programs and changes in accessibility to medical care are practically indistinguishable from changes in the more physiological aspects of health status. Henry Sigerist, the eminent medical historian, maintained that medicine is not so much a natural as a social science.[5] That view is particularly apposite to the development of indicators of the health status of populations.

Much of the health information in *Social Indicators, 1976* was derived from *Health: United States, 1975*[6]—the first of a legislatively mandated annual report from the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare to the President and the Congress. The reader is encouraged to refer to this and *Health: United States, 1976–77*[7] for a wealth of information on health status, health resources and their use and health expenditures.

5. Henry E. Sigerist, "The Social History of Medicine," *The Western Journal of Surgery, Obstetrics and Gynecology* 48 (December 1940), p. 715.

6. U.S. Dept of Health Education and Welfare, Health Resources Administration, *Health —United States, 1975*, no. (HRA) 76–1232 (Washington, D. C., USGPO, 1976).

7. U.S. Dept of Health Education and Welfare, Health Resources Administration, *Health —United States, 1976–1977*, no. (HRA) 78–1232 (Washington, D. C. USGPO, 1977).

Table 5/1
LIFE EXPECTANCY AT BIRTH, BY RACE AND SEX: 1900–1974
(Years)

YEAR	TOTAL			WHITE			BLACK AND OTHER RACES		
	Both sexes	Male	Female	Both sexes	Male	Female	Both sexes	Male	Female
DEATH REGISTRATION STATES									
1900	47.3	46.3	48.3	47.6	46.6	48.7	33.0	32.5	33.5
1901	49.1	47.6	50.6	49.4	48.0	51.0	33.7	32.2	35.3
1902	51.5	49.3	53.4	51.9	50.2	53.8	34.6	32.9	36.4
1903	50.5	49.1	52.0	50.9	49.5	52.5	33.1	31.7	34.6
1904	47.6	46.2	49.1	48.0	46.6	49.5	30.8	29.1	32.7
1905	48.7	47.3	50.2	49.1	47.6	50.6	31.3	29 6	33.1
1906	48.7	46.9	50.8	49.3	47.3	51.4	32.9	31.8	33.9
1907	47.6	45 6	49.9	48.1	46.0	50.4	32.5	31.1	34.0
1908	51.1	49.5	52.8	51.5	49.9	53.3	34.9	33.8	36.0
1909	52.1	50.5	53.8	52.5	50.9	54.2	35.7	34.2	37.3
1910	50.0	48.4	51.8	50.3	48.6	52.0	35.6	33.8	37.5
1911	52.6	50.9	54.4	53.0	51.3	54.9	36.4	34.6	38.2
1912	53.5	51.5	55.9	53.9	51.9	56.2	37.9	35.9	40.0
1913	52.5	50.3	55.0	53.0	50.8	55.7	38.4	36.7	40.3
1914	54.2	52.0	56.8	54.9	52.7	57.5	38.9	37.1	40.8
1915	54.5	52.5	56.8	55.1	53 1	57.5	38.9	37.5	40.5
1916	51 7	49.6	54 3	52.5	50.2	55.2	41.3	39.6	43.1
1917	50.9	48.4	54.0	52.0	49.3	55.3	38.8	37.0	40.8
1918	39.1	36.6	42.2	39.8	37.1	43.2	31.1	29.9	32 5
1919	54.7	53.5	56.0	55.8	54.5	57.4	44.5	44.5	44.4
1920	54.1	53.6	54.6	54.9	54.4	55.6	45.3	45.5	45.2
1921	60.8	60.0	61.8	61.8	60.8	62.9	51.5	51.6	51.3
1922	59.6	58.4	61.0	60.4	59 1	61.9	52.4	51.8	53.0
1923	57.2	56.1	58.5	58.3	57.1	59.6	48.3	47.7	48.9
1924	59.7	58 1	61.5	61.4	59 8	63.4	46.6	45.5	47.8
1925	59.0	57.6	60.6	60.7	59.3	62.4	45.7	44.9	46.7
1926	56.7	55.5	58.0	58.2	57.0	59.6	44.6	43.7	45.6
1927	60.4	59.0	62.1	62.0	60.5	63.9	48.2	47.6	48.9
1928	56.8	55.6	58.3	58.4	57.0	60.0	46.3	45.6	47.0
UNITED STATES									
1929	57.1	55.8	58.7	58.6	57.2	60.3	46.7	45.7	47 8
1930	59.7	58.1	61.6	61.4	59.7	63.5	48.1	47.3	49.2
1931	61.1	59.4	63.1	62.6	60.8	64 7	50.4	49.5	51.5
1932	62.1	61.0	63.5	63.2	62.0	64.5	53.7	52.8	54.6
1933	63.3	61.7	65.1	64.3	62.7	66.3	54.7	53.5	56.0
1934	61.1	59.3	63.3	62.4	60.5	64.6	51.8	50.2	53.7
1935	61.7	59.9	63 9	62.9	61.0	65.0	53.1	51 3	55.2


Table 5/1 (Continued)

YEAR	TOTAL			WHITE			BLACK AND OTHER RACES		
	Both sexes	Male	Female	Both sexes	Male	Female	Both sexes	Male	Female
1936	58.5	56.6	60.6	59.8	58.0	61.9	49.0	47.0	51.4
1937	60.0	58.0	62.4	61.4	59.3	63.8	50.3	48.3	52.5
1938	63.5	61.9	65.3	65.0	63.2	66.8	52.9	51.7	54.3
1939	63.7	62.1	65.4	64.9	63.3	66.6	54.5	53.2	56.0
1940	62.9	60.8	65.2	64.2	62.1	66.6	53.1	51.5	54.9
1941	64.8	63.1	66.8	66.2	64.4	68.5	53.8	52.5	55.3
1942	66.2	64.7	67.9	67.3	65.9	69.4	56.6	55.4	58.2
1943	63.3	62.4	64.4	64.2	63.2	65.7	55.6	55.4	56.1
1944	65.2	63.6	66.8	66.2	64.5	68.4	56.6	55.8	57.7
1945	65.9	63.6	67.9	66.8	64.4	69.5	57.7	56.1	59.6
1946	66.7	64.4	69.4	67.5	65.1	70.3	59.1	57.5	61.0
1947	66.8	64.4	69.7	67.6	65.2	70.5	59.7	57.9	61.9
1948	67.2	64.6	69.9	68.0	65.5	71.0	60.0	58.1	62.5
1949	68.0	65.2	70.7	68.8	66.2	71.9	60.6	58.9	62.7
1950	68.2	65.6	71.1	69.1	66.5	72.2	60.8	59.1	62.9
1951	68.4	65.6	71.4	69.3	66.5	72.4	61.2	59.2	63.4
1952	68.6	65.8	71.6	69.5	66.6	72.6	61.4	59.1	63.8
1953	68.8	66.0	72.0	69.7	66.8	73.0	62.0	59.7	64.5
1954	69.6	66.7	72.8	70.5	67.5	73.7	63.4	61.1	65.9
1955	69.6	66.7	72.8	70.5	67.4	73.7	63.7	61.4	66.1
1956	69.7	66.7	72.9	70.5	67.5	73.9	63.6	61.3	66.1
1957	69.5	66.4	72.7	70.3	67.2	73.7	63.0	60.7	65.5
1958	69.6	66.6	72.9	70.5	67.4	73.9	63.4	61.0	65.8
1959	69.9	66.8	73.2	70.7	67.5	74.2	63.9	61.3	66.5
1960	69.7	66.6	73.1	70.6	67.4	74.1	63.6	61.1	66.3
1961	70.2	67.0	73.6	71.0	67.8	74.5	64.4	61.9	67.0
1962	70.0	66.8	73.4	70.9	67.6	74.4	64.1	61.5	66.8
1963	69.9	66.6	73.4	70.8	67.5	74.4	63.6	60.9	66.5
1964	70.2	66.9	73.7	71.0	67.7	74.6	64.1	61.1	67.2
1965	70.2	66.8	73.7	71.0	67.6	74.7	64.1	61.1	67.4
1966	70.1	66.7	73.8	71.0	67.6	74.7	64.0	60.7	67.4
1967	70.5	67.0	74.2	71.3	67.8	75.1	64.6	61.1	68.2
1968	70.2	66.6	74.0	71.1	67.5	74.9	63.7	60.1	67.5
1969	70.4	66.8	74.3	71.3	67.8	75.1	64.3	60.5	68.4
1970	70.9	67.1	74.8	71.7	68.0	75.6	65.3	61.3	69.4
1971	71.1	67.4	75.0	72.0	68.3	75.8	65.6	61.0	69.7
1972	71.1	67.4	75.1	72.0	68.3	75.9	65.6	61.5	69.9
1973	71.3	67.5	75.3	72.2	68.4	76.1	65.9	61.9	70.1
1974	71.9	68.2	75.9	72.7	68.9	76.6	67.0	62.9	71.2

Source: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, National Center for Health Statistics, *Vital Statistics of the United States, 1973*, Vol. II, and *Monthly Statistical Report*, Vol. 24, No. 11, sup. 1.

Chart 5/1 Social Indicators, 1976

LIFE EXPECTANCY (YEARS) AT BIRTH, BY RACE AND SEX, 1929 TO 1974



Source: see table 5/1

Table 5/5
INFANT AND NEONATAL MORTALITY RATES, BY RACE: 1940–1974
(Deaths per 1,000 live births in specified group)

YEAR	INFANT			NEONATAL		
	Total, all races	White	Black and other races	Total, all races	White	Black and other races
1940	47.0	43.2	73.8	28.8	27.2	39.7
1941	45.3	41.2	74.8	27.7	26.1	39.0
1942	40 4	37.3	64.6	25.7	24.5	34.6
1943	40.4	37.5	62.5	24.7	23.7	32.9
1944	39.8	36.9	60.3	24.7	23.6	32.5
1945	38.3	35.6	57.0	24.3	23.3	32.0
1946	33.8	31.8	49.5	24.0	23.1	31.5
1947	32.2	30.1	48.5	22.8	21.7	31.0
1948	32.0	29.9	46.5	22.2	21.2	29.1
1949	31.3	28.9	47.3	21.4	20.3	28.6
1950	29.2	26.8	44.5	20.5	19.4	27.5
1951	28.4	25.8	44.8	20.0	18.9	27.3
1952	28.4	25.5	47.0	19.8	18.5	28.0
1953	27.8	25.0	44.7	19.6	18.3	27.4
1954	26.6	23 9	42 9	19.1	17.8	27.0
1955	26.4	23.6	42.8	19.1	17.7	27.2
1956	26.0	23.2	42.1	18.9	17.5	27.0
1957	26.3	23.3	43.7	19.1	17.5	27.8
1958	27.1	23.8	45 7	19.5	17.8	29.0
1959	26 4	23.2	44.0	19.0	17.5	27.7
1960	26.0	22 9	43.2	18.7	17 2	26.9
1961	25.3	22.4	40.7	18.4	16.9	26.3
1962[1]	25.3	22.3	41.4	18.3	16.9	26.1
1963[1]	25.2	22.2	41.5	18.2	16.7	26.1
1964	24 8	21.6	41.1	17.9	16.2	26.5
1965	24.7	21.5	40.3	17.7	16.1	25.4
1966	23.7	20.6	38.8	17.2	15.6	24.8
1967	22.4	19.7	35.9	16.5	15.0	23.8
1968	21.8	19.2	34.5	16.1	14.7	23.0
1969	20.9	18.4	32.9	15.6	14.2	22.5
1970[2]	20.0	17.8	30.9	15.1	13.8	21.4
1971[2]	19.1	17.1	28.5	14.2	13.0	19.6
1972[2]	18.5	16.4	27.7	13.6	12.4	19.2
1973[2]	17.7	15.8	26.2	13.0	11.8	17.9
1974[2]	16.7	14.8	24.9	12.3	11.1	17.2

Source U S Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, National Center for Health Statistics, *Vital Statistics Rates in the United States, 1940–1960*, *Vital Statistics of the United States*, Vol II, annual issues 1961 to 1970, *Monthly Vital Statistics Report*, Vol 23, Nos 3, 7, and 11, and Vol 24, No 11, and unpublished data

[1] Excludes data for residents of New Jersey


[2] Excludes deaths of nonresidents of the United States

Infant mortality comprises deaths occurring to persons under 1 year of age, neonatal mortality comprises deaths occurring during the first 28 days of life.

Chart 5/5

Social Indicators, 1976

INFANT AND NEONATAL MORTALITY RATES, BY RACE, 1950 TO 1974



Source: see table 5/5

Table 5/22
PERSONS AGE 65 AND OVER IN NURSING HOMES, BY SEX, AGE, AND RACE: 1964, 1969, AND 1974

RACE AND AGE	MALE			FEMALE		
	Total population (thous.)	In nursing homes[1] Number	In nursing homes[1] Percent	Total population (thous.)	In nursing homes[1] Number	In nursing homes[1] Percent
1964						
Total, 65 years and over	7,855	157,600	2.0	10,001	330,100	3.3
65 to 74 years	5,146	40,400	0.8	6,259	64,000	1.0
75 to 84 years	2,311	74,100	3.2	3,105	156,800	5.0
85 years and over	398	43,100	10.8	637	109,300	17.2
1969						
Total, 65 years and over	8,216	207,100	2.5	11,114	515,200	4.6
65 to 74 years	5,232	52,200	1.0	6,624	86,300	1.3
75 to 84 years	2,498	90,800	3.6	3,694	231,100	6.3
85 years and over	486	64,100	13.2	796	197,800	24.8
Black, 65 years and over	614	10,700	1.7	793	16,500	2.1
65 to 74 years	372	4,800	1.3	459	4,100	0.9
75 to 84 years	185	4,100	2.2	257	6,800	2.6
85 years and over	57	1,800	3.2	77	5,600	7.3
1973–74						
Total, 65 years and over	8,801	265,500	3.0	12,528	694,800	5.5
65 to 74 years	5,750	65,100	1.1	7,467	97,900	1.3
75 to 84 years	2,506	102,300	4.1	3,976	282,100	7.1
85 years and over	545	98,100	18.0	1,085	314,800	29.0
Black, 65 years and over	815	20,100	2.5	1,056	30,200	2.9
65 to 74 years	549	7,700	1.4	676	8,300	1.2
75 to 84 years	213	6,700	3.1	292	12,100	4.1
85 years and over	53	5,700	10.8	88	9,800	11.1


Source: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, National Center for Health Statistics, *Vital and Health Statistics*, Series 12, Nos. 12 and 19, and unpublished data from the 1973–74 Nursing Home Survey.

[1] Includes personal care homes with nursing, personal care homes without nursing, and domiciliary care homes except for 1974 data which do not include personal care homes.

Chart 5/22

Social Indicators, 1976

PERCENT OF POPULATION 65 AND OVER IN NURSING HOMES, BY SEX, AGE AND RACE, 1964, 1969, AND 1974



Source: see table 5/22

Social Indicators, 1976

Chart 5/26

NUMBER OF PHYSICIANS, NURSES, DENTISTS AND PHARMACISTS PER 100,000 POPULATION, SELECTED YEARS, 1960–1973




Table 5/26

PHYSICIANS, NURSES, DENTISTS, AND PHARMACISTS: 1960–1973

(Number per 100,000 population)

YEAR	PHYSICIANS	NURSES	DENTISTS	PHARMACISTS
1960	148	282	56	(NA)
1961	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	65
1962	(NA)	298	(NA)	(NA)
1963	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	64
1964	(NA)	306	(NA)	(NA)
1965	153	(NA)	(NA)	61
1966	(NA)	319	(NA)	(NA)
1967	(NA)	327	(NA)	62
1968	161	335	(NA)	(NA)
1969	163	345	(NA)	62
1970	166	356	56	63
1971	170	366	(NA)	63
1972	174	376	57	63
1973	(NA)	390	(NA)	63

Source: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Public Health Service, National Center for Health Statistics, *Health Resources Statistics*, 1974.
NA Not available.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 435, Jan. 1978

Trends in Education and Training

By ABBOTT L. FERRISS

ABSTRACT: Because of changes in the magnitude of cohorts to be educated, the elementary school population will fluctuate by a decrease of some 7 million pupils and more than a quarter of a million teachers, followed by increases of the same magnitude over the 14 years following 1982. Such variation will impose traumatic adjustments upon the educational system. The increasing enrollment in prekindergarten schools pushes new responsibilities on the school system and promises to accelerate progress in primary grades. A number of unmet needs of school children, which require attention, correction of speech deficiencies and the special problems of the emotionally disturbed, for example, are identified. The record of retention in school is satisfactory up to high school ages, but drop-outs and decreasing enrollment of youth 17 years and over are unmistakable. Educational lag is apparent in both dropping out and in falling behind the modal grade of the school age group. Females are beginning to surpass males in college going. The continuation from high school to college appears to have peaked and now is decreasing, but the college attendance of youth in the top half of the ability spectrum may be superior to the record two decades ago. As to learning, particularly in the secondary schools, the evidence of improvement is scant while there are extensive indicators of decreasing test performance at the end of high school. Models of processes of education are needed to identify appropriate educational statistics to improve social indicators of education in the United States.

Abbott L. Ferriss is Professor of Sociology at Emory University. He has been Research Sociologist with the Russell Sage Foundation, Study Director with the National Science Foundation, Statistician with the Outdoor Recreation Resources Review Commission, Chief of the Health Statistics Branch of the U. S. Bureau of the Census and Chief of various human relations research units of the United States

Air Force. He is the author of Indicators of Trends in the Status of American Wome (1971), Indicators of Change in the American Family (1970), Indicators of Trends i American Education (1969), The National Recreation Survey (1962), *and others In 1971, Dr. Ferriss edited the volume* Research and the 1970 Census.

Parts of this paper were developed under National Science Grant SOC 76-17387—"A Tes of Demographic Accounting Methods with U.S. Data on Education"—to Emory University Appreciation is expressd for the bibliographic and computational assistance of Charles Warrei and Hugh Spitler.

THE EDUCATIONAL system in the United States, when compared with that of other industrial societies shows marked superiority in some respects and notable weaknesses in others. When compared with its own ideals, or even with its own recent past record, American education reveals many areas for improvement. This is the picture one reads in the graphs and statistical tables of chapter 7, "Education and Training," in *Social Indicators, 1976 (S. I. '76)*.

This paper is not a critical review of the selection of data by the editors of *S. I.* '76, nor a catalogue of ways to improve educational data were resources available. It does not offer a framework nor conceptual model for the collection and analysis of educational indicators. Rather, it is a commentary on "Education and Training" for the general public and the molders of public policies affecting education. It seeks to interpret the trends revealed by the statistics. Where are we falling down in educating future generations? What trends foretell changes which call for planning? In what ways may educational indicators contribute to the more rational ordering of our society? A comprehensive interpretation of the educational data in *S. I.* '76 is prevented by the limits on available space; consequently, this review is selective.

THE DEMOGRAPHIC MOVER

Above all, population change pervades the educational system. Change: in the size of the cohort to be educated, either through increases o decreases in the birth rate, or througł migration or the demands of war alter the supply of students and require adjustments in educational institutions. Following the 1969 peal of 36.8 million children aged 5-13 a population decline occurred, creating many adjustment problems fo the schools. Decreases in the schoo population of 500,000 to 1.2 millio will continue to be experienced eacl year until 1982. What does this mea for our elementary schools?

If a school is closed and the building locked up, a functioning servic institution has been removed fron the community. "Our school" is n longer there, even though the building remains. This lacuna may be avoided by constructive educationa planning. Educational alternative: include adult education, noncredi courses in arts, crafts, and the performing arts, and vocational education to serve the requirements of industries in the community.[1] How

1 A number of suggestions have beer advanced to further these objectives. See for example, "Declining Enrollment: Current Trends in School Policies and Programs," (Arlington, Va.: National Schoo Public Relations Association, 1976)

ever, if the school population is sufficiently large for the school to remain open, adjustments in the program are needed to decrease the number of pupils per teacher, to add new academic programs, and to devote attention to persistent educational problems, such as lagging performance in reading or mathematics.

Series II Census projections predict a decline of 7 million pupils between the ages of 5 to 13 in the years from 1969 to 1982. Assuming we retain a student-teacher ratio of about one teacher for each 25 students, this implies a loss of 280,000 teachers or about one-fourth the teachers in fall 1969. In the 14 years following 1982 an equal number of new teachers must be added. Colleges must assume responsibility for alerting students to the ebb and flow of teacher demand.

The demographic waves of fluctuating cohort size will impose traumatic adjustment problems on the school system, its buildings and equipment, its patrons, and its students. The maximum demand for high school education occurs between 1974 and 1978; its nadir, in 1990. The college population peaks in 1981 after which it bottoms out in 1997. Local and state planning should adjust programs to these stresses and shocks so as to improve the quality of education, to conserve the educational resources of the community, to meet needs for adult and vocational education, and to anticipate the eventual revival of demand for elementary and high schools.

PREKINDERGARTEN ENROLLMENT

Enrollment of 3- and 4-year-olds in nursery school has increased from 5 percent of this population to approximately 25 percent between 1964 and 1975. The increase, a continuing trend, is shared by white, black, Spanish-speaking and Mexican segments of the population.

The preprimary enrollment rate (nursery school and kindergarten) is directly associated with the child's family income, increasing as income increases ($r = .75$, approximately), and is as strongly associated among whites as among blacks and other "races." The family income of enrollees in private preprimary schools ($14,130, median, 1974) is approximately 30 percent greater than the family income of enrollees in public preprimary schools ($10,861, median), and the heads of households of preprimary enrollees are slightly better educated than other heads of households who have children enrolled in school.

The enrollment rate (1974) was considerably lower in nonmetropolitan areas (20 percent) than in the suburbs (34 percent) or central city (32 percent). Only about one-third of the preprimary school children remain a full day in school.[2] This increasing enrollment represents a revolution in child care and in shifting responsibility from the family to public and private agencies. If learning experiences in nursery school are more enriching than in the isolated family, it could significantly improve future learning capability, accelerating the transmission of skills and competencies.[3]

2. "Social and Economic Characteristics of Students, October 1974," *Current Population Reports*, ser. P–20, no. 286 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, November 1975), pp. 12 and 19.

3. Cycle II study, the National Health Examination Survey of children 6–11 years old showed that the intelligence of children who had some preschool educational experience, when educational attainment of parent was held constant, "generally showed some advantage" over children who had not attended kindergarten or nursery

The shift also weakens the ties of the family to the child. The quality of the nursery school becomes quite important. A study (1971–72) estimated that less than 20 percent of children under 6 years of age were cared for in licensed or approved day care centers.[4] If unlicensed centers provide less effective learning experiences, communities need to improve the quality of preprimary schools.

UNMET NEEDS OF SCHOOL CHILDREN

In Cycle II, for children 6–11 years of age, and Cycle III, for those 12–17 years, the National Health Examination Survey requested teachers of children in the samples to complete a questionnaire on the needs of the children.[5] Table 1 translates the rates into population estimates for 1976, assuming the teachers' evaluations and the students' needs remain the same as when the rates were current. Table 1 estimates only the perceived needs for which no resources are available.

There are unmet needs among both talented and slow learners. Table 1 shows that a large population of slow learners needs remedial and special instruction and that many of the gifted require additional resources to develop their capacities. What priority on the allocation of resources should be made for these two groups? Many of the slow, with appropriate stimulation and motivation, can improve, and the gifted, if not cultivated, become a talent loss to the nation's potential creativity.

While most of these deficiencies can be relieved by the school program, the emotionally disturbed require something more than special classes and devices. They require resources capable of adjusting the social and emotional climate of the home and neighborhood, resources normally beyond the capacity of the school to provide.

All but one—mental retardation—are perceived by teachers as less acute for older than younger children. Perhaps many of the retardees have been institutionalized in special schools, as have the deaf and the blind. The mental retardee, distinguished from slow learner, begins to be recognized by the teacher among 9 year olds. The slow learner is recognized by age 7 and the label persists to age 12. The rate of slow learners after age 11 is less than half the rate of those 11 and younger. Has the problem been "corrected?" Is the teacher of older children less sensitive to the problem? Or, has the problem disappeared with maturity?

Except for those requiring orthopedic corrective devices and for the gifted, more boys invariably are per-

---

chool. Jean Roberts and Arnold Engel, Family Background, Early Development, nd Intelligence of Children 6–11 Years, United States," ser. 11, no. 142, DHEW Publication no. HRA 75–1624 (Rockville, Md.: National Center for Health Statistics, Health Resources Administration, August 974).

4. Kurt J. Snapper et al., *The Status of Children, 1975* (Washington, D.C.: Social Research Group, George Washington University, 1975), p. 18.

5. Jean Roberts and James T. Baird, Jr., Behavior Patterns of Children in School, United States," ser. 11, no. 113, DHEW Pub. no. HSM 72–1042 (Rockville, Md.: National Center for Health Statistics, Health Services and Mental Health Administration, February 1972), Lincoln I. Oliver, Behavior Patterns in School of Youths 12–17 Years, United States," ser. 11, no. 139, DHEW Pub no NRA 74–1621 (Rockville, Md : National Center for Health Statistics, Health Resources Administration, May 974) For a review of the extensive literature in this area, see Nicholas Hobbs, general editor, *Issues in the Classification of Children*, vols 1 and 2 (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1975).

TABLE 1

NUMBER OF CHILDREN FOR WHOM TEACHER RECOMMENDS SPECIAL RESOURCES ARE NEEDED BUT UNAVAILABLE, BY TYPE OF PROBLEM, 1976 (ESTIMATED)

TYPE OF PROBLEM	AGE OF CHILDREN 6–11 YEARS	12–17 YEARS (THOUSANDS OF CHILDREN)	TOTAL
Hard of hearing	110.3	20.1	130.4
Sight-saving	150.6	5.5	156.1
Speech therapy	442.0	71.3	513.3
Orthopedic handicap	21.1	4.5	25.6
Gifted	556.7	51.7	608.4
Slow learner	1,590.9	282.8	1,873.7
Mentally retarded	48.4	32.4	80.8
Emotionally disturbed	399.8	88.3	488.1
Other	434.6	152.9	—
Remedial reading		270.5	—
English for youths from non-English speaking environments		76.8	—
Remedial training		229.5	—

SOURCE: For 1963–65· NCHS Series 11–113, p. 27. For 1966–70. NCHS Series 11–139, p. 20. Data for both groups are applied to estimates of the population of youth in the Census Bureau's 1976 *Current Population Reports*, ser P–20, no 307, p 12 See also footnote 5.

NOTE *The rates prevailing between 1963 and 1965 for 6–11 year-olds and between 1966 and 1970* for 12–17 year-olds were multiplied by the 1976 population to produce the above estimates It is possible that the needs of children, as perceived by teachers, have changed and that the resources for meeting those needs have also changed during the intervening years. The estimates should be considered only gross approximations.

ceived as having needs requiring attention than girls. A larger proportion of girls than boys are thought to be gifted, and smaller proportions of girls are perceived as slow learners, as mentally retarded, as emotionally disturbed, as needing speech therapy, as being hard of hearing, etc., than boys.

The acuteness of the "remedial reading" problem among 12–17-year-old youth may be further explored through a special study of illiteracy. Inversely associated with parental education and income, illiteracy is greater among males than females, among black than white youths, among residents of rural and small urban places than residents of larger places, and is more prevalent in the South and less in the Midwest, even when race and sex are controlled, than other regions. The illiteracy rate declines slightly with age: from 9.4 per 100 male youths 12 years of age to 6.5 for 17-year-olds, and from 4.3 per 100 females 12 years of age to 2.3 for those 17.[6] These results indict the educational system and parents for failure to provide a skill essential for adjustment in a complex society. In terms of the 1976 population, 140,000 17-year-old young men and 47,000 17-year-old young women enter adult life unable to read!

ARE THEY STAYING IN SCHOOL?

A central value of American culture, reinforced by history, holds that education is a good thing, the more the better. It is the avenue to

6. Dorothee K. Vogt, "Literacy Among Youths 12–17 Years, United States," ser. 11, no. 131, DHEW Pub. no. HRA 74–1613 (Rockville, Md · National Center for Health Statistics, Health Resources Administration, December 1973)

upward occupational and social mobility and a primary means for advancing social justice.[7] Social policy to maximize opportunity emphasizes keeping youth in school, preventing dropouts and opening educational opportunities to otherwise disadvantaged youth. Recent international comparisons show that United States enrollment rates among 15–18-year-olds and the full-time enrollment of 19–25-year-olds exceed other modern Western nations.

School enrollment and retention rates must be regularly monitored to detect evidence of weakening.[8] In recent years considerable weakness has developed. The enrollment record through age 13 years is satisfactory. A trend toward lower attendance is developing among youth 14 to 17 years—the high school years—and attendance rates are undeniably turning downward among males, 18–19 and 20–21, while enrollment rates of females in these older age categories have reached a peak and levelled off. Is there a declining interest in attending school and college among older youth? Enrollment rates for males are as low now as they were in the early 1960s.

In a study of dropouts and other youth in two Louisiana parishes, Bertrand found higher dropout rates among families of lower occupational and social status.[9] He hypothesized that school retention was dependent both upon the family reinforcing educational aspirations and upon a school environment where the student found rewarding relationships with peers and teachers through athletic and club participation, and through successful classwork. Other studies have shown that dropping out of school among older youth may accompany expansions of military forces or periods of high employment, luring youth away to jobs.[10]

The lower enrollment in the high school ages may be partly attributed to compulsory school attendance laws, which in most states do not require attendance of the 17-year-olds (only 11 states require attendance of 17- or 18-year-olds). Enrollment rates of 18-19 year-old males, which had increased over the long term during the post-World War II years, turned downward after 1968 and have declined with some consistency since then. None of the explanations for a decline in enrollment proves satisfactory in this case. Neither high employment nor the expansion of manpower in the military explains the downturn in the enrollment rate. Males evidently turned their backs on school enrollment when deferments from Selective Service were reduced after 1968, and shortly thereafter, when the lottery system was

7. In the context of public goals in this country, see Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, *Priorities for Action. Final Report of the Carnegie Commission on Higher Education* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1973), pp. 33–41. See also footnote 25.

8. Abbott L. Ferriss, "Monitoring and Interpreting Turning Points in Educational Indicators," *Social Indicators Research* 1 (1974), pp. 73–84.

9. Alvin L Bertrand, "School Attendance and Attainment: Function and Dysfunction of School and Family Social System," *Social Forces* 40 (March 1962), pp. 228–33.

10 Beverly Duncan, "Trends in Output and Distribution of Schooling," in *Indicators of Social Change. Concepts and Measurements*, eds Eleanor Bernert Sheldon and Wilbert E. Moore (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968), pp. 601–74; Abbott L. Ferriss, *Indicators of Trends in American Education* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969), pp. 36–49, Marcus Felson and Kenneth C Land, "A Dynamic Macro Social Indicator Model of Changes in Educational Enrollments, Attainments, and Organizations in the United States: 1947–74," Working Paper 7610, mimeographed (Urbana, Ill., University of Illinois, October 1976).

introduced in the draft, making for an earlier decision on induction or noninduction. Finally, the draft was discontinued entirely. About the same time the dampening influence of negativism among youth toward the achievement oriented values of the "Establishment" was felt and an alternate youth counterculture arose.[11] Both the 18–19 and the 20–21 year-old males were influenced. The consequence was a reduction in the educational level of the labor force, a reduction already evident in the average educational attainment of the cohorts affected.

In contrast, the long-term increase in enrollment of females 18–21 years of age has merely levelled off; by 1976 it had actually inched up 4 or 5 percentage points over 1969. Current emphases upon changes in the role of women have brought about this result, attesting to the potency of peer social influences. Meanwhile, the labor force participation rates of these ages, both male and female, continue to increase, even though the unemployment rates are about double that of the total labor force among these ages.

Another means for detecting changes in school enrollment are school retention rates. The most recent tracing of the experience of the 1966 5th grade cohort (graduating 1974) presents a high school graduation rate slightly less than that of the graduating class of 1973; the 1975 class graduated at an even lower rate.

The evidence of lower rate of high school graduation and a lower enrollment rate among older youth is sufficient to call for a national program to stimulate school retention, beginning with 17-year-olds. Adequate numbers of junior colleges, community colleges, and technical institutes now are organized to provide additional years of education. A sophisticated industrial, commercial, and artistic society requires well trained personnel. The program should seek to make the home and school environments more supportive of educational achievement. "Stay in School" bumper stickers are not enough.

11. Ferris, "Monitoring and Interpreting Turning Points," pp. 77–80.

Educational lag

A useful indicator of relative lag in school progress is based on the percent of enrolled population in the modal grade for selected ages and the percent below the modal grade by sex and color. The record for 1974 is not as good as the record for 1970, larger percentages being below the modal grade among all youth 17 years of age and older, with the one exception of 21-year-old females. As age increases there is an increasing percentage below the modal grade. The percent enrolled below the modal grade among blacks is greater than the percent below among whites of the same sex, some comparisions being twice greater. Unsettling as this may be, it is not the entire picture. For the whole story, the population not enrolled at all must be added. To illustrate, in 1975, 34 percent of white males age 18 enrolled in school were below the modal first year of college. However, only 56 percent of 18 year-olds were enrolled. Actually, 63 percent of the 18 year-olds were either not enrolled or enrolled below the modal grade. This index for the age reveals the true dimension of educational lag.

Educational lag has been slowly edging up for 17-year-old white males, but it has been increasing

even more rapidly among 18 year-olds. Educational lag is clearly more severe among black than among white males. Among white 17 year-old males the average over the past seven years has been 35 percent; among black males it has been 57 percent. Among white 18 year-old males, the average over the past seven years has been 52 percent; among black males it has been 82 percent. If additional schooling is important to the national interest in developing its human resources, then the national interest clearly is not being served.

Among white females slight increases in educational lag are evident, but the total percent lag is less. Black 17-year-old females are more likely than white 17-year-old females to be below the modal grade by a factor of 2, and the same is generally true for black 18 year-olds. In general, black and white females show slightly better school progress than their male counterparts of the same age.

What level of educational lag among 17 and 18 year-olds can the nation tolerate? One-third? One-half? When more than one-third of the 17 year-olds and one-half the 18 year-olds are lagging or not progressing at all, a flag of warning should be raised to alert parents, school, and public policy officials to a generation of youth which is bypassing the opportunity to formally develop its talents.[12]

COLLEGE GOING

Often before high school graduation the student decides whether to go on to college, to enter vocational school, or to try for a job. Several studies have identified the characteristics of students who plan to continue school. Clearly high school seniors with definite plans to attend college are decreasing. Studies show that future plans for additional education influence eventual college enrollment.

In 1974 females (44.7 percent) were more likely to plan to attend college than males (39.4 percent). High school seniors who had a relative living in the household who was already attending college (61.2 percent) were more likely to plan to attend than seniors with no other relative in the household attending college (38.9 percent). This is an unexpected result, for one might expect that the prospect of two attending college from the same household might exceed the family's educational budget. That the opposite obtains testifies to the importance of the family orientation toward educational achievement.

Seniors living outside the central city of metropolitan areas were more likely (47.4 percent) to plan to attend than those living in the central city (40.7 percent) or those living in nonmetropolitan areas (36.9 percent). Seniors living in the West were more likely to plan to attend (56.3 percent), than those in the Northeast (40.8 percent), the South (38.8 percent), or the North Central (38.1 percent). Seniors of Spanish origin were more likely to plan to attend college (47.1 percent) than other white (43.4 percent) or black (33.5 percent) seniors.

The higher the socioeconomic status, the more probable is college attendance. For example, the percent of seniors planning to attend increases from the lowest income category (under $5,000 family in-

12. A table of the percent of 17 and 18 year-olds not enrolled or below the modal grade for the age, by color and sex, will be provided upon request. Write: Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Emory University, Atlanta Ga., 30322.

come) (25.8 percent) to the highest ($25,000 and over) (67.6 percent). Indicators of education and occupation underscore this same relationship. This pinpoints precisely the population not inspired to attend college. Progression up the educational ladder provides the means of upward social mobility. School enrollment by socioeconomic status supplies a critical social indicator criterion for monitoring how effectively educational opportunity is being achieved. If the nation aims to maximize the opportunities to youth to realize its potentialities, the educational aspirations of lower socioeconomic groups must be influenced.

Based upon aggregate high school graduation and college entrance ratios, college going by males reached a peak in 1969 (70.3 percent), declined through 1973, and since has increased very slightly. The continuation ratio still is 5.7 percentage points below the 1969 record. Among females, the continuation ratio leveled off between 1969 and 1973, and since 1974 has been inching up, now standing (1976) at its highest point (58.2 percent). Thus, the social influences that are retarding the progress of male youth are not similarly affecting females.

Ratio of college degrees to high school graduates

The ratio of bachelor's degrees to high school graduates four years earlier shows females making marked progress but males making no improvement in the past seven years.

This ratio is a remarkable indicator, reflecting changes in the educational system as it has responded to social, economic, and industrial-commercial needs for trained personnel. During the period 1885–95 secondary schools and colleges were primarily for the male elite, and the indicator showed that approximately half the high school graduates completed college four years later. Then the expansion of secondary schools took place.[13] The declining ratio reached a low point during World War I of less than .2. The industrial-commercial system needed college-trained personnel; in response, higher education expanded after 1920, as did the ratio of college completions. The ratio declined with the Great Depression and when youth went away to World War II, reaching its lowest point (.1) at the end of the War. The revival of college enrollments in the late 1940s brought the indicator back up, peaking at an artificial high in 1950 when many veterans obtained bachelors degrees. Since the late 1950s the indicator has been close to .3. Now, a high school education is nearly universal and postsecondary vocational-technical training is viewed by many as being sufficient preparation. Youth today, particularly men, view college attendance as less compelling than formerly. There is little likelihood that this indicator soon again will reach the peak it attained in the 1890s.[14]

Are the most capable high school graduates entering college?

The answer to this question is strongly in the affirmative. Con-

13. Martin Trow, "The Second Transformation of American Secondary Education," *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* II (September 1961), pp. 144–66.

14. Ferris, *Indicators of Trends in American Education*, pp 107–12 and idem, "Monitoring and Interpreting Turning Points," pp 140–51.

TABLE 2

ESTIMATES OF THE PERCENT OF THE TOP HALF IN ABILITY OF HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATING CLASSES WHICH ENTERED COLLEGE, VARIOUS STUDIES, 1950–1972, UNITED STATES

		PERCENT OF HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATING CLASS ENTERING COLLEGE	
YEAR	TEST CRITERION	WITHIN 1 YEAR	WITHIN 5 YEARS
Circa 1950	Above the mean AGCT score of high school graduating class[1]	54.4	
1960	1960 high school graduates in top 50% in ability (I.Q.) enrolled in college in the fall, 1960[2]	52.3	
1960–65	Top 50% in ability of 1960 high school graduates enrolled in college within five years of graduation[3]		63.9
1965	October 1965 high school seniors who graduated with high school grade point average of A or B (51.4% of the class), enrolled by February, 1967[4]	55.1	
1972	High school graduates in the top 50% in ability, enrolled in October, 1972[5]	61.0	

1 Dael Wolfle, *America's Resources of Specialized Talent* (New York: Harper and Bros., 1954), calulated from Appendix G, pp. 311–14

2 Charles B Nam and James D. Cowhig, "Factors Related to College Attendance of Farm and Nonfarm igh School Graduates, 1960," *Farm Population*, Census–ERA P–27, no. 32 (Washington, D C.. U. S. Bureau f the Census, 15 June 1962), pp. 14 and 16

3. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, *Toward a Social Report* (Washington, D.C USGPO, 969), p. 21 Probabilities from the 1960 11th and 12th grade classes follow-up study by Project TALENT.

4. "Factors Related to High School Graduation and College Attendance 1967," *Current Population eports*, ser P–20, no. 185 (Washington, D C USGPO, 11 July 1969), p 7

5 Kenneth A Tabler, *National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972, Tabular Sumary of the First Followup Questionnaire Data*, NCES 76–212 (Washington, D C USGPO, 1976) Ability a composite index The 50th percentile is estimated as middle position of the two middle quartiles om data presented pp. 290 and 28 The estimate excludes vocational-technical and "other" enrollment

idering the upper quartile in ability s the "most capable," the 1972 high chool graduating class registers 80 ercent in college or vocational-echnical school. There is reason to elieve that this record is superior o previous high school graduation lasses, but the many variations in ethod, definition of "college," eriod of time when the graduate ntered college, and definition of ability," renders any direct comarison impossible. The authors f *S. I. '76* enforced more rigorous onditions of comparability for an xamination of trends than seem ecessary. Table 2 draws together the best comparisons over time of samples representing American high school graduating classes.[15] Be-

15. Other studies have used different cutting points for identification of high-ability youth, such as the 10th, 25th, and 30th percentile See Donald S. Bridgman, *The Duration of Formal Education for High-Ability Youth*, NSF 61-36 (Washington, D C. National Science Foundation, 1961), Christopher Jencks, "Social Stratification and Higher Education," *Harvard Educational Review* 38 (Spring 1968), p 277, Glen Stice, William G Mollenkopf, and Warren S. Torgerson, *Background Factors and College-Going Plans Among High-Aptitude Public High School Seniors* (Princeton, N.J., Educational Testing Service, August 1956). One of the most intensively studied cohorts,

cause of differences in the sources of variation just mentioned, one cannot rely too heavily upon the evidence, but the data suggest that there has been only slight improvement in the rate of entering college by high school graduates in the top half of ability. In a 20-year span, from the early 1950s to the early 1970s, there may have been an increase of 6 percentage points in the continuation ratio of the upper half in ability, if vocational-technical enrollment is excluded. If all types of institutions are counted, the current picture is brighter.

ARE THEY LEARNING MORE?

Toward a Social Report, the initial federal attempt to summarize social indicators of change, answered this question affirmatively in 1969: ". . . American children in the sixties are learning more than their older brothers and sisters learned in the fifties."[16] Since then, a National Assessment of Educational Progress (NAEP) has been launched to periodically administer achievement tests to 9, 13, and 17 year-olds and to adults 26 to 35 years of age. The sample, sufficiently large to represent segments of the population, produces test scores in eight subject matter areas, but each administration does not include all subjects; consequently, the change over time in achievement scores cannot be assessed each year. With this more definitive testing program, can it be said that students are learning more? The answer: in some subjects, among some ages, yes; in others, no.

The 1974 17 year-olds did slightly better on reading than the 1971 17 year-olds, improvement showing up in all categories of learners. Nine year-olds were tested in reading in 1970 and 1974. The more recent 9 year-olds responded correctly to 1.2 percent more of the questions than did the 1970 9 year-olds.[17]

Tests of writing were administered in 1970 and 1974. The 9 year-olds in 1974 did slightly better than the 9 year-olds in 1970, but both the 13 and 17 year-olds in 1974 did not perform as well as comparable ages in 1970.

Science tests were administered to 17 year-olds in 1969–70 and 1972–73. The more recent scores in all categories of the 17-year-old population were lower, except for those living in small places and rural areas.

Tests given in various years between 1969 and 1973 enable comparisons of 17 year-olds with young adults 26 to 35 years of age. The 17 year-olds performed better than adults did on tests of social studies, citizenship, writing, and music, but the older group was superior on literature, reading, science, and mathematics.

This more definitive testing program gives us no comfort. In reporting the drop of nearly 2 percent in the national level of performance in science, the NAEP labelled the decline "disturb-

---

the Wisconsin high school graduating class of 1957, was followed up in 1964–65 to determine its educational progress. Some 53.4 percent of the high school graduates entered college and, after 7–8 years, 30 percent had completed college. William H. Sewell and Vimal P. Shah, "Socioeconomic Status, Intelligence and the Attainment of Higher Education," *Sociology of Education* 40 (Winter 1967), pp. 1–23.

16. *Toward a Social Report* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1969), p. 67

17. Mary A. Golladay, *The Condition of Education*, 1977 edition, vol. 3, pt. 1 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1977), p. 108

ing."[18] With gratitude for the slight gains that have been registered, the public can find little solace that student learning has increased comparable to the increase in expenditures for education. The latter increased from 6.6 percent of the Gross National Product in 1965 to 7.9 percent in 1975, the total expenditure in 1975 being in excess of 120 billion dollars (a figure more than half the public thinks is "too little."[19] Reverting to our knowledge of what makes Sammy learn, however, the public must acknowledge that the family must assume equal responsibility with the school for the sluggish trend in pupil achievement.

More definitive conclusions of the decline in test performance were reached by Harnischfeger and Wiley after they reviewed trends in all the major mass test results.[20] They found lower test scores in the last ten years on "English, writing, literature, vocabulary, reading, social studies, mathematics, and natural sciences"[21]—the traditional academic learning areas. In many test series the decline began after 1963. As one important cause, the authors attribute changes in the secondary school curriculum: lower enrollments in academic courses. Over time, also, a lower pupil dropout rate has been experienced, perhaps retaining in school pupils of less potential.

The decline in achievement test scores, however, was not evident below grade 5 and it was more pronounced in the higher grades. Harnischfeger and Wiley suggest that this may have resulted from "a differential effect of television viewing of different age groups,"[22] even though conclusive proof of this point is lacking. They see a need to reconsider the school curriculum in relation to the skills needed in our society for adjustment in employment, leisure, consumption behavior, political life, etc. If changes in the curriculum are indicated they would lead naturally to changing the content of the tests. Opposing this view, of course, is the "back to basics" movement in education.

Finally, the authors attribute to the school, rather than to the social background of the students, the primary source of academic achievement.[23] The question certainly deserves more definitive research. Until such results are available, however, a model of pupil academic

18. *The National Assessment of Educational Progress* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1975), p. 10.

19. W. Vance Grant and C. George Lind, *Digest of Educational Statistics*, 1976 edition, NCES 77-401 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1977), p. 25.

20. These included the Scholastic Aptitude Test, The American College Testing Program, the Preliminary Scholastic Aptitude Test, the Minnesota Scholastic Aptitude Test, the Iowa Test of Educational Development, the Iowa Tests of Basic Skills, Comprehensive Tests of Basic Skills, as well as the National Assessment of Educational Progress. Annegret Harnischfeger and David E. Wiley, *Achievement Test Score Decline: Do We Need To Worry?* (Chicago: CEMREL, Inc., 1975).

21. Ibid., p. 118.

22. Ibid., p. 116.

23. Reference is to the results of studies which have found the social background of the students to account for more variance in achievement than the characteristics of the schools, as reported by J. S. Coleman, *et al.*, *Equality of Educational Opportunity* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1966) and C. S. Jencks *et al.*, *Inequality: A Reassessment of the Effect of Family and Schooling in America* (New York: Basic Books, 1972). An intensive study of the decline in SAT scores was completed by a panel headed by Willard Wirtz: *Report of the Advisory Panel on the Scholastic Aptitude Test Score Decline* (Princeton, N.J.: College Entrance Examination Board, Educational Testing Service, 1977). The Wirtz study was discussed in *The Chronicle of Higher Education* XV (6 September 1977),

achievement is suggested which would attribute weight both to the school and the family for the academic attainment of youth. The primary basis for motivation and reward rests in the social and cultural influences of family and school. Where the home or the school fails to stimulate maximum personal development by youth, techniques of intervention, politically feasible or not, are needed. Social and educational research should show the way.

MODELS ARE NEEDED

This commentary on the Education and Training chapter of *Social Indicators, 1976* has not considered many time series on education in the volume: the public's perception of aspects of education, adult and vocational education, international comparisons, and others. Neither has it discussed the many relationships presented in the volume between education and many important indicators of societal functions: fertility, occupational attainment, educational differences between ethnic groups, attitudes and opinions toward several important social issues, the distribution of income and consumer expenditures by educational level, trends in knowledge-producing and -disseminating occupations, trends in the subject matter of books published, intergenerational shifts (father to son) in years of school completed, and others.

These extensive data on education attest to the richness of the United States social accounting system and to continuing efforts to improve the quality and usefulness of the data, particularly in the last decade.[24]

24. See chapter 5 on education by Ezra Glaser in *Social Statistics in Use*, ed. Philip M. Hauser (New York: Russell Sage Founda-

Despite these accretions a persistent cry for more and more data is heard. The need arises from attempts to understand more fully the structures and processes of society. This laudable objective can be aided by more educational data only if the data would serve to explicate models of processes within and affecting the educational system.

Models are needed to interpret social indicators of education. Models are conceptual schemes of interacting variables which account for variation in a criterion indicator. Many such models have been, and are being, developed.[25] Many, for example, predict the manpower output of the educational system while others predict the manpower requirements of education.[26] Im-

25 The Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development has released several publications on modeling in education. Two of these are Richard Stone, *Demographic Accounting and Model-Building* (Paris. OECD, 1971) and idem, *Mathematical Models for the Education Sector* (Paris. OECD, 1973). Status and educational attainment have been favored criteria in sociological models Some recent studies James G Anderson, "Causal Models and Social Indicators: Toward the Development of Social Systems Models," *American Sociological Review* 38 (June 1973), pp. 285–301, Kenneth L Wilson and Alejandro Portes, "The Educational Attainment Process. Results from a National Sample," *American Journal of Sociology* 81 (September 1975), pp. 343–63, Karl L. Alexander, Bruce K Eckland, and Larry J Griffin, "The Wisconsin Model of Socioeconomic Achievement. A Replication," *American Journal of Sociology* 81 (September, 1975), pp 324–42.

26. Four models have been the subjects of National Science Foundation and the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare support. Thomas Wallace, "An Empirical Investigation of Expenditures and Time Spent on Formal Schooling," (Raleigh: North Carolina State University); Saul J Gass, "Enrollment and Financial Aid Model for Higher Education," (Bethesda, Md. Mathematics Inc), Vaughn Huckfeldt, "National Planning Model," (Boulder Colo. National

proving them and extending them to encompass the major significant criteria is necessary. Specifying the model is the first step toward identifying needed indicators of education. Until such models are developed and tested by social science, improvement in the quality and utility of educational indicators is likely to be piecemeal.

Social indicators of education are statistical time series that reflect the condition of some aspect of the system.[27] Indicators of normative interest may be taken as criteria indicators which are dependent upon the independent predictors in an interactive system. When arranged in a time series, singly or in combination, the independent predictors herald changes in the criterion indicator. Educational indicators of this kind are needed to monitor the system, to anticipate future changes, to plan, to facilitate adjustment, and to understand the social forces at work.

The need for models of numerous processes in the educational system is crucial. Analytical models are needed to facilitate the interpretation of the successive stages of growth and learning upon the basis of longitudinal observations of a cohort. Models are needed that predict the growth function in learning skills and competencies upon the basis of personal traits and situational influences of home and school. Models are needed of classroom activity, teacher behavior, and peer influences on learning. Models are needed which more clearly identify the effect of the numerous inputs to the educational system on learning. Improved models of manpower requirements are needed for more deliberate educational planning. Models of the broader social consequences of education, viewed as generational change, as occupational achievement, as increments to the quality of life, and, broadly, as social and cultural change are also of critical importance.

---

ment Systems); James F. McNamara, "Mathematical Progression Models in Educational Planning," (Eugene, Ore. Center for Advanced Studies in Educational Administration, University of Oregon) The latter study is cited in Gary Fromm, William L. Hamilton, and Diane E. Hamilton, *Federally Supported Mathematical Models: Survey and Analysis*, NSF-RA-S-74-029 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1975).

27. Ferriss, *Indicators of Trends*, pp. 2–6. Broad societal relationships to education have been modeled by Felson and Land, *A Dynamic Macro Social Indicator Model*.

Table 7/1
POPULATION UNDER 25 YEARS OF AGE, BY SELECTED AGE GROUPINGS: 1940–2000
(Thousands)

Year	Total	Under 5 years	5 to 13 years	14 to 17 years	18 to 24 years	Year	Total	Under 5 years	5 to 13 years	14 to 17 years	18 to 24 years
1940	132,122	10,579	19,936	9,844	16,616	1970	204,879	17,156	36,636	15,910	24,683
1941	133,402	10,850	19,674	9,742	16,747	1971	207,045	17,174	36,104	16,281	25,776
1942	134,860	11,301	19,427	9,643	16,845	1972	208,842	17,006	35,456	16,556	25,901
1943	136,739	12,016	19,319	9,568	16,878	1973	210,404	16,714	34,739	16,746	26,381
1944	138,397	12,524	19,246	9,474	16,852	1974	211,909	16,304	34,082	16,878	26,908
1945	139,928	12,979	19,326	9,251	16,728	1975	213,450	15,910	33,441	16,923	27,597
1946	141,389	13,244	19,625	9,019	16,583	1976	215,074	15,545	32,957	16,879	28,161
1947	144,126	14,406	20,118	8,878	16,382	1977	216,814	15,589	32,252	16,774	28,616
1948	146,631	14,919	20,990	8,656	16,309	1978	218,678	15,988	31,413	16,632	28,967
1949	149,188	15,607	21,634	8,502	16,024	1979	220,663	16,589	30,682	16,259	29,282
1950	152,271	16,410	22,424	8,444	16,075	1980	222,769	17,259	30,246	15,753	29,441
1951	154,878	17,333	22,998	8,499	15,781	1981	224,963	17,935	30,009	15,211	29,488
1952	157,553	17,312	24,501	8,684	15,472	1982	227,207	18,546	29,979	14,650	29,332
1953	160,184	17,638	25,701	8,792	15,257	1983	229,484	19,066	30,051	14,305	28,998
1954	163,026	18,057	26,887	8,959	15,103	1984	231,776	19,484	30,181	14,259	28,458
1955	165,931	18,566	27,925	9,248	14,968	1985	234,068	19,785	30,380	14,388	27,834
1956	168,903	19,003	28,929	9,617	14,980	1986	236,345	19,984	30,974	14,311	27,069
1957	171,984	19,494	29,672	10,303	15,094	1987	238,596	20,110	31,842	13,980	26,435
1958	174,882	19,887	30,651	10,786	15,308	1988	240,809	20,167	32,827	13,502	25,960
1959	177,830	20,175	31,767	11,108	15,677	1989	242,973	20,161	33,774	13,027	25,621


Table 7/1 (*Continued*)

Year	Total	Under 5 years	5 to 13 years	14 to 17 years	18 to 24 years	Year	Total	Under 5 years	5 to 13 years	14 to 17 years	18 to 24 years
1960	180,671	20,341	32,965	11,219	16,128	1990	245,075	20,096	34,643	12,941	25,162
1961	183,691	20,522	33,217	12,052	17,004	1991	247,109	19,978	35,382	13,199	24,700
1962	186,538	20,469	33,897	12,759	17,688	1992	249,068	19,817	35,974	13,669	24,261
1963	189,242	20,342	34,578	13,500	18,268	1993	250,950	19,619	36,410	14,203	23,984
1964	191,889	20,165	35,244	14,274	18,783	1994	252,758	19,395	36,678	14,773	23,780
1965	194,303	19,824	35,754	14,153	20,293	1995	254,495	19,161	36,799	15,317	23,641
1966	196,560	19,208	36,283	14,405	21,376	1996	256,170	18,934	36,808	15,784	23,576
1967	198,712	18,563	36,629	14,735	22,327	1997	257,795	18,728	36,714	16,162	23,927
1968	200,706	17,913	36,804	15,173	22,883	1998	259,381	18,557	36,530	16,437	24,617
1969	202,677	17,376	36,836	15,560	23,723	1999	260,943	18,432	36,273	16,625	25,478
						2000	262,494	18,364	35,963	16,752	26,328

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-25, Nos. 311 (1940 to 1959), 519 (1960 to 1973), and 541 (1974 to 2000).

Chart 7/1 Social Indicators, 1976

U.S. POPULATION UNDER 25 YEARS OF AGE BY SELECTED AGE GROUPINGS, 1940 TO 2,000 (Series II projections)



Source: see table 7/1

Chart 7/2 Social Indicators, 1976

PREKINDERGARTEN ENROLLMENT OF 3- AND 4-YEAR-OLDS, BY RACE: 1964–1974




Table 7/2

PREKINDERGARTEN ENROLLMENT OF 3- AND 4-YEAR-OLDS, BY RACE: 1964–1974

Year	Number enrolled (thousands)			Percent of 3- and 4-year-old population enrolled		
	Total	White	Black and other races	Total	White	Black and other races
1964	439	374	65	5.2	5.3	5.1
1965	475	413	64	5.7	5.8	4.9
1966	627	513	114	7.6	7.4	8.7
1967	665	534	131	8.2	7.9	10.1
1968	738	604	134	9.4	9.3	10.4
1969	778	610	168	10.5	9.9	13.4
1970	1,003	824	180	14.1	13.9	14.8
1971	992	831	161	14.2	14.3	13.5
1972	1,213	1,015	197	17.9	17.8	18.4
1973	1,242	1,022	219	17.7	17.4	19.6
1974[1]	1,515	1,273	243	21.7	21.9	20.9

Source U S Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, National Center for Education Statistics, *The Condition of Education, 1976*

[1] Estimated.


Table 7/7
SCHOOL RETENTION RATES: 1924–1974
(Retention rates per 1,000 students who entered 5th grade)

School year pupils entered 5th grade	5th grade	6th grade	7th grade	8th grade	9th grade	10th grade	11th grade	12th grade	High school graduation	
									Number	Year
1924	1,000	911	798	741	612	470	384	344	302	1932
1934	1,000	953	892	842	803	711	610	512	467	1942
1944	1,000	952	929	858	848	748	650	549	522	1952
1954	1,000	980	979	948	915	855	759	684	642	1962
1960	1,000	980	973	967	952	913	858	787	749	1968
1965	1,000	996	983	980	980	947	874	786	749	1973
1966	1,000	989	986	985	985	959	871	783	744	1974

Source U S Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, National Center for Education Statistics, *Digest of Educational Statistics, 1975*.

Chart 7/7 Social Indicators, 1976

SCHOOL RETENTION RATES FROM FIFTH GRADE TO HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATION: 1924–1974



Source: see table 7/7

Table 7/19
PERFORMANCE IN SUBJECT AREAS, BY AGE LEVEL AND SEX: EARLY 1970'S
(Percent)

Subject area, year of assessment, and sex[1]	9-year-olds	13-year-olds	17-year-olds	26- to 35-year-olds
MATHEMATICS, 1972–73				
National norm	36.7	51.3	57.1	59.3
Male	.7	.4	2.3	5.4
Female	−.7	−.4	−2.2	−5.0
SCIENCE, 1972–73				
National norm	68.2	58.3	47.0	51.2
Male	.8	1.5	2.8	5.2
Female	−1.0	−1.4	−2.4	−4.7
SOCIAL STUDIES, 1971–72				
National norm	72.2	66.2	73.8	72.4
Male	.4	.1	.6	2.3
Female	−.4	−.1	−.6	−2.2
CITIZENSHIP, 1969–70				
National norm	64.1	63.1	61.8	60.4
Male	.1	.3	.4	1.4
Female	−.2	−.4	−.4	−1.3
WRITING, 1969–70				
National norm	28.3	55.4	62.5	58.4
Male	−4.0	−3.4	−3.4	−2.3
Female	4.1	3.2	3.0	2.1
READING, 1970–71				
National norm	70.4	68.1	77.5	83.5
Male	−2.4	−2.5	−2.0	.2
Female	2.3	2.3	1.9	−.3
LITERATURE, 1970–71				
National norm	43.9	53.4	61.3	64.0
Male	−.7	−1.6	−1.1	—
Female	.6	1.6	1.0	−.1
MUSIC, 1971–72				
National norm	53.8	48.9	49.2	41.5
Male	−.3	−.9	−.9	−.9
Female	.3	.9	.8	.9

Source: U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, National Center for Education Statistics, *The Condition of Education, 1976*, and National Assessment of Educational Progress, Education Commission of the States, Newsletter VIII, No. 5 (Denver, Colorado: October 1975).

— Represents zero.


[1] Figures for sex indicate median difference in percentage points from the national norm.

Chart 7/19

Social Indicators, 1976

PERFORMANCE IN SUBJECT AREAS FOR SELECTED YEARS

males perform better than females in mathematics, science, social studies and citizenship at all age levels



Source: see table 7/19

ANNALS, AAPSS, 435, Jan. 1978

Perceptions About Black Americans

By BARBARA L. CARTER AND DOROTHY K. NEWMAN

ABSTRACT: The data sources used in *Social Indicators, 1976* are more restricted and interpretation more restrained than in earlier reports by the Census or the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Available data that measure how institutions established for dealing with racial injustice are working have not been incorporated in the report.

Black Americans continue to have less of the society's most valued characteristics and conditions and more of those that are disvalued and stigmatized, or are evidence of discrimination and neglect. At the root of blacks' disfavored position is a combination of interacting forces. These include the cumulative effects on American institutions of generations of blatantly overt racial discrimination in every area of life; the continuing subtle practices of racial and economic discrimination; and the absence of a national will or commitment to undertake those pragmatic political, social, and economic policies necessary to erase discrimination, and to enforce those policies forthrightly.

Barbara L. Carter holds a doctorate in sociology from Brandeis University. She is a co-author of Protest, Politics and Prosperity: Black Americans and White Institutions, 1940–75, *and has done research on the experiences of women in prison. She is Associate Provost and Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of the District of Columbia.*

Dorothy K. Newman, who received her doctorate in sociology from Yale, is senior author of Protest, Politics and Prosperity *and of* The American Energy Consumer. *She has directed many socioeconomic studies for the Bureau of Labor Statistics and has written extensively about minorities, the consumer, housing, and employment. She founded the National Urban League Research Department in Washington, where she was the Director from 1968 to 1972.*

THE SOCIAL indicators movement blossomed in the 1960s when all eyes were focused on the social changes taking place in American race relations. The civil rights movement, and especially black initiatives, were aimed at destroying a centuries old caste system, reinforced by the sanction of law, that kept blacks at the back of the bus, at the bottom of the economic ladder, in the poorest health, in the worst housing, disenfranchised in many places, and often as fearful of law enforcers as of lawless offenders. Through their active and highly visible protest in the 1960s, black Americans called national attention to their second-class citizenship and set in motion policies to reduce overt discrimination to a minimum, and to improve their social and economic conditions and opportunities.[1]

SOCIAL INDICATORS—BLACK HISTORY

A by-product of this struggle and the national spotlight that it achieved was a growing concern among social policy professionals with the measurement and publicizing of the extent to which changes were actually occuring. One of the results was a White Paper entitled "To Fulfill These Rights" prepared for President Johnson's White House Planning Conference on economic security held in Washington in November 1965. The conference was called following serious disorders in Birmingham, Cambridge, Maryland, Chicago, Harlem, Hough in Cleveland, and Watts in Los Angeles, among others. The issue paper prepared in the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS)[2] had a number of precursors in much earlier years, which reflected substantial effort to glean and analyze whatever hard data existed about black Americans. They were published in 1952, 1957, 1958, 1959, 1960, and 1962.[3] The title of the 1962 report, like that of the others, featured only the economic condition of blacks. But the titles are misleading, since in addition to information about work and wages, the BLS studies investigated voting rights, educational segregation, segregation in public accommodations, as well as demographic questions such as population trends, birth and death rates, mobility, and life expectancy. Interspersed with statistics are informative analyses of trends, and outspoken discussion of discrimination as reflected in data from sources both in and out of the federal government. In fact, the sources are not as restricted and the interpretation as restrained in these early reports as they are in *Social Indicators, 1976*. Yet the 1970s abound with a huge volume of government and nongovernment data upon which to draw for studying the conditions, pace of change, and the extent of equality of black Americans with

1. For analysis of the significance of black protest in bringing about political and legal action, see *Protest, Politics, and Prosperity. Black Americans and White Institutions* by the authors of this article, with Nancy J. Amidei, Dawn Day, William J Kruvant, and Jack S. Russell (New York Pantheon Books, forthcoming, 1978).

2. Dorothy K. Newman prepared the paper and attended the conferences as a resource person for the panel sessions that dealt with economic security and housing.

3. U.S. Dept of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Negroes in the United States, Their Employment and Economic Status*, BLS Bulletin no. 1119 (Washington, D.C. USGPO, 1952), idem, *Notes on the Economic Situation of Negroes in the United States* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1957 and revised and repeated in 1958 and 1959); idem, *The Economic Situation of Negroes in the United States*, BLS Bulletin no. S-2 (Washington, D.C.. USGPO, 1960), BLS Bulletin S-3, 1962.

others in our society. Data are available also that can measure how institutions established for dealing with racial injustice are working. The 1965 White House Conference issue paper, and its charts and tables, evolved into the BLS 1966 publication, *Social and Economic Conditions of Negro American*,[4] and gave rise to an annual series of reports about American blacks by the Census Bureau, beginning with the joint BLS-Census bulletin *Social and Economic Conditions of Negroes in the United States*,[5] published in October 1967. The analytic thrust in the latter report began the effort to present a minimum of large and confusing numbers and yet cover a wide range of readily interpretable data. Its simplicity of presentation for ready understanding depended on substantial knowledge of the subject beforehand, thoroughly digested data, and the use of several sets of data within tables in an analytical frame to shed light on significant issues.

The statistics about blacks in *Social Indicators, 1976*, while numerous, are scattered throughout the chapters. Since they are not drawn together and interpreted in one place, they leave a vague, diffused impression. Those responsible for the *Indicators* publication as a whole may well have reasoned that the undertaking was ambitious enough without a chapter devoted entirely to blacks. After all, they could refer readers to the Census Bureau's annual series, *The Social and Economic Status of the Black Population in the United States*. But a social indicators report was an opportunity to use creativity and depth of interpretation about race in our country during the mid-1970s when malaise was increasing, and when the indicators that did exist showed a gulf between black and white, and lagging enforcement both of the letter and the spirit of the law. One of the main reasons for a race classification as a social indicator is to provide a way of discerning causes for the trends as well as insights into positive changes and continuing disparities between the races. But, as the report itself tells the reader, the question is not "Why?" but "What?" Even without considering the "why," the significance of the fact never surfaces that in America being black is a social indicator. What happens to black people describes progress made and successes or failures of American society.

THE "WHAT?" AND SOME OF THE "WHY?"

In virtually all areas for which race data are shown in *Social Indicators, 1976* trends for black Americans are identical to those for the white majority. This is a simple, but often overlooked, point. It is as true for changes in population growth, marriage and divorce, fertility, health, and family arrangements as for employment and unemployment, for instance. When the society as a whole, and the white majority in particular, gains or loses, so do blacks. But the rub is, that although going in the same direction, blacks are on a different track. They continue to have

4. U.S Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Social and Economic Conditions of Negro Americans*, BLS Bulletin 1511 (Washington, D.C. USGPO, 1966). The Bulletin was prepared by Dorothy K. Newman.

5 U S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Social and Economic Conditions of Negroes in the United States*, BLS Report no. 332 (Washington, D.C: USGPO, 1967) and *Current Population Reports*, ser P–23, no. 24. Herman P. Miller of the Bureau of the Census and Dorothy K Newman of the Bureau of Labor Statistics developed the latter Report.

less of the most valued characteristics and conditions and more of those that are disvalued and stigmatized or are evidence of discrimination and neglect.

Health

Using health as an example, while the proportion of those healthy enough to live to or beyond 65 has increased for everyone over the past few decades and is expected to continue to rise, blacks' shorter life expectancy has persisted, so that proportionately fewer blacks experience those "golden years." Similarly, as we place increasing value on smaller, planned families, the fertility rate has declined among blacks and whites, but it remains higher among blacks. Black women, like white women of childbearing age, want fewer children than they used to, so family size for both races has dropped sharply. By 1975, average family size was 2.5 for white and 2.9 for blacks. Infant and neonatal mortality rates also have fallen, but they remain substantially higher for blacks than whites.

High blood pressure is substantially more prevalent among blacks than whites. If stress is a factor in high blood pressure, that may be why the highest incidence is among black women, who disproportionately suffer from the double burdens of being black and women in our society.[6] And blacks, who average less income than whites, are less able to pay for increasingly expensive health care, and they tend not to be covered by group health insurance. The tensions of daily living under varying levels and patterns of discrimination have been associated with higher incidence of mental illness among blacks.[7] Blacks, more than whites cannot afford private psychiatric care and show much higher admission rates to psychiatric inpatient and outpatient services of mental hospitals.

Ironically, when illness would interfere with getting a full pay check, health "indicators" appear to be better for blacks than whites. Blacks between 45 and 65 have fewer days of work loss. Black children under 16 have fewer days of restricted activity, school days loss, and bed disability days than white children. This is linked, no doubt, to the larger proportion of black than white mothers who work outside the home, are unable to afford household help, or are without the paid annual leave that makes it possible for them to stay home with their ill children.

Housing

The quality of housing has improved dramatically for all Americans during the past several decades, but blacks continue more often to live in overcrowded and substandard housing. Especially significant is the fact that the races live almost entirely apart. Blacks reside mostly in the central cities of metropolitan areas; whites, in the suburban ring or the open country. The extent of housing segregation has not changed since 1940; not even the most active period of civil rights protest in this

6. See Jermiah Stamler *et al.*, *Hypertension In The Inner City* (Minneapolis, Minn. Modern Medicine Publications, 1974), pp 11–30 for a discussion of social, psychological, and economic factors related to hypertension.

7. Thomas F Pettigrew, *A Profile of The Negro American* (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1964), pp. 73–82; Morton Kramer *et al.*, Definitions and Distributions of Mental Disorders In A Racist Society" in *Racism and Mental Health*, eds., Charles V. Willie, *et al.*, (Pittsburgh. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1973), pp. 353–459.

century, the 1960s, has affected the pattern of segregated housing. The intensity of both hidden and overt discrimination is especially demonstrated in the housing arena.[8] Data are abundantly available that afford good measures of this, but they do not appear in *Social Indicators, 1976*.

Work

Earnings and incomes are unequal between the races as is the acquisition of those components of income that create wealth. Unemployment rates are shockingly higher among blacks than whites and a larger proportion of black people live in poverty. Even comparable years of schooling and a college degree do not bridge the gap. Some of it narrows when incomes are similar, but the basic pattern of inequality does not disappear.

It is said often that blacks' economic difficulties are affected to a large degree by an unusual mix of demographic groups in their labor force, with blacks having a larger proportion of those most vulnerable to unemployment. Regardless of the merits of this argument, which describes, but does not deny the problem, a close look at data, not all of which are in the *Indicators* report, shows that however well or poorly the economy is doing and whatever the high-risk group—whether high school dropouts, teenagers, women, or persons in unskilled occupations—the black unemployment rate is invariably much higher than the white. In the best of times, when employers are in great need of labor, the preference is for whites whatever the qualifications. In the worst of times, white high school dropouts are kept on or hired in preference to blacks with substantially more schooling.[9]

Quality of schooling or scholarship standings also are often cited for discrepancies in hiring, promotion, and occupational achievement between black and other workers. But just a casual look at the figures shows that white applicants and workers who have not finished high school are much more numerous than all black applicants or workers, whatever their qualifications. One of the truly analytical tables in the report concisely illustrates that blacks tend to have even more schooling than whites in jobs for which education could be presumed most necessary—professional and managerial work. Further analysis, using well-known studies about the gap between black and white occupational achievement relative to education, shows that a sizable gap in job levels remains over three decades between blacks and whites of the same age group as well as between blacks and whites in the same educational group.[10]

Yet most jobs can be performed without the schooling American employers require of American applicants, according both to the United States Employment Service's *Training and Reference Manual for Job Analysis* and its *Dictionary of Occupational Titles*, and the BLS *Occupational Outlook Handbook*. The overwhelming majority of the American work force—black and white alike—has had as much or more schooling than successful job perform-

8. See Newman and Carter, *Protest, Politics, and Prosperity*, chap. 5 for a full development of housing segregation, its extent and courses.

9. For a more complete development of this point and associated documentation, see Newman and Carter, *Protest, Politics, and Prosperity*, chap. 2.

10. See Newman and Carter, *Protest, Politics, and Prosperity*, end of chap. 3

ance requires. Most jobs are learned by doing, and in a short time. A large component of the white labor force has long held such jobs without much formal schooling, whereas blacks have been called unqualified for lack of school credentials. In 1950 half of the total experienced labor force, including two-thirds of all clerical and sales workers, were whites with less than a high school education. In 1970 white workers without a high school diploma still were half of all production workers, one-fifth of the police, and about one-fourth of clerical and sales workers.[11]

That it is hyprocrisy and discrimination that downgrades black Americans' capabilities for the work that has to be done in the United States is revealed by the hiring practices of multinational American firms abroad. In industrialized Western Europe migrant Southern European workers, who were untrained and illiterate in any language, were hired to produce the same commodities for which black Americans are required to have a high school education, experience, or special training here[12] —black Americans, who grew up knowing the language and customs of their native land.

The occupational distributions in *Social Indicators, 1976* show that a large shift has occurred over several decades among women, especially among black women, into low paying clerical and sales jobs requiring the least education, and also and especially, in the health services. They are not flocking into such professions as doctors, lawyers, dentists, college professors, physicists, and social scientists. These are the most advantaged in professional work in terms of security, status, and earnings, and white men still dominate them. White men, followed by black men, also dominate industrial jobs, which are not just better paid than are the usual clerical and sales work women do, but carry with them more security in the form of collective bargaining agreements, seniority lines, and coverage by private pension and health plans. Some of these facts are present among the tables and charts in the report, but some are missing. It would be difficult to sort out viable conclusions without the missing pieces, and without prior knowledge, and an analytical frame of reference. Especially misleading is the dichotomy between "white collar" and "blue collar," leaving the often made assumption that jobs in the former are "better" than those in the latter.[13]

Wages and wealth

Americans, black and white, tend to earn most of their income by working for someone else, as the *Social Indicators* report clearly shows. After this, the facts are not so clear. For instance, some of the income that is unearned and is not from self-employment in a business or profession is presented in economic terminology as a "transfer payment." So-called transfer payments are principally from social security programs (Old Age and Survivors and Disability and Health Insurance [OASDHI] unemployment insurance, and public assistance). Looked at by many as a way of bilking Uncle Sam, such payments show up as being more prevalent among black than white

11. Ibid
12. Ibid.

13. For more data documentation about the relative position of black workers by occupation and education, and the deceiving nature of white-collar and blue-collar designations, see Newman and Carter *Protest, Politics, and Prosperity*, chaps. 2 and 3.

families. Analyses are needed from data that reflect other parts of the picture. For instance, in the largest program with most status—OASDHI—black families get less per recipient than white families.[14] Also, the nation's security programs as a whole are more effective in bringing white families out of poverty than black families.[15] In addition, taxes foregone or forgiven, so that they do not reach the nation's coffers at all—called tax preferences or loopholes, as you will—benefit white families far more than black.[16]

The tables and charts in *Social Indicators, 1976* plainly show that blacks have substantially less wealth and less means of creating it. They show that, counting income alone, the ratio of black to white family income has hovered around the same figure for almost a decade—about 60 percent. When the concept of wealth is used, the gap is far greater.[17] And, as we all know, money makes money. The emphasis in *Social Indicators, 1976* is on vast improvements in income among black families. Money income has risen sharply for us all, but the true measure of economic status is in wealth, and it is relative. The ratio of black to white family income alone edged up only about 10 points in almost 30 years, with most of that rise occurring in the 1960s. Relatively, very few black families are wealthy or receive large incomes from property.[18]

Further exaggeration about income results from including other races, mostly Chinese Americans and Japanese Americans, with black Americans. Data are available from 1968 on that exclude the other races, who are so affluent, on the average, that their median family income is well above that of white Americans and almost twice that of black Americans. Misinterpretation is especially great when using the whole group of "Negroes and Other Races" in presenting comparative data for the West. These show deceptively high black to white income ratios. But in the West, blacks are only half the total of "Negroes and Other Races." Chinese, Japanese, and Filipinos are almost all the rest,[19] with substantially higher median family income than blacks. Blacks' median income nationally is just a shade higher than that of American Indians, the most oppressed of us all.

The family

Because the family is so central in importance in the society, its treatment in a report called Social Indicators is a clue to the nature of the treatise as a social document. An acquaintance with the process of social change and with variations in kinship bonds and social networks is a necessary background for selecting the data and lines of analysis. The report gives trends in divorce rates, the number of children who live in husband-wife households, and the number of households in which women have been enumerated as the "head." These are slim reeds on which to base the analysis of differences between groups in family life and affectional ties.

As with all gross assumptions about the causes of social malaise, those

14. *Protest, Politics, and Prosperity*, chap 7, table 7.

15. *Protest, Politics, and Prosperity*, chap 7, table 1.

16. *Protest, Politics and Prosperity*, chap 7, analysis and footnote references.

17. *Ibid.*

18. *Ibid.*

19. U S Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of Population, General Population Characteristics, U S Summary*, PC(1)–B1, (Washington, D C USGPO, 1972), table 55, pp. 1–281.

about problems associated with divorce, children in fatherless homes, and in homes in which women are the principal breadwinner or manager have the merit of some truth in fact. The monolithic nature of the data selected, however, and the moralistic tone in them, create a false impression. It is true, of course, that black families are well in the lead in the decreasing proportion of husband-wife families, and in the proportion of children in homes without two parental *guardians* present,[20] (not all two-parent households include both the *natural* parents of the children).[21] The differences between black and white are very wide, with the white well above the black in being "together." These differences are the result of dissimilarities in nurturing and family adaptation, stemming from a combination of social and economic conditions, social attitudes, and pragmatic adjustment to life situations in an often hostile and discriminatory environment. Almost insuperable problems have generated great strengths. The strengths of black families have been documented in several studies using many sources of statistical data. One of the most significant works cites the strengths of black families as "adaptability of family roles, strong kinship bonds, strong work orientation, strong religious orientation and strong achievement orientation."[22]

Some of the differences in family arrangements between the races have to do with demographic matters, for instance, differences in the number of persons living or available to marry. Thus, for example, higher black than white death rates among men in the prime of life result in twice as large a proportion of black widows to white widows. Also, even talking into consideration at least a 10 percent undercount of young black men by census or *Current Population Survey* interviewers, black Americans' sex ratio (males per 100 females) has been substantially lower than whites' in the ages when people are seeking mates to marry.[23] This leaves more women single.

Economic hardship is stressful, taking its toll on the individual, and, in turn, on the family.[24] Blacks, much more than whites, are likely to endure unemployment, low wages, and dead-end jobs. Their divorce and separation rates are higher, adding to the discrepancy between black and white women managing alone in their own household. Black households' acceptance of others' children to love and nuture, and close bonds among relatives increases the extent to which they include children, with or without a man in the home. A white mother will, more often, place illegitimate children for adoption while she remains under the parental roof, or will choose the route of an abortion, or will marry after pregnancy

20. For a comprehensive review of social understanding on this topic, see Elizabeth Herzog and Cecelia E. Sudia, "Family Structure and Composition," in *Race, Research and Reason: Social Work Perspective* (New York: National Association of Social Workers, 1967), pp. 145–164. See also, by the same authors, "Children in Fatherless Families," *Review of Child Development Research*, vol. 3 (1973), pp. 141–232.

21. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports, Population Characteristics, Marriage, Divorce, Widowhood, and Remarriage by Family Characteristics*, Ser. P–20, no. 312 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1977) pp. 16–17.

22. Robert B. Hill, *The Strengths of Black Families* (New York Emerson Hall, 1971), p. 4

23. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of Population, General Population Characteristics*, table 52.

24. Sar A. Levitan, William B. Johnston, Robert Taggart, *Still A Dream* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1975), pp 121–24.

has occurred. Abortions have increased among blacks, but are still less common among blacks than whites. Black women are less likely to have the funds necessary for an abortion or access to an attending physician. But, on the other hand, they are much more likely to want their babies and to keep them even when they do not want to marry the father. The black family has a place for them in its extended nurturing system.[25] In March 1970, for example, families with a woman as household manager and with no children of her own, were six times as likely to occur in black families than in similar white families.[26] Grandmothers, aunts, cousins, and neighbors help. Many help to bring up related and unrelated children, sometimes because educational facilities are deemed better in the "adopted" home, sometimes because the child's family was having financial or health difficulties, and for many other reasons. This difference between the races in nurturing is great even in husband-wife families, which, while declining, continue to be dominant in black as well as white households.

The phenomenon of the declining husband-wife family among whites as well as blacks, and the women's movement, is creating general acceptance of the woman as household manager, or as "head" of household. Such acceptance has long been true among blacks. Besides, dramatic changes have occurred during this generation in attitudes toward cohabitation without or before marriage, toward permitting unmarried women to adopt children legally, and toward the woman partner assuming an equal managerial position in the husband-wife home. The Bureau of the Census and the Bureau of Labor Statistics have recognized this trend and are preparing new approaches to collecting and presenting family data that reflect it. Janet L. Norwood, Deputy Commissioner of Labor Statistics, recently wrote that "Attitudes toward marriage, childbearing, and toward the position of women in the family have been changing all over the world. . . ," that "The past few decades have seen an upheaval in social patterns," and that "Government statistical agencies have an obligation to ensure that the data they produce reflect the conditions of the times and that the analyses they publish are relevant to contemporary issues."[27]

If some steps had been taken in this direction in *Social Indicators, 1976*, the black family would have looked much more like the white family. Today only 16 percent of all families are the stereotypical model consisting of a husband, a wife who is not in the labor force, and one or more children under 18 years of age.[28] If the reason for not taking such steps was to preserve the consistency of trends over time, anyone reading the report can point to numerous instances in other spheres in which only one or two recent years were used for analysis. Recognition of a change in social attitudes was especially important in this sensitive area in view of the hue and cry in the 1960s about the "crumbling"

25. For a discussion of these points see Hill, *Strengths of Black Families*; idem, *Informal Adoption Among Black Families*, (Washington, D.C.: National Urban League, 1977); Carol B. Stack, *All Our Kin* (New York: Harper & Row), 1974.

26. Hill, *Strengths of Black Families*, table 1, p. 41.

27. Janet L. Norwood, "New Approaches to Statistics On the Family," *Monthly Labor Review*, vol. 100, (July 1977), pp. 31, 33, and 34.

28. *Ibid*, p. 31.

black family.[29] The cries of alarm then were a classic example of cultural lag. They were taking place at the very time coed dorms, "living together", bachelor apartments, and the safety-first of "the pill", among other developments, were prominent in middle-class, white male-female relations.

Ethnicity

The Introduction to *Social Indicators, 1976* is a welcome attempt to address special social issues. It is in the same genre as the editorial, social commentary, and special articles in the United Kingdom's *Social Trends*.[30] The ethnic diversity of immigrants is one of the issues discussed in the Introduction to *Social Indicators, 1976*. It is a subject of great importance in our country which consists of people of many national origins, and commentary on it is a welcome departure from its usual treatment. However, the result is disappointingly narrow in scope and fragmentary. The only blacks involved are those migrating from the Caribbean in this century. The rich source of disaggregated data from censuses since 1820 on the number of blacks, slave and free, are not given,[31] nor are data about blacks coming voluntarily from countries outside the Caribbean, for example, from other parts of the Antilles and from Africa.[32]

The white immigrant groups—those of Spanish origin and the Germans, Irish, Italians, plus the English, Scots, and Welsh—are discussed in terms of immigration streams only since 1891. This ignores not just the heavy immigration of blacks before Emancipation, but the large numbers of Irish and Germans who migrated from the mid-nineteenth century until 1891—especially the Irish from 1847–54 and the Germans from 1852–54 and 1881–88.[33] Except for the first decade of the twentieth century, the rate of United States immigration has never been greater than in the half century 1841–90.[34] The European late comers are compared with "Spanish," meaning—to name a few—those of Mexican, Puerto Rican, Panamanian, Chilean, and Argentinian origin. Few Americans of Spanish origin have come directly from Spain.[35] Asian Americans and native Americans are scarcely discussed in the section on ethnic diversity. The main immigration of

29. The badge of social science was placed on this conception with the release of the report by Daniel P. Moynihan, *The Negro Family. The Case for National Action* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Planning Policy and Research, March 1965)

30 United Kingdom, Central Statistical Office, *Social Trends* (London, Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1975).

31. See especially, U.S. Bureau of the Census, with the cooperation of the Social Science Research Council, *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1957*, Ser. A95–122 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO Office, 1961), p 11.

32 Idem, Ser C88–114, pp. 56–59. See also *Annual Reports of the Immigration and Naturalization Service* and U.S Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1975* (Washington, D.C., USGPO, 1975), table 160, p 101

33. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics*, Ser. C88–114, pp. 56–59.

34. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract 1975*, Table 157, p. 99

35 See chart on cover of U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports, Population Characteristics, Persons of Spanish Origin in the United States, March 1975*, Ser. P-20, no. 290 (Washington, D.C., USGPO February 1976). The chart shows between six and seven million Mexican-Americans, between one and two million Puerto Ricans, about half a million each of Cubans and Central and South Americans as a group, plus about one million other Americans of Spanish origin.

Japanese and Chinese, the largest of the Asian groups, was in the late nineteenth century and early in the twentieth.[36]

A fascinating set of comparative analyses could be made quite easily using appropriate segments of the Spanish origin population, the European groups, the Asian peoples, native Americans, and black Americans. It would show, referring only to a few available facts, that the Asians are the best educated, have achieved most in job levels and income, and native Americans the least in all these categories. It would show that blacks have more schooling than Mexican-Americans and those of Puerto Rican origin, and that, despite the fact that most blacks have been in the United States over more generations than most people of Mexican or Puerto Rican stock, blacks have not achieved as much occupationally, or in earnings and income. The groups of European origin are in between the Asians and the Mexican, Puerto Rican, blacks, and native Americans. Their occupational distribution, for instance, is very like the average for the nation, whereas the Japanese and Chinese show the largest proportion as professionals and managers and the lowest in unskilled low paid work. Blacks are close to the other end of the spectrum.[37]

36. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Historical Statistics*, Ser. C88–114, pp. 56–59.

37. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *1970 Census of Population, Subject Reports, Negro Population*: PC(2)-1B, *American Indians*, PC(2)-1F, and *Japanese, Chinese, and Filipinos*, PC(2)-1G (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1973). See also U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports, Population Characteristics, Characteristics of the Population by Ethnic Origin, March 1972 and 1971*, Ser. P-20, no. 24g (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1973). See also Newman and Carter, *Protest, Politics, and Prosperity*, Chap. 3, figure 1.

Blacks are the largest group after those originating in the British Isles and Germany. They are almost three times as numerous as Italians, comprise four times the number of Mexican Americans, and twenty times the number of Puerto Ricans. Blacks were counted in all the population censuses, in some of them, even to the point of describing their complexions—mulatto or octaroon.[38] But blacks could not be naturalized Americans until passage of the 14th and 15th Amendments. As one authority wrote "In 1870 in consequence of the changed status of Negroes, eligibility to naturalization was extended to aliens of African nativity or persons of African descent."[39] Here was a unique opportunity to add a stimulating dimension to the Social Indicators and an unusual analysis to the status of black Americans in the context of our ethnic diversity.

ASSESSMENT

In part because *Social Indicators, 1976* does not include a chapter on blacks, a publication devoted to indicators of social change fails to address one of the most crisis-laden issues of our times. The authors could argue that enough is included with which to formulate conclusions and analyze a number of issues in the broad area of race relations. The data are many and varied, but the traditional manner in which they are structured has left them well behind current knowledge.

What is of even greater concern is the dearth of information about discrimination and efforts to reduce it. There is nothing that reveals

38. See, for example, the 1860 census of population.

39. Maurice R. Davie, *World Immigration* (New York: Macmillan, 1936), p. 80.

prejudice in the housing market, including redlining, blockbusting, and the differential price and cost of housing for blacks and whites; about the changing extent of school desegregation and the significance of school resegregation; about the pace of civil rights enforcement in employment, in financial institutions, and in educational organizations. These are indicators of "system performance," which are said to have been included among the broad types of indicators considered for the report. Many can be derived from administrative statistics like those used in presenting information about social security and unemployment insurance.

The tables and charts in *Social Indicators, 1976* reveal the often told story about "how far they have come." They quantify the most usually presented gaps between black and white. They do not fulfill, in the field of social indicators about black Americans, the hope expressed by Natalie Rogoff Ramsøy, in her critique of *Social Indicators, 1973*, that the next report might "give a . . . more connected picture of the way things work in American society."[40] Even though interpretation was to be left to others, value judgments had to be made in selecting and combining the data that appear. It is impossible to approach an undertaking such as a social indicators report without such judgments. In the sphere of race relations the judgments are old fashioned, peripheral to many of the main issues, and lacking in courage and commitment. They are not sufficient for a social document for our country in our time.

At the root of blacks' disfavored position is a combination of interacting forces in the society. These include the cumulative effects on American institutions of generations of blatantly overt racial discrimination in every area of life; the continuing subtle practices of racial and economic discrimination; and the absence of a national will or commitment to undertake those pragmatic political, social, and economic policies necessary to erase discrimination, and to enforce those policies forthrightly.[41] The necessary policies include ensuring the franchise, the right to a home of one's choice, a full employment program, and equal educational and job opportunity.[42] Such policies and the commitment to enforce them are necessary if blacks are not to continue to be unduly disadvantaged by our traditional systems of privilege. Affirmative action is one of those pragmatic policies needed to erase subtle forms of discrimination, but, still in the late 1970s, it has been the subject of wide-ranging attacks to discredit it.[43]

The most vocal and influential thrust against affirmative action has come from colleges and universities—our institutions of higher

40. Natalie Rogoff Ramsøy, "Social Indicators in the United States and Europe. Comments on Five Country Reports," in *Social Indicators, 1973. A Review Symposium*, ed. Roxann A. Van Dusen (Washington, D.C.. Social Science Research Council, 1974), p. 48

41. U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *The Federal Civil Rights Enforcement Effort, 1974. Volume VII: To Preserve, Protect and Defend the Constitution* (1977) and Newman and Carter, *Protest, Politics and Prosperity.*

42. U.S. Commission On Civil Rights, *The Unfinished Business Twenty Years Later* (September, 1977). This report summarizes civil rights issues in each of the 50 states and the District of Columbia. Also see *Protest, Politics and Prosperity.*

43 *The Urban League Review*, vol. 2, no. 2 (Summer 1977). This was a special issue devoted to affirmative action.

learning. These institutions have long perpetuated more "acceptable" and traditional forms of affirmative action such as the "old buddy" system of hiring and recruitment; maintaining geographic distribution of the student body by waiving certain scholastic requirements for students coming from underrepresented areas; admitting athletes without the usual scholastic qualifications, and favoring the sons and daughters of alumni. But efforts made to incorporate race and sex within the traditionally accepted systems of privilege have been met with outrage and charges of reverse discrimination. And because the university elite, with its special power of the pen and access to wide segments of the population is so influential, the issue has generated controversy and debate out of all proportion to the reaction when private industry was the special target. Of great significance is the pending United States Supreme Court case of Allan Bakke, a University of California medical school applicant who, white and male, has charged reverse discrimination on the grounds that although he presented high grades and test scores, he was denied admission while 16 of 100 openings were filled by minorities. The Court's decision will have a great impact on efforts to implement policies and practices to ensure equal opportunities and life chances for minorities and women.

Now that most widespread practices of overt racial discrimination have been eliminated as a result of the 1960s protest actions that generated greater protection of the rights of all minorities and disadvantaged groups, it has become increasingly difficult for the white majority to accept the reality that racial discrimination exists and influences American society. The situation is exacerbated by the different way minorities and the white majority define the presence or absence of discrimination. Minorities define discrimination in terms of its consequences or effects. The white majority perceives it largely in terms of the intent of both our institutional practices and consequences. This crucial difference in definition is evident in a recent Supreme Court ruling on job seniority systems. In the spring of 1977 the court ruled that seniority systems that perpetuate the effect of past discrimination in hiring or promotion are not unconstitutional unless the systems were created for discriminatory purposes.[44] While the full impact of this decision is still being debated by attorneys, civil rights advocates, and policymakers, the ruling itself reflects a serious dilemma. Until we accept and act upon the fact that racial discrimination exists and is not likely to disappear voluntarily, the opportunities and life chances will continue to be less for blacks and those others who are likewise disadvantaged, than for the privileged in the society.

Those who have the personal power to discriminate, however subtly, or by whatever outside institutional means, are not easily persuaded to alter the practices that have prejudicial results. It is essential that we the people become aware of the negative consequences of policies that are presumably neutral, but disproportionately harm black Americans. These are policies, for instance, that perpetuate less than full employment as a national goal, that call for the armed forces

44 *International Brotherhood of Teamsters*, v *U S. et al* , 97 S Ct. 1843 (1977).

to reduce recruitment efforts in central cities, or that effectively kill legal and administrative efforts to make our educational institutions more accessible to blacks. To advocate and support ostensibly neutral policies that have clearly negative racial consequences is discriminatory; it insures blacks' continued disadvantaged status. And so the trends that identify blacks' social and economic status will be repeated year after year, not because blacks cannot achieve more, but because we as a people are geared to thwarting that achievement. Hopefully we are maturing as a nation, so that *Social Indicators, 1979* will analyze what is going on in race relations in the society—how and why. Hopefully, also, that maturity will yield more salutory results.

Table 8/5

CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION OF PERSONS 16 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY AGE, SEX, AND RACE: 1948–1976

(Percent of the civilian noninstitutional population in the civilian labor force; annual averages)

Race, sex, and year	Total, 16 years and over	16 and 17 years	18 and 19 years	20 to 24 years	25 to 34 years	35 to 44 years	45 to 54 years	55 to 64 years	65 years and over	14 and 15 years
WHITE										
Male										
1948	86.5	51.2	76.2	84.4	96.0	98.0	95.9	89.6	46.5	26.1
1949	86.4	50.1	74.8	86.5	95.9	98.0	95.6	87.6	46.6	26.3
1950	86.4	50.5	75.6	87.5	96.4	97.7	95.9	87.3	45 8	27 6
1951	86.5	52.7	74.2	88.4	97.0	97.6	96.0	87 4	44.5	26.9
1952	86 2	51.9	72.7	87.6	97.6	97.9	96.3	87.7	42.5	25.3
1953	86.1	49.8	72.8	87.4	97.5	97 9	96.4	87.7	41.3	23.6
1954 .. .	85.6	47 1	70 4	86 4	97.5	98.2	96.8	89.2	40.4	24.5
1955	85.4	48 0	71.7	85.6	97.8	98.3	96.7	88.4	39.5	23.5
1956	85.6	51.3	71.9	87.6	97.4	98.1	96.8	88.9	40.0	26.7
1957	84.8	49 6	71.6	86.7	97.2	98.0	96.6	88.0	37.7	25.1
1958	84.3	46 8	69.4	86.7	97.2	98.0	96.6	88.2	35.7	24.1
1959	83.8	45.4	70 3	87 3	97 5	98.0	96 3	87 9	34.3	24.2
1960 ...	83.4	46 0	69.0	87.8	97.7	97.9	96 1	87 2	33.3	22.2
1961	83.0	44.3	66.2	87 6	97.7	97.9	95.9	87.8	31.9	22.2
1962	82 1	42 9	66 4	86.5	97.4	97.9	96 0	86 7	30 6	22.3
1963 . . .	81.5	42 4	67.8	85.8	97 4	97.8	96.2	86.6	28.4	21.4
1964	81.1	43.5	66 6	85.7	97.5	97.6	96 1	86 1	27.9	21 2
1965	80 8	44 6	65.8	85.3	97 4	97.7	95 9	85.2	27.9	21 7
1966 . . .	80.6	47.1	65.4	84.4	97.5	97.6	95 8	84.9	27.2	22.3
1967 . .	80 7	47 9	66.1	84.0	97.5	97 7	95.6	84 9	27 1	22.6
1968	80.4	47 7	65 7	82.4	97.2	97.6	95.4	84.7	27 3	22.7
1969 ..	80 2	48.8	66 3	82 6	97 0	97.4	95 1	83 9	27.3	23 0
1970	80.0	48.9	67 4	83.3	96.7	97 3	94 9	83.3	26 7	23.0
1971 .	79 6	49.2	67 8	83 2	96.3	97 0	94 7	82.6	25.6	23.7
1972 ..	79.6	50 2	71 1	84 3	96.0	97.0	94.0	81.2	24 4	23.5
1973 .	79.5	52.7	72 3	85.8	96 3	96 8	93.5	79 0	22.8	24.4
1974	79.4	53 3	73.6	86 5	96 3	96.7	93 0	78 1	22.5	24 4
1975	78 7	51 8	72.8	85 5	95.8	96 4	92 9	76.5	21.8	23.1
1976 . .	78.4	51 8	73 5	86 2	95.9	96 0	92.5	75.4	20.3	(NA)
Female										
1948 ...	31.3	31 7	53.5	45 1	31 3	35 1	33 3	23.3	8.6	11 1
1949	31 8	31.4	54.0	44.4	31.7	36 1	34 3	24.2	9 1	10.3
1950	32 6	30 1	52.6	45.9	32.1	37.2	36 3	26.0	9 2	11.5
1951	33.4	32 4	54.1	46.7	33.6	38.0	38.0	26.5	8.5	11.2
1952	33.6	34 1	52.0	44.8	33.8	38 9	38.8	27.6	8.7	10.2
1953	33.4	31 2	51.9	44 1	31 7	38.8	38 7	28.5	9.4	9.9
1954	33.3	29 3	52 1	44 4	32.5	39 4	39 8	29.1	9.1	10 5
1955	34.5	29 9	52.0	45.8	32 8	39 9	42.7	31 8	10 5	11 2
1956 ...	35 7	33 5	53 0	46 5	33.2	41 5	44.4	34 0	10 6	12 7
1957	35.7	32.1	52.6	45.8	33 6	41.5	45 4	33.7	10.2	12.5
1958	35 8	28.8	52.3	46.1	33.6	41.4	46 5	34 5	10.1	12.2
1959	36.0	29.9	50.8	44.5	33.4	41.4	47.8	35 7	10.2	13 0
1960	36.5	30.0	51.9	45 7	34.1	41 5	48.6	36.2	10.6	12.5
1961	36.9	29.4	51.9	46.9	34.3	41.8	48.9	37.2	10.5	13.5
1962	36.7	27.9	51.6	47 1	34 1	42.2	48.9	38.0	9.8	13.7

Table 8/5 (*Continued*)

CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION OF PERSONS 16 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY AGE, SEX, AND RACE: 1948–1976—*Continued*

(Percent of the civilian noninstitutional population in the civilian labor force; annual averages)

Race, sex, and year	Total, 16 years and over	16 and 17 years	18 and 19 years	20 to 24 years	25 to 34 years	35 to 44 years	45 to 54 years	55 to 64 years	65 years and over	14 and 15 years
1963	37 2	27.9	51.3	47.3	34.8	43.1	49.5	38.9	9.4	12.2
1964	37.5	28.5	49.6	48.8	35.0	43.3	50.2	39.4	9.9	12.7
1965	38 1	28.7	50.6	49.2	36.3	44.3	49.9	40.3	9.7	12.9
1966	39.2	31 8	53.1	51.0	37.7	45.0	50.6	41.1	9.4	14 5
1967	40 1	32.3	52.7	53.1	39.7	46.4	50.9	41.9	9.3	15.4
1968	40.7	33.0	53.3	54.0	40.6	47.5	51.5	42.0	9.4	16.0
1969	41.8	35 2	54.6	56.4	41 7	48.6	53.0	42.6	9.7	16.1
1970	42.6	36 6	55.0	57.7	43 2	49.9	53.7	42.6	9.5	17.3
1971	42.6	36 4	55.0	57.9	43.6	50.2	53.7	42.5	9.3	17.2
1972	43 2	39 3	57.4	59.4	45 8	50.7	53.4	42.0	9.0	17 7
1973	44.1	41 7	58 9	61.6	48 5	52.2	53.4	40.8	8 7	18.9
1974	45 2	43 3	60.4	63.8	51 1	53 7	54.3	40.4	8.0	18.9
1975	45 9	42 7	60.4	65.4	53.5	54.9	54 3	40.7	8 0	18.4
1976	46.9	43.8	61.8	66 2	55.8	57 1	54 7	40 8	8 0	(NA)
BLACK AND OTHER RACES										
Male										
1948	87.3	59 8	77 8	85.6	95.3	97.2	94.7	88 6	50.3	39.3
1949	87.0	60 4	80.8	89.7	94.1	97.3	95.6	86.0	51.4	36.6
1950	85 9	57 4	78.2	91 4	92.6	96.2	95 1	81.9	45 5	37.7
1951	86 3	54.7	80 8	88.7	95 7	96.4	95.1	84.6	49.5	34.6
1952	86 8	52.3	79 1	92 8	96.2	97.2	95 0	85.7	43.3	30.5
1953	86.2	53.0	76 7	92.3	96 7	97.3	93 9	86.7	41 1	27 8
1954	85 2	46 7	78.4	91.1	96.2	96 6	93.2	83.0	41.2	27.2
1955	85 0	48 2	75 7	89 7	95.8	96 2	94.2	83 1	40 0	27.1
1956	85.1	49 6	76 4	88.9	96.2	96.2	94.4	83.9	39.8	25.5
1957	84 3	47 5	72 0	89 6	96 1	96 5	93.5	82 4	35 9	24.7
1958	84 0	45 1	71 7	88.7	96 3	96.4	93.9	83.3	34.5	21.3
1959	83 4	41 7	72.0	90.8	96 3	95 8	92.8	82.5	33.5	23.9
1960	83 0	45 6	71.2	90 4	96.2	95.5	92.3	82.5	31 2	23.3
1961	82 2	42.5	70 5	89.7	95 9	94.8	92.3	81.6	29 4	19.2
1962	80.8	40.2	68.8	89.3	95.3	94.5	92 2	81.5	27.2	16.5
1963	80.2	37.2	69 1	88 6	94 9	94.9	91.1	82 5	27 6	17.2
1964	80 0	37.3	67 2	89.4	95 9	94 4	91.6	80.6	29.6	18.7
1965	79 6	39.3	66.7	89.8	95.7	94.2	92 0	78.8	27.9	18.9
1966	79 0	41.1	63.7	89.9	95.5	91.1	90.7	81 1	25 6	17.3
1967	78.5	41 2	62.7	87.2	95.5	93.6	91.3	79.3	27.2	18.3
1968	77.6	37.9	63.3	85 0	95.0	93 4	90.1	79.6	26.6	18.1
1969	76 9	37 7	63 2	84 4	94.4	92.7	89.5	77.9	26 1	15.8
1970	76.5	34.8	61.8	83.5	93 7	93.2	88 2	79.2	27.4	16.6
1971	74.9	32 4	58.9	81 5	92.9	92.0	86.9	77.8	24.5	15 2
1972	73.7	34 1	60.1	81.5	92.7	91 4	86.1	73.6	23 6	14.7
1973	73 8	33.4	61 4	81.8	91 7	91.3	88.0	70.7	22.6	13.5
1974	73 3	34.6	62 4	82.1	92.3	90.9	84.7	70.2	21.7	14.8
1975	71 5	30 1	57.5	78.4	91.4	90.0	84.6	68.7	20.9	12.8
1976	70.7	30 2	55 6	78.4	90 6	90.6	83 4	65.7	19.7	(NA)


Table 8/5 (*Continued*)
CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION OF PERSONS 16 YEARS OLD AND OVER, BY AGE, SEX, AND RACE: 1948–1976—*Continued*
(Percent of the civilian noninstitutional population in the civilian labor force; annual averages)

Race, sex, and year	Total, 16 years and over	16 and 17 years	18 and 19 years	20 to 24 years	25 to 34 years	35 to 44 years	45 to 54 years	55 to 64 years	65 years and over	14 and 15 years
Female										
1948	45.6	29.1	41.2	47.1	50.6	53.3	51.1	37.6	17.5	21.0
1949	46.9	30.1	44.8	49.8	50.9	56.1	52.7	39.6	15.6	23.5
1950	46.9	30.2	40.6	46.9	51.6	55 7	54.3	40.9	16.5	22.0
1951	46.3	30.4	40.2	45.4	51.1	55.8	55.5	39.8	14.0	17.3
1952	45.5	27.4	44.7	43.9	50.1	54.0	52 7	42.3	14.3	18.5
1953	43.6	24.2	37.8	45.1	48 1	54.9	51 0	35 9	11.4	14.9
1954	46.1	24.5	37.7	49.6	49.7	57.5	53.4	41.2	12.2	16.2
1955	46.1	22.7	43.2	46.7	51.3	56.0	54.8	40.7	12.1	11.4
1956	47.3	28.3	44.6	44.9	52.1	57.0	55.3	44.5	14.5	14.4
1957	47.2	24.1	42.8	46.6	50.4	58.7	56.8	44 3	13 6	12 6
1958	48.0	23 2	41.2	48.3	50.8	60.8	59.8	42.8	13.3	11.6
1959	47.7	20.7	36.1	48.8	50.0	60.0	60 0	46.4	12.6	12.6
1960	48.2	22.1	44.3	48.8	49.7	59.8	60.5	47.3	12.8	13.2
1961	48.3	21.6	44.6	47.7	51.2	60.5	61.1	45.2	13.1	11.0
1962	48.0	21.0	45.5	48.6	52.0	59.7	60 5	46.1	12.2	9.7
1963	48.1	21.5	44.9	49.2	53.3	59.4	60 6	47.3	11.8	8.7
1964	48.5	19.5	46.5	53 6	52.8	58.4	62.3	48.4	12.7	8.0
1965	48.6	20 5	40.0	55 2	54.0	59.9	60.2	48.9	12.9	8.1
1966	49.3	23.6	44 0	54.5	54.9	60.9	61.0	49.1	13.0	7.5
1967	49.5	22.8	48 7	54.9	57.5	60.8	59.6	47.1	13.0	9 4
1968	49.3	23.3	46.9	58.4	56.6	59.3	59.8	47.0	11.9	7.2
1969	49.8	24.4	45 4	58 6	57.8	59.5	60 8	47.5	11.9	7.1
1970	49.5	24.3	44.7	57.7	57.6	59.9	60.2	47.1	12.2	9.7
1971	49.2	21.9	41.4	56.0	59.2	61.0	59.4	47 1	11.5	8.3
1972	48.7	21.4	43.9	56 7	60.1	60.7	57.3	43.9	12.8	9.3
1973	49.1	24.3	45.1	57.5	61.0	60.7	56 4	44.7	11.1	7.4
1974	49.1	24.2	44.6	58.2	60.8	61.5	56.9	43.5	10.0	9.1
1975	49.2	26.5	45.1	56.2	61.4	61.7	56.8	43.8	10.5	8.5
1976	50.2	23.9	43.3	57.9	65.3	62.2	57.3	43.4	11.2	(NA)

Source: U.S. Department of Labor, *Employment and Training Report of the President, 1976*.
NA Not available.

Chart 8/5 Social Indicators, 1976

RATES OF ECONOMIC ACTIVITY FOR PERSONS 16 YEARS AND OVER, BY COLOR AND SEX: ANNUAL AVERAGES, 1948–1975



Source see table 8/5

Table 9/6
TOTAL FAMILY INCOME, BY RACE OF FAMILY HEAD: 1947–1974
(1974 constant dollars)

Family income and race of family head	1947	1950	1955	1960	1964	1965
ALL RACES						
Number of families....thous.	37,237	39,929	42,889	[r]45,539	[r]47,956	[r]48,509
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under $3,000	16.7	17.4	14.1	11.5	8.8	8.4
$3,000 to $4,999	17.1	15.4	11.5	10.3	10.1	9.3
$5,000 to $6,999	22.8	19.8	14.9	12.0	10.9	10.1
$7,000 to $9,999	19.6	23.1	24.5	21.2	17.9	17.3
$10,000 to $11,999			13.5	14.6	12.2	12.3
$12,000 to $14,999	23.7	24.4	9.7	11.6	14.4	15.0
$15,000 and over			11.9	18.8	25.8	27.6
Median income	6,691	6,800	8,137	9,358	10,444	10,874
WHITE						
Number of families....thous.	34,120	(NA)	38,982	41,123	43,081	43,497
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under $3,000	14.2	15.3	12.1	9.6	7.5	7.2
$3,000 to $4,999	16.3	14.5	10.7	9.5	9.0	8.2
$5,000 to $6,999	23.6	19.8	14.5	11.6	10.2	9.3
$7,000 to $9,999	20.6	24.3	25.3	21.6	17.9	17.2
$10,000 to $11,999			14.2	15.4	12.6	12.7
$12,000 to $14,999	25.2	26.1	10.3	12.2	15.2	15.8
$15,000 and over			12.9	20.1	27.6	29.5
Median income	6,970	7,057	8,495	9,716	10,903	11,334
BLACK AND OTHER RACES						
Number of families....thous.	3,117	(NA)	3,907	4,333	4,754	4,782
Percent	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Under $3,000	42.5	39.8	33.5	28.9	20.5	19.7
$3,000 to $4,999	26.0	25.4	19.6	17.7	19.6	18.9
$5,000 to $6,999	14.8	19.4	19.0	16.3	17.1	17.3
$7,000 to $9,999	8.8	9.7	16.6	16.9	17.5	17.6
$10,000 to $11,999			6.5	8.1	8.1	8.5
$12,000 to $14,999	7.9	5.7	3.1	5.6	7.4	7.9
$15,000 and over			1.7	6.6	9.8	10.2
Median income	3,563	3,828	4,685	5,379	6,102	6,242

Table 9/6 (*Continued*)

1966	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
[r]49,214	[r]50,111	[r]50,823	[r]51,586	[r]52,227	53,296	54,373	55,053	55,712
100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
7.0	6.7	5.9	5.9	6.1	5.9	5.4	5.1	5.3
8.7	8.4	7.7	7.3	7.5	7.8	7.7	7.5	7.8
9.2	8.8	8.5	8.2	8.7	9.1	8.3	8.3	8.9
16.6	16.0	15.3	14.4	14.3	14.5	13.8	13.3	13.8
12.0	11.8	11.6	10.8	10.8	10.1	9.7	9.7	10.2
15.3	15.5	15.7	15.8	15.2	15.4	14.7	14.4	14.1
31.1	32.7	35.4	37.7	37.4	37.2	40.5	41.7	39.8
11,445	11,717	12,236	12,689	12,531	12,523	13,013	13,375	12,836
44,110	44,814	45,437	46,022	46,535	47,641	48,477	48,919	49,451
100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
5.8	5.8	5.0	5.0	5.1	4.9	4.4	4.1	4.3
7.7	7.4	6.9	6.5	6.7	6.9	6.7	6.6	6.8
8.5	8.2	7.8	7.5	8.1	8.6	7.7	7.7	8.4
16.4	15.7	15.0	13.9	13.9	14.1	13.5	12.9	13.5
12.3	12.1	11.8	10.9	11.0	10.3	9.8	9.8	10.5
16.0	16.1	16.2	16.3	15.7	16.0	15.2	14.8	14.6
33.2	34.7	37.3	39.9	39.4	39.2	42.7	44.2	42.0
11,890	12,162	12,668	13,175	13,000	12,995	13,614	13,977	13,356
4,954	5,020	5,074	5,215	5,413	5,655	5,896	6,134	6,262
100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
16.9	15.0	14.0	13.9	14.5	14.2	13.5	13.3	13.5
17.4	17.6	15.7	14.1	14.0	14.9	15.7	15.1	16.0
15.3	14.2	14.7	13.7	13.6	14.1	13.2	13.2	13.1
18.5	18.5	17.4	18.5	17.6	17.6	16.1	16.5	16.1
9.5	9.5	9.6	9.6	9.3	8.6	8.8	9.2	8.3
9.6	9.9	10.6	11.6	11.0	10.9	10.5	10.8	10.7
12.9	15.3	18.1	18.6	19.9	19.9	22.2	22.0	22.3
7,128	7,524	7,924	8,328	8,275	8,175	8,376	8,429	8,265


Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-60, No. 101.

[r] Revised from earlier published data to reflect population controls based on the 1970 census. Population controls based on the 1970 census not available by race.

NA Not available.

Chart 9/6 Social Indicators, 1976

PERCENT OF FAMILIES WITH TOTAL MONEY INCOME UNDER $3,000 AND OVER $15,000, BY RACE OF HEAD, 1960–1974



Source: see table 9/6

Table 9/9
FAMILIES RECEIVING INCOME, BY SOURCE AND BY RACE OF FAMILY HEAD: 1967–1974
(Current dollars)

Source of income and race of family head	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
ALL RACES								
Number of families, thousands	r50,111	r50,823	r51,586	r52,227	53,296	54,373	55,053	55,712
Percent[1]	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Wage or salary income	85.6	85.9	85.8	85.3	85.4	85.1	84.9	84.4
Nonfarm self-employment income	11.8	12.2	12.1	12.2	12.1	12.1	11.9	11.7
Farm self-employment income	5.9	5.9	5.5	5.2	5.1	5.1	5.0	4.6
Income other than earnings[1]	53.6	59.3	61.4	64.1	64.6	66.1	66.6	71.8
Social Security	19.4	19.2	19.3	19.8	19.9	20.6	21.6	21.8
Dividends	32.4	39.2	41.4	41.6	41.4	43.9	44.1	48.9
Public assistance	4.2	4.9	5.0	6.0	6.6	6.7	16.5	7.8
Unemployment	11.3	12.7	13.8	16.3	17.0	16.2	15.4	18.5
Private pensions	6.8	8.9	9.9	9.4	9.6	10.4	10.7	11.8
WHITE								
Number of families, thousands	44,814	45,437	46,022	46,535	47,641	48,477	48,919	49,451
Percent[1]	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Wage or salary income	85.9	86.3	86.2	85.7	85.5	85.3	85.1	84.6
Nonfarm self-employment income	12.5	12.8	12.8	13.0	12.7	12.8	12.6	12.6
Farm self-employment income	6.2	6.3	5.9	5.6	5.4	5.5	5.4	5.0
Income other than earnings[1]	54.8	60.9	62.9	65.5	65.6	67.1	67.5	73.2
Social Security income	19.7	19.6	19.7	20.0	20.1	20.8	21.7	22.0
Dividends	35.0	42.2	44.7	45.1	44.8	47.4	47.7	52.8
Public assistance	3.0	3.4	3.6	4.3	4.5	4.6	4.4	5.7
Unemployment	11.5	13.0	14.0	16.6	17.4	16.7	15.8	19.0
Private pensions	7.0	9.2	10.2	9.8	9.9	10.7	11.2	12.3
BLACK AND OTHER RACES								
Number of families, thousands	5,020	5,074	5,215	5,413	5,655	5,896	6,134	6,262
Percent[1]	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Wage or salary income	87.4	87.5	88.1	86.3	84.6	83.1	83.7	83.0
Nonfarm self-employment income	6.9	6.8	6.6	6.3	6.7	6.0	15.3	5.3
Farm self-employment income	3.3	3.2	2.2	2.0	1.9	1.5	1.7	1.5
Income other than earnings[1]	45.5	49.1	51.6	55.0	56.1	57.6	58.8	61.2
Social Security income	17.0	16.9	17.2	18.9	17.9	18.8	20.5	20.2
Dividends	11.1	14.2	14.7	14.0	13.1	15.4	15.1	18.4
Public assistance	15.8	18.4	18.1	20.6	23.9	23.8	23.4	24.8
Unemployment	10.0	10.4	12.4	14.5	13.8	12.6	12.4	14.5
Private pensions	5.5	7.2	8.4	6.7	7.5	7.6	7.1	8.2


Source U S Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-60, Nos 59, 66, 75, 80, 85, 90, 97, and 101

r Revised from earlier published data to reflect population controls based on the 1970 census Population controls based on 1970 census not available by race

[1] Detail does not add to total because some families have more than one of the types of income specified and some families have no income.

Chart 9/9 · Social Indicators, 1976

PERCENT OF FAMILIES RECEIVING INCOME OF SPECIFIED TYPE BY RACE OF HEAD: 1967 AND 1974



Source: see table 9/9

Table 9/10
AGGREGATE FAMILY INCOME, BY SOURCE: 1967–1974
(Current dollars)

TYPE OF INCOME AND RACE OF HEAD	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974
ALL RACES								
Aggregate income mil dol	438,575	488,411	541,915	576,915	617,339	686,442	749,922	807,935
Percent	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0	100.0	100 0
Earnings	90 4	89.5	89.1	88 6	87.9	87 6	87 1	86 1
Wage or salary income	80 8	79 7	80 2	80 1	79 1	78 8	78 3	78 2
Nonfarm self-employment income	8 0	8 3	7 5	7 2	7 5	7 4	6 9	6 4
Farm self-employment income	1 7	1 5	1.5	1 3	1 3	1 5	1 9	1.4
Income other than earnings	9 6	10 5	10 9	11 4	12 1	12 4	12 9	13.9
Social Security income	3 3	3 2	3 0	3 3	3.7	3 9	4 3	4 6
Public assistance income	6	7	7	9	9	9	9	1 0
All other unearned income	5 7	6 5	7 2	7 2	7 5	7 6	7 7	8 3
WHITE								
Aggregate income mil dol	408,528	454,472	504,080	534,914	571,529	635,335	692,838	744,089
Percent	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0
Earnings	90 5	89.6	89 1	88 7	88 1	87 7	87 2	86 2
Wage or salary income	80 5	79 4	79 8	79 8	78 9	78 5	77 9	78 0
Nonfarm self-employment income	8 2	8 6	7 8	7 5	7 8	7 7	7 2	6 7
Farm self-employment income	1 7	1 6	1 5	1 4	1 4	1 6	2 0	1 5
Income other than earnings	9 5	10 4	10 9	11 3	11 9	12 3	12 8	13 8
Social Security income	3 2	3 2	3 0	3 3	3 7	3 9	4 3	4 5
Public assistance income	4	4	5	6	6	6	5	7
All other unearned income	5 9	6 7	7.4	7 4	7 7	7 8	8 0	8 6
BLACK AND OTHER RACES								
Aggregate income mil dol	30,047	33,939	37,835	42,001	45,810	51,107	57,084	63,822
Percent	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0	100 0
Earnings	89 3	88 6	88 9	87 8	86 2	86 3	86 0	85 0
Wage or salary income	84 4	83 9	84 8	84 1	81 9	82 5	82 9	81 4
Nonfarm self-employment income	4 2	4 0	3 6	3 5	4 1	3 7	2 8	3 3
Farm self-employment income	7	6	5	2	3	2	2	.3
Income other than earnings	10 7	11 4	11 1	12 2	13 8	13 7	14 0	15 0
Social Security income	3 5	3 4	3 0	3 6	3 9	4 3	4 7	4 9
Public assistance income	3 7	4 2	3 9	4 4	5 3	5 2	5 0	5 1
All other unearned income	3 6	3 8	4 2	4 3	4 6	4 2	4.3	5 0

Source U S Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-60, Nos 59, 66, 75, 80, 85, 90, 97, and 101

Chart 9/10B Social Indicators, 1976

PERCENT OF AGGREGATE INCOME OF FAMILIES, BY RACE, FROM SOURCES OTHER THAN WAGES AND SALARIES, 1967–1974



Source: see table 9/10

Table 9/11

MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME, BY RACE OF FAMILY HEAD AND BY REGION: 1953–1974

(Median income in 1974 constant dollars)


	Northeast			North Central			South			West		
	Median income		Ratio of black and other races to white	Median income		Ratio of black and other races to white	Median income		Ratio of black and other races to white	Median income		Ratio of black and other races to white
YEAR	White	Black and other races		White	Black and other races		White	Black and other races		White	Black and other races	
1953	8,590	6,201	0 72	8,575	6,539	0 76	6,856	3,353	0.49	8,560	7,001	0 82
1954	6,578	6,010	70	8,155	5,971	73	6,859	3,369	49	8,306	5,912	71
1955	8,916	6,129	69	8,845	6,804	77	7,509	3,456	.46	9,077	6,691	74
1956	9,769	6,729	69	9,412	7,182	76	7,645	3,590	.47	9,650	6,555	68
1957	9,717	6,946	71	9,194	6,556	71	7,650	3,540	46	9,749	7,048	72
1958	9,684	6,734	70	8,953	6,473	72	7,786	3,435	44	9,833	6,984	71
1959	10,147	7,130	70	9,540	6,647	70	8,294	3,264	.39	10,645	7,540	.71
1960	10,359	7,040	68	9,788	7,175	73	8,169	3,527	.43	11,041	8,988	81
1961	10,589	7,180	68	9,828	7,038	72	8,152	3,482	43	11,458	9,936	87
1962	10,989	7,205	66	10,408	7,067	68	8,500	4,004	47	11,177	8,137	73
1963	11,407	7,426	65	10,810	7,916	73	8,964	4,057	.45	11,521	8,725	.76
1964	11,795	7,877	67	11,129	8,023	72	9,364	4,614	49	11,777	9,199	78
1965	12,110	7,822	65	11,642	8,611	74	9,717	4,730	49	12,205	9,810	80
1966	12,424	8,529	69	12,374	9,218	74	10,459	5,250	50	12,624	9,828	78
1967	12,789	8,592	67	12,333	9,568	78	10,869	5,880	54	13,009	10,930	84
1968	13,211	9,307	70	13,127	9,878	75	11,286	6,088	54	13,412	11,646	87
1969	13,808	9,471	69	13,713	10,401	76	11,789	6,741	57	13,717	11,138	81
1970	13,892	10,042	72	13,345	9,928	74	11,735	6,681	57	13,185	11,223	85
1971	13,748	9,416	68	13,417	9,359	70	11,818	6,629	56	13,154	11,250	86
1972	14,507	9,411	65	14,083	10,107	72	12,336	6,754	55	13,820	11,121	80
1973	14,681	8,908	61	14,568	10,072	69	12,770	7,207	56	14,050	11,328	81
1974	14,164	9,399	66	14,017	9,901	71	12,050	6,805	56	13,339	11,107	83

Source U S Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, unpublished data

Chart 9/11A

Social Indicators, 1976

MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME, BY RACE OF HEAD, FOR REGIONS: 1954, 1964 AND 1974 (in 1974 dollars)



Source: see table 9/11

ANNALS, AAPSS, 435, Jan. 1978

"Massification" and Democratization of the Leisure Class

By JOHN P. ROBINSON

ABSTRACT: The enriched data on culture and leisure presented in chapter 10 of *Social Indicators, 1976* support both the hypotheses of massification of leisure (through increasing availability of free time and through greater use of this time for the mass culture of television) and of democratization of leisure (through increasing attendance at sports events and performing arts and through increasing dissemination of knowledge and books on the arts). Many problems with available indicators of leisure participation and spectatorship are identified from the perspective of time diaries of how Americans spend the full 24 hours of their day. The lack of trend data on the arts to parallel those presented in chapter 10 on the humanities and sciences is noted, along with the need to present social indicator data in some form of input-output context. Possible candidates for future leisure and culture indicators include: monetary expenditures for leisure goods and services, available data on television viewing habits and program content, the satisfactions and pressures associated with time uses, accessibility of leisure facilities, conversational content and personal contemplation about leisure, and an inventory of "experiences" to which individuals have been exposed.

John P. Robinson is Director of the Communication Research Center and Professor of Communication at Cleveland State University. His Ph.D. degree in mathematical and social psychology was received from The University of Michigan in 1965. He has written extensively on survey data concerned with attitudes and behavior, including How Americans Use Time, *the* Statistical Appendix *to* The Use of Time, *and* Measures of Social Psychological Attitudes. *He is on the editorial boards of the* Public Opinion Quarterly *and* Sociometry, *and served as research coordinator for the U.S. Surgeon General's study of Television and Social Behavior. He is currently on leave at the Audience Research Branch of the British Broadcasting Corporation.*

NOT A week goes by, it seems, without a magazine or newspaper article about the "culture boom" or the latest adventure to be enjoyed in our "expanding leisure" time. Such articles invariably support their arguments with statistics on the increased spending for this or that recreational activity or on the decreasing importance of the workweek as more vacations and early retirement become realities. Increases in the mass availability of leisure and culture are usually assumed to be a good thing, allowing individuals greater freedom of expression, enjoyment and appreciation of the finer things in life than they can find in increasingly bureaucratized work settings. This greater use of discretionary time for cultural pursuits, formerly only the province of the rich, has been referred to as a "democratization of leisure".[1]

The democratization has occurred at the same time as a concern has developed about the "massification" of leisure, that is the availability of abundant leisure time to a pubic unprepared to use it for anything more than the consumption of frivolous and undemanding mass culture, particularly television. Assumptions about increasing free time also pervade academic literature and policy discussion of the world of leisure and culture. The arguments of those who have drawn different conclusions from the data—such as those who see in government figures little drop in the length of the workweek,[2] or who see little change in recreation expenditures once inflation and gains in disposable income are taken into account,[3] or who wonder whether our "harried leisure class" has become the servant and not the master of its leisure technology[4]—tend to get less attention in these speculations and beliefs about leisure.

Chapter 10 of *Social Indicators, 1976* presents vivid evidence that the apparently divergent phenomena of massification and democratization may coinhabit the world of culture and leisure. The charts and tables in chapter 10 provide an opportunity to see what has happened in this world over the last decade, a period during which increased value has been placed on self-expression or hedonism, depending on whom you read. Has massification or democratization prevailed across what one observer has called the "Me decade?"

A DIGEST OF MATERIAL COVERED

As seems true of other chapters in *Social Indicators, 1976*, chapter 10 on culture and leisure contains a far richer and more ambitious set of data than was available in the pioneering 1973 volume. Only two data sources in the 1973 edition are employed again: data from Michigan's Survey Research Center on how people spend time, and data collected by the U.S. Bureau of Outdoor Recreation on participation in selected outdoor recreation activities. The only

1. Rolf Meyersohn, "Is There Life After Work?" *Saturday Review*, 4 May 1974, p 14–16.

2. Examples may be found in Sebastian DeGrazia, *Of Time, Work and Leisure* (New York: Twentieth Century Fund, 1962); John Robinson and Philip Converse, "Social Change as Reflected in the Use of Time," in *The Human Meaning of Social Change*, eds. A. Campbell and P. Converse (New York. Russell Sage Foundation, 1972); John Owen, "Workweeks and Leisure: An Analysis of Trends 1948–75," *Monthly Labor Review* (August 1976), p 3–8

3. Sylvia Porter, "Spending Patterns—Here are Some Surprises," *Detroit Free Press*, 15 July 1977, p. 6B.

4. Staffan Linder, *The Harried Leisure Class* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1970), for example.

other data source used in the 1973 edition—TV ratings data from the A. C. Nielsen Company—is not utilized.

Several new indicators make a welcome appearance. To this reviewer, somewhat of a "subjective indicator" advocate (as will become apparent) the Gallup data which stretch back to 1938 on favorite leisure activities and the categories of new book titles provided the most novel insights. Attendance figures for the performing arts and sports events are particularly appropriate additions, even though these have long been available in the *U.S. Statistical Abstract* and pose severe interpretative problems as described below; much the same characterizes the data presented on employment trends in "knowledge industries." Subjective indicators of the "output" from leisure (which could be argued is a contradiction in terms) are presented on the satisfaction levels that the public reports about its friendships and nonwork activities, their confidence in the mass media, and the daily frequency with which television is behaviorally boycotted "because there weren't any programs worth watching." The chapter closes with 1965 comparisons of how time was used in the United States compared to nine other countries, with particular reference to work and media usage and emphasizing parallel "hard" data on the production of books in each country.

It is difficult to judge which findings in the rich collection would most intrigue readers unfamiliar with recent literature in culture and leisure, but this reviewer was struck by the following.

1. *The 10 to 20 percent increase in free time available to members of the labor force households between 1965 and 1975.* This increase, made possible by decreased time devoted to family care and work activities, represents the first evidence of an increase of leisure in periods outside of holiday and vacation days—the major source of increased free time in the work force in previous periods. Some increase in sleep and resting was also noted over this period, a further indicator of a possible general movement of daily life in a more relaxed or passive direction in this country.

2. *The close match between free time expenditures as measured by time-diaries and the frequency with which activities Gallup independently reports are chosen as favorite leisure activities.* Television leads both lists (which also share a common pattern of demographic correlates), taking up 35 percent of free time in diaries and being cited by 46 percent of national samples as the favorite leisure activity. Visiting with family and friends and reading are mentioned with next most frequency in time-diaries as favorite activities.

3. *A slight increase (from 10 to 12 percent)—higher among blacks, younger adults, and the college educated—in the frequency with which people say they turned off their television sets on a particular day because of poor programming.* This increase is far less dramatic than the increase noted in actual viewing time between 1965 and 1975, but parallels a recent decrease in the confidence the public expresses in the personnel responsible for television.

4. *The 50 to 300 percent upsurge between the early 1960s and 1970s in attendance counts at sports events and the performing arts.* That horse racing annually outdraws

baseball by a 2½ to 1 margin continues to boggle the mind, but the almost 300 percent increase in the number of professional boxers over the decade may be the most counterintuitive trend to be found in the chapter.

5. *The 78 percent increase in knowledge producers (researchers and professors) between 1960 and 1970 and the 55 percent increase in knowledge disseminators (teachers and media specialists).* The gap between the two may possibly explain why those of us in research feel frustrated in not reaching audiences with the results of our research. Alternatively, it may say something uncomplimentary about the quality of our output and diffusability of the research. Research professionals may be more encouraged to find that research and publications have kept pace with the three-fold increase in awards made by the National Endowment for the Humanities between 1969 and 1974; or that titles in economics and sociology have shown the greatest increase (almost 12-fold) in book title trends between 1955 and 1975.

6. *Compared to workers in other countries, Americans spend neither more time nor less time at work or in commuting to work*—nor in front of their television sets, given set ownership, nor in reading, given our higher educational levels. While the United States and the U.S.S.R. lead the world in book production, most other European countries outproduce both in book publication on a per capital basis.

In brief, this evidence tends to favor the first answer to Zuzanek's question,[5] "Society of leisure or the harried leisure class?" If one defines "the leisure class" by the amounts of free time it has, then the size of this class has certainly increased over time—that is, become massified—and the mass cultural use of television has grown at an even greater pace than increase in free time.

SOME PROBLEMS WITH THE DATA PRESENTED

Since the perfect social indicator for any topic area has yet to be developed, each of the indicators employed in this chapter shares its own weaknesses and ambiguities in the methodology of data collection and interpretability. This section describes some of the major problems with each data source, quite apart from the problems of small sample size and representativeness that usually plague these and other social indicators.

This examination proceeds in large part from biases ingrained by the reviewer's intimate involvement in the Americans' Use of Time project over the last 12 years. Time is a commodity that is increasingly thought about and planned for in a postindustrial society.[6] Time planning not only consciously enters the leisure world of individuals, but of those in the leisure industries who cater to them in convenient time packages, e.g. book digests and amusement park day passes. Time-diaries of how people spend the 24 hours of a particular day then provide an opportunity to operationalize a quantitative measure of that most elusive concept, free time. As Meyersohn has cogently pointed out, however, not all free

5 Jiri Zuzanek, "Society of Leisure or the 'Harried Leisure-Class,'" *Journal of Leisure Research* 6 (Fall 1974), pp. 293–304

6. Daniel Bell, *The Coming of Post-Industrial Society*, 2nd edition (New York: Basic Books, 1976).

time is leisure.[7] The valuable feature of the time-diary method is that investigators with alternative definitions of what activities comprise leisure or free time can apply them to generate their own measures.

Because time-diaries are something like a "census" of free time activity in society, their examination puts the world of culture and leisure in clear perspective and also alerts one to its understudied or forgotten aspects. From time-diaries, the pervasive and increasing role of the mass media during free time becomes quickly obvious. No other class of activities has taken as large a share of the increased free time available over the last ten years as the mass media, with television being practically the sole overall beneficiary. Television's gains are found in all sex, race, age, education, and employment groups. Visiting and related social life, the second most prevalent use of free time, have shown some modest decline over the same period. The "semi-leisure" activities of adult education and organizational participation show some modest gains.

In terms of time use, then, time-diary data suggest only about 5 to 10 percent of free time is devoted to such activities as participation in outdoor recreation and attendance at sports and cultural events. In fairness, this is a bias shared by most of the academic literature and policy discussion of leisure and culture, and these activities could be argued to be the most uplifting and engaging uses of free time (even though they do not appear on Gallup's list of favorite free time activities). Nonetheless, aggregate attendance data from institutions miss the more time consuming spectatorship of local sports and cultural events for which no admission may be charged or counts tallied—high school football games or neighborhood art exhibits, for example. In fact, concert and museum attendance is noted less often in time-diaries than personal participation in cultural activities—pottery, painting, practicing music, or literature.

The indexing of sports and recreation is possibly even more hazardous. Like museum attendance, a substantial number of children attend sports events. Multiple attendance for sports events is also likely and the tabulation of the possibly sporadic attendance of season ticket holders is uncertain. The repeat visits of horse race fans, and the greater number of racing days, must have something to do with these astronomical attendance figures (horse racing was reported in only two of the over 1,500 time-diaries in 1975). How else is it possible for attendance at greyhound races to outnumber attendance at professional football games? How much of this attendance is accounted for by people out of the "mainstream" of society; i.e. the retired or the unemployed?

How does the National Golf Foundation estimate that there were almost 12 million persons who had played more than 15 rounds of golf in the last year? The Bowlers Association estimates there are only 9 million bowlers,[8] yet in time-diaries bowling was mentioned more often than all other sports activities combined—making it, incidentally, Americans' favorite

7. Rolf Meyersohn, "Leisure," in *Human Meaning of Social Change*, eds. Campbell and Converse

8. U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Statistical Abstract of the United States 1976* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1977).

participation sport.[9] Yet the American Softball Association estimates there were over 25 million softball players in 1975 (*U.S. Statistical Abstract, 1976*), more than the number of bowlers and golfers combined. Quite aside from any possible vested interests that may be served by these estimates, their value as social indicators is highly ambiguous unless they are collected on a systematic, periodic basis by a single data collection method or agency.

Even this step will not necessarily ensure that usable social indicator data will become available, if the record of the U.S. Bureau of Outdoor Recreation (BOR) affords any example. The Bureau has conducted five national surveys (in 1960, 1965, 1970, 1971, 1972) of participation in outdoor recreation, and is now embarking on a sixth. None (including the sixth) has used common survey questions so that we might know about trends in participation across this transitional time period.[10] The BOR trend figures presented in chapter 10 represent extrapolations from the 1975 data; differential participation in activities by income and by situs of the activity are shown for the 1972 data only. Some figures are for the entire year; others, for the summer only. Popular indoor sports, like bowling, racquet ball, and basketball, are not examined.

Moreover, it is not obvious that participation based on direct respondent estimates for a lengthy time period, such as a season or a year, provide data that are suitably accurate or reliable. Compared to time-diary estimates, whose aggregate accuracy seems quite satisfactory, respondents estimate very generous amounts of weekly or yearly time on housework, volunteer work, television and several other activities.[11] If one asks people to estimate the hours per week they spend on various activities, the total will likely far exceed the 168 hours a week that are available, and the discrepancy cannot be readily resolved by distinguishing between primary and secondary activities. There is the more basic and subtle matter of activity definition: does the respondent consider shuffleboard or chess a "sport;" is a walk for the dog or to the store counted as "walking for pleasure;" has one gone "swimming" if not even the ankles get wet? Such problems are not likely to be solved soon, and BOR has wisely shifted its survey attention to gauging availability and unmet needs for recreation facilities and to gathering public opinion data on the same dilemmas that policymakers face: to improve existing facilities or to build new ones; to concentrate on land- or water-based facilities, for example.

The time-diary data have been cited as a basis for criticizing other data sources, but they, too, suffer from severe limitations. Only one day's activities are collected from each respondent and participation in active leisure activities is rare on a particular day. Thus far, only sporadic sampling of summer days, vacations, and holidays has been

9. John Robinson, *How Americans Use Time: A Social-Psychological Analysis of Everyday Behavior* (New York: Praeger, 1977), p. 108.

10. Carol Stowell, *Evaluation of Five Previous Nationwide Citizen Surveys* (Washington, D.C.: Kirschner Associates, Inc. November 1975).

11. John Robinson, "Methodological Studies into the Reliability and Validity of the Time Diary," in *Studies in the Measurement of Time Allocation*, ed. T. Juster (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Institute for Social Research, forthcoming).

undertaken, and these are the peak periods of outdoor recreation and spectator activities. No national time-diary data are available for children. And the behavioral context or psychological consequences of participation are seldom revealed.[12]

Some subjective indicator data related to participation presented in chapter 10 concern overall satisfaction with nonwork activities and with friendships. On the four occasions the question has been asked by the National Opinion Research Center, satisfaction with spare time activities (58 percent satisfied "a great deal" in 1976) is reported at a lower level than satisfaction with friendships (69 percent satisfied "a great deal"), consistent with the higher satisfaction with visiting noted in footnote 12. The less-educated claim less satisfaction from spare time activities, and it becomes interesting to know whether there are distinctive patterns of free time activity among the less-educated that make this the case, particularly since satisfaction with spare time activities has shown some general decline in recent surveys. Are less-educated people watching more TV than they should, for example?

Satisfaction with friendships has also declined recently, and again the less-educated, along with younger people and men, are less satisfied. It would be useful here, as well, to know what objective factors—number of close friends or relatives; frequency of interaction; marital status—accompany these lower levels of satisfaction with friendships. Is it possible that some people are dissatisfied because they have too many acquaintances, or that wives and/or relatives dominate the social circles of men and the less educated, or that men in our society are socialized to be so isolated or mobile that they are unable to form permanent friendships? Similar interesting, but unanswered, questions arise in connection with why the public has more confidence in people running the press than in people running television.[13] How directly do these ratings relate to the product for which these people are responsible? How do these ratings compare to other professions, particularly the products of those professions with which the public comes into daily contact?

On the other hand, the indicators of cultural activity seem unduly narrow for this multivaried concept. For example, number of people in cultural occupations is a natural indicator, but scientific researchers and teachers would seem more

12. Subsequent to compilations of *Social Indicators, 1976*, data are now becoming available on the "psychological meaning" of various activities in which people participate, particularly the satisfactions or "consumption benefits" they derive from various free time activities (Robinson, *How Americans Use Time*, pp. 116–32) There is a marked tendency for people to engage more in activities from which they claim to derive greater satisfaction, that is, people who get more satisfaction from television watch more than those who are not satisfied and vice versa. However, there is little carryover at the aggregate level, in the sense that visiting and social life rank near the top of satisfying activities overall, and well above television, but television takes up much more of peoples' free time—and is taking up more of it vis-a-vis the more satisfying activity of visiting since 1965 Television is also reported as a highly elastic activity, being the first people say they would give up if some urgent matter arose on a particular day (See Robinson and Converse, "Social Change as Reflected in Use of Time.")

13 Ratings of press performance show an interesting divergence starting with 1974, perhaps indicating the polarization caused by Watergate—more people now say they have a good deal of confidence in the press and more people also say they have hardly any confidence.

appropriately considered as knowledge producers than as culture producers when compared to artists, writers, composers, musicians, sculptors, dancers, jugglers, and actors. While it is instructive to find a three-fold increase in the number of awards by the National Endowment for the Humanities between 1969 and 1974, one assumes that the increase was achieved without the offsetting decrease in the monetary value of the awards. Apart from this consideration is the question of output from these awards. How many outstanding essays or exchanges of ideas were stimulated that would not have occurred without the awards? Less abstractly, how many recipients were satisfied that the awards enriched their lives or careers in some significant way and how did the awards aid in this personal growth? How would awards from the National Endowment for the Arts, again more directly tied to culture than to knowledge, compare with these outputs?

The trends in book topics between 1955 and 1975 were fascinating,[14] but prompted this reviewer to wonder about parallel trends in the topics covered in the other mass media—movies, records, television, magazines, radio, and newspaper—for which there are probably few data. Media researchers know that the most significant trends over this period came as a result of competition with the more pervasive medium of television—the decline of fiction, the rise in specialty magazines, the growth of specialized FM stations, and the appearance of pornographic and spectacular movies. It would be fascinating to be able to document the subtle changes that media observers claim are taking place in media content over the last two decades, e.g., the shorter and simpler stories reported in newspapers, the movement of interest from local stories to national stories in the news (a trend possibly now being reversed), and the increasing sophistication of popular television scripts or television advertising.

Finally, the international comparisons might have better focused on differences in total free time across countries, rather than in time spent working, commuting, and using media. Americans in the 1965 study were distinctive in terms of the greater free time they had available compared with people in European countries. Moreover, while the total time spent reading in the United States and the U.S.S.R. was almost equivalent, as was book production in the two countries, a closer examination of the sources of these time-use data reveals that reading times in the Soviet Union are preponderantly devoted to books while those in the United States are preponderantly spent with newspapers.[15]

This last observation illustrates the major problem in this chapter, as perhaps with the social indicator movement in general—namely, that of relating inputs to outputs, or

14. After book titles on social science, those dealing with recreation and with art experienced most growth between 1955 and 1975. With regard to cultural production (see comments on these occupations above), art books experienced far more growth than those dealing with music, literature, and poetry-drama, all of which experienced average or slightly below average growth compared to other publications. The lowest growth rates were noted for children's books and for fiction, again reflecting the spectre of television. It should be remembered that these figures are for books published and may not necessarily reflect their public diffusion through sales.

15. John Robinson, Philip Converse, and Alexander Szalai, "Everyday Life in Twelve Countries," in *The Use of Time*, eds. A. Szalai *et al.*, (The Hague: Mouton, 1972).

input-output at one level, for example, production of books, with input-output at another level, for example, time spent reading books and individual gains in information or cultural awareness. To be sure, indicators are only supposed to draw our attention to something, an early warning system of the appearance or continuation of a trend or social condition. But unless we are able to invest them with further meaning, or match them with related indicators of input-output, their use for policymaking and understanding will be too severely restricted.

These remarks are not meant to detract from the rich compilation of information assembled in this chapter. As the authors note in the introduction to *Social Indicators, 1976*, the data "are also likely to raise additional questions and may provide contradictory interpretations." The authors' zeal and creativity in overcoming monumental obstacles in data availability, comparability, and interpretability with limited resources is obvious and commendable. The collecting of social indicators is still in its infancy, and most of the problems and criticisms raised by this reviewer are hardly insoluble.

POSSIBLE FUTURE DIRECTIONS

As one looks forward to future editions of this invaluable and insightful reference work, it might be hoped that material on culture and leisure would be as enhanced as this one was over its predecessor. Sources of enrichment come both from data already available and data not now available.

In the first category, one might like to include available data on monetary expenditures for leisure and culture. These figures should be suitably corrected for spurious economic factors so that we might know if leisure and culture are sharing disproportionately in our economic growth. While these are not likely to dovetail closely with time expenditure data,[16] the discrepancies between time and money investment might themselves be provocative indicators. Some attempt should also be made to distinguish data that refer to the entire population and data that exclude particular demographic groups, such as children, the unemployed, or the retired.

Some reference ought to be made to other data available on that most prominent facility for leisure and culture—television. Whatever criticisms one may have about the validity of the Nielsen data,[17] their annual yearbook contains a wealth of historical information on programming trends and highlights gathered in a consistent and systematic fashion. The same holds true for the survey data collected periodically since 1959 by Roper for the Television Information Office and the yearly content analysis of television violence conducted by the Annenberg School of Communications at the University of Pennsylvania.[18] C.B.S. may soon sponsor another replication of Steiner's classic study of public perceptions of television; a 1970 replication found trends consistent with those in the chapter 10 data, that is, toward longer but more selective viewing, and more

16. Robinson, "Methodological Studies."

17. Robinson, *How Americans Use Time*, p. 175.

18. Burns Roper, *Changing Public Attitudes Toward Television and Other Mass Media, 1959–1976* (New York: Television Information Office, 1977); George Gerbner and Larry Gross, "Living with Television: The Violence Profile," *Journal of Communication* 26 (Spring 1976), pp. 172–99.

criticisms of television in general terms but more opportunity to find programs that satisfied particular interests.[19]

Research into time use and leisure may soon begin to generate time series data on the leisure activities that people find most enjoyable or satisfying.[20] Given the greater concern with time in a postindustrial society, data on whether people feel they have enough, or too much, free time would seem an essential complement to feelings about satisfaction with free-time activities.[21] The incidence of "secondary activities" in time-diaries may be taken as a further indicator of the hectic pace of modern life and "time deepening," the ability to squeeze more experience out of the same amount of leisure time available.

Of course, availability of time and money comprise only two of the many resource factors that constrain participation in leisure and culture. One of the new measurement areas that policymakers, as well as indicator researchers, will have to face is the accessibility of leisure facilities in terms of distance and economic cost. Some promising work in this area is already underway in Europe[22] and in the latest survey conducted by the Bureau of Outdoor Recreation. Accessibility becomes especially important in light of the severe energy shortages forecast for the future; if fuel for transportation becomes more scarce, the less energy-consuming activity of TV viewing may become an even more popular alternative.

Moving to the output side of the ledger, data on information processing that takes place during leisure would seem a natural type of indicator, although measurement issues abound. Katz has proposed a scheme for systematically monitoring the content of people's conversations.[23] Some national survey data on the most interesting conversations and most pressing personal concerns people reported on a particular day are already available,[24] although these are in need of extensive refinement before they can serve as viable social indicators. One researcher has begun to monitor what people think about on a time sampling basis; an intriguing indicator from this research is the frequency with which leisure activities are contemplated while at work.

19. Gary Steiner, *The People Look at Television* (New York Knopf, 1963), Robert Bower, *Television and the Public* (New York: Holt, 1972).

20. One of the more intriguing features of these activity satisfaction ratings is that they show relatively little difference between the reported satisfaction of free-time activities and work activities (Robinson, *How Americans Use Time*), bringing into question the common assumption that leisure has replaced work as a central life interest. Perhaps work is being underrated as a relative source of gratification, or perhaps leisure itself affords little opportunity to satisfy central life interests of workers

21. In the 1965 time use study, about a quarter of the respondents said they "always feel rushed" to do the things that had to be done While people who felt always rushed also reported lower than average satisfaction with their lives, people who "hardly ever feel rushed" reported even lower life satisfaction (Robinson and Converse, "Social Change as Reflected in Use of Time"). This curvilinearity between life satisfaction and perceived time also appears for actual time (Robinson, *How Americans Use Time*) and indicates that too much free time may be more of a burden than too little Teenagers in particular complained about having too much free time.

22. I.N.S.E.E., *Les Comportments de Loisir des Francais* (Paris: I.N.S.E.E., 1967), pp. 16–19. The Central Bureau of Statistics in Norway has relevant data for 1971–72.

23 Elihu Katz, *Social Research on Broadcasting* (London· British Broadcasting Corporation, 1977), pp 46–47

24. Robinson, *How Americans Use Time*, pp. 138–46.

Finally there ought to be a way to index a shift that some observers suggest has accompanied more democratized leisure,[25] namely from collections of things and technology to collections of "experiences"—the trips to faraway places and natural wonders, the participation in mystical or exotic events, such as the Boston Marathon or the King Tut exhibit, the endless search for peak experiences or offbeat thrills, and the attempts to make one's way somehow into the Guinness Book of Records. If such a shift in societal emphasis is taking place—"You only go around once in life . . ." as the ad says—then cultural deprivation could challenge economic and educational deprivation as a major social concern in the years ahead. Perhaps a "poor" person in the year 2000 will be defined as an individual who, by a certain year in life, has never had a "peak experience," been fascinated by some work of art, won a sports award beyond his or her supposed athletic ability, become "famous" for some accomplishment during leisure time, lived in another culture, or worked through a personal definition of the meaning of life.

25. Geoffrey Godbey, "Time Deepening and the Future of Leisure," *Leisure Today* (October 1976), pp. 9–11; Alvin Toffler, *Future Shock* (New York: Bantam Books, 1970)

Table 10/1
AVERAGE HOURS PER WEEK SPENT IN MAJOR TYPES OF ACTIVITY BY SELECTED URBAN POPULATION GROUPS, 1965 AND 1975


TYPE OF ACTIVITY	Race		Total sample	Employed men		Employed women		Married housewives
	White	Black and other races		Married	Single	Married	Single	
1965 URBAN SAMPLE								
Size of sample (number)	1,030	103	1,218	448	73	190	152	341
Total time (hours)	168	168	168	168	168	168	168	168
Sleep	53.4	50.9	53.3	53.1	50.6	53.8	52.6	53.9
Work for pay	31.9	36.6	33.0	51.3	51.4	38.4	39.8	5
Family care	26.0	23.6	25.4	9.0	7.7	28.8	20.6	50.0
Personal care	21.8	19.9	21.5	20.9	22.2	20.3	21.7	22.6
Leisure time (total)	34.9	36.9	34.8	33.7	36.1	26.7	33.3	41.0
Organizations	2.8	3.0	2.8	2.6	3.6	1.4	3.7	3.4
Media	14.8	15.7	14.7	17.1	13.9	10.7	11.1	15.3
Social life	9.3	9.1	9.4	7.2	10.4	7.9	9.6	12.6
Recreation	1.1	.6	.9	1.4	1.3	6	.5	.6
Other leisure	6.9	8.4	7.0	5.4	6.9	6.1	8.4	9.1
1975 URBAN SAMPLE								
Size of sample (number)	680	77	726	245	87	117	108	141
Total time (hours)	168	168	168	168	168	168	168	168
Sleep	54.5	54.8	54.7	53.4	54.1	55.1	54.3	56.8
Work for pay	30.0	30.0	32.5	47.4	40.0	30.1	38.8	1.1
Family care	21.1	17.6	20.5	9.7	9.0	24.9	16.6	44.3
Personal care	22.1	21.0	21.8	21.4	20.0	26.2	21.9	21.4
Leisure time (total)	40.3	44.6	38.5	36.1	44.9	31.7	36.4	44.4
Organizations	4.4	4.9	3.8	3.7	4.8	2.2	4.4	4.8
Media	18.7	19.6	18.2	18.9	18.5	15.6	14.5	20.4
Social life	8.2	9.8	7.8	6.4	8.9	6.6	8.9	10.1
Recreation	1.5	4	1.3	1.3	4.1	8	.5	7
Other leisure	7.5	9.9	7.4	5.8	8.6	6.5	8.1	8.4

Source John P Robinson, "Changes in America's Use of Time, 1965–1975," *Report of the Communication Research Center*, Cleveland State University, 1976 Used by permission.

Chart 10/1A

Social Indicators, 1976

AVERAGE HOURS PER WEEK SPENT IN MAJOR TYPES OF ACTIVITY FOR SELECTED URBAN POPULATION GROUPS, 1965 AND 1975




Source: see table 10/1

Chart 10/1B

Social Indicators, 1976

TIME USE: AVERAGE HOURS PER WEEK OF "FREE TIME" BY TYPE OF ACTIVITY FOR SELECTED URBAN POPULATION GROUPS, 1965 AND 1975



Source: see table 10/1

Table 10/4

FAVORITE LEISURE ACTIVITIES, BY SELECTED YEARS: 1938–1974

(Percent reporting)

Type of activity	1938	1960	1966	1974
Reading	21	10	15	14
Movies and theater	17	6	5	9
Watching television	(NA)	28	46	46
Dancing	12	3	2	4
Radio	9	([1])	2	5
Playing cards and games	9	6	5	8
Staying home with family	7	17	5	10
Visiting friends	4	10	5	8


Source: The Gallup Opinion Index, report No. 105, March 1974.
Note: Percentages are not additive because of multiple responses.
NA, Not available.
[1] Less than 1 percent.

Chart 10/4

Social Indicators, 1976

SELECTED FAVORITE LEISURE ACTIVITIES BY TYPE OF ACTIVITY 1938–1974

(Percent responding)



* Less than 1 percent or not available.
Source. See table 10/4

Table 10/16
SATISFACTION WITH FRIENDSHIPS AND LEISURE-TIME ACTIVITIES AND CONFIDENCE IN TELEVISION AND THE PRESS: 1973–1976

RESPONSE	1973		1974		1975		1976	
	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent	Number	Percent
	SATISFACTION WITH FRIENDSHIPS							
TOTAL NUMBER RESPONDING . . .	1,495	100.0	1,484	100 0	1,484	100.0	1,492	100.0
A great deal[1]	1,044	69.8	1,073	72.3	1,050	70.8	1,035	69.4
Quite a bit[2]	405	27.1	376	25.3	393	26.5	383	25.7
A little or none . .	46	3.1	35	2.4	41	2.8	74	5.0
Total sample size . . .	1,504	(X)	1,484	(X)	1,490	(X)	1,499	(X)
	SATISFACTION WITH NONWORK ACTIVITIES, HOBBIES, AND THE LIKE							
TOTAL NUMBER RESPONDING . . .	1,487	100.0	1,479	100.0	1,477	100.0	1,489	100.0
A great deal[1] . . .	813	54 7	811	54.8	841	56.9	856	57.5
Quite a bit[2] . .	521	35.0	523	35.4	505	34.2	430	28.9
A little or none . . .	153	10 3	145	9.8	131	8.9	203	13.6
Total sample size .	1,504	(X)	1,484	(X)	1,490	(X)	1,499	(X)
	CONFIDENCE IN PEOPLE RUNNING TELEVISION							
TOTAL NUMBER RESPONDING	1,480	100 0	1,464	100.0	1,451	100.0	1,464	100.0
A great deal .	278	18 8	347	23 7	265	18.3	279	19.1
Only some .	875	59 1	861	58.8	853	58.7	779	53.2
Hardly any . . .	327	22 1	256	17 5	333	23.0	406	27 7
Total sample size	1,504	(X)	1,484	(X)	1,490	(X)	1,499	(X)
	CONFIDENCE IN PEOPLE RUNNING THE PRESS							
TOTAL NUMBER RESPONDING	1,477	100 0	1,463	100.0	1,442	100 0	1,463	100.0
A great deal	346	23 4	383	26 2	354	24 6	424	29.0
Only some	911	61.7	821	56.1	823	57.0	776	53.0
Hardly any . .	220	14 9	259	17 7	265	18.4	263	18.0
Total sample size	1,504	(X)	1,484	(X)	1,490	(X)	1,499	(X)

Source National Opinion Research Center (NORC), University of Chicago, *National Data Program for the Social Sciences, Code Book for the Spring 19--, General Social Survey* (1973, 1974, 1975, and 1976) Copyright by NORC Used by permission.

X Not applicable


[1] Includes the response category "a very great deal."

[2] Includes the response categories "a fair amount" and "some"

Chart 10/16A

Social Indicators, 1976

SATISFACTION WITH FRIENDSHIPS AND LEISURE-TIME ACTIVITIES AND CONFIDENCE IN TELEVISION AND THE PRESS: 1973–1976



Source: see table 10/16

Table 10/17
TIME SPENT AT MAIN JOB AND TRAVEL TO AND FROM JOB, BY SEX, SELECTED COUNTRIES: 1965–66
(Average minutes per workday)


COUNTRY	EMPLOYED MEN		EMPLOYED WOMEN	
	Main job	Travel to and from job	Main job	Travel to and from job
Belgium	503	47	412	34
Czechoslovakia	477	53	390	39
France	517	47	439	38
Germany (Fed. Republic)	538	45	387	29
Hungary	503	69	454	50
Peru	445	84	361	63
Poland	482	61	427	52
United States	480	52	411	42
U.S.S.R.	444	48	429	42
Yugoslavia	465	52	428	46

Source: Alexander Szalai (ed.), The Use of Time, (The Hague: Mouton and Co., 1972). Copyright by Mouton and Co. Used by permission.

Chart 10/17

Social Indicators, 1976

TIME SPENT AT MAIN JOB AND TRAVEL TIME TO AND FROM JOB: 1965–1966



Source: see table 10/17

Social Mobility and Social Participation

By WILLIAM H. SEWELL

ABSTRACT: This article examines the charts and tables contained in chapter 11 of *Social Indicators, 1976* covering a wide range of social behavior under the general topic "Social Mobility and Social Participation." The topics covered include educational and occupational mobility, voting in national elections, volunteer work, charitable giving, participation in community organizations, views on religion, and feelings of anomie. Most readers will agree that this is a potpourri of topics but that all have bearing on the well-being of citizens. There would be less agreement on the significance of most of the indicators for public policy. The factual conclusions that can be drawn from the tables and charts are discussed and additional information from recent research on some of the topics is presented—particularly on educational and occupational mobility, voting and political behavior, and participation in community organizations.

William H. Sewell is Vilas Research Professor of Sociology at the University of Wisconsin. He has published extensively on social stratification. His recent books include: The Uses of Sociology (1969) *(coedited with Lazarsfeld and Wilensky)*; Attitudes and Facilitation in the Attainment of Status (1972) *(coauthored with Gasson and Haller)*; Education, Occupation, and Earnings: Achievement in the Early Career (1975) *(coauthored with Hauser); and* Schooling and Achievement in American Society (1976) *(coedited with Hauser and Featherman).*

CHAPTER 11 of *Social Indicators*, 1976, is devoted to the topic "Social Mobility and Social Participation." It includes 22 charts and the tables on which these charts are based. The sources of this information are numerous, but all come from sample surveys made by various governmental and private-not-for-profit research agencies. Unlike indicators based on census data, the time dimensions involved are usually limited to recent years; consequently, it is difficult in some instances to detect a trend. The indicators selected for inclusion actually cover a very wide range of social behavior that presumably provide a basis for gauging the well-being of citizens in the United States, which is the stated purpose of the chapter. They are educational and occupational mobility, voting in national elections, volunteer work, charitable giving, participation in voluntary associations, views on the importance of religion, and feelings of anomie. This is indeed a potpourri of topics, but most readers would agree that all of them have a bearing on the well-being of citizens. On the particular indicators selected for presentation and their importance for social well-being, there will be much less general agreement. Finally, there would be great disagreement about the significance of most of the indicators for public policy. I am not convinced that my opinions on these matters are of any great interest, nor are any more informed than those of the reader. Consequently, little space will be devoted to these matters. Rather, the factual conclusions that can be drawn from the information contained in the indicators will be discussed. If I consider the topic to be of great importance and if I know something about it from my own research and reading, additional information will be presented. Greatest attention will be given to social mobility because this is my area of specialization. Somewhat less attention will be given to voting and political behavior because I have not done original research in this area, but an attempt will be made to supplement the information reflected in the indicators by providing a brief and selective summary of pertinent findings from recent research on the topic. I have no special knowledge or interest in the other topics contained under the rubric social participation. Consequently, my handling of these matters admittedly will be perfunctory.

SOCIAL MOBILITY

Sociologists have long been fascinated with the amount and nature of social mobility in a given society. American sociologists have been particularly concerned with this subject, perhaps because the American value system places great emphasis not only on socioeconomic achievement but also on equality of opportunity for social and economic advancement. Much of the research on social stratification in American society has been involved with the extent to which the members of our society, at a particular point in time, have been able to take advantage of opportunities to improve their social status over that of their parents and with the trends in social mobility over time. Most of the studies have been of adult, white males, and have been concerned with comparing the attainments of a sample of sons with those of their fathers. Much of this research has been done using a mobility table in which the son's current status (education,

occupation, earnings, etc.) is cross-tabulated with his father's status at some point in the father's working career. Such a table provides the basis for estimating the extent to which adult sons have moved up or down or remained in the same status category as their fathers. The marginals of the mobility table also provide information on the status distributions of the father's and the son's generations. However, only limited inferences about earlier periods may be drawn from these comparisons because the fathers tend to be a biased sample of men in the parental generation—obviously males without male children could not possibly be in the sample. For that matter, there are a number of technical problems, which need not be gone into here, in the computation of mobility statistics from mobility matrices.[1]

The two status achievements that have been the subject of greatest analysis are educational and occupational attainments—the two on which charts and tables have been presented in Chapter 11 of *Social Indicators, 1976.*

Educational mobility

Data are available to show the changes in the mean levels of education completed by five-year birth cohorts of American men in the civilian, noninstitutionalized population in March 1962 and March 1973, and to indicate the intergenerational—father to son—shifts in educational attainment at the two time periods. The 1962 data are from the Blau and Duncan Occupational Changes in a Generation (OCG) survey[2] and the 1973 data are from replicate surveys conducted by Featherman and Hauser.[3,4]

Levels of education of cohorts of men born since 1900 have been increasing substantially and regularly over a period of 50 years. The evidence for this is that both in the 1962 and in the 1973 samples, men in each successively younger birth cohort had obtained more education than those born earlier in the century. Thus, in the 1962 sample the range in mean educational attainment was from 8.9 for men aged 60–65 (born 1897–1901) to 11.8 for men aged 20–25 (born 1937–41). In the 1973 sample, the means for the same age groups were 9.9 (born 1907–11) and 12.8 (born 1937–51), respectively. If we compare the oldest age group, those who were 60–65 in 1962, with the youngest, those who were 20–25 in 1973, the mean increase in schooling is 3.7 years, which probably is an underestimate of the true increase because many of those in the youngest cohort were still in school or would return for more schooling in the future.

Another important trend is that there has been a great decrease in the variability of schooling across age cohorts. Because of this trend and the general trend toward higher levels of educational attainment, inequality in the distribution of schooling has fallen rapidly from one

1. For a discussion of these problems, see Robert M Hauser, "A Structural Model of the Mobility Table," *Social Forces*, vol. 56 (March 1978).

2 Peter M. Blau and Otis D. Duncan, *The American Occupational Structure* (New York: Wiley, 1967).

3 David L. Featherman and Robert M. Hauser, "Design for A Replicate Study of Social Mobility in the United States," in *Social Indicator Models*, eds. Kenneth C. Land and Seymour Spilerman (New York. Russell Sage Foundation, 1975) pp. 219–52.

4. Robert M. Hauser and David L. Featherman, "Equality of Schooling: Trends and Prospects," *Sociology of Education*, vol. 49 (April 1976) pp. 99–120.

cohort to the next. Thus, schooling has become more equally distributed during the twentieth century.[5]

In March 1962 sons reported that they have had from two to three years more education than their fathers. For the 1973 survey, the sons reported from two to almost four years more schooling than their fathers. The intergenerational differences were greatest in the ten year period 1917–27 and have since declined. Thus, the trend would appear to be for the educational gap between fathers and their sons to be narrowing over time. It is possible that this gap will continue to lessen because of the increasingly high proportion of men in each cohort who are graduating from high school and obtaining postsecondary education. Unless a trend toward greater college retention occurs in the future, it seems quite likely that we will soon be reaching a mean educational level that will not be greatly exceeded by future generations.

Hauser and Featherman have done further analysis of the data from the OCG surveys. Their regression analysis of factors associated with educational achievement indicates that the disadvantages which in the past have been associated with farm background, broken families, southern birth, black skin, and Spanish origin seem to be declining but that those associated with large families and poorly educated fathers have persisted. Finally, their analysis of similarities in the correlations between the educational attainments of their sample members and their eldest brothers indicates that at least 50 percent of the variance in schooling which they have observed in their analysis can be explained by the global effects of family background.[6]

5. Ibid., pp. 102–104.

Race and schooling

Unfortunately, there is no information on mean years of schooling completed nor on intergenerational shifts in educational attainment for blacks. However, we may again turn to the research of Hauser and Featherman for information on trends in schooling by race.[7] Their evidence, comparing the educational achievements of white and black men in the 1962 and 1973 OCG samples, shows that there were large and regular increases in the educational attainments of both races. The mean years of schooling of the total sample of black males was 8.1 years in 1962 and 10.1 years in 1973; the comparable figures for white males were 11.0 years in 1962 and 12.0 years in 1973. In 1962, the oldest cohort of black workers (aged 60–65) averaged 5.4 years of schooling, but by 1973 the youngest cohort (aged 20–25) averaged 11.6 years; for whites the comparable means were 9.6 and 12.7. Also, there was a decline in educational inequality, as indicated by lower standard deviations, for both black and white males. This decline was brought about by the combined effects of the reduced importance of social background and by increased equality among men with the same social backgrounds. Specific comparisons of the mean educational attainments of black and white males by birth cohorts reveals that among young males (aged 25–34) the gap between the races narrowed from 2.3 in 1962 to 1.2 years in 1973. Actually, when differences in the socioeconomic backgrounds of black and white young men are

6. Ibid., pp. 104–18

7. Ibid., pp. 111–16.

taken into account, their educational attainments are now virtually identical. Hauser and Featherman did not have similar information on the educational attainments of either black or white females, so parallel comparisons were not made for women.

The fact that comparable tables covering women's educational achievements by race are not available from the OCG surveys, and that no attempt has been made to present the data from Census and other sources on trends in women's educational mobility, must be counted as a major shortcoming of Chapter 11 of *Social Indicators, 1976*.

Occupational mobility

There have been important changes in social stratification and, more particularly, in occupational mobility in the United States in the period 1962–73.[8] A comparison of the data for 1962 with the same data for 1973 for all employed men, mainly white, shows a trend away from farming and manual occupations into white-collar occupations. The percentage of all employed men who were in each of the white-collar occupational categories was somewhat larger in 1973 than in 1962, whereas the percentage in each manual occupational category declined slightly and the percentage in farming declined markedly during the period. This overall trend out of farming and manual occupations into the white-collar occupations has been going on in the United States throughout this century.

On the whole, blacks have made a rather striking shift from lower status occupations to higher status occupations during the period. Just under 6 percent of all employed black men were in upper white-collar jobs in 1962, but in 1973 almost 12 percent were so employed. Likewise, only 6 percent of the blacks were in lower white-collar occupations in 1962 in comparison with just over 11 percent in 1973. Moreover, black gains were not limited to the white-collar occupations; blacks were also considerably more likely to be in upper manual occupations in 1973 than in 1962 (15 percent versus 9 percent, respectively). These upward trends in the occupational distribution of black workers resulted from shifts out of lower manual work and farming into higher status occupations. However, it should be noted that despite the marked gains by blacks, inferrable from the occupational distributions in 1962 and 1973, blacks in 1973 were still noticeably concentrated in the lower manual occupational status category; 68 percent of all black workers were lower manual in 1962 and in 1973 the figure was 59 percent.

There was a marked tendency toward occupational status inheritance for the total male civilian labor force, both in 1962 and in 1973. Sons in a given occupational status category were more likely to have been recruited from their father's occupational category than from any other occupational category. There was also a great deal of occupational mobility among male workers, both in the 1962 and in the 1973 samples. In both years, well over one-fourth of the sons of upper white-collar workers were in manual occupations; for sons of lower white-collar workers the movement into the manual occupations was still greater. However,

8. Based on tables contained in Robert M. Hauser and David L. Featherman, "Occupations and Social Mobility in the United States" (Discussion Paper no. 36, Institute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1976).

there was even more upward mobility: in both of the years, from 30 to 40 percent of the sons of manual workers were engaged in white-collar work. A comparison of the occupational distributions of sons and their fathers indicates that approximately one-half of the sons were upwardly mobile in 1962 and in 1973. What is striking, however, is that there are no important differences in the patterns of father-son mobility in 1962 and 1973.

The pattern of occupational inheritance, indicated by the fact that sons were most likely to be in the same occupational status category as their fathers, does not hold for blacks in either 1962 or 1973. The most striking fact is that black fathers are less able to pass on their higher status occupations to their sons than are higher status fathers generally. Thus, in both 1962 and 1973, but especially in 1962, the most likely destination for sons of blacks whose fathers were white-collar workers was lower manual occupations. In fact, this was the most likely occupation for black males, in both 1962 and 1973, regardless of their origins. Upward movement, from the manual to the white-collar occupations, although sizeable, was considerably less marked in both years. The movement out of farming, especially into the manual occupations, was impressive in both years. Still there was a rather dramatic shift in 1973 in the occupational mobility of black men toward the pattern which characterized all men in the labor force in 1962 and 1973. Thus, in 1973 there was a strong tendency for black sons of white-collar fathers to become white-collar workers, and there was an increased likelihood that sons of farmers and manual workers would enter the white-collar occupations. Even with these changes, black men in 1973 experienced less occupational inheritance and less upward mobility than all employed men.

What has been said above is true only in a gross sense and more precise conclusions about occupational mobility in the period can come only from more complete analysis of the data. It is obvious that one would wish to know more accurately the extent to which upward mobility during the period is due to increases in the relative mobility chances of men whose fathers held different occupations, rather than to changes in the occupational structure over the period. One would wish also to know the extent to which any gains in upward occupational mobility, for either whites or blacks, were distributed among various age cohorts of employed men. Finally, to the extent possible, one would wish to know more about the complex process by which sons attain their current occupational status, taking into account at least their socioeconomic origins, including their fathers' occupation and their fathers' education, their own educational attainments, and their initial jobs. These are the variables used by Blau and Duncan in their now classic causal model of occupational attainment.[9] If possible, one would wish also to know the effects of measured ability and other social-psychological variables such as school grades, the encouragement of significant others, and educational and occupational aspirations in the attainment process. These are the variables that Sewell and his associates have introduced into the Blau and Duncan model to

9. Blau and Duncan, *American Occupational Structure*, pp 163–204.

further explain the process of socioeconomic achievement.[10]

Fortunately, in the past ten years a great deal of analyses of the kinds noted above have been completed. Although many scholars have been involved in this research, the most pertinent and extensive recent work has been carried out by Featherman and Hauser, using data from the OCG surveys and the Census. While it would be impossible in the space available to adequately summarize their analyses, several of their major conclusions should be presented to round out our discussion of occupational mobility.[11]

First, using much finer grained categories of occupational status, they have shown that the shift in the occupational structure, toward the ranks of upper white-collar and lower white-collar occupations and away from farming and manual occupations, has been going on for several decades in the United States.[12]

Second, the long-time trend in occupational mobility in the United States is neither uniform nor inevitable. In the period 1962–73 there was more mobility than in the previous decade but less than in 1942–52. Future occupational mobility is greatly limited by the rapid depletion of such occupational groups as service workers, laborers, and farmers, which in the past have served as sources for recruitment into the higher status occupations.

Third, no changes have taken place in the rates of intergenerational occupational mobility in the American male labor force in the last half-century that cannot be accounted for by the changing occupational distribution.[13] The evidence

10. William H. Sewell, Archibald O. Haller, and Alejandro Portes, "The Educational and Early Occupational Attainment Process," *American Sociological Review*, vol. 34 (February 1969) pp. 82–92, and William H. Sewell, Archibald O. Haller, and George W. Ohlendorf, "The Educational and Early Occupational Attainment Process: Replication and Revisions," *American Sociological Review*, vol. 35 (December 1970) pp. 1014–27.

11. For further detail and for consideration of aspects of their work not covered by references in this article, the reader may wish to consult Robert M. Hauser and David L. Featherman, *The Process of Stratification: Trends and Analysis* (New York: Academic Press, 1977), and David L. Featherman and Robert M. Hauser, *Opportunity and Change* (forthcoming, Academic Press).

Important recent work on stratification and social mobility not cited in this article would include at least the following: James S. Coleman *et al.*, *Equality of Educational Opportunity* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1966); Otis D. Duncan, David L. Featherman, and Beverly Duncan, *Socioeconomic Background and Achievement* (New York: Seminar Press, 1972); R. W. Hodge and D. J. Treiman, "Class Identification in the United States," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 73 (March 1968), pp. 535–42; Leo A. Goodman, "How to Ransack Social Mobility Tables and Other Kinds of Cross-Classification Tables," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 75 (July 1969) pp. 1–40; Otis D. Duncan, "Social Stratification and Social Mobility: Problems in the Measurement of Trend," in *Indicators of Social Change*, eds. Eleanor B. Sheldon and Wilbert E. Moore (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968), Natale R. Ramsøy, "Changes in the Rates and Forms of Mobility," in *Social Structure and Mobility in Economic Development*, eds. Neil J. Smelser and Seymour M. Lipset (Chicago: Aldine, 1966), Lawrence E. Hazelrigg and Maurice A. Garnier, "Occupational Mobility In Industrial Societies: A Comparative Analysis of Differential Access to Occupational Ranks in Seventeen Countries," *American Sociological Review*, vol. 41 (June 1976) pp. 498–510), and Joan Huber and William H. Form, *Income and Ideology* (New York: Free Press, 1973).

12. Robert M. Hauser and David L. Featherman, "Trends in the Occupational Mobility of U.S. Men, 1962–1970," *American Sociological Review*, vol. 38 (June 1973) pp. 302–10.

13. See especially Robert M. Hauser *et al.*, "Temporal Change in Occupational Mobility: Evidence for Men in the United States,"

indicates that although successive cohorts have had more opportunities to enter high status occupations, regardless of their social origins, the dependence of son's occupation upon father's has been remarkably stable for more than 50 years in the United States.

Fourth, turning more specifically to the findings regarding occupational mobility by race, it is clear that although the average occupational status of men in the experienced civilian labor force rose between 1962 and 1973, blacks gained more than whites but black men were still considerably behind white men in occupational status in 1973. In fact, blacks in 1973 had not yet reached the average occupational status held by white men in 1962.[14] In examining the reasons behind the shifts, Featherman and Hauser note that among white men family factors were less important in occupational allocation in 1973 than they were in 1962, but that schooling had increased in importance; whereas, among black men the effects of family background have become more closely linked with occupational attainment over the period and black men with the same socioeconomic background and educational attainment were in higher status jobs in 1973 than in 1962.[15] Moreover, in younger cohorts of workers, patterns of occupational stratification by race were less in 1973 than in 1962, but socioeconomic discrimination by race was still marked in the older cohorts of workers. Featherman and Hauser in summarizing their findings say ". . . race and class have become less important in the processes that allocate men from families to schooling and subsequently to positions in the occupational hierarchy."[16]

Economic attainments

The distribution of income and wealth have not been discussed in this paper, even though many consider this to be the ultimate stratification issue, because these matters are covered in another chapter of *Social Indicators, 1976*, and in another essay in this issue of THE ANNALS. We should summarize briefly, however, the results of recent attempts to use the Blau and Duncan[17] and the Wisconsin causal models[18] to explain economic achievements. The two best-known studies, by Jencks[19] and Sewell and Hauser[20] have shown that although the status attainment models explain educational and occupa-

American Sociological Review, vol 40 (June 1975), pp. 279–97; and Robert M. Hauser *et al.*, "Structural Changes in Social Mobility Among Men in the United States," *American Sociological Review*, vol. 40 (October 1975), pp. 585–98.

14. Robert M. Hauser and David L Featherman, "White-Nonwhite Differentials in Social Mobility Among Men in the United States, 1962–1972," *Demography*, vol. 11 (May 1974) pp. 247–65.

15. David L. Featherman and Robert M. Hauser, "Changes in the Socioeconomic Stratification of the Races," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol. 82 (November 1976) pp. 621–51.

16 Ibid, p 621

17 Blau and Duncan, *American Occupational Structure*

18 Sewell, Haller, and Portes, "Educational and Early Occupation Attainment Process."

19. Christopher Jencks, *et al.*, *Inequality. A Reassessment of the Effects of Family and Schooling in America* (New York. Basic Books, 1972)

20 William H. Sewell and Robert M. Hauser, "Causes and Consequences of Higher Education: Models of the Status Attainment Process," *American Journal of Agricultural Economics*, vol. 54 (December 1972) pp. 851–61 and Idem, *Education, Occupation, and Earnings Achievement in the Early Career* (New York. Academic Press, 1975).

tional attainments quite effectively (as being largely dependent on socioeconomic background and ability), they are much less efficient in explaining economic attainments, accounting for 8 to 20 percent of the variance in earnings or income, depending on the model and the sample used.

This finding has resulted in a great deal of controversy, especially among those who have thought that programs designed to reduce educational inequality would greatly reduce economic inequality. While neither Jencks nor Sewell and Hauser deny that education influences earnings or income, their results indicate that factors not included in their models must be taken into account in explaining inequality in economic attainment. Jencks has said that the principal factor may be luck. Sewell and Hauser place less emphasis on luck, although not denying its importance, and suggest that factors having to do with more recent experiences such as family formation, marital stability, migration, job markets, on-the-job training, and job satisfaction may help to explain economic success. They and other researchers, including Jencks, have undertaken research to test these suppositions. The search for causal explanations of differences in economic attainments is likely to continue to engage the attention of social scientists during the next decade as new data accumulate and as better multivariate techniques become available for data analysis.

Sexual stratification

Although the tables on social mobility presented in *Social Indicators, 1976*, do not contain information on sexual inequalities in socioeconomic achievements, our exposition would be incomplete without a summary of the most important findings of the recent research on the occupational mobility of women. The major studies have been those of Tyree and Treas, Treiman and Terrell, McClendon, Featherman and Hauser, and Sewell, Hauser and Wolf.[21] Because the Featherman and Hauser analysis is based on the OCG-I and -II surveys, and because their results do not differ greatly from those of most of the other studies, we may summarize their findings, supplementing them with information from other research where appropriate.[22]

The Featherman and Hauser

21. Andrea Tyree and Judith Treas, "The Occupation and Marital Mobility of Women," *American Sociological Review*, vol 39 (June 1974), pp 293–302, Donald J Treiman and Kermit Terrell, "Sex and the Process of Status Attainment: A Comparison of Working Women and Men," *American Sociological Review*, vol. 40 (April 1975) pp. 194–200, McKee J. McClendon, "The Occupational Status Attainment of Males and Females," *American Sociological Review*, vol 41 (February 1976), pp 52–64; David L Featherman and Robert M. Hauser, "Sexual Inequalities and Socioeconomic Achievement in the U.S., 1962–73," *American Sociological Review*, vol. 41 (June 1976) pp. 462–83; and William H. Sewell, Robert M. Hauser, and Wendy C. Wolf, "New Findings in Sex Similarities and Differences in the Occupational Attainment Process," (Paper for the Center for Demography and Ecology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1977).

22. The analysis reported by Featherman and Hauser is based on married persons in the experienced labor force in 1962 and 1973 and therefore their findings for women (the wives of the men in the OCG samples) may not hold for all employed women. However, evidence from a recent study indicates that this sampling limitation probably does not bias their results appreciably. Wendy C. Wolf, "How Biased are Sex Comparisons of Occupational Attainment when Wives of Male Respondents are Utilized as the Sample of Women?" (Paper no 17 for the Center for Demography and Ecology, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1977).

analysis of intercohort shifts in educational attainment, occupational status, and earnings, indicates that there were socioeconomic improvements for both men and women during the period 1962–73. Improvements in the educational and occupational attainments of women somewhat exceed those for men, on the average, but the ratios of female to male average earnings were slightly lower in 1973 than in 1962, 0.38 and 0.39, respectively. Thus, greater equality of educational and occupational opportunity has not yet produced anything approaching equality of economic opportunity for women. Causal models show that men and women tend to be allocated to educational and occupational statuses in much the same way. Women's socioeconomic achievements are less related to family origins, especially farm origins, than are men's and the net effect of educational attainment on occupational status is greater for women than for men.[23]

These findings are in general agreement with the earlier studies cited above. However, the most recent study, by Sewell, Hauser, and Wolf, in which attainment models are based on large independent samples of men and women, and which contain additional important variables not available in the OCG data sets, such as parental income, measured intelligence, and first job, reports interesting differences in the occupational attainment processes of males and females that have not been noted before.[24] The most important finding from the standpoint of the current discussion is that, although women obtain first jobs that on the average are of considerably higher status than those of men, by mid-life men are in higher status occupations than women. Their discussion of the way men and women are sorted into occupations suggests a complicated allocation process. Apparently both men and women rely heavily on their educational attainments for their first jobs but for later occupational placement men rely increasingly on experience and less on educational attainments. Women, on the other hand, because they have less continuous occupational histories and because the occupations they enter provide fewer opportunities for promotion to higher status jobs, must continue to depend mainly on their educational qualifications for later occupational placement. Men clearly profit by their experience in the labor market and tend to be upwardly mobile over their working lives, whereas women tend to remain essentially at the same occupational status level throughout their working careers.

Subjective class placement

American scholars have long been interested in subjective class placement; essentially the question is "how do people place themselves in the class structure?" Subjective class placement may be viewed as the psychological dimension of class, based on self-attribution and identification with others perceived to have similar attitudes, values, and interests. Centers's classic studies showed that over half (51 percent of all American adult male workers in 1945 considered themselves to be in the working class and well over two-fifths (43 percent) placed themselves in the middle class.[25] Only 3 percent

23. Featherman and Hauser, "Sexual Inequalities and Socioeconomic Achievement."

24. Sewell, Hauser, and Wolf, "New Findings in Sex Similarities."

25. Richard Centers, *The Psychology of Social Class* (Princeton, N. J.: Princeton University Press, 1949) and Idem, "Social

placed themselves in the upper class and only 1 percent said they were lower class. One of the most interesting findings was that, regardless of occupation, most men placed themselves in either the middle or the working class category. Even the owners of large businesses and professional men were quite unlikely to place themselves in the upper class, and manual workers were even more unlikely to place themselves in the lower class.

Centers's questions have been repeated in the National Opinion Research Center's General Social Survey in each successive year since 1972. The interesting fact is not that so *little* change has taken place in subjective class placement over the four-year period covered by the NORC surveys, but that contemporary men's subjective placements do not differ in any substantial way from those reported by Centers over 30 years ago. Thus, it would appear that, for whatever reasons, American men hold tenaciously to the view that they are members of a society in which almost everyone is concentrated into two main classes at the middle of a hierarchy in which few persons are in either the upper or the lower classes.

SOCIAL PARTICIPATION

This section of the social report has little if anything to do with social mobility but is included in the same chapter because social participation and social mobility are assumed to have a central role in the well-being of the citizens of the United States. The section is concerned with the extent to which citizens are involved in different forms of personal and community activities, including voting in national elections, volunteer work, philanthropy, and group and association membership. Also included are selected indicators of religiosity and anomie.

Voting behavior

Perhaps the most generally interesting set of indicators in this section have to do with voting behavior. This is a topic to which social scientists have devoted great attention over the years.[26] These indicators are designed to call attention to trends in voting in national elections and to the reasons given for not participating in elections by various categories of persons of voting age. Voting in national elections has varied a good deal between 1930 and 1976, reaching a peak in 1960 when 63 percent of the voting aged population voted in the presidential election. Since 1960 the percentage voting in presidential elections

Class, Occupation, and Reputed Belief," *American Journal of Sociology*, vol 58 (May 1953), pp 543–55. See also, Mary R. Jackman and Robert W. Jackman, "An Interpretation of the Relationship Between Objective and Subjective Social Status," *American Sociological Review*, vol. 38 (October 1973) pp 569–82.

26. In addition to those studies directly cited in this article, at least the following should be mentioned: Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard R Berelson, and Helen Gaudet, *The People's Choice* (New York. Duell, Sloan, and Pierce, 1944). Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, *Voting* (Chicago. University of Chicago Press, 1954), Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963); V O Key, *Public Opinion and American Democracy* (New York Knopf, 1961), Sidney Verba and Norman H. Nye, *Participation in America: Political Democracy and Social Equality* (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), James D. Wright, *The Dissent of the Governed* (New York: Academic Press, 1976), Walter D. Burnham, *Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics* (New York. Norton, 1970).

has declined steadily, reaching a low of 53 percent in the 1976 elections. The trend in voting in congressional elections is exactly the same, but the percentage voting is always smaller than in presidential elections. Voting is still less in congressional contests in which there is no presidential election. This oldest of political democracies had the lowest voting participation rate of any of the seven major democratic countries for which such data are available.

Comparisons of voting behavior by race and ethnic origin categories over the period 1964–76 show quite clearly that whites are more likely to vote in national elections than are blacks; persons of Spanish origin are least likely to vote of any of the three racial-ethnic categories. There has been a downward trend in voting in presidential and congressional elections by blacks and persons of Spanish origin, just as by white voters, since 1964.

The reason respondents to a national survey, who were registered to vote in the 1974 elections, gave for not voting indicates differences by race and sex.[27] Women, regardless of race, gave illness or family emergencies as their main reasons for not voting. Men were much more likely than women to claim that they could not leave work or get to the voting place—this was particularly true for black men. Lack of interest was given as the reason for not voting by almost one-fifth of all voters and the differences between the races and sexes were small. Very few persons (less than 2 percent) indicated that they did not vote because they felt that their vote would not count.

Two-fifths of the respondents to the survey question asking people why they did not register to vote in the November 1974 election gave as their reason lack of interest.[28] There were no marked sex differences in responses to this question, but blacks gave this response more frequently than whites. Other analysis of the data from these surveys reveals that there were striking differences between major social categories in both registration and voting. The social categories with the highest participation were older persons (aged 45 to 74), those who resided outside of the South, the highly educated (college graduates), those with high annual incomes (over $25,000), and professional and technical workers. Those least likely to register and vote were young persons (aged 18 to 24), residents of the South, those with less than eight years of schooling, those with low annual incomes (less than $5,000), and blue-collar laborers.

The decline in political participation during the past 20 years has occupied the attention of many students of political behavior. Much of the research seeking to explain voter apathy has been done using data from periodic surveys of the public conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan, beginning with the 1944 presidential election and continuing to the present.[29] Data from these surveys have been supplemented by

27. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, "Voting and Registration in the Election of November 1974," *Current Population Reports*, ser. P–20, no. 293 (Washington, D.C., April 1976).

28. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, "Voting in November 1976" (Advanced Report), ser. P–20, no. 204 (Washington, D.C., December 1976).

29. Angus Campbell and Robert L. Kohn, *The People Elect A President* (Ann Arbor, Michigan University of Michigan Survey Research Center, ser no 9, 1952); and Angus Campbell *et al.*, *The American Voter* (New York: Wiley, 1960)

less comprehensive information on the political activities of Americans from the Gallup poll, since 1935,[30] and from the National Opinion Research Center study of the 1944 presidential election.[31]

It is neither possible nor necessary to go into detail about the results of the many studies of political behavior in the past 20 years, but a recent comprehensive analysis of changing political behavior, based largely on the Survey Research Center files, by Nye, Verba, and Petrocik (*The Changing American Voter*) may be paraphrased and summarized.[32] They find that politics in the United States has changed markedly since the 1950s and that the public has responded in ways that differ fundamentally from political behavior typical of earlier periods. In the 1950s the vast majority of citizens were satisfied with the political process and, although they were only mildly involved in politics, were aligned with one or the other of the two major political parties. In contrast, in the 1960s and early 1970s, citizens were politically aroused by specific issues, identified less with political parties, had less faith in political leaders, and tended to be dissatisfied with the political process.

Nye, Verba, and Petrocik suggest that the political malaise of recent years can perhaps be attributed to the failure of government to solve the major crises of the period: race conflict, the war in Viet Nam, urban decay, Watergate, unemployment, and inflation. All of these issues cut across traditional political party lines and have resulted in a weakening in party loyalty on the part of both voters and candidates. The percentage of citizens who consider themselves to be independent voters has grown substantially and now is approximately the same as the proportion who say they are Democrats and is twice the size of the percentage who say they are Republicans. Issue voting has increased greatly over the period and there has been greater emphasis on the personality of the candidates, with increasing dependence on television in political campaigns. Issue orientation, lack of party identification, distrust of the political process, and a tendency not to register to vote unless the issues or candidates engage their attention, all tend to characterize the younger voters—especially those who have recently obtained the franchise.[33]

What these changes portend for the future of party politics in the United States is not presently apparent. Nye, Verba, and Petrocik suggest that what may evolve is a politics of issue-based factions, with parties and candidates becoming more responsive to citizens' concerns. This does not mean that party politics is likely to fade out of the picture. There are still many more citizens who identify with one of the two major parties than who consider themselves to be independents. Moreover, there is no evidence suggesting the emergence of any signifi-

30. George Gallup, *The Gallup Poll, 1935–1971* (New York: Random House, 1972).

31. Sheldon J. Korchin, "Psychological Variables in the Behavior of Voters" (Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1946)

32. Norman H Nye, Sidney Verba, and John Petrocik, *The Changing American Voter* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976).

33. Participation in elections is lower for citizens 18 to 20 than for any age category. The next least likely group to register or to vote is the 21 to 24 age category. (See the previously cited *Current Population Reports*, ser. P–20, no. 293). Thus has the extension of the franchise to citizens aged 18 to 20 contributed to the downward trend in voting in national elections since 1972.

cant new party. Pomper, in his preliminary analysis of the 1976 presidential election, finds party loyalty to be on the upsurge for the first time in a generation and suggests that the existing parties may be in the process of creating new alliances along regional, class, and issue lines.[34] Miller and Levitan argue that lasting political partisan realignment will depend on the ability of leaders to mobilize the electorate around issues.[35] Crucial in any realignment will be the young voters, about half of whom are independents and thus are open to persuasion, rather than older voters, most of whom tend to be identified with and loyal to their political party.[36]

Other indicators

Just under 24 percent of all persons over 14 years of age did volunteer work of one kind or another in 1974. There appears to have been an increase in the percentage engaged in volunteer work since 1965. Volunteer workers tend to be employed, married, and in the age group 25–44. Whites are much more likely than blacks to do volunteer work. Unfortunately, nothing in the *Social Indicators, 1976* is given on the sex composition of volunteers. The principal reasons given for doing volunteer work are the desire to help people, a sense of duty, and enjoyment of the work.

Households with incomes of over $20,000 in 1973 accounted for almost half (46 percent) of all charitable giving in the United States. The estimated funds spent on private philanthropy rose from just under $9,000,000 in 1960 to over $25,000,000 in 1974. The largest allocations throughout the period were for religion, followed by health, education, and welfare.

National associations are also considered in chapter 11 of *Social Indicators, 1976*. Apparently educational and cultural organizations have grown most rapidly during the period (1968–73), followed by health and medical associations, with scientific, engineering, and technical organizations also prominent. All the types of organizations studied seem to have grown over the period with the single exception of the fraternal, nationality, and ethnic category. The chapter also shows that membership is greatest in church affiliated organizations, followed by membership in school-related groups, sports associations, labor unions, and fraternal associations. There has been a general increase in participation in Red Cross and in scouting organizations through 1970, with some decline in 1974.

Religious beliefs

A huge majority of those responding in 1975–76 to a question on the relative importance of religious beliefs to them said that religious beliefs are very important. Likewise, the preponderant majority expressed a great deal of confidence in or-

34. Gerald M. Pomper, "The Presidential Election" in *The Election of 1976*, eds. Gerald M Pomper *et al* (New York: McKay, 1976).

35. Warren E. Miller and Teresa E Levitan, *Leadership and Change: The New Politics and The American Electorate* (Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop Publishers, 1976).

36. Converse has demonstrated the importance of new entrance into the voting electorate in producing enduring shifts in political alignments as far back as the elections of 1932 and 1936. See especially, Philip E. Converse, "Public Opinion and Voting Behavior" in *Handbook of Political Science*, vol. 4, eds. Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, (Reading, Mass . Addison-Wesley, 1975), pp. 75–171; also Kristi Andersen, "Generations, Partisan Shifts and Realignment" in Nye, Verba, and Petrocik, *The Changing American Voter*, chap. 5, pp. 74–95.

ganized religion. Although the majority of those in all social categories shared this view, it was held most strongly by nonwhites, housewives, those with no more than eight grades of schooling, and persons over 50 years of age. A comparison between respondents to this question from selected countries indicates that Americans are outstanding in their confidence in organized religion. The percentage believing that religion is increasing its influence declined drastically between 1957 and 1970, but rose appreciably in 1975 for both males and females and for Protestants and Catholics.

Alienation

From the responses of national samples of adults to specific statements in the Srole Anomie Scale, it is apparent that the majority subscribe to the view that most people do not really know on whom they can count these days, think that public officials are not interested in the common man, and don't care what happens to the next guy. On the other hand, most people disagree with the view that a person has to live for today, that nothing is worthwhile anymore, that it is unfair to bring a child into the world anymore, and that money is the most important thing in life. Between 1974 and 1976 there was a slight trend toward agreement with the latter set of responses. The answers reflecting the more anomic positions are much more likely to be held by those with little schooling. There is no striking response pattern by age. No comparisons are made by sex, race-ethnicity, or socioeconomic categories.[37]

An Additional Note on Social Participation

Social scientists have long been interested in the study of citizen participation in the formal and informal activities of the community. Numerous articles and books have been devoted to this general subject. Unfortunately, there have been very few national surveys of the extent and nature of social participation in the United States at different points in our history. Hyman and Wright have succeeded in providing us with the best available information on trends in voluntary association membership by means of secondary analysis of replications of national surveys made over the period 1955–69 by the National Opinion Research Center.[38] Voluntary association membership is not, and has not been, characteristic of the majority of American adults. Relatively few belong to as many as two organizations. However, there has been a small, but noteworthy, increase in memberships over the period studied. Membership is directly related to current socioeconomic status, measured in a variety of ways, including income, occupation, and education. The trend toward in-

37. There is a vast literature on alienation in the United States, much of which deals with political alienation. Even a summary review of this literature is beyond the scope of this paper. Fortunately for the interested reader recent reviews are available. For an authoritative summary and critique of writings on the general topic, see Melvin Seeman, "Alienation Studies," in *Annual Review of Sociology*, ed. Alex Inkeles (Palo Alto, Calif.: Annual Reviews, Inc., 1975), pp. 91–124. Robert R. Alford and Roger Friedland, "Political Participation and Public Policy," in Ibid., pp. 429–79, provide and equally comprehensive and authoritative review of the literature on political alienation.

38. Herbert H. Hyman and Charles R. Wright, "Trends in Voluntary Association Memberships of American Adults: Replication Based on Secondary Analysis of National Sample Surveys," *American Sociological Review*, vol. 36 (April 1971), pp. 191–206.

creased associational membership occurs in each socioeconomic category, especially among those of lower socioeconomic status. The trend toward increased membership applies to both black and white adults, but is greater for blacks. A recent comprehensive review of the literature on voluntarism by Smith adds to the above the following facts: males have higher membership rates in voluntary associations than females, persons in the age range 35–55 are more likely to participate than those in older or younger age groups, and married people are more likely to participate than single people.[39] Smith also presents evidence from a small number of studies which suggests that higher participation in voluntary associations is associated with more favorable test scores on such personality traits as social conformity, efficacy (internal control), self-confidence, sociability, assertiveness, need for affiliations, and general personality adjustment. Hyman and Wright and Smith point to the great need for national panel studies on social participation and suggest the need for more sophisticated research on the causes and consequences of participation in voluntary associations.[40]

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The level of education in the United States has increased substantially for both black and white men over the past 50 years. Blacks still lag behind white men in schooling but the gap is closing. Among young men racial differences in educational achievement are least because of increased educational opportunities for blacks in recent years.

There has been a marked change in the occupational structure in the United States in the last half century, with a great shift out of farming and manual occupations into white-collar occupations and professions. Blacks have shared in this shift but still continue to be concentrated in the lower status manual occupations.

Occupational status inheritance continues to characterize the employed male population in the United States; sons in a given occupational status category are more likely to have been recruited from their fathers' occupational status category than from any other category. But occupational mobility also continues in the United States. Clearly there is more upward mobility, sons of farmers and manual workers becoming white-collar workers, than downward mobility, sons of white-collar workers becoming blue-collar workers and farmers. However, no changes in occupational mobility have taken place in the last half century that cannot be accounted for by the changing occupational distribution.

National surveys show that black men have made greater gains in occupational status than white men during the period 1962–73, but still in 1973 had not reached the average occupational status held by white men in 1962.

Analysis of intercohort shifts in educational attainment, occupational status, and earnings indicates that there were socioeconomic improvements for both men and women in the period 1962–73. Improvements in the educational and

39. David H Smith, "Voluntary Action Groups and Voluntary Groups" in *Annual Review of Sociology*, vol 1, ed Inkeles (Palo Alto, Calif.: Annual Review, Inc., 1975), pp. 247–70

40. For examples of the use of causal models in the explanation of participation, see Richard F Curtis and Elton F. Jackson, *Inequality in American Communities* (New York: Academic Press, 1977).

occupational status of women exceeded those for men but these gains had not yet resulted in anything approaching equal economic opportunity for women.

Recent surveys indicate that Americans hold tenaciously to the view that our society consists of two main classes, positioned in the middle of a status hierarchy, in which relatively few persons are in either the lower or the upper class.

Voting in national elections in the United States has varied considerably from 1930 to 1976, reaching a high of 63 percent in 1960 and steadily declining to 53 percent in 1976. Those least likely to register to vote are young persons (18–24), residents of the South, those with eight years of schooling, blue-collar workers, and blacks.

Recent studies of elections and political participation have noted marked changes in political beliefs and behavior in the past 20 years. In comparison with the 1950s, citizens of the 1960s and 1970s tend to be much less identified with political parties, have less faith in political leaders, are more dissatisfied with the political process, and are more likely to be aroused by specific issues. Young people, particularly those who have recently gained the franchise, are most likely to exhibit these characteristics and are least likely to register to vote.

What these changes portend for the future of party politics in the United States is not clear at present. Possibly a new politics will emerge based on issue-based factions with parties and candidates becoming more responsive to citizens' concerns. Possibly the existing parties will be able to create new alliances along regional, class, age, and issue lines. To date there is little evidence suggesting the emergence of any significant new party.

It is difficult to make any broad generalization on the basis of the evidence contained in *Social Indicators, 1976* concerning social participation in the United States. Participation in voluntary organizations does not appear to have changed greatly in recent years. Most Americans participate in fewer than two voluntary associations. Answers to questions regarding the importance of religion and religious beliefs indicate a higher level of religiosity in the United States than in other industrialized countries for which comparisons are possible. From survey information there is evidence that the majority of adults subscribe to statements which indicate lack of trust in others—especially public officials—but most seem to think that life is still worthwhile and say that money is not the most important thing in life. How this would compare with what citizens would have said a generation or two ago or how these responses would differ from country to country is not known. Without such comparisons it is difficult to gauge the significance of these responses as indicators of the well-being of the citizens of the United States.

Table 11/1
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT AND INTERGENERATIONAL SHIFTS IN EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT OF MALES, BY YEAR BORN: 1962 AND 1973
(As of March of each year: civilian noninstitutional population)


Year of birth	Mean years of school completed		Intergenerational shifts (father to son)	
	1962	1973	1962	1973
1947–1951	([1])	12.81	([1])	2.13
1942–1946	([1])	12.76	([1])	2.87
1937–1941	11.78	12.40	2.14	3.22
1932–1936	11.75	12.02	2.93	3.56
1927–1931	11.57	11.72	3.16	3.72
1922–1926	11.19	11.46	3.28	3.77
1917–1921	10.80	11.03	3.07	3.68
1912–1916	10.40	10.55	3.03	3.44
1907–1911	9.86	9.87	2.47	2.97
1902–1906	9.22	([1])	2.06	([1])
1897–1901	8.91	([1])	1.98	([1])

Source: Robert M. Hauser and David L. Featherman, *Equality of Access tc Schooling: Trends and Prospects*, (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin). Usec by permission.

[1] Not covered in survey.

Chart 11/1B Social Indicators, 1976

INTERGENERATIONAL SHIFTS IN MEAN YEARS OF SCHOOL COMPLETED (FATHER TO SON): U.S. MALE CIVILIAN NONINSTITUTIONAL POPULATION IN 1962 AND 1973 BY YEAR OF BIRTH



Source: see table 11/2

Table 11/2

OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY OF MALES, BY RACE: 1962 and 1973

(Percent of the experienced civilian labor force aged 20 to 64)


Year of survey and father's occupation	Total	Son's current occupation: Upper white collar	Lower white collar	Upper manual	Lower manual	Farm	Distribution of fathers by occupation
ALL MALES							
1962							
Total	100.0	27.8	12.4	20.0	32.1	7.7	100.0
Upper white collar	100.0	53.8	17.6	12.5	14.8	1.3	16.5
Lower white collar	100.0	45.6	20.0	14.4	18.3	1.7	7.6
Upper manual	100.0	28.1	13.4	27.8	29.5	1.2	19.0
Lower manual	100.0	20.3	12.3	21.6	43.8	2.0	27.5
Farm	100.0	15.6	7.0	19.2	36.1	22.2	29.4
1973							
Total	100.0	29.9	12 7	21.7	31.5	4.1	100.0
Upper white collar	100.0	52.0	16.0	13.8	17.1	1.1	18.2
Lower white collar	100.0	42.3	19.7	15.3	21.9	.8	9.0
Upper manual	100.0	29.4	13.0	27.4	29.0	1.1	20 5
Lower manual	100.0	22.5	12.0	23.7	40.8	1.0	29.7
Farm	100.0	17.5	7.8	22.7	37.2	14.8	22.6
BLACK MALES							
1962							
Total	100.0	5.9	6.1	9.1	68.3	10.6	100.0
Upper white collar	100.0	10.4	10.3	19.7	59.6	—	4.5
Lower white collar	100.0	14.4	13.5	—	72.1	—	1.9
Upper manual	100.0	8.5	9.7	10.4	67.9	3.6	9 0
Lower manual	100.0	7.6	8.0	10.8	71.4	2 3	37.2
Farm	100.0	3.2	3.3	7.0	66.7	19.8	47.4
1973							
Total	100.0	11.8	10.6	14.8	59.4	3.6	100.0
Upper white collar	100.0	33.2	21.8	10.1	34.8	—	5.0
Lower white collar	100.0	23.8	17.2	12.3	45.8	9	3.5
Upper manual	100.0	15.2	14.7	15.0	54.9	.2	10.2
Lower manual	100.0	12.4	11.2	13.9	61.4	1.1	46.1
Farm	100.0	5.6	6.2	16.8	62 9	8.5	35.1

Source: Robert M. Hauser and David L. Featherman, *Occupations and Social Mobility in the U.S.* (Madison, Wis.: University of Wisconsin). Used by permission.

— Represents zero.

Chart 11/2 *Social Indicators, 1976*

MOBILITY FROM FATHER'S (OR OTHER FAMILY HEAD'S) OCCUPATION TO CURRENT OCCUPATION, BY RACE: U.S. MEN IN THE EXPERIENCED CIVILIAN LABOR FORCE AGED 20 TO 64 IN 1962 AND 1973



Source: see table 11/2

Chart 11/4 Social Indicators, 1976

REPORTED VOTERS AS A PERCENT OF POPULATION OF VOTING AGE, 1964 TO 1976




Table 11/4

REPORTED VOTERS AS A PERCENT OF THE VOTING-AGE POPULATION, BY RACE AND SPANISH ORIGIN: 1964–1976

Race and Spanish Origin	1964[1]	1966[2]	1968[1]	1970[2]	1972[1]	1974[2]	1976[1]
Total voting age population, thous. .	110,604	112,800	116,535	120,701	136,203	141,299	146,548
PERCENT REPORTING THAT THEY VOTED							
Total	69.3	55.4	67.8	54.6	63.0	44.7	59.2
White	70.7	57.0	69.1	56.0	64.5	46.3	60.9
Black	58.5	41.7	57.6	43.5	52.1	33.8	48.7
Spanish origin[3]	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	37.5	22.9	31.8

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-20, No. 304.

Note: In 1964, 1966, 1968, and 1970, data include persons 18 years old and over in Georgia and Kentucky, 19 years old and over in Alaska, 20 years old and over in Hawaii, and 21 years old and over in the remaining states. Includes all persons 18 years old and over in 1972, 1974, and 1976. Data relate to the civilian noninstitutional population, excluding inmates of institutions and members of the Armed Forces.

NA Not available.

[1] Presidential election years (including congressional elections).

[2] Congressional election years only.

[3] Persons of Spanish origin may be of any race.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 435, Jan. 1978

Public Safety: Crime Is Up, But What About Punishment?

By DAVID SEIDMAN

ABSTRACT: Reported crime rates have risen, and arrest rates have too, particularly among the young. Men have higher victimization rates than women, and blacks have higher victimization rates for crimes of violence than whites. *Social Indicators, 1976* tells us this and a bit more about crime and responses to it, but overall the picture presented is at once insufficiently informative and inappropriately precise. The shortcomings of major data sources are acknowledged, but questionable findings are presented as near certain. Uniform Crime Reports trends for 1960–75 are presented without the important context of earlier trends. Important data from the National Crime Survey are presented without mention of probable artifacts.

Data on system response to crime could have been presented so as to provide insight into the probable cause of the increases shown in trends in reported offenses. Important data, particularly those showing a declining rate of imprisonment, have been omitted, and the interrelations of crime and response have not been highlighted. The major shortcomings of the chapter seem to result not from inadequacies in execution of the design, but rather from limitations in available data and from the apparent assumption that data presented in chart form speak for themselves.

David Seidman, Ph.D., Washington, D.C., is a Staff Associate of the Social Science Research Council's Center for Coordination of Research on Social Indicators. A political scientist, he taught at Princeton University and has published articles on social indicators, crime statistics, administrative structure, statistical methodology, and the regulation of pharmaceuticals.

The members of the Social Science Research Council's Subcommittee on Criminal Justice Statistics (Albert J. Reiss, Jr., Albert D. Biderman, Alfred Blumstein, Stephen Fienberg, Don Gottfredson, and Leslie Wilkins) provided, over the past three years, most of the useful ideas in this paper. Albert J Reiss, Jr., offered important advice on an earlier draft. The views expressed in this article are those of the author, and not necessarily those of the Social Science Research Council. Preparation of this article was supported by Grant No. SOC 74-07148 from the National Science Foundation.

"PUBLIC Safety and Legal Justice," not just "Public Safety," was the title of chapter 6 of *Social Indicators, 1976* when I first saw an outline of the proposed volume. The reason for the deletion is plain: there is very little national data concerning legal justice, and even less that is good. Data on the federal courts, prisons, and parole system exist, and if we knew how to measure "justice," legal or otherwise, these would be useful indicators. But the business of justice in the United States is predominantly the business of state and local governments. Since the early 1930s, the federal government has assiduously amassed state and local data on crimes, but it has done far less with possible measures of justice—here, perhaps, is an indicator of our national preoccupations. Ambitious plans are now afoot to generate and amass such data,[1] but their realization is a long way off, and far from certain. In 1931, the Wickersham Commission noted the same lack of national statistics and urged that something be done. From 1932 through 1946, the Census Bureau collected court statistics from the states on a voluntary basis.[2] No one has done so since then.

"Public Safety" is a misleading title for what is left. Except for one table, only the "International Comparisons" section deals with noncriminal hazards. Fires, floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, tornadoes, industrial accidents, and dangerous products are peripheral to this chapter when they appear at all.[3] As the text explains, "the overriding public concern in this broad area, at least in the United States, is with crime . . ." That may be, though no data are presented to prove it. Publications such as *Social Indicators, 1976* could, of course, attempt public education and the shaping of public concerns. That choice was not made, and it might be more appropriate to call this chapter "Crime and Response." Even that is too broad. American society has not organized itself to generate reliable information about more than a small number of the many different types of crime. The text itself comments on the absence of information about white-collar crime. There are also no data on extortion, kidnapping, arson, and any number of other crimes. A chapter which began as "Public Safety and Legal Justice" emerges as one about murder, rape, robbery, assault, burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft, and some of the responses to these crimes. The content is, in short, the usual.

SOME ORGANIZING QUESTIONS

What ought we to learn about crime and response from a report of this kind on "current social conditions and trends"? I suggest the report should tell us about the direction of trends in crime events, the reasons for these trends, the distribution of criminal victimization in society, changes in the nature of offending, the effect of crime on

1 U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service, *Program Plan for Statistics 1977–81* (Washington, D.C., USGPO, n.d.).

2. For a review of the history of national criminal justice statistics, see President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of Justice, Task Force on Assessment, Task Force Report: *Crime and Its Impact—An Assessment* (Washington, D.C., USGPO, 1967), chap. 10

3 A useful compilation on such matters is the annual *Insurance Facts*, published by the Insurance Information Institute. The data, like much crime data, are of uncertain reliability

our lives, the nature and extent of public and private response to crime, and the effect of that response on crime and on other aspects of our lives. A minimum set of questions is, what is happening? who is doing it? to whom is it happening? with what response? and why? I will examine the chapter for the light it sheds upon these questions, occasionally drawing upon other data.[4]

TRENDS IN CRIME

The Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, administered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, is the only source of national trend data on crime before 1973, and *Social Indicators, 1976* quite naturally uses these data. They show that, from 1960 to 1975, the trend for seven crimes, murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft, is upward, more or less unrelievedly so. The seven trends are quite similar, though robbery, sometimes considered particularly significant because it involves predatory violence, or the threat of it, rises a bit faster than the others, and the rise in motor vehicle theft tapers off a bit at the end.[5]

The data suggest, rather dismally, that the rise in recorded crime rates is inexorable and inevitable. It is not. The series presented in *Social Indicators, 1976* begin in 1960, and therefore cannot show that the period from 1960 to 1975 is unusual. Peculiarities in the way estimates of national reported crime rates have been constructed make extended comparisons over time highly questionable.[6] However, *Social Indicators, 1973* published trend data extending back to 1933. The trends generally appear U-shaped, falling from a peak in 1933 to a trough in the mid-1940s, generally flat until the late 1950s or early 1960s, and rising thereafter. Murder, for example, does not regain its 1933 peak until 1970; robbery, until 1967; burglary, 1954; and motor vehicle theft, 1965. The trends for the remaining three categories have less pronounced U-shapes, with aggrevated assault and larceny regaining their early peaks in the mid-1940s, while rape shows a gradual increase over the entire period. Perhaps the most important point about the time covered by *Social Indicators, 1976* is that it is an exceptional period and, unfortunately, the reader is not shown that.

These are trends in offenses recorded by the police, and what they tell us about trends in crime events is unclear. A crime comes to the attention of the police if they observe it or if another observer reports it to them. In recent years, surveys

4. Much information on these questions is available in small scale studies. I accept the same restrictions that apply to *SI '76* and use only national data.

5. The calculated "annual average rates of change" in the chapter manage to suggest the similarity of trends in spite of a somewhat eccentric method of calculation. The endpoints of the five-year intervals have been used to calculate an exponential growth curve, which ignores what happened in the intervening years. The reader is advised to pass over these calculations and to simply observe the logarithmic plots.

6. The technical notes explain that "the time-series of these data, which extends back to 1933, has undergone numerous adjustments from year to year, reflecting changes in the reporting units and in the concepts and definitions employed in classifying criminal events. Thus, the data shown in this report cover only the period 1960 to 1975, for which an internally consistent set of definitions and classifications has been utilized." This explanation is certainly correct in suggesting enormous difficulties for comparison over time, and almost surely overoptimistic in suggesting that the problems have been solved for the period since 1960.

of the population have asked people about their experiences as victims of crime. Many of the victims of crime do not report the event to the police, so a large proportion of all crimes cannot be recorded by the police. We do not know whether an increasing proportion of the crimes which occur have been reported to the police over the last 15 years or so, but it has been suggested that "as larger proportions of the population become integrated into the dominant society and come to share its normative conceptions, more people mobilize the police to enforce private deportment," and that "the professionalization and bureaucratization of police forces with centralized command and control leads to improved recordkeeping and greater use of formal, as opposed to informal, police procedures, with consequent increases in figures of offenses. . . ."[7] It would be ironic if the great increase in recorded crime over the period were explained by increasing police professionalism and racial integration, which both lead minority populations increasingly to report crimes which once went unreported. As Albert Biderman has written,

As people who once felt they were outside of the society feel more and more that they are a part of it, and as our law enforcement officials come to judge them by the same standards and give them the same protections as the middle class, we shall go through a period of decreasing crime but of increasing crime statistics. There will not be more crimes, but more *recorded* crimes.[8]

That is a comforting thought, but unlikely to be the full explanation of the recent rise in recorded crime.

Once reported to the police, events must be recorded, classified in the appropriate crime category, and reported to the FBI. Many reports do not survive the trip. Administrative practices within police departments explain much of the loss in transit,[9] and administrative practices have changed over time. Some of the increase in UCR figures may be explained by these changes.

The FBI attempts to estimate the amount of crime which would be recorded by those police departments which do not actually report to it. Over the years, the proportion of the population covered by reporting agencies has grown, so the published figures rely less and less on estimates for missing areas. Then, each year the FBI reestimates the totals and rates for previous years to take into account new knowledge about trends in areas newly reporting and to reduce the effects of changes in administrative practices. Thus the 1963 aggravated assault rate as reported in *Crime in the United States 1975* is 17.8 percent higher than the rate as reported in *Crime in the United States 1963*. Robbery is 16.4 percent higher; burglary, 11.4 percent; rape, 8 percent; while murder is only 2.2 percent higher and motor vehicle theft, 2.4 percent.[10] The price of better data is unstable history.

7 Albert D Biderman and Albert J. Reiss, Jr., "On Exploring the 'Dark Figure' of Crime," *The Annals*, vol. 374 (November 1967), p. 7.

8. Albert D. Biderman, "Social Indicators and Goals," in *Social Indicators*, ed. Raymond A. Bauer (Cambridge, Mass., M.I.T. Press, 1966), p. 125.

9. David Seidman and Michael Couzens, "Getting the Crime Rate Down Political Pressure and Crime Reporting," *Law and Society Review*, vol. 8 (Spring 1974), pp. 457–93.

10 The FBI does not publish reestimates for years before 1960, which in large measures explains why *SI '76* did not use earlier data. It is perhaps significant that murder and motor vehicle theft show the smallest adjustments. Both bodies and automobiles are large, valuable, uniquely identified, enmeshed in govern-

It is possible, then, that crime rates have been decreasing, while recorded crime rates have been increasing. But it is not likely. We have all seen too much of the changing character of life in our cities to believe the increase in crime is all a paper increase. And there is other hard evidence to confirm this impression: murder statistics are assembled by the Public Health Service as well as the FBI, and the two sources report much the same picture,[11] even though definitions vary slightly.

Dissatisfaction with both the reliability and the scope of UCR has led to the development of a new system for measuring crime rates. It grows from a simple, seemingly obvious, insight: if a major problem with UCR is that individuals frequently do not report their victimizations to the police, that problem could be avoided by asking scientifically selected samples of individuals about their experiences as victims of certain kinds of crimes. The interviews could also produce other information about crimes and victims not now available through UCR and, by preserving records organized in terms of individuals, allow more sophisticated analyses of relationships than is possible with UCR. From this insight has grown the National Crime Survey (NCS), a continuing national sample survey program (with additional surveys of a number of urban areas) of substantial cost and complexity.[12] Unlike UCR, NCS counts victimizations, not offenses.

In a perfect world, NCS would provide the "true" crime rate as a way of checking on the UCR rate. In the real world, NCS, like any other data system, provides only another probe into reality, and not reality itself. Furthermore, NCS does not use the same definitions as UCR and purports to describe a different universe. It relies on the fallible memories of victims, who differ in their propensities to report events to interviewers. And because NCS is new, it has unresolved methodological and conceptual problems.

In any event, UCR trends cannot be checked against NCS data simply because there are no NCS data before 1973. While differences in definitions, universes, and the like make comparison between the two data sources treacherous, a brief comment on trends from 1973 to 1975 may be useful. I compared the victimization rates of individuals or households for rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, and motor vehicle theft with the UCR offense rates for similar categories. None of the 1973–74 changes in victimization rates was statistically significant,[13] though all but one had the same sign as the corresponding UCR changes. One of the 1974–75 NCS changes—aggravated assault—was statistically significant (at the 90 percent level), but it was a decrease

ment paper chains, and likely to be insured. It is hard to ignore a dead body or the loss of a car.

11. The homicide rates in *SI '76* chart 6/3A are age adjusted; they reflect what the homicide rate would be with current age-specific rates and the age structure of the 1940 population. The adjustment is designed, in effect, to control for the relationship between homicide rate and the age of the victim. The figures before adjustment are different, but the trend is quite similar.

12. The most complete discussion of NCS available is National Research Council, Panel for the Evaluation of Crime Surveys, *Surveying Crime* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1976).

13. Because NCS is based on sampling techniques, variability in estimates is to be expected. Therefore, statistical tests of hypotheses such as no change are appropriate. UCR is not based on sampling, so tests of this kind are not appropriate for UCR data.

while the corresponding UCR change was an increase. Indeed, while all of the UCR categories showed increases, four of the five NCS categories (motor vehicle theft is the exception) showed decreases. Percentage changes from 1973 to 1975 were small. The largest was a decrease of 4.3 percent in aggravated assault. Two were increases, two were decreases, and one was approximately zero. UCR offense rates for these five crimes increased by from 6 percent to 24 percent. Very different pictures emerge from the two sources of data.

NCS provides estimates of the proportion of victimizations reported to the police. Since changes in that proportion might account for the different pictures, I multiplied the victimization rates by the appropriate proportions and then recomputed the percentage changes. For the one year changes, there is one additional instance of agreement in sign between UCR and NCS. The two-year NCS changes now all agree in sign with the UCR changes, but differ substantially in magnitude. Major discrepancies between the two data systems remain, and they are unexplained.

The unfortunate conclusion is that we do not have very much information about trends in crime. The data suggest a sustained increase in crime rates over a 15-year period and that our experience in the 30 years before that was quite different. But while it is implausible that there was no substantial increase in crime between, say, 1960 and 1975, we simply do not know how much of the increase in measured crime rates is due to increases in real crime rates and how much is due to other factors. *SI '76* recites the appropriate caveats, but I suspect they carry little weight when the pictured trends are so striking and when it is baldly stated that "the rates of both violent and property crimes have risen substantially and dramatically." The art form *SI '76* represents has difficulty coping with such peculiar data.

THE VICTIMS

The chances of being a victim are not evenly distributed throughout the society. UCR data are published disaggregated by size of reporting jurisdiction, though without many of the refinements and adjustments used for the national data. They show, roughly, that crime rates increase with the size of the reporting jurisdiction, and that rates of increase have been roughly the same for all size categories over the 1960–75 period. Since the data are worse than the national data, it was perhaps wise not to include them in *SI '76*.

UCR data are available by jurisdiction, so it is also possible to examine the statistical relationships between various characteristics of jurisdictions and crime rates. This kind of analysis has long been a staple of criminology,[14] but none of the findings are included in *SI '76*. Reasons for the omission may include the unreliability of the crime rates, the unenlightening character of the findings, and the lack of time series studies.

Vital Statistics has long reported homicide rates by age, sex, and color of the victim. As displayed in *SI '76*, the disparities in rates when sex and color are considered are enormous and relatively stable, though the rates themselves are rising. The reasons for the disparities

14 The state of the art, as of a decade ago, is reviewed by Judith A. Wilks, "Ecological Correlates of Crime and Delinquency," in President's Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice, *Crime and its Impact*, appendix A.

are suggested by nothing in *SI '76*. Indeed, other data in the chapter suggest mainly the extraordinary character of the disparities. Undoubtedly the apparent importance of color here and elsewhere would diminish substantially if such variables as education, income, and employment status were simultaneously considered. Color bears a heavy weight when other variables are ignored.

NCS allows much more detailed analysis of the distribution of victimization in society. The chapter text summarizes much of the information nicely:

> In general, males are about twice as likely as females to fall victim to crimes of violence and are also more likely to fall victim to personal crimes of theft . . . Blacks and persons of Spanish origin are somewhat more likely than whites to be victimized by personal crimes of violence and theft. [But the data show whites have higher victimization rates for crimes of theft.] The rate of victimization for personal crimes of violence tends to decline with increased income of the victim, while that of victimization for personal crimes of theft rises with increased income of the victim.

These findings are hardly surprising, but the details raise some questions. The victimization rate for crimes of violence for black males is 23.6 percent higher than the rate for white males,[15] a remarkably small difference in light of the difference in age-adjusted death rates from homicide: the rate for "other" males (mainly black) in 1973 was 786.2 percent higher than that for white males. Disaggregating "crimes of violence," we find that white males have a higher victimization rate for combined aggravated and simple assault than black males (35.0 versus 31.9). This is composed of a lower white rate for aggravated assault (15.5 versus 19.2) and a higher one for simple assault (19.5 versus 12.7). Similarly, white males have a lower robbery victimization rate (8.9 versus 22.6), but a higher proportion of that rate is "without injury" for whites (70 percent) than for blacks (64 percent). Thus the data show that black males are relatively and for simple assault absolutely, infrequently victimized by the less serious crimes of violence. This does not seem reasonable, and suggests artifacts in the data. Blacks appear less likely than whites to report minor incidents to interviewers. Educational attainment may explain some of the difference. Then, undercoverage and nonresponse in NCS "vary by demographic categories, and it is a fair presumption that undercoverage is greatest for persons with no usual place of residence and for some classes of persons who have higher-than-average exposure to victimization."[16] Black males are especially likely to be both victimized and undercounted. NCS findings here may be misleading.

Victimization rates show little variation by place of residence, and most of the variation is between central cities and other places. UCR shows much larger variations by size of place, but the categorization is by size of the jurisdiction where the

15. The rates do not include "series victimizations (i.e., those cases in which the respondent says he was victimized three or more times but cannot give certain details of the individual incidents.)" National Research Council, *Surveying Crime*, p. 77. NCS methodology depends upon descriptions of details, so these are set aside. Obviously, including them would increase the victimization rates by an unknown quantity, and not necessarily by the same quantity for different population groups or different types of victimizations.

16. National Research Council, *Surveying Crime*, p. 28.

crime occurred, not, as in NCS, by size of central city in the metropolitan area where the victim resides. NCS would probably show more variation by size of place if UCR categories were used, and tallying victimizations by place of occurrence rather than by place of residence would surely sharpen the differences between central cities and other places. With these adjustments, NCS data might or might not show variation by size of place as large as that found in UCR. As they stand, they suggest that location matters less to victimization than other data have indicated.

Sharp differences do appear in the rates of victimization for different age groups—and these are not mentioned in *SI '76*. Considerable public attention has been given to the victimization of the aged, but NCS data consistently show that victimization rates for the elderly are substantially lower than those for the young: rates peak in either the 12–15 age group or the 16–19 age group and taper off sharply after that. For crimes of violence and personal larceny, the victimization rate of those 65 and over in 1974 was about 13 percent of the rate for those 16–19.[17] Youth is the time for victimization.

Why do the elderly appear less threatened than others? Perhaps because they avoid threatening places, situations, and associates. If so, victimization rates are limited as a means of identifying social problems, because they take no direct account of exposure. Street crime must be low when no one uses the streets. More useful rates would relate victimization to the activities in which people engage and the places they frequent. The logic here is more general, and is occasionally followed by NCS: the rates for crimes against households use number of households, not individuals, as the base. And *SI '73* recomputed UCR motor vehicle theft and burglary rates, using registered vehicles as the base for motor vehicle theft and households and business establishments for burglary. Choice of base for rates is an unresolved problem, and that choice matters.

The victimization data in *SI '76* reflect insufficient analysis. We learn from *SI '76* and published reports of the NCS that victimization by violent crimes is relatively high among blacks, the poor, those in central cities, and the young. But blacks are disproportionately poor, young, and located in central cities (though those who live elsewhere may be victimized in central cities). Neither the independent effects of these factors nor their patterns of interaction are revealed in *SI '76*. Since *SI '76* is based on data analysis done elsewhere, the problem lies elsewhere: the tabulations produced by the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration and the Census Bureau do not allow the requisite multivariate analysis. Producing these tabulations is a needed step towards answering some important questions.[18]

VICTIMS AND OFFENDERS

Common wisdom among criminologists has long held that in a large proportion of violent crime, victim and offender know each other—

17 U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service, *Criminal Victimization in the United States. A Comparison of 1974 and 1975 Findings* (A National Crime Survey Report, no. SD–NCP–N–5, February 1977), table 4.

18. This is difficult, because crime is a rare event. It may be necessary to aggregate data over a considerable period of time in order to find enough victimizations of, say, wealthy old suburban blacks to allow analysis.

indeed, they are often relatives or spouses. This wisdom has been based on fragmentary information. The point is an important one, because the social character of violent crime depends in large measure upon whether it consists of friends and relatives brutalizing each other or of anonymous attacks by strangers. NCS, which asked victims about the offender, provides the first detailed national look at this question, and *SI '76* reports the results. They do not support the common wisdom: according to NCS data, the victims of violent crime are more often the victims of strangers.

While important, the finding is also questionable. There is good evidence that victimizations by strangers are more likely to be reported to survey interviewers than victimizations by nonstrangers, and the effect of this differential reporting may be substantial:

> We are not concerned that there might exist a small bias in this stranger-violence quotient; we are not quibbling over whether 60 or 70 percent of violent crimes reported to NCS interviewers are attributed to strangers. Rather, we are concerned that a more appropriate figure, adjusted for differential reporting of victimizations according to relationship between victim and offender, could be less than one-half, if so, the policy implications would appear to be quite different.[19]

The adjustment will not be an easy one.

While murder is undoubtedly an atypical crime, comparison with UCR statistics on the circumstances of murder may be instructive. UCR classifies murders according to whether they are "spouse killing spouse, parent killing child, other relative killings, romantic triangle and lovers' quarrels, known felony-type, and suspected felony-type." Felony-type murders are "those killings resulting from robbery, burglary, sex motive, gangland and institutional slaying, and all other felonious activities."[20] In 1974, only 27.8 percent of the murders were counted as known or suspected felony-type, but the proportion has been rising. (See table 1.) If these statistics reflect the circumstances of other violent crimes, the common wisdom on the relationship between victims and offenders is correct, but is becoming less valid. Since the NCS finding was known to be subject to question, *SI '76* might well have omitted it.

TABLE 1

PERCENTAGE OF UCR MURDERS WHICH ARE KNOWN OR SUSPECTED FELONY TYPE

YEAR	PERCENT FELONY TYPE
1963	17
1964	20
1965	21
1966	22
1967	21
1968	25
1969	26
1970	29
1971	28
1972	27
1973	29
1974	28
1975	32

SOURCE. *Uniform Crime Reports—Crime in the United States*, annual issues

SYSTEM RESPONSE AND THE CAUSES OF CHANGE

It is difficult to separate the question of the criminal justice system's response to the (presumed) increase in crime from that of the explanation of the increase, in part because system response provides much of the data upon which explanation rests,

19 National Research Council, *Surveying Crime*, p. 120.

20 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Uniform Crime Reports. Crime in the United States 1973* (Washington, D.C., USGPO, 1974), p. 9

and in part because system response may itself be a large part of that explanation. As the system arrests and further processes individuals, records are created. By telling us about individuals identified by the system as having committed offenses, these records help explain the increase. But the criminal justice system does not identify all offenders, and in any event is permeated by administrative discretion. Police, for example, arrest on the basis of both discretionary judgments and the information they are able to obtain. Arrest statistics, therefore, are partly determined by the number of offenders, partly by the skill of offenders in avoiding arrest, and partly by the habits and patterns of the police in the use of their discretion.[21] Data from later stages of the criminal process are probably even less likely to reflect the offender population accurately, so it is perhaps fortunate that such data were not available for *SI '76*: they might suggest inappropriate conclusions.

It is unlikely that estimates of arrest rates for different age groups for urban places were included in *SI '76* merely to provide information about the changing behavior of the police. For better or for worse, they must be considered as saying something about offenders as well. The message is striking: arrest rates increased rapidly over the period, and, particularly for crimes of violence, the increase was even more rapid for youths, who began the period with rates already higher than those for the older population.[22]

These changes in rates obscure the change in age composition of arrestees, because over the period the age distribution of the population shifted. For example, between 1960 and 1973, the proportion of the total United States population aged 14–24 grew from 15.1 percent to 20.5 percent. Thus, those under 25 accounted for 46 percent of arrests in 1960, but for 61 percent in 1974. For crimes of theft, the proportion rose from 75 percent to 80 percent.

If age-specific arrest rates reflect age-specific offense rates (and of course they may not), some of the increase in total offense rates can be attributed simply to the changing age distribution. If the age-specific 1960 arrest rates applied to the 1974 population distribution, the total arrest rate for violent crimes would be about 54 percent of the actual total arrest rate in 1974, and the same is true for crimes of theft.[23] So the age distribution may directly account for about half the increase.

The rest of the increase in offense rates is, under the assumption linking arrests and offenses, due to rising age-specific rates. Convincing ex-

21 See, for example, Jerome H Skolnick, *Justice Without Trial* (New York: Wiley, 1966) UCR collects arrest data, but from fewer jurisdictions than report offenses.

22. The choice of an arithmetic scale for these charts obscures the rates of increase. For both crimes of violence and crimes of theft, the percentage increase was highest for the youngest age group and lowest for the oldest. The most extreme difference, between 11–14 year olds and those 25 and older for crimes of violence, is the difference between a 1960–74 increase of 177.8 percent and one of 52 2 percent. The pattern is not the same for each of the separate crimes. For example, arrest rates for motor vehicle theft did not increase much at all, and those for 15–17-year-olds were lower at the end of the period than at the beginning.

23 The figure varies for the separate crimes. These computations are not very reliable. the population figures, those used to compute the rates in *SI '76*, are derived by assuming the age distribution for the jurisdictions reporting arrests to UCR is the same as that for the United States as a whole If UCR published lists of the reporting jurisdictions, the age distribution for at least Census years could be examined, but the lists are not published. The results might also differ somewhat if finer age categories were used

planations of these increases are not easy to find. The high arrest rate increases among the young provide a clue. A major function of social institutions is the socialization of the young. It has been argued that as the moving wave of the baby boom passed through adolescence, these social institutions—schools and employment markets, for example—were swamped, and the result was rising crime rates.[24] This is hard to demonstrate with available data, but Irving Leveson has found a relationship between crime rates and that part of the youth unemployment rate which is not related to the adult unemployment rate; this is at least consistent with the socialization argument. Leveson also found that adult unemployment rates over the period were not significantly related to crime rates.[25]

UCR publishes arrest data by sex and race, as well as by age, but simultaneous classifications by these three variables are not published or even collected. Analysis is therefore limited in sophistication. The separate tabulations by sex and race include a single age break, at age 18. Some of the increase in arrest rates can be attributed to more rapid increases for females than for males. For crimes of theft, about 11 percent of all arrests were of women in 1960, but by 1974, the proportion had grown to about 22 percent. The increase was about the same for the two age groups, under 18 and 18 and over. For crimes of violence, excluding rape, the proportion changed almost not at all (from 12 percent to 11 percent), but among those under 18, there was an increase from 7 percent to 10 percent, while for the older age group, there was a decrease from 13 percent to 11 percent. Increases may be due to either, or both, increased offense rates among women, or an increased willingness to arrest women.[26] In any event, these data do not suggest that women played any great role in the large increases in offense rates. Perhaps no damage was done by excluding these data from *SI '76*, though there may be substantial public curiosity about them.

The link between race and crime is a sensitive subject, which may explain why no equivalent of the *SI '73* chart showing arrest rates by race is included in *SI '76*. Blacks have higher arrest rates. Some of the difference may well be attributable to differential police treatment of whites and blacks, but not all: blacks have higher victimization rates as well. Differences between blacks and whites in age distribution, income, and so forth might account for the rest, but the data to test the hypothesis do not exist. While arrest rates for both blacks and whites increased over the period, the rate of increase for whites has in general been greater.[27] Be-

24 James Q. Wilson makes roughly this argument in *Thinking About Crime* (New York: Basic Books, 1975), chap. 1.

25. Irving Leveson, "The Growth of Crime," (Hudson Institute HI-2444/2-D, July 1976), chap. III.

26. The data here differ from those analyzed by Rita James Simon, *The Contemporary Woman and Crime*, Crime and Delinquency Issues: A Monograph Series, National Institute of Mental Health, Center for Studies of Crime and Delinquency (Washington, D.C. USGPO, 1975), because Simon did not use the age classification To use it, I had to rely on a different set of tables in the annual issues of Uniform Crime Reports. Further, there are slight differences in categories of crime examined. The results for the total population, however, are essentially identical. Simon points out that increased willingness to arrest does not explain the differences between crimes of violence and crimes of theft. Thus she sees the explanation largely in terms of changes in women's opportunities to commit certain types of crimes. See Simon, p. 48.

27. Leveson has examined this in some detail in *The Growth of Crime*, chap. II The outcome of the comparison depends upon

cause black arrest rates are so much higher, arrest rates for the total population may have increased because of an increasing black proportion of the population in the reporting jurisdictions, particularly in the high arrest age groups. But UCR does not tell us which are the reporting jurisdictions. Leveson, using crude data, concludes that the effect here was small.[28]

Considered as indicators of system response, the key fact about the arrest rates—which *SI '76* does not point out—is that they grew less rapidly than reported offense rates.[29] UCR provides data on the proportion of arrests which result in criminal charges, the proportion of charges which result in conviction—by trial or plea—and the disposition of those convicted, but they are of very poor quality. For what it is worth, Leveson has assembled and examined the data, finding that, in general, the dropoff at each stage in the criminal process has increased over time.[30]

The classic form of punishment for crime is imprisonment. Since the rise in arrests has not kept pace with the rise in reported offenses, and since arrests have become less likely to lead to conviction, it would not be surprising to find that the proportion of the population imprisoned has not increased as rapidly as the reported offense rate. In fact, the imprisonment rate has declined since 1961. Since 1926, the National Prisoner Statistics (NPS) program has assembled data on the year-end population of state and federal prisons. Figure 1 presents these data as rates per 100,000 along with UCR offense rates for crimes of violence.[31] The number of prisoners has also declined since 1961. The increase in recorded offense rates has evidently been accompanied by a decline in punishment.[32] This is important for at least two reasons: First, incarceration undoubtedly affects the quality of life of those incarcerated, and the size of the institutionalized population may say something about the character of a society. Second, imprisonment may affect the crime rate through deterrence of potential offenders and incapacitation of those in prison.[33] It may be that the decline

both the precise crimes considered and the exact time period. Thus, between 1963 and 1973, the percentage increase in arrest rates for crimes of violence taken together and for crimes of theft taken together was greater among whites, but the reverse is true between 1963 and 1969. And for 1963–73, blacks had the larger percentage increase in arrest rates for murder and robbery

28. Ibid., pp. IV–11 and pp. IV–12.

29. The relation between arrests and offenses is tangled. One offense, with multiple offenders, may lead to many arrests One arrest, of a multiple offender, may "clear" many offenses. And, of course, some arrests are of individuals who have committed no offense. UCR data do not permit untangling. UCR data on the proportion of offenses "cleared by arrest" exist, but they are generally considered highly unreliable.

30. Leveson, *The Growth of Crime*, chap VI There is variation by crime type.


31. NPS is a voluntary reporting program which has been modified over the years The data should be taken as only roughly approximating the trend. NPS also provides a series on prisoners received by state and federal prisons, but it is less reliable than the series used here.

32 For a discussion of the long-term stability of the prison population, see Alfred Blumstein and Jacqueline Cohen, "A Theory of the Stability of Punishment," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, vol 64 (June 1973), pp 198–207, and Alfred Blumstein, Jacqueline Cohen, and Daniel Nagin, "The Dynamics of a Homeostatic Punishment Process," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, vol. 67 (Sept. 1976), pp 317–34

33. The literature on deterrence is immense, and that on incapacitation is growing. For a recent discussion of both, see National Academy of Sciences, Panel on Research on Deterrent and Incapacitative Effects, *Deterrence and Incapacitation: Estimating the Effects of Criminal Sanctions on Crime Rates* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, forthcoming).

FIGURE 1

POPULATION OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONS AT END OF YEAR; CRIMES OF VIOLENCE, 1940–1973 (RATES)



SOURCE *Imprisonment Rate*
1940–1970. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Prisons, "National Prisoner Statistics Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions for Adult Felons, 1968, 1969, 1970," table 2
1971–1973 U.S Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, National Criminal Justice Information and Statistics Service, "Prisoners in State and Federal Institutions on December 31, 1974," table 4
Crimes of Violence
Social Indicators, 1973.

in punishment, reflected in both the prison and the arrest statistics, provides not merely information about the performance of the criminal justice system, but also a partial explanation of the rise in the recorded offense rate.

It is difficult to understand why *SI '76* did not include the NPS data.[34] The omission is just one of the weaknesses of the "Social Responses" section of the chapter, which tells us very little about explanations of the presumed increase in crime, the response of the system to that increase, or the consequences of system response. Part of the weakness can be attributed to the difficulty of providing explanation in a chartbook, part to the weaknesses of the available data. But there were readily avail-

34 It provides instead data on the jail population in 1970 and on juveniles in detention and correctional facilities in 1971 and 1973 The data are of interest, but they say nothing about trends or system response to serious crime

able data which could and should have been used.

PRIVATE RESPONSE

The consequences of a rapid increase in crime rates might best be understood through an examination of the responses of individuals to perceived threats to their own safety. Unfortunately, data concerning such responses are hard to find. *SI '76* includes only a series on production and importation of firearms for private sale and some opinion poll responses covering very little of the period in which the increase occurred. The firearms data are striking—and the absence of such data for 1971–73 illustrates the failure of the system to monitor private responses. Reading into the series perhaps more than is there, the fear of crime seems to have led many individuals to resort to self-defense measures, indicating their lack of faith in the ability of the system to provide protection.[35] The consequences are perhaps shown in the rising proportion of murders which are committed with firearms. Some argue that the rising murder rate is in part attributable to the increased availability of firearms,[36] but a linkage between firearms purchases induced by the fear of crime and firearms murders has not been clearly established.

The opinion data, covering at best the period 1972–75, are not very revealing: the period is too short for substantial changes in opinion to be found, and the major increase in recorded crime rates preceded the earliest data point. The restricted range appears to reflect a decision to take all the data from the General Social Survey (GSS) of the National Opinion Research Center. GSS, however, was designed to repeat questions asked earlier in other surveys, so longer time series were available for *SI '76*. For example, a series on the question "Are you in favor of the death penalty for persons convicted of murder?" can be constructed from Gallup Polls beginning in 1936.[37] The percentage favoring the death penalty reached its low point in 1966, and has risen rather steadily since then. The period of the rise corresponds to a period of noticeably rising recorded crime rates, which suggests that support for capital punishment is a response to rising crime rates. However, it also corresponds to a period in which there were no executions.[38] Support may decline again if executions become frequent.

The data on private response are exceedingly sketchy, but *SI '76* concludes that, taken together with the data on system response, "they provide ample evidence that concern with the impact of crime on public safety is perhaps second only to concern with health in our society." Perhaps not. The 1974 *Annual Housing Survey* asked occupants of a sample of housing units in the United States about the adequacy of neighborhood services. The proportion responding that the service was inadequate was higher for public transportion, shopping, and hospitals and health clinics than for police protection. Of those saying the service was inade-

35 I have explored this question extensively elsewhere. See David Seidman, "The Urban Arms Race. A Quantitative Analysis of Private Arming" (Ph.D diss., Yale University, 1975).

36. See, for example, Richard Block, "Homicide in Chicago. A Nine-year Study (1965–1973)," *Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology*, vol. 66 (Sept 1975), pp 496–510

37 There are minor variations in question wording. The data can be found in Michael J Hindelang *et al*, *Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics—1976* (Washington, D C.: USGPO, 1977), table 2.59.

38. The number fell from 56 in 1960 to 1 in 1966, rising to 2 in 1967. Then there were none until 1976 Ibid., table 6.124.

quate, there were more respondents who said that public transportation was so inadequate they would like to move from the neighborhood than there were who said this about police protection. When asked about undesirable conditions in the neighborhood, more people cited noise and heavy traffic than cited crime.[39] These data, of course, are not precisely to the point, but neither are the data in *SI '76*. In any case, they begin to suggest that concern about crime may have less to do with its impact on public safety than with something else, perhaps a generalized concern about the character of the society.[40] This seems to be one of the rare instances in which *SI '76* drew an incautious inference. The effort could better have been made elsewhere.

CONCLUSION

Having abandoned the aim of reporting on "Public Safety and Legal Justice," *SI '76* was still faced with an extremely difficult problem. The major source of data on trends (UCR) is unreliable, while the other major data source (NCS) is new and insufficiently analyzed and understood. The variables which would allow description and understanding of social conditions are often not measured at all. Crucial relationships are difficult to show in graphical form. Mainly for these reasons, though in part because of choices made in the design of the chapter, "Public Safety" is a weak report on "social conditions and trends."

Early in this paper, I identified a minimum set of questions. How well does *SI '76* do in answering them? First, in answer to "what is happening?," it suggests that crime is increasing, but the time period chosen removes the data from their context. Less information is provided on why there has been such an increase, though some can be teased out of the data. The distribution of criminal victimization is haphazardly presented, though, since the data are less familiar than the UCR trends, this presentation is particularly important. Questions about the nature of offending and offenders are hardly addressed at all, and in at least one instance addressed with highly questionable data. Response to increases in reported crime is presented only in very sketchy form, with the data on imprisonment the most striking omission. The interaction of response and trend, never mentioned in *SI '76*, is particularly difficult to address because the imprisonment data are missing. In short, the minimum set of questions is not well answered. Neither is it well answered here. *SI '76* can be no better than the available data base.

39. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Current Housing Reports*, Final Report H-150074, Annual Housing Survey, 1974, part B, "Indicators of Housing and Neighborhood Quality for the United States and Regions" (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1976), table A-4.

40. See Frank F. Furstenberg, Jr., "Public Reaction to Crime in the Streets," *American Scholar*, vol. 40 (Autumn 1971), pp. 601–10.

Chart 6/11 Social Indicators, 1976

PERCENT OF VICTIMIZATIONS REPORTED TO THE POLICE, BY RACE OF VICTIMS AND TYPE OF CRIME, 1974




Table 6/11

VICTIMIZATIONS REPORTED TO POLICE, BY RACE OF VICTIMS AND TYPE OF CRIME: 1974

(Percent)

Type of crime	White victims	Black victims
All crimes of violence ...	46.7	48.0
Rape	52.5	52.2
Robbery	53.1	55.3
Aggravated assault	52.9	54.4
Simple assault	39.6	28.5
All crimes of theft	24.7	24.0
Burglary	47.7	48.6
Household larceny	26.1	17.9
Motor vehicle theft	66.6	72.8

Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, *Criminal Victimization in the United States, A Comparison of 1973 and 1974 Findings*, Report No. SD-NCP-N-3, 1976.

Table 6/12
URBAN POLICE ARRESTS OF SUSPECTED OFFENDERS FOR CRIMES OF VIOLENCE, BY AGE OF SUSPECTS: 1960–1974
(Rate per 100,000 urban population)


Year	Total, all ages	11 to 14 years old	15 to 17 years old	18 to 24 years old	25 years old and over
1960	144.1	70.3	273.0	357.6	111.3
1961	150.5	69.1	287.5	386.5	114.1
1962	144.0	76.3	272.4	360.9	109.6
1963	145.3	73.7	272.9	356.9	108.0
1964	151.6	79.1	279.9	368.5	111.8
1965	162.8	99.3	323.0	379.9	115.7
1966	176.2	110.9	362.4	400.5	123.7
1967	189.2	122.9	408.3	436.1	127.3
1968	200.0	146.0	437.3	473.3	125.4
1969	215.9	153.1	476.5	526.0	130.6
1970	232.1	163.9	523.5	550.3	140.0
1971	201.0	180.3	574.6	599.4	150.3
1972	270.6	194.9	601.2	634.3	163.0
1973	262.6	186.7	595.3	607.7	158.0
1974	291.5	195.3	674.7	703.4	169.4

Source: National Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence, Staff Report, *Crimes of Violence*, Vol. II, 1969; U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Uniform Crime Reports for the United States*, annual issues, 1960–1974; and U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-25, Nos. 519 and 529.

Chart 6/12

Social Indicators, 1976

URBAN POLICE ARREST RATES OF SUSPECTED OFFENDERS FOR CRIMES OF VIOLENCE, BY AGE OF SUSPECTS, 1960–1974



Source: see table 6/12

Table 6/13

URBAN POLICE ARRESTS OF SUSPECTED OFFENDERS FOR CRIMES OF THEFT, BY AGE OF SUSPECTS: 1960–1974

(Rate per 100,000 urban population)

Year	Total, all ages	11 to 14 years old	15 to 17 years old	18 to 24 years old	25 years old and over
1960	581.0[1]	1,212.3[1]	2,596.1	1,181.1	206.9
1961	618.9[1]	1,261.6[1]	2,790.0	1,240.3	223.2
1962	617.2[1]	1,339.1[1]	2,679.2	1,153.8	210.6
1963	662.4[1]	1,410.6[1]	2,830.3	1,224.1	222.4
1964	692.5	1,636.4	2,930.3	1,278.9	217.2
1965	718.3	1,744.8	3,087.8	1,258.6	226.9
1966	722.2	1,831.5	3,113.0	1,218.8	217.5
1967	773.3	1,912.5	3,288.6	1,323.2	232.8
1968	815.3	1,944.8	3,448.7	1,448.0	239.1
1969	861.4	2,007.0	3,557.1	1,571.6	250.9
1970	968.1	2,080.2	3,905.9	1,826.7	295.4
1971	1,003.7	2,126.8	4,049.5	1,933.3	307.9
1972	984.9	2,097.9	3,871.4	1,877.0	305.9
1973	954.6	2,013.2	3,820.2	1,807.4	294.4
1974	1,164.1	2,470.0	4,734.9	2,260.1	344.6


Source: U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, *Uniform Crime Reports for the United States*, annual issues, 1960–1974; and U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P-25, Nos. 519 and 529.

[1] Arrest data include persons under 11 years of age; population base includes persons 10 years old but not under 10.

Chart 6/13

Social Indicators, 1976

URBAN POLICE ARREST RATES OF SUSPECTED OFFENDERS FOR CRIMES OF THEFT, BY AGE OF SUSPECTS, 1960–1974



Source: see table 6/13

ANNALS, AAPSS, 435, Jan. 1

Social Indicators, 1976 and *Perspective Canada II*: Elixirs of Reason or of Sleep?

By DAVID A. BRUSEGARD

ABSTRACT: Both *Social Indicators, 1976* and its Canadian counterpart, *Perspective Canada II*, are produced by government organizations with the intent to develop social indicators and provide a social report on the condition and progress of their respective nations. Having examined both publications, the author suggests that neither goal has been accomplished or properly dealt with. It is argued that to accomplish either objective in a satisfactory manner, both *Social Indicators, 1976* and *Perspective Canada II* must change their organization, commentary, authorship, and intended audience. Among other things, such publications must seek authors outside of government and actively draw them to the attention of education and public audiences.

David A. Brusegard is the Chief of the Social Indicator Unit of Statistics Canada. He formerly headed the Social Statistics unit of the province of Alberta. The author of articles on the development of social indicators and social reporting, Dr. Brusegard is the associate editor of and a contributor to the Perspective Canada *series. A major monograph on national level social reporting for the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development is in press.*

Perspective Canada II is available from: Publications Distribution, Statistics Canada, Ottawa, Ontario, Canada K1A 0T6 (Order catalogue number 11-508/1977) It may be purchased for $9.25 ($11.00 for orders outside Canada).

IF EVER the reasonable musings of men were to submit to the shackles of censorship, the standard four letter words would not be the target of the outlawing knife. By far the most disreputable and myth-conjuring expression to creep into rational discussion is the innocuous but prostitutional, "quality of life." Mere utterance of the words can seduce research grants, father promiscuous social surveys, and breed varied reports, books, and papers, all seeking recognition as the true and rightful offspring. This is the most bogus concept ever to have been embraced by seemingly intelligent men and women.

Concern with this elusive element of our existence has resulted in a situation in which almost every piece of social research, government program, and statistical measurement is reputed to be in some way prompted by or related to our quality of life. Those concerned with monitoring or measuring social conditions and trends, and who took both their work and a humanistic concern seriously, saw it as only fair to erect a terminological barrier to protect themselves. "Social indicator" is still an attempt to keep out the vulgate.

The problem in moving emphasis from concern with the quality of life to the development of social indicators is that the defense is almost too good. Few if any serious researchers in government and the academic community will admit to having come across a bona fide member of the species. While the publication *Social Indicators, 1976* offers great hopes, it slips in the escape rider that its data are not really ideal social indicators, only a step in the appropriate direction. The Canadian contemporary, *Perspective Canada II*, makes no pretense at backbone. For the original authors, social indicators were to be those data series that people ended up calling "social indicators"—hardly an indefensible position even if no data were so named.

SOCIAL REPORTING IN CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

In attempting to contrast *Social Indicators, 1976* with *Perspective Canada II* I found myself continually drawn to more fundamental questions that lay at the existence and character of both. It is clear that both publications are up to the same thing, but there is a distinct flavor to the introductions of both that would indicate that neither is aware of exactly what they are up to. We should wonder then, what in the world is being delivered to us in these relatively lush government publications, and what should be delivered. Public funds and hard work have generated these publications, but are they examples of the trivia buff's delight, statistical digests for a select few, or something beyond this?

The original intentions of the masterminds of social reporting were somewhat diverse, but in general their publications were to provide a decisionmaking tool for high-level policymakers. The audience for social reports were the policymakers themselves and the planning establishments who served the usually elected policymakers. Depending upon the perspective, such tools were to help in the management of social phenomena in the same way that economic indicators permitted control of and reaction to economic phenomena,[1] or to provide an information system for social plan-

1 See for example, Bertram N. Gross, *The State of the Nation. Social Systems Accounting* (New York Tavistock Publications, 1966).

ning,[2] or place social issues into a cost/benefit context so that they could be dealt with in those terms.[3] All this was to provide a value-introducing, politically-motivating, and problem-solving force, the vehicles of which were to be publications like *Social Indicators, 1976* and *Perspective Canada II*, which in some way applied social and socio-economic statistics to common concerns.

What has happened is that neither *Social Indicators, 1976* nor *Perspective Canada II* have become the Bible of the planning elite or the embodiment of early hopes. The early hopes were too lofty and significant strides toward a comprehensive set or system of social indicators require much more work than the original proponents might have imagined. Thus there may be a tendency for some critics to set these statistical pachyderms aside as monuments to an impractical idealism that preached concern with the well-being of the individual and consideration for human benefit. I suggest, however, that such a dismissal would constitute a tragic error, for what is at present correctly perceived to be a low-to-moderate-use reference item for planning agencies and researchers, is in fact the embryo of what could become a widely used and valuable vehicle for social communication and understanding for elected officials, socially aware citizens, and their future counterparts—the high school and university student.

2. See Raymond A. Bauer, *Social Indicators* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1966), and "Societal Feedback," *The Annals*, vol 373 (Sept 1967), pp 180–92

3 See Daniel Bell, "The Idea of a Social Report," *The Public Interest* 15 (Spring 1969), pp. 72–84; and "The Adequacy of Our Concepts," in *A Great Society?*, ed. Bertram N. Gross (New York: Basic Books, 1966), pp. 127–61.

THE NEED FOR CHANGE

To discover how this might happen, and how social reports must change, one must see the other premises in the argument:

1.) Both *Social Indicators, 1976* and *Perspective Canada II* conflate the presentation of social indicators with the different, but related, task of providing national level social commentary and explanations of social changes. At the root of the problem is a preoccupation with social indicators. Social indicator strategies focus upon standardized areas of concern and attempt to provide a few series that permit inferences regarding the attainment of national or obvious social goals; but there is a natural tendency and need in publications like *Social Indicators, 1976* and *Perspective Canada II* to detail and make clear the social changes and trends taking place in our society. To do the second job using the strategies of the first results in half-way products like the documents just mentioned.

Social Indicators, 1976 divides its chapters into three sections, the basic "hard" measures, public perceptions, and international comparisons. This very structure lends itself to continued regimentation over time and the logical product of such work, given progress in the development of social indicators, is an even more defined publication that would provide us with the same statistical series year after year. It thus becomes an increasingly less useful publication, much on the model of major economic indicator summaries.

2.) A second premise is that the really important debates on social

planning and alternatives take place in various direct or indirect forms between politician and politician, or politician and the public or special interest groups. Neither politicians nor the public are overly sophisticated with respect to the use of statistics for decisionmaking or problem solving. Both must be approached in a way that is not only comprehensible but intuitive in its use of concepts and treatment of the interrelations of social phenomena. In the simplest terms social reports must address the issues of what is happening, what are the likely reasons for its happening, and what does this mean for us as a group or segment of the population five or ten years down the road. There is little of this integrated approach in either *Social Indicators, 1976* or *Perspective Canada II*.


3.) The last premise is that interesting and topical national level social policy and social problem issues are not easily organized under the national goals model presently used by *Social Indicators, 1976* or *Perspective Canada II*. Treatment of issues such as children's rights, women's rights, immigration policies, and drug abuse do not fall neatly into chapters standardly titled "Family," "Population," or "Health." It is perhaps noteworthy that *Social Indicators, 1976* has considered immigration in its introduction rather than in a specific chapter. One can only guess whether this is a consequence of the rigidity of the book's structure or the intentions of the authors.

If these three fundamental premises are accepted, then we can come closer to a conception of what such publications can do best and what they should be doing. It is evident from what I have said so far that I take the real goals of government-sponsored documents like *Social Indicators, 1976* and *Perspective Canada II* to be separable into two components: (1) the provision of social indicators relating to the attainment of national goals, and (2) the provision of social intelligence to the public, who pays for the production, in a form that relates to processes, changes, and trends, and deals with reasons and consequences.

The first goal can be attained by separating the indicator sections of publications from interesting, supporting, and thematically organized data. If we are serious about social indicators then let us see a few series offered as and argued for as indicators, and commence the debate from there. The second goal cannot be accomplished by simply paying attention to topical issues like children's rights or the consequences of our immigration policies. Since most of the audience for social reports are interested citizens and students, we cannot simply assume that this audience has a clear conception of the questions and problems involved in any issue, let alone the understanding of how existing social institutions and programs which deal with those problems work. This would imply a burdensome, but necessary, educative role for social reports, including the numerical detailing of such things as, for example, how the justice system works, with its charging, reduction of charges, diversion, possibilities for disposition, to mention only some of its components. Again, apart from providing statistical data on criminal activities, the detailing of information on matters like clearance rates can only be interpreted in the context of an understanding of how the system that generates those rates works. Since the

FIGURE 1

INCIDENTS, VICTIMS AND LEGAL STATUS OF MURDER SUSPECTS, 1961–1974



SOURCE *Perspective Canada II*, 1977, p. 306.

1. *Includes 3,988 adult and 247 juvenile suspects.*
2. *Includes only adult suspects who were cleared otherwise.*
3. *Cleared by charge in this case means that charges were laid against a suspect.*
4. *These and subsequent figures pertain only to adult suspects.*
5. *Includes those suspects who committed suicide or died of natural causes after being charged, as well as those who had their charge(s) withdrawn before preliminary hearing.*
6. *Includes those suspects who were awaiting trial, who had a stay of proceedings or had their charge(s) withdrawn, who died before conviction or acquittal, who received an absolute discharge, and those for whom the status or disposition at trial was not known.*

authors of chapters on public safety or crime and punishment must be aware of how things work in order to rationalize their choice of material, it is not excessive to demand that such crucial understanding be communicated to the readers for whom it is produced.

In looking at both *Social Indicators, 1976* and *Perspective Canada II* the single example I can find of an attempt to show a process in operation is a chart in the latter that outlines the flow of murder suspects through the criminal justice system and down its various alleys and pathways during a 14-year period. This is clearly not an attempt at providing a social indicator but rather an extremely informative look at what we, as a society, are doing to a certain group via the institutional reaction to the offense. (See figure 1.)

In presenting social data such publications are also obliged to inform us about how these processes may affect our lives. For example, while *Perspective Canada II* provides some interesting information (see tables 1 and 2) within its sometimes overwhelming tables and charts on the elderly, little is made of the data as a harbinger of possible future social conditions. Yet, it is possible to notice that the rates of hospitalization for the elderly are extremely high while the number of hospitals and the number of hospital beds per 1,000 persons have been stable since the mid-1960s. Couple this with the increasing growth rate for the elderly population, and it can at least be conjectured that either more hospitals or hospital beds will be needed in the future or that some other form of care for the elderly, now normally placed in hospitals, will have to be found. In another chapter the rather eclectically presented education data indicates that the unit costs of university education

TABLE 1

PERCENTAGE OF CANADIAN POPULATION 65 AND OVER, 1881–2001

YEAR	PERCENT
1881	4 1
1891	4 5
1901	5.0
1911	5.4
1921	4 8
1931	5 5
1941	6 7
1951	7.8
1961	7.6
1971	8 1
Projections	
1981	9.0
2001	9.8

SOURCE *Perspective Canada II*, 1977, p. 39.

TABLE 2

NUMBER OF OPERATING HOSPITALS AND RATED BED CAPACITY, BY TYPE OF INSTITUTION (1958–1974)

YEAR	NUMBER OF OPERATING HOSPITALS	RATED BED CAPACITY PER 1,000 POPULATION
Public General Hospitals		
1958	955	5.5
1963	976	5.9
1968	1,043	6.3
1973	1,049	6.4
1974	1,043	6.6
Public mental institutions (3):		
1958	71	3 5
1963	83	3.5
1968	105	3.3
1973	110	2.6
1974	108	2.1
Public tuberculosis sanatoria:		
1958	51	0.7
1963	39	0.4
1968	36	0.2
1973	11	—
1974	6	—

SOURCE *Perspective Canada II*, 1977, p 82

will no doubt rise as a consequence of declining enrollments and a low average age of university professors. The young teachers will rise through the ranks, drawing increasingly large salaries, and driving up the per student costs.

While these examples are not particularly ominous or earth-shattering from the point of view of consequences for our future, they are the minimal kinds of things that can be said about even the most eclectically organized chapters in *Social Indicators, 1976* or *Perspective Canada II*. The point to be made is that not only do these publications avoid telling us what their data might mean or suggest, they seem oblivious to the fact that this is what social reporting is all about—the provision of a tool that will assist in planning our future, not simply provide us with random snapshots of our past. Unless some concern is given to the communication and reporting aspects of social reports, including the addressing of both problems and prospects, they will indeed become little more than statistical digests of passing interest.

THE PROBLEM OF GOVERNMENT SPONSORSHIP

Social Indicators, 1976 and *Perspective Canada II* have not fulfilled their potential as funnels of social communication and intelligence, and if they utilize their own extant resources and staff it is likely that they will be unable to do so. The task is too great and too diverse. The only method that will permit the realization of their potential is the bringing together of external authors in a publication framework espousing definite goals of social description and education. At present the situation will permit such expansion. Both the American and Canadian publications have established reputations, markets, and wide ranging staff contacts. This combination should be sufficient to lure capable people, both inside and outside government, to write and publish in a national social report in return for little more than author credit and possibly a modest honorarium.

Even if social reports were what they could be, they are produced by governments, and governments are notorious for hiding lights under bushels; and the sales of these reports to date indicate that this is exactly what is happening. These are public documents, supposedly produced to open debate between the public and the political processes, but the public, especially teachers, seems unaware of the existence of either *Social Indicators, 1976* or *Perspective Canada II*. This is especially ironic for these publications are produced in countries which have a national pride in the efficiency and effectiveness of their marketing and advertising skills. At the very least, social reports should be advertised to teachers of high school and university courses. Teachers teach people, not students, and it is in the school setting that strategies for problem solving and problem understanding are formed. If we are ever to have a socially astute electorate, our educational institutions must encourage the exposure of social concerns.

In this regard it is worth noting that *Social Indicators, 1976* does contain a section explaining how to read and come to grips with various types of charts and graphs, and, *Perspective Canada II* will be supported by a teacher's guide and a supplementary booklet on delineating social problems and issues by using social statistics.

THE PROBLEM OF LIMITED READERSHIP

There is an old chestnut that old news is no news. Since social reports present data that are usually at least two years out of date, there is a tendency among some groups, the media especially, to regard them as having the same informative level as history texts. Such data, however, are not only the most recent that reports can call upon, but the trends and changes they signal have implications for the present, and ten or twenty years hence. The fact that newspapers and other commentators fail to notice these reports attests to the point I have been making here that social reports are not carrying through with their mandate and responsibility. Neither *Social Indicators, 1976* nor *Perspective Canada II* have made the best seller list for nonfiction or the *New York Review of Books.* This should have been because of poor advertising and not because the publications were perceived of as not relevant to their focus or concerns. I fear, however that it is the latter, but I would contend that the interested reader has as much to learn from *Social Indicators, 1976* or *Perspective Canada II* as from *The Joy of Sex.*

INCLUSION OF ATTITUDINAL DATA

One of the major shifts in emphasis in the second American social report has been the inclusion of data on public perceptions in every chapter. The measurement of public attitudes and opinions is very much in vogue and including these measures, particularly those on overall life satisfaction, seems to be more out of concession to this present interest than out of their relevance for interpretation of other data. However, this is not always the case: attitudes on priorities are generally relevant to underscoring differences between population groups, and the data on attitudes toward abortion, for example, may signal a decline in birth rates and possibly marriage rates. Both of these possibilities have consequences for our national future. Similarly, consideration of the attitudes of grown children toward sharing their home with their aged parents may be extremely relevant in the context of planning future out-of-home housing for the elderly. Negative attitudes towards home-sharing on the part of grown children could foretell a large exodus from shared homes if other housing facilities for the aged were available. While this is conjectural at best such data at least permit the question to be raised and aired, and this is the essence of social reporting.

Some attitudinal data are extremely difficult to interpret. *Social Indicators, 1976* includes data on satisfaction with neighborhoods and neighborhood facilities, yet one is hard pressed to see what is at issue in cases where satisfaction differed even as much as 30 to 40 percent. I do not know whether this is a national issue, a social problem, or municipal mismanagement. The context in which the table on satisfaction with neighborhood appears sheds no light on how to interpret its inclusion. It seems that, so far as public attitudes toward housing are concerned, the authors have put in what attitudinal data were available rather than noting that which would have been most relevant.

CONCLUSION

In sum, I have been trying to argue that social reports like *Social*

Indicators, 1976 and *Perspective Canada II* have the choice of sinking together or picking up the challenge of organizing and distributing what I have chosen to call social intelligence, as opposed to social data. We have not been taught to, and we may not have the inclination to work hard at, understanding and using social data. This process must be started for us through increased commentary and explanatory material in social reports, and the vehicle for the process must literally be placed in front of us through educational institutions and advertising.

I do not mean to underplay work on social indicators and consideration of the attainment of national goals. Publications cannot ignore these important measures, but neither can they present them to us out of context. Trends and changes, forecasts and estimates, and reasoned possibilities give us one of the few accurate pictures of where we are, or seem to be going, and our national goals themselves are formulated against this background. The planning elite will unearth the information they require with or without *Social Indicators, 1976* or *Perspective Canada II*, but the people who pay their salaries need all the help they can get.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 435, Jan. 1978

Social Indicators and Congressional Needs for Information

By ELMER B. STAATS

ABSTRACT: The second edition of *Social Indicators* again presents valuable information on the social well-being of the nation. The Congress of the United States, in its appropriation, authorization, budgeting, and oversight functions, has a growing need for social statistics. These statistics are increasingly being used in program operations—in some cases triggering the beginning and end of programs and in other cases targeting funds under allocation formulas.

Congressional needs also exist for social indicator information in the oversight functions. Social indicators can provide a data base for program evaluation and policy analysis of social programs, however they are only a part of the federal statistical system. The Congress is taking a closer look at that highly decentralized system in an attempt to specify statistical needs of government better, to establish priorities for statistics, and to consider improvements to the current system.

Elmer B. Staats became Comptroller General of the United States in March 1966, after 26 years of service in the federal government. Before this appointment, Mr Staats had served as Deputy Director of the Bureau of the Budget under Presidents Johnson, Kennedy, Eisenhower, and Truman. He is a graduate of McPherson College in Kansas, holds the M.A. from the University of Kansas and the Ph.D. from the University of Minnesota. He received the Rockefeller Public Service Award in 1961

AMERICANS began realizing in the mid-sixties that economic prosperity and growth had components and complications which our national economic accounts could not reveal. At the same time we were finding that efforts to assess noneconomic problems and accomplishments were frequently blocked by limited theoretical understanding and limited descriptive measures. It was in this context that the need for social indicators was proposed. Questions then followed: What are social indicators? How should we define them? How should we use them? With the appearance of *Social Indicators, 1976*, these questions will be asked again.

There have been many definitions and many proposed uses for social indicators since the mid-sixties. The social indicator movement drew together numerous groups interested in the fuller development of social statistics and social theory and, in most cases, in the fuller and more significant use of social statistics and social theory in public management and decisionmaking. The movement, however, never reached a consensus on the definition of social indicators, which statistics were social indicators, or how to use social indicators. Much of this lack of consensus still exists.

The definitions and uses proposed in the past decade have ranged from the very pragmatic and particular to the highly theoretical and mathematical. For example, *Social Indicators, 1976* defines its contents as "selected descriptive statistics or statistical measures . . . which indicate the general status of the population with respect to certain aspects of each concern."[1] A well-known definition for social indicators comes from the 1969 publication *Toward a Social Report:*

> A social indicator . . . may be defined to be a statistic of direct normative interest which . . . is in all cases a direct measure of welfare and is subject to the interpretation that if it changes in the right direction, while other things remain equal, things have gotten better. . . .[2]

By this definition, a social indicator is a social statistic that measures, for example, the health of the population directly; it is not a count of doctors. Increased numbers of doctors are only one input to health and may or may not change the health of the population. There is no legal definition or mandated use of social indicators. The Congress, however, has tried to use social statistics in public management and decisionmaking. Congressional interest is part of the demand for information relevant to the Congress's multiple responsibilities:

—authorization of new and renewable legislation;
—appropriation of funds;
—oversight of the executive's implementation of laws and programs.

Congress would like social statistics for program operation, program evaluation, and policy and program development. The use of social statistics in these processes is consistent with several definitions of social indicators. The Congress has made direct efforts to incorporate social statistics into program operation and program evaluation but does not have

1. U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of Federal Statistical Policy and Standards and Bureau of the Census, *Social Indicators, 1976* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1977), "Introduction."

2. U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, *Toward a Social Report* (Washington, D.C. USGPO, January 1969), p. 97

direct methods to use social statistics in policy and program development.

As a result of attempting to obtain relevant statistics for these uses, and having some experience with the available statistics, Congress has increased the attention given the federal statistical agencies and their products.

PROGRAM OPERATION

Congress has used several statistical series in powerful roles in program operation. Social statistics have been used in public programs as eligibility criteria, automatic program triggers, and in distributional formulas. Values of the statistical series are associated with individuals, communities, or states experiencing degrees of distress or change that require or recommend public action. For example, the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 and Public Works Employment Act of 1976 both use unemployment rates for states and local areas to determine eligibility for funds. Also, both Acts use unemployment counts as weights in the distribution of funds among areas. The Economic Development Administration, under the Public Works and Economic Development Act, uses unemployment rates to establish eligibility for area assistance programs.[3]

Income figures are used directly to allocate funds in revenue sharing programs and indirectly in public works programs. Several programs aimed at helping older Americans—for example, providing part-time jobs—use an income figure as an eligibility standard. Poverty indexes help determine who is eligible for food stamps, job corps training, and summer youth employment.[4] Population figures are an important factor in the revenue sharing formulas. In fiscal year 1975, there were 75 population-based grants-in-aid to states and local governments which used Census Bureau population data. These grants represented about $34 billion in federal funds for states and local governments.[5]

Because of these program operation uses by the Congress, social statistics have become extremely significant to states, localities, and individuals. Their prospects for receiving public funds are directly affected by whether series values are changing, are above or below a normative value, or are different from a given value by some relative or absolute amount.[6]

The significance of these numbers has resulted in public attention to their definitions and accuracy. The series have been criticized as

3. For uses of the unemployment rates, see U.S. Department of Labor and the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, *Employment and Training Report of the President* (Washington, D.C. USGPO, 1977), p. 29

4. For uses of income and poverty figures, see U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, *The Measure of Poverty. A Report to Congress as Mandated by the Education Amendments of 1974* (Washington, D.C., USGPO, April 1976), pp. 14–17

5. Charles A. Ellett, "A Study of Data Requirements of Population Based Formula Grants," *Statistical Reporter* (November 1976), p. 49.

6. Most bloc and revenue sharing grant formulas use more than one social statistic. The array of statistics used includes. Population data—total population, population in urbanized places, population 16 and 17 years old, population 18–64 years old, Indian population, Income data—per capita income, extent of poverty, adults in families with annual income less than $7,000; Housing data—housing overcrowding, housing vacancies, substandard housing, Labor force—number of unemployed in state and unemployment rate. See Ellett, "A Study of Data Requirements," pp. 51–53.

inaccurate because of poor technique or because they are not appropriate for representing the concerns described in the legislation. Population counts, income measures, and, most recently, unemployment statistics have been criticized in one or both of these ways. Thousands of challenges were made to revenue sharing data elements by state and local governments in the early years of that fiscal assistance program. In some cases, local governments went to court to prove that a social statistic was not correct and should be changed. In 1976, the Congress authorized the creation of the National Commission on Employment and Unemployment Statistics to examine both conceptual and technical issues of employment statistics.[7]

Many of the statistics which are used in program operation are included in *Social Indicators, 1976*. However, the frequencies and levels of aggregation of the statistics are different from their use in the formulas. Because of the focus of the report—an overview—program operators will continue to rely on other documents for current and detailed information. However, in setting or amending normative values for operational series, Congress and others should find the time series format and the international comparisons in *Social Indicators, 1976* helpful.

PROGRAM EVALUATION

Because of the increasing number and size of social programs in the federal government and a desire to determine whether these programs are effective, Congress has stated that it shall receive noneconomic as well as economic information for program evaluation. It has legislated important changes in the functions of both the General Accounting Office and the Congressional Research Service, and has added new support offices—the Office of Technology Assessment and the Congressional Budget Office—to create, collect, and make accessible the program evaluation information it requests.

When the General Accounting Office was created by the 1921 Budget and Accounting Act, we looked at the application of public funds in a narrow sense, relying almost entirely on the accountant's most common information—the information records of the operation being audited. This limited application, however, has long since changed. Today, with the expanded responsibilities assigned by Congress, we are looking at programs to see whether the application of funds has any effect. And as government moves more and more into social programs, we are looking more and more into social measurement. Thus, our increased responsibility, along with the increasing use of social statistics as indicators by the Congress, has made the criticisms leveled at these statistics an important concern of the General Accounting Office.

We have broadened our base of resources by hiring economists, actuaries, systems analysts, doctors, psychologists, and many other experts. By using representatives from these disciplines, we can often get a better fix on changes in social indicators and whether they have been affected by government programs.

In 1970, Congress gave new responsibilities to both GAO and the Congressional Research Service.[8]

7. Emergency Jobs Program Extension Act of 1976, Public Law 444, 94th Cong., Sec. 13

8. Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970, Public Law 510, 91st Cong

The Congress extended the role of GAO beyond determining whether programs were being administered efficiently, effectively, and in conformity with the letter and spirit of the law, to include performing program evaluations and assisting Members and Committees to interpret program evaluation information. The Congressional Research Service was called on to produce briefs and bibliographies on expected issue areas and to keep computerized records of proposed and expiring legislation. In addition, because the House adopted Committee amendments in 1974 that required standing Committees to "undertake futures research and forecasting in matters within the jurisdiction of that Committee," the Congressional Research Service has established a futures research group.[9] In 1972 Congress created the Office of Technology Assessment to identify existing and probable impacts of technology and ascertain cause and effect relationships.[10] The Office's duties include identifying the social effects of technology.

One of the more significant changes in the kind of information Congress has indicated it needs came as a result of the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974. The Act created the House and Senate Budget Committees and directed that they study ways of "developing techniques of human resource accounting and other means of providing noneconomic as well as economic evaluation measures."[11] The Act also revised and restated GAO's mandate to review and evaluate government programs and activities. It required that GAO develop and recommend to Congress methods for reviewing and evaluating government activities and perform certain functions regarding collecting and disseminating fiscal, budgetary, and program-related information. Because these kinds of data are so varied and large, organization and categorization of information were stressed. The inventories of information sources and systems, recurring reports, and evaluations which GAO has created since then are indeed evidence that organization and categorization are of prime importance.[12]

Although these laws do not specifically require social data, they do require program evaluation. Program evaluators seek to discover whether a program has achieved its stated objectives in a legal and efficient manner. They compare measures of program concerns before a program is undertaken and after it has been in operation. They also compare the outcome and costs of one program with other programs or uses of resources. The social impact of a program is conveyed through analysis of many statistics, especially since programs often have multiple objectives and outcomes. However, the statistics alone have not been sufficient to measure whether programs are causing substantive changes.

Program evaluation requires data to evaluate program performance and not general indicators of system

9. House Committee Reform Amendments of 1974, H.R. 988.

10. Technology Assessment Act of 1972, Public Law 484, 92nd Cong.

11. Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Public Law 344, 93rd Cong., Sec. 703 (a)(4).

12. U.S. General Accounting Office, *Federal Information Sources and Systems* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1976), OPA-76-23, U.S. General Accounting Office, *Federal Program Evaluations* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1976), PAD-77-5; U.S. General Accounting Office, *Requirements for Recurring Reports to the Congress* (Washington, D.C. USGPO, 1977), PAD-77-61

performance. The indicators in *Social Indicators, 1976* are not program specific. As the General Introduction states, the report contains indicators of system performance, indicators of well-being, and indicators of public perceptions.[13] To use them alone as program evaluators is to make heroic simplifying assumptions.

POLICY AND PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT

Policy and program development in today's world are complex processes. To develop national policies and programs, the Congress requires information to assess present situations, knowledge of what will change these situations, and administrative procedures to accomplish policy intents.

Social Indicators, 1976 presents a collection of measures of individual or family well-being. It gives a broad overview of social conditions in the United States, but reflects results or outcomes rather than inputs of resources. The report differs from another well-known statistical compendium, the *U.S. Statistical Abstract*, by omitting most administrative and program data, including information about public attitudes from nongovernment sources, and making international comparisons. It differs from a statistical agency report because the data it publishes are highly aggregated. It is unlike *Toward a Social Report* because it does not try to make a written interpretation of the statistics and status of a social concern.

In recent years, Congress has considered requiring a social report from the executive branch to assess the social well-being of the nation and to suggest new and different directions for social programs and policy. In each legislative session from 1967 through 1973, Senator Walter F. Mondale and others proposed The Full Opportunity and Social Accounting Act, also called The Full Opportunity and National Goals and Priorities Act. The Act would have created a Council of Social Advisors in the executive branch and would have required a social report from the President to the Congress. The bill passed in the Senate in 1970 and 1972, but not in the House.[14]

In deciding whether *Social Indicators, 1976* will serve policy and program development purposes, experiences with *Social Indicators, 1973*—the first volume in this series—need to be considered. A 1975 sample survey of upper level executive branch policymakers conducted by Nathan Caplan and Eugenia Barton found fewer than four percent of the sample made use of *Social Indicators, 1973* in their work.[15] Although Caplan and Barton had learned in an earlier study that the officials expected social indicator data to be valuable, the few reported uses involved speech and report writing. Those interviewed attributed the low level of use to the availability of better, more specific, or more up-to-date

13. *Social Indicators*, 1976, "Introduction."

14. The bill was introduced in 1973 as S.5, "Full Opportunity and National Goals and Priorities Act," and was reported by the Senate Committee on Labor and Public Welfare but tabled in 1974

15 Nathan Caplan and Eugenia Barton, "Social Indicators, 1973: A Study of the Relationship between the Power of Information and Utilization by Federal Executives," *Program in Social Research and Public Policy* (Ann Arbor, Mich. The University of Michigan, Institute for Social Research, Center for Research on Utilization of Scientific Knowledge, 1976).

information and the report's lack of interpretation and subjective data. It is probably true that a good number of the policymakers were more concerned with the program development and implementation stages of policy development than with the planning stages. They needed more demographic and geographic disaggregations in the data, more timely data, and more data about behavior than *Social Indicators, 1973* provided.

Caplan and Barton argued, however, that the minimal use was explained by the fact that the data were not linked to policymaking in a "system of national evaluation of progress toward more clearly defined goals"[16] and because an assessment did not emerge from the facts alone but needed to appear within a framework of goals. They deplored the tendency "toward a widespread and often desultory collection of data conducted with the implicit hope that somehow, from this pragmatic but goalless effort, some notions would evolve about what is the good life and how responsible governments may help achieve it."[17]

Other explanations of the use of *Social Indicators, 1973* deemphasize goals. Goals are made concurrently with an assessment of the present and an assessment of the ability to cause change. What are present conditions; does the society want to change them; does it know how to create change; does it know and accept the changes in behavior and costs in resources required to accomplish change? Social science theory and empirical research cannot always answer these questions.

Because policymakers are aware of the shortage of this kind of information, they have actively supported social measurement research in social experiments, demonstrations, and evaluations. The General Accounting Office has recently criticized the management of federally-supported and federally-performed social research and suggested that national policymakers could make greater use of social research and information about program development if there were more planning and coordination of the various research programs and if the findings were more accessible.[18]

FOCUSING ON THE SYSTEM

The Congress, in its attempts to gather and use social statistics for the purposes of program operation, program evaluation, and policy and program development, has become increasingly aware of limitations in federal statistical outputs and of the complications, expense, and burden of collecting these statistics. Fifty-four agencies have all or a part of their budgets designated for statistical activities, and there are over 100 recognized collectors of statistical data. In fiscal year 1977, over half a billion dollars will be spent on federal statistical activities.[19]

The agencies within the federal statistical system can be grouped into four categories according to their principal activities.

16. Ibid., p. 37.
17. Ibid., p. 38.

18. U.S. General Accounting Office, *Social Research and Development of Limited Use to National Policymakers* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO 1977), HRD-77-34

19. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, "Special Analysis G: Principal Federal Statistical Programs," in *Special Analyses. Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1978* (Washington, D.C. USGPO, 1977), pp. 143–58.

1. *A central coordinating office, now the Office of Federal Statistical Policy and Standards, Department of Commerce (where this report was prepared), to prevent duplication, achieve balance, and develop procedures for an integrated system of governmental statistics;*
2. *Five general purpose statistical* collection agencies, whose primary function is the collection, compilation, and publication of statistics: the Bureau of the Census, Department of Commerce; the Bureau of Labor the Statistical Reporting Service, Department of Agriculture; and the National Center for Health Statistics and National Center for Education Statistics, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare,
3. Analytic and research agencies which use statistics collected by other agencies for interpretive purposes including preparation of composite measures, and
4. Administrative and regulatory agencies which collect statistics primarily as a by-product of their administrative and operation responsibilities.

Because of the way it developed and the diversity of agencies producing statistics, the system provides data in different timeframes, geographic detail, demographic breakdowns, and definitions. The nature of the federal system makes it difficult to determine both the worth of many of the statistics that are gathered and the real demand for social statistics. In many cases, the agencies that collect the information are not aware of the extensive uses that are made of data.

In the opinion of some, the available data would be easier to use for social measurement, social research, and causal analysis if the system were more centralized or somehow more planned and coordinated. In the opinion of others, the decentralized system acts as a system of checks and balances on the perceptions we have of ourselves and allows more responsiveness in the system to special needs.[20] In either case, based on the way statistical gathering techniques grew in government, systematic attempts to set priorities on the gathered data, to evaluate their usefulness, or to determine whether the data collection process could be more efficient and effective are faced with a difficult challenge.[21]

Questions about organization and priorities have been raised in both Congress and the executive branch. Congressional studies have been made of the subject and the Office of Federal Statistical Policy and Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce, is drafting a report entitled "Framework for Planning U.S. Federal Statistics 1978–1989."[22] The im-

20. Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, *Issues '78—Perspectives on Fiscal Year 1978 Budget* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1977), pp. 271–72.

21. For further discussion of the problems, especially with reference to education statistics, see the report of the Panel on Methodology for Statistical Priorities of the Committee on National Statistics, *Setting Statistical Priorities* (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1976).

22. See for example, U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, *Coordination in Federal Statistics Gathering Programs* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1977). Also selected issues from May 1976 through 1977 of Office of Management and Budget, *Statistical Reporter* (Washington, D.C.:

portance of priorities developed also from a concern about information-gathering burdens. The Federal Commission on Paperwork, which just recently completed its task of evaluating federal data collection, focused on much more than social statistics, but the congressionally-established Commission did recommend improved ways for the government to obtain data.[23] It recognized that obtaining information imposes a reporting burden which should not exceed the value of the information obtained.

In 1976, Congress passed a bill to provide for a mid-decade census. The first such census will be conducted in 1985. The mid-decade efforts will provide an opportunity for a periodic updating of significant national, social, and demographic characteristics. This should reduce the concerns about adjusting data series over the ten years between population censuses and limit the number of special surveys needed. GAO has undertaken a systematic review of the accuracy and use of statistical series which eventually will include social indicators. This effort is being undertaken not only to see if we can offer suggestions relating to the improvement of this information but also to learn about appropriate and inappropriate uses of the information.

CONCLUSION

In looking at *Social Indicators 1976*, I think it is necessary to understand the size, complexity, and multiple purposes of the total federal statistical system. *Social Indicators, 1976* has made full use of the system. Its relatively consistent viewpoint and data levels are an accomplishment, given the decentralized statistical system. The authors of *S.I., 1976* have selected carefully from statistics whose original purposes were more specific than reporting on social well-being, and have integrated both international and nongovernmental data. While this document may have insufficient detail for program operation and too little sophistication for program evaluation, it can be a source for those general assessments which are the first step in policy development. *Social Indicators, 1976* is not designed with the expert in mind anyway. It is for the nonexpert, but interested, citizen. It will be these individuals who will give it the relevant review.

USGPO) contain portions of the "Framework." Forthcoming issues of the *Statistical Reporter*, now to be issued by the U.S. Department of Commerce, will contain additional portions of the "Framework."

23 Commission on Federal Paperwork, *A Report of the Commission on Federal Paperwork* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1977).

*Postlude: Past, Present and Future**

By DENIS F. JOHNSTON

ABSTRACT: Recent federal efforts to produce social indicator reports are a partial response to the growing perception that economic indicators alone cannot provide an adequate informational basis for developing viable public policies and programs. That perception stems in part from the rise in public concern regarding the nonmaterial ingredients of the good life and in part from the emergence of a bewildering variety of problem areas whose components include a complex of social, economic, political, and ecological factors. Significant improvements in the state of the art of social reporting await the establishment of an improved data base that would permit more sophisticated analysis of the interplay of environmental and socioeconomic factors, but even if our analytic capabilities are increased, the essential task remains: that of effectively communicating these findings and interpretations to as wide an audience as possible. Such communication will promote informed public consideration of the issues we face and will thereby encourage the development of both public and private policies that reflect a realistic appraisal of our present condition and an appreciation of our goals and aspirations. *Social Indicators, 1976*, together with this issue of THE ANNALS, represents a modest effort in that direction.

Denis F. Johnston assumed responsibility for the preparation of Social Indicators, 1976 *in July 1974, when he joined the staff of the Statistical Policy Division, Office of Management and Budget (since reorganized as the Office of Federal Statistical Policy and Standards, U.S. Department of Commerce). He also serves as United States representative to the Working Party on Social Indicators of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris. He holds the Ph.D. degree in sociology and is the author of numerous articles on such topics as labor force projections, manpower development, social forecasting methods, and social indicators.*

* The views and interpretations expressed in this article are the author's and do not necessarily reflect the positions or policies of the agencies with which he is affiliated

FEDERAL efforts to produce national social indicator reports (as distinct from compendia of social statistics) were begun in 1929, when President Hoover commissioned a four-year research project under the direction of William F. Ogburn.[1] However, that pioneering effort at comprehensive societal assessment was not sustained, except in the more narrowly defined area of economic indicators. Not until the early 1960s were social indicator reports again issued, albeit on a much smaller scale.[2]

The resurgence of interest in societal assessment that accompanied the Great Society programs of the mid-1960s prompted the establishment, in 1966, of an advisory group of social scientists to advise Wilbur J. Cohen (then Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare) on the measurement of social change and the preparation of a social report. The brief report (101 pages) that resulted from this group's work was entitled *Toward a Social Report*. That publication is an important prototype in providing assessments of our current status in selected areas of social concern.[3]

An independent but conceptually related undertaking, oriented toward future goals and policy initiatives, was begun in July 1969, when President Nixon established a National Goals Research Staff within the White House, under the direction of Leonard Garment.[4] Its research culminated in the issuance of a report in July 1970 entitled *Toward Balanced Growth: Quantity with Quality*.[5]

Taken together, these two reports illustrate both the potential and the limitations of social reports as produced under federal auspices. *Toward a Social Report* was intended to serve as a prototype for annual assessments of social well-being that would, in turn, "facilitate informed decisions about priorities and directions in this Nation's social programs."[6] The analysis it contained was deliberately normative and the criteria employed in selecting the few social indicators it contained emphasized their normative significance. *Toward Balanced Growth* had a different focus. It

1. President's Research Committee on Social Trends, *Recent Social Trends in the United States* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1933). For brief accounts of the origins of social reporting efforts and current thinking on the subject, see Philip M. Hauser, *Social Statistics in Use* (New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1975) pp. 339–56 and articles by Daniel Bell, "The Idea of a Social Report," and Mancur Olson, Jr., "The Plan and Purpose of a Social Report," *The Public Interest*, no. 15 (Spring 1969) pp. 72–84 and 85–97, respectively

2. Beginning in 1961, the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare issued a monthly report entitled *Indicators*, supplemented by an annual compilation of time-series entitled *Trends*. Both reports presented selected statistics relating to program developments and pertinent population characteristics in the above subject areas, together with brief articles. Both series were discontinued in 1968.

3 U.S Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, *Toward a Social Report* (Washington, D.C · USGPO, 1969)

4 An earlier effort of this kind was the report of the President's Commission on National Goals, *Goals for Americans* (New York. The American Assembly, 1960). A more recent effort in a similar vein has been the work of the Commission on Critical Choices for Americans established by Nelson A. Rockefeller. The reports issued by this Commission are published by Lexington Books (D C. Heath and Company) is a series entitled *Critical Choices for Americans*.

5. National Goals Research Staff, *Toward Balanced Growth Quantity with Quality* (Washington, D C : USGPO, 1970).

6. As stated in the Letter of Transmittal from Wilbur J. Cohen to the President, in *Toward a Social Report*, p. iv.

was designed to explore possible alternatives for future societal development by proposing a number of "debates of emerging issues" for public consideration. Thus the former report offered an assessment of our current status; the latter, a discussion of options to be considered in our future development. The authors of these reports were keenly aware of the limited value of available statistical data for the purposes envisaged. Statistics describe facts, but the deeper concern in both reports was with values.[7]

THE CURRENT FEDERAL EFFORT

Shortly after publication of *Toward a Social Report*, work was begun within the Statistical Policy Division of the Office of Management and Budget on the first comprehensive national social indicator report. *Social Indicators, 1973* was finally issued in February 1974, after more than four years of development. Its basic format and orientation were quite different. First, it was not designed to be a social report; it did not provide any interpretations of the data presented. Second, it placed far greater emphasis upon comprehensive coverage of major areas of social concern, using descriptive statistics presented in graphic as well as tabular form. Finally, it tried to select and organize the data it contained so as to facilitate independent assessments of emerging social trends and current conditions by the interested reader. It was assumed, perhaps optimistically, that such data, if presented in graphic form, would provide a coherent picture of trends and conditions without the need for extensive interpretation. It was also assumed that, in any case, detailed interpretations could not be provided with the resources available.[8]

The preparation of the second report, *Social Indicators, 1976*, was begun shortly after the first one was issued. Like its predecessor, the second report is basically a chart book. Its principal distinctive features are its expanded coverage of major areas of social concern and the inclusion in each chapter of separate sections on public perceptions and international comparisons.[9]

The strengths and limitations of a report like *Social Indicators, 1976* should be recognized by those who peruse it. For readers with general interests in the topics covered, a chart book is an effective means of presenting summary information in compact form. Presented in this manner, the highlights of the data can be quickly seen and grasped. A further advantage is its compre-

7. The need to distinguish between "facts" and "values" without losing sight of either realm continues to prompt much philosophical discussion. For recent examples, see Mario Bunge, "What is a Quality of Life Indicator?", *Social Indicators Research* 2, no. 1 (June 1975), pp 65–80 and Ian Miles, *The Poverty of Prediction* (Lexington, Mass · Lexington Books, 1975) pp 19–89

8. The principal motivation for this issue of *The Annals* is to meet the need for interpretive essays based on the contents (and omissions) of *Social Indicators, 1976*. It is hoped that future social indicator reports can be designed to incorporate independent interpretive essays of this kind.

9. Daniel B. Tunstall, who was responsible for the preparation of *Social Indicators, 1973*, was most helpful in guiding the initial development of its successor report, although he cannot share the blame for its defects. For his views on future reports of this kind, see his "Social Indicators and Social Reporting" (Paper presented at the Joint American Marketing Association and British Marketing Research Society Conference: Changing Values and Social Trends. How do Organizations React?, Oxford, England, June 6, 1974)

hensive coverage, affording an overview of the several areas of social concern from a uniform perspective. But the data presented, insofar as they reflect a variety of complex social conditions, are self-explanatory only superficially. They tell us "what" but not "why" or "how." A further limitation relates to the criteria employed in selecting and organizing the data shown. No matter how large such a report is, its preparation requires the rejection of far more data than are finally included. The editorial judgment that must be exercised in making this selection should certainly be scrutinized, particularly in view of the fact that the most important single factor governing the inclusion or omission or any given body of information was whether or not it was available in a form suitable for graphic presentation. The resources available did not permit extensive analysis or reworking of data. It must also be recognized, especially with regard to the time-series of data, that today's rich fund of information did not spring forth in full bloom with the birth of the nation. The principal factor limiting the coverage and detail of these time-series is simply the absence of comparable information for the earlier periods.[10]

A final limitation is the paucity of "explanatory" measures—statistical measures that represent inferences drawn from the analysis of relationships among groups of variables selected to test hypotheses concerning some phenomenon of interest. Stated simply, that is not the primary aim of the report; its objective is to provide a body of comprehensive statistical information from which individual readers may develop independent assessments of the condition and trends in our society. Readers seeking authoritative interpretations of these data will find them in the preceding essays of this issue; those seeking analytical studies of social phenomena will find them in the academic journals and in some of the references to further reading provided in the report itself.[11]

In summary, *Social Indicators, 1976* places a heavy burden upon its readers. It provides a rich diversity of statistical data, but of variable quality. The available data do not permit equal coverage of each area of social concern. Proxy measures have often been shown in the absence of the indicators that might be preferred. Descriptive statistics that reveal differences among population groups may invite facile interpretations or unwarranted conclusions. Finally, the report may contain both good measures of the wrong things and poor measures of the right things. It is evident, therefore, that much remains to be done

10. Data limitations also explain the paucity of detailed information for different ethnic or racial groups for earlier periods, except for recent decennial censuses. For further discussion of these and other limitations, see the Introduction to *Social Indicators, 1976*.

11. A growing number of annual federal publications provide more detailed coverage of some of the areas of social concern included in *Social Indicators, 1976*. Examples include the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, *Health, United States* (first issued in 1976), *The Condition of Education* (first issued in 1975), the *Annual Statistical Supplement* to the Social Security Bulletin (first issued as a separate publication in 1955) and the U.S. Department of Labor, *Employment and Training Report of the President* (first issued in 1964). In general, the essays included in these reports are more descriptive than analytic, in keeping with the decriptive nature of the data they contain.

in this challenging area; that is the subject of the concluding section.

PROSPECTS FOR THE FUTURE

Cooperative international efforts

The concern of national governments with the need to supplement their reports of national economic accounts with assessments of national welfare or the well-being of their citizens is reflected in the growing number of national "social indicator" reports that have been issued during the past decade.[12] These reporting efforts have both stimulated and been strongly influenced by the research and development activities of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the United Nations Statistical Office (UNSO) in the area of social indicators, social accounts, and related conceptual development.[13]

The OECD effort, with a sn professional staff within the OE(Secretariat and a Working Pa on Social Indicators composed representatives from the memb countries, has been focused on a three-phase development project In Phase I, a basic list of areas of social concern was agreed upon. Phase II, still in process, is aimed at specifying statistical measures (social indicators) that would reflect conditions and trends in each of the areas of social concern with acceptable reliability and validity. Phase III, now being planned, will seek to establish a common reporting framework for presenting available indicators from member countries for purposes of policy analysis and development. It will also provide recommendations for the development of such indicators for concerns not adequately represented by available measures.[14]

The work of the United Nations Statistical Office and affiliated agencies is designed to provide more fundamental improvements in the underlying data systems on which all measures in the socioeconomic realm must rely. The centerpiece

12 The Introduction to *Social Indicators, 1976* lists such reports as already published or in preparation in 24 countries Exemplary in this reporting effort are the annual *Social Trends* reports of the United Kingdom, issued annually since 1970. For some of the thinking behind this effort, see Sir Claus Moser, "Social Indicators—Systems, Methods and Problems," *The Review of Income and Wealth*, ser. 19, no. 2 (June 1973) pp. 133–41 and Muriel Nissel, "Government Social Statistics," *HMSO Statistical News*, no. 25 (May 1974) pp. 25 1–25.6.

13. For an account of the origins and purpose of the OECD effort, see David E. Christian, *Social Indicators: The OECD Experience* (Paris, OECD, June 1974) and his expanded treatment, "International Social Indicators: The OECD Experience," *Social Indicators Research* 1, no 2 (September 1974), pp. 169–86 For critical examinations of these national reporting efforts, see Bernard Cazes, "The Development of Social Indicators: A Survey," in *Social Indicators and Social Policy*, eds Andrew Shonfield and Stella Shaw (London Heinemann Educational Books, 1972), pp 9– 22; Abbott L Ferriss, "National Approaches to Developing Social Indicators," *Social Indicators Research* 2, no 1 (June 1975), pp 81–92, Wolfgang Zapf, "Social Indicators 1973: Comparisons with Social Reports of Other Nations," and Natalie Rogoff Ramsøy, "Social Indicators in the United States and Europe: Comments on Five Country Reports " The latter two articles were published in Roxann A. Van Dusen (ed.), *Social Indicators 1973. A Review Symposium* (Washington, D C.· Social Science Research Council, Center for Coordination of Research on Social Indicators, 1974), pp. 20–40 and 41–62, respectively.

14. Progress on the first two phases of this effort is reported in OECD, *List of Social Concerns Common to Most OECD Countries* (Paris: OECD, 1973) and OECD, *Measuring Social Well-Being: A Progress Report on the Development of Social Indicators* (Paris. OECD, 1976)

of the UNSO effort is the "system of social and demographic statistics" (SSDS).[15] Full implementation of the SSDS framework would require fundamental transformation of existing procedures for collecting and tabulating much of the statistical information in these subject areas. The principal objective of the SSDS and similar proposals is to establish a comprehensive, integrated body of statistical data whereby information on both the characteristics of given units of observation (stocks) and their movements across subsystem boundaries (flows) could be recorded. With such a system, observations tracing the movement of population groups could be linked with corresponding data from national economic accounts so that economic and social transactions could be analyzed in comparative perspective. Even limited implementation of such a system promises to yield a number of useful social indicators.

Improving the data base

The recent passage of legislation authorizing a mid-decade census in 1985 provides federal statistical agencies with a valuable opportunity to develop and introduce a set of common concepts, classifications, and coverage specifications whereby information from a number of sample surveys could be linked with census data for purposes of comparative analysis. By means of this developmental effort, the SSDS concept can be tested and adapted to meet our particular information needs.[16]

Two additional research needs may be mentioned here. First is the need for replicative studies—studies designed to repeat selected base-line studies at appropriate intervals so as to yield information on emerging trends and changes over time.[17] Second, there is a need for continued research in the general area of perceptual indicators. If social indicators purport to reflect significant aspects of the quality of life, they cannot be limited to objective measures of our social conditions. Inasmuch as our perceptions of or attitudes toward these conditions are the only direct indicators of their impact on the quality of our lives, they must be included together with objective measures. It must be admitted that the bulk of the subjective measures now available represent "poor measures of the right things." But there is little reason to believe that further experience and experimentation with such measures will fail to produce

15 United Nations Statistical Office, *Towards a System of Social and Demographic Statistics* (New York: United Nations, ST/ESA/STAT/SER.F/18, 1975). On the development of social indicators within an SSDS framework, see the United Nations Secretariat, *System of Social and Demographic Statistics (SSDS)—Draft Guidelines on Social Indicators* (New York: United Nations, ST/ESA/STAT.76/24, April 1975) Also pertinent in this regard is D. W. Henderson, *Social Indicators: A Rationale and Research Framework* (Ottawa. Economic Council of Canada, 1974).

16. For details, see Joseph W. Duncan, "Priority Setting in the Coming Decade—Survey Linkage and Integration" (Paper presented at the Economic Commission of Europe Seminar on Statistics in the Coming Decade, Washington, D.C., March 21–25, 1977, reprinted in the *Statistical Reporter*, no 77–7 [April 1977] pp. 221–28) and Denis F. Johnston, "Social Indicators and Social Accounts—A Developmental Strategy," *Statistical Reporter*, no. 77–8 (May 1977) pp. 346–57

17. On this point and related approaches, see Otis Dudley Duncan, *Toward Social Reporting: Next Steps* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1969) and Eleanor Bernert Sheldon and Robert Parke, "Social Indicators," *Science*, vol. 188 (16 May 1975), pp. 693–99.

significant improvements in our ability to glean useful information from such data.[18]

The need for "counter indicators"

A number of social analysts have expressed the concern that social indicator reports, particularly those developed within government agencies, could readily evolve into instruments of propaganda. The data they present could be carefully selected in a way to justify or elicit popular support for established policies. Indicators would thus become "vindicators."[19] No amount of evidence concerning the methods employed in developing statistical concepts and definitions is likely to overcome the suspicions of the more extreme skeptics. But by marshalling a variety of statistics relating to a given subject area, it is at least possible to reveal different aspects and thus discourage premature fixation on any single measure. It is also possible (as shown by some of the preceding essays in this issue) to develop reasonable but different interpretations of the same data, so that no single, "official" view need be accepted as definitive. In short, the need for "counter indicators" might be interpreted more realistically as a need for "counter interpretations" of the available data. Such interpretations can and should include criticisms of the underlying concepts and definitions, so that needed improvements can be brought to light.[20]

The need for projections

To differentiate social indicators from the much larger body of social and economic statistics from which they are selected, it is often asserted that indicators possess normative significance. This means, of course, that the phenomena they reflect are widely perceived in normative terms, that is, as "good" or "bad." The statistics are themselves neutral: murder statistics are not murderous. It is precisely these normatively significant statistics that are especially important in assessing our condition, inasmuch as they pertain to those aspects of our lives that either reflect or affect our values. But the significance of values, in turn, lies in the sphere of human action; values determine our goals and priorities. Facts can only tell us what we have done or what we have become. Values can tell

18. For insight into both the problems and potentialities of this area of social indicator development, see Frank M. Andrews and Stephen B. Withey, *Social Indicators of Well-Being: Americans' Perceptions of Their Life Quality* (New York: Plenum Press, 1976); Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, and Willard L. Rodgers, *The Quality of American Life: Perceptions, Evaluations, and Satisfactions* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1976); and Burkhard Strumpel, ed., *Subjective Elements of Well-Being* (Paris: OECD, 1974).

19. On this sensitive issue, see Albert D. Biderman, "Social Indicators and Goals," in *Social Indicators*, ed. Raymond A. Bauer (Cambridge, Mass.: The M.I.T. Press, 1966) pp. 68–153; Bertram M. Gross and Jeffrey D. Straussman, "The Social Indicators Movement," *Social Policy* 5, no. 3 (Sept./Oct. 1974), pp. 43–54; and Peter J. Henriot, *Political Aspects of Social Indicators: Implications for Research* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1972).

20. In this regard, see the remarks of Bertram M. Gross, "A Historical Note on Social Indicators," in Bauer, ed., *Social Indicators*, pp. ix–xviii; Dennis L. Little, "Social Indicators and Public Policy," *Futures* 7, no. 1 (February 1975), pp. 41–51; Judith Innes de Neufville, *Social Indicators and Public Policy* (Amsterdam: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, 1975), pp. 225–47; and Genevieve J. Knezo, "The Potential for Using Social Indicators in the Congress" (Paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science, February 24, 1977).

us what we should aspire to become in the future. Thus social indicators, from this perspective, are essentially future oriented.[21]

When they are available in time-series form, social indicators can readily be projected on the basis of specified assumptions to yield plausible estimates of their future values at a given future time. But even when social indicators consist only of single-time observations, they can suggest fruitful directions for future actions. For example, current measures of the prevalence of physical defects or disabilities offer advance warnings of potential future demand for health care services. Furthermore, observed differences among population groups with respect to such characteristics as health status, educational achievement, and the like can be employed in developing normative projections that suggest the path of improvement to be followed in bringing the less favored groups to the level enjoyed by the more favored. The objective of such exercises is not to predict the future but rather to explore the possibilities that exist in the present. It is hoped that the few illustrative projections included in *Social Indicators, 1976* will prompt greater interest in such exercises.[22]

The need for explanatory measures

Social scientists engaged in research seek to deepen our understanding of human behavior by exploring the determinants and consequences of delimited areas of behavior. For the areas under study, they try to identify those factors (variables) that exert a significant impact. From this perspective, social indicators are those variables that can "explain" significant amounts of the change in the phenomenon under study. The identification of such indicators depends upon the accumulation of research findings in the different areas of social concern. But it must be stressed that descriptive indicators, particularly when available as time-series or in disaggregated form, are highly informative in their own right. They cannot provide rigorous cause and effect explanations, but they can reveal the realities against which such explanations must be compared and verified. In addition, they offer clues as to what needs explaining and thus guide research efforts in more fruitful directions. Given the present state of the art, social indicator reports must continue to rely upon descriptive indicators for the bulk of the information they present. But as explanatory measures are developed, they, too, can be incorporated in such reports.[23]

21. Argument is detailed in Denis F. Johnston, "Social Forecasting Methods and Social Indicators," in *Handbook of Futures Research*, ed. Jib Fowles (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, forthcoming). Also pertinent are Jib Fowles, "The Problem of Values in Futures Research," *Futures* 9, no. 4 (August 1977), pp. 303–14, Richard L. Henshel, *On the Future of Social Prediction* (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1976), and Irene Taviss, "Futurology and the Problem of Values," *International Social Science Journal* XXI, no. 4 (1969), pp. 574–84.

22. For contrasting views on approaches to social forecasting, see Daniel Bell, "Twelve Modes of Prediction—A Preliminary Sorting of Approaches in the Social Sciences," *Daedalus*, (Summer 1964) pp. 845–80, reprinted in Albert Somit, ed., *Political Science and the Study of the Future* (Hinsdale, Ill.: The Dryden Press, 1974), pp. 40–67 and Seymour Spilerman, "Forecasting Social Events," in *Social Indicator Models*, eds. Kenneth C. Land and Seymour Spilerman (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1975), pp. 381–403.

23. For numerous examples of current research efforts related to social indicator development, see Eleanor Bernert Sheldon and Wilbert E. Moore, eds., *Indicators of Social Change—Concepts and Measurements* (New

The issue of policy relevance

From its inception, the social indicators movement has been oriented toward meeting the information *needs of* policymakers in assessing social conditions, monitoring social change, and evaluating social programs. But no single social indicator report, however comprehensive, can hope to satisfy these requirements. Such a report can only provide general background information; it cannot address the specific information requirements of policymakers who must cope, on a daily basis, with an ever-changing variety of issues. Therefore, it is *not* policymakers in situ but policymakers in training that may be expected to find such reports useful. It follows that such reports, if they are to find their greatest potential usefulness, should be directed primarily toward the staffs of government training institutes, to teachers of college courses in public administration and contemporary society, and above all to the nation's librarians.[24]

CONCLUSION

It is perhaps appropriate to close with a word of caution. Social reality has many dimensions and can be appraised from many viewpoints. Social indicators are conceptual constructs that guide our perceptions of that reality. In revealing certain aspects, they obscure or remove attention from other aspects. There is a danger that policymakers and the general public alike may have their attention captivated by a few officially or professionally sanctioned measures and thus become ignorant of or insensitive to other perspectives. Exclusive reliance upon a rigid set of indicators or a prescribed mode of interpretation could threaten our ability to perceive or adapt to changing conditions. Agreement on the use and meaning of certain basic indicators is of course essential; without such agreement, meaningful dialogue becomes impossible. But in moving toward such agreement, we must exercise care to ensure that our perceptions of social reality give us both an adequate grasp of our current condition and an adequate awareness of the possibilities open to us in our pusuit of our goals and aspirations.[25]

York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1968) and Land and Spilerman, eds., *Social Indicator Models*. For approaches that place less emphasis upon quantitative methods and the metaphors of physical science, see Bertrand de Jouvenel, *The Art of Conjecture* (New York: Basic Books, 1967) and Richard H. Brown, *A Poetic for Sociology* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1977).

24. Evidence indicating the limited usefulness of *Social Indicators, 1973* for direct policymaking is reported by Nathan Caplan and Eugenia Barton, "Social Indicators 1973: A Study of the Relationship Between the Power of Information and Utilization by Federal Executives" (Paper published by the Center for Research on Utilization of Scientific Knowledge, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, September 1976). For additional criticisms, see Walton J. Francis, "A Report on Measurement and the Quality of Life" (Staff paper of the U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, January 1973) and Michael Springer, "Social Indicators, Reports, and Accounts: Toward the Management of Society," THE ANNALS, vol. 388 (March 1970), pp. 1–13.

25. For pertinent arguments, see Bruce L. Gates, "Knowledge Management in the Technological Society: Government by Indicator," *Public Administration Review* 35, no. 6 (Nov./Dec. 1975), pp. 589–93 and Fred A. Kramer, "Policy Analysis as Ideology," *Public Administration Review* 35, no. 5 (Sept./Oct. 1975) pp. 509–17.

Book Department

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND POLITICS

FRED L. BLOCK. *The Origins of International Economic Disorder: A Study of United States International Monetary Policy from World War II to the Present.* Pp. 294. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. $14.00.

The theme of this work is that the Bretton Woods international monetary system can be more readily understood if its growth and development is perceived as an attempt by the United States to control the economic growth of Western Europe following World War II. Although not denying the importance of security issues and Cold War ideological disputes, Professor Block argues that a primary objective of United States foreign policy was to discourage the emergence of nationalist capitalism within the countries of Western Europe.

The book is divided into two parts. Part 1 focuses on the evolution of the Bretton Woods system. Because of the author's painstaking attention to historical detail, it would be difficult for the reader to finish this section without acquiring some appreciation of the way in which the building of the international monetary order was interwoven with the political fabric of the Cold War. Block does an excellent job in illustrating how the British loan, the Marshall Plan, and the decision to rearm Europe were equally as important in the assault on the growth of national capitalism as they were in containing communism. Such an analysis is valuable because it demonstrates how fruitless it is to search for a primary explanatory factor, whether it be economic or political. The only reservation that can be offered concerning this part of the work is that the thrust of the author's argument forces him to diminish the idea that the leaders of Western Europe had similar views on rebuilding a capitalistic world. The context provided by postWorld War requirements for reconstruction and the need for Cold War leadership did allow the United States to assume a hegemonial position, but the vision of a capitalist world economy was already well formed in the minds of British, French, and German leaders by their own historical experience. Block's argument based on American fears of emerging national capitalism in Western Europe is important, but it unduly obscures the common historical background and basic economic and political ties between the actors involved in building the Bretton Woods system.

Part 2 of the work is devoted to an

examination of the various factors that led to the dismantling of the Bretton Woods monetary system. Professor Block contends that unilateral United States efforts to: first, confront a persistent balance-of-payments deficit; and second, to deal with the more recent enigma of growing inflation are critical in explaining the breakdown of the old order. The author's analysis, however, might have been more complete if he had adequately linked attempts at adjustment and inflation control with the growing importance of displaced domestic groups; for example, labor, and the influence of government cartels, agricultural trade.

Overall, this volume is a valuable addition to the burgeoning literature on international political economy. Most significantly, it emphasizes how various systems of interaction (in this case, the international monetary order) can be utilized to control or structure relationships among nations.

LAWRENCE V. GOULD, JR.
Purdue University
West Lafayette
Indiana

T. A. COULOUMBIS, J. A. PETROPULOS, and H. J. PSOMIADES. *Foreign Interference in Greek Politics: An Historical Perspective*. Pp. 171. New York: Pella Publishing Co., 1976. $6.00

Usually on account of their location, some countries seem destined to be a focus of foreign attention. Greece is a case in point. Those with a strategic interest in the eastern Mediterranean, notably Britain (latterly succeeded by the United States) and Russia, could hardly fail to take an interest in her affairs. Additionally, history gave this particular pot an influential stir. From the Crusades until recent times, France sought prominence in the area. And for 100 years Greece encouraged intervention by her large irredentist claims and concerns, only a quarter of the nation being gathered within the state which came to birth in 1832.

This study deals with the effect of foreign interference on Greece's foreign policy and its internal scene. The first half discusses the nineteenth century, suggesting that while the Powers obstructed Greek territorial ambitions, so far as domestic politics were concerned, they simply nourished existing tendencies. During the interwar period Greece was, for the first time, left very much to herself and, having put irredentism to one side, did not attract attention. But beginning with the Second World War, this pattern was drastically reversed. A harsh German occupation was followed by a "covert form of [British] colonialism" (p. 115), with Churchill as "Greece's arch-penetrator" (p. 107). It is argued that whether Britain is seen as defending Greece against Communism or engaged in an antiliberal conspiracy, she polarized Greek politics and so prepared the way for the civil war of the late 40s. Britain's successor from 1947, the United States, is charged with tilting Greek politics towards conservatism, bolstering the military, and bearing much indirect responsibility for both the 1967 colonels' coup and the 1974 crisis over Cyprus. However, while the authors' views regarding these matters are clear, they do not ascribe blame. Instead they see Greece's experience as almost inevitable, given the way in which the international system works. And they look forward to the possibility that Greece will be able to build up her West European connections and so diffuse American influence.

It is regrettable that the book does not include any maps. But it is clearly written and, though brief, has wide implications. It should be of value not only to those interested in Greece but also to analysts of foreign policy and of the relations of great and small states, especially those concerned with the idea and practice of intervention.

ALAN JAMES
University of Keele
England

RICHARD COX, ed., *Operation Sealion*. Pp. 190. San Raefel, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1977. $8.95.

Unlike most military accounts of World War II, Richard Cox's, *Operation Sealion* provides the military historian with a unique war game narrative of Operation Sealion, the planned German inva-

sion of England which was postponed by Hitler on September 16, 1940. The war game was organized jointly by London's *Daily Telegraph* and the Royal Military Academy at Sandhurst. The gamers, players, and umpires were evenly divided in numbers between former German and British military officers, some of whom had actually participated in the planning and preinvasion activities of Sealion. As it may surprise no one, the game concludes in a German defeat, within three days after 90,000 troops had landed, on September 22, 1940, on the Dover coast between Folkestone and Seaford. Only 15,000 managed to escape to Dover.

While the tactical analyses of armies locked in battle are an important part of *Operation Sealion*, the major portion of the book is devoted to examining what factors determined the war game defeat of the Germans. On this account alone, the 190 page book is well worth its price.

The gamers found that only two of Hitler's four preconditions for Sealion's success were attained. While the sea lanes from France to the English coast for landing and resupply may have been partially cleared and the north/south channel flanks protected, the inability of the Germans to neutralize the Royal Navy and the failure of the Luftwaffe to gain air superiority over the RAF, and therein the Channel, proved disasterous for the German invaders. In addition, there was a lack of any plan for a combined operations headquarters, a situation quite different in Operation Overlord; German failure to recognize the complexity of an amphibious operation, whereby Sealion found all cross-channel resupply efforts thwarted by bad weather, inadequate landing craft, and British air and naval harassment, and possibly most important, Hitler's deflection, in the middle of Sealion, to the planning for Operation Barbarossa, the invasion of Russia, and Hitler's paramount objective in World War II.

One distracting feature of the book is that Mr. Cox can't seem to make up his mind on whether to write a war novel or report the results of a war game. However, any criticism of this informative and very readable book may be overshadowed by the research problem all World War II military historians may now face in light of the publication of *The Ultra Secret* by F. W. Winterbotham in 1974. Cox does not mention or allude to ultra, the codeword for the intercepted top secret messages between Hitler and his generals, and Winterbotham contends that the intelligence gained by the British in breaking the German code early in the war proved decisive, not only in Sealion, but in many other allied victories in the European theatre of operations. If one believes Winterbotham's account, the rewriting of the military history of World War II, including Operation Sealion, should keep revisionist historians busy for decades.

RICHARD E. JOHE
Department of State
Washington, D.C.

ROBERT E. HUDEC. *The GATT Legal System and World Trade Diplomacy*. Pp. vi, 339. New York: Praeger, 1975. $23.50.

This is a detailed and sometimes enthusiastic survey of the origins of the General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs, and of its structure and procedure up to 1974. In his preface, the author says that GATT "Law" is a unique blend of legal and diplomatic strategies, and in subsequent chapters he describes its rules and procedures as legal, but recognizes that "it is impossible to make any meaningful appraisal of how much legal rulings contribute to results." The book will be of special value to students of the history and significance of modern international organizations. Six of the early cases brought to GATT are discussed in detail, and an appendix lists the 77 complaints made up to 1974.

Before the end of his book, however, Professor Hudec writes of GATT'S "current legal malaise" and even of its "delegalization." The formation of the EEC was a serious blow to the organization's original concept of global reciprocity, and the consensus necessary to its effectiveness disappeared as member countries increased from 34 to 100 between 1955 and 1973. This increase consisted almost entirely of Third World countries,

and "by the latter part of the 1960s most developed countries had come to view the developing country bloc as nonpaying participants who had lost their standing to enforce legal claims." At the same time, domestic and regional issues had become more important for most members than the global principles of GATT, and after the 1950s, the number of cases brought to it declined substantially. However, the organization has shown a strong survival capacity in accepting these new conditions, and it is not surprising that the "skeletal organizational structure of the early GATT blossomed into a full-time institution with an intricate bureaucracy." It is unfortunate not to find in the book the names of member countries at significant stages of GATT'S career, for readers should be informed not only of those who joined the organization, but of those who did not.

IDA GREAVES

Royal Bank of Canada
London

RICHARD LOWENTHAL. *Model or Ally? The Communist Powers and the Developing Countries*. Pp. vi, 400. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977. $12.95.

The Third World has loomed ever larger in the thinking of Soviet and Chinese leaders. Both Communist powers court key Afro-Asian and Latin American countries for combinations of ideological, political, strategic, and economic reasons that vary over time and with the target country. Both commit considerable resources to this aspect of their foreign policy.

This collection of updated essays was written over a period of more than a decade. It examines Soviet and Chinese efforts "to win imitation for their system as a model, and [their] efforts to win support for their overall international policies from existing governments." In the process, one becomes familiar with the difficulties and dilemmas facing Moscow and Peking, the limits of ideology as a motivating factor, the prominence of strategic considerations, and the emergence of long-term economic needs in shaping political ties.

Professor Richard Lowenthal's versatility, originality, deep understanding of the arcane byways of Communist ideology and in-fighting and his facility for integrating analysis make each essay, which is an entity unto itself, a rewarding experience. The essays cover a wide range of topics: the role of the state in the transformation of Third World countries, with an overview of the Communist, Western, and nationalist dictatorship models of development; the Soviet system of one party rule and its impact on the political-economic policies of noncommunist Kemalist Turkey, Kuomintang China, Mexico, and some of the African and Arab states that have attempted "selective imitation" (more than one-third of the book is devoted to this selection); "the background of the evolution of Soviet ideas from Lenin's vision of the colonial revolution through the Chinese experience of the 1920s to Stalin's dogmatic hostility toward the ex-colonial states and its revision by Khrushchev"; the background of Khrushchev's strategy of "licensed infiltration" of noncommunist single party systems and the reasons for its failure; the contrasting Maoist and Soviet approaches to economic development; the domestic and international determinants that led Moscow and Peking increasingly to follow divergent policies in the Third World, the reasons for the transformation of Marxism as it has taken root in different countries; and the economic motivation behind present-day Soviet policies in the Third World.

The essays deal more with doctrinal formulations and perceptions than with the opportunism underlying the quest of Moscow and Peking for tangible political and strategic advantages; and they do not devote much attention to the complex diplomacy of the 1970s. However, Professor Lowenthal has provided us with valuable information and rich insights on a subject of growing importance.

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN

University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia

MICHAEL S. SHERRY. *Preparing for the Next War: American Plans for Postwar Defense, 1941–45.* Pp. x, 260. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977. $12.50.

This book provides a splendid introduction to postwar defense planning during World War II. Author Michael Sherry has thoroughly canvassed the pertinent source materials, particularly the labyrinthine army files, and has written a convincing account that should remain standard on the subject for years to come. His clear prose style has resulted also in a readability rare in books utilizing such heavy archival materials.

A member of the postwar generation, Sherry writes from "a need, personal and intellectual, to understand better the origins of the Cold War." He reflects some of the bewilderment of his generation over Cold War issues and particularly the tendency to seek military solutions to political problems. He believes that the Cold War mentality was attributable in part to wartime defense planning. These plans generated an "ideology of national preparedness," that abetted the growth of Cold War policies.

The author's chief contribution is in recounting the army side of postwar planning. Others have provided similarly excellent accounts of navy and air force planning. Serious army planning began with the creation of the Special Planning Division of the Special Staff. Sherry makes the first scholarly study of the work of SPD. Its powers, he claims, were insufficient to accomplish its purposes. It lacked adequate staff, prestige, or authority to achieve success in planning. The core of SPD plans was universal military training, designed to build a large postwar reserve force. UMT, however, was already anachronistic and different opinions within the Army General Staff prevented the development of a completed plan capable of winning approval either from the military establishment or Congress.

Special coverage is also given to other topics that shed much light on the postwar services, such as the intense interservice rivalries for funds and force levels, the changing attitudes within the military services toward scientific research and development, and the gradual recognition of Russia as the chief potential antagonist of the postwar era. Sherry also evaluates the impact of the atomic bomb on military thought and planning, pointing to an early trend to rely on nuclear weapons as instruments of deterrence and massive retaliation.

Despite a tendency to criticize the military and its plans for the postwar period, the book is not overly tendentious, and provides a good factual account of postwar military planning. Perhaps the chief defect is a failure to indicate the author's view of a more reasonable defense program and to show how it might have moderated the Cold War.

FRANK D. CUNNINGHAM
Southwest Baptist College
Bolivar
Missouri

AFRICA, ASIA, AND LATIN AMERICA

HOLDEN FURBER. *Rival Empires of Trade in the Orient, 1600–1800.* Vol. II of *Europe and the World in the Age of Expansion.* Pp. ix, 408. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1976. No price.

This is one of a ten-volume series on Europe and the World in the Age of Expansion. It is divided into two parts. The first deals with European commercial activity in the East (principally south and southeast Asia), the analytical framework being the three main commodities that successively formed the basis of trade between Asia and Europe: spices, calicoes, and tea. The second part is concerned with the structure of empire in Asia and deals with the organization of the various European trading companies, with the commodities they trade in, both with Europe and within Asia (the latter being the country trade), and with the personal contacts between Europeans and Asians.

Holden Furber brings to the subject of European expansion in Asia a lifetime's

research and writing in this field and a thorough familiarity with the English and Dutch sources, at least of the eighteenth century, as well as a sound knowledge of the secondary literature. The main outlines of the story are familiar enough but Furber fleshes out his account with a wealth of interesting detail written in a felicitous style that makes the book a pleasure to read. The most important theme is the significance of the country trade between Asian ports as the factor explaining the building of European empires of trade and subsequently of the conquest in Asia. The key commodities were tea, for which a wholly unexpected European demand developed, and opium; the upsurge in the country trade and the trade with Europe which took place as a result led to the eventual British supremacy over the other European companies. On the Asian side, the power of local European rulers was lessened by the European desire to monopolize a commodity, combined with the desire to exclude other Europeans from the dominions of an Asian prince, their powerlessness at sea, and the weakness of their political authority, especially in India and the Malay archipelago.

Furber shows that it is too facile to view the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as simply a period of exploitation of Asia by Europe, though there were pockets of exploitation, both as to particular regions and periods of time. Nor, he argues, was Europe progressively enriched chiefly by its trade with Asia, though individual entrepreneurs made large fortunes. He rightly warns against transferring back into earlier eras modern criteria for determining economic growth which present Asia today as underdeveloped in contrast to highly developed Europe. Equally, he shows that there was a rough similarity of economic conditions between Europe and Asia at the beginning of the seventeenth century. This is a work both of synthesis and of original scholarship which provides an excellent survey of European expansion in southern Asia in the early modern era.

PETER HARNETTY

University of British Columbia
Vancouver
Canada

JOHN G. GURLEY. *China's Economy and the Maoist Strategy*. Pp. ix, 325. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976. $15.00.

The deaths of Mao Tse-tung, Chou En-lai and other veteran leaders of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the purge of the Gang of Four, and the complicated leadership succession, (including Teng Hsiao-p'ing's return from political oblivion) mark a watershed in the Chinese struggle to reach revolutionary modernization along Marxist streams. Reviewing the long period during which Chairman Mao's charismatic guidance left an indelible imprint on Chinese society calls for a clear view of the strategy which has yielded such impressive results in human and material terms. Unfortunately, even in the postNixon visit period, when interest is high and reports on China and Mao now abound, valid and meaningful insights into the Chinese process of economic development are few. Two major barriers help explain this situation: Mao and other leaders have not set forth their strategy in readily identifiable, complete form, and most outside economic analysts have viewed China's development process in a narrow economic context, applying bourgeois economic canons, and either ignoring or minimizing important social and political linkages

Professor John Gurley of Stanford University and Monthly Review Press deserve our thanks for the publication of *China's Economy and the Maoist Strategy*, for it helps greatly to put China's development process in a meaningful context and to set forth precisely the evolution and specifics of the Maoist model for Chinese revolutionary modernization The author's eight essays on the political economy of China's development, written for a broad audience, fulfills a need to deal with the background, strategy, programs, and outcomes through which the CCP has steered the Chinese people for half a century. His is a sympathetic, though not uncritical, analysis of the Chinese experience written from a Marxian viewpoint. His synthesis of the emergence and development of the Chinese economy derives from two contradictory

sources: the Chinese-Marxist version and the work and analyses of tens of outside bourgeois economic specialists on China.

Gurley's eight essays integrate the Chinese development experience within the framework of an evolving Maoist strategy. Four of the essays had been published separately earlier and the remaining four are presented afresh. First, the Maoist strategic overview with its rejection of a trickle-down development approach and its building on the worst, that is; depending on the masses, rather than elites, to mount sustained economic development is described. The second essay sketches the formation of Mao's economic strategy in the crucible of revolutionary struggle from 1927 to the eve of the takeover. Next, Gurley takes the measure of China's economic performance by reviewing, critically but fairly, the data and analyses of over two dozen books on the economy. The fourth and fifth essays trace the economic background and history of the building of socialism in China: the Russian experience and contribution, the Chinese development strategy, the Maoist vision of Communism, and rural development problems and policies—the heart of China's modernization question. The remainder of the book covers the financial system, prices, profits, and the question on the diffusibility of the Chinese model

This fine book helps specialists and generalists to fathom the strategy and meaning of one of the world's great happenings, the Chinese Revolution. Given the great confusion that results both from the rapid, far-reaching changes in China and the often feeble or well-intentioned but incomplete interpretations of these changes outside China, Professor Gurley's volume contributes in many ways to a better understanding of what the Chinese are about, why, and how well they have done.

CHARLES HOFFMAN
State University of New York
Stony Brook

BENEDICT J. KERKVLIET. *The Huk Rebellion: A Study of Peasant Revolt in the Philippines*. Pp. xviii, 305. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. $16.00.

DENNIS MORROW ROTH. *The Friar Estates of the Philippines*. Pp. xi, 1970. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1977. $12.00.

In 1950—my first visit to Manila—I vividly remember my apprehension when I saw the major highways leading to central Luzon with barbed wire barricades manned by armed soldiers. It was rumored (falsely) that the Huk rebels ("Most of them are Commies") were planning to invade Manila. *The Huk Rebellion* is a splendid investigation of this agrarian uprising, "perhaps the most important and certainly the largest" in Philippine history. Kerkvliet analyzes his impressive data with keen insight and elegance. He states:

> My purpose in this book is to understand the Huk movement from the point of view of its participants and sympathizers. This is a perspective other social scientists have ignored when writing about the Huks and one frequently absent in studies of peasant movements in general [xi].

The author's scholarship for the preparation of this important book included 17 months in the Philippines researching his subject (with residence in rural central Luzon), interviews with major Huk leaders (some then in prison), and the examination of records in Manila archives. An additional year in Washington, D.C., was devoted to the study of pertinent American materials related to the rebellion and writing the book.

To obtain the desired peasant perspective, Kerkvliet lived in a village in central Luzon for four months. "In San Ricardo and other villages, I talked to people wherever I found them—inside their homes, working in the fields, standing on the roadsides, resting under shade trees, chatting at village hang-outs" [xvi] Each chapter begins with what he learned about the Huk rebellion from his tenant informants in San Ricardo and then analytically moves to its broader setting of central Luzon and Manila. This approach gives the book an unusual warmth and poignancy, for the usually muted voices of the peasants are heard.

The limited space available for this re-

view is best used by briefly summarizing some of the author's major conclusions. First, "A major cause for the unrest was the dramatic deterioration of traditional ties between local elites and peasants." The traditional patron-client bonds between landlord and tenant had been cruelly weakened by a growing population, an increasing scarcity of agricultural land, and expanding commercial markets. New markets, for example, increased the prosperity of the landlords, while the tenant's subsistence way of life became more miserable and uncertain. In their efforts to organize (eventually militantly) to regain their waning rights (not new privileges), the peasants were brutally evicted by many of their former patrons, grossly abused by armed guards and Filipino soldiers, and largely abandoned by an insensitive landlord-centric bureaucracy.

Second, "Peasants' demands were moderate, not radical." They rose, in their slowly accumulated wrath, not to overthrow the government or illegally seize their former fields, but only to regain traditional rights essential for a humble existence. They were Rizalian in their demands: they wanted reform not the establishment of a new revolutionary government. In this regard, *The Huk Rebellion* is a corrective to earlier accounts (e.g. Baclagon, *Lessons from the Huk Campaign in the Philippines*, Scaff, *The Philippine Answer to Communism.*) that "portrayed the Huk movement as being more radical than my findings would allow.

Third, the "peasants tried a variety of ways to cope with the drastically changing agrarian conditions and to demand reform" before they revolted. Kerkvliet disputes the conclusions of earlier books on the Huk rebellion that "describe unrest in central Luzon prior to the revolt . . . as if it were a sudden explosion of discontent. . . Finally, neither the Huk rebellion itself nor the peasant unrest preceding it resulted from outsiders coming into the villages to start trouble." Fourth, the book documents in detail that the "PKP [Philippine Communist Party] did not inspire or control the peasant movement in central Luzon during the 1930s and 1940s, the Hukbalahaps, or the Huk rebellion itself." These are *specious conclusions of Filipino elite*, American military leaders, and Filipino government officials many writers uncritically embraced.

Finally, Kerkvliet reports the rebellion "hastened the decline of the old order, which peasants had set out to restore." The ancient patron-client relationships were fractured beyond repair. Increasing mechanization of agriculture enhanced the value of nameless, *compadre*-less salaried workers. Unlike some Filipinos today, the peasants were agitating for a just, not a new, society. They have found in Kerkvliet an able chronicler of their struggles.

The Friar Estates of the Philippines is a carefully researched account of these once vast fiefs, their religious, political, and economic administration, internal labor conditions, and the socioeconomic changes that occurred during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries that led to their crucial role in the 1896 revolt of the Filipinos against the Spaniards. These estates, (that often included towns), owned by the Dominicians, Jesuits, Augustinians, and Recollects, included nearly one-half of the total land area of the four provinces surrounding Manila, Bulacan, Rizal, Cavite, and Laguna. At this time this region was the most developed heartland of the nation. The disputes that swirled around them, their subsequent purchase by the new American colonial government for reallotment to tenant farmers (who quickly lost them to the elite) are central topics in modern Philippine history.

Roth reports that the friars' involvement in the economy of the Philippines was facilitated by the small Spanish commercial group in Manila, largely explained by the distance of the colony from Spain and the archipelago's lack of precious metals that discouraged outlanders from rushing to the new Asian colony. Hence, there was little competition or conflict between the businessmen in Manila and the friars. During the seventeenth century, many Spanish landowners (for religious and economic reasons) donated or sold their estates to the friars. Roth then skillfully compares the religious, political, and economic administration of these estates with those

in Latin America. This is a book, therefore, that Latin Americanists should not overlook.

Another chapter deals with the techniques the friars used to obtain workers for the estates that frequently involved defrauding the state and exploiting the Filipino peasant. He discusses the marketing of estate produce, largely rice, for the cattle ranches developed in Latin America were a failure in the Philippines. He concludes that the estates did not become significant sources of profit to the monastic orders until the nineteenth century.

By the nineteenth century, conditions on the estates had changed drastically. The workers rents accelerated while crop declines left them with smaller shares of the harvest. A class of noncultivating tenants (including the family of José Rizal) was created who engaged subtenants to till their leased fields. The social structure of the haciendas was modified and the paternalistic aspects of their administration decreased. "In the Weberian vocabulary . . . power, rather than authority, had become the more fragile basis on which rested the relationships between landlord and tenant." Conditions became unbearable so that "agrarian unrest on the friar estates was one of the main causes of the Revolution of 1896." This theme is a tragically familiar one in Philippine history as the review of Kerkvliet's book demonstrates.

Roth made extensive use of neglected materials in the Archivo de la Universidad de Santo Tomás and the Archivo de la Provincia de Santisimo Rosario in the Philippines. He also used the Newberry and Lilly holdings on the Philippines and the Vatican Collection of Saint Louis University. He notes various gaps in the archival materials for his investigation of the friar estates. For example, there is a dearth of descriptions of life on the haciendas—a vexing hiatus for an anthropologist. However, he tries to overcome these limitations "through a process of ethnohistorical reasoning and some educated guesswork." I see no reason to dispute his facts, reasoning or guesswork.

DONN V. HART
Northern Illinois University
DeKalb

IRVING LEONARD MARKOVITZ. *Power and Class in Africa*. Pp. xii, 398. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977. $12.95.

Power and Class in Africa offers a unique perspective on contemporary African states. Professor Markovitz departs from the "currently fashionable political positions that masquerade under an academic facade . . . ," which focus on instability and malaise in African states and which also assume African societies to be classless.

For Markovitz, the key to understanding contemporary Africa is to appreciate the continuity of modern Africa from its antiquity and to see African evolution as similar to the evolution of other societies at comparable stages of social development. The chief characteristic of African society, especially of African kingdoms, has been, Markovitz tells us, its class character. Since independence, African traditional elites have continued their roles as elite social classes in the modernizing state.

This thesis is sustained by a survey of African history which focuses on the Great Kingdoms of the past two thousand years and by presenting evidence that the slave trade and the era of imperialism served to reinforce the positions of ruling classes. In contemporary Africa, the author reviews the roles of the bureaucracy, business, labor, military, peasantry and farmers to assess the nature of classes in Africa today. From the ruling classes of earlier times has emerged a contemporary bourgeoisie which rules. Throughout black Africa an organizational bourgeoisie, ". . . distinguishable by their strategic locations in society, from which they make major decisions that affect the life chances of thousands of their compatriots . . ." exercises power invariably for their class advantage.

For those who look upon African societies as essentially classless, Markovitz's case to the contrary must be considered. His argument might be either enhanced or refuted by statistical data. The author's approach is largely anecdotal, but the case he makes has weighty evidence in its support.

Yet, should we grant that African soci-

eties have been class stratified, what has been the consequences of class divisions? One might expect, as a matter of course, that class divided societies are inevitably class conflict societies. Markovitz has little to report of evidence of such class conflict. Indeed, only when class lines and ethnic identities are one, for example, as between the Tutsi and Hutu, is class conflict demonstrably present.

While classes are described and discussed fully, the other theme of this work, the evolution of African society along trends similar to those of Europe, is treated too briefly. It deserves a fuller discussion and one might suspect, in additional chapters, for an adequate explication. If the case can be sustained, then could it be expected that nationalism and the industrial revolution would turn African politics toward democratic/capitalist structures?

Markovitz decries African class systems because they lead to economic growth rather than development. His distinction defines growth as a greater output and ascribes to development a more equitable sharing of the country's wealth by the people. The Western model suggests that only after productive forces develop can one expect a more equalitarian distribution of a country's resources, but this approach was barely considered.

What emerges then is a worthwhile discussion of forces molding contemporary Africa, but an inconclusive case that classes provide the master key for understanding Africa and for predicting its destiny.

J. LEO CEFKIN

Colorado State University
Fort Collins

THOMAS A. METZGER. *Escape from Predicament: Neo-Confucianism and China's Evolving Political Culture.* Pp. vii, 303. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. $15.00

This highly complex work is, among other things, a re-evaluation of traditional China's response to being brought into the modern world. Utilizing cross-cultural and interdisciplinary perspectives, Metzger focuses on late Imperial China and its neo-Confucian structure and elite, and asserts that the confrontation between the neo-Confucian ethic and the West led not to the widely accepted politics of despair, but rather to a welcome escape from predicament and a new optimism. While not attempting, certainly, to slay any giants among the pioneers in his field of inquiry, he nevertheless casts a very critical eye on many of the conclusions of his predecessors, ranging from Weber through Levenson to Solomon.

Rejecting standard interpretations of Chinese attitudes toward dependence and individuality, Metzger argues that the neo-Confucian elite was the product of an ethos of interdependence which allowed considerable inner personal autonomy. Self-assertion was possible, praiseworthy, and even common, although it was not the sort the West knew or understood. The Confucian, imbued with a sense of the possibility of achieving within himself a godlike sort of moral power, nevertheless faced most anxiously the probability that his society would ultimately ensure that he did not. His internalized sense of worth and potential morality was inhibited by the externals of his society. Escape from this frustrating predicament began to seem possible only when the West pushed in and offered an alternative, not to the individual's perception of his own worth and perfectability, but to the nature of external and inhibiting society. Far from despair, sustained contact with the West brought optimism and hope. Internal moral power might still be achieved, if nurtured in a new milieu. Metzger sees a large degree of continuity into the Maoist present.

This is an important piece of revision, broad-ranging in scope and yet careful in detailed evidence. Its many aspects should occupy scholars for some time, for it demands response. It is a major and exciting work.

R. KENT LANCASTER

Goucher College
Baltimore
Maryland

JANICE E. PERLMAN. *The Myth of Marginality: Urban Poverty and Politics in Rio de Janeiro*. Pp. xxiv, 341. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976. $14.95.

In 1968–69, the author, now an assistant professor of city and regional planning at the University of California, Berkeley, went to Brazil to do field work for her doctoral dissertation. (She had already visited the country briefly, during the wild days of João Goulart, and shared his enthusiasm for "structural reforms.") She studied three types of squatter settlements in Rio de Janeiro, "a favela on a hillside in the midst of an upper-class residential and commercial area," "a favela in the industrial periphery of the city," and "a subúrbio—a group of neighborhoods in an outlying satellite, or dormitory city."

She lived in each for "a few weeks to several months," and used "a mixture of informal and formal research techniques." There were interviews with a random selection of residents and a group of community leaders. She returned to Rio in 1973 "to update my study for this book," but the earlier data forms its backbone.

Dr. Perlman concludes that the favelados "are not politically and economically marginal, but are instead repressed and exploited." She was a witness to "the poverty, the exploitation, and the systematic repression which, although affecting the entire social pyramid, are most visible in the favelas." Fernando Henrique Cardoso calls the book "a major contribution to our theoretical understanding of marginality and urban poverty in developing nations. . . ." Her analysis "illuminates the dialectical relationship between the world of the disinherited and the poles of dynamism and economic growth of the system."

Under the circumstances, the approach could hardly have been moralistic or theological, only doggedly and determinedly social scientific. Dr. Perlman is not interested in poverty as such, and would surely scoff at the traditional view, that poverty is part of man's condition. Without telling us exactly what poverty is, she is convinced that it can be eliminated. It is a serious "problem" of modern society, but like all problems identified or posed by social scientists, capable of being "solved." (She assumes that the resources of the earth are enough to make everybody rich, and is unaware that human "problems" are filled with mystery.)

The book paints the life of the favelas in dark and somber colors, and no basic changes are possible so long as the status quo continues. Only by changing the structures of society will the "evil" be eliminated. (I am at a loss to know what kind of ideal society she has in mind, what system intended to supersede the existing one would insure the abolition of poverty and favelas. She does not say that she shares the Marxist view of capitalism, as does D. Helder Câmara, the revolutionary antipoverty archbishop of Olinda-Recife.)

This type of research is not my dish of tea, and I put the book down with the feeling that a poet let loose in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro would have come up with the same conclusions, but less tediously, less repetitiously, and at less cost to the foundations. The author is of course very objective (if one assumes the validity of her premises). Her dedication to methodology is impeccable but it tied her down: her refusal to leap unaided by others or trust her own intuitions led her to prove many obvious things. It is an intense book, one that reflects the author's emotional involvement with her subjects, and there are autobiographical insights of a prissy irrelevance. She takes social scientists to task for their earlier, fuzzier studies, and castigates the "capitalist" establishment. Her most clearly humanistic concept is that favelas ought to be left alone.

These strictures to the contrary notwithstanding, the book is an impressive contribution to the study of urban poverty. It pinpoints, at a moment in time, what the situation was and what the feelings were. Granted that change is of the nature of man, will the author have to return periodically to update her findings? Will her personal involvement, the friendships that she forged, be lost and forgotten now that the book has seen the light of day? The dangers and limitations

of the subject are, I think, apparent enough. What remains to be said is that she proves her thesis, that marginality in her Rio sampling is a myth.

MANOEL CARDOZO
The Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C.

G. WILLIAM SKINNER, ed. *The City in Late Imperial China*. Pp. xvii, 820. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1977. $35.00.

Although for the past 3000 years many of the major cities of the world have been located in China, it is only recently that scholars have begun serious study of the institutional framework and ecology of Chinese cities. There is no lack of descriptive material concerning the physical makeup of these cities or documentary evidence concerning their institutions, but Chinese political and intellectual elites, wedded to an agrarian ideal, never regarded the city as a primary social entity or a crucial element in the expansion of Chinese society. Traditional Chinese scholars seemed to feel that the basic cosmological significance and physical form of Chinese capital cities had been set by the beginning of the first millenium and subsequently sanctified by tradition, while lesser cities were primarily political extensions of the capital, reproducing its form and significance in microcosm. Thus they paid little attention to further development of urban theory. Later Western scholars basically followed their Chinese teachers in their approach to understanding Chinese cities.

The City in Late Imperial China, represents the most recent and most comprehensive break with this traditional approach and is the last of three studies emanating from two conferences in 1968–69 sponsored by the Subcommittee on Research on Chinese Society under the Social Science Research Council and American Council of Learned Societies' Joint Committee on Contemporary China. The two previous works: *The City in Communist China*, edited by John Wilson Lewis (1971), and *The Chinese City Between Two Worlds*, edited by Mark Elvin and G. William Skinner (1974), dealt with the transformation of the Chinese city from about 1850 on. The present work, consisting of some 16 essays by 15 different writers, primarily deals with the city from the fourteenth to the nineteenth centuries. It is divided into three parts, each preceded by an introduction by William Skinner. In these introductions, Skinner not only summarizes the main points of the individual essays, but attempts to provide a common theoretical framework for the whole, thus tying together what would otherwise often appear as disparate and unrelated studies.

While the work as a whole is primarily concerned with Chinese cities of late imperial times, part one on "The City in History" also contains discussions of general development since earliest times in two articles by the late Arthur Wright on "The Cosmology of Chinese Cities" and Sen-dou Chang on "The Morphology of Walled Capitals." Specific examples of urban development in later times are then provided by two articles of F. W. Mote, "The Transformation Nanking 1350–1400" and Harry J. Lamley, "The Formation of Cities: Initiative and Motivation in Building Three Walled Cities in Taiwan." Skinner himself contributes a major article on "Regional Urbanization in Nineteenth-Century China," which further enhances our understanding of the importance of regional studies when dealing with socioeconomic and political problems in Chinese history.

Part two on the "City in Space" deals with the relationship between the city and countryside. In many respects this is the most valuable section of the book. Skinner again provides a major interpretive study on "The Cities and the Hierarchy of Local Systems," which expands on the article mentioned above and shows that: "the formal administrative attributes of capital cities stemmed in large part from their place in the relevant regional system of economic central places," and that "the size and strength of informal political systems varied inversely with the intensity of bureaucratic government—a covariation that expressed the structure of 'natural' eco-

nomic regions at least as much as the arrangement of provinces" (p. 254). On p. 345, he concludes that: "Ch'ing field administration was marvelously adapted to the realities of regional structure within the empire. On the one hand, the revenue potential of different localities was largely a function of their place in the hierarchy of nodal economic systems that culminated in eight regional economies, each with a core-periphery structure. On the other hand, defense requirements varied in conformity with the structure of physiographic regions; critical defense perimeters were closely associated with regional frontiers, and other strategic sites guarded the major approaches to the heartland of physiographic regions, whose rich resources and great cities constituted the ultimate military objectives."

Skinner's article is followed by John R. Watt's discussion of "The Yamen and Urban Administration," which treats with the relationship between the magistrate and his yamen, representing the central administration and local interests. Two fascinating articles, showing the specific workings of this regional system, are then provided by Yoshinobu Shiba dealing with "Ningpo and its Hinterland" and Mark Elvin on "Market Towns and Waterways: The County of Shanghai from 1480 to 1910." They, in turn, are supplemented by two studies on "The Academies and Urban Systems in Kwangtung" by Tilemann Grimm and "Extended Kinship in the Traditional City" by Hugh D. R. Baker. Both of these articles show the interlocking nature of the educational and kinship systems within the regions dominated by urban centers.

Finally, part three attempts to deal with "The City as a Social System." Skinner's introduction provides a particularly valuable overview of the social composition, spatial arrangement, and administration within the city. Peter J. Golas, Stephan Feuchtwang and Sybille van der Sprenkel contribute interesting articles on "Early Ch'ing Guilds," School-Temple and City God," and "Urban Social Control," and the work concludes with two studies on Taiwan cities by Donald R. DeGlopper and Kristofer M. Schipper, "Social Structure in a Nineteenth-Century Taiwanese Port City" and "Neighborhood Cult Associations in Traditional Tainan." To me this was the least satisfactory part of the book, not because of any deficiency on the part of the individual articles, but because they seemed to raise more questions than the limited space allotted could answer. In discussing "The City as a Social System" the writers were constantly skirting the questions of "how things worked" and "how people lived." This is where the analytical approach of the social historian breaks down, and the reader begins to wonder where all the people were.

In spite of the inevitable unevenness among the articles, this is clearly the most important volume on Chinese social history to be produced in the past ten years, and special thanks are due to William Skinner, who not only performed a masterful feat in tying it all together, but produced some of the most insightful writing on the structure of Chinese society in many years. The work is further enhanced by some thirty-six maps and twenty-two illustrations. In addition there is a comprehensive "character list" and index.

W. ALLYN RICKETT
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia

ALEXANDER STEWARD. *The World, the West and Pretoria.* Pp. ix, 299. New York: David McKay, 1977. $14.95.

Part one of the book covers the years 1945 to 1960, and is entitled "World Context: *Idealism*."

In the first four chapters, Steward talks about the five years he spent in North America (Canada). He sets the political stage by describing how apartheid contradicted and challenged the hopes and ideals of the postwar Western world; Pretoria's race superiority was to be countered by the Western belief that all men were to be regarded as the same politically and socially. Since the United States had become the world reformer and missionary, leading the revolution for liberty and human rights, Steward

felt that Pretoria's case could not get a fair hearing. While the rest of the world was proclaiming the sameness of men, Pretoria was implementing a policy of apartheid based on the essential difference between them.

The author defines the pseudo liberal, and claims that his pernicious influence was apparent everywhere in America. He argues that all men are not created equal. "Except in obedience to authority there is no liberty; and the pursuit of happiness is, in itself the chase of the wild goose."

Steward next examines the national and international policies of Britain which he traced to their historical origins. He discusses the utilization doctrine of Jeremy Bentham, the greatest happiness of the greatest number. This doctrine, he claims, was implemented by the Fabian society, whose goal it was to establish a socialist society where equality of opportunity would be assured. Classes were to be abolished and wealth was to be distributed equally. These ends were to be achieved by evolution rather than revolution. Steward contends that these socialist policies have caused Britain to lose her leadership in the world. He then argues that Britain's governmental policies against apartheid incited the agitations against Pretoria's policy of separatism.

Steward turns to the world movements and discusses the United Nations and its charter. He reminds the reader of the article of non-intervention in the affairs of any state, and argues that other states of the West and the world have continuously violated it. He also examines the pros and cons of membership for Pretoria in the world body He takes another world body to task—the Church—because of its continued attack on the apartheid policies of South Africa

The writer moves on to black Africa, where he describes the tribal societies of South Africa. He said that they survive, but do not progress "It was in the areas of technology that the black man is so utterly dependent on Western culture. . . ." He claims the African is not equipped to participate in a materialistic, competitive, technological, Western-oriented world.

Steward, in part one/section one, sets against the proposition of World Context: Idealism, the Pretoria Theme, which is separatism. He gives a brief history of the origin of the white Africaners. Then he discusses the important crossroads. Should Pretoria's policies go to the left (the direction of the West and the world) and adopt integration, or go to the right where the sign post is marked domination? Pretoria, he said, chose to live in peace along side the black man.

The author traces the origin of the policy of the apartheid. He sets forth the land legislation; the laws on influx control; and the new concept of separate development of the territories established by Pretoria.

In part two/section one, Steward examines the World Context: Disillusion.

His theme is that the West, during the 1960s, had become disillusioned and moved toward a breakdown. The United States' civil rights commitment to blacks had failed. Our relations with black Africa professed to be for equality, and this incited Africans to overthrow the government of South Africa.

He takes Britain to task by arguing that it had lost its leadership in the world because it adopted socialism. He pointed out that Britain had the same kind of race problem as the United States; now they are trying to contain it by passing legislation.

The author again looks at world movements and reviews the attacks by the Third World on Pretoria's policies. The toleration of these attacks by the West brought about a decline of the reputation of the world body. Steward discusses the effect of Britain's decolonization of black Africa. He then returns to the Pretoria Theme. Engagement.

Steward tells why the influx control law (pass law) is necessary. He also considers Pretoria as the custodian of the black man's heritage, and would not abandon its role to the (black) African National Congress. He also states that separatism reached its fruition in the Bantu Authorities Acts, purporting to grant self-government to the black nations within its borders.

Part three: section one is about Now The World Context: Balance. Steward

approaches the subject of balance by again examining the policies of the United States, the United Kingdom and the United Nations.

He says the United States suffered a loss of authority and leadership in its war with Viet Nam; its appeasement of Russia with Detente; and its failure to act decisively in the Angola conflict. His solution was that the United States must strike a balance between discipline and intuition, reason and imagination. He asks: Can Britain forget Bentham and Marx and strike a balance between capital and exploitation and labor blackmail?

In his discussion of the United Nations, he argues that this is not a democratic world and never will be, and international affairs cannot be properly handled through majority vote in the world organization. He thinks that regional grouping of states with commonality would be better. He feels confederation is best for the black nations and that separatism is the proper direction. There are no crossroads. Integration would mean a disaster for the people of South Africa.

Steward saves the last piece of the puzzle to the world picture until the end—The Need for God. He states that Western society with its cultural anarchy, cannot live by reason alone, but must return to God. If not, then Western civilization will perish from the earth. "Even Separatism."

Using the point-counterpoint method of presentation, Steward sets up the West versus Pretoria; The World versus Pretoria, and the Black Nationalists versus Pretoria. He then argues for the rightness of his conclusions based upon his own premises. He argues against those nations that strive for morality among their fellow men, stating that they are wrong for offering equality to blacks. Then he argues that the only way to save Western civilization is to return to the principles of God. Morality seems to be all right for the whites in South Africa and their allies, but not for blacks in South Africa and elsewhere in the world.

Such an intransigent position is certain to precipitate an international race war. This will be the second war, because in the first war, the Africans lost the Roman Empire and the world to the present German race. This, the author failed to mention as a part of his historical background.

EDWARD L. JONES
University of Washington
Seattle

PIERRE L. VAN DEN BERGHE and GEORGE P. PRIMOV. *Inequality in the Peruvian Andes: Class and Ethnicity in Cuzco*. Pp. iii, 324. Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1977. $17.50.

WILLIAM FOOTE WHYTE and GIORGIO ALBERTI. *Power, Politics and Progress: Social Change in Rural Peru*. pp. iii, 307. New York: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, 1976. $15.00.

Two books of interest to scholars of social structure, power relations, and modernization or development are *Inequality in the Peruvian Andes: Class and Ethnicity in Cuzco* by Pierre L. van den Berghe and George P. Primov and *Power, Politics and Progress: Social Change in Rural Peru* by William Foote Whyte and Giorgio Alberti. The authors of these two studies start with the same basic preoccupation: the organization and distribution of power. They ask the same basic question, what determines unequal development or progress? Both books are written by specialists trained in the same field, using comparable methods of data collection and analysis.

Despite these initial and underlying similarities, the studies differ significantly in focus, format, and findings. Van den Berghe and Primov present a very readable and well-organized study of the determinants of relations of inequality in one region of highland Peru—the department of Cuzco, based on almost a year and a half in the field. After a general introduction to the geography and history of the area, they proceed to discuss the political and economic structures which define relations of inequality, the cultural and linguistic dynamics of class and ethnic relations, and the institutional framework within which these relations are played out. Following

this theoretical discussion, they report their empirical findings in three locations: rural areas, market towns, and the regional metropolis of Cuzco. They conclude with a model of class and ethnic relations.

Focusing on the individual, van den Berghe and Primov ascribe intraregional disparities in social position to class (which they do not explicitly define, but equate with occupation) and ethnicity (which they index by fluency in Spanish, dress, and customs). They maintain that although these two factors greatly overlap and are essentially synonymous in some localities, they are sufficiently different to reject the class-based, radical definition of Indian. Stratification in the Cuzco area is a result of both class and ethnicity, the latter magnifying the clear inequalities of the former. They assert that although class structure is rigid and changes slowly, ethnic lines are fluid and social mobility is considerable. When the authors analyze interregional relations, they criticize both the so-called radical models of dependency and internal colonialism and the conservative model of plural societies. They argue that the subordinate position of the Cuzco region vis à vis the coast, and particularly Lima, is more the consequence of economic marginality than overt, calculated exploitation, except for the lowland tropical fruit and cash crop sector and the wool-producing industry. They adopt a middle position, concluding that reality lies somewhere between the two models.

Whyte and Alberti report the results of a ten-year collaborative research effort between sociologists and anthropologists at Cornell University and the Lima-based Instituto de Estudios Peruanos. Their book consists of a short introductory section, a series of brief reports on twelve communities in three regions—Cuzco, Junin and Chancay—and a section on theory, methodology and practice. Although somewhat disjointed, pieced-together, and therefore difficult to read, their monograph is a valuable manual for students who are contemplating field work because the authors candidly and systematically outline the successive changes in their thinking and hypotheses as their project progressed. They began to study modernization in rural Peru expecting personality traits (values, attitudes, beliefs and perceptions) to be the important variables explaining change, but such factors proved inadequate explanations of the process. In the course of their study, the authors accept and use Marx's formulations of economic interests and class conflict and conclude that structure accounts for more of the variance in rate and success of community development than personality. They formulate a typology of communities based on scores on two scales of conflict and cooperation which together indicate a community's potential for modernization. They reject on the basis of their field experience several accepted premises, such as the passive peasant. They also find that individual social mobility is difficult, albeit increasing.

In short, Van den Berghe and Primov stress marginality, not dependency, and ethnicity, not class. Whyte and Alberti, in contrast, start with sociocultural leanings and end stressing economic factors. What are the explanations for these two interpretations of Peruvian reality? One factor is philosophical orientation. Van den Berghe and Primov, on the one hand, avoid radical interpretations of regional disparities in development and power in favor of a more neutral stance, based on economic isolation. Their basis for dismissing the theories of dependency and internal colonialism in the nineteenth century, however, seems unconvincing because their explicit exceptions—the cash crop and wool industries—directly or indirectly affected almost everyone in the region from omnipotent landowner to tenant farmer, merchant, and bureaucrat. The fact that nearly everyone was integrated to some degree into the larger export-oriented system seems a sufficient basis on which to negate marginality in favor of integration and, by extension, dependency. Likewise, on the individual level, they emphasize sociocultural factors instead of economic

ones. Whyte and Alberti, on the other hand, move away from their preconceived notions on personal attributes and adopt as explanations structural determinants of change, asserting that the latter define the context which limits individual behavior and interaction. Second, van den Berghe and Primov limit their investigation to one selected region, where ethnic differences are as marked as anywhere else in the country. Ethnicity, as they define, it is not as evident on the coast or in the northern highlands, where, according to their criteria, the percentage of Indians would be insignificant. On a national scale, sociocultural differences are less important than economic ones; hence, Whyte and Alberti's emphasis on structure.

These disparities in philosophical underpinnings and scope, in turn, affect the authors' respective findings on social mobility. Van den Berghe and Primov's conclusion that there is a great deal of mobility is based on the fact that many individuals made relatively small moves up the hierarchical social structure, essentially changing their ethnic designation from that of Indian to mestizo, although their class position remained the same. Whyte and Alberti, in contrast, base their assessment on economic criteria. They assert that relatively few individuals were upwardly mobile, by which they mean that few persons made the move between lower class and middle or upper class. The difference is one of categorization and magnitude of moves. Whether or not you agree with one set of authors or the other depends on your own world view and philosophical leanings and the definitions you are willing to accept.

SUSAN RAMÍREZ-HORTON
Ohio University
Athens

EUROPE

CLYDE BINFIELD. *So Down to Prayers, Studies in English Nonconformity 1780–1920.* Pp. xiv, 296. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1977. $15.00.

This volume of essays on different aspects of the life of the English Protestants who dissented from the Church of England professedly aims to evoke the atmosphere of this significant element of English social and religious life during the nineteenth century, with some chronological overlapping at either end of that century. In a series of independent, but not unrelated, studies of important Nonconformist leaders, including Edward Baines, Edward Miall, Baldwin Brown and Silvester Horne, and of such topics as church architecture, English foreign missions, and reactions to British involvement in World War I, insofar as they relate to Protestant Nonconformity, the author achieves his goal. In the course of his discussions, many illuminating remarks about the character of English Nonconformity are made, and if any consistent impression results from all of the essays together, it is that these Protestant dissenters had an important and influential role in English life, which increased, rather than decreased, in the nineteenth century. The author is especially concerned with the relationship of his subject to English politics and to literary and artistic culture; with reference to the second of these there runs throughout the book a gentle but effective argument against the famous strictures of Matthew Arnold concerning the Philistinism of Protestant dissent. The suburban and middle-class character of Nonconformity is another recurrent theme. In painting his picture of the Nonconformists, Binfield draws heavily from such sources as letters, diaries and local church records. His focus is somewhat more on the laity than the clergy, and more on Evangelical Nonconformity, especially the Congregationalists, than on the Quakers or Unitarians.

Binfield, a Lecturer in History at the University of Sheffield, writes as an insider, though certainly not as an uncritical one, a fact which is perhaps helpful in a book which seeks to evoke atmosphere. But whether because of this, or because he writes as an essayist, with an almost casual and certainly

very literate style, these studies are skillfully crafted, impressionistic reflections upon events and persons, rather than attempts to establish precise points by marshalling evidence. Accordingly, these essays leave the reader with various impressions about English Protestant Nonconformity in the nineteenth century without convincing him or her that really important (and perhaps significantly revisionist) conclusions have been proved or even reached. The essays also assume a certain familiarity with the subject on the part of the reader, making them unsuitable as an introduction to Protestant Nonconformity from 1780 to 1920.

DEWEY D. WALLACE, JR.
The George Washington University
Washington
D.C.

NORMAN MACKENZIE and JEANNE MACKENZIE *The Fabians*. Pp. 446. New York. Simon & Schuster, 1977. $30.00.

The Fabians will be more appreciated by the general reader than by the scholar. As the title indicates, the emphasis is not on the Fabian Society itself, that is, its relation to social change in general and to political reform movements in particular during the late Victorian period and the Edwardian years. One would hardly guess from an examination of this book alone that the actual contribution of the Fabian Society has been a matter of considerable controversy among historians in recent years, with works such as A. M. McBriar's *Fabian Socialism and English Politics, 1884–1918* (1962) and Paul Thompson's *Socialists, Liberals and Labour: The Struggle for London, 1885–1914* (1967), heavily discounting the role claimed for so many years by the Fabians themselves. Indeed, the student thoroughly grounded in the period will find little of significance, particularly in matters of interpretation, that he doesn't already know. In this respect this book is hardly in the same class with the e.cellent biography of H. G. Wells, published by the same authors in 1973.

But "contribution to knowledge" aside, *The Fabians* is an absorbing narrative of the roles of the leading Fabians themselves, especially those of Sidney and Beatrice Webb, George Bernard Shaw, Graham Wallas, Annie Besant, James Ramsay MacDonald, Hubert Bland, Sydney Olivier, William Clarke, and H. G. Wells. It holds close attention from the initial gathering of 15 at the home of Edward Pease in London in 1883 until World War I, when the energy of the founding Fabians flagged. The authors, for the most part, write directly from manuscript material, particularly the Passfield Papers and the Shaw Papers, and often provide detail beyond other historians who have used the same material. Indeed, it is the detail which gives this book distinction, even when it seems to wander somewhat in elaborating such matters as Sidney Webb's courtship of Beatrice Potter, the marriage of Bernard Shaw and Charlotte Payne-Townshend, Shaw's plays, and the origins and early history of the London School of Economics.

The history of the Fabian Society, it should be emphasized, is there as well—its organization, activities, controversies within and without—but this is overshadowed by the story of the careers of its leaders. The work as a whole suggests, perhaps without the authors so intending, that the Fabians as individuals contributed far more to the English experience in these years than did the Fabian Society itself.

ALFRED F. HAVIGHURST
Amherst College
Massachusetts

FERGUS MILLAR. *The Emperor in the Roman World*. Pp. xiii, 656. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977 $27.50

"The emperor 'was' what he did," according to Fergus Millar and in government "the most significant form of action is communication between persons." Thus, with these assumptions as its basis, *The Emperor in the Roman*

World is considered by its author as "a guide whose aim is to map out certain essential elements in the structure and functioning of the Roman Empire," or as he reiterates, "this book is largely a map of who said or wrote what to whom." This communications map is arrived at without the benefit of sociological jargon or systems analysis and leads Millar to maintain that what the emperor did was the fusion of what the Roman senator did and what the Hellenistic king did. Thus Millar argues "the role and function of an emperor present us, if examined closely, with the most complete exemplification of the predominance of rhetoric in the culture of the Graeco-Roman world." The object of Millar's "essay in historical interpretation" is "to suggest that these patterns are of fundamental importance in understanding what the Roman empire was."

For more than 600 pages, Millar demonstrates the breadth and depth of his erudition over a highly selective landscape that includes among many other topics imperial residences, provincial councils, athletes, and bishops. Scores of pages are devoted to detailed discussions of instruments of communication such a *libelli*, *mandata*, *epistulae*, *codicilli* and other equally specialized materials. Much of this detailed technical argument, which wanders far from the author's purpose, might well have been omitted since Millar eschews presenting "the bibliography of the question" and "does not set out to provide the complete evidence on any point." Rather, the many pages devoted to technical discussions of various classes of documents or of legal status, and an even greater amount of space wasted on superfluous examples illustrating the same point, might well have been used to cover important areas that the author neglected such as client kings, diplomatic contacts with kings and peoples beyond the empire, the role of the emperor as general and his relations with his soldiers and allies, the imperial secret service, *delatores*, and propaganda—especially as developed on coinage. Millar might even have been drawn to examine the evidence for the western half of the empire in the detail it deserves; he might thus perhaps have been less seduced by communication and have seen the emperor more as a soldier and a builder and less as a *rhetor*. A less arbitrary choice of topics and evidence might well have led Millar to see that form is not substance and there is more to the man than style.

BERNARD S. BACHRACH
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis

DENNISON RUSINOW. *The Yugoslav Experiment 1948–1974*. Pp. xxi, 410. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. $16.50.

Dennison Rusinow, author of *Italy's Austrian Heritage, 1919–1946*, now turns his hand to Tito's Yugoslavia. Mr. Rusinow, an executive of the American University's field staff, has lived in Yugoslavia for many years. The work relies principally upon published Serbo-Croatian and English sources. The author has also interviewed numerous personages important in the new Yugoslavia.

The study actually antedates 1948, going back to the days of defeat during World War II, the Chetniks, and the beginnings of the Communist-led Partisan movement. The cruelties and mutual hatreds, political and ethnic, of these times stand out.

The author treats events and policy-making in postwar Yugoslavia in analytic detail. He ranges widely: the concept of Tito and his associates as to what the new Yugoslavia would be; the setting up of the put-together state and reconstruction, the break with Stalin; the attempts to create laissez faire socialism; the price of pluralism; the 1974 constitution, with its emphasis upon "impressive further development of plural institutions" plus "a blatantly increased role for the Party as the one ring to bind them all. . . ."

What emerges from all of this is rather perplexing. On the one hand, Tito's Yugoslavia, unlike Czechoslovakia, managed to defy the USSR and main-

tain its independence. The new Yugoslavia, it is further claimed, has also sometimes managed to produce goods superior to those of the East European bloc, and hence these are coveted by the latter.

On the other hand, the reconciliation of freedom with socialism (one of the slogans, incidentally, of the June 1968 strike of the Belgrade university students) has never really occurred. No freedom of political dissent is to be found during these years, except in the most patchy way. As for the goal of brotherhood and unity among the south Slavs, this has no more been achieved under the present federation than in the Serb-dominated Yugoslavia of the interwar years.

Mr. Rusinow strives to be critical, even though his enthusiasm for the new Yugoslavia and its leaders is visible throughout the presentation. Hence his conclusions are somewhat startling.

"As the State and the regime began their fourth decade . . . it seemed more likely that Yugoslavia would become merely another slovenly, moderately oppressive, semi-efficient, semi-authoritarian State run by an oligarchy of contending élites, a society in which many people are free and participant and many are not. Like most States."

Apart from the probably justified evaluation of Yugoslav socialism, the cynical generalization, "Like most States" is certainly questionable. This monograph deserves serious study. But a turgid style will deter even a determined and sympathetic reader An unfortunate misprint on the very fist page of the preface reads "Yugoslave" instead of "Yugoslav".

DAVID HECHT

Pace University
Westchester
New York

BRADLEY F. SMITH. *Reaching Judgment at Nuremberg: The Untold Story of How the Nazi War Criminals Were Judged*. Pp. xviii, 349. New York. Basic Books, 1977. $15.00.

For more than 30 years, the German city of Nuremberg has been synonymous with the International Military Tribunal that judged major figures of the Nazi regime. Countless articles and books have been written on the subject. This latest work by Bradley Smith, author of two important studies on the early years of Hitler and Himmler, is by no means just another book on the subject. Making use of recently released British and American documents on the trial, Smith has probed deeply into the negotiations leading to the establishment of the Tribunal, selection of defendants, indictments, legal aspects of the trial and the secret deliberations on the verdicts. This is, indeed, a significant book that deals with issues largely ignored in earlier accounts.

Among the problems the author grappled with are the conspiracy to commit aggressive war and the criminal organizations of the Nazi movement. Conspiracy is a common, but often controversial, aspect of Anglo-American law; however, it is virtually unknown to continental law. Most of the German defense lawyers, and the defendants, failed to comprehend fully this complex legal concept. Moreover, neither the Russian nor the French members of the Tribunal had experienced legal cases involving conspiracy. In the author's opinion, the crimes of the Nazis had so inflamed world opinion that failure to condemn the SS and the Gestapo would have brought about serious political consequences. The situation was a delicate one, but the Tribunal by declaring several lesser groups not criminal, avoided political repercussions and possible miscarriages of justice. Lurking behind everything at Nuremberg was the ever-present question: was this ex post facto law?

In a fascinating and compelling section, Smith carefully describes the reaching of individual verdicts, from the easy ones to the acquittals. Through the use of unpublished sources, particularly Biddle's papers, he has reconstructed brilliantly and meticulously the controversies and compromises leading to final judgment. Here the role of biases, national policies, personalities, and differing approaches to law can readily be seen.

This book has great value for students of European affairs as well as for specialists in the Nazi era. Smith also views the Nuremberg trial as contemporary history. He convincingly shows how the changes that accompanied the transition from war to peace became evident in American values and policies. Those concerned with efforts to make leaders accountable for unleasing war and causing mass atrocities will also profit from this superb study.

CHARLES J. HERBER
The George Washington University
Washington
D.C.

SIDNEY TARROW. *Between Center and Periphery Grassroots Politicians in Italy and France*. Pp. xv, 272. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977. $15.00.

Following his studies on communism in south Italy, and another book on communism in Italy and France, Sidney Tarrow of Cornell University now presents his 1969–72 investigation of 117 French and 131 Italian mayors in four regions of France and Italy, where the populations of the cities varied from 500 to 50,000.

The book first reviews some political science and sociological studies, and refers, among others, to the work of Edward Shils and especially to Michel Crozier and his co-workers, Jean-Claude Thoenig and Jean-Pierre Worms. Let me immediately make a critical observation here by saying that usually Max Weber is not classified as a functionalist. Moreover, there is an absence of reference to any human ecological studies that have been developed—especially in the United States—that deal with problems of centralization and decentralization of urban communities.

Referring to interview data and chapters describing citizens and mayors and their governmental structure which links them to major capital centers, the author calls the French type dirigiste and the Italian clientelistic. Not only in the French case does the role of the state governmental structure become more important, with the mayors playing a more active role, but, also, the French mayors frequently do not stress their party allegiance, professing, rather, to being apolitical, and serving the whole community. The Italian mayor, on the other hand, was more politically involved. He was usually a party member and he spent most of his time trying to obtain favors for his clients. He frequently contacted different political centers in the capital, exploring and experimenting with different channels, both formal and informal. In other words, grassroots democracy was practiced more in Italy than in the more administratively organized French arrangement. An Italian mayor felt that meetings with citizens were helpful to reach decisions, while his French counterpart used meetings mostly to explain something to the voters. Italians appeared more competitive, while rationality tended to prevail in France.

Reflecting on his data, Professor Tarrow feels that in the Italian case an increase of bureaucracy makes a desirable improvement difficult, while in France, the state is impermeable and less likely to enhance local responsibilities. But it appears that in the small community of Italy, there was relatively quite a lot of cooperation between different political groups in spite of an absence of such cooperation at the national level. In France, there was less cooperation at the local level and more at the national level. In France there was also, of course, local sentiment which showed in terms of anti-party attitudes, or perhaps we could say in apolitical attitudes.

This analysis has provided us with good insights corroborating that a comparison of the same category of phenomena opens new perspectives that replace our usual inability to experiment. Critically considered, I have two questions: Italian mayors did not aspire to continue in their jobs, and they disliked being asked to intervene personally in matters. However, the majority of French mayors felt gratified with their jobs. Why? This should be further explored. Maybe the state also functions somewhat differently in the

Napoleonic France, as it was frequently described by the author, than in the state of Italy. Secondly, Tarrow almost apologetically uses the term system. It appears that this attitude is unnecessary since the concept of social system and other systems has been critically and usefully accepted into sociology.

JIRI KOLAJA
University of West Virginia
Morgantown

HOWARD J. WIARDA. *Corporatism and Development: The Portuguese Experience*. Pp. x, 447. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1977. $20.00.

Professor Wiarda's study is a major contribution to the English language literature on Portuguese politics. Indeed, there is no other book length analysis which covers twentieth century Portugal so thoroughly.

The principal thesis of the book may be stated simply. It is that "corporatism" —a form of political and social organization through which, in effect, the central government controls the structures of interest representation—is more or less natural to the Iberic-Latin tradition How is such a system different from outright totalitarianism? Although Wiarda does not stress the point, the hallmark of Portuguese authoritarianism during the Salazar-Caetano era (from the early thirties to the early seventies) was mass demobilization. Widespread popular participation in politics was not encouraged, not even symbolically, as in certain totalitarian systems; the apolitical nature of the Portuguese political system set severe limits to the implementation from above of corporate organizations and activities.

Wiarda recognizes that there are at least two problems with the Ibero-Latin thesis. One is that it tends to degenerate into an explanation of authoritarian rule based on national character or a vaguely defined political culture. After all, modern authoritarianism is not peculiarly Latin. The second difficulty concerns the reality of the corporatist organizations, which, in theory, were supposed to thrive during the renaissance of Ibero-Latin authoritarianism in Portugal. In fact, these organizations existed for the most part on paper. The workers' syndicates had almost no real power. For that matter, the employers' associations were largely window dressing. Salazar himself did not take corporatist theory, such as it was, very seriously. The actual system of power appears to have been highly personalistic and based, as well, on rather clearcut differences between classes.

Thus, Wiarda's central hypothesis does not seem to go far in explaining Portuguese politics. To be sure, he is aware of competing theories, and he does not press his own to the exclusion of others. The trouble with this approach is that it entails much "on the one hand, on the other hand" discussion, with the result that the book begins to lose focus and a definite point of view.

Nevertheless, despite the conceptual uncertainty, Wiarda's presentation of the ins-and-outs of Portuguese politics during the Salazar-Caetano years is impressively rich. His book constitutes a baseline on which subsequent studies of Portuguese authoritarianism can build. The defects of Wiarda's study are real, but they do not outweigh the value of his pioneering effort.

PETER J. MCDONOUGH
The University of Michigan
Ann Arbor

UNITED STATES

HERMAN BELZ. *A New Birth of Freedom: The Republican Party and Freedman's Rights, 1861–1866* Pp. xv, 199. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1977. $16.95.

Some historians, sympathetic with the civil rights movement of the 1960s, have berated Republicans for failing to legislate complete equality a century ago. The failure, these writers explain, was due to the Republicans' racial prejudices or their laissez faire convictions

Other historians, equally devoted to civil rights for Negroes, have credited the Republicans with going to unexpected lengths to establish such rights. According to this view, the Congress of the 1860s fully intended in the fourteenth amendment to give the federal government the power—which it now exercises—of intervening against private groups as well as state officials.

In *A New Birth of Freedom* Professor Belz of the University of Maryland takes issue with both schools of thought. Belz concludes, on the one hand, that the fourteenth amendment was designed to limit only public, not private, action. Thus he implies that the Supreme Court followed legislative intent in the civil rights cases of 1883. He concludes, on the other hand, that Congress went as far as could be reasonably expected, considering the spirit of the times. "The really significant fact is that Republicans asserted equality before the law as the foundation of national policy toward the freedmen, in conscious despite of the contemporary belief in inherent racial differences and Negro inferiority" (p. 177). This was, in itself, a tremendous gain for blacks, and it provided a basis for further gains in the future.

Belz arrives at this conclusion after reviewing the steps that led up to the fourteenth amendment and discussing contemporary opinions of the significance that each step had for the legal status of blacks. The "revolution in personal status" advanced through black military service, the confiscation acts, the Emancipation Proclamation, Lincoln's plan of reconstruction, the Wade–Davis Bill, the Freedmen's Bureau, the thirteenth amendment, and the 1866 Civil Rights Act. On Lincoln's stand, Belz involves himself in some confusion. He is quite incorrect when he says (p. 35) Lincoln "abandoned his border state policy" of gradual, compensated emancipation after the passage of the Second Confiscation Act. He is on dubious ground when he indicates (pp. 41–2) that Lincoln made complete abolition a sine qua non for reconstruction under the ten-percent plan. Belz himself later (p. 62) contradicts this impression.

Despite these few lapses and a number of clumsily constructed sentences, he succeeds in making a convincing case. The book is a worthy successor to his *Reconstructing the Union* (1969), which it parallels and elaborates.

RICHARD N. CURRENT
University of North Carolina
Greensboro

WILLARD W. COCHRANE and MARY E. RYAN. *American Farm Policy, 1948–1973*. Pp. vii, 431. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1976. $18.50.

GARIN BURBANK. *When Farmers Voted Red: The Gospel of Socialism in the Oklahoma Countryside* Pp. xvi, 225. Westport, Conn.. Greenwood Press, 1976. $13.95.

Professor Cochrane of the University of Minnesota, as one of the most prominent agricultural economists of the contemporary period, played a significant role in the Kennedy-Johnson administrations as an advisor to Orville Freeman, Secretary of Agriculture. Therefore, his historical and analytical study of the origins and development of the agro-economic programs of the federal government since the 1920s certainly must be considered as a serious and authoritative account.

Beginning with the initial lobbying for federal aid to agriculture during the Harding administration (the so-called McNary-Haugen Movement), he traces the gradual transition of American agriculture from a laissez faire economy to one managed by the government. This process then expanded with the growth of the Welfare State until a series of highly complex farm programs were in operation. The basic farm act was the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938. Its modification, revision, and amendment produced the modern program, a process to which Cochrane personally contributed as a leading Democratic advisor. He is thus well equipped to explain the meaning and significance of

such concepts as: parity, domestic allotment, price supports, marketing agreements, P.L. 480, Soil Bank, set asides, reserves, etc.

In addition to this overall survey, Cochrane and his co-author Mary Ryan also made a detailed study of each commodity and how it prospered or declined under each successive program. Their final conclusion was that the federal price support program has been salutary because it stabilizes the agricultural sector of the economy and successfully has reconciled the conflicting interests of producers and consumers. Likewise, despite its complexity, the program has remained democratic, pragmatic and flexible.

In contrast to the broad national scope of Cochrane and Ryan's study, Gorin Burbank has investigated only one small aspect of the total agricultural picture. As a Berkeley graduate student during the turbulent 1960s, he became imbued with the desire to explore alternatives to capitalism, and hence focused on Socialist efforts to proselytize tenant farmers in Oklahoma during the early twentieth century Whereas Cochrane dealt with the successful innovation of today's farm programs, Burbank relates the failure of the Socialists to make any real impact upon the farmbelt. Although plagued with many internal doctrinal disputes, the Socialists did receive a modicum of protest votes in support of their agitation for federal aid to agriculture, but essentially their failure was an inability to promote such concepts as class struggle, cooperative farming and collective ownership. The traditional Puritan ethic was too deeply ingrained in the dirt farmers of the Sooner state to be enticed by a collectivist ethic. The mixed economy of free enterprise and governmental aid offered to them by the Progressives and New Dealers was much easier to assimilate into their traditional agrarian value system. The Socialists erroneously tried to impose a doctrinaire solution upon farm problems rather than to seek a grass roots consensus of farm organizations, the way Henry A. Wallace and other New Dealers did.

Socialism, as Populism, served a role as a vehicle for protest; but neither possessed the political and economic acumen to formulate realistic farm programs that could gain widespread support.

Cochrane has utilized a vast storehouse of statistical and economic data from governmental sources, as well as private institutes and academic studies. His work is extremely well documented and also reflects his own personal knowledge and experience. This expertise provides insights and judgments that are invaluable. Burbank, on the other hand, has based his dissertation primarily upon newspapers of the period, and while capturing the emotional fervor of the times, it cannot overcome this one dimensional handicap. The author decries the fact that Socialist leaders did not preserve their records, and if they did, their families chose not to make them accessible for research. This forced him occasionally to quote Debs or Berger, although they were not directly involved in the Oklahoma activities.

The Cochrane and Ryan book would be of great value to any political or social scientist seeking a better understanding of our past and present farm policies and programs. It would serve as a fundamental primer for novices and an interesting stimulant to those well acquainted with the subject. Burbank's book has a more restricted value in the field of agriculture, but as a part of the Contributions in American History series, it would interest those studying the American radical or socialist movement.

FREDERICK H. SCHAPSMEIER
University of Wisconsin
Oshkosh

ROGER H. DAVIDSON and WALTER J OLESZEK. *Congress Against Itself* Pp. ix, 306. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1977. $15.00.

Can the House of Representatives be kept safe from the ambitions of its members? This book is a lucid and fascinating study of the House and its

Select Committee on Committees of the 93rd Congress (1973–74) which will prompt most readers to answer, "probably not."

Congress Against Itself is a case study of House committee reorganization. The authors, seasoned political scientists, were professional staff members to the Select Committee. The book is an excellent journalistic account tracing the creation of the Standing Committee, its proceedings, and final action by the House on its recommendations. It records the evolving views of the members, as they wrestled with advocates and opponents of change. However, the authors go beyond reporting by reviewing reformism in the House, by the history of its organizational development, and by explaining the behavior of House members when a majority adopted the milder Hanson Committee substitute reorganization plan.

The book has many strengths and few deficiencies. All who are interested in American governmental processes, whether as a citizen, agent of change, defender of tradition, spokesperson for a special interest, novice student, or distinguished scholar, should read it. (1) It shows that Congress is a changing institution. Too many people remember the strong committees and strong chairmen of the past. Today's House is marked by scatteration of responsibility over nearly 150 subcommittees. (2) It shows that no one is in charge of the House—not party leaders, committee chairmen, or any establishment elite. Influence is notable for its diffusion. (3) It sets the specific actions of the Select Committee in the larger context of House behavior. How do members of a committee "mark up" a bill? The process is well illustrated by a description of fine tuning the Committee's resolution. (4) It illustrates that member ambitions, and perceptions of them by others, powerfully affect behavior. House decentralization is a response to member aspirations to really take part in policymaking. Majority Leader O'Neill's ambitions for the Speakership discouraged his support for Bolling's reforms. Both members and staff of threatened committees mobilized opposition to structural changes.

Some readers will desire a more balanced analysis. Have the authors given short shrift to good reasons for defeating the Select Committee's proposal? Does their regard for Bolling color their explanation of ranking minority member Martin's late substitute proposal? The caveats are worth mentioning, but I do not ascribe them much force. This case study is important for understanding the House today and in the future.

JACK VAN DER SLICK
Southern Illinois University
Carbondale

ANDREW M. GREELEY. *The American Catholic: A Social Portrait.* Pp. vii, 280. New York: Basic Books, 1977. $15.00.

On the basis of popular social commentary and mass media coverage of busing demonstrations in Boston, most social scientists and laymen alike "know" that urban working class Catholics comprise an important part of the new conservatism emerging in the United States. Two characteristics customarily attributed to Catholics are racial intolerance and a lack of education, so that the only feature that distinguishes Archie Bunker from the average Catholic in the American weltanschauung is ownership of a crucifix. Correspondingly, the church hierarchy is typically viewed as initiating inept and/or reactionary measures when confronted with rapidly changing social conditions. The conservation of the church is purportedly intensifying the estrangement of young clerics from Catholicism. Professor Greeley's new monograph disputes this popular characterization of the congregation, while merely clarifying what could be deemed as minor misconceptions regarding the church hierarchy. Consequently, Greeley at least implicitly shifts the blame for the negative light in which Catholics are currently viewed in America from parishioners to higher-level clergy.

The American Catholic is from the outset a self-proclaimed marriage of social science and polemics. Regrettably, this wedlock occasionally assumes the appearance of a mismatch. As a social scientist, Greeley better succeeds when defending the image of the congregation against the popular stereotype. As he repeatedly asserts, contemporary American Catholics are more liberal, less racist, and equally well-educated, when they are compared under controlled conditions with their Protestant counterparts. Culled from numerous articles published over the past decade, the empirical evidence Greeley amasses in support of this argument is absolutely conclusive.

As a polemicist, however, Greeley reaches his zenith when chastising the church hierarchy. Owing to the "decrepit institutional structure of the church," the changing needs of the congregation are no longer adequately fulfilled by contemporary Catholicism. Unfortunately, the staid hierarchy of the church has misinterpreted declining parishioner participation as backlash against the Second Vatican Council (which resulted in an English spoken liturgy) rather than as disenchantment with the Vatican's recent *Humanae Vitae* statement on birth control. While Greeley adequately demonstrates the fallacy of church policy based on misinterpretation of congregational sentiments, his subsequent characterizations of bishops as incompetent conservatives, chosen for their prudent rather than charismatic temperaments, maybe difficult for non-Catholic social scientists to fathom.

It is apparent that Greeley wrote this book for two divergent audiences—liberal Catholic laymen who disagree with current church policy and social scientists. Unfortunately, social scientists, while finding Greeley's efforts to discredit prevailing Catholic stereotypes most laudable, may be offended by his polemical characterizations of the church hierarchy (just as liberal Catholics, while applauding Greeley's polemics, may find his social science boring and tedious). To have best accommodated both audiences, Greeley perhaps should have written two books—one polemical and the other scientific. Indeed, as the reception of this monograph among academicians may substantiate, even talented social scientists who have large polemical axes to grind sometimes end up with their own heads on the chopping block.

RICHARD A. WRIGHT
Indiana University
Bloomington

KIRSTEN A. GRØNBJERG. *Mass Society and the Extension of Welfare, 1960–1970*. Pp. xiii, 266. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1977. $16.00.

Concerned with what she calls "the crisis of explanation surrounding the rising welfare rolls" (p. 35), the author of this sociological monograph describes her primary purpose as restating "the problem of the welfare crisis so as to place it in a larger perspective" (p. 2). Along the way she rebuts some of the pet hypotheses of such welfare theorists as Banfield, Moynihan, Piven, and Cloward.

After a short, but adequate, survey of the welfare crisis that distinguishes the popular and sociological conceptions of poverty, Professor Grønbjerg outlines her framework of analysis and study design. Briefly, her study is restricted to the AFDC program (ADC before 1961) for the years 1960 and 1970, and her principal tool of analysis is stepwise regression analysis. Throughout the book the author views the welfare explosion of the 1960s, which occurred in a time of increasing personal income and decreasing poverty, in the larger perspective of sociological theory about mass society. Morris Janowitz, in a foreword, only slightly exaggerates when he depicts the work as "sociology in the grand manner," resting on "a fusion of theoretical concerns with detailed empirical research" (p. x).

The chief findings of Professor Grønbjerg's quantitative analysis can be briefly summarized. The welfare

growth of the 1960s was greatest in the largest, most industrialized, and wealthiest states—though not because poor blacks and whites fled the South to seek the more generous welfare benefits of the North. Since that decade, there has been an increasing separation of property and dependency and a corresponding closer association between affluence and dependence; from this flows the crisis of our understanding of welfare. More important, for some time now the United States has been moving away from a pattern where poverty alone was the occasion for the distribution of public aid. Formal requirements of AFDC eligibility, somewhat surprisingly, have little, if any direct relationship to the size of AFDC rolls, the largest and most rapidly growing of all the public aid programs. Finally, "the United States has been gradually and haltingly moving toward a mass society in which the definition of citizenship is being extended to include economic rights and duties" (p. 153). This trend, the author thinks, may eventually end with some form of guaranteed annual income or a universal flat grant system, but not for some time to come.

Since this book is so thoroughly committed to a quantitative methodology, it is scarcely surprising that the conclusions are less than world shaking. The conclusions, modest as they are, typify the author's judicious and restrained approach to one of the most complicated issues of public policy. Though she is to be highly commended for having surveyed such an amazing amount of welfare literature in a relatively brief space, the general reader will be happy to know that much of the statistical and methodological materials have been confined to 25 pages of appendices in the back of the book. In addition to these, the author has wisely included voluminous notes for each chapter, an author index, a subject index, and an extensive bibliography.

The deficiencies of the book are relatively minor. Many of the laboriously derived findings actually do little more than confirm common sense. Perhaps somewhat more should have been made of the politics and economics of welfare. The explanatory concepts, "social stratification approach" and "mass society approach," though central to the book's analysis, are somewhat ambiguous. Much repetition occurs in the later chapters, not all of it necessary. There is a surplus in the writing of such conjunctive adverbs as yet, however, and nevertheless. Not nearly enough was said about the fundamental dilemma of all welfare statist democracies: the problem of simultaneously maximizing equality and freedom, given an economy of scarce resources. Finally the writing, though commendably objective, lacks even a hint of verve or literary panache. But that, alas, seems the inevitable price one must pay for quantitative sophistication in an age that views scholarship and readability as antithetical.

In spite of these reservations, it is impossible not to be impressed by the performance of an industrious scholar who has plowed deeper than most of her colleagues into the raw materials of the welfare crisis. This book, therefore, definitely belongs on the shelf of all serious students of poverty, public policy, social change, and federalism. It is, to be sure, only a monograph; but until a comprehensive synthesis comes along, it remains a wide-ranging study that will leave the defenders of right-wing orthodoxy unhappy, the readers who crave pat answers hungry, and those eager for the stimulation of quantitative scholarship satiated.

FRANCIS M. WILHOIT

Drake University
Des Moines
Iowa

ALBRO MARTIN. *James J. Hill and the Opening of the Northwest.* Pp. xii, 676. New York. Oxford University Press, 1976. $19.50.

The last quarter of the nineteenth century witnessed a period of great change in the United States. Devel-

opments in industry, transportation, and finance, were dominated by the efforts of an unusually large number of giants—men who not only made large fortunes, but who transformed the American economic scene and made possible the industrial machine that was to win two world wars and dominate the entire world during the first half of the next century. Among these giants, a man possessed of unusual talents, tremendous drive, and impressive skill, was James J. Hill, the subject of this biography.

Son of immigrants from northern Ireland, James Jerome Hill was born on a farm in the back country of Ontario Province, Canada, in 1838. Provided with limited, but unusually effective education, young Hill came to the United States at the age of 17. Within ten years, he had established himself as a young man of integrity, ambition, and ability, and was ready to enter business on his own. A dozen years later, at the age of 40, Hill and four associates took over the management of the St. Paul & Pacific Railroad. They established a connecting link with Winnipeg, and by 1893 had extended their railroad to Seattle. These were the formative years of the man who was, in the next decades to dominate the transportation of the American Northwest.

Hill's Great Northern was the only northern transcontinental railroad to avoid bankruptcy during the hard years of the 1890s. Hill acquired the bankrupt Northern Pacific and, with the assistance of J. P. Morgan, gained control of the Burlington, overthrowing Edward Harriman in the process. From then until his death on May 29, 1916, James J. Hill dominated the transportation of the Northwest. The man who had been successful in selling coal to the early railroads, the marketing specialist who had labored long hours and established himself as a young man with great business acumen, became one of the nation's wealthiest and most successful businessmen.

Hill was an articulate man; he preserved his voluminous correspondence, and the files of the James J. Hill papers not only reveal much of the man and his business methods, but also tell of many of his associates, his competitors, and the business practices and problems of his era. These sources have been examined, thoroughly and with great care, by Professor Martin, who teaches in the Harvard University Graduate School of Business Administration and also edits *The Business History Review*. The author has not only been thorough in his research, he has been insightful in his analysis of Hill and his era. Avoiding a weakness found in many comparable biographies, Professor Martin reveals the human being as well as the business tycoon. Mrs. Hill, the large family of children, their home life, are all given sympathetic and understanding treatment. Professor Martin writes with sureness and feeling; his text is carefully documented; the result is certainly one of the great biographies of the decade, a study that will long remain the definitive analysis of Hill and the Northwest railroads.

RALPH ADAMS BROWN
State University of New York
Cortland

JACK NEWFIELD and PAUL DUBRUL. *Abuse of Power. The Permanent Government and the Fall of New York* Pp. ix, 368. New York: Viking Press, 1977. $12.50.

This book is difficult to review for a social science journal. It is basically a newspaper editorial centered about the assumptions that New York City's woes, past and present, were and are caused by the bankers and their political henchmen. Messrs. Newfield and DuBrul list a series of alleged actions by Nelson and David Rockefeller and their proteges and attempt to relate these actions to successive financial crises confronting the city. Nothing is said about banking activities that precede the subsidence of crises.

The authors lay out the "true history" of the fiscal crisis, stating that the investment sector's refusal to buy municipal paper and the redlining of neighborhoods by the bankers and realtors are the causes of the city's financial decline

Could it be that the decline caused the banks and realtors to react? The federal government is charged with diverting "New York money" to the Sun Belt, with consequent dire results to the whole Northeast. No statement is made that federal taxes are levied on firms and individuals who may have made their income over an extended area, national as well as international. The permanent government of New York, alleged to consist of the banks, the "Feds", and the metropolitan authorities, such as the New York Port Authority, is the chief culprit in milking the city and its citizens. Had the temporary government of Lindsay, Beame and company stood up to the permanent government all would have been well. How they should have stood up is never quite spelled out. It is at this point that the authors fail to do any political science. Cause and effect relationships, tenuous at best, get very murky. Names and events are listed with reckless abandon, but the reader searches in vain for any high degree of correlation between events and personal activities of the presumed decisionmakers. As a treatise in political decisionmaking, the work would have extreme difficulty in any accredited graduate seminar.

At the end the authors make recommendations for saving the city, one of which is to establish a federal urban bank with power to fix interest rates and the duty to create a municipal bond market How long would such a bank stay in business if it did not reflect the going interest rate and the current price of municipal bonds generally?

There is little discussion of the roles played by municipal unions, street gangs, or overpopulation of certain minorities, in the city's financial situation. Rather the blame is laid squarely on the bankers in typical devil theory fashion. Perhaps, if the authors had started with Plato's concept of metabole and stasis, an operational hypothesis concerning New York City's fiscal problems would be forthcoming. As it stands, this book is nothing more than questionable journalism.

PAUL DOLAN
University of Delaware
Newark

FRANK S. ROBINSON. *Machine Politics: A Study of Albany's O'Connells.* Pp. ii, 249. New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1977. $12.95.

American political machines perpetually fascinate novelists, political parties professors, journalists, reformers, and indeed most folks. Their classical escapades could be fun, and the muckrakers gained attention as much for the amusement as for the evil doing they uncovered. Functionalists have had a field day with urban political machines, many contemporary observers study quantitatively and qualitatively presumed virtues of machine corruption in developing nations and the problem of lack of political system balance between bureaucratic and representative institutions when party machines are weak, and historians would find difficulties explaining melting pots without reference to bosses and ward leaders.

Albany, which for over half this century has been dominated by one political machine, presents numerous excellent perspectives for urban politics students. It is an old school organization with a constituent service-oriented ward leader structure, tax assessments and delinquencies manipulations, low paying though numerous patronage positions, power partly gained through justice administration control from police to grand juries, local Catholic church public policy linkages, wealth garnered by political leaders through municipal business dealings. It is a Democratic machine which at times controlled local Republican, Liberal and Conservative parties. And it is a personal story of the O'Connell family, particularly of longtime boss Daniel P. O'Connell, and of long-time mayor Erastus Corning.

Frank S. Robinson's *Machine Politics: A Study of Albany's O'Connells* provides wide-ranging details concerning Albany's machine, from its evolution as a youthful reformist group throwing Republican rascals out, through an epoch of unquestioned supremacy to its first serious electoral challenges in the early 1970s Robinson uses primarily files of local newspapers detailing that history and certainly aiding understanding spe-

cific machine procedures. Yet, that history never comes alive. Perhaps not interviewing Daniel P. O'Connell and many of his cohorts contributed to omission of the spirit of what kept the machine going for so long; indeed, long after Robinson shows its vitality dissipating, its hierarchy aging, its failure to induce new and committed precinct recruits, its failing to keep pace with Albany's drastic demographic changes, and its becoming increasingly status quo oriented. It somehow escaped the last hurrah theme of replacement by New Deal bureaucracy and then lingered. Analysis of why this happened, not given by Robinson, would have presented a provocative critique. Capturing the spirit of the pols who kept the machine going so long also could have been a great deal of fun.

CHARLES A. JOINER
Temple University
Philadelphia
Pennsylvania

ELLIOT A ROSEN. *Hoover, Roosevelt, and The Brains Trust: From Depression to New Deal*. Pp. x, 446. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. $16.95.

The main themes running through this scholarly monograph are as follows. (1) Hoover's failure to swerve from the course set in his *American Individualism* (1922) in the struggle to preserve America's decentralist past and to rely on individual, community, and voluntary solutions. In Rosen's opinion Hoover's program "promoted the Depression" and was no forerunner of the New Deal, contrary to some revisionists' views.

(2) Roosevelt's candidacy. The Albany group of Jim Farley, Louis Howe, and Colonel House almost botched his nomination, but the conservative coalition (Raskob, Smith, Baruch, etc.) was unable to hold its forces together. At the Chicago convention McAdoo and California, not Texas, played the decisive role on the crucial fourth ballot During the campaign FDR was caught between a crossfire of Democratic conservatives, who favored an international approach to the problems of the Depression, and the liberal intranationalists, who wished to concentrate on domestic solutions. His campaign speeches reflected political reality.

(3) In March 1932 FDR became convinced of the need of a group of academic advisers; hence, the "Brains Trust" of Raymond Moley, Rexford Tugwell, and Adolf Berle, Jr. was recruited. During the next 12 months they constantly studied, consulted others, and advised FDR. Most of the later New Deal legislation was formulated during that time by the Brains Trust (not the Albany group) in collaboration with Roosevelt. These men believed in expansion of government functions at the national level. Planning and regulation, not ownership, was their goal.

Rosen notes that Roosevelt had a keen mind, was receptive to ideas, was not doctrinaire, but ever the politician He rejected some proposals out of hand, some because of poor timing, and some as not politically feasible. Until his inauguration, conservatives of both parties tried to influence FDR to follow their policies. Momentarily he wavered, but in the end followed the line he and the Brains Trust had projected.

Rosen spent 13 years on this book, which includes 50 pages of footnotes, many from primary sources. The author interviewed and corresponded with many of the principals. Moreover, he notes that often recollections published in later memoirs are at odds with letters and memos written in 1932. He is particularly indebted to Moley, whose papers have received scant use, and he believes Moley deserves a larger share of credit for the New Deal than Moley himself claimed.

The author furnishes excellent background chapters on the political and economic philosophy of each of the Brains Trusters, and his chapter "Disharmony of International Cooperation is a severe indictment of American shortsightedness toward the world economic crisis of 1931–32. Finally Rosen contends that the conservative forces suffered only temporary defeat

with the advent of the New Deal. Some critics, however, will note his bias against Hoover and will dispute his view that there were not "two" New Deals. Nevertheless, this is a fine study which will be particularly rewarding to specialists.

ERNEST M. LANDER, JR.
Clemson University
South Carolina

UPTON SINCLAIR. *The Coal War*. Pp xcii, 417. Boulder: Colorado Associated University Press, 1976. $12.50

Social scientists can learn much from the sociological novel, where concrete examples of the processes of conflict, change, and other areas of human interaction are portrayed by the writer of fiction. Upton Sinclair, whose centenary will be celebrated in September 1978, was a great journalist, whose sociological novels were both propaganda tracts and economic reports.

A socialist, the last of the muckrakers, a symbol of a strand of American idealism, founder of the American Civil Liberties Union and the League of Industrial Democracy, he was for a long time the best read American author abroad. About 800 translations of his books were made, in 47 languages and almost as many countries. His early work, *The Jungle*, published in 1906 when he was a young man of 28, brought to light conditions in the Chicago stockyards and made him famous.

The Coal War, until now an unpublished novel, is significant from several perspectives. It is, in effect, a documentary account of a vicious labor-capital battle in the Colorado coal fields in 1913–14. It also portrays, in a most graphic way, the bitter struggle of the labor movement in the United States at a time when the laissez faire social Darwinism of Herbert Spencer and William Graham Sumner was the dominant and fashionable ideology of American industry. A 92-page Introduction by John Graham of the University of Colorado provides a succinct history of the times and the background to the strike in the coal fields that culminated in the 1914 Ludlow Massacre.

Sinclair was actively involved in the strike, made an unsuccessful effort to interview John D. Rockefeller, Jr., met with protestors, picketed, was arrested and imprisoned. He later wrote *King Coal*, to which this novel is a documentary follow-up. The manuscript was rejected by Macmillan in 1917 and Sinclair refused to revise it. To him, any book was important insofar as it was influential as a force for change. Here is a valuable historical novel, but one based upon actual historical events, which the author not only observed, but also participated in.

Both John Graham's Introduction and the novel are a genuine contribution to social history. This book can be read with profit not only by literary scholars but by all interested in United States social and economic developments in the early 1900s, political processes, and the role of individuals in protests against injustice.

JOHN E. OWEN
Arizona State University
Tempe

SOCIOLOGY

CHARLES F. DELZELL, ed. *The Future of History. Essays in the Vanderbilt University Centennial Symposium*. Pp. xi, 263 Nashville, Tenn., Vanderbilt University Press, 1977. $13.95.

During the 1975–76 academic year the history department of Vanderbilt University, celebrating the beginnings of that University's second century of classroom teaching, offered a series of public lectures by prominent historians. The department did not overly structure the series, rather, it asked the lecturers to "address themselves to the problem of 'the future of history' as they perceive it in their own fields of inquiry, fields which embrace some of the new as well as more traditional approaches to the discipline." Each guest was particularly encouraged "to engage in cautious speculation about the paths

that Clio may be inclined to pursue in the years that lie just ahead" (p. vi). The participants represented 11 of the most distinguished historians in the discipline today, including Lawrence Stone, Stephan Thernstrom, Kenneth A. Lockridge, I. Bernard Cohen, Paul K. Conkin, C. Vann Woodward, Woodrow Borah, John Whitney Hall, Lewis W. Spitz, Gordon Wright, and Richard W. Leopold.

Based on the symposium's published results, the Vanderbilt history department not only served its university well but did also for the profession as a whole. The published lectures sparkle as historiographical pieces. They will become standard reading fare for practicing historians and graduate students alike, indeed important reading for all those seeking to know more about the current state of research and writing among the guild of academic historians.

The topics of inquiry are as diverse as the special fields of the contributors. The essays touch upon subjects such as historical demography, the history of science, Latin America, periodization as related to the Renaissance and Reformation, and contemporary history. The breadth of topics normally would make substantive generalizations difficult for reviewers, were it not for the attention that some of the authors pay to the maturing relationship between history and the social sciences.

Lawrence Stone's opening essay sets the tone for much of the volume. Stone stresses the decline of the narrative form and the rise of new analytical modes. Others consider the same issue in more than passing commentary, discussing new research strategies, methodologies, and techniques (especially quantification) now being employed for conquering the past. Each author varies in his appraisal of the possible beneficent effects. Stone issues a full list of warning signals about the pursuit of value-free social sciencism through history. That topic clearly reverberates through the essays by Thernstrom, Lockridge, Conkin, and Vann Woodward. Lockridge enthusiastically endorses the new history by chiding those who deny that the bits and pieces of accumulated data on human existence can become the basis for a more fully developed understanding of dynamic social change through time. Yet the others warn that new methodologies and techniques may be as dehumanizing to Clio's subject as they are envigorating. The exchange epitomizes the collection's high point, in that it puts critical methodological issues in perspective, without falling prey to the tiresome debate over the so-called sciences-humanities dichotomy.

What also emerges from the volume is the impression that historians are not particularly comfortable about probing the future. Some contributors frankly admit that confronting the crystal ball wrenches them too much from their natural character. As a result, the essays, while illuminating as historiography, are fuzzy as predictive explorations. The collection might have been served better with a title emphasizing recent important trends. Then again, the Vanderbilt series might have been served better had the participants been more willing to look ahead boldly, especially when the profession is under increasing attack in today's academic world for reputedly pursuing a non-utilitarian and, worse yet, uninformative subject. If the recent trends and subjects are as pathbreathing as some of the authors suggest, then why all the din and fuss about history as a declining field? Is it possible that the new techniques have already stripped history of its humanizing vitality, leaving behind a residue of scholarship that fascinates only a few initiated specialists? Such questions should have had meaning in a centennial celebration, especially when many who pick up this volume will be wondering whether Clio can hold on in the next century as a subject worthy of the uninitiated's attention. More concern about the future might have made this important collection even more valuable.

JAMES KIRBY MARTIN
Rutgers University
New Brunswick
New Jersey

H. WENTWORTH ELDREDGE, ed. *World Capitals: Toward Guided Urbanization*. Pp. xiii, 642. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1975. $19.95.

The process of urbanization has positive and negative aspects. First, it involves the physical concentration of people which makes possible more efficient exchanges of goods and services in an industrial economy with concurrent increases of wealth and well-being. Second, it brings intensification of buildings and pollution, beauty and ugliness, affluence and poverty, social change and stress, giving rise to appalling problems which threaten to break down civilization and destroy our natural environment. The process is occurring everywhere in the world, and at accelerating rates, so that by the year 2000 A.D., it is expected there will be three billion urban dwellers—half of the projected world total population. City and regional planners look with dismay upon the results of urbanization, the negative aspects of which they endeavor to control and rationalize. The tasks set by urban planners for themselves are outlined in the introductory chapter and three concluding chapters by H. Wentworth Eldredge, the editor of this massive volume.

The contents comprise largely the substantive chapters on 11 metropolises, written by 11 authors drawn from varied backgrounds in universities and planning agencies. Nine of the metropolises are national capitals (Brasilia, Caracas, Dakar, London, Moscow, Paris, Stockholm, Tokyo, and Washington), while two are state or provincial capitals (Chandigarh and Toronto). These places represent a broad range of historical growth, economic and cultural development, and degrees of effectiveness in planning policy. The selection of capital cities is intended to focus attention on such places as the symbols of political power and the problems arising from either too little control with conflicting goals, as observed in Western Europe, certain of the countries of the Americas, Japan, and newly-independent Africa and India, or in a planned society, under powerful centralized authority, as in the Soviet Union. The descriptions and interpretations, however, are as varied as the viewpoints of the authors, six of whom are professional planners (Bozarth, Dakin, Feiss, Honjo, and Sidenbladh), three, geographers (Bastie, Shepherd, and Sommer), two, political scientists (Frolic and Violich), and one, an architectural historian (Evenson).

In the opinion of this reveiwer, the editor is not successful in deriving integrating principles or programs for the future from these contributions. One does not conclude this volume with a sense of how urbanization may be guided, especially in free democratic political systems and free market economies.

The book has value for reading in courses on comparative urbanism and planning as a reference for the treatment given to particular cities. On the basis of personal experience and classroom use, this reviewer recommends the chapters on Stockholm, Toronto, Moscow, Tokyo and Chandigarh. The chapters on Washington, prepared by two authors, is particularly disappointing. It would be impossible in a volume of this size to exclude all errors and correct all typography. However, it should be mentioned that the map of Tokyo's urbanized area in 1965, appearing on page 112, has been transposed from the chapter on Tokyo (pp. 340 ff.) to the chapter on London. The grouping of the cities into four parts (I—Western: Old World; II—Western: New World; III—Non-Western; and IV—Developing Nations) does not seem cogent and can be regarded only as historically valid.

JOHN E. BRUSH

Rutgers University
New Brunswick
New Jersey

WILLIAM B. GOULD. *Black Workers in White Unions:* Job Discrimination in the United States. Pp. 506. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977. $20.00.

This is a comprehensive study of the scope and effectiveness of our national laws prohibiting racial discrimination in employment. The study reveals the long road we have yet to travel to remove discrimination in the work place, despite the existence of a plethora of laws prohibiting racial discrimination. The media frequently feature the most prominent discrimination suits which reach the courts, but most Americans are scarcely aware of the widespread racial discrimination in labor unions, offices, factories, government, and, of all places, among institutions of higher learning.

Despite the statements of George Meany and other labor leaders to the contrary, trade unions, more than any other institutions, are, according to the author, "the focal point of racial discord in our society." "Unions," he says, "often constitute roadblocks to the achievement of nondiscriminatory employment practices."

It comes as no surprise that the business community in general lacks sympathy for the nondiscrimination laws. Business too often accepts, or participates with unions, in discrimination in apprenticeship placements, in hiring, promotion, layoff and related job actions. Although the book details much of the extensive litigation relating to discrimination in the lily-white construction industry and the building trades, racial issues in the industrial unions—autos, rubber, meat cutting, trucking, to cite some of the larger ones —carry a different emphasis. The issues here are more those of the type of jobs, promotion, and union leadership posts made available to minorities Blacks, as a percent of their numbers in the mass production industries, attain few skilled jobs, supervisory posts or union offices.

Gould, while giving credit for progress made toward eliminating discrimination in employment, cites other reasons for our stumbling progress: inadequate enforcement of the laws due to insufficient funding by Congress, "the absence of political will and competence . . . to crack down on offenders," and the poor performance of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.

The extensive research which went into this work is evident in the scores of cases cited and documented. It is at once a record of where we stand regarding antidiscrimination legislation, how we got to where we are, what remedies are available to the aggrieved, and what improvements can be made in law and enforcement. The author's dissatisfaction with the record to date points however at more than discrimination in employment. He sees employment as "the key to the colorblind society that must remain this country's objective. Resistance in other areas should decline to the extent that blacks progress up the economic ladder."

JAMES R. BELL

California State University
Sacramento

DAVID KIPNIS. *The Powerholders*. Pp. ix, 230. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1976. $12.50.

In an effort to better understand the dimensions of the exercise of power in society, Kipnis concentrates on various methods, procedures and previous studies to be utilized in understanding the roles and functions of the powerholder or the powerwielder. Emphasis is placed on an examination of strategies used by powerholders because it is felt that "psychology has had surprisingly little to say about the use of power" which leads the author to lament "we find comparatively few mentions of the topic 'social power' in reference periodicals that list topics studied in psychology." (p. 4) The expectation is thereby created early on that Kipnis will concentrate on making up for these deficiencies by providing new studies, in depth analyses and thought provoking insights about powerholders and "target persons," the phrase used by the author to describe those who are subject to the orders, whims, slings(?) of powerwielders, evidently considered to be almost always to be hit or harmed in the process. These new analytic studies never appear in the

two hundred some pages of the text. What does materialize is a recitation of the discourses of philosophers, the recording of results of studies on power exercised in work relationships, in the context of marriage and "among employers of housemaids," with a few quotations from the plays of Sophocles, Shakespeare, and *My Fair Lady* thrown in for good measure.

In attempting to support a developing orientation which Kipnis calls "the metamorphic effects of power;" i.e., that any exercise of successful power on the part of the powerholder will influence both the perception of the powerholder's own sense of self and self-esteem, as well as the powerholder's perception of the "target person" who has been, evidently, suitably demeaned and defeated in the encounter. Several hypotheses are posited for consideration, but not tested, as part of this metamorphic effect. Indeed, one tentative statement, "To the extent that powerholders believe that they have caused a target's behavior, powerholders are likely to devalue the target's worth" (p. 196), is alleged to be true based on 1) a study of marriage customs in the Victorian age and 2) from the work of "Undergraduate students in several of my classes [who] distributed the questionnaire to all the married persons they knew, most of whom were living in the Philadelphia area." (p. 189) With these kinds of sampling methods, who needs rigorous scientific procedures?

Briefly, in summary, one could ask if the author has ever given thought to the possibility of considering the findings in the field of social psychology. There is an abundance of studies on community power structures, personality and power, strategies of wielding power from presidents to mayors, and (sadly) the poor as target persons in urban renewal programs across the country. The various hypotheses relating to the metamorphic effects of power would be suitably tested and might conceivably fill in for "the lack of a broad empirical base for my ideas" (p. 214). A very helpful start would be an analysis of *The Power Broker: Robert Moses and The Fall of New York* by Robert A. Caro. Mr. Moses was a consummate powerholder and when he wielded his power, everybody became target persons.

JOHN J. LENNON

University of Arkansas
Little Rock

ELLIOT A. KRAUSE, *Power and Illness: The Political Sociology of Health and Medical Care* Pp. vii, 383. New York: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, 1977. $12.95.

The author employs a Marxist perspective to account for the failure of the health and medical institutions in the United States to provide adequate care. The introduction surveys the historical development of health systems in Western society followed, in Part I, by an analysis of the occupational structure of health care. The profit motive and the legal basis for physicians' control of medical practice is used to explain the persistent dominance of medical doctors as loci of power on which other health practitioners depend and for the limitations observed on the type, amount, and location of delivery of health services.

The focus of the analysis, in Part II, expands from the structure of hospital-based medical occupations to the social context of health care. The author asserts that it is the capitalist system of political economy, with it's accompanying profit motive, which mandates a two-class system—a private system for the rich; and a public system for the poor.

Part III discusses the politics of national health planning as a system in which producer and consumer compete for control of health resources But the producer, aided by the sanctions of a capitalist bureaucratic government, dominates and therefore is unresponsive to consumers. The final chapter predicts the future health care system in the United States will result from the outcome of the conflict between the many interest groups with a stake in the health care field; but that the creation of a consumer-based system requires the abolition of corporate power. Only in this

way can the distribution of power between producers and consumers be equalized.

The book is well written and conceptually interesting. The limitations are inherent in what the author has chosen to do. Once having selected a macrosociological approach, the scope becomes enormously broad, and much is oversimplified. The emphasis on a single factor explanation means that the analysis overlooks other factors in the system which affect the outcome. Only one among the questions which might be raised is the extent to which it is the nature of the political economy or the structure of complex organizations which are detrimental to consumers' interests. Nevertheless, it is an enlightening book which presents an enlarged picture of medical sociology. It would be useful for courses in social problems and social issues, as well in courses in the sociology of medicine and health care.

CAROLYN R. DEXTER
The Pennsylvania State University
Middletown

LEON RADZINOWICZ and JOAN KING. *The Growth of Crime: The International Experience* Pp. v, 342. New York: Basic Books, 1977. $11.95

This book is clearly written for a lay audience, and there is, one suspects, an important reason for this. The data on crime and criminal justice from many countries of the world are simply too scant and unreliable to allow anything more than impressionistic comparisons to be made from one country to another. Furthermore, there are many serious methodological difficulties in making international comparison of crime rates, prison rates, and criminal justice practices.

Sir Leon has, therefore, wisely chosen to share with us his international experiences, making clear, when necessary, that his observations are impressionistic, and tempering his interpretations of the research and practice with his vast knowledge and experience in criminology. The result is an immensely readable book, full of interesting details (Iceland has only one prisoner in its prison; Sir Leon was shot by a psychotic in a Viennese cafe) and a great deal of information concerning every aspect of crime and criminal justice.

The authors have tried assiduously to present a balanced account of the current state-of-the-art in criminology (concerning research and practice and policy) and by and large they achieve their goal. They have also shown considerable restraint in not assigning to any particular country the label of being the worst in its level of crime or treatment of criminals. This is indeed a worthy achievement since the temptation is always there these days to point the accusing finger at the United States (and conversely to feel smug about one's own country). But the authors point the finger at issues and problems rather than countries.

Another positive feature of the book is its clear awareness of the history of criminology and of criminal justice, so that when we reach the final chapter, which deals with various aspects of prison and alternative penal measures, Sir Leon and Ms King are well aware of the trap that lies for overzealous reformers. They do not offer pop solutions; rather they make clear the incredible complexity of the issues, both from a theoretical and practical point of view. Yet they are also able to assert that some programs have been successful in some parts of the world, and it is on these that we should build.

Two important issues are raised by this book. The first is Sir Leon's constant observation that different countries are at different stages of "penal development." The authors never elaborate upon this concept, and one wonders what is meant by this term, when so much time is spent these days arguing that things today are no better than they were 200 years ago. (As the authors point out, in 1975, 200 years after Beccaria's treatise, the U.N. was very proud of its achievement in passing a resolution denouncing the use of torture on prisoners). Is there an impli-

cation that the United States or Britain, or some other Western country is "better" penally developed than other "backward" countries? If so, which are these countries, and what is the yardstick of "progress?" These are tremendously complicated problems which have yet to be addressed in the field of comparative criminology.

The second important issue is raised by default. This is the only criminology book that I have read that has ventured a comment regarding the comparative level of crime or treatment of criminals in Communist areas such as the U.S.S.R., East Europe and China. But the authors' references to these cover no more than a few lines. In comparison, the failures in penal measures, the constant increase in crime are catalogued in great detail for the Western countries. The clear reason for this is what everyone knows but is inclined to forget: the Communist countries continue to be extremely secretive about even the most basic information (such as crime rates, prison rates, etc.), so that the illusion is created that crime is somehow the responsibility and sole problem of the West.

This is an excellent book, delightfully written and informative to sophisticates and laymen alike.

GRAEME R. NEWMAN
State University of New York
Albany

SEYMOUR B. SARASON. *Work, Aging, and Social Change: Professionals and the One Life-One Career Imperative.* Pp. xiii, 298. New York: The Free Press, 1977 $14.95.

There is a need for a comprehensive treatment of work values and experiences of professionals. Seymour Sarason's *Work, Aging and Social Change* is an attempt to fill this need. The book is a treatment of "emergent values" especially authenticity, autonomy, search for novelty and personal growth, which arose during and after World War II (the "Age of Psychology"), and had spread extensively by the sixties. It focuses on the notion of "one life-one career" imperative as it applies to professionals. Because of these emergent values, the imperative is breaking down.

The book has some qualities. For example, it focuses on an often unexpressed sentiment (job dissatisfaction) among many professionals. It discusses several major post World War II phenomena, such as the effects of the atomic bomb and Vatican II. And it integrates dramatic works, such as *Death of a Salesman* into the discussion.

Nonetheless, it is seriously flawed. To begin with the title is misleading. "Aging" is not a focus, as it is rarely mentioned, except in one brief chapter. There are errors in grammar; e.g., "is to indulge presumption" (p. 117). There are a number of small errors in facts or interpretation; for example, whether Betty Ford "explicitly sanctioned premarital sex" (p. 48) is questionable. Sarason uses himself as an example of a "changed career;" yet, he has been a psychologist (admittedly in several settings) throughout his career. In fact, he (over) uses his own experiences (and cites his own work) much too heavily to be credible. He refuses to define most of his central concepts, including what constitutes career change, and especially "values, ideas and attitudes—call them what you will" (p. 53). There are many unsupported impressions and sweeping generalizations. For example, he states "to talk candidly about one's relationship to one's work is as difficult as talking about one's sex life" (p. 57). Finally, the book is replete with stylistic flaws. There are too many exclamatory statements and overused metaphors, especially of the sewn seeds, ballgame, and stage acting varieties. The most serious defect is that the book has scores of clichés; e.g., "old hat" (p. 55), "Lady Luck" (p. 85), "eat his cake . . . and have it" (p. 135).

It is tempting to review the book with clichés, sweeping generalizations and personal experiences. However, it is enough to say that it is a poor effort and is not recommended.

WILLIAM BRIDGELAND
Michigan State University
East Lansing

DOUGLAS E. SCHOEN. *Enoch Powell and the Powellites*. Pp. xviii, 317. New York; St. Martin's Press, 1977. $18.95.

Enoch Powell was born to lower middle class parents, both school teachers; as a young boy he won scholarships to grammar school and developed a special interest in the classics; he won a classics scholarship to Trinity College, Cambridge, and soon was recognized as a brilliant scholar, especially in Greek, totally uninterested in social or other activities; at age 25, he became Professor of Greek at Sydney University, the youngest professor in the British Commonwealth. This academic career was, however, interrupted by the World War II. He joined the British army in 1939 as a private and left it six and one-half years later as a Brigadier, having again performed brilliantly.

Finally, in 1947, Powell entered politics as a right wing Conservative and imperialist, he fought a hopeless battle for a parliamentary seat in a safe Labour constituency, but in the general election of 1950 he won the marginal Wolverhampton seat by a small majority, even though the Tories lost the country Thereafter, he held that seat with increasing majorities until he withdrew his candidacy in 1974; he was then adopted by an Ulster constituency and continues to serve a somewhat anomalous role as an Ulsterite M.P. During those years Powell soon distinguished himself as the most intellectual, principled, and independent of the Tory leaders, and always as a rigid Conservative. For some time he was generally considered to be among the top three or four leaders of the party, serving in several ministries, in the Shadow Cabinet, and in the Cabinet, and was even thought of as a possible Prime Minister. But his rigid Tory principles made him a critic, and an increasingly bitter critic, of the chosen party leaders, especially of Mr. Heath and Mr Maudling, and they, in turn, resented Powell's attitude and blocked his ambitions. He was eventually ousted from the Shadow Cabinet, denied further appointments to the Cabinet or other high posts, and lost the support of the Tory backbenchers as well as of the leadership. Although he insisted that he remained a Tory and that his quarrel was only with the party leaders, he went so far as to support Labour in the 1974 election, and has become a lonely and somewhat tragic figure.

All this, and much more, is told in detail and closely analyzed in this book. The eleven chapters are divided into two parts, Part one (7 chapters) being a detailed account of Enoch Powell's career as a British politician, while Part two (4 chapters) is an attempt to explain him, the theories or issues for which he fought (Powellism), the nature of his following (Powellites), the reasons for his high standing with the electorate, but consistent failure as a leader Mr. Schoon, an American, who was introduced to the fascinations of British politics by his professors at Harvard and Oxford, seems particularly well prepared to make this study; and he made it without the cooperation of his subject, Enoch Powell, who not only refused to be interviewed and objected to interviews with other M.P.'s about himself, but even submitted a bill for the few speeches that he did provide. In addition to the usual sources of information, Mr. Schoon relied heavily on public opinion polls, the data from which is represented by 111 tables and 31 figures scattered throughout the book These are, however, intelligible to any reader, and are interpreted in pages of clear, well-written English text, for which the author should be complimented. The book has all the other paraphernalia of good scholarship—a bibliography of more than seven pages, 21½ pages of notes, and an index. Altogether, it is a useful addition to the literature of British politics.

CLARENCE A. BERDAHL
University of Illinois
Urbana

J. THORSTEN SELLIN. *Slavery and the Penal System*. Pp. viii, 202. New York Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, 1976. $12.50.

Professor Sellin's latest contribution to the criminological literature is a brief

volume which traces the influence of chattel slavery on the evolution of the penal system from ancient times to the present. The author's historiography provides a concise, eloquent, and compelling argument to the effect that the social institution of slavery has had a direct and pronounced effect on the criminal law of all Western nations.

In the early chapters of the book, Sellin focuses on ancient Greece and Rome, where slavery was regarded as a natural and legitimate social institution. In Greece, slaves were regarded as articles of property and were thus subject to the whims of their owners. Slaves were regarded as things and, as such, they could be bought, sold, traded, and even killed. The history of ancient Greece reveals two penal systems, one for citizens and one for noncitizens (including slaves). When slaves were brought to public trial, they, as well as other noncitizens, could be subject to judicial torture. If convicted, they could be punished by flogging, and for gross offenses the slave might be put to death. Sellin finds no evidence that in Greece the two systems ever merged to make slave punishments applicable to all law violators. However, conclusive evidence that punishments applicable only to slaves became proper punishment for certain classes of citizens is found in the history of ancient Rome. The evolutionary process leading to the merger of the two systems reveals an abandonment of the traditional principle of equity before the law as Rome evolved from a primitive small city-state to a multiple-nation world-state. Although the traditional punishments of exile, deportation, fines, and so on were retained for criminals of the upper classes, judicial torture and various slave punishments (e.g., hanging, crucifixion, burning at the stake) were introduced for the lower classes. Moreover, the lower classes, which comprised the majority of the population, were subjected to penal slavery in mines and various forms of public work. Thus it was during this period that hard labor or penal servitude developed into a favored punishment for lower class criminals. The penal system that Rome left as a legacy to the Middle Ages was one which oppressed the lower classes and favored the powerful upper classes.

The notion that domestic punishment for slaves and, in particular, penal servitude, was made applicable to all offenders over the centuries is developed further by Sellin in subsequent chapters dealing with the following: Germanic nations of the Middle Ages; galley slavery in maritime countries; the rise of slavery on public works; the radical changes leading to houses of correction; the naval arsenal prisons (bagnes) operated in France, Spain, and Italy; penal slavery in Russia; and penal slavery in the antebellum South, including the convict lease system, chain gangs, and penal farms and plantations. For example, according to Sellin, galley slavery, as one form of penal servitude for crime, was never intended to reform offenders and restore them to the community as better citizens. Its aim was to remove undesirable or dangerous persons from the community and to put them to work for the profit of the state. Sellin notes that "penal slavery in other guises was to become a feature of the treatment of serious offenders down to our times" (p. 55). Thus Sellin argues, that while houses of correction signified a radical innovation in penal practice, they were in reality also important for making prison labor profitable to the state. This premise is further elaborated upon in his discussion of the convict lease system in southern states following the Emancipation Proclamation of 1863, where convict labor became a windfall for politically powerful lessees, who profited from a form of chattel slavery often worse than that from which blacks had been freed. That some fixtures of penal servitude survive to the present day is amply documented in the chapter dealing with chain gangs and prison farms (e.g., Cummins Farm and Tucker Farm in Arkansas).

Sellin synthesizes a mass of literature and data to support the contention that the penal systems of Western nations reflect slavish origins. Some may not agree with a perspective which portrays the evolution of penal systems as being unaffected by other forces,

such as the theories of punishment in vogue at a given time. Nevertheless, the book is an important contribution to the literature questioning the forces that shape punitive practices and systems of punishment. The author's scholarship and his impressive list of sources provide ample support for the thesis of the book.

DAVID M. PETERSEN
Georgia State University
Atlanta

OLIVER THOMSON. *Mass Persuasion in History: An Historical Analysis of the Development of Propaganda Techniques*. Pp. vi, 142. New York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1977. $13.50.

The promise of historical perspective in media studies is always welcome. The genre suffers traditionally from too little diachronicity. The credentials of the writer in this instance also raise our expectations: a multinational graduate (from the college of J. Walter Thompson) who now heads a Scottish advertising agency and lectures on mass persuasion at Glasgow University. Alas, the high cost and low quality of the illustrations make this reader question the value of the book, intellectually and financially. But it does turn over the soil for the first time (in my reading) in a way that reveals a crucial turf that needs to be plowed by deeper, more controlled minds.

The book is divided into two parts of very divergent size: The Vocabulary of Leadership deals with an introduction, discussion of sources, a typology (objectives, media, message, inhibiting factors, intensifying factors, side effects), criteria of penetration, audience analysis, response analysis, access to media, and media development); and Historical Case Studies, including the Roman Empire, the Papacy, the Reformation, the Revolutionary Period, Nineteenth Century Propaganda, Lenin and Communism, Hitler and Fascism, Modern China, Democracy and the Western World, and Epilogue (which basically is sensible talk about how not to give into apocalyptical interpretations of what he bizarrely calls the "octopoidal media"). The second section is by far the more entertaining. The first is mainly "potted" media sociology, probably in both the British and American senses of that adjective. The second is a tasty plum pudding, cultural history seen through the narrow perspective of a movieola, as if H. G. Wells were a student of Marshall McLuhan's.

One original idea of Thomson's deserves a very careful analysis. He argues very plausibly that political rhetoric, which he somewhat capriciously keeps calling "social cybernetics", must include the study of things as well as the traditional study of words.

> Architecture should be included within the umbrella of graphic communication media Traditionally, it has been given little attention from the standpoint of its use as a medium of propaganda. It is, nevertheless, of great importance. Buildings are capable of communicating awe, size, assurance, power, or dynamism, and if in a central or imposing position, can do this to a fairly large audience over a long period. Inevitably, in political terms, it tends to be a medium for the establishment, not the revolution, although a rebel hideout or catacomb can become a symbol by contrast (p 41).

Indeed, they can—as the public demolition of the Pruitt-Igoe project in St. Louis announced the end of an era of complacency about welfare culture. But the same architect, Minoru Yamasaki, gave Manhattan the twin-towered World Trade Center. The folk here who climbed it—"because it was there"—sends us one message; more likely, it will become in history the tallest mausoleum ever—to the memory of Robert Moses. I was amused in Cairo recently to read in the Egyptian Museum that Rameses I had his name carved covertly on the unseeable bottom of his granite likeness—to discourage Rameses II from converting it to *his* image! And when you read line markers in the apse of St. Peter's in Rome bragging that this is as far as St. Paul's comes, you know that the Counter Reformation at least was using its buildings to bully its congregations.

Thomson is right about the rhetoric of things. We need to become sophisticated in "reading" the man-made environments—as well as its degradations. Norman Mailer's touting the defaced New York subway cars as great art is condes-

cending, ignoble savagery. And the blackout looting in New York is a classic text we are only now trying to learn how to decipher. What is missing from most of that analysis and what is missing from this book is a sense of dynamics. The media are the sum total of their contradictory messages. When Thomson says cinema proper had only a 50-year reign (p. 49), I wonder where that leaves Joan Micklin Silver, Fred Wiseman, and Judy Peiser of the Center for Southern Folklore—not to mention my own introduction to film course, which only a few of the students find dead! Atmospheric level generalizations about media are worse than no generalities at all, I guess.

And while I really enjoyed the anecdotes about media and propaganda over time (that Vergil's *Aeneid* was commissioned by the Emperor, for example), I would always want to check Thompson's stories out with standard histories, especially when I find allusions to Senator Jo Macarthy (p. 21)—does this new firm have no American proofreaders? Or see Dr. Johnson's famous aphorism come out 180 degrees from where he left it: "Patriotism may be the last refuge of a gentleman" (p. 22). No matter, maybe it is just one Scotsperson's way of getting even with another one who said mean things about the country he fled for London. Thomson has identified an important terrain, no small contribution to a field that sprawls and yawns erratically, leaving much of the past unconnected with contemporary media sociology.

PATRICK D. HAZARD
Beaver College
Glenside
Pennsylvania

HARRIET ZUCKERMAN. *Scientific Elite: Nobel Laureates in the United States.* Pg. XV, 335. New York: The Free Press, 1977. $14.95.

The major focus of this study is ninety-two Nobel laureates who worked in the United States on the research that was to bring them their rewards. The data include interviews with forty-one of them, as well as other scientists, and autobiographical and biographical accounts of scientists. An array of comparative data on the productivity and career patterns of laureates, members of the National Academy of Sciences, and a sample of scientists matched with the laureates on age, field of specialization, and type of organizational affiliation is also included.

After a brief introductory chapter, in which Pareto's conception of an elite is discussed, the author traces the process through which Nobel Prizes became preeminent symbols of scientific excellence. Their rapid early rise to eminence appeared, in part, to result from a backlog of highly prestigious scientific figures who were the earliest laureates. Their later stature was further enhanced by the symbolic value that various organizations, universities, research institutes, and other sectors of society have bestowed upon these particular awards. Chapter three, which compares the social and educational origins of future laureates with those of their eminent colleagues, traces the processes involved in the accumulation of advantages which characterize the laureate's career. Such processes, which result in the rich becoming richer and the poor poorer, help create and maintain the structure of stratification in science. Compared to other scientists, future laureates came from families of somewhat higher socioeconomic status, more frequently attended elite colleges, and did their graduate work at the top ranked universities. A striking feature of their graduate training is that over half of the ninety-two laureates worked with older Nobel laureates either as students, recipients of post doctorates, or as junior collaborators. Chapter four traces these relationships between apprentice and masters and touches on their dynamics. In the following chapter, the careers of these laureates are traced, and their rates of productivity are compared to members of the larger elite of the National Academy as well as a sample of other scientists. In chapter six, the personal and social context of the research that led to their award is examined. In this chapter, the author brings her data to bear on the widespread belief that important scientific breakthroughs are made primarily by the young. The data suggests that this conclusion has

been much overdrawn. While it is true that slightly over a third did their prize-winning work before the age of 35, it is the middle-aged scientists who turn up disproportionately among the laureates.

Chapter seven examines the consequences for them for having won the prize, including their later rate of productivity, their relations with other scientists, and their roles outside the scientific community. The prize, as could be expected, is not an unmixed blessing. With it comes a host of demands that sharply reduce the laureate's productivity, particularly for those thrust suddenly into emminence; yet, it should be added that their productivity on the average remains above that of the matched sample of scientists. The final chapter sums up the author's observations concerning scientific elites, stratification in the sciences, and the effects of the Nobel Prize as the ultimate award in Science. As the author recognizes, her study raises more questions than it answers, but this does not detract from an excellent first step in the study of the reward system in the scientific community.

CARL W. BACKMAN
University of Nevada
Reno

ECONOMICS

JOHN A. BRITTAIN. *The Inheritance of Economic Status*. Pp. ix, 185. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977. $9.95.

This book, by an economist, is a recent addition to the debate over education, educational policy, and the persistence of economic inequality. The author touches upon the historical roots of the debate involving the American belief in the importance of equal opportunity, as well as the more recent implications of human capital theory and education as a tool in the war on poverty. His analysis and findings are contrasted with those of Jencks et al. Family background, according to Brittain, exerts a strong effect upon later economic success; in addition, there is a strong independent effect of educational attainment upon economic success.

The advantage which Brittain's analysis has over Jencks's lies in the nature of the sample, a sample of actual brothers. Family background, therefore, can be taken into account without the measurement problems inherent in intergenerational mobility studies. The disadvantage of Brittain's analysis lies in his small basic sample size of 128 brothers from 55 families. The analysis is not limited to this basic sample, however, and includes surviving sons and daughters of a 5 percent sample of 659 estates closed in Cleveland Probate Court in 1964–5. One of the more innovative analyses of this study, moreover, used the daughters' economic status as measured by their husbands—i.e., the sons-in-law. The relationship between the parents' and the son-in-law's economic status was as strong as that between the parents' and the son's economic status. Daughters, however, showed an unexplained tendency to end up slightly less well-off than their brothers.

The analysis is sophisticated both with respect to statistical techniques and to explanations of the methodological problems. Parental characteristics examined in the regression analysis predicting the son's economic status included age and education, occupation where the parent was male, total number of siblings, race, religion, size of parents' estate, and the presence of a will. The descriptive techniques of transitional matrices are used to show that there was no overlap in economic success between those who began with family backgrounds in the top tenth and those who began in the bottom tenth In addition, the author presents a sophisticated analysis of educational attainment in separating out the effects of education as an intervening variable, reflecting the impact of family background upon later economic success, and the effects of education independent of family background. The conclusion is that educational attainment has a strong independent effect.

The study is an important one in furthering the understanding of social mobility, especially with regard to educa-

tion. The author proceeds to make policy recommendations suggesting that "public policies aimed at reducing the inequality of educational attainment would have an independent effect alleviating the inequality of economic status" (p. 162). This would be true only under the assumption that changes in the income distribution can come about through manipulating the supply of workers—i.e., the amount of human capital. Brittain's analysis, however, does not provide any evidence that we can ignore the demand side—i.e., the kind of jobs available. Are low wage jobs in the secondary labor market going to be transformed into high wage jobs as more high school graduates enter them? Even in his analysis, there appears to be support for education as a sorting device since his evidence suggests that the parents' education relative to the parents' date of birth may be more important than absolute years of education. Furthermore the effect of parents' education decreases as the parents' date of birth becomes more recent.

SALLY BOULD
University of Delaware
Newark

GEORGE A. COLLIER. *Fields of Tzotzil: The Ecological Bases of Tradition in Highland Chiapas*. Pp. xv, 255. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1976. $9.75.

The theme of George Collier's carefully argued and eclectically conceived study of perduring Mayan village integrity in Chiapas is suggested in its title. For he gives as a virtual law that the traditional village community based on patrilineal descent is promoted where land is scarce and valued but still adequate to maintain a largely self-sufficient village. If land is free and abundant, the strong patrilineal descent village is unnecessary and unlikely to appear. Nor can it survive amid infertile, dwarf plots, ever shrinking in relation to a growing village population. The first rather narrow set of conditions is most likely to produce the durable, dynamic traditional Mayan village, quick to defend its rights and extend its modest holdings. By village is meant not the largish *municipio* or Spanish township, but the smaller hamlet within it usually consisting of a score or less exogamous, patronymic lineages.

The most significant contribution of this book is that the hamlet is identified as the core of a vital ethnicity able to cope with a variety of challenges. These challenges are internal and external. The internal ones include land transfer and inheritance procedures, and a growing population threatening a limited supply of land. External challenges are presently posed by state and national bureaucracies and scheming *ladinos*, always eager to exploit Mayan labor and to extend or maintain ranching domains which growing villages desire. Ethnicity is not a barrier imposing isolation or simple distinction on a group, but the necessary essence of hamlet collective identity, enabling it to realize effective interaction with the outside world. Fortunately, examples illustrate precisely how this happens.

Collier is relentlessly eclectic and he disparages environmental determinism. He draws attention to the weakness of studies which rise out of such a viewpoint. But there is a lot of determinism in this book, for it is land, available or scarce, fertile or exhausted, which seems to determine the fate of the marginal, traditional Chiapas hamlet and its structure of descent and inheritance. In showing how such a hamlet can survive and grow or disintegrate and vanish, *The Fields of Tzotil* does much to bring up to date the long history of the Middle American Indian village, at least in one region. But reference to many interpretations recalls how varied and dramatic this history has been and foretells that while Collier is convincing about what he has observed first hand in field work, that each region and epoch, when studied separately, will likely yield its own unique findings.

PHILIP EVANSON
Temple University
Philadelphia

ALEXANDER GERSCHENKRON. *An Economic Spurt That Failed: Four Lectures in Austrian History.* Pp. x, 172. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977. $12.50.

Based on research in the Austrian archives, Alexander Gerschenkron's *An Economic Spurt That Failed* is the revised and enlarged product of two Janeway Lectures (Princeton). While perhaps not consciously intended as such, the book constitutes, in fact, a practical application to (Cisleithanian) Austria of the author's views on industrialization under varying "degrees of economic backwardness," as developed in his 1967 presidential address to the Economic History Association ("The Discipline and I," *Journal of Economic History*, XXVII (December 1967), pp. 443–59).

As in his other studies, Gerschenkron deals with the problem of an economic "spurt," but this time with a spurt that was not a spurt: the prologue and postscript to the two investment bills of June 1901, by which the ministry of Ernest von Koerber sought to strengthen the railway links with Trieste and to build the inland waterways necessary for uninterrupted communication by water with Hamburg and St. Petersburg. While the railroads were built, the average annual investment in the waterways project between 1904 and 1917 was less than one-half of one percent of the total budget of the Austrian state for 1901, not the sort of expenditure from which spurts erupt.

Gerschenkron defines a spurt as the product of a "substitution" or innovation for one of the so-called prerequisites to a sustained rate of industrial growth in the model country of industrial development. The intended innovation in Austria was to use the state as an active agent of economic development: in Koerber's words, "to place the full power of the State in the service of culture and national economy" (p. 24).

This was also the objective of Latin American and Balkan progressists in the period just before and after 1900. But Gerschenkron takes no note of this fact, insisting instead that what Austria lacked—unlike mid-nineteenth-century France and fin-de-siècle Russia—was an industrialization ideology. Such an ideology failed to win the approval of Austro-Marxists. But it was also insufficiently strong among the entrepreneurs and bankers, upon whom Koerber urged the formation of an Economic Party, to coalesce around the goal of economic development.

Another major obstacle to the spurt was the obstruction of Koerber's minister of finance, the economist Eugen von Boehm-Bawerk. Fearful that an inflationary investment policy would upset the currency and jealous of incursions into its own sphere of action, the ministry of finance opposed a policy of state investment in industrial development despite the fact that such action might have created the jobs with which to counteract the depression of 1900–1905. Moreover, Koerber himself was reluctant to take big risks partly because he, too, may have been a victim of fiscalism—but I would add, of a fiscalism that dates back to the eighteenth, perhaps even the seventeenth, century, wherefore the need to study the failed spurt in the framework of the long term.

Interested in spurts, events, and event makers, Gerschenkron generally neglects long-term problems, although he has pinpointed the long-term obstacles to economic development in Cisleithania (Austria without the northeastern Austrian provinces): the great distance of industrial centers from the sea, the dispersion of natural resources, the eastward flow of the Danube River through economically less developed countries, the heavy taxes levied on joint stock companies, the prestige of a landed aristocracy, that was involved in some banking and industrial activities but apprehensive of the threat presented by industrialization to their social position, and the consequent reluctance of banks to invest in industry.

Persuaded more or less that a successful industrialization spurt would have aided Austria in coping with its multitudinous political and ethnic conflicts, Gerschenkron has presented, in essence, a counterfactual history. At the

same time, he maintains that "counterfactual history should be essentially regarded as an instrument for the elucidation of relatively short-term changes, preferably in situations in which the political factor may be largely neglected." ("The Discipline and I," p. 457.) But in Austria, the political factor could not be neglected, wherefore the failure of the Economic Party.

TRAIAN STOIANOVICH
Rutgers University
New Brunswick
New Jersey

BOYD GIBBONS. *Wye Island*. Pp. ix, 227. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977. $10.95.

The setting for the controversy described in the present volume is Wye Island, a previously relatively isolated part of the upper eastern shore of Maryland. The story deals with the problem of accommodating increased land use and human value systems. The issues raised and the feelings of the characters are generally familiar. The locale could have been any one of a number of places facing problems of development, land subdivision, or environmental preservation. In this particular case, the protagonists are the development company of James Rouse and assorted long time and relatively new residents of the area.

The book is not theoretical. The methodology is that of the social historian, largely ethnographic and based on interview and observation, as well as the examination of local records. The author's fascination with the human condition and individual human beings leads him to offer detailed characterization of almost all major, and many peripheral, actors who have in some way impinged on the current dispute. The development of character description helps contribute to the reader's understanding of the complexity of issues involved. At times, one has the feeling that the description is overdone, but there are valuable insights to be gained from it, as well as lessons for individuals who themselves contemplate doing a study based on observation.

Students of land planning research will be interested in the statements and assumptions about planning that Gibbons attributes to various participants in the controversy. Many of these statements, because of the nature of their content, must remain at the level of assumption. Others would make interesting experiments or research projects for the future. Academicians and nonacademicians will both find the book appealing. The content can be related to concepts in various disciplines as well as to very practical concerns.

Some readers may be disappointed that the author did not conclude the book by attempting to tie together the many variables and questions that emerged in the controversy into a theoretical framework. Yet, if the book is viewed as mainly a sensitizing exploratory work on issues in the land use-environment controversy, then this criticism will be dismissed in favor of the richness of the basic data presented.

In order to stimulate the thinking of an audience, broader than that which will be touched by the book, the author should consider a film documentary based upon his work.

WILLIAM A. PEARMAN
Millersville State College
Millersville
Pennsylvania

ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN. *The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before its Triumph*. Pp. vii, 153. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977. $10.00. Paperbound, $2.95.

Almost without thinking, contemporary students of capitalism go to Adam Smith, *The Wealth of Nations* (1776), as a sourcebook of arguments regarding the "invisible hand" guiding a free market economy, private enterprise, untouched by the visible hand of government regulation and intervention, and, more generally, the case for unfettered private gain. In this volume—a gem of intellectual historiography—Albert O. Hirschman, a political economist and permanent member of the Institute for Ad-

vanced Study in Princeton, argues that the rise of the spirit of capitalism has its origins in discussions of statecraft and political philosophy that antedate Smith's *Wealth of Nations* by several centuries. As the somewhat cryptic title indicates, Hirschman is much concerned with the philosophic etymology of "passions" and "interests," for it is, he suggests, the ultimate tensions between the two which give rise to the historic defense of capitalism. In this regard, and as a central thesis of his extended essay, Hirschman contends that principal justification for capitalism may be found not in the idea that individual pursuit of private gain leads to large-scale, community-wide benefits (à la Adam Smith and Max Weber), but, instead, in the idea that individual interests (in material advantage) could be used as a countervailing force to check individual passions (such as ambition, lust for power, or sexual lust).

Hirschman constructs an historical justification for man's innate proclivities toward capital and monetary gain—a justification based upon a theory of countervailing forces or powers. The analytic distinction between passions and interests, the author argues, was important historically, for the two were not regarded as synonymous until the eighteenth century. From the writings of St. Augustine onward, the focus of a number of philosophers lay in trying to curb the inevitable, excessive passions of man. Often their answer came through the imposition of law and rule: in the construction of political institutions or edifices. But, Hirschman argues, the more effective response was to pit passion against passion. And, over the centuries, certain passions were regarded as less dangerous and destructive than others. Consequently, the passion toward economic advantage and material accumulation is transformed into a positive force strong enough to stem the more injurious vices and passions of man. The *interest* of rulers (an important component of classical statecraft) became the *interests* of various groups among the ruled, and with this transformation, the passion for material gain became an economic *interest* for individuals in a society.

Out of such argument—interests taming passions—comes the idea that an interest in material wealth and acquisition may have a beneficial effect for all of society. The political benefits (for example, in the areas of commerce and economic growth) of following individual interests were many, according to Baron Charles Louis de Montesquieu and Sir James Steuart. It was only Adam Smith—the most celebrated apologist for capitalism—who was to narrow the defense to more strictly economic themes. In fact, as Hirschman points out, Smith, himself, was not unaware of the ideas of countervailing interests and passions developed by his intellectual precursors.

This is, without question, a significant essay in political economy. Not only would it appeal to students of economic thought, but also to political philosophers and psychologists concerned with human nature, drives, and motivation.

ROBERT G. SEDDIG

Allegheny College
Meadville
Pennsylvania

JUAN MARTINEZ-ALIER. *Haciendas, Plantations and Collective Farms.* Pp. viii, 185. Totowa, N.J.: Frank Cass, 1977. $19.50.

Martinez-Alier provides an innovative theoretical perspective for scholars interested in landlord-peasant relations. The book, which incorporates a number of articles that have previously appeared in academic journals, focuses on sheep-farming haciendas in highland Peru and on sugar estates in Cuba, both before and after the implementation of land reform. His discussion of labor relations, land reform, and political activity dispels some misconceptions, including those held by specialists in the field. For example, Martinez-Alier demonstrates that the social relations of sheep haciendas in Peru in no way ressembled the type of debt-peonage or serfdom found in medieval Europe or other parts of Latin America. On the contrary, peasant-laborers attached to such sheep estates, and also associated with nearby communal villages, were able to exercise a high de-

gree of economic independence by herding their own animals and periodically encroaching on the landowner's property. Such peasants, whose social position was much more advantageous than that of wage laborers or peasants outside of the hacienda system, maintained their own language and ethnic identity as a tool in their ongoing and often successful struggle against local landowners and the government agencies that have recently replaced them. In the case of Cuba, the author shows that sugar cane was primarily cultivated by large tenants with a high degree of security of tenure, using wage laborers, thus counteracting the image that the large foreign companies which ran the sugar mills, were directly involved in the growing, as well as the processing, of cane. He also discusses the relationship between cane growers, mill owners, and wage laborers during and after the Castro revolt

A series of case studies are preceded by an introductory chapter, in which the author discusses the concepts of land rent, exploitation, and surplus. His main thesis is that the radical distinction between traditional peasants and a modern rural proletariat, so frequently made by social scientists, fails to account for the fact that landowners often convert their day laborers into sharecroppers or small cash tenants, or vice versa. Previous theories have thus been incapable of explaining why seemingly "proletarian" plantation workers have petitioned for land distribution while seemingly typical peasants with "strong roots to the soil" have organized labor unions. This central idea, already apparent in his earlier writings on southern Spain, has been further developed in the present book. Martinez-Alier uses an economic analysis partly derived from neoclassical theory and foreshadowed by Chayanov, a well-known Russian rural economist, to show that it is frequently more profitable for commercial landowning farmers to use sharecroppers instead of laborers. However, political and ideological factors must also be taken into account to explain why landowners do not always act in their own best interest. Martinez-Alier is especially perceptive in showing how the widespread use of wage labor, itself an unintended consequence of laws protecting tenancy, can lead to high rates of rural unemployment and the subsequent social upheavals which those tenancy laws were originally designed to avoid. Unfortunately the author does not extend his analysis to small-scale peasant farmers owning their own plots, a topic which he deems to lie outside of his field of interest.

The main drawback of this book is that the different sections, especially the last chapter on socialist Cuba, are not well tied together in a unified whole. Despite a common theoretical approach running throughout his book, it resembles a patchwork of separate articles. Nevertheless, Martinez-Alier's work will be a landmark in the study of agrarian societies with labor-intensive farms.

FRANS J. SCHRYER
University of Guelph
Ontario
Canada

BILL WARREN, *Inflation and Wages in Underdeveloped Countries*. Pp. ix, 285. Totowa, N.J: 1977 $30.00.

This book is an empirical study of the relations among inflation, wage and profit shares of value added, profit margins, real wages, and material costs for manufacturing in the 1940s and 1950s in the developing countries of India, Peru and Turkey. The topic is of importance because of the widespread assumption that inflation leads to greater nonwage income and therefore savings in developing countries, in addition to the obvious implications for income distribution. The methodology is modest, with neither mathematical modeling nor statistical hypothesis testing. The movements of each of the variables just mentioned are simply considered for each of eight inflationary episodes.

The results question some conventional wisdom in this area. Leaving aside exceptional periods (e.g, initial wartime disruptions or complete trade liberalizations), the labor shares rose and the profit margins fell with inflation. This pattern reflected a greater rise in unit material costs and in nominal wages than

in prices of industrial goods due to short-run relative supply inelasticity in agriculture, as compared to manufacturing and to the oligopolistic market structure of manufacturing. Demand pressures quickly raised the flexible agricultural prices (and, thus, prices of materials and of food), given the short-run inelastic agricultural supply. These demand pressures did not, however, increase prices as much in the modern industrial sector, owing to the short-run supply elasticity and relative inflexible oligopolistic pricing in that sector. Money wages in manufacturing were institutionally determined by government policies and union pressures, with a substantial cost-of-living (and, therefore, agricultural, through the price of food) orientation, despite the existence of surplus labor. Manufacturing prices responded to rising material and labor costs less than proportionately in what Warren terms "defensive inflation." Thus inflation did not result in an increased surplus for reinvestment in the hands of the owners of the manufacturing sector.

This study has its shortcomings. The lack of explicit mathematical modeling and of explicit multivariate hypothesis testing makes the presentation at times tedious and insufficiently structured so that the reader cannot be confident of all of the author's claims. Nevertheless it is a thoughtful analysis, within an implicit general equilibrium framework, which comes to some provocative conclusions after careful consideration of the existing data. It should be of interest to those who are concerned about inflation, savings, distribution, and interactions between agriculture and manufacturing in developing economies, as well as to specialists on India, Peru, and Turkey.

JERE R. BEHRMAN
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia

OTHER BOOKS

ANDERSON, R D. *France 1870–1914: Politics and Society.* Pp. vii, 215. Boston, Mass : Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977. $12.50.

APTER, DAVID E. *Introduction to Political Analysis.* Pp. viii, 553. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977. $12.95.

BAKER, JEAN H. *Ambivalent Americans: The Know-Nothing Party in Maryland.* Pp. vii, 206. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977. $14.00.

BELKNAP, ROBERT L. and RICHARD KUHNS. *Tradition and Innovation: General Education and the Reintegration of the University.* Pp. 130. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. $12.00. Paperbound, $4.00.

BENNETT, CORWIN *Spaces for People: Human Factors in Design.* Pp. v, 195. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977. $9.95. Paperbound, $3.95.

BIRCH, R. C *1776. The American Challenge.* Pp. iv, 122. Seminar Studies in History. New York: Longman, 1977. $2.50. Paperbound.

BLOODWORTH, DENNIS and CHINO PING BLOODWORTH *The Chinese Machiavelli: 3000 Years of Chinese Statecraft* Pp. 348. New York: Dell, 1977. $2.25. Paperbound

BOURDIEU, PIERRE and JEAN-CLAUDE PASSERON. *Reproduction in Education Society and Culture.* Pp. 256. Beverly Hills, Calif.. Sage, 1977. $15.00. Paperbound, $6.95.

BRODEY, WARREN M. *Family Dance: Building Positive Relationships Through Family Therapy.* Pp. 160. New York: Doubleday, 1977 $2 95 Paperbound.

BRUNNER, HEINRICH. *Cuban Sugar Policy from 1963 to 1970* Pp. vii, 163. Pittsburgh. University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977 $9 95.

CAMPBELL, RITA RICARDO. *Social Security. Promise and Reality.* Pp. ix, 351 Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1977 $14.95

CANTOR, MILTON and BRUCE LAURIE, eds. *Class, Sex, and the Woman Worker.* Pp. ix, 253 Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1977 $14.95.

CARJA, ION. *Tom Emperor of the Mountains* Pp 33. New York Vantage Press, 1977 $4 50

CARSTEN, F. L. *Fascist Movements in Austria. From Schönerer to Hitler.* Pp. 360 Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977. $17.50 Paperbound, $7.50.

CARTER, JIMMY. *A Government as Good as its People* Pp. 262. New York. Simon & Schuster, 1977. $8.95.

CHALIAND, GÉRARD. *Revolution in the Third World: Myths and Prospects.* Pp. x, 195 New York: The Viking Press, 1976. $11.95

CIPOLLA, CARLO M., ed *The Middle Ages The Fontana Economic History of Europe*, vol. I Pp. 389 New York: Barnes & Noble, 1976. No Price.

CLARK, DENNIS J. *Irish Blood. Northern Ireland and the American Conscience.* Pp. ix,

97. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1977. $7.95.

CLARK, JOHN P. *The Philosophical Anarchism of William Godwin*. Pp. vii, 343. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977. $16.50.

CLEVELAND, HARLAN. *The Third Try at World Order: U.S. Policy for an Interdependent World*. Pp. iii, 119, New York: Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1977. No price.

COHEN, DOROTHY H. and MARGUERITA RUDOLPH. *Kindergarten and Early Schooling*. Pp. iii, 432. Englewood Cliffs, N J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977. $11.95.

COHEN, SHIRLEY. *Special People: A Brighter Future for Everyone with Physical, Mental, and Emotional Disabilities*. Pp. xiii, 177. Englewood Cliffs, N.J : Prentice-Hall, 1977. $8.95. Paperbound, $3 95.

COHEN, WILLIAM B., ed. *Robert Delavignette on the French Empire*. Pp. vii, 148. Chicago. University of Chicago Press, 1977. $13.00.

Computer Based Aids to Parliamentary Work. Pp. 85. New York. UNIPUB, 1976. $10.00. Paperbound.

CONDE, ROBERTO CORTES and STANLEY J. STEIN, eds. *Latin America. A Guide to Economic History 1830–1930*. Pp. 685. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977 No price

CONNELL, JOHN et al. *Migration from Rural Areas: The Evidence from Village Studies* Pp iv, 228. New York. Oxford University Press, 1977 $7.00.

COVENEY, P. J., ed. *France in Crisis, 1620–1675*. Pp vii, 273 Totowa, N J.. Rowman & Littlefield, 1977. $19.50.

COWLING, MAURICE *The Impact of Hitler. British Politics and British Policy, 1933–1940* Pp ix, 445 Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977. $7.95. Paperbound

DE CARMOY, GUY. *Energy for Europe: Economic and Political Implications*. Pp. 120 Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977 $3.25 Paperbound.

DENTLER, ROBERT A. *Urban Problems: Perspectives and Solutions*. Pp. vii, 438. Chicago, Ill.: Rand McNally, 1976 No price.

DIAMOND, EDWIN. *The Tin Kazoo: Television, Politics, and the News*. Pp. viii, 269 Cambridge, Mass . MIT Press, 1977. $4.95. Paperbound.

DIAMOND, IRENE. *Sex Roles in the State House*. Pp. ix, 214. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977. $12.50.

DONAHUE, WILMA T., MARIE MAGUIRE THOMPSON, and D. J. CURREN, eds. *Congregate Housing for Older People. An Urgent Need, A Growing Demand*. Pp. iii, 221. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, 1976. No price.

DZIEWANOWSKI, M. K. *Poland in the Twentieth Century*. Pp. vii, 309. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. $14.95.

EICHELBERGER, CLARK M. *Organizing for Peace: A Personal History of the Founding of the United Nations*. Pp. vii, 317. New York: Harper & Row, 1977, $12.50.

ERNST, ELDON G., *Without Help or Hindrance: Religious Identity in American Culture*. Pp. 240. Philadelphia, Pa.: Westminster Press, 1977 $6.95. Paperbound.

ESMAN, MILTON J., ed. *Ethnic Conflict in the Western World*. Pp. 399. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977. $17.50.

FAULKNER, HAROLD U. *The Decline of Laissez Faire, 1897–1917*. The Economic History of the United States, vol VII Pp. 464. White Plains, N.Y.. M. E Sharpe, 1977. $9.95. Paperbound.

FELTHAM, R G *Diplomatic Handbook*. 2nd ed. Pp vi, 138. New York. Longman, 1977. $6.95 Paperbound

FONTANA, ANDREA *The Last Frontier: The Social Meaning of Growing Old*. Pp. 216. Beverly Hills, Calif. Sage, 1977. $11.00. Paperbound, $6.00

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950. National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, vol. I. Pp. 111, 945. Washington, D.C.. U S. Government Printing Office, 1977. $11 00

Foreign Relations of the United States 1949. Eastern Europe: The Soviet Union, vol. V Pp. iii, 1011. Washington, D.C.. U S. Government Printing Office, 1976 $11.25.

Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949: The Near East, South Africa, and Africa, vol VI. Pp 111, 1852 Washington, D.C.: U.S Government Printing Office, 1977. $16.50

FORSYTH, FREDERICK *The Making of an African Legend: The Biafra Story*. Pp. 285. New York: Penguin Books, 1977. $1.95. Paperbound.

FREESE, ARTHUR S. *Help for Your Grief: Turning Emotional Loss into Growth*. Pp. 207 New York. Schocken Books, 1977. $9 95.

FRIEDMAN, EDWARD *Backward Toward Revolution. The Chinese Revolutionary Party*. Pp. 254. Berkeley, Calif.. University of California Press, 1977. $3.85 Paperbound.

FRIEDMAN, LAWRENCE M. *Law and Society: An Introduction* Pp. ix, 177 Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977. $7.95. Paperbound, $3.95

GALNOOR, ITZHAK, ed. *Government Secrecy*

in Democracies. Pp. vii, 317. New York: Harper & Row, 1977. $5.95. Paperbound.

GATES, PAUL W. *The Farmer's Age: Agriculture, 1815–1860*. The Economic History of the United States, vol III. Pp. 496. White Plains, N.Y.: M. E Sharpe, 1977 $10 95 Paperbound.

GEORGE, SUSAN. *How the Other Half Dies: The Real Reasons for World Hunger*. Pp. vii, 308. Montclair, N.J.: Allanheld Osmun, 1977. $12.50. Paperbound, $4.95.

GOLDMAN, RALPH M *Contemporary Perspectives on Politics*. Pp. v, 454. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1976. $14.95.

GOLDSTEIN, HERMAN. *Policing A Free Society*. Pp. 384. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1977. $15.00.

GRANATSTEIN, J. L. and J. M. HITSMAN. *Broken Promises: A History of Conscription in Canada*. Pp. 281. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977. $8.50 Paperbound.

GREENBERG, EDWARD S *The American Political System: A Radical Approach*. Pp v, 501. Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop, 1977 $7.95 Paperbound.

GRIFFITHS, TONY. *Contemporary Australia* Pp. 165. New York. St. Martin's Press, 1977. $14.95.

GRONLUND, NORMAN E., ed. *Constructing Achievement Tests*. 2nd ed. Pp. ix, 150 Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977 $4.95. Paperbound.

GROSSMAN, MENDEL. *With A Camera in the Ghetto* Edited by Zvi and Alexander Sened. Pp. 112. New York: Schocken Books, 1977 $12.95.

Guidelines for Developing an Effective National Food Control System Prepared in Collaboration with the United Nations Environment Programme Pp. 169. New York· UNIPUB. 1976. $12.00 Paperbound.

HALL, RICHARD H. *Organizations. Structure and Process*. 2nd ed. Pp. v, 356 Englewood Cliffs, N.J.. Prentice-Hall, 1977. $11.95.

HAMER, D. A. *The Politics of Electoral Pressure: A Study in the History of Victorian Reform Agitations*. Pp. vii, 386. Atlantic Highlands, N.J : Humanities Press, 1977. $20.00

HARRINGTON, MICHAEL. *Fragments of the Century*. Pp. 246. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1977. $3.95. Paperbound.

HARRINGTON, MICHAEL. *The Twilight of Capitalism*. Pp. 446. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1976 $4 95. Paperbound

HAUG, RARIE R and JACQUES DOFNY, eds *Work and Technology* Pp 258 Beverly Hills, Calif Sage, 1977. $12.00 Paperbound, $6 00

HEIKOFF, JOSEPH M. *Coastal Resources Management: Institutions and Programs*. Pp. v, 287. Ann Arbor, Mich.: Ann Arbor Science, 1977. $16.50.

HEIMAN, GEORGE, ed. *Associations and Law: The Classical and Early Christian Stages*. Pp. 160. Buffalo, N.Y.: University of Toronto Press, 1977. $15.00.

HENDRICKS, JON and C. DAVIS HENDRICKS. *Aging in Mass Society. Myths and Realities*. Pp. vii, 426. Cambridge, Mass.· Winthrop, 1977. $13.95.

HENLEY, NANCY M. *Body Politics: Power, Sex, and Nonverbal Communication*. Pp. vii, 214. Englewood Cliffs N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977. $9.95. Paperbound, $3.95.

HENSLIN, JAMES M., ed. *Deviant Life Styles*. Pp. 380. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1977. $12.95.

HÜFNER, KLAUS and JENS NAUMAN. *The United Nations System International Bibliography: Learned Journals and Monographs 1945–1965*, vol. I. Pp. viii, 519 New York: UNIPUB, 1976. $39.00.

HUMMEL, RALPH P. *The Bureaucratic Experience* Pp. viii, 238. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977. $12.95

IL SUNG, KIM. *On Juche in Our Revolution*. Pp vii, 537. New York. Guardian Associates. 1977. $4.95. Paperbound.

IRWIN, GRAHAM W. *Africans Abroad: A Documentary History of the Black Diaspora in Asia, Latin America, and the Caribbean During the Age of Slavery*. Pp v, 408. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977 $20.00. Paperbound, $7 50.

ISAAK, ROBERT A *American Democracy and World Power*. Pp vii, 216 New York. St Martin's Press, 1977. $12.95.

JARMAN, RUFUS. *The Energy Merchant* Pp 279. New York: Richard Rosen, 1977. No price.

JOHNSON, WALTER, CAROL EVANS, and C. ERIC SEARS, eds *The Papers of Adlai E Stevenson: Continuing Education and the Unfinished Business of American Society 1957–1961*, vol. VII. Pp. vii, 655 Boston. Mass.. Little, Brown, 1977 $22.50.

JONES, DOROTHY M. *Aleuts in Transition: A Comparison of Two Villages* Pp. v, 125 Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1976. $9.50

KALISH, RICHARD A., ed. *The Later Years. Social Applications of Gerontology*. Pp. v, 402. Monterey, Calif.. Brooks, Cole, 1977 No price.

KISSINGER, HENRY A. *American Foreign Policy* 3rd ed Pp 445. New York. W W Norton, 1977. $9.95. Paperbound, $4 95

KOCHAN, LIONEL. *The Jew and His History* Pp 164. New York: Schocken Books, 1977 $15.00.

KOHL, JAMES and JOHN LITT. *Urban Guerrilla Warfare in Latin America*. Pp ix, 425. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977. $4.95. Paperbound.

KONCZACKI, Z. A. and J. M. KONCZACKI, eds. *An Economic History of Tropical Africa: The Pre-Colonial Period*, vol I. Pp. vii, 310. Totowa, N.J.: Frank Cass, 1977. $25.00.

KOTZ, NICK and MARY LYNN KOTZ. *A Passion for Equality: George Wiley and the Movement*. Pp. 372. New York: W. W. Norton, 1977. $8.95.

LADNER, JOYCE A. *Mixed Families: Adopting Across Racial Boundaries*. Pp. 312. New York: Doubleday, 1977. $10.00

LANDIS, JEDSON T and MARY G. LANDIS, eds *Building A Successful Marriage*. 7th ed. Pp. vii, 556 Englewood Cliffs, N.J : Prentice-Hall, 1977. $12.95.

LANGBEIN, JOHN, H *Comparative Criminal Procedure: Germany*. Pp 172 St. Paul, Minn., West, 1977. $4.95 Paperbound.

LEFEBVRE, VLADIMIR A. *The Structure of Awareness Toward a Symbolic Language of Human Reflexion* Pp. 200. Beverly Hills, Calif. Sage, 1977 $11 00 Paperbound, $6 00.

LEVIN, ARTHUR, ed *Health Services: The Local Perspective*. Pp. vii, 262. New York Academy of Political Science. $6.50 Paperbound.

LIEBERT, ROBERT M , RITA WICKS POULOUS, and GLORIA STRAUSS MARMOR. *Developmental Psychology* 2nd ed Pp v, 572. Englewood Cliffs, N J . Prentice-Hall, 1977. $14.95.

LIEBERT, ROLAND J and ALLEN W IMMERSHEIN, eds *Power, Paradigms, and Community Research*. Pp 344 Beverly Hills, Calif · Sage, 1977. $12.00. Paperbound, $6 00

LIGHT, DONALD JR and JOHN SPIEGEL, eds *The Dynamics of University Protest*. Pp. vii, 198. Chicago, Ill. Nelson-Hall, 1977. $12.00.

LINDER, MARC. *Anti-Samuelson Basic Ideological Concepts, Crises and Keynesianism*, vol. I Pp v, 395. New York. Urizen Books, 1977. $5.95. Paperbound.

LINDER, MARC. *Anti-Samuelson: Money and Credit Value and Price Theory Factors of Production in the World Market*, vol. II. Pp. 472. New York: Urizen Books, 1977 $5.95. Paperbound.

LOW, DONALD A. *That Sunny Dome: A Portrait of Regency Britain*. Pp. vii, 208. Totowa, N.J. Rowman & Littlefield, 1977 $10 00

LOYE, DAVID *The Leadership Passion. A Psychology of Ideology*. Pp. ix, 249 San Francisco, Calif: Jossey-Bass, 1977 $12.95

LUKACS, GEORG. *The Young Hegel: Studies in the Relations between Dialectics and Economics*. Pp. v, 576. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977. $9.95. Paperbound.

LYNN, KENNETH S. *A Divided People*. Pp. xi, 113. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1977. $11.95.

MACAVOY, PAUL W., ed. *Federal-State Regulation of the Pricing and Marketing of Insurance*. Pp. 105. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 1977 $3.25 Paperbound.

MADDOX, ROBERT J. *The Unknown War With Russia: Wilson's Siberian Intervention*. Pp. ix, 156. San Rafael, Calif: Presidio Press, 1977. $9.95.

MAGID, ALVIN. *Men in the Middle: Leadership and Role Conflict in A Nigerian Society*. Pp. vii, 292. New York. Holmes & Meier, 1976. $25.00.

MAINE, HENRY SUMNER. *Popular Government*. Pp. 254. Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Classics, 1976 $7.95. Paperbound, $1.95.

MARQUAND, DAVID. *Ramsay Macdonald* Pp. vii, 903 Totowa, N.J : Rowman & Littlefield, 1977 $25.00

MARVICK, ELIZABETH WIRTH, ed. *Psychopolitical Analysis: Selected Writings of Nathan Leites*. Pp. 384. New York: Halsted Press, 1977. $20 00.

MAZUZAN, GEORGE T *Warren R. Austin at the U.N., 1946–1953* Pp ix, 233. Kent, Ohio Kent State University Press, 1977. $10.00.

MCLAUGHLIN, CHARLES CAPEN *The Papers of Frederick Law Olmsted. The Formative Years 1822–1852*, vol. I Baltimore, Md.. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977. $20.00

MENENDEZ, ALBERT J. *Religion at the Polls* Pp. 248. Philadelphia, Pa.. Westminster Press, 1977. $5 95 Paperbound.

MEYER, LORENZO. *Mexico and the United States in the Oil Controversy, 1917–1942*. Pp xi, 367. Austin. University of Texas Press, 1977 $19.95

MILIBAND, RALPH *Marxism and Politics*. Pp. viii, 199. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977. $10 00.

MITCHELL, BROADUS. *Depression Decade: From New Era Through New Deal, 1929–1941*. The Economic History of the United States, vol. IX. Pp. 496. White Plains, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1977. $10.95. Paperbound.

MONAT, ALAN and RICHARD S LAZARUS. *Stress and Coping* Pp vii, 426 New York Columbia University Press, 1977 $20 00 Paperbound. $10 00

MONTGOMERY, PETER G. *Humanity at the Helm A Blueprint for World Unification*

Pp. vii, 190. Ardmore, Pa.: Dorrance, 1977. $6.95.

MOON, MARILYN and EUGENE SMOLENSKY, eds. *Improving Measures of Economic Well Being*. Pp. ix, 239. New York: Academic Press, 1977. $16.00.

MOONEY, CHRISTOPHER F. *Religion and the American Dream: The Search for Freedom Under God*. Pp. 144. Philadelphia, Pa. Westminster Press, 1977 $4.95. Paperbound.

MORGAN, PATRICK M. *Deterrence A Conceptual Analysis*. Pp. 216. Beverly Hills, Calif.. Sage, 1977. $11.00. Paperbound, $6.00.

MORRISON, ELEANOR S and VERA BOROSAGE, eds. *Human Sexuality Contemporary Perspectives*. 2nd ed. Pp. iii. 504. Palo Alto, Calif.: Mayfield, 1977. No price.

MUCHOW, DAVID J. *The Vanishing Congress: Where Has All the Power Gone?* Pp ii, 276. Washington, D.C.: North American International, 1976. $10.00.

MURPHY, WALTER F. and JOSEPH TANENHAUS. *Comparative Constitutional Law. Cases and Commentaries*. Pp. ix, 754. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977. $20.00.

NAGEL, STUART S., ed. *Modeling the Criminal Justice System* Pp. 320 Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977. $17.50. Paperbound, $7.50

NOONAN, JOHN T., JR. *The Antelope. The Ordeal of the Recaptured Africans in the Administrations of James Monroe and John Quincy Adams* Pp. 205. Berkeley. University of California Press, 1977. $10.00.

NETTELS, CURTIS P. *The Emergence of A National Economy, 1775–1815*. The Economic History of the United States, vol. II. Pp 464 White Plains, N Y : M. E. Sharpe, 1977. $9 95. Paperbound

NEWCOMB, JOAN I. *John F. Kennedy An Annotated Bibliography*. Pp iii, 143. Metuchen, N.J Scarecrow Press, 1977 $6 00.

OSKAMP, STUART *Attitudes and Opinions*. Pp. iii, 466. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977. $14.95.

OTERO, LUIS LENERO, ed *Beyond the Nuclear Family Model. Cross-Cultural Perspectives*. Pp. 226 Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977. $12.00. Paperbound, $6.00.

OTT, DAVID J. and ATTIAT F. OTT *Federal Budget Policy. 3rd ed* Pp. ix, 178. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977 $9.95. Paperbound, $3.95

PARSONS, TALCOTT. *Social Systems and the Evolution of Action Theory*. Pp. ix, 420. New York: The Free Press, 1977. $15.95.

PENNOCK, J. ROLAND and JOHN W. CHAPMAN, eds. *Human Nature in Politics*. Pp. viii, 348. New York: New York University Press, 1977. $17.50.

PINE, VANDERLYN R. *Introduction to Social Statistics*. Pp. v, 415. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977. $13.95.

PLATT, ANTHONY M. *The Child Savers: The Invention of Delinquency*. 2nd ed. Pp. ix, 240. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977. $3.95. Paperbound

PLISCHKE, ELMER. *Microstates in World Affairs: Policy Problems and Options*. Pp. 153. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977. $3.00. Paperbound.

RATCLIFFE, BARRIE M. and W. H. CHALONER, eds. *A French Sociologist Looks At Britian: Gustave d'Eichthal and British Society in 1828*. Pp. 169 Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield. 1977. $12.50.

RENSHON, STANLEY ALLEN, ed *Handbook of Political Socialization: Theory and Research* Pp v, 547. New York: The Free Press, 1977. $19.95.

RICHMOND, J. C. B. *Egypt 1798–1952*. Pp. vii, 243. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. $15.00.

ROBERTS, NEAL ALISON. *The Government Land Developers*. Pp. vii, 249. Lexington, Mass . D C Heath, 1977. $18.00.

ROGERS, DOROTHY. *Issues in Adolescent Psychology* 3rd ed. Pp. iii, 485. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977. $8.95. Paperbound.

ROSE, LEO E *The Politics of Bhutan*. Pp 237 Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977. $19 50

ROSE, PETER I , MYRON GLAZER, and PENINA MIGDAL GLAZER. *Sociology Inquiring into Society* Pp. 603. San Francisco, Calif.: Canfield Press, 1977 No price

ROSENFELD, ERWIN and HARRIET GELLER *Afro-Asian Culture Studies*. 2nd ed. Pp 469 Woodbury, N Y. Barron's Educational Series, 1976 $4 40 Paperbound

RUBEN, BRENT D , ed. *Communication Yearbook 1*. Pp. xi, 656. New Brunswick, N.J Transaction Books, 1977. $24.95

RUMMEL, R. J. *Field Theory Evolving*. Pp 533. Beverly Hills, Calif.· Sage, 1977 $29.95.

RUSSELL, FRANCIS. *A City in Terror: The 1919 Boston Police Strike*. Pp. v, 256. New York: Penguin Books, 1977. $3.95. Paperbound

SACHS, MOSHE Y., ed. *The United Nations A Handbook on the United Nations, its Structure, History, Purposes, Activities and Agencies*. Pp. v, 246. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1977. $9.95.

SCALAPINO, ROBERT A., ed. *The Foreign Policy of Modern Japan* Pp. 445. Berkeley University of California Press, 1977. $21.50 Paperbound, $5.45.

SCHIESEL, MARTIN J. *The Politics of Efficiency: Municipal Administration and Reform in America: 1880–1920.* Pp. 268. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. $11.75.

SCHLAGHECK, JAMES L. *The Political Economic, and Labor Climate in Brazil.* Pp. iii, 116. Latin American Studies, no. 4. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977. No price.

SCHRAMM, WILBUR. *Big Media, Little Media: Tools and Technologies for Instruction.* Pp. 315. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977. $17.50. Paperbound, $7.50.

SCRIBNER, JAY D., ed. *The Politics of Education: The Seventy-sixth Yearbook of the National Society for the Study of Education.* Pp. vii, 367. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977. $12.00.

SHANAS, ETHEL and MARVIN B. SUSSMAN, eds. *Family, Bureaucracy, and the Elderly.* Pp. v, 233. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1977. $12.75.

SHANNON, FRED A. *The Farmer's Last Frontier. Agriculture, 1860–1897.* The Economic History of the United States, vol. V. Pp. 464. White Plains, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1977. $9.95. Paperbound.

SHAPIRO, R. DIANE. *Foundation for Sociology. A Self-Learning Text.* Pp. v, 407. Chicago, Ill.: Rand McNally 1977. $7.95. Paperbound.

SHAVER, KELLY G. *Principles of Social Psychology.* Pp. vii, 636. Cambridge, Mass.: Winthrop, 1977. $14.95.

SIFF, TED and ALAN WEIL, eds. *Ruling Congress. How the House and Senate Rules Govern the Legislative Process.* Pp. 299. New York: Penguin Books, 1977. $2.95. Paperbound.

SINAI, ANNE and ALLEN POLLACK, eds. *The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the West Bank.* Pp. 371. New York: AAAPME, 1977. $6.95. Paperbound.

SIRACUSA, JOSEPH M., ed. *The American Diplomatic Revolution. A Documentary History of the Cold War 1941–1947.* Pp. 263. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1977. $12.95. Paperbound, $7.95.

SMITH, JONATHAN RILEY. *What Were the Crusades?* Pp. 92. Totowa, N.J.: Rowan & Littlefield, 1977. $9.50.

SMOLKA, RICHARD G. *Election Day Registration: The Minnesota and Wisconsin Experience in 1976.* Pp. 69. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977. $2.75. Paperbound.

SOBEL, ROBERT, ed. *Biographical Directory of the United States Executive Branch, 1774–1977.* 2nd ed., rev. Pp. x, 503. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1977. $29.95.

SOBOUL, ALBERT. *A Short History of the French Revolution, 1789–1799.* Pp. 197. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. $12.00. Paperbound, $2.95.

SORRENTINO, ANTHONY. *Organizing Against Crime: Redeveloping the Neighborhood.* Pp. 272. New York: Human Sciences Press, 1977. No price.

SOULE, GEORGE. *Prosperity Decade: From War to Depression, 1917–1929.* The Economic History of the United States, vol. VIII. Pp. 400. White Plains, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1977. $8.95. Paperbound.

SPANNAUS, NANCY and CHRISTOPHER WHITE, eds. *The Political Economy of the American Revolution.* Pp. v, 470. Philadelphia, Pa.: University Editions, 1977. $4.95. Paperbound.

SPIEGEL-RÖSING, INA and DEREK DE SOLLA PRICE, eds. *Science, Technology and Society. A Cross-Disciplinary Perspective.* Pp. 607. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977. $29.95.

Spines Thesaurus: A Controlled and Structured Vocabulary of Science and Technology for Policy-Making, Management and Development. Pp. 666. New York: UNIPUB, 1976. $54.50. Set. 3 vols. in 4 parts.

SPIRA, THOMAS. *German-Hungarian Relations and the Swabian Problem.* Pp. viii, 382. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. $18.50.

STOLER, MARK A. *The Politics of the Second Front: American Military Planning and Diplomacy in Coalition Warfare, 1941–1943.* Pp. xiii, 244. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1977. $16.95.

STEINTRAGER, JAMES. *Bentham.* Pp. 133. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977. $11.50.

STEINERT, MARLIS G. *Hitler's War and the Germans.* Pp. vii, 387. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1977. $20.00.

TAYLOR, GEORGE ROGERS. *The Transportation Revolution, 1815–1860.* The Economic History of the United States, vol. IV. Pp. 520. White Plains, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1977. $10.95. Paperbound.

TEITLER, G. *The Genesis of the Professional Officers' Corps.* Pp. 246. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977. $13.50.

THOMA, HENRY F., ed. *The American Prospect. Insights into Our Next 100 Years.* Pp. v, 159. Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1977. $7.95. Paperbound, $3.95.

TODARO, MICHAEL P. *Economic Development in the Third World.* Pp. vi, 440. New York: Longman, 1977. $14.95.

TOWNSEND, JOHN OMAN. *The Making of the Modern State.* Pp. 212. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977. $16.95.

TURK, HERMAN. *Organizations in Modern Life*. Pp. ix, 283. San Francisco, Calif.: Jossey-Bass, 1977. $15.00.

ULLMANN, WALTER. *Medieval Foundations of Renaissance Humanism*. Pp. vii, 212. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977. $12.50.

WATTS, WILLIAM and JORGE I. DOMINGUEZ. *The United States and Cuba: Old Issues and New Directions*. Pp. 53. Washington, D.C.: Potomac Associates, 1977. $4.00. Paperbound.

WATTS, WILLIAM and LLOYD A. FREE. *Aspirations and Social Concerns. Crime, Blacks, Inequality, and Women* Pp 50 Washington, D.C: Potomac Associates, 1977. $2.50. Paperbound

WEPPNER, ROBERT. S, ed *Street Ethnography*, vol. I. Pp 288. Beverly Hills, Calif: Sage, 1977. $17.50. Paperbound, $7.50.

WETTIG, GERHARD. *Broadcasting and Détente: Eastern Policies and their Implication for East-West Relations*. Pp. v, 110. New York. St. Martin's Press, 1977. $9.95

WHEELER, MICHAEL. *Lies, Damn Lies, and Statistics. The Manipulation of Public Opinion in America*. Pp. 320. New York: Dell, 1976. $2.50 Paperbound

WILLIE, CHARLES V., ed. *Black, Brown, White Relations: Race Relations in the 1970s*. Pp. 235. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1977. $12.95. Paperbound, $4.95.

WOOD, W. D. and PRADEEP KUMAR, eds. *The Current Industrial Relations Scene in Canada 1977*. Irregular pagination. Ontario, Ca.: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977. $40.00. Paperbound.

WOODSWORTH, DAVID E. *Social Security and National Policy: Sweden, Yugoslavia, Japan* Pp. 156. Ontario, Ca: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977. $8.50. Paperbound, $3.95

WORICK, W. WAYNE and WARREN E SCHALLER. *Alcohol, Tobacco, and Drugs. Their Use and Abuse*. Pp. v, 170. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977. $7.95. Paperbound, $4.95.

ZIEGER, ROBERT H. *Madison's Battery Workers, 1934–1952: A History of Federal Labor Union 19587* Pp. v, 126. Ithaca, N Y. Cornell University Press, 1977 $4 50. Paperbound.

ZIRING, LAWRENCE, RALPH BRAIBANTI, and W HOWARD WRIGGINS, eds. *Pakistan The Long View*. Pp. xi, 485. Durham. N C. Duke University Press, 1977. $19 75.

INDEX

INDEX

VOLUME 436 MARCH 1978

THE ANNALS

of The American Academy *of* Political
and Social Science

Richard D. Lambert, *Editor*
Alan W. Heston, *Assistant Editor*

AMERICAN INDIANS TODAY

Special Editors of This Volume

J. MILTON YINGER
Professor of Sociology and Anthropology
Oberlin College
Oberlin, Ohio

and

GEORGE EATON SIMPSON
Professor Emeritus of Sociology and Anthropology
Oberlin College
Oberlin, Ohio

PHILADELPHIA

Library of Congress Card Number 77-26529

MARION M. WILLIAMS, *Copy Editor*

The articles appearing in THE ANNALS are indexed in the *Book Review Index*, the *Public Affairs Information Service Bulletin*, *Social Sciences Index*, and *Current Contents: Behavioral, Social, Management Sciences* and *Combined Retrospective Index Sets*. They are also abstracted and indexed in *ABC Pol Sci*, *Historical Abstracts*, *United States Political Science Documents*, *Social Work Research & Abstracts*, *International Political Science Abstracts* and/or *America: History and Life*.

International Standard Book Numbers (ISBN)

ISBN 0-87761-225-0, vol. 436, 1978; paper—$4.50
ISBN 0-87761-224-2, vol. 436, 1978; cloth—$5.50

Issued bimonthly by The American Academy of Political and Social Science at 3937 Chestnut St., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104. Cost per year: $18.00 paperbound; $23.00 clothbound Add $2.00 to above rates for membership outside U.S.A. Second-class postage paid at Philadephia and at additional mailing offices.

Claims for undelivered copies must be made within the month following the regular month of publication. The publisher will supply missing copies when losses have been sustained in transit and when the reserve stock will permit.

Editorial and Business Offices, 3937 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104.

CONTENTS

BOOK DEPARTMENT

PAGE

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND POLITICS

AFRICA, ASIA, AND LATIN AMERICA

EUROPE

BOOK DEPARTMENT PAGE

UNITED STATES HISTORY AND POLITICS

SOCIOLOGY

FOREWORD

A great many changes have occurred in American society and among Native Americans since the appearance of an earlier issue of THE ANNALS (May 1957) devoted to an examination of "American Indians and American Life." The Indian population has grown rapidly and has become urban even more rapidly. A civil rights movement has swept over the country, dramatically changing the legal framework within which racial and cultural contacts occur and heightening the sense of group identity of America's minorities. Significant changes in the economic, political, and educational opportunities of the members of minority races have occurred, but these changes only reveal more clearly the great inequalities and the discrimination that remain. These have been years of conflict, as claims have been pressed—in the face of resistance—by various forms of black power, brown power, and red power.

The articles in this issue of THE ANNALS examine many aspects of these changes among American Indians and in the relationships of Indians to the government and the larger society. Our aim, in selecting the authors—distinguished students of Native American life—has been to focus on the recent developments. Yet we are struck also by the continuity. This can best be shown, perhaps, simply by repeating the foreword that we wrote for the 1957 volume, for it may suggest the distance we have yet to go before the country has truly redefined its racial and ethnic practices. It may also emphasize the importance of the study of those practices for an understanding of American society:

> White Americans seem continually to be rediscovering the Indians. In the last few years, a growing Indian population on a limited land base, a vigorous national controversy over desegregation, a turn in the Indian policy of the federal government, and world-wide attention to questions of colonialism and minorities have been among the forces renewing America's interest in her Indian citizens.
>
> The student of Indian affairs recognizes that to some degree the status of Indians in American society is similar to the status of other minorities. To a significant degree, however, Indian experience has been different, for unlike any other minority group in the nation, they were here, living in unified societies, when the European settlers came. Their response to invasion may have as much in common with the minorities in Eastern Europe as with the willing and unwilling migrants to America, torn as they were from their cultural roots.
>
> There is scarcely a major issue of policy in the United States that has not been involved in the relationships of Indians and whites. Questions of universal citizenship and franchise, of land use and conservation; of the "melting pot" versus pluralism; of prejudice, discrimination, and segregation; of colonialism, of the separation of church and state, of private property and communal property; and of the extent and nature of government responsibility for education—to mention several basic issues—have all involved policy questions concerning Indians.
>
> We need scarcely stress the importance and value of a study of the place of American Indians in American life. To the social scientist, it offers a valuable field for the testing of theories of social and cultural change, of acculturation, of personality

development, and the like. To the policy maker, "the Indian question" is a key test of democracy with which our society has struggled for generations. To the student of international affairs, it offers experience— much of it negative, of course—and an important testing ground for the study of the results of culture contact between highly industrialized and "underdeveloped" societies. And in its own right, as a problem with difficult questions of justice and equality involving a large group of human beings, the analysis of the status of American Indians challenges us all.

Clearly the authors of this volume do not agree on all aspects of the question of the place of American Indians in American life. There are some disagreements in interpretation of facts, in method, and even in objective. While we have not sought to have all possible points of view represented—for our aim has been a scholarly review of several aspects of Indian life today, not a policy debate—we nevertheless welcome the several points of view that naturally appeared as the various authors explored their subjects. Each author writes from a wealth of experience. The interaction of their views can bring us to a more adequate understanding of American Indians and toward a resolution of the difficult questions still before us in establishing full equality and freedom for Indians.

J. MILTON YINGER
GEORGE EATON SIMPSON

ANNALS, AAPSS, 436, Mar. 1978

The Economic Basis of Indian Life

By ALAN L. SORKIN

ABSTRACT: This paper focuses on trends in the economic position of the American Indian and discusses programs to spur Indian development. The rapid growth in Indian income and occupational status in comparison to blacks and whites is indicated. However, these gains have been made primarily by urban, as opposed to reservation, Indians. Despite economic progress, 50 percent of reservation Indians and 20 percent of urban Indians obtained incomes below the poverty level. The biggest economic problem on Indian reservations is unemployment which has averaged 40 percent of the labor force for the past 20 years. Manpower and industrial development programs, while bringing benefits to a few, have done little to make the reservations economically viable. Moreover, the manpower programs operated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and Department of Labor overlap and should be coordinated to prevent duplication of effort. Agricultural development has lagged partly due to inadequate technical assistance and financial aid and the fractionated nature of Indian land. The most productive acreage is often sold or leased to whites. Indian centers may hold the key to the integration of native Americans into the social and economic life of urban America.

Alan L. Sorkin is Professor and Chairman of the Department of Economics, University of Maryland-Baltimore County and Associate in the Department of International Health at the Johns Hopkins School of Public Health. He received the Ph.D. in economics from Johns Hopkins in 1966. He is the author of American Indians and Federal Aid *(The Brookings Institution, 1971), as well as a number of articles concerning manpower and industrial development programs for native Americans. He is presently undertaking a study of the economic and social development of the urban American Indian.*

THE PURPOSE of this paper is to indicate trends in the economic position of the American Indian as well as to discuss the various programs developed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) and other federal agencies to accelerate development of Indian resources. Whenever possible a distinction will be made between data relating to reservation Indians and those concerning nonreservation (urban) Indians. In order to place this information in proper perspective the economic progress of American Indians will be compared with that of white and black Americans.

INCOME

Many reservation Indians receive incomes which are below the poverty level. According to the most recent figures available, approximately one-half of all reservation Indians and one-fifth of all urban Indian families earned less than $4,000 a year (the income level which separated poor families of average size from nonpoor in 1969). Income statistics for Indian, black and white males for 1939–69 are presented in table 1.

While the income of male Indians rose much faster than that of white males over the 1949–69 period, the former was less than one-half of the latter in 1969. The statistics also indicate the widening income gap between reservation and urban Indians. In 1949 the median income of Indians on reservations was 80 percent of that of Indians living in urban areas; in 1969 the figure had dropped to 57 percent. The increased disparity results from the migration of many relatively well-educated and highly skilled Indians from reservations to major urban centers over that 20-year period. In the metropolitan areas better-paying jobs, more commensurate with the level of education and training of the Indians seeking them, were available. At the same time the reservation economy remained comparatively stagnant, and as a result incomes grew slowly.

From 1939 to 1969 the median income of reservation Indians grew slightly faster than the median income of black males (see table 1). In recent years, however, the average income of black males has been double that of reservation Indians. Finally, in 1969 the median income of black males and urban male Indians was almost the same, although the latter had increased nearly three times as rapidly as the former in median income from 1949 to 1969.

Reservation Indians are heavily dependent on government for jobs and income. In 1972, nearly 40 percent of reservation Indian earnings was accounted for by the federal government with an additional 20 percent coming from tribal and state and local government. In addition, 20 percent of income was obtained from commercial and industrial employment, 12 percent from agriculture and 8 percent from forestry, minerals and outdoor recreation.[1]

Such heavy reliance on government employment could become a source of difficulty for reservation Indians. In the event of even a moderate cutback in federal Indian programs, several tribes, which already face severe unemployment problems, would find themselves in

1. Keith Fay, *Developing Indian Employment Opportunities* (Washington, D.C.: Bureau of Indian Affairs, 1974), p. 100. In addition to earned income about 20 percent of all Indian families receive welfare income, compared with only about 5 percent for the total United States population. The average income from this source is $1,200 per Indian family.

TABLE 1

MEDIAN INCOME FOR MALE INDIANS, BLACKS, AND WHITES, 1939–69* (1969 DOLLARS)

	INCOME				
YEAR	ALL INDIANS	URBAN INDIANS	RESERVATION INDIANS	BLACKS	WHITES
1939	—	—	$ 576	$1,066	$2,035
1944	—	—	760	1,843	3,506
1949	$1,094	$1,198	950	2,218	3,780
1959	2,218	2,961	1,699	3,398	5,229
1964	—	—	2,074	3,947	6,743
1969	3,509	4,568	2,603	4,508	7,759
Percentage Increase 1939–69	—	—	352	323	281
Percentage Increase 1949–69	220	281	174	103	105

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, *Current Population Reports*, Series P–60, nos. 5, 7, and 47, *Income of Families and Persons in the United States* (1965), pp. 51–51; U S Bureau of Indian Affairs, "Reservation Income, 1939" (unpublished); Bureau of the Census, 1940 Census of Population, *The Labor Force*, table 71, p. 116 and the volume on *Education*, table 31, p. 161; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1950 Census of Population, *Nonwhite Population by Race* (1953), table 10, p. 32, and table 21, p. 72, *Occupational Characteristics* (1956), table 10, p. 183, and table 21, p. 215, U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1960 Census of Population, *Nonwhite Population by Race*, table 33, p. 104, *Occupational Characteristics*, table 25, p. 296, and table 26, p. 215; Bureau of Indian Affairs, "Selected Data on Indian Reservations Eligible for Designation under Public Works and Economic Development Act" (mimeographed, 1966), U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1970 Census of Population, *American Indians* (1973), table 13, pp 161–63, and *Education* (1973), table 7, pp. 149–51.

* Data include all males and all sources of income, whether earned or unearned.

a crisis situation. For example on the Pine Ridge reservation 65 percent of all employed Indians work for the federal government; on the Fort Belknap reservation the figure is 72 percent.[2]

There is great variation in income among reservations. Median family income in 1969 ranged from $2,500 on the Papago reservation in Arizona to $6,115 on the Laguna Pueblo in New Mexico.[3] Even within a state the difference is sizable. For example in Montana, the median family income varied from $4,258 on the Blackfeet reservation to $5,278 on the Northern Cheyenne reservation. Differences in income levels are more closely related to variations in off-reservation employment opportunities and reservation labor force participation rates than to levels of reservation development.

OCCUPATIONAL STATUS

The distribution of the Indian labor force by occupation reveals a concentration among the lowest paying positions (see table 2). However, the occupational status of Indians in 1970 was more favorable than that of blacks, with higher proportions of the former classified as professionals, managers, and craftsmen, and with fewer enumerated as operatives, laborers, and service workers than the latter.

The most significant occupational change among Indians has been the rapid decline in agricultural employ-

2. Bureau of Indian Affairs, "BIA Program Planning Output Data" (Unpublished tabulation, Bureau of Indian Affairs, December 1972).

3. U.S. Bureau of Census, 1970 Census of Population, *American Indians* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1973), table 14, pp. 171–73.

TABLE 2

PERCENT DISTRIBUTION OF INDIAN, BLACK, AND WHITE MALES BY OCCUPATION GROUP, 1940, 1960, 1970

Occupation Group	Indian					Black			White		
	1940	1960	Total 1970	Urban 1970	Rural 1970	1940	1960	1970	1940	1960	1970
Professional and technical	2.2	4.9	9.2	11.4	6.8	1.8	3.4	5.7	5.9	11.6	14.9
Managers, Officials and Proprietors except Farmers	1.4	2.8	5.0	5.8	4.2	1.3	1.9	2.8	10.7	12.1	12.4
Clerical and Sales	2.0	4.9	8.1	7.3	3.9	2.0	7.0	10.0	14.0	15.1	14.8
Craftsmen and Foremen	5.7	15.5	22.1	23.1	20.9	4.4	10.7	15.4	15.7	21.1	21.9
Operatives	6.2	21.9	23.9	25.6	22.1	12.6	26.7	29.5	18.9	20.1	18.8
Laborers	11.4	20.2	13.2	10.8	15.8	21.4	22.2	16.1	7.5	6.0	6.0
Service Workers	2.6	6.3	10.4	10.8	10.1	15.3	16.0	15.9	6.0	5.7	7.3
Farmers and Managers	46.7	9.5	2.3	0.2	4.6	21.2	4.7	0.9	14.1	5.8	2.8
Farm laborers	21.7	14.0	5.7	1.8	10.2	19.9	7.5	3.6	7.0	2.5	1.5

SOURCE: 1940 Census, *Characteristics of the Nonwhite Population By Race*, table 26, pp. 83–84, and *The Labor Force*, table 62, pp. 88–89, 1960 Census, *Nonwhite Population By Race*, table 33, p 104, and *Occupational Characteristics*, table 2, pp. 11–20, and table 3, pp 21–30, 1970 Census of Population, *American Indians*, table 7, p 86, and U.S. Bureau of the Census, *The Social and Economic Status of Negroes in the United States*, 1970, table 48, p. 60.

ment. Nearly half of all Indian males were classified as farmers or farm managers in 1940, but only 2 percent were so classified in 1970. The principal reason for this decline has been the pressure of competition from non-Indian farmers, whose greater capital resources and technical skill have made farming unprofitable for many Indians. Thus Indian farmers earn only about 60 percent as much as reservation Indian males engaged in other occupations, encouraging an exodus from agriculture as well as the leasing of a large part of the most productive land to whites.

There has been a rapid expansion in the proportion of skilled and semiskilled workers. Nearly half of all Indian males were employed as carftsmen or operatives in 1970 compared to 12 percent of the Indian labor force in 1940. The rapid growth in skilled and semiskilled employment of Indians has been associated with the migration during the 1950s and 1960s of younger Indians from the reservations to urban centers in the West. Many of these migrants were participating in training and relocation programs operated by the Bureau of Indian affairs.

Finally there has been a considerable increase in the proportion of Indian males employed as professional workers or managers and proprietors. Less than 4 percent of

TABLE 3

UNEMPLOYMENT RATES, INDIAN, BLACK, AND WHITE MALES, 1940–1975*

YEAR	INDIANS: ALL	INDIANS: URBAN	INDIANS: RESERVATION†	BLACKS	WHITES
			(IN PERCENT)		
1940	32.9		—	18.0	14.8
1950		15.1	—	9.6	5.9
1958			43.5	13.8	6.1
1960	38.2	12.1	51.3	10.7	4.8
1962			43.4	10.9	4.6
1965			41.9	7.4	3.6
1967			37.3	6.0	2.7
1970	28.6	9.4	41.0	8.2	4.0
1973			36.5	7.6	3.7
1975			39.8	13.7	7.2

SOURCE: Black and White Males, 1950–75, *Employment and Training Report of the President*, 1976, table A-20, p. 242; 1940 Census, *Characteristics of the Nonwhite Population by Race*, table 25, p. 82, and *The Labor Force*, table 4, p. 18; 1950 Census, *Nonwhite Population by Race*, table 10, p. 32; 1960 Census, *Nonwhite Population by Race*, table 33, p. 104; *Indian Unemployment Survey* (1963); Bureau of Indian Affairs, unpublished tabulation December, 1967; Bureau of Indian Affairs, "Estimates of Resident Indian Population and Labor Force Status by State and Reservation, March, 1973 and April, 1975" (mimeographed, 1973 and 1975).

* Data for Indians 1940–70 and blacks and whites in 1940 include those 14 years old and over; all other data include males 16 years old and over

† The Bureau of Indian Affairs considers an individual who is not in school or working as unemployed whether the person is actually looking for a job or not. The Department of Labor, in its calculation of national unemployment rates, excludes persons who are not looking for work from the labor force.

Indian males were so classified in 1940 compared to 14 percent in 1970. The latter figure was nearly twice the percentage of black males employed in professional and managerial jobs.

Many of the Indian professionals are employed as school teachers, both on the reservations and in urban areas where a sizable proportion of the public school students are descendents of the first Americans.[4] Moreover, the Bureau of Indian Affairs and the Indian Health Service have made important gains in placing native Americans in relatively well-paid professional jobs. For example, in 1970 more than one-third of the professional positions in those agencies paying $8,000 or more per annum were held by Indians.[5]

MANPOWER UTILIZATION

The very low levels of Indian income are associated with unemployment rates several times those of non-Indians (see table 3). While the unemployment rates for blacks and whites fell sharply between 1940 and 1960, the rate for Indians rose 16 percent. This increase was chiefly a result of the great exodus of Indians from agriculture in search of better-paid employment. Since many of them lacked training and education, they were restricted to unskilled occupations with high rates of joblessness, particularly in reser-

4. However, only one-sixth of the teachers employed in reservation schools are Indian.

5. Sar A. Levitan and Barbara Hetrick, *Big Brothers Indian Programs: With Reservations* (New York: McGraw Hill, 1971), p. 12.

vation areas where there had been little industrialization.

That the Indian unemployment rate is far above acceptable levels is apparent in a comparison with the rate for males during the Great Depression, which reached 25 percent in 1933. Throughout the 1958–75 period the unemployment rate of reservation Indians was far higher. While the male unemployment rate on reservations has been somewhat lower from 1967–75 than from 1958–65, progress has been painfully slow. Furthermore the jobless rate of reservation Indians seems relatively insensitive to movements of the business cycle. While there was a decrease of more than 50 percent in the unemployment rates of white and black males from 1961 to 1967 (a period of increasing prosperity), the decrease for reservation Indians was only 25 percent. Similarly the relative rise in unemployment during the severe 1973–75 recession was only 10 percent for reservation Indians while the unemployment rates for blacks and whites nearly doubled (see table 3).

Nonreservation Indians have unemployment rates approximately 10 to 15 percent higher than blacks. Both populations are highly urbanized (with 70 percent of all blacks and over 90 percent of nonreservation Indians living in urban areas) and have roughly similar employment and income levels. Many of the reservation Indians, newly arrived in cities, have adjustment problems very similar to those of southern blacks who have migrated to a northern urban center.

Between 1950 and 1970 the unemployment rate for nonreservation Indians fell by nearly 40 percent in spite of a major migration from the reservation to urban areas. This reflects some tendency for migrants to enter cities with relatively tight labor markets.

On some reservations more than half of all males in the labor force are unemployed. Unemployment averaged 67 percent in 1975 among Indians in the Bethel, Alaska area, 78 percent on the Havasupai Reservation in Arizona, and 62 percent on the Ute Mountain Reservation in Utah and Colorado.[6] Jobless rates on most reservations are even higher during the winter when agricultural and other outside activities are at a low ebb.

RESERVATION DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS

In order to accelerate economic development on the reservations and to provide urban Indians with economic opportunities the Bureau of Indian Affairs and other federal agencies have developed a variety of programs in the areas of manpower training, business and industrial development, and natural resource utilization. Programs in each of these three areas will be discussed in turn.

Manpower training

To ameliorate the problems of poverty and surplus labor on the reservations, the Bureau of Indian Affairs has established a variety of manpower programs which emphasize training and/or relocation of participants. These include direct employment (relocation), on-the-job training, adult vocational training, and the deployment of Indian action teams.

An Indian participating in the direct employment program is either

6. Bureau of Indian Affairs, "Estimates of Resident Indian Population and Labor Force status (16 years and over) by State and Reservation: April, 1975," mimeographed (1975).

placed in a job near the reservation or transported at government expense to major western and midwestern cities. He or she is found employment and generally receives BIA counseling and other follow-up services for a year.

Many Indians prefer to remain on the reservation regardless of the economic consequences. The Indian Vocational Training Act authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to contract with private industry to provide subsidized on the job training (OJT) for Indians 18 to 35 years of age. Given the present minimum wage of $2.30 per hour the BIA pays $1.15 an hour subsidy while the person is in training. This program not only provides reservation Indians with a chance to learn a skill, but through the training subsidy offers an inducement for businessmen to locate factories on reservations.

Partly because of the concentration of Indians in unskilled and semiskilled positions, the BIA provides a wide variety of advanced vocational training courses in schools located within urban centers and near reservations.[7] Upon completion of the vocational training course the enrollee receives job placement services. Between 1952 and 1975 nearly 150,000 reservation Indians participated in these three BIA manpower programs.[8] The total level of funding for these programs in 1975 was $35 million.

While benefit-cost studies[9] show that these programs have raised the income of the average participant substantially, each program has been plagued by a high dropout and/or reservation returnee rate. Partly because of the latter the BIA has changed the emphasis of the direct employment and adult vocational training programs. For example, in 1968, only one-third of the job placements were on or near the reservation with the remaining two-thirds in urban locations. In 1975, nearly 75 percent of program participants were found jobs on or near the reservations.[10] With placement close to home, adjustment problems are less severe, and the reservation employment assistance officer can maintain contact with the program participant and provide effective follow-up services.

In order to expand employment opportunities quickly on the reservations, a new training and employment concept has been developed by the BIA—the Indian Action Team Program. It provides funds to tribes that train and employ Indians in construction work on reservations. Training is provided by the Indians themselves, who are generally BIA employees skilled in carpentry, plumbing, bulldozer operation, and other construction occupations. As the apprentices become trained, they obtain jobs as foremen or supervisors and in turn teach their skills to additional trainees on a part-time basis. This program not only gives Indians the responsibility for construction, maintenance, and management of reservation roads and buildings, but provides them with the skills necessary to accelerate reservation development and improve the qual-

7. Bureau of Indian Affairs, "Employment Assistance Programs" (Unpublished manuscript, 1972), p. 9.

8. Bureau of Indian Affairs, "Statistical Summary of Activities From Inception of Program through June 30, 1975" (Unpublished tabulation).

9. See Alan Sorkin, *American Indians and Federal Aid* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1971), pp. 104–35.

10. Bureau of Indian Affairs (Unpublished tabulation, 1976).

TABLE 4

FACTORIES ON INDIAN RESERVATIONS AND TOTAL EMPLOYMENT BY FISCAL YEAR

YEAR	PLANTS ESTABLISHED	PLANTS CLOSED DOWN	TOTAL PLANTS IN OPERATION (END OF YEAR)	TOTAL EMPLOYMENT (END OF YEAR)	
				INDIAN	NON-INDIAN
1957–59	4	1	3	391	171
1960	3	0	6	525	156
1962	5	1	14	887	600
1964	14	7	25	1668	2286
1966	21	4	57	3044	3244
1968	36	3	110	4112	4365
1970	28	4	162	6443	7051
1972	37	1	225	7339	9093
1974	21	4	250	6173	9390

SOURCE: Data for 1957–68 from Bureau of Indian Affairs, "Summary Record of Plants Established as a Result of the Indian Industrial Development Program" (unpublished tabulation, 1968); Idem., "Summary of Plant Closings" (unpublished tabulation, 1968). Data for 1970–72 from Idem., "Employment in Industrial and Commercial Enterprises Established in Indian Labor Force Areas" (unpublished tabulation, 1972). Data for 1974 from Idem., "Employment in Industrial and Commercial Enterprises Established in Indian Labor Force Areas" (unpublished tabulation, 1974).

ity of reservation life.[11] In 1975 about half the reservations had Indian Action Team programs, their total cost coming to about $15 million.[12]

Between 1970 and 1975 the Department of Labor rapidly expanded the number of Indians enrolled in the national programs supported by that agency. During 1975, nearly 52,000 Indians participated in the manpower programs offered under the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act. About three-fourths were reservation Indians. Of the total about 56 percent were in work experience assignments, 18 percent in public service employment, 12 percent in classroom training and 10 percent in on-the-job-training.[13] Job placement and drop-out rates were comparable to that of BIA programs.

In terms of manpower development there is clear overlap between BIA and Department of Labor Programs. It is imperative that these agencies strive to coordinate their programs and eliminate duplication of effort.

Business and industrial development

Industrial development of Indian reservations is a comparatively recent phenomenon. Prior to 1960 there were only four plants located on Indian land. The number of factories in operation and total employment are shown in table 4. The efforts of the BIA and the Economic Development Administration have

11. Helen Johnson, *American Indians in Transition* (Washington, D.C., U.S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Research Service, report no. 283, April 1975), pp. 24–25.

12. Bureau of Indian Affairs, "List of Indian Action Team Contractors" (Unpublished tabulation, 1975).

13. U.S. Department of Labor and Department of Health Education and Welfare, *Employment and Training Report of the President, 1976* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1976), p. 106.

succeeded in attracting an increasing number of enterprises; in 1974 there were 250 on the reservations.

As indicated in table 4 the industrial growth of Indian reservations proceeded swiftly from 1957–72, with the Indian labor force more than eight times greater in 1972 than it was a decade earlier. However, only 5 percent of the Indian labor force was employed in reservation factories during 1972. From 1972–74 Indian employment fell by one-sixth. The recession, which began in 1973, was primarily to blame for this situation. With many of these firms being marginal enterprises, a severe downturn in the national economy resulted in substantial layoffs among the Indian employees.

In recent years an increasing proportion of the workers in reservation factories have been non-Indian. This situation has occurred for two reasons. First, many of the expanding industrial plants have been located near the reservation boundaries. These firms recruit Indian workers residing on the reservations as well as non-Indians living elsewhere. Second, due to the high turnover and absenteeism of Indian employees, a few plants have found it necessary to reduce the number of Indians employed. For example, a manufacturer of styrofoam cups at the Gila River Reservation in Arizona claimed he had intended to hire only Indian labor, but found it too unstable and had to fill about half the work force with non-Indians. The manager stated that some Indians had quit and had been rehired ten times.[14] In a carpet mill located on the Crow Reservation in Montana, 60 percent of those Indians hired had quit within one year.[15] However, a large electronics plant on the Navajo Reservation reported that turnover had decreased from 8.8 percent in 1966 to 3.4 percent in 1971.[16]

Economic Development Administration programs

The Economic Development Administration (EDA) recognizes that one of the major barriers to industrial development is the lack of social overhead capital. Thus an important feature of the EDA program is grants of up to 50 percent for the costs of water, sewage disposal, and community building projects. In addition supplementary grants of up to 80 percent of project costs are permitted for distressed communities that have difficulty raising local matching funds.

The EDA also makes public works and business loans at below market interest rates. With regard to the latter, the borrower has 25 years to repay.

From 1966 to 1975 the EDA spent nearly $150 million on Indian reservations with the bulk of the funding for public works grants. Many of these grants have been utilized for the creation of industrial parks. For example in 1975 the Swinomish tribe in Washington received $313,000 for an industrial park and the Cherokee in Oklahoma received $196,000.

However, in spite of expenditures of nearly $150,000,000, including $17 million for industrial parks, not

14. Monroe E. Price and Reid P. Chambers, "The Role of the Interior Department in the Leasing of Indian Lands" (Unpublished paper, 1972), p. 117.

15. Bureau of Indian Affairs, Division of Employment Assistance, "Annual Statistical Summary, 1971," processed, p. 113.

16. Fay, *Employment Opportunities*, pp. 174–75.

more than 2,000 Indians are presently employed due to EDA efforts, including 1,213 working in industrial parks.[17] A 1975 survey indicated that of 3,487 acres of land available for plant sites in industrial parks, only 455 had been leased.[18]

Tribal assistance

Indian tribes provide several types of assistance to potential manufacturers. Tribal land is provided as an industrial site; and in many cases, a plant is built to employer specifications by the tribe at no cost to the firm. The building and grounds are leased to the company (Indian trust property cannot be sold to a non-Indian). These firms pay no property tax, because lands are held in trust by the federal government and treaties exempt them from this tax. Some tribes have provided capital by investing in industrial enterprises, with approximately $25 million being invested in 1971. The Indian Financing Act of 1974, which provided an additional $50 million[19] in guaranteed loans as well as subsidies to loans by private lenders, should stimulate an increase in commercial and industrial investment by the tribes.

The Indian Business Development Fund

The Indian Business Development Fund was initiated by the BIA in 1971 and received a 3.4 million dollar appropriation. The purpose of the program was to stimulate Indian entrepreneurship and employment by providing nonreimbursable capital grants to Indian individuals, tribes, and associations to establish Indian owned businesses. The IBDF grant was designed to provide the necessary equity financing to induce leaders to provide Indian business loans. The program has had enormous leverage in generating capital from customary lenders. Thus in 1971 nearly five dollars in loans was obtained for every dollar of grant money.[20]

During its first year of operation the program was quite successful generating over 3,000 Indian jobs at a cost of less than one-fourth the cost of EDA industrial development programs.[21] The program, in spite of its success, was suspended until 1974, when it was revived following passage of the Indian Financing Act. During 1975 it received an appropriation of $10 million.[22]

Agriculture

Three general categories of farming and ranching are significant sources of Indian income. Grazing which is the least intensive land usage, takes place on nearly 45 million acres of open and forest land; dry farming is practiced on 1.6 million acres, and 600,000 acres are irrigated.[23] Not only are large proportions of the most productive acreage

17. Economic Development Administration, "Indian Industrial Parks Funded by EDA" (Unpublished tabulation, January, 1976).

18. Ibid.

19. Levitan and Johnston, *Big Brothers Indian Programs*, p. 33.

20. Bureau of Indian Affairs, "Indian Business Development Fund: A Briefing Report," processed (April 1972), p. 4.

21. Bureau of Indian Affairs, "Indian Business Development Fund: A Briefing Report," processed (April 1972), p. 11.

22. Interview with Gordon Evans, Bureau of Indian Affairs, July 20, 1976. A 1972 survey indicates that there are 773 Indian-owned businesses employing 5,819 native Americans.

23. Levitan and Johnston, *Big Brothers Indian Programs*, p. 21.

leased to non-Indians, but the returns per acre are smaller on Indian operated farms than reservation farms owned or operated by non-Indians. Thus the dollar return per acre on grazing land is $2 for Indians and $6 for non-Indians; for row crops $96 per acre for Indians and $192 for non-Indians; and for hay, $38 per acre for Indians and $50 for non-Indians.[24]

In addition to poorer land quality, there are several reasons for lower productivity on Indian farms. One problem is that Indian management of farms tends to be inefficient. Poor planning and negligent care reduce Indian crop and livestock yields, in part because of inadequate education and technical assistance, but also because most tribes do not have agricultural traditions and have not adapted readily to farming and ranching. It is unfortunate that vocational agriculture was removed from the curriculum of Indian schools nearly 20 years ago.

Besides these problems of management, most Indians lack sufficient capital to make the investments in machinery, feed, fertilizer, and buildings that are necessary for efficient agriculture. Although the BIA operates a revolving farm loan fund, the level of appropriation is completely inadequate. About $12 million was available in 1973, while needs for agriculture were estimated at more than $89 million.[25]

In addition many Indian landholders are too small to be efficient. The chief obstacle to reallocating land in tracts of economic size is that land ownership has become quite fractionated over the years owing to the cumulative effects of the 1887 allotment act. This law provided that the federal government must hold land in trust for all heirs of deceased land owners, rather than assign it to one person or subdivide it. As a result, only two-fifths of allotted Indian lands have only one owner, and 17 percent have 11 or more.

Federal efforts to improve Indian agricultural productivity range from technical assistance in soil and water conservation to range management and legal assistance in the consolidation of divided landholdings. The most important efforts in terms of economic potential are irrigation projects. With 600,000 acres presently irrigated, the BIA estimated that another 400,000 could be profitably supplied with water. In 1973, the BIA spent $1.6 million on maintenance of irrigation systems and $16.8 million for the construction of new facilities, $10.2 million of which was earmarked for the large Navajo irrigation project in New Mexico.

Minerals

In recent years, most of the income from minerals has come from oil and gas leases, with much smaller revenues accruing from coal, asbestos, phosphate, uranium, vanadium, and copper. Mineral income is very unequally distributed with about nine reservations receiving 85 percent of the royalties from oil and gas.[26]

It is possible that Indian tribes will receive increasing income from mineral deposits. Recent energy

24. Ibid., p. 22.
25. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, *Department of the Interior and Related Agencies for 1975*, pt 4, 93rd Cong., 2nd sess., (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1973), pp. 244–45.
26. Levitan and Johnston, *Big Brothers Indian Programs*, p. 27.

shortages have intensified the search for fuel reserves, and the BIA has proposed a comprehensive survey of Indian mineral resources.

URBAN INDIAN DEVELOPMENT

Since the end of World War II more than 300,000 reservation Indians have left their communities and settled primarily in urban areas. In the cities they find adjustment difficult because of language problems, alien customs, and poor housing. In the last several years, about 80 Indian centers have been established to assist in finding jobs, housing, and social services provided by federal, state, and local government.[27] One of the major adjustment problems of urban indians results from their breaking of ties with both their Indian communities and the BIA.

An urban Indian project in Minneapolis–St. Paul, where nearly 10,000 Indians reside, focuses on improving Indian access to health facilities and services. With financial assistance from the Indian Health Service, the Indian Health Board of Minneapolis was established. It is a nonprofit corporation made up of 21 Indian organizations to determine what health resources are available and how to use them. Both state and county health departments have cooperated in the project. By taking the initiative, Indians in this Minneapolis project have located the individuals and groups who are able to solve some of the health problems of Indians living there.

27. Johnson, *American Indians in Transition*, p. 25.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 436, Mar. 1978

Indian Education Since 1960

By ROBERT J. HAVIGHURST

ABSTRACT: Since 1960 there has been a growing policy of Indian self-determination in the field of education of Indian youth. Two major federal government laws have put money behind this policy—The Indian Education Act (1972) and the Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act (1975). This leads to a policy of local self-determination for Indian tribes and Indian communities, and to greater responsibility of Indians as teachers and administrators. During this same period there has been a rapid expansion of the number of Indian students in college, most of them aided by government scholarship funds. There has also been a growth of schools on reservations, which are operated by local native school boards, with government funds.

There remains the question of the basic goal of the education of Indian youth—assimilation into the Anglo society or separate economic and social activity, based on tribal culture and tradition. Some form of cultural pluralism will be worked out, located between these two poles. The American Indian Policy Review Commission, established by Congress for the 1975–77 period, has recommended a maximum of self-determination for Indians in their economic, social, and educational life. For the next 20 years, it appears that the Indian tribes and communities will be finding their places in a permissive American society. However, the fact that more and more Indians are moving to large cities and trying to find a place in urban society, will tend to favor a degree of assimilation in the mainstream of economic and social life.

An especially important and significant situation is provided by the Alaska Native Land Claims Settlement, which gives Alaskan Eskimos, Aleuts, and Indians a relatively large amount of money and land in return for the oil and minerals

and land which has been and will be taken by the Anglo economy. Here, in contrast to nineteenth century dealings between the United States government and Indian tribes, the native Americans are receiving a fairly large amount of money and property, which goes to them as members of native corporations, or regional resident groups. What forms of personal and village or communal life will emerge from this situation?

Professor Robert J. Havighurst has been Professor of Education and Human Development at the University of Chicago since 1941. He has specialized in research in human development and behavior in a variety of societies, and at all age levels. His own research activities have combined methods of sociology, social anthropology, psychology, and education. Between 1942 and 1950, he devoted much of his time to studying the development of Indian children in six tribes of the Southwest and the Dakotas. From 1968 to 1971 he was Director of the National Study of Indian Education, financed by the U.S. Office of Education. Field work for this project was carried on by teams from seven universities studying 26 Indian communities and 39 schools.

THE EDUCATIONAL experience of American Indians saw greater change and greater growth in the period from 1960 to 1977 than had occurred in any earlier period. An official government policy of assimilation of Indians into the mainstream of American culture was changed to a policy of cultural pluralism.

Already, during the New Deal days of the 1930s, Congress had passed the Indian Reorganization Act, and John Collier, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, had worked effectively to increase the power of Indian tribes to govern themselves. Their elected tribal councils were given more powers of local self-government. Many more day schools on reservations were introduced, and they were expected to replace boarding schools. But educational change was at first slow to come. And there was a reaction in Congress against government economic assistance to Indian tribes during the 1950s, which resulted in termination of several reservations, including the relatively large and economically valuable Klamath and Menominee Reservations, a policy aimed to "get the government out of the Indian business." This closing of reservations and division of tribal property among the individual members of the tribe was aimed to encourage Indians to merge into the broader society.

Most Indian leaders and Indian tribes wanted self-determination, as tribes, but did not want to give up the rights and privileges they had in their tax-exempt reservation land. They looked to the new President, John F. Kennedy, who assumed office in 1960 for assistance. The Secretary of the Interior, Stewart Udall, in 1961 appointed a Task Force to advise him on Indian policy.

This was followed in 1966 by a White House Task Force on Indian Affairs, appointed by President Johnson. At that time Senator George McGovern of South Dakota introduced a concurrent resolution in the Congress which stressed a policy of Indian self-determination and economic development. In March 1968, President Johnson sent a message to Congress on Indian Affairs which stressed the government's policy of supporting a stronger Indian voice in Indian affairs, directed the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) to establish school boards at all federal schools, and created a National Commission on Indian Opportunity made up of Indian leaders. At this time the United States Senate appointed a Special Subcommittee on Indian Education, headed by Senator Robert Kennedy, and later by Senator Edward Kennedy. This committee had hearings for 18 months and issued a report urging increased Indian control over education.

Meanwhile, other events and publications relating to Indian affairs were going on: The American Indian Chicago Conference published *The Voice of the American Indian: Declaration of Indian Purpose* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1961); The Commission on Rights, Liberties, and Responsibilities of the American Indian, financed by the Fund for the Republic, of the Ford Foundation produced a report entitled *A Program for Indian Citizens* in 1961; and A National Study of Indian Education, financed by the U.S. Office of Education, directed by Professor Robert J. Havighurst of the University of Chicago, and involving teams from seven universities studying 26 Indian communities and 39 schools, was conducted from 1968 through 1970.

The 1970 Presidential Message on Indian Affairs

The almost complete official acceptance of a policy of self-determination was laid out in detail in President Nixon's message to Congress on July 8, 1970. Before this date there had been much action by individual tribes in their negotiations with the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Most thoroughgoing was the series of contracts made by the Zuni Tribe of New Mexico earlier in 1970, which empowered the tribe to administer all the programs formerly operated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The President's Message commences with such general statements as: "It is long past time that the Indian policies of the Federal Government began to recognize and build upon the capacities and insights of the Indian people." The main points of the Message are:

—The Indian tribes should have self-determination over their own affairs without termination of their reservation status and their tribal unity. The Indian tribes should have the right to control and operate federal programs, including schools;
—The federal government should assist financially in projects for economic development of Indian groups;
—A substantial increase in funding of the U.S. Public Health Service for Indians should be made; and
—Assistance to urban Indians through the operation of service centers in major cities should be forthcoming.

The Commissioners of Indian Affairs, who directed the Bureau of Indian Affairs, under Presidents Johnson and his successors were

for the first time Indians: Robert Bennett, a member of the Oneida Tribe; Louis R. Bruce, Mohawk-Sioux; Morris Thompson, Athabascan from Alaska; and Forrest Gerrard, Blackfeet.

Cultural pluralism as the basic policy

Education of Indians since 1965 has been powerfully influenced by the broad policy, known as cultural pluralism, which has dominated American interethnic relations. More in the limelight have been the forces working for recognition of the rights and privileges of the two largest ethnic groups—the blacks and the Spanish-origin people. There has also been a rising chorus of voices of European ethnic groups from the east and south of Europe—the Poles, Slavs, Italians, and Greeks. These movements have been antagonistic toward the melting pot ideal which would reduce ethnic differences in America. They have advocated, instead, cultural pluralism, which has three principal characteristics:

1. Mutual respect and appreciation for each cultural group by other groups.
2. Collaboration in government and economic affairs of the country.
3. Self-determination in all matters of importance, as far as possible, and without infringing the rights of other groups.

On a line extending from the extreme of the melting pot at one end and ethnic separatism at the other end, cultural pluralism falls somewhere toward the middle, with the exact location depending on the wishes of the people of a given group, and some assessment on their part of the advantages and the disadvantages of one or another position on the line.

The educational program wanted by a particular ethnic subgroup depends on the solution it works out for itself on the scale of cultural pluralism. Most cultural subgroups have differences of opinion and differences of interest within their ranks with respect to the most desirable solution. There generally is a trade-off between income and economic advantages on the one side, and close harmony of ethnic identity on the other side. The principal issues and problems with respect to education for native Americans lie in their efforts to work out a viable position on the cultural pluralism continuum.

STATUS OF NATIVE AMERICAN EDUCATION AS OF 1970–78

Since 1960 there has been a rapid growth of school and college enrollments of Indian youth, together with tentative movements toward greater initiative and responsibility by Indian communities for the administration of their schools. An example of what this policy signified to a responsible Indian leader is given in the following statement by the former Tribal Chairman of the Northern Cheyenne, Mr. John Woodenlegs, in 1970:

> For over a year I have spent most of my time working on education, serving as a member of the National Indian Education Advisory Committee, as an education field worker for the American Association on Indian Affairs, as a member of one public school board, and an ex-officio member of an advisory school board.
>
> Our goals have been:
>
> 1. To educate our schools and the local communities to the idea of community

schools, serving the needs of the local people over and above daily education of children.

2. To encourage parents to be more concerned and involved with the schools, including active membership on school boards.
3. To help teachers get more knowledge of the Cheyennes, their past history and culture and present life.
4. To encourage Cheyenne resource people to go into classrooms to talk on history and culture.

We feel our children need education which gives the best of both cultures. We feel that many of the values of our past Cheyenne society can still serve us well in this modern world. We feel we need this to give us understanding and pride in our past, just as other Americans learn their history for the same reason.[1]

Types of schools attended by Indian youth

In 1978 there are about 275,000 Indians aged 6–17, inclusive, and about 90 percent of them are enrolled in school. There are four categories or types of schools. Except for the first category, these are not official and there are no official data on the numbers of students, but they can be estimated with reasonable accuracy. The types, with numbers of Indian pupils, are:[2]

	Enrollment	Percent of Total Group
A. Schools with practically all-Indian enrollment:	47,000	17
BIA-operated boarding and day schools;		
Indian-Controlled School Boards:		
Contract with BIA (estimated)	2,500	1
Mission or other private schools	9,000	3
Public schools operating on or contiguous to reservations	30,000	11
B. Public Schools with 50 to 90 percent Indian enrollment:		
Contiguous to Indian reservations or in native communities	105,000	38
C. Public schools with 10 to 50 percent Indian enrollment:		
Mainly in rural communities and small cities	50,000	18
D. Public schools with 1 to 10 percent Indian enrollment:		
Mainly in large cities	30,000	11

Thus the educational picture is very complicated. But one thing should be clear. Practically all native Americans between the ages of 6 and 17 inclusive have access to schools and attend schools almost as fully, in terms of proportions attending school by age, as do the

1. Estelle Fuchs and Robert J. Havighurst, *To Live on This Earth. American Indian Education* (Garden City, N.Y. Doubleday, 1972), p. 20.

2. Here and elsewhere in this article we include Alaskan Eskimos and Aleuts in the numbers, and sometimes we speak of native Americans to remind ourselves that we do include approximately 7,000 Aleuts,

Anglos, the Spanish descent groups, and the blacks. The proportion of Indians who graduate from high school is smaller than the proportion of all American students, but this is more a matter of socioeconomic status than of ethnicity, and the proportion of Indians graduating from high school is approximately the same as the proportions of other ethnic groups which have a similar socioeconomic or income composition.

School achievement and mental ability of Indian youth

On standard tests of school achievement, Indian pupils fall below national averages, as a group. Starting with the third grade, Indian pupils achieve at a level about one year below national averages; and they achieve about two years below national averages at the senior high school ages. This relatively low academic achievement is not because Indian children are less intelligent than white children. Several studies based on intelligence tests which do not require reading ability show Indian children to be at or slightly above the level of white children.

For example, on the Goodenough Draw-a-Man Intelligence Test, which is a test of mental alertness that does not require language facility, Indian children show about the same level of achievement as white children. The 1,700 Indian children who took this test in 1969 under the auspices of the National Study of American Indian Education showed an average IQ of 101.5 which is slightly superior to the average of white children. On the Grace Arthur Performance Test of Intelligence (a battery of nonverbal tests), in a study made in 1942, a representative sample of Indian pupils from six tribes showed an average IQ score of 100.2. As part of the latter study, a group of 30 Sioux pupils on the Pine Ridge Reservation showed an average IQ score of 102.8, but the same group tested a year later with the Kuhlmann-Anderson, a verbal test requiring reading ability, showed an average IQ score of 82.5.[3]

There is abundant evidence that the school achievement of children depends to a large extent on their experience in their family and their local community or neighborhood. If their parents read widely, read to them, use large vocabularies while conversing at home, take them to museums, provide children's encyclopedias in the home, and set examples of educated behavior, the children will generally follow in their footsteps. On the other hand if the parents do not read or read very little, do not speak English, do not use complex sentences or express themselves in complicated ways, their children are likely to be slow in learning to read English and consequently retarded in the other school subjects. They are even more likely to achieve poorly in school if they live in a community or neighborhood characterized by poverty.

Teachers of Indian pupils

Since the majority of Indian pupils attend public schools with white

28,000 Eskimos, and 16,000 Indians, in Alaska, from the 1970 census. This is especially important, from the point of view of cultural pluralism, since these three groups have very different cultures and languages. The Eskimos and Indians have a number of different tribes or subgroups.

3. Fuchs and Havighurst, *To Live on This Earth*, chaps, 4 and 5.

pupils and are taught in classes with white children, both groups have the same teachers. These are probably a cross-section of teachers in the small cities and rural parts of the country west of the Mississippi, and a similar cross-section of teachers in the 20 or more big cities that have relatively large Indian populations.

However, the schools operated by the Bureau of Indian Affairs have about 1,800 teachers who have passed a federal civil service examination and have been assigned to BIA schools. The BIA made a study of its teachers in 1968, from which the following facts are drawn. There were 1,772 teachers, 61 percent women. Among the teachers, 15 percent were Indian. Salaries in 1968 ranged from $6,176 to $15,119, depending on amount of training, standing in university class, and amount of teacher experience. These teachers are on duty for 12 months, with the three summer months taken up with in-service education, student home visits, preparation for the following year, and vacation. Employment in Alaska is accompanied by a 25 percent cost of living supplement.

Indian teachers tend to stay longer in service than non-Indians. It is likely that substantially more Indians will seek teaching jobs, both in BIA schools and in local public schools, as their numbers of college graduates increase. Of school administrators in BIA schools, 28 percent are Indian.

Postsecondary education of Indians

There has been a very rapid increase in the numbers of Indian youth who enter a university and who finish a four-year course. Before about 1960, the number who completed high school was small, and most of them did not go on to college. A substantial fraction went into a one- to two-year vocational training program such as that of the Haskell Institute, maintained by the Bureau of Indian Affairs at Lawrence, Kansas. The Institute provided secretarial and trade training, and its graduates had a good record of employment.

After 1960, larger proportions of Indian youth began to attend postsecondary institutions. This proportion probably multiplied fivefold between 1960 and 1970. Approximately 8,000 Indian students were in universities or postsecondary colleges in 1970. This constituted about 12 percent of the number in the Indian age group from 18 through 21. At that date, about 35 percent of an age group finished secondary school, 20 percent entered a university level institution and another 10 percent entered a postsecondary institution for vocational training; and 5 percent graduated from universities with a bachelor's degree based on four years of study. These are all rather high figures, compared with other American groups with low family incomes. A major reason was the availability of money to help pay for this kind of education—money provided both by the federal government and by a number of tribal councils. The BIA in 1969 awarded scholarship grants to 3,432 young people, with an average of $868 per student. By 1975 the number of scholarship awards had increased to 15,000 with an average of $1,750 per student. In that year there were 1,497 graduates from four-year colleges who had received BIA scholarships. Of this number, 335 had been trained for teaching, and 198 for health service work. The BIA had a record of 48 Indian studies

programs in as many colleges and universities in 1971. The following institutions all had fifty or more Indian students per year in the period 1966–70: University of Alaska, Northern Arizona University (Flagstaff), Fort Lewis College (Colorado), University of New Mexico, Phoenix (Arizona) Community College, Pembroke State University (North Carolina), University of Montana, Northern Montana College, Central Washington State College, Northeastern State College of Oklahoma, Brigham Young University (Utah), and the Navaho Community College.

The Navaho Community College is a creation of the Navaho tribe, and is not supported financially by the federal government. Founded in 1968, the College has been built amid sage brush, pinon and juniper trees on the arid Arizona landscape, with the Lukachukai Mountains in the background. Navaho Community College accepts and recognizes the reality of and the persistence of Indian culture and institutions. It holds that uniquely Indian values, skills, and insights are highly functional in the modern world today, and, just as Indian knowledge contributed to the survival of European settlers in the New World, so today, Indians have much to contribute to the survival of American and world society. Navaho Community College is based upon the assumption that not only is it possible for Navahos to direct and control their own institutions, but that this is the only way they ever will be able to assume total responsibility and self-support, at least as a group.

The College is ruled by a Board of Regents consisting of ten Navahos, one from each of the five administrative areas of the Reservation, two members elected at large and appointed by the Tribal Chairman, and three members ex officio: the chairman of the tribe, the chairman of the Navaho Education Committee, and the president of the college student body. The Indian faculty members have organized a Curriculum Committee to search out and formulate a Navaho philosophy of education, in which the present and future are rooted in the values of the traditional past. Ned A. Hatathli, first president of the College, said,

> If we can blend these and come up with a philosophy this would be a stepping stone for the Navaho tribe. There is something good in Navaho values, in their way of rearing children. The Navaho have existed for centuries and we have seen the growth of the people. Medicine men, the elders, are helping us search for the things that have sustained the Navaho.[4]

A further impetus to higher education for Indians came in 1976, when $500,000 was provided for 50 fellowships for students who had been accepted for professional study by universities. This money comes from the Indian Education Act, and has been allocated for the academic year of 1976–77 to cover tuition costs and subsistence for students who have been accepted for programs in engineering, law, medicine, business, forestry, and fields related to one of these areas. The fellowships will be continued for four years of study for successful students.

CONTEMPORARY EDUCATIONAL ISSUES

Early in the 1970s, the federal government provided funds which would assist native Americans to re-

4. Ibid., p. 288.

form and direct their educational systems. The Indian Education Act of 1972 and its successor, the Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act of 1975 provide money and require Indian direction and Indian responsibility for the design of program. The Bilingual Education Act, part of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act since 1967, provides funds for the employment of teaching staff who speak the local home language in Indian and Eskimo communities.

The Indian community is itself divided on the kind of education it wants for Indian youth, recognizing that Indian-oriented education is central to the establishment and maintenance of a viable cultural pluralism. The two extremes of assimilation and separatism have their proponents. For example, an exchange between Robert A. Manners and John Collier was published in the journal *Indigena*, which enabled Manners to state forcefully the case for assimilation. He wrote: "The aim should be not to protect the American Indians against the risks to which most white members of our society are subject, but to elevate them to a status and a competence in which they are equipped to face those risks with the same chances of 'success' as the whites. . . ." We should "provide the Indian with the tools he will need for voluntary assimilation."[5]

At the opposite pole, we have strong Indian voices arguing against "Anglo-conformity," and for Indian self-determination. One of the most eloquent was that of Clyde Warrior, a Ponca living in Oklahoma, and President of the National Indian Youth Council, speaking in 1967:

> Perhaps, the National Indian Youth Council's real criticism is against a structure created by bureaucratic administrators who are caught in this American myth that all people assimilate into American society, that economics dictates assimilation and integration. From the experience of the National Indian Youth Council, and in reality, we cannot emphasize and recommend strongly enough the fact that no one integrates and disappears into American society. What ethnic groups do is not integrate into American society and economy individually, but enter into the mainstream of American society as a people, and in particular as communities of people. The solution to Indian poverty is not "government programs" but in the competence of the person and his people. The real solution to poverty is encouraging the competence of the community as a whole.
>
> [The] National Indian Youth Council recommends for "openers" that to really give these people "the poor, the dispossessed, the Indians," complete freedom and responsibility is to let it become a reality, not a much-heard-about dream and let the poor decide for once, what is best for themselves. . . .[6]

In another vein, there is a growing number of Indian and Eskimo teachers who are teaching in native communities where the home language is not English and where there is a local community desire to preserve the traditional way of life, including the language. The writer experienced this directly when teaching at the University of Alaska, where some Eskimo village school teachers were working for a University degree. For them, an

5 Robert A. Manners and John Collier, "Pluralism and the American Indian," in *The North American Indians. A Sourcebook*, eds. Roger C. Owen, James J. F. Deetz, and Anthony D. Fisher (New York. Macmillan, 1967).

6. Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., ed., *Red Power. The American Indians Fight for Freedom* (New York: American Heritage Press, 1971), p. 77

Eskimo language was essential as the language of instruction in the village school, and as a means of preserving and maintaining the Eskimo culture. They, personally, had been subjected to an Anglo-dominated educational program, with the problems that arose from having teachers who did not understand their language or their culture.

Self-determination of educational program as the dominant policy

In 1975 the Congress created the American Indian Policy Review Commission and instructed it to formulate a perspective on the status of American Indians in the United States. The Commission made its final report in the summer of 1977. The five Indian leaders and six members of Congress on the Commission were:

Indian Commissioners
John Borbridge, Jr., Tlingit-Haida
Louis Bruce, Mohawk, Oglala Sioux
Ada Deer, Menominee
Adolph Dial, Lumbee
Jake Whitecrow, Quapaw, Seneca-Cayuga

Members of Congress
James Abourezk, South Dakota
Lloyd Meeds, Washington
Lee Metcalf, Montana
Mark O. Hatfield, Oregon
Sidney R. Yates, Illinois
Sam Steiger, Arizona

The work of the Commission was done by eleven task forces, including one on Indian education, which consisted of four Indian educators and staff members.

The Commission recommended that all government-aided Indian programs should be brought together under a federal Indian Department or independent agency, *reporting to the Office of the President. The Congress should enact legislation that would aid tribal* governments and Indian communities to take responsibility for control of education in accordance with their desires. Among other objectives is that of recruiting and training Indians to serve as teachers in practically all schools with a predominantly Indian enrollment.

Initiative has already been taken by several hundred Indian organizations which have sought and received money from the federal government for educational programs. For example, under the Indian Education Act and for fiscal year 1976, approximately $18 million was given to school and tribal education projects in the form of 210 separate grants, aimed to supplement existing education programs and to train Indian personnel for work in the schools.

This amplifies the program which was started in the late 1960s, whereby the Bureau of Indian Affairs contracted with a local Indian school board on a reservation to give the money that would have gone to pay expenses of a BIA-operated school to the Indian Board which would take responsibility for the school. The first and best-known of these contract schools is the Rough Rock School on the Navaho Reservation. This school is governed by a five-person school board, all Navahos, with only one having any schooling. The school starts teaching in the Navaho language, and devotes a good deal of attention to Navaho tradition and Navaho arts. John Dick, one of the first school board members, said:

> We want our children to be proud of being Navajos. We want them to know who they are. . . . In the future they will have to be able to make many

choices and do many different things. They need a modern education to make their way, but they have to know both worlds—and being Navajo will give them strength.[7]

By 1975 there were 15 of these Indian-contracted school boards, which had banded together into a Coalition of Indian Controlled School Boards.

The Alaska native land claims and education

December 18, 1971 marked the most comprehensive and favorable legal settlement of native people's claims to land and its resources yet seen—the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act. The educational implications and results of this Act have profound significance for Alaskan natives and for the question of the viability of a policy of cultural pluralism for Indians.

Here, for the first time, very large economic resources are placed in the hands of native people with very few external controls over the way they use those resources. The United States Congress recognized the right of Alaskan natives to land and mineral resources, restored 40 million acres of land to native ownership, and promised to pay $962.5 million for land taken over by the state and federal governments. There are approximately 55,000 Eskimos, Aleuts, and Indians living in Alaska, and another 20,000 living outside of Alaska, having one-fourth or more Alaska Indian, Aleut, or Eskimo ancestry. As of the date of passage of the Act, there were approximately 76,500 "Alaskan natives" of all ages entitled to equal shares of the land and money. These people as individuals will not receive large money grants. Over the 20-year period from 1971 to 1991, most of them will receive less than $1,500 apiece. The valuable thing they receive is 100 shares in one of 12 Native Regional Corporations which take title to the land and which keep for investment purposes 90 percent of the money paid under the Act. Also, the Regional Corporations must distribute almost half of their income to some 200 native villages which will form corporations to select land, possibly invest money, or use money income to provide services to village residents.

The Regional Corporations were formed as quickly as possible after the passage of the Act, and have been using the approximately $200 million they received from the government in the first five years to invest in productive enterprises such as hotels, supermarkets, mineral exploration, reindeer herds, and fish canneries. The stock in the Regional Corporations cannot be sold in the market until 1991, 20 years after the passage of the Act. At that time, the youngest stock holder will be 20 years old (having been born on or before the day of the passage of the Act by Congress). The money value of the stock will then depend on the investment experience of the corporations, just as it does for any other business corporation. Since every Indian, Aleut, and Eskimo in Alaska has become a "capitalist" by virtue of the Act, there will be a need to understand this complicated process. One educational consequence has been the publication of a high school textbook, *Alaska Native Land Claims*, by economist-educator Robert D. Arnold, sponsored by the Alaska Native Foundation.

Educational effects of the Act are

7 Fuchs and Havighurst, *To Live on This Earth*, p. 253.

already seen in the training of employees of the Regional and Village Corporations, in the Corporations' selection of officers who have some business or technological experience or training. Several vocational schools have come into existence—such as the school at Barrow, farthest north settlement in the United States, and capital city of the Arctic Slope Regional Corporation. Furthermore, an Eskimo university, Inupiaq University, was founded at Barrow, to serve as a kind of community college, with representatives in a dozen villages on the Arctic Slope. Correspondence courses are offered for those who cannot get to classes.

Informed opinion is divided concerning the educational consequences of the Land Claims Settlement. Some say they will result inevitably in the assimilation of the Alaska native people into the economic and cultural mainstream. Others say that the Eskimo culture, with its emphasis on community action and cooperation, will be active in the form of a cooperative society culture, and that the Eskimo language will be kept alive in the villages, which will not grow very much because life in them requires hunting, fishing, and adjustment to the arctic climate, a life style which few Anglos will choose.

In the upper Yukon River region, inhabited by Athabaskan Indians, the Tanana Chiefs Conference is an organization of tribal leaders with headquarters at Tanana, on the Yukon. They have organized two educational projects in response to the Land Claims Act. One is the Tanana Chiefs Land Claims College, to help villagers work effectively with the resources of the Act; the other is the Tanana Chiefs Survival School, aimed at working for the maintenance of the Athabaskan culture.

Bilingual programs and issues

The Bilingual Education Act has a major application in Indian education. It emphasizes the use of the child's home language in his learning to read. Since he already has a speaking vocabulary in his home language, he can learn to read this language without the difficulty of having to learn a new vocabulary at the same time. This sensible procedure has been used with Navaho children, where there has been a Navaho orthography (set of signs for the sounds of the language) for some years, and children's books have been printed in Navaho. With this method, Navaho pupils can progress in reading as rapidly as Anglo pupils can. Soon after entering school, Navaho students start to learn English as a second language, just as Anglo pupils might commence to study Spanish or French in the elementary school. The goal of this method is to teach reading efficiently, and, at the same time, enable the pupil to see that his home language is of value in the school.

For Indian children who speak English at home, the tribal language is treated as a second language to be learned after the pupil has been using English in the school. This has as its basic aim the teaching of respect and familiarity with the native culture and tradition. In an English-speaking community, bilingual education means having bilingual teachers who accept whatever language the child seems to prefer and who will begin a program of the native language, as a second language, when students are nine or ten years old. On the other hand,

if the native language predominates in the local community, a bilingual program tends to emphasize English in the school after children have reached the age of nine or ten.

Courses in Indian history and culture

Nearly everybody working in the field of Indian education favors the study of Indian history and culture in the elementary school and junior high school curriculum. This is thought to be effective in promoting mutual understanding and appreciation of the various native cultures by the bearers of the various cultures. However, there are some problems.

Where there is primary concern for helping Indian youth to understand and appreciate their own tribal history and culture, reading material that deals explicitly with the local tribe, if the tribe maintains a collection of such materials, as many Indian tribes do, is of great importance. Such material can be supplemented by bringing pupils into contact with elders of the tribe, who can tell stories and exhibit crafts which they have practiced. This may be called the "ethnocentric approach" to teaching the local history and culture. In schools where the Indian pupils are in a majority this approach turns out well, especially if native teachers, who are increasing in numbers, are in charge.

However, there is a serious problem of teaching general Indian history and cultures accurately and with enough detail to make the material interesting and effective with respect to "understanding and appreciation" for Anglo pupils and for the wide variety of native American tribes. Very few history or social studies text books for use in the middle school grades or the high school give accurate and balanced information. The National Study of American Indian Education commented as follows:

> . . . One author, after examining more than a hundred history texts, concluded that the American Indians have been obliterated, defamed, disparaged, and disembodied. The notion of the blood-curdling, perilous, massacring savage is common[8]

The writing and production of scrupulously honest textbooks are of prime importance.

The 1977 frontier of Indian education

We have noted that approximately 30 percent of Indian youth are in schools where they are in the minority—often a small minority. There is no likelihood that this proportion will decrease; it will probably increase. Whether these young people become Indian-Americans or mainstream Americans will depend somewhat on the quality of the education they experience. The Indian Education Act makes money available for educational programs in such communities. Whether the local school board tries to do anything for these youth, as Indians, will depend largely upon initiative taken by Indian adults and others who are interested in cultural pluralism.

With respect to the 70 percent of Indian youth in communities where Indians are the largest cultural group, Indians are gaining greater control over programs and policies. They will have to decide how far the schools should go in pushing Indian youth toward assimilation into the dominant culture. They will

8. Ibid., p. 216

have to decide how the native languages should be treated in the schools, and how much attention should be given to the history and culture of Indians and of the local tribe.

The policy of the federal government, and the policies of state and local school districts, will be to maintain schools which encourage freedom of choice for Indians. This is stated clearly in the 1975 Indian Self-Determination and Educational Assistance Act. That is, Indian tribes and Indian individuals will be encouraged to make the decisions that determine their future, supported somewhat better than they have been in the past by the wider society in which they live.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 436, Mar. 1978

Religion Among American Indians

By MURRAY L. WAX AND ROSALIE H. WAX

ABSTRACT: The traditional worldview of North American Indians is outlined as a basis for explicating the central tribal ceremonials and for comprehending the tribal response to prolonged missionization from Christian denominations. The missionaries operated in a context of authoritarian superiority, and most conceived of themselves as bearing civilization, rather than a plain scriptural message; hence, there was little concern to modify Euro-Christianity to fit with native rituals and values. Today, most Indians are Christians, at least nominally; but, in many cases, the Christianity is integrated with the native worldview, and the individual participates in a variety of both Christian and neotraditional rituals. The destructive impact of the European invasions stimulated millenarian movements, such as the Ghost Dance; the continued vitality of these movements was expressed in the recent occupation of Wounded Knee, which should be comprehended as a religious, rather than a political, action. The Peyote Cult, organized as the Native American Church, constitutes a syncretism of Christian and traditional rites and attitudes, and it is widespread as intertribal and pan-Indian. Further pan-Indian, neotraditional, revivalistic, and millenarian movements may be anticipated.

Murray L. Wax and Rosalie H. Wax are professors in the Departments of Sociology and Anthropology, Washington University at St. Louis. Together, they have performed major field research projects with the Oglala Sioux of Pine Ridge and the Tribal Cherokee of eastern Oklahoma; they have also worked with various other tribal and national Indian groupings. Their joint fieldwork and Rosalie Wax's work earlier in the relocation centers where the Japanese-Americans were confined during World War II are described frankly in her book Doing Fieldwork: Warnings and Advice *(University of Chicago Press). In addition to the area of religion, magic, and worldview, their interests also include the study of education and the ethical and methodological problems of fieldwork.*

SUCCESSIVELY, we discuss traditional worldview and ceremonials, Christian missionization, the consequent religious system upon a modern Plains reservation, Indian millenarianism, and the Peyote cult. The reader is reminded that the traditional religious system of any one tribe, such as the Navajo, Iroquois, or Pawnee, could easily require several monographs for elucidation; the modern system of such a tribe could require another several. Restricted, as we are, to the brief compass of this essay, we must omit, compress, and cite selectively. If the several pieces of the essay do not fit together as neatly as we should like, and if our coverage of religious matters is far from complete, this but reflects the diversity among tribal groups, the heterogeneity within what were once religiously and culturally homogeneous communities, and the overall complexity of the subject matter.

We have tended to illustrate and develop our arguments from among the tribal groups we know best, because it is for those that we can make the most accurate judgments as to the reliability and significance of the ethnohistorical and ethnographic sources. In particular, we refer most often to the Oglala Sioux (or Teton Dakota) of the Pine Ridge Reservation, while making occasional references to the Pawnee and to the Cherokee. We believe that this consistency of focus will help the reader, even though we realize that the resultant coverage is less than encyclopedic. While details of religious systems have varied and continue to vary among the tribes of North America, nonetheless kindred social and religious processes have been at work during the years, and we hope that our presentation will have the virtue of exhibiting common themes.

TRADITIONAL WORLDVIEW AND RELIGIOUS CEREMONIALS

As viewed by the traditional Indian, the world was composed of a variety of sentient beings who were responsive socially and emotionally to the conduct of humans. Unlike the scientistic Western vision, which perceives man as if he were part of a system of molecular structures amidst a universe of other such structures, all governed by abstract laws of physical reaction, the Indian view was of a world inhabited by beings. The Lakota word, *oyate*, seems to designate "people," but "includes not only man but each blade of grass and leaf and living creature on this earth." Thus, as the Buffalo Virgin Calf instructed the Sioux, when she gave them the sacred pipe, "All these people and all these things are joined to you who smoke the pipe—all send their voices to Wakan Tanka. When you pray with this pipe, you pray for and with everything."[1] "Everything" could include, not only living things—plants and animals—but even rocks and other entities which modern Western man considers as inanimate, that is without soul or spirit.

The myths, or holy tales, of the Pawnee depict the animals as if they were different tribes of human beings. When a human hero encounters an animal, the two may converse, share a pipe, perform a ritual, or engage in a contest. If the hero and the animal are of opposite sex, they may marry, establish a household, and have children. Several Pawnee stories describe how human

1. Joseph Epes Brown, ed., *The Sacred Pipe: Black Elk's Account of the Seven Rites of the Oglala Sioux* (Baltimore, Md. Penguin Books, 1972), pp. 6–7; Gayla Twiss, "The Role of the Pipe in Dakota Religion," *Pine Ridge Research Bulletin*, no. 10 (August 1969), p. 11.

beings came to hunt the buffalo (bison); this is never presented as a technological achievement (involving horses, bows and arrows, or guns), but as a social treaty arising from such adventures as a marriage between a human and a buffalo cow, followed by a ritual contest between the human and the protagonists of the buffalo people:

A witch-woman and her grandson live on the prairie. Although he is a great hunter, she is a cannibal and prefers the delicate flesh of human beings. The buffalo are angered at this slaughter of man, and they send two young cows to lure the boy to them so that they might kill him. When the trio reach the herd, the boy finds them all hostile, except for one wise chief who knows that he has acted at the behest of his grandmother and has not himself partaken of human flesh. There are now contests between the boy, aided by a small friendly faction of buffalo, and the hostile majority. The magic and strength of the boy and his helpers prove the more potent: he can blow smoke higher; he can drink more; and he can run faster.

Enraged by their defeat, the hostile faction attacks the boy, but his grandmother and her dogs now come to his aid. She tastes buffalo meat and finds it superior to human. They separate: she going north, bearing seeds and agricultural implements, he going south to become a warrior.

The buffalo hold a great council: "The people will live and they will kill many buffalo and eat of our meat. . . . In all things we were beaten by the boy. In smoking the boy beat us, so the people will do the smoking, and they will send us only whiffs of smoke.

In drinking of the water from the pond, the boy was given horns to help him drink the water; so from this time the people shall make spoons from our horns, and eat with them. . . ."[2]

2. Condensed from "The Cannibal Witch and the Boy Who Conquered the Buffalo," in *The Pawnee. Mythology*, ed. George A. Dorsey (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Institution, Publication no. 59, 1906), pp. 72–82

The various tribes (or species) of beings, and the different individuals among them, each may possess distinctive kinds of power. (In Shakespearian English, it would have been spoken of as virtue, an inherent power or efficacy, as in a phrase such as "a medicine of great virtue.") In many North American myths, beaver and loons were thought to have great therapeutic powers, while eagles had great powers of vision, mice had powers for stealth and concealment, and so on. Such powers were not a simple by-product of physiology, but were sustained by ritual and could be transferred from being to being. Thus, many tribes, especially of the Plains, had a Vision Quest, in which an individual would isolate himself, perhaps on a hilltop, where he would fast and pray for as many as four days and nights; in some cases he would mutilate or scarify himself. If he were fortunate, he would experience a vision; and, if he were especially fortunate, in the vision he would encounter a being who would become a spiritual helper, granting him some particular kind of power that might assist him in warfare, or healing, or gambling, or love. By such a vision, a great runner might have acquired power from horses or wolves; a person gifted at finding lost objects might have acquired power from eagles or hawks; while a great buffalo hunter might have acquired from that species the gift of calling them and bringing a herd to himself.[3]

3 Descriptions of *hanble ceya* ("crying for a dream"), the ritual of crying for a vision among the Oglala Sioux, may be found in Stephen E. Feraca, *Wakinyan: Contemporary Teton Dakota Religion*, Studies in Plains Anthropology and History, no. 2 (Browning, Montana. Museum of the Plains Indian, 1963), pp. 20–25; also in Brown, *The Sacred Pipe* pp. 44–66. Feraca has read this manuscript and noted several errors, which we have corrected, we are grateful to him for his coun-

To modern Americans, the foregoing depiction of an animate world with a dynamic of power may sound mystic, and there may be a tendency to associate power with the more dramatic and unusual of natural events. In opposition to this view, it should be emphasized that for the traditional Indian, any variety of prosperity or success was a manifestation of some particular kind of power: a healthy birth; a successful hunt; a profitable war party; a winning streak at gambling; a good harvest. Good health and vitality were manifestations of power; illness and weakness were signs of the absence of power, or that some being was directing its power against one's self. Consequently, therapy was not a matter of readjusting the homeostatic equilibrium of the biochemical organism, but a matter of reestablishing harmonious relationships between the afflicted person and the human and other beings of his environment (note the comments about the RedBird Smith movement among the Cherokee).

The conceptual fashions and developments of the 1960s have in some ways assisted the communication of this traditional worldview, but in other ways they have muddied Western perceptions. Thus, the emphasis upon altering or expanding consciousness, or upon "finding the self," whether through drugs or rituals, misdirects our attention. The young man on a Vision Quest was not seeking to enlarge his consciousness; he sought a vision in order to establish a relationship that would confer power; and he sought power because only by possessing power could he become an adult of stature and respect. The man (or woman) who vowed to participate in the Sun Dance, and who then prayed, fasted, danced, and tortured him (or her) self during the several days of its performance, would be seeking to restore or maintain health and prosperity to family and kin.

The theology of this traditional world is addressed to the notion of maintaining a proper balance and harmony among its beings and powers. Thus, many peoples had great annual ceremonials which were designed to replicate—or move the world toward—the organization that it was given by the deities cosmogenically. From the revered Pawnee priest, Running Scout, Dorsey collected a poetic account of the creation, with similarities to the opening paragraphs of Genesis:

> In the beginning was Tirawahut (the Universe-and-Everything-Inside); and the chief in Tirawahut was Tirawa, the All-Powerful, and his spouse was Atira (Vault-of-the-Sky). Around them sat the gods in council. Then Tirawa told them where they should stand. . . .
>
> Each of you gods I am to station in the heavens; and each of you shall receive certain powers from me, for I am about to create people who shall be like myself. They shall be under your care. I will give them your land to live upon, and with your assistance they shall be cared for. You (pointing to Sakuru, the Sun) shall stand in the east. You shall give light, and warmth, to all beings and to earth. . . . Teuperekata, Bright-Star (Evening Star), you shall stand in the west. You shall be known as Mother of all things, for through you all beings shall be created.

After the gods are assigned their stations and duties, the earth and its beings are created by the joint activity of the gods under the leadership of Tirawa, and first man and first woman set upon it. They multiply and the people number many vil-

---

sel, while occasionally deviating from his interpretations of contemporary religions among the Oglala Sioux.

lages. Eventually, almost all the villages are called together for a great ceremony led by the priests:

> Mother Bright-Star told this man that now they were to hold a ceremony in imitation of Tirawa, when he first made up his mind to make earth, people, and animals to live on the earth; that the gods who sat in council with him had been given certain stations in the heavens; that each of these bundles was to be dedicated to those certain gods, stars in the heavens; and that in this ceremony they were to have the same relative positions as the gods in the heavens, who had given them the bundles. . . .

And so the people replicate the great actions of creation.[4]

This tale, concerns, not merely blessings (or magical power), which culture heroes have received from divine and other beings, but the proper, harmonious structure or pattern of the universe, most strikingly illustrated by Tirawa's stationing of the stellar deities. Narrowly conceived, the purpose of the rite is the symbolic recreation of the situation described in the myth, where the hero obtained magical power, so that ritual participants may now be blessed, as was he. Broadly conceived, as might a philosophically minded Pawnee, the purpose is to recreate a desirable pattern of relationships among the beings of the universe—human, divine, and other—so that each may give to the others. In an unpublished manuscript Dorsey, himself, interpreted all Skidi Pawnee ceremonies as having a significance much like the broader one we have inferred from his data: "In theory the Skidi Pawnee ceremonies all have as their object the performance either through drama or through ritual of the acts which were performed in the mythological age."[5]

To Dorsey's words, we would add only that "performance" must not be understood as if it were imitation or commemoration but rather as re-presentation. The performance is not a play-acting of a past, it is the re-creation now of the harmonious order of the universe.[6]

CHRISTIAN MISSIONIZATION

From the sixteenth century, when the Spanish brought Roman Catholic missionaries into the Caribbean, until the present date, the Indians of North America have been the repeated target of Christian missions. Catholic missionaries accompanied the Spanish into Mexico and New Mexico, where they proselytized the Pueblo peoples; they also accompanied the French explorers, traders, and trappers into northeastern North America, up the St. Lawrence River and across the Great Lakes onto the prairies. Russian missionaries of Greek Orthodox faith labored among the Indians and Eskimo of Alaska, until it was purchased by the United States. Moravians, Methodists, and Baptists were working among the tribes of the Southeast early in the nineteenth century. And more recent decades have seen intensive efforts by the Church of Latter Day Saints, Seventh Day Adventists, and Pentecostal sects.

In general, the missionaries bore an ethnic self-confidence of such magnitude as to constitute arro-

4. George A. Dorsey, ed., *Traditions of the Skidi Pawnee*, Memoirs of the American Folk-Lore Society, vol. VIII, (Boston, Mass.: Houghton-Mifflin, 1904), pp. 1–12.

5. Cited in Ralph Linton, "The Origins of the Skidi Sacrifice to the Morning Star," *American Anthropologist*, vol. 28 (1956), p. 457.

6. Cf. Murray L. Wax and Rosalie H. Wax, "The Magical World View," *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, vol 1, no. 2 (Spring 1962), pp. 179–88.

gance. They felt that they were dealing with a people who were not only pagan, but inferior to such degree that they had totally to be transformed. As Stephen Riggs, the Sioux missionary was to write in 1846:

> *As tribes and nations the Indians must perish and live only as men!* With this impression of the tendency of God's purposes as they are being developed year after year, I would labor to prepare them to fall in with *Christian civilization* that is destined to cover the earth.[7]

With this attitude it is not surprising, but nonetheless noteworthy, that after 36 years of work among the Cherokee, none of the missionaries of the American Board was capable in 1851 of preaching in that native language.[8]

This gulf in status and authority—and therefore in culture and language—between missionary and missionized made it difficult for Christianity to be ethnically modified and adapted, as it had been for example, during the prolonged medieval missionization of northern Europe. It also increased the likelihood that, as nationalistic tendencies reemerged among Indians, they would be expressed in revitalizations of traditional religions, rather than in "reformations" and other revisions or purifications of the Christian gospel. (Note that Deloria, who was trained in a Christian seminary, and whose family has closely been associated with Christian denominations, has come to reject Christianity and to advocate a return to traditional Indian beliefs.)[9]

The relationship between the missionaries and the federal government continued to be close for many years, and in 1865 the government contracted with the missionary societies for the maintenance of schools for teaching agricultural and mechanical arts to Indians. To eliminate denominational competition, the various Indian agencies were allocated exclusively among the missionary societies (with the exception of the Catholics). Thus in 1870, the Pawnee, Omaha, Winnebago, and other Nebraska tribes were under the jurisdiction of the Hicksite Friends (Quakers); the Yakima, Skokomish, Quinault, and other northwestern tribes under the Methodists; and RedCloud's band of Sioux under the Episcopalians.[10]

Originally, the Catholic Church had been indifferent to the plans of the federal government for containing and assimilating the Indians, but when its missionaries found themselves excluded from Indian territories it was not slow to respond. The Sioux had long been exposed to Catholic missionaries, and Red-Cloud was discontented with the relationship the federal government had established for his band with the Episcopalians. He kept pressuring the Indian agents to admit "the Black Robes." Meanwhile the Board of Indian Commissioners—Protestant in its composition and ideologically committed to tolerance—became in 1881 the recipient of a Presbyterian memorial asking that "Indians be granted the same religious liberty which we claim for ourselves.[11] So it was that in 1888 the Jesuits were able to establish a mis-

7. Cited in Robert F Berkhofer, Jr., *Salvation and the Savage: An Analysis of Protestant Missions and American Indian Response, 1787–1862* (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1965), p. 7.

8. Ibid., p. 49

9. Vine Deloria, Jr., *God Is Red* (New York: Dell, 1973).

10. Henry E Fritz, *The Movement for Indian Assimilation, 1860–1890* (Philadelphia, Pa., University of Pennsylvania Press), pp. 56, 76–79.

11. Ibid., p. 103.

sion on the Pine Ridge Reservation. (Nevertheless, tolerance was confined to Christian denominations, and indigenous rituals, such as the Sun Dance, were long under federal ban. While public revival of the Sun Dance may be dated to the 1930s, it was not until 1959 that the piercing rituals were publicly reinstituted.)

The Jesuits of Pine Ridge included scholars who devoted themselves to the conscientious study of the Lakota language and Siouan traditions. Initially, their interest was evangelical and they dismissed traditional rituals as heathen and therefore to be extirpated. But, by the mid-1960s some of the Fathers had become ethnologically more sophisticated and religiously more catholic. Thus, Paul Steinmetz advocated the transformation of the Sacred Pipe into "a Christian prayer instrument," and he spoke of the Pipe reverently as "a type of Christ because it is the instrument of the mediator in the Sioux Religion."[12] So deep was the break between himself and the earlier generation of Jesuits that he encountered resistance from the more devout among his parishioners, "there will be good Catholic Indians who will not want to accept the Pipe because it has been condemned by some Fathers,"[13] but he felt confident enough to develop a liturgy for the Pipe. Even so, his proposal remains quite conservative in that the Pipe does not have in his service the central and symbolic role which it has in either the traditional Sioux rituals or some Plains versions of the modern Peyote Cult. Rather, during the service which Steinmetz outlines, the Pipe is used in gesture and movement, but it is not communally smoked. He suggests that, if the Pipe is to be smoked—and passed from person to person as in traditional rituals—that this be done at the conclusion of the prayers, when it becomes a part of the social aspect of Holy Communion. With these qualifications, we may note that, not only among the Jesuits of the Catholic Church, but also among Protestant missionaries, there has been a recent movement toward reevaluating the native practices of exotic peoples, rather than dismissing them all as "heathen." This reorientation has come to affect the attitude toward such Plains ceremonials as the Sun Dance, and the observer will now encounter Christian ministers willing to bless its participants, whilst more fundamentalist evangelicals denounce them as engaging in pagan and heathen rites.

A Modern Plains Reservation

Pine Ridge, South Dakota, is representative in many ways of Plains Indian reservations. Except for the congestion of the Agency town, the Indian population of about 10,000 people is thinly scattered across an area approximately the size of the state of Connecticut. Natural resources are modest, and the population is characterized by poverty, underemployment, unemployment, and a variety of related problems. Although the Sioux have been missionized for decades and their children enrolled in schools where English is the sole accepted language, nonetheless Lakota remains the primary domestic and communal language for many persons and English is a foreign language, which only a minority handle with skill and comfort. (Lakota is the Siouan dialect

12. Paul Steinmetz, "Explanation of the Sacred Pipe as a Prayer Instrument," *Pine Ridge Research Bulletin*, no. 10 (August 1969), p. 20.

13. Ibid., p. 21.

TABLE 1

PRIMARY RELIGIOUS AFFILIATION OF INDIANS OF PINE RIDGE, BY PERCENTAGE OF INDIAN BLOOD

DENOMINATION	PERCENT FULLBLOOD	PERCENT MIXEDBLOOD
Episcopalian	47	27
Roman Catholic	33	58
Presbyterian	11	6
Body of Christ	3	1
Latter Day Saints	1	0.4
Other	5	7.6
Total	100	100

spoken by the Oglala of Pine Ridge.)[14]

In the late 1960s a baseline data survey was conducted on Pine Ridge. Fullblood Oglalas comprised 45.6 percent, mixedblood Oglalas comprised 48.7 percent, and Indians from other tribes 5.6 percent of the total Indian population. The survey also inquired as to membership or affiliation with religious denominations.[15] In percent, the findings are shown in table 1. Other denominations together with percentage of reservation adherents include: Native American Church (0.8 percent), Seventh Day Adventists (0.6 percent), Church of God (0.4 percent), Lutheran (0.3 percent), Gospel Missionary Union (0.3 percent), Congregational (0.3 percent), Methodist (0.2 percent), and Baptists (0.1 percent).

These figures of denominational membership would not look out of place for many other small towns of mid-America. Nevertheless, Pine Ridge is in fact very different from non-Indian communities of mid-America. While less than one percent of Indians list the Native American Church (Peyote cult) as their primary religious affiliation, nevertheless, 11 percent of fullbloods and 6 percent of mixedbloods acknowledge attending its meetings. And, while no figures were obtained as to attendance at the great Sun Dances, sponsored annually by the Oglala Sioux Tribal Government during the late 1960s, the count would have numbered several thousands. Also, many families who consider themselves members in good standing of Christian denominations, nonetheless participate in the small cultic ceremonials known usually and generally as *yuwipi*. And, in addition, there are many other cults or ceremonials, and corresponding types of shamans, medicinemen, or holymen, or other initiates.[16]

14. Descriptions of the Pine Ridge Reservation, as of the 1960s, may be found in Eileen Maynard and Gayla Twiss, *That These People May Live: Conditions among the Oglala Sioux of the Pine Ridge Reservation* (Pine Ridge, S.D., Indian Health Service, U.S. Public Health Service, 1969), also in Murray L. Wax, Rosalie H. Wax, and Robert V. Dumont, *Formal Education in an American Indian Community*, Monograph #1, Society for the Study of Social Problems, Supplement to *Social Problems*, vol. XI, no. 4 (1964), especially chaps. 2 and 3.

15. The baseline data survey was reported in a number of issues of the *Pine Ridge Research Bulletin*, and in Maynard and Twiss, *That These People May Live*. Of special utility here is the anonymous essay, "Some Denominational Preferences among the Oglalas" in *Pine Ridge Research Bulletin*, no. 10 (August 1969), pp 1–6.

16. In addition to the ceremonials already mentioned—*wiwanyank wacipi* ("sun gazing as they dance"), the Sundance, the *yuwipi* and *wanbli* rituals; and *hanble ceya*, the vision quest—there are *inikagapi*, the rite of purification via the sweat lodge, *išna ta awi ča lowan*, puberty rite at menarche, *šunkwaci*, horse dance; and others. Sacred to the entire Sioux nation is Ptehincala Canunpa, the Buffalo Virgin Calf Pipe, held in trust by a shaman on the Cheyenne River Reservation; it has not been displayed nor used publicly for some time. Among priests and practitioners, there are *wicaša wakan*, holy man; *wapiye wicaša*, doctor man; *pejuta wicaša*, medicine man, *pejuta winyela*, medicine woman; as well as

Between February and May of 1973, a group of Indians, mainly Sioux, and variously affiliated with the American Indian Movement (AIM), occupied and assumed political-military control over the hamlet of Wounded Knee. Their activities were opposed by the recognized tribal government and by the Nixon administration. There were great shows of force on both sides, some casualties, and much coverage in the mass media. The incident has come to be known as Wounded Knee II, in commemoration of the terrible slaughter inflicted upon the Sioux in the same locale in 1890. In retrospect, it is hard to take WK-II seriously as a pragmatic political act, and it is noteworthy that in the next election to the Oglala Sioux Tribal executive, AIM spokesman Russell Means could not secure a majority of the vote. Nevertheless, one should not underestimate WK-II as a symbolic statement or religious ceremonial. Indians from all over North America made pilgrimages to the besieged camp at Wounded Knee, bringing gifts and blessings. Medicinemen are known to have journeyed with their sacred bundles through the entrenchments in order to perform rites which they had not otherwise thought appropriate in modern times. For many Indians, at that moment in time, Wounded Knee had become the locus of an epiphany.[17]

the shamans who perform *wanbli* (*wanbli wapiye*). For further details on the above, consult Feraca, *Wakinyan* and Brown, *The Sacred Pipe*.

17. A portrait of Wounded Knee-II may be found in Vine Deloria, Jr., *Behind the Trail of Broken Treaties: An Indian Declaration of Independence* (New York: Dell, 1974). See also, Philip D. Roos *et al.*, "The Impact of the American Indian Movement on the Pine Ridge Reservation," (Paper delivered at the annual meetings of the Society for the Study of Social Problems, 1977).

MILLENARIANISM

The 1890 massacre at Wounded Knee was precipitated by the spread to the Sioux of the Ghost Dance movement. Originating with a prophet among the Northern Paiute, the Ghost Dance swept like a prairie fire across the Plains, bringing to Indians a message of hope and transfiguration. Once lords of the Plains, proud and untrammeled horse-nomads, their needs supplied from their great hunts of the buffalo, the Plains tribes in a few decades had been decimated by disease, emaciated by starvation, and confined to idleness in reservation settings under alien and authoritarian governance. Traditional religious ceremonials had appeared useless to cope with the new disasters; only too often the revered possessors of sacred lore had gone to their deaths without being able to transmit their skills and rituals to the next generation.

The Ghost Dance was but one of a number of movements that have affected various of the North American tribes. Its prophet, Wovoka, preached that the world would be returned to its state prior to the coming of the Whites and that the dead Indians and vanished game would reappear. Associated with his message were various rituals, especially a round dance which, when performed, led some of the participants to lose consciousness and journey spiritually to the land of the dead, where they encountered their ancestors and the ecological conditions of their childhood.[18]

Some observers believed that the

18. There have been many studies and analyses of the Ghost Dance, but the fullest ethnographic account was given in 1896 by James Mooney and is reprinted now as *The Ghost-Dance Religion and Wounded Knee* (N.Y.: Dover, 1973).

Ghost Dance movement had ceased with the Wounded Knee massacre. But, 40 years later, Alexander Lesser found the Ghost Dance cult was still influential among the Pawnee.[19] Alice Kehoe, working among Canadian Dakota during the 1960s found remnants of its cult.[20] Whether or not the movement still persists among the Oglala is a matter for argumentation. Among the older generation, there are many who cherish the hope for the return of the Black Hills. Several decades ago, such hopes might have been classified as millenarian, especially when held tenaciously by a people without funds, political power, or legal skills. Yet in an age when tribes elsewhere are having success with a court suit over rights to much of the real estate of Maine, there is a genuine question as to how to categorize the hopes for the return of the Black Hills. For some Sioux who are highly assimilated to non-Indian culture, that return would simply constitute an heirship claim, representing a cash payment for a swindle performed upon their ancestors; but for many Sioux of traditional attitudes, the Black Hills constitute a sacred symbol of the vitality of the Sioux people and of their relationship to the larger universe.

Among the Tribal Cherokee of eastern Oklahoma, a kindred type of vision persists: the resurrection of the sovereign and independent Cherokee nation. Such a nation existed from the time of their removal from the southeast (under the presidency of Andrew Jackson) until the turn of the century, when Congress forcibly dissolved it. The dissolution and the accompanying division of the Cherokee lands, with their allotment in severalty, represented catastrophe for the Tribal (or fullblood) Cherokee. In these hours of tribulation, a spiritual leader, RedBird Smith, directed their attention to the traditional Cherokee way—the white path of harmony—and rekindled the fires of the stompground for the Nighthawk Cult.[21] As of 1963, there were in eastern Oklahoma six functioning Nighthawk stomp grounds, each a cultic center for a local fullblood community. (There were also 42 churches in the Cherokee Indian Baptist Association, 9 Cherokee Methodist Churches, 3 Cherokee-Creek Baptist Churches, and 3 other Cherokee churches, each of these also functioning as a cultic center for a local Cherokee-speaking community.)[22] Explicitly for the Nighthawk Cult, but also for many of the members of the Christian churches, the restoration of the sovereign Cherokee nation remains a cherished goal. To the typical outsider who observes the extent of the intrusion into Cherokee lands of the Whites and their governmental agencies, the hope for a revived sovereignty must appear millenialist and utopian. Nevertheless, it is precisely the restoration of sovereignty of Indian tribes and nations that is intrinsic to much of contemporary Indian nationalism (as manifested in AIM and in the writings of such spokesmen as Vine Deloria, Jr.)

19 Alexander Lesser, *The Pawnee Ghost Dance Hand Game*, Columbia University Contributions to Anthropology, vol. XVI, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1933), pp. 1–337.

20. Alice B. Kehoe, "The Ghost Dance Religion in Saskatchewan, Canada," *Plains Anthropologist*, pt. 1(1968), pp. 13–42.

21 Robert K. Thomas, "The Origin and Development of the RedBird Smith Movement" (M.A thesis, University of Arizona, 1954).

22. Albert Wahrhaftig, "The Tribal Cherokee Population of Eastern Oklahoma," *Current Anthropology*, vol. IX, no. 5 (December 1968), pp. 510–18.

THE PEYOTE CULT[23]

For centuries peyote has been used sacramentally by the peoples of Middle America. Like the wine in the communion chalice of the Christian Eucharist, its status is freighted with symbolism, emotion, and tradition. The Huichol Indians of Mexico annually perform a lengthy pilgrimage in order to gather peyote for their ritual use.[24] Plains Indians will perform individual pilgrimages to the regions where it is found and will recite prayers on encountering the first specimen. Thus peyote is no more to be interpreted in terms of its biochemical composition than is the wine in the chalice. For its communicants, peyote is a beneficient and potent deity, capable of healing and of conferring a variety of blessings and benefits.

Among North American Indians, the cult developed during the past century. It can especially be found among the tribes who were native to the southern plains during the nineteenth century and were then settled in western Oklahoma. But the cult has spread widely throughout the West, from the Winnebago of the Great Lakes to the Paiute of the Great Basin, and from the Arapaho of the northern Plains to the Navajo of the Southwest. It seems evident that the cult took root among these peoples as they lost their more traditional religious practices during the latter half of the nineteenth century and the earlier part of the present century. While there are significant differences between the cults as practices by the Huichol and by Plains Indians, there are notable similarities, such as the journey or pilgrimage for peyote, the nighttime ceremonial, and the presence in the morning meal of corn (maize).

Peyote grows wild in the Rio Grande River valley and southwestward. *Lophophora williamsii* is a small, carrot-shaped cactus whose top is harvested to become the "peyote button" that will be ingested. Chemically, the button is complex and contains a variety of alkaloids, some with effects like strychnine and others with effects like mescaline. The taste is bitter, and even habituees may be subject to vomiting. A variety of effects seem to follow digestion. Excitement and exhilaration are followed by alterations in the sense of time and by optical visions such as brilliance of colors, and auditory hallucinations. The toxic effects seem minor, and the plant is not addictive.

The spread of peyote among North American Indians coincided with the Prohibition movement, and peyote became the subject of religious and governmental attacks. The accusations were based more upon fantasy than on knowledge, but legislation against the consumption of peyote was introduced in both the Congress and some state legislatures. Partly in an effort to accommodate the sacramental usage to Euro-American religious traditions, and to provide themselves with the religious protections of the federal constitution, some Indians began a process of formal organization. In 1914, the "First-born Church of Christ" was organized under the laws of Oklahoma. Since strong Christian elements pervade the Plains ritual, the title was not a misnomer; but, nevertheless, many peyotists were uncomfortable about it, and, within a few years, some organized them-

23. The principal source for this section is Weston La Barre, *The Peyote Cult*, 4th ed., enl. (New York. Schocken Books, 1975)

24. Fernando Benitez, *In the Magic Land of Peyote*, trans. John Upton (New York: Warner Books, 1968).

selves as the Native American Church (NAC). That title, which symbolizes the intertribal and aboriginal nature of the cult, has proved more popular and durable. The church has since been established and incorporated in a number of states, but the general organizational structure is congregational and federal rather than bureaucratic and centralized; or, to be more exact, the structure is loose and decentralized in the fashion characteristic of Plains or intertribal associations. (It may be illuminating to compare the discussion by Gerlach and Hine of the strength and resilience of a similar type of anarchic or decentralized structure in the cases of the Pentecostal and Black Power movements.)[25]

Typically, the religious service of an NAC group begins on Saturday night and continues until Sunday morning. For Plains Indians, the location may be a tipi; for Navajo, a hogan; but in practice, the service can be held anywhere so long as there is space for a central altar, including a fire (or coals), about which the participants will be seated. At midnight and dawn there are ceremonies involving water; and, in the morning, there is a ritual breakfast which will include corn (maize), fruit, and boneless meat. During the service, peyote is passed among the communicants, and in the Plains ritual, each usually consumes at least four buttons. Likewise a water-drum and other ritual paraphernalia are passed about the circle, and in turn each person sings four peyote songs, while accompanied on the drum by the person on his right. The service may vary, depending upon the tribe and the leader. In some cases there may be a sermon; and in some cases there may be reading from the Bible, which is present in the central altar.[26]

In addition to the services beginning on Saturday night, others may be held on holidays, or at times of stress or illness, or to express gratitude or thanksgiving for a special event like the birth of a healthy child. Whether among Mexican or North American Indians, doctoring (healing) is a major rationale for a cultic ceremony, and peyote is regarded as a powerful therapist. Among Plains Indians, services will also be sponsored for the purposes of securing a vision that will confer blessings and power upon the supplicant.

CONCLUSION

We began this essay with a review of traditional religious worldview and ceremonials. These ceremonials were an aspect of the integration of community and tribe. Belief was not an issue, and participation flowed from membership in the tribe and its voluntary associations (medicine societies). Centuries of missionization and of intercourse with a variety of non-Indian peoples have fractured this religious and cultural unity. A tribal unit of 10,000 persons now contains a multiplicity of denominations and of cultic practices, some mutually consistent, others mutually inconsistent. Moreover,

25. Luther P. Gerlach and Virginia H. Hine, *People, Power, Change: Movements of Social Transformation* (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970).

26. An informal but accurate account of a peyote service with an intertribal composition, held on the Navajo Reservation, can be found in Peter Nabokov, "The Peyote Road" reprinted in *Solving "The Indian Problem,"* eds. Murray L. Wax and Robert W. Buchanan (New York: New Viewpoints, 1975), pp. 197–210.

there has also been the emergence of intertribal, yet distinctively Indian, religions such as the Native American Church.[27] The major directions of change seem to be toward millenarianism—as expressed in a drive to reclaim lands and regain sovereignty—and toward reviving or revitalizing traditional cults. Christian denominations also are moving toward a more catholic recognition of the virtues of the traditional cults and ceremonials.

27. For a discussion of these issues see Murray L. Wax, *Indian Americans: Unity and Diversity* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1971).

ANNALS, AAPSS, 436, Mar. 1978

Hippocrates Was A Medicine Man: The Health Care Of Native Americans In The Twentieth Century

By PATRICIA D. MAIL

ABSTRACT: The provision of health and medical care to American Indians and Alaska Natives has undergone major changes in the 150 years during which the federal government has assumed responsibility for these services. Significant legislation leading to present programs and directions is reviewed to place current programs in the perspective of historic evolution. The changing patterns of disease indicate that Indian health status is rapidly approaching that of the Western world, with a reduction in infectious diseases and an increase in psychosocial problems and chronic conditions. In order to provide quality health care under isolated, rural conditions, the Indian Health Service is exploring innovative uses of paraprofessionals and the application of modern space technology to primary care settings.

Patricia D. Mail is a Public Health Educator and Community Health Representative (CHR) Coordinator with the U.S. Public Health Service, Indian Health Service. She holds a Masters in Public Health from Yale University, an M.S. degree from Smith College, and an M.A. degree in Anthropology from the University of Arizona. She is currently working with Indians of the Pacific Northwest, and has had experience with the Papago and Apache peoples in Arizona. She teaches a course in cross-cultural counseling as a part of Seattle University's Alcohol Studies Program, and is an advisory board member for the Seattle Indian Alcohol Program.

THE health of the Native American is a complex and many-sided realm. The roots of Indian health practice are lost in antiquity, and the present delivery of health and medical care involves, in some instances, the most modern space technology. Some concepts about Indian health belong to the contemporary folklore, such as the stereotype of the "drunken Indian," which reflects a widely held belief that Indian people are somehow different and cannot drink like normal people. Yet recent research has suggested that this is not the case.[1] Other elements in Indian health are still largely unexplored, such as the understanding of the success of native practitioners and ceremonials. And with this is the mostly Indian-transmitted knowledge of power and the persistence of native belief systems. Indian health is a rapidly changing, politically impacted, and culturally important field. Very briefly, an overview of its many dimensions will be considered.

STEPS TO THE PRESENT

The provision of medical care to native peoples was, at one time, an empirically refined and exclusively practiced art independent of Western man. Native practitioners were called by many names, but all strove to maintain and promote the well-being of individuals and to maintain their native societies. Armed with an extensive pharmacopoeia[2] and considerable faith, they endeavored to minister to the needs of people in both a physical and mental environment.

Indian health today is largely dependent on Western-trained practitioners and the vagaries of politicians. The transition between independence and dependence is a long and intricate history, interwoven with the history of the gradual domination of Indian peoples by the relentless European westward migration.

When Indian land had been secured and reservations established, treaties provided for minimal medical care in the person of a "physician to reside at said central agency, who shall furnish medicine and advice to their sick, and shall vaccinate them."[3] On the Great Plains, the War Department became involved in the administration of medical services to Indians largely to protect American soldiers from infectious diseases. Congress authorized the appropriation of monies to vaccinate against smallpox in 1832. In 1849, the responsibility for Indian health was transferred, along with other Indian concerns, to the newly created Bureau of Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior. Medical care for Indians passed from military to civilian control.[4] In 1954, the responsibility for Indian health was

1. L. Bennion and T. Li, "Alcohol metabolism in American Indians and Whites," *New England Journal of Medicine*, vol. 294, no. 1 (1 January 1976), pp. 9–13. J. H. Leland, *Firewater Myths*, Monograph no. 11 (Rutgers Center for Alcohol Studies, 1976). J. E. Levy and S. J. Kunitz, *Indian Drinking* (New York: John Wiley, 1974).

2. V. J. Vogel, *American Indian Medicine* (New York. John Wiley, 1974)

3. V. Deloria and K. Kickingbird, *Treaties and Agreements of the Indian Tribes of the Pacific Northwest* (Washington, D.C.. The Institute for the Development of Indian Law, n.d.) p. 14.

4. Felix Cohen, *Handbook of Federal Indian Law* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1942), p. 243

transferred to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, U.S. Public Health Service. However, authority for the provision of medical services to Indians had been broadly established in 1921 with the passage of the Snyder Act, which provided for appropriations to assist Indians in the "conservation of health" and for the "employment of . . . physicians." In 1954, P.L. 83–568 provided the authority to transfer "all functions, responsibilities, authorities, and duties . . . relating to the maintenance of the health of Indians . . ." to the U.S. Public Health Service, under the Direction of the Surgeon General.[5] Since 1954, the Indian Health Service has grown from a budget of $34.5 million and a staff of 2900 to its present 1975 level of staffing at 7400 individuals and an annual appropriation in excess of $200 million.[6]

Health and medical care for the American Indians and Alaska Natives is currently available in 24 western states through a network of 51 hospitals, 83 health centers, and over 300 health stations.[7] In addition to direct medical care through outpatient installations and inpatient facilities, the Indian health service also saw the passage of significant environmental health legislation in P.L. 86–121, which provided a separate authorization for the construction of sanitation facilities on reservations where there had never been running water or sanitary waste disposal. This legislation, coupled with more recent Housing and Urban Development (HUD) grants, has permitted a vastly improved physical environment for many Indian peoples.[8]

In 1975 and 1976, two complementary pieces of major Indian-oriented legislation were passed into law, the implications of which herald major changes for medical service delivery and perhaps mark the greatest legislative impact on Indian tribes since the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. These bills are: P.L. 93–638, the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (January 4, 1975), and P.L. 94–437, the Indian Health Care Improvement Act (September 30, 1976). This last is one of the most comprehensive documents spelling out the obligations of the federal government with respect to the needs of Indian peoples yet promulgated. This is not to imply that it fully meets the needs of Indian people, or that it does not have some drawbacks.

The Self-Determination Act provides the legal framework within which an Indian tribe may contract with the federal government for the operation of various health programs which are managed by the tribe itself. And the Indian Health Care Improvement Act delineates a number of program areas in which Indian people may manage contracts: training programs, specific health services, health facilities, waste disposal programs, and urban Indian clinics. The latter is a most important inclusion, because it is the first time that those Indian peoples residing off-reservation have had their health needs formally recognized by legislation.

5. "DHEW, PHS, Provision of Contract Health Services," in *Federal Register*, 41(206): 46792 (22 October 1976).

6. D. J Press, D. Sakiestewa and R. D. Kane, *A Study of the Indian Health Service and Indian Tribal Involvement in Health* (Arlington, Virginia: Urban Associates, 1974) p. 3. Prepared for the Office of Special Concerns, DHEW

7. Ibid., p. 142.

8. Ibid., p. 11.

TABLE 1

INDIAN HEALTH SERVICE PROGRAM ACCOMPLISHMENTS

HEALTH IMPROVEMENTS	1955 RATE	1974 RATE	PERCENT DECREASE
Death Rates:			
Infant	62.5	18.7	70
Neonatal	22.7	9.4	59
Postneonatal	39.8	9.3	77
Maternal	82.6	16.4	80
Influenza and pneumonia	89.8	29.7	67
Certain diseases of infancy	67.7	21.0	69
Tuberculosis, all forms	55.1	7.5	86
Gastroenteritis, etc.	39.2	6.6	83
Congenital malformations	19.0	8.5	55
Incidence Rates:			
New active tuberculosis	257.7*	79.8	69
Trachoma	1712.7**	388.8	77

SOURCE Indian Health Service, Analysis and Statistical Branch, "Program Accomplishments." (A package of charts and materials prepared for the congressional budget hearings of March 8 and March 10, 1976)
* 1962 Rate
** 1966 Rate

THE CHANGING PATTERNS OF DISEASE

One should make a distinction between health problems and medical problems. Increasingly among nonmedical professionals, as well as tribal employees, health problems are being defined as those socio-cultural and physical-environmental elements which have a negative effect on the physical and emotional well-being of people: (1) inadequate housing; (2) poor nutrition; (3) a lack of job opportunities; (4) inferior educational opportunities; and (5) lack of recreational outlets. Clinical personnel still tend to define medical problems as those diseases and states of ill-health which are encountered in the clinic setting, and which lend themselves to reporting on the various medical records forms. But the medical problems are symptomatic of the health problems, so efforts directed at Indian health improvement are two-fold: preventive and curative.

Since the Indian Health Service began to keep records on Indian medical problems in calendar year 1955, there has been a major improvement in the health of native peoples, as indicated by selected morbidity and mortality rates and the percent decrease in these rates through calendar year 1974. These are summarized in table 1.

Until very recently, Native Americans died in larger numbers from diseases which did not cause high mortality in the rest of the population: infectious diseases and conditions relating to poverty. However, an examination of the leading causes of death for Indians and Alaska Natives in 24 reservation states would suggest that Indians' general health status and living circumstances are catching up with the rest of the nation. More native people are dying from accidents and chronic conditions, while a glance at the reduction in rates in table 1 indicates that infectious disease is coming more and more under control. In calendar

year 1971, the Indian Health Service listed the top ten causes of death for Indians as: accidents, diseases of the heart, malignant neoplasms, cirrhosis of the liver, cerebrovascular disease, influenza and pneumonia, diseases of infancy (unspecified), diabetes mellitus, homicide, and suicide.[9] Four of these conditions are related to the heavy use of alcohol among reservation residents: accidents, cirrhosis, homicide, and suicide. Regardless of whether or not the Indian has a genetic susceptibility to alcohol intoxication, there is an overwhelming abundance of evidence to indicate that alcohol abuse among native peoples is a serious problem. In a widely quoted study, the Indian Health Service noted that alcohol abuse was the number one health problem of American Indians.[10] Yet that same agency has no overall policy for dealing with this health problem and professionals within the agency often appear reluctant to plan for treatment or intervention. It is of interest to note that the National Institute for Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism, a separate HEW agency, has some $24 million in funds for Indian alcohol programs.

When the U.S. Public Health Service first examined the beneficiary population it had inherited from the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the major causes of mortality and morbidity were infectious diseases. In the first decade of health services delivery to Indian people, the sources and causes of morbidity and mortality were vigorously attacked by the Division of Indian Health personnel. Not only medical staff, but allied health manpower as well, worked together to develop a comprehensive approach to the reduction of disease. Sanitarians, civil engineers, medical social workers, and health educators formed a part of the team which scattered across the reservations to ameliorate existing conditions. The success of this broad-scale approach to community health has resulted in a marked reduction of the infectious diseases. Even tuberculosis and otitis media are no longer the threats they once were for Indian people, although there is still considerable fear in the Indian communities about tuberculosis, and much repairable deafness from otitis which requires surgical correction.

In the last few years, the chronic diseases and mental health problems have increasingly required the attention of medical professionals and the growing cadre of paraprofessionals. In spite of vague and fragmented programs, or perhaps because of them, alcohol abuse continues to be held by many tribal people[11] as well as by federal officials[12] to be the major health problem among Indian people. However, alcohol abuse is also held by many to be symptomatic of environmental, acculturative, and other stresses which impact heavily on Indian communities.[13] Levy and Kunitz

9. U.S. Public Health Service, *Indian Health Trends and Services*, DHEW publication no. (HSA) 74-12,009 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1974). p. 32.

10. Indian Health Service Task Force on Alcoholism, *Alcoholism. A High Priority Health Problem*, DHEW publication no. (HSM) 73-12002 (Washington, D C. USGPO, 1972.)

11. Arizona Commission of Indian Affairs, Phoenix, *Reservation Survey: Health*. (A series of questionnaires submitted to tribal leaders from 1963-66 asking for Indian perceptions of major health problems. Alcohol was often cited as the number one problem.)

12. Indian Health Service Task Force, *Alcoholism: A High Priority Health Problem*.

13. J. Ablon, "Cultural Conflict in Urban Indians," *Mental Hygiene* 55 (1971), pp.

point out that among Navajo, Apache, and Hopi people there may have been prehistoric cultural configurations which have persisted and which influence present drinking habits,[14] while Lurie notes that Indian-style drinking helps to maintain a sense of "Indianness."[15] Other observers note that there are differences in Indian drinking and that certainly not all Indian drinking constitutes alcoholism or even alcohol abuse.[16] It can be seen that there is much more unknown about this major health problem than is known, and sensitive individuals working in the field of Indian alcohol abuse suggest that it is time to stop the body count of abusers and begin to develop comprehensive, community-based approaches to the problem which incorporate prevention, early identification and intervention, effective treatment, follow-up and rehabilitation, with all of the attendant services implied by these concepts.[17] This would require a multi-agency cooperative approach, because services to Indian people are seriously fragmented across numerous agencies. However, such an attack is not inherently impossible.

It has been suggested that differential use of health facilities by social class[18] and generational differences in morbidity rates for some diseases result from the strains of acculturation.[19] Certainly it is a mistake to view cultural groups as internally homogeneous,[20] but due to limitations of space it will be necessary to generalize about Indian people and trends, keeping in mind that there are always exceptions. A partial solution to dealing with the cultural differences which affect utilization of health services, as well as influence the health behavior of Indian people, is to increase the utilization of indigenous personnel, most especially therapists who deal with emotional and social problems. It has been suggested that effective medical care delivery would be enhanced if health professionals could modify their etiological concepts of causation of psychosocial disturbances, and if native practitioners could also achieve a better understanding of contemporary medical concepts and be assisted to integrate these into the indigenous concepts of disease causation.[21]

199–205. W. V. Curlee, "Suicide and Self-destructive Behavior on the Cheyenne River Reservation," in *Suicide Among the American Indians* (Washington, D.C., U.S Public Health Service, publication no. 1908, June 1969), pp. 34–36. E P. Dozier, "Problem Drinking among American Indians: The Role of Sociocultural deprivation," *Quarterly Journal of Studies on Alcohol*, vol. 27, no. 1 (1966), pp. 72–87.

14. Levy and Kunitz, *Indian Drinking*.

15. N. O. Lurie, "The World's Oldest On-going Protest Demonstration. North American Indian Drinking Patterns," *Pacific Historical Review*, vol. 40, no. 3 (1971), pp. 311–32.

16. F. N. Ferguson, "Navajo Drinking: Some Tentative Hypotheses," *Human Organization* 27 (1968), pp. 159–67. J. J. Westermeyer, "Options Regarding Alcohol Use Among the Chippewa," *American Journal of Orthopsychiatry*, vol. 42, no. 3 (1972), pp. 398–403.

17. Personal communication with Ernest J. Turner, Director, Seattle Indian Alcoholism Program, November 1976.

18. E. L Koos, *The Health of Regionville* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1954). p. 160

19. S. Graham, "Ethnic Background and Illness in a Pennsylvania County," *Social Problems*, vol. 4, no. 1 (1956), pp 76–82.

20. P. Kunstadter, "Culture Change, Social Structure, and Health Behavior: A Quantitative Study of Clinic Use Among the Apaches of the Mescalero Reservation" (Ph.D. diss. University of Michigan, 1960), p. 409.

21. E. F. Torrey, "Mental Health Services for American Indians and Eskimos," *Community Mental Health Journal*, vol. 6, no. 6 (1970), pp. 455–63.

This brings up the question of who is currently providing care for Indian people. The traditional doctor-patient relationship is undergoing some interesting and innovative alterations in an attempt to better meet the health needs of a rural, often isolated, frequently bilingual, and culturally distinct people.

INNOVATIONS AND NEW DIRECTIONS

Almost from the time of the transfer of responsibility from the Bureau of Indian Affairs to the Public Health Service, professionals within the health delivery system began to consider innovations and changes in the traditional medical model in order to provide a comprehensive program of medical and health services to the Indian people. Confronted with major manpower shortages, a very rural and scattered population, language differences, and distinct value and cultural differences, not to mention the isolation of professionals, antiquated facilities and inadequate congressional appropriations, the administrators of the Division of Indian Health began to explore a then new approach to service delivery: the paraprofessional. The earliest groundwork was laid by the Navajo-Cornell Field Health Research Project, which in 1955 began to explore ways to develop effective cross-cultural health delivery. The development of a cadre of Health Visitors, who worked as a part of a medical team to help bridge cultural and linguistic gaps, laid the foundation for the burgeoning paraprofessional programs which exist today.[22] Medical teams in Alaska were developing the Village Aide programs, training indigenous individuals in isolated native villages to provide a range of primary care functions. The importance of indigenous first-contact people became a major concern of Indian Health Service staff. Thus, in 1968 a training center and research station was established on the Arizona desert in Tucson. This multicomponent program consisted of a national training center, Desert Willow, whose function was to provide basic training to tribally-hired and-employed outreach workers known as Community Health Representatives. The Health Program Systems Center began to explore ways to facilitate the delivery of health services, and the Office of Research and Development, in cooperation with the National Aeronautics and Space Administration, sought ways to bring space technology down to earth to improve medical care delivery in remote corners of Indian reservations. And with the growing recognition of the capabilities of physician-extenders, the Indian Health Service established, in 1970, a Community Health Medic training program to produce Indian physician assistants.[23]

In addition to these paraprofessionals, there is a growing cadre of other allied health workers within the IHS, including trained native people who concentrate in the areas of nutrition, maternal and child health, senior citizen programs, alcohol abuse counseling, and other social service areas. Many of these individuals are not directly employed by the IHS, but are hired by tribes and agencies under federal contracts. The biggest program with as yet

22. J. Adair and K. W. Deuschle, *The People's Health* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1970).

23. *Community Health Medic of the Indian Health Service*. (Tucson, Arizona: Health Program Systems Center, April 1971).

largely unrealized potential is the Community Health Representative program, which employed nearly 1,500 paraprofessionals by the end of fiscal year 1976. Because these individuals are employed by their respective tribal governments, and their work assignments are largely developed to meet local needs, the program allows for a flexible approach that few other programs can manage. The tribe sets the employment criteria, so that education, age, and previous experience vary widely. Although the program initially saw itself as independent of the IHS professionals, since 1970 there has been a growing sense of teamwork, and more and more reservation health needs are being identified and met as a result of the community outreach provided by the CHRs. The program is operated through a contract mechanism, whereby the IHS contracts with individual tribes or Indian agencies for services, and the tribes hire and administer the employees. Current funding for this program alone is in excess of $15 million dollars. But while the program is a tribal program, the IHS has a definite responsibility for ongoing training, support, and advice on program planning and evaluation.

One of the major benefits of the CHR program is that the existence of trained paraprofessionals not only increases the reach of health services and contributes to community education, but the CHRs can also provide important cross-cultural training and orientation to Indian health professionals as the non-Indian staff undergoes its annual change-over of physicians. Certainly one of the continuing problems for Western-trained professionals is the necessity to make some accommodations in accepted medical practice to meet cultural expectations about appropriate and acceptable medical care. The CHR can advise the physician, as well as explain to the patient necessary procedures, thereby establishing a very important link in the chain of services.[24]

Although it is too early to really assess the impact of these new programs, the Indian Health Service is exploring new directions in health service delivery which have important implications for the rest of the nation. One program which has possible benefits for most of Alaska and many other isolated populations is the STARPAHC program (Space Technology Applied to Rural Papago Advanced Health Care).[25] By utilizing sophisticated telemetry, a communications link (which could someday be beamed via satellite), and mobile health centers, the IHS is exploring ways for a physician and physician assistant to communicate with patients when the physician is located in a medical center at some distance from the patient. By television and radio the physician can direct the physician assistant and patient to assess immediate medical problems and make recommendations for further care.

Also being explored are new ways

24. W Brodt, "Implications for Training Curriculums from a Task Inventory Survey of Indian Community Health Representatives," *Public Health Reports*, vol. 90, no. 6 (November–December 1975), pp. 552–60. N. H. Rund, R. D Myhre, and M. Fuchs, *Community Health Representative. A Changing Philosophy of Indian Involvement* (Tucson, Arizona. Office of Program Development, Indian Health Service February 1970) Patricia D. Mail, "Professionalism: The Paraprofessional View" (Paper prepared for the 11th annual meeting of the USPHS Professional Association, New Orleans, May 1976).

25 *Space Technology in Remote Health Care*, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, publication no. JCS–09161 (Houston, Texas· August 1974).

to deal with patient records, and the Health Information System is a project which provides physicians with a computer-based medical record designed to reflect sociocultural data as well as pertinent medical history. *Special training of paraprofessionals in early disease intervention* is also producing significant results in the reduction of such major health problems as infant diarrheas and streptococcal infections.[26]

Aside from programs within the federal government, there has been a growth of urban Indian outpatient and social service programs in many cities where there is a substantial Indian population. Such cities as Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Minneapolis have seen the growth and development of Indian clinics, many of which had their origins in volunteer services until state and finally federal funding could be obtained to maintain and increase services. The urban Indian programs have predominantly Indian staffs, and frequently tend to siphon off from the reservations skilled Indian professionals. The impact of recent federal legislation which recognized urban Indians has yet to be fully assessed.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Medical services and health care programs for Indians and Alaska Natives have moved from the nineteenth to the twenty-first century in a span of some 25 years. Programs and projects currently being explored by the Indian Health Service have implications for changes in traditional medicine which might point to directions that national health *delivery programs should take. The ever-expanding utilization of paraprofessionals and allied health professionals has demonstrated that* effective quality care can be achieved *with fewer physicians who are, in turn, better utilized. Recent federal* legislation has laid a groundwork for the increasing assumption of Indian *tribal responsibility for health care*, and the Indian population is growing more and more sophisticated with respect to its knowledge, expectations, and understanding of modern medicine. Yet in most Indian communities, there is a renewed interest in the value and worth of traditional practices as well, and Indian students in the health professions are seeking to combine the best of both traditions to provide even better health services to Indian people in the years ahead.

The Indian Health Service is faced with the continuing responsibility to provide effective and comprehensive services to Indian people, and the urban migrant is making increased demands on the federal government to recognize his entitlements, regardless of residence. As the nation's population concentrates in urban centers, recruitment and retention of skilled professionals is an increasing problem for the IHS, with the expanded roles for paraprofessionals providing only a partial solution.

Overall, the health of Indian people is vastly improved from the first measures taken in the late 1950s, but the status of health of Indian people is not yet equivalent to that of the majority population, nor will it be until unemployment, poverty, isolation, discrimination, poor housing, inadequate and inferior education, and federal paternalism give way to genuine Indian participation, management, and assumption of admin-

26. Personal communication with Rice Leach, M.D., Office of Research and Development, Indian Health Service, Tucson, Arizona, June 1976.

istrative responsibility by trained Indian people. The Indian Health Service is working to bring this about, and within the Indian communities there is a growing sense of new pride in being identified as the First Americans.

Western medicine sprang from the traditions of the Greeks, as articulated initially by Hippocrates. Indian medicine, as practiced by the medicine man, is now being integrated with Western medicine to provide a more sensitive and effective approach to bridging the cultural differences between the Old World and the New. From the empirical knowledge of medicine men come the practical approaches of contemporary practitioners, working together to provide accessible, acceptable, and effective medicine designed to improve the status of Indian health.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 436, Mar 1978

The Bureau of Indian Affairs: Activities Since 1945

By RAYMOND V. BUTLER

ABSTRACT: The journey from termination, where the federal government was trying to get out of the Indian business, to Indian self-determination, where the federal government is committed to becoming a full partner to the Indian tribes, is the major theme of Indian affairs over the past several decades. The impact of Indian self-determination on the future operations of the Bureau of Indian Affairs cannot be predicted at this time. The particular nature of and direction of the change will depend upon how totally the tribes embrace its philosophy; the commitment of the Congress to the concept outlined in the Indian Self-Determination Act, as reflected in appropriations and supportive legislation; and the conversion of the Bureau from the role of policymaker to technical advisor. Present critical problems involving urban Indians, water, hunting and fishing rights, historic land claims, and the question of federal recognition of heretofore unrecognized Indian groups, will challenge every aspect of the concept of self-determination.

Raymond V. Butler, a Blackfeet Indian, was appointed Acting Commissioner of Indian Affairs in January of 1977 and served in this capacity for most of that year. Since 1972 he has served as head of the Division of Social Services in the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). A graduate of the University of Washington, with a masters degree in social work from Florida State, Butler has worked at the agency, area, and central office levels in the Bureau. He began his career with BIA in 1958.

MEMBERS of the Eighty-third Congress, reflecting years of frustration in trying to solve the "Indian problem," in 1953 unanimously endorsed House Concurrent Resolution 108 which stated:

Whereas it is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible to make the Indians within the territorial limits of the United States subject to the same laws and entitled to the same privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of the United States, to end their status as wards of the United States, and to grant them all of the rights and prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship; and

Whereas the Indians within the territorial limits of the United States should assume their full responsibilities as American citizens: Now therefore, be it

Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that, at the earliest possible time, all of the Indian tribes and individual members thereof . . . should be freed from Federal supervision and control. . . . It is further declared to be the sense of Congress that, upon the release of such tribes and individual members thereof from such disabilities and limitations, all offices of the Bureau of Indian Affairs . . . whose primary purpose was to serve any Indian tribe or individual Indian freed from Federal supervision should be abolished.[1]

This resolution initiated what has come to be called the "Termination Policy."

On January 4, 1975, President Gerald Ford signed the "Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act." This law states as a "Declaration of Policy" that:

The Congress declares its commitment to the maintenance of the Federal Government's unique and continuing relationship with and responsibility to the Indian people through the establishment of a meaningful Indian self-determination policy which will permit an orderly transition from Federal domination of programs for and services to Indians to effective and meaningful participation by the Indian people in the planning, conduct, and administration of those programs and services.[2]

The journey from termination, where the federal government was trying to get out of the Indian business, to self-determination, where the federal government is committed to becoming a full partner to the Indian tribes, is the major theme of Indian affairs of the past two decades.

TERMINATION

Contrary to many opinions, the termination policy did not spring full-blown from the brows of conservative Congressmen. It was the logical culmination of the historical policy aimed toward the assimilation of the American Indians into the mainstream of American life. From the beginning of its history until 1934, the federal government's Indian policy was based on the understanding that sooner or later all Indians would be assimilated into the American melting pot with all the benefits, as well as the responsibilities, which such a move entailed. The fluctuations of the Indian policy during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were manifestations of the differing means. The end, however, was always the complete assimilation of the American Indian. In the 1930s under the administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, John Collier, initiated a different

1 U.S. Congress, House, *Concurrent Resolution 108*, 83rd Cong. 1st sess, 1953.

2. 88 *Stat.* 2203, 2204.

approach. The Collier policy was aimed at preserving, as much as possible, Indian culture, tribal identification, and lifestyle. For many, this policy was enunciated in the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) of 1934. The major purpose of this act was to revitalize weak and, in some cases nonexistent, tribal governments. This was to be accomplished by means of written tribal constitutions and by-laws approved by the Secretary of the Interior.

As a result of a number of circumstances (not the least of which was Collier's inability to sell his policy to a skeptical Congress), toward the end of World War II the feeling was beginning to grow that the New Deal reforms were hampering the Indians in their overall growth and development. The problem appeared to be too much federal interference in the management of the Indians' lives. Many believed that the government, through the Bureau of Indian Affairs, was guilty of preventing the Indians from enjoying the full fruits of American citizenship. If the Indian could be freed from these unnatural constraints, then he, too, would have the enjoyment and responsibilities inherent in the American Dream.

In the immediate postwar period, the movement for termination was accelerated.[3] Some commentators see evidence of termination in the Indian Claims Commission. Claims settlement was viewed as a necessary step to provide the Indians with financial reserves to aid them when they began to manage their own affairs.[4]

House Concurrent Resolution 108 called for the termination of all the Indian tribes within the states of California, Florida, New York, and Texas. In addition, four individual tribes were singled out for immediate action. Subsequently, on June 17 1954, the Menominee tribe of Wisconsin, one of the four, became the first tribe slated for termination.[5] Between 1954 and 1959 ten more termination acts were passed. The final act was in 1962, and it concerned the Ponca tribe of Nebraska. These acts "freed" 13,263 tribal members and removed over 1,365,800 acres from federal trust status.[6]

Glenn L. Emmons, Commissioner of Indian Affairs from 1953 to 1961, supported the Congressional decisions. At first, however, he expressed apprehension at the possibility that Congress was too impatient in its desire "to write the whole problem off as insoluble and to liquidate it in one sweeping piece of legislation."[7] By 1958, he was one of the chief exponents of the policy ". . . I have no hesitancy whatever in calling it [H. Cong. Res. 108] one of the most valuable and salutary Congressional measures we have had in Indian Affairs for a great many years."[8] Even then, however, Emmons continued to caution that a unilateral immediate termination of all federal relationships with Indians and the destruction of tribal integrity was not the administration policy.

3. Theodore W. Taylor, *The States and Their Indian Citizens* (Washington, D.C.. USGPO, 1972), pp. 53–56

4. S. Lyman Tyler, *A History of Indian Policy* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1973), p. 150.

5. Menominee Termination Act. 69 *Stat* 2150.

6. Taylor, *States and Indian Citizens*, p. 180

7 Glenn L. Emmons, Address to the Annual Convention of the National Congress of American Indians, Omaha, Nebraska 1954, cited in Tyler, *History of Indian Policy* p. 177.

8. Glenn L. Emmons, "Why We Still Have an 'Indian Problem,'" *Sunday Telegram* (Worcester, Mass.), 12 January 1958, cited in Tyler, *History of Indian Policy*, p. 178.

the policy of the present administration does NOT call for hasty termination of Federal trust responsibilities in Indian Affairs. Rather it [the administration] emphasizes the need for thorough study, careful planning, and full consultation with the Indians, tribe by tribe and group by group. It also recognizes and stresses the right of the Indians to continue holding their lands in common and maintaining their tribal organizations for as long as they wish after the Federal trusteeship has been terminated.[9]

The continued fears of the Indians and their allies precipitated a slight shift in the position of Secretary of the Interior Fred E. Seaton. In 1960, in an attempt to allay these apprehensions, he stated that the administration has "no thought whatever of trying to force Indian people off the reservation, or even of subtly persuading them to move against their will."[10] Although this had been the stated position from the beginning of the 1950s, the Indian opponents of termination continued to argue over the reconciliation of the terms "earliest possible time" in H.C.R. 108 and such terms as "force" and "subtly persuading" as in the Secretary's statements.

It would be a mistake to view the termination question as being the government on one side and the Indians on the other. There were vigorous proponents and opponents of termination in both camps. Many tribes were severely divided over the issue of whether or not to seek termination. The reluctance of some of the federal officials to push too hard for such legislation has been mentioned.

It should be reemphasized that the termination policy was directed by Congress to represent the overview of the general direction of Indian policy. It was not, however, the exclusive concern of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. The Bureau still had the responsibility to those tribes, the vast majority, who remained under federal jurisdiction. In this regard, Commissioner Emmons had a four-point program which was the guide to his administration. The four points concerned health, education, economic development, and employment.

The health portion of this program was solved, in part, by the transfer of the Bureau's health programs to the United States Public Health Service in 1955, where it became known as the Indian Health Service. While this move was motivated in part by the desire to bring a wider range of health services and programs to Indian people, it was also part of the plan to dismantle the Bureau of Indian Affairs by transferring its separate functions to the executive departments which handled that specific area. Thus it was thought, for example, that eventually Indian education would be in the Office of Education and law enforcement in the Justice Department. None of these other transfers were consummated. Instead the various executive departments established what became known as "Indian Desks" which occasionally competed with the Bureau offices, performing similar functions on the reservations.

The second area of Commissioner Emmons's concern was with education. The Johnson O'Malley Act[11] continued to be a cornerstone of the Bureau's education program. This Act enabled the Secretary of the Interior to contract with states and public school systems for the education of Indians, including the provi-

9. Ibid.
10. Tyler, *History of Indian Policy*, p. 186.
11. 48 *Stat* 596

sion of special programs to meet their needs. Further aid to public education of Indians was provided when the 81st Congress enacted legislation enabling public school districts to count Indians in the formula for reimbursement under the impact aid program (P. L. 874).

Emmons supplemented Indian school programs by initiating an adult education program to provide the opportunity for a basic education to all Indians who desired it. In addition to the traditional forms of education, the Bureau supported legislation enacted in 1956, which authorized vocational education and training to Indians between the ages of 18 and 35.[12] This program rapidly became one of the most important federally supported educational programs.

The commitment to the education of the Indians was not directly concerned with the termination controversy. Many persons, however, were aware that the more the Indians were exposed to the public schools and the values taught there, the greater the possibility for erosion of tribalism within the reservation. For the most part, this was viewed at the time as a positive achievement. It was noted by several commentators that the losses in terms of tribal cohesiveness were more than offset by the gains of the individual in his ability to function in the nonreservation world.

The Vocational Education Training Act of 1956 had a twofold purpose. The first act was to provide useful education opportunities for young adults, but it was also part of Emmons's industrial development program. It would provide a competent manpower pool to attract industries to the reservations. Unfortunately, like many programs of the period, this program competed with the Relocation Service Program, whose purpose was to remove the Indians to where there were jobs, thereby depleting this same manpower pool.

Manpower was only one of the resources available on the reservation, and in the 1950s efforts to assess the economic potential of the individual reservations were intensified. Land was the most obvious, and on many reservations the only, resource available for development. Public Law 450 made it easier for Indian land owners to obtain loans from banks by permitting them to use their allotted land as collateral.[13] In addition, another law enabled owners to lease their lands for a period of up to 50 years. The advantage of this law to the Indian was that he could now lease his property to persons who were interested in long term improvement and not just immediate exploitation.

THE 1960S

The Kennedy Administration ushered in the New Frontier. It was only natural that the Indian community, major participants in the old frontier, received the attention of the new administration. Immediately after assuming office, Secretary of the Interior Stewart Udall appointed a special task force to study the Indian situation and make its recommendations.[14] The report, submitted in July of the same year, recommended a shift from the historical custodial role of the Bureau to that of entre-

12 P.L. 84-959

13. P.L. 84-450.

14. Task Force on Indian Affairs, "Report to the Secretary of the Interior," mimeographed (Washington, D.C., 10 July 1961).

preneur. It emphasized the development of the human and natural resources available in Indian country. Although the language was more vigorous and the platform more visible, the Task Force's emphases were very similar to those of the previous administration. It called for a strong effort to attract industries to the reservation, an expanded vocational education and placement program, and special efforts aimed toward the economic development of the reservations. The objectives of the program, dubbed the "New Trail," were maximum Indian economic self-sufficiency and participation of Indians in American life, and equal citizenship rights and responsibilities.

The tools to accomplish these ends were the Area Redevelopment Act, the Housing Act, and the Manpower Development and Training Act. In addition, authorizations for the Indian revolving loan fund were increased from $10 million to $20 million. These acts are indicative of the new place Indian affairs had in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. The economic and social problems of the Indians and the reservations were no longer considered unique; instead, they were seen as similar to the difficulties of other economically depressed areas. Therefore, according to the New Frontiersmen, a separate law for the manpower problems of the reservations was not necessary. Instead, what was needed was to adapt the provisions of the Manpower Development and Training Act to the Indian community. The advantage of of this outlook was that the Indians could benefit from the experience of the other communities and have a broader scope from which to choose their own solutions to their problems.

Philleo Nash, Commissioner of Indian Affairs during the period, was particularly concerned that the Indian community and the Bureau take advantage of the entire resources of the federal government. It was through his instigation, for example, that the arrangements were made with the Department of Labor to apply the provisions of the Manpower Development and Training Act to Indians. He succeeded in gaining congressional approval for considering Indian reservations as communities in the War on Poverty legislation, thereby increasing the availability of federal resources to the Indian communities. He was also instrumental in impressing upon the Indian leaders the importance of federal grantsmanship; that is, the technique of obtaining federal monetary grants to use on the reservations. The establishment of the Office of Economic Opportunity with its Community Action Project for Indian reservations popularized the concept of Indian Desks in the executive departments. Nash strongly supported this type of program. His policy differed from that of Emmons in that Nash believed that the Indian Desks should serve as technical advisors to the Bureau and not usurp its functions. In this way he hoped to avoid wasteful duplication and competition on the reservations.

To facilitate these changes, in 1962, the Bureau organized the Division of Economic Development. Its purpose was to oversee the utilization of reservation natural resources, encourage business and industrial development, supply technical assistance to the tribes, and assist with land management practices. In addition, the Division handled home building and public works programs.

Indian education was also a major concern of the Nash administration, with special emphasis on vocational education. In 1962, the Congress more than doubled the Bureau's budget for vocational education; it was one of the Bureau's most successful educational efforts. In 1963, Commissioner Nash estimated that 86 percent of those who completed the program were gainfully employed.[15] Unfortunately, two other areas, the high secondary school dropout rate and the low number of college students remained a major cause for concern to the Commissioner. Some of the dropouts were later salvaged by the vocational training programs, but the low college attendance continued to mystify him.[16]

The continued involvement and importance of education programs on the reservation brought increasing demands for the entire operation to be transferred to the Office of Education within the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare. In anticipation of such a change, HEW created an Office of Indian Progress to consolidate the Department's efforts. Indian leaders, however, made it abundantly clear that they did not favor such a wholesale transfer.

In response, the Bureau began a concentrated effort toward upgrading its educational programs, making them more responsive to the local Indian community. Indians were encouraged to become active in the local school districts, to serve on the school boards, and participate in the parent-teacher associations. A large construction program was undertaken in the early sixties. Between 1962 and 1967 construction was authorized on buildings that would accommodate a student capacity of 20,000.[17] During this period the Bureau broadened its definition of education on two fronts. In cooperation with the Public Health Service, it launched a concentrated effort to identify and educate mentally retarded Indian children. On the other side of the scale, the Bureau continued to operate the Institute of American Arts, designed to attract the gifted Indian artist, in Santa Fe, New Mexico.

While money was literally being poured into Indian country during the early 1960s, many Indian leaders were reluctant to take full advantage of the opportunities offered because of the specter of termination. They feared that if all the tribes seemed to be self-sufficient, the cry for termination would again be heard. At the same time they were aware that much of their so-called prosperity was a direct result of, and based on, the same federal programs which would be withdrawn if the tribe were terminated.

To allay these fears and to encourage greater participation by the tribes in the antipoverty programs, President Lyndon B. Johnson delivered to Congress on March 6, 1968, "The Forgotten American" speech. In it the President called for an end to termination and proposed a "new goal" that stressed self-determination. "I propose, in short, a policy of maximum choice for the American Indian, a policy expressed in programs of self-help, self-development, self-determination."[18] Concurrent

15. Philleo Nash, "Address" to the Annual Convention of the Congress of American Indians, Cherokee, North Carolina, 1962

16. Philleo Nash, Address to the Annual Meeting of the Governor's Interstate Indian Council, October 15, 1962

17. *Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1966), p. 6.

18. "The Forgotten American," Presidential Message to Congress, 6 March 1968, p 2

with this statement, the President established the National Council on Indian Opportunity, headed by the Vice President, and composed of Indian and business community leaders. The purpose of this council was to give greater high level emphasis to finding solutions to the Indians' problems.

Self-determination quickly became the most popular phrase used by both government and tribal officials. But what did President Johnson mean when he uttered the phrase? No one knew precisely and Congress also failed to give any substance to what appeared to many an empty political slogan.

The Congress did produce a negative definition of self-determination with the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1968.[19] Title II of that act constituted what has been called an "Indian Bill of Rights." It emphasized that Indian tribes are subject to the United States Constitution. Self-government by an Indian tribe does not exempt that tribe from the Constitution's limitations and responsibilities.

NIXON AND FORD YEARS

The theme of Indian self-determination was quickly picked up and used with various interpretations by all those involved in Indian affairs. Richard Nixon, in his presidential campaign of 1968, strongly supported the repeal of termination and the concept of self-determination. He also pledged a greater involvement of Indian people in the federal planning and policy decisions affecting their lives. Underlining these specific policies was Nixon's belief in cultural pluralism. This is important because it illustrates an historic shift from assimilation, of which termination was the logical result, toward a policy of recognition and appreciation of the differences among cultures.

Upon assuming the presidency, Nixon continued to pursue the policy announced in his campaign. He appointed Louis R. Bruce as Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Bruce was a vigorous supporter and salesman for the concept of self-determination. He was strongly supported by the Secretary of the Interior Walter J. Hickel. To insure that the Indian view would be heard at the highest level, the President maintained the National Council on Indian Opportunity that was chaired by the Vice President, but reorganized it to include eight Indian members and an equal number of cabinet level officials. The culmination of this effort was President Nixon's Special Message to the Congress on July 8, 1970. This message, while repeating the same general philosophy of President Johnson's earlier message, was much more specific and stronger. Nixon called for an end to termination and at the same time an end to the paternalism, as exercised by the federal government, over the affairs of the Indian people. He called for self-determination, which he defined as strengthening "the Indian's sense of autonomy without threatening his sense of community. . . . And we must make it clear that Indians can become independent of Federal control without being cut off from Federal concern and Federal support."[20]

The specific recommendations of the President to Congress in this message included: 1) a new congressional resolution specifically repealing the termination policy out-

19. P L. 90-284.

20 *Indian Record* (August 1970), p. 3.

lined in HCR 108 of the 83rd Congress; 2) congressional support for Indian control of Indian programs; 3) recognition of the right of and support for Indian communities to take over their schools; 4) support for the Indian Financing Act of 1970; 5) assistance for Indians living in urban centers; and, 6) the establishment of an Indian Trust Council Authority "to assure independent legal representation for the Indians natural resource right" and to avoid conflicts of interests within federal agencies.[21]

In Commissioner Bruce, President Nixon found a person fully committed to the ideals put forth in the 1970 message. Prior to that message, Bruce had issued a memorandum to Bureau personnel in which he emphasized that under his administration the Bureau would be transformed from a management to a service organization. In other words, he believed in, and would try to implement, the idea of Indian policy being made by the tribes, with the Bureau providing the technical expertise and guidance needed to define and implement tribal policies. He further stated that the tribes should have the option to take over any, or even all, the BIA reservation programs if they should so desire.

Bruce, who was an Indian, believed that one way to insure that the BIA reflect the Indian point of view was to fill its top positions with Indians. Shortly after taking office he realigned the BIA's central office and appointed a new executive staff of 15 Indians. He also believed in working closely with such organizations as the newly formed National Tribal Chairmen's Association (NTCA) and the National Congress of American Indians (NCAI). In January 1972, the Commissioner released a five point program for his administration.[22] The major thrust of this program was the economic development of the reservation under what was called a Reservation Acceleration Program (RAP). This was a systematic attempt to study each reservation individually to determine its particular capabilities and needs. In addition, Bruce, reemphasized Nixon's desire for Indians to gain increased control over their educational programs.

The restoration of the Blue Lake to the Taos Pueblo in December 1970, and of 21,000 acres to the Yakima were the first concrete results of the Nixon Indian policy. These land transactions were significant. Formerly Indians could only receive cash payments for lands unjustly taken; now, the fact that land had been returned gave new hope to those tribes with similar claims. The Menominee Restoration Act of December 22, 1973, restoring the previously terminated Menominee tribe to federally recognized status, provided concrete evidence that termination was dead.

While the rhetoric of the Nixon administration was producing results as in the restoration acts discussed above, it was, at the same time, increasing the expectations of the Indian community. The gap between results and expectations began to irritate some Indian people who felt that, despite all the administration's efforts to reach Indians, they were still being ignored. This frustration, combined with the radical-activist mood of the late 1960s and early 1970s, contributed to the rise of militancy among the Indian populace. The Indian occupation of Al-

21 Ibid., pp. 4–11.

22. Tyler, *History of Indian Policy*, p. 257

catraz Island, from the fall of 1969 until the Indians were forceably removed in the summer of 1971, was the first manifestation of Indian militance. The most spectacular was the takeover of the Bureau of Indian Affairs' Central Office Building in Washington, D.C. for six days in November 1972 by a group using the slogan "Trail of Broken Treaties." This action led to the resignation of Commissioner Bruce and most of his executive staff. It was followed the next spring by the Wounded Knee incident on the Pine Ridge Reservation. While these actions were deplored by most responsible Indian leaders, they did serve to emphasize the severe social and economic problems affecting America's Indian population.

Major pieces of legislation affecting Indians were also being passed by the Congress. The most important was the Indian Financing Act of 1974. The act consolidated and increased existing Indian revolving loan funds then being administered by the Bureau and authorized insuring or guaranteeing of commercial loans to members of the Indian community. In addition, it established the Indian Business Development Program designed to provide capital grants to aid and encourage independent Indian businessmen. The importance of this Act was that it not only received the philosophical backing of Congress but its financial support as well.

INDIAN SELF-DETERMINATION ACT

On January 4, 1975, President Gerald Ford signed the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act. This act was viewed as the most significant piece of Indian legislation since the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. It was the legislative embodiment of much of Nixon's 1970 message. It contained a strong statement, not only repudiating the termination policy, but also emphasizing a commitment to the "maintenance of the Federal Government's unique and continuing relationship with Indian people. . . ."[23] It emphasized the federal obligation to the principle of Indian self-determination by fostering Indian involvement and participation in the direction of education and service programs.

Contracting is the process which the act provides for Indian tribes to assert their control over the federal programs. In order to assure the smooth transition of a program from federal to tribal control, the act mandates that the BIA provide any and all technical or other kinds of assistance required by the tribe. Such assistance was designed to lessen the possibility of tribal default on its contracts. Furthermore, if after contracting to administer certain programs, the tribe no longer wishes to continue, it has the right of retrocession. In other words, a tribe retains the right to return a contracted program to the Bureau of Indian Affairs at anytime, and for any reason, without penalty.

Despite these safeguards, the specter of termination made many of the tribes reluctant to avail themselves of the Self-Determination Act's provisions. This remained true despite the continuous effort of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs Morris Thompson. He spent a considerable portion of his time trying to sell the tribal leaders on the advantages of the program. His efforts were hampered somewhat by the failure of appropriations committees of the

23. P.L. 93-638.

Congress to fully fund the grant and technical support provisions of the act.

The impact of the Indian Self-Determination Act on the future operations of the Bureau of Indian Affairs cannot be predicted at this time. It could change the entire concept of Indian affairs. The nature and direction of the change will depend upon how totally the tribes embrace the act and its philosophy, the commitment of the Congress to the act as reflected in appropriations and supportive legislation, and the commitment of the Bureau to its role of technical advisor rather than of policymaker.

In addition to the implementation of the Self-Determination Act, other matters that will have to be addressed in the immediate future are the position of the Bureau on the urban Indian question; the land claims of eastern seaboard and other Indian groups; definition and protection of Indian water rights; and the question of federal recognition for a number of heretofore ignored Indian groups. As in the past the handling of these matters will involve the interaction of many parties, in and out of government, and on and off the reservation. Today, as a result of the greater social awareness brought to the fore in the 1960s and the commitment to the concept of human rights, the climate is ripe for large strides toward a more responsive era in the field of Indian affairs.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 436, Mar. 1978

The Bureau of Indian Affairs Since 1945: An Assessment

By JAMES E. OFFICER

ABSTRACT: Following World War II, the Bureau of Indian Affairs entered one of the most turbulent periods of its history. First arousing Indian ire during the 1950s for its support of the so-called termination policy, it passed through a relatively tranquil decade in the 1960s as many other government agencies began supplying services to Indians, then moved into the 1970s, which have been notable for much favorable legislation and greatly increased appropriations. At the same time the Bureau has been significantly affected by growing Indian frustration and militancy. By late 1976, it was also beginning to feel the effects of an expanding white backlash against Indians in many areas, stemming at least in part from more aggressive Indian espousal of the concept of tribal sovereignty. This backlash has produced changes in the committee structures of Congress which could have negative consequences for Indian legislation and appropriations. Internally, the Bureau since the mid-1970s has experienced considerable tension between Indian and non-Indian employees, the former having been favored by federal court decisions confirming their entitlement to preference in hiring, promotion, and lateral transfer within the BIA and the Indian Health Service. The administration of President Carter faces unprecedented challenges in Indian affairs because of the many changes which have taken place since 1945.

James E. Officer, at present a Professor of Anthropology at the University of Arizona, was U.S. Associate Commissioner of Indian Affairs from 1962–67, and Assistant to Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall in 1967–68. He served on Udall's 1961 Task Force on Indian Affairs and on the 1962 Task Force on Alaska Native Affairs. He holds a Ph.D. in anthropology from the University of Arizona, represents the United States on the Interamerican Indian Institute, and in 1968 received the Department of the Interior Distinguished Service Award.

MORE than three decades have passed since John Collier, considered by many to have been the greatest of all Indian Commissioners, submitted his resignation to President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Through this interval, the Bureau of Indian Affairs has remained the nation's ranking symbol of the evils of excessive federal paternalism. Yet, in many respects, the Bureau of today is very different from that which Collier headed.

The protective functions of the agency—founded in treaty, statute, and court decision—remain, clearer in extent perhaps than in Collier's day, but still woefully fuzzy in many areas. The number of social and economic services provided Indians by the BIA is greater than when Collier left office, and the funding which supports them is infinitely more generous; yet the overall scope of these services has, in fact, diminished. Since 1955, another federal agency in a completely different department has provided medical attention for reservation Indians and helped them build community water and sewage disposal facilities. For well over a decade a majority of the social welfare services and most agricultural extension services have been administered by state agencies. Both the states and the U.S. Office of Education have assumed major roles in educating Indian children. A variety of other agencies—many of which did not even exist in Collier's day—now bring to Indian reservations a host of services differing from or complementing those provided by the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

Finally, the BIA itself—which today has Indians in nearly all major policy positions—has been encouraging tribes to take over administration of many programs heretofore planned and directed by the Bureau. Financial support for these services continues to come from federal sources, but tribal, rather than federal, bureaucrats administer them.[1]

On the reservations, the economic emphasis since 1945 has shifted from agriculture and stock raising to tourism, industrial development, and exploitation of mineral resources. Attorneys and other specialists, rather than employees of the Bureau of Indian Affairs, are often the principal advisers to tribes in all these areas of economic endeavor.

Many longstanding controversies surrounding Indian property and water rights are now being litigated, or settled through legislation, as lawyers for the departments of Justice and the Interior begin to take more seriously their roles as Indian advocates; and, even more importantly, as private attorneys with support from foundations and government agencies begin to supply Indians the kinds of legal services not previously available.

Without question, then, the three decades since John Collier's resignation have been among the most dynamic in history for American Indians; and for all its reputation as a federal agency which still conducts its business in mid-nineteenth century style, the BIA has not remained unaffected by the changes going on within and around it.

INDIAN POLICY AFTER WORLD WAR II

The single most important ingredient in Indian policy following World War II, and in much of the period since, has been what is now widely known as "termination"; that

1. George P. Castile, "Federal Indian Policy and the Sustained Enclave: An Anthropological Perspective," *Human Organization* vol. 33, no. 3 (Fall 1974).

is, the elimination of the special relationship between many Indians and the federal government. The foundation for a postwar termination policy was laid in Commissioner Collier's day. During 1943–44, Collier and Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes engaged in a running battle with the Senate Committee on Indian Affairs over a subcommittee report calling for a termination program more radical in nature and extent than that which Congress endorsed a decade later.[2]

TERMINATION AND INDIAN CLAIMS

One of Collier's sorest disappointments on leaving office was his failure to secure general legislation permitting Indian tribes to sue the federal government for past grievances.[3] William A. Brophy, Collier's hand-picked successor, gave high priority to such legislation, and on August 13, 1946, Congress finally passed an Indian Claims Act.

Brophy's success in obtaining this important legislation was related to the greatly increased strength of the terminationists in Congress. Convinced that the federal government could never withdraw from its special relationship with Indian tribes so long as many obviously legitimate claims went unsettled, these legislators became strong advocates of a claims act.[4] Within six months after its passage, the Indian Bureau was called upon to explain how it might reduce its budget by withdrawing services from Indian groups, and to supply a timetable for achieving this goal.[5] Over the next four years, Congress considered several termination proposals without taking final action on any.

Neither Brophy nor his successor, John R. Nichols, favored termination. In fact, it was not until May 1950, that the first "termination-minded" Commissioner took office. He was Dillon S. Myer, previously head of the War Relocation Authority, who announced shortly after taking over the Commissioner's post that he was setting up a Program Division to prepare proposals for withdrawing special federal services from Indians.[6] Under Myer's stimulus, Congress began looking at a variety of termination-related bills. Although it enacted none, it did push several beyond the hearing stage, and the House even passed a bill to transfer legal jurisdiction over California reservations to the state.

Shortly before leaving office on March 20, 1953, Myer assisted the new Republican administration to draft a policy letter to Congress on Indian affairs. It put the Eisenhower government solidly behind a policy of termination, one which Myer's successor, New Mexico banker Glenn Emmons, endorsed as enthusiastically as Myer.[7]

During the summer of 1953, Congress began work on several pieces of major termination legislation. The

2. Kenneth R Philp, *John Collier's Crusade for Indian Reform 1920–1954* (Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1977), p. 208. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Indian Affairs, *Investigation of Indian Affairs*, 1944, pp 28 ff

3. Philp, *Collier's Crusade for Indian Reform*, p. 241, fn. 2.

4 U.S. Congress, House, *Report 1466*, 1945, p 1351, and U.S. Congress, House, *Report 2503*, 1952, p. 16.

5. William Zimmerman, Jr., "The Role of the Bureau of Indian Affairs Since 1933," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, (May 1957), pp. 36–37. Also, see *House Report 2503*, pp. 162–79.

6. U.S. Department of the Interior, *Annual Report of the Secretary*, 1952, p. 389.

7 U.S. Department of the Interior, *Annual Report of the Secretary*, 1953, p. 23.

first of these—House Concurrent Resolution 108—was approved on August 1. It confirmed termination as official government policy and specified certain tribes and groups from which special federal services were to be withdrawn "at the earliest possible time."[8] Two weeks later, it enacted Public Law 83–280 bringing Indian lands in California, Minnesota (except for the Red Lake Reservation), Nebraska, Oregon (except for the Warm Springs Reservation), and Wisconsin (except for the Menominee Reservation) under the legal jurisdiction of the states, and authorized other states, whenever they chose to do so, to assume similar jurisdiction in their areas. President Eisenhower reluctantly signed PL 53–280, at the same time urging Congress to amend it to provide for Indian consent.

During its second session in 1954, the 83rd Congress transferred the responsibility for Indian health programs from the BIA to the U.S. Public Health Service, and passed six termination bills, including two which affected tribes with substantial resources (the Klamaths and Menominees). Except for a handful of bills related to a number of small tribes and Indian communities in about half a dozen states, the entire termination record of the 1950s rests with the 83rd Congress.

Contributing to the slower pace of termination legislation after 1955 was the fierce opposition of Indian tribes and defense groups. The National Congress of American Indians, founded a decade before, now had a major issue with which to rally its membership. It quickly moved into the forefront among the organizations lobbying against House Concurrent Resolution 108. Inside Congress, friction developed between those legislators who felt that no tribe should be terminated without its consent, and those who believed that consultation, with or without consent, was sufficient.

By the middle of 1958, the termination thrust had lost its punch. On September 18 of that year Secretary of the Interior Fred Seaton told a radio audience in Flagstaff, Arizona that "no Indian tribe or group should end its relationship with the Federal Government unless such tribe or group has clearly demonstrated—first, that it understands the plan under which such a program should go forward, and second, that the tribe or group affected concurs in and supports the plan proposed."[9]

Although the termination policy resulted in new service programs for Indians (to prepare them for federal withdrawal) and placed increased emphasis on the importance of education and economic development, the most significant legacy of the era was a psychological one. Many Indians by the late 1950s were convinced that the federal government intended to set them adrift without regard for the consequences. "Termination means *ex*-termination" was a common way of putting it. As a result of their fears, Indians for a time forgot tribal differences to join forces in the fight against termination.

THE KENNEDY–JOHNSON YEARS

Early in August of 1961, President Kennedy appointed Dr. Philleo Nash, an anthropologist cum politician, as Commissioner of Indian Affairs. Dr. Nash had served on an

8. See Edward H. Spicer, *A Short History of the Indians of the United States* (New York: Van Nostrand, 1969), document no. 18, p. 218

9. U.S. Department of the Interior, *Annual Report of the Secretary*, 1958, p. 231.

Indian affairs task force established the previous January by Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall. Although many Indian leaders hoped that Nash would begin with a vigorous effort to secure the repeal of termination legislation, the new Commissioner chose instead to concentrate on obtaining congressional support for several important, but relatively noncontroversial, legislative amendments which could increase Indian employment and stimulate reservation resource development. Even before taking office, Nash had urged the Interior Department to seek increases in the appropriations ceilings for the Indian Revolving Loan Fund and the Adult Vocational Training Program. In September, only a month after taking office, he was successful in persuading Congress to raise these ceilings.

Nash also set out to make certain that Indians shared in the benefits of federal programs designed for all Americans in need. He directed his subordinates to help tribes apply for assistance under the new Area Redevelopment Act, and by the end of his first year in office, he had stimulated the designation of 56 reservations and four Alaska native regions as "Redevelopment Areas" eligible for federal financial aid in formulating Overall Economic Development Programs (OEDPs).[10] He also opened discussions with representatives of the federal housing agencies which resulted in the creation of tribal housing authorities and the beginning of low rent and mutual self-help housing projects. In addition, he initiated conferences with the Department of Labor which led eventually to help for Indians under the Manpower Development and Training Act. Nash's determination to involve other federal agencies in serving the population of the reservations became a hallmark of his administration and has significantly influenced U.S. Indian policy in subsequent years.

INDIANS AND THE POVERTY PROGRAMS

Apart from the BIA and the Indian Health Service, the federal agency making the greatest impact on the reservations during the 1960s was the Office of Economic Opportunity. By the end of fiscal year 1965, ten Job Corps Conservation Centers had been approved for Indian reservations, 55 Indian communities had applied for assistance under the Neighborhood Youth Corps Program, another 20 had requested funds for Operation Head Start, and 26 applications had been approved for Community Action Programs.[11]

Most OEO programs stressed Indian initiative and provided grants to tribes to develop their own projects. Especially through the Community Action Programs (CAPs), a broad cross-section of tribes began for the first time to assume responsibility for the kind of decisionmaking previously done for them by employees of the BIA.

Hostility between local BIA officials and representatives of the Office of Economic Opportunity was, from the outset, more pronounced than that between BIA employees and colleagues in other federal agencies. The latter were usually willing to defer to BIA personnel as more knowledgeable about Indian ways than

10. U.S. Department of the Interior, *Annual Report of the Secretary*, 1962, p 10.

11. U.S. Commission on Indian Affairs, *Indian Affairs, 1965, A Progress Report from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs* (Washington, D.C.: USGPO), pp. 20–22.

they. Not so the young, community development-minded representatives of the OEO. To many of them, the Bureau was the "enemy" and they made few concessions to BIA employees, privately branding them as anti-Indian, unimaginative, and overly paternalistic.

Nash's tenure as Commissioner, which ended early in 1966, was not marked by the passage of any major legislation of general character, although he did assist several tribes in obtaining legislation beneficial to them. Attempts to find a legislative solution to the complex land inheritance problem common to many reservations failed in the 87th and 88th Congresses, largely because of opposition from the National Congress of American Indians, whose representatives viewed the proposals under consideration as threats to preservation of the Indian land base.[12]

Following Nash's departure, President Johnson in April 1966, nominated Robert L. Bennett for Commissioner. Bennett, a career BIA employee, and an Oneida from Wisconsin, became the first Indian to serve in the post in nearly a century.

THE NEW THEME: SELF-DETERMINATION

In their report on Bennett's confirmation hearings, members of the Senate Interior Committee criticized the BIA for not following through on congressional directives regarding the termination of several tribes for which withdrawal programs had been requested. The report was a shock to both Indians and BIA personnel who had come to feel that termination was a dead issue. When Secretary Udall summoned Bureau officials to a policy conference in Santa Fe shortly after Bennett's confirmation and invited representatives from Congress, many tribal leaders became alarmed that a new era of termination was in the offing. The National Congress of American Indians called an emergency executive meeting in Santa Fe and demanded admission to Udall's conference. Indian representatives were finally admitted, but while the Secretary was deliberating on the matter, he was accused in the press of formulating Indian policy without Indian participation.[13]

In fact, Udall had called the meeting to inform BIA officials and congressmen of the work of a team of Interior Department officials, headed by Under Secretary Charles Luce. This group was trying to develop legislative proposals aimed at stimulating Indian reservation resource development within a context that could assure tribal governing bodies more responsibility than they had had previously. Among the proposals under consideration were those which would establish a federal loan guarantee and insurance fund, permit tribes to issue tax exempt bonds, authorize the chartering of Indian corporations, and allow tribal governing bodies to mortgage or sell trust property when a majority of the tribal members felt this step necessary in order to raise development capital. The secretary also wanted to tell those present in Santa Fe of his favorable reaction to a recommendation by one

12. U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Indian Affairs, *Hearings on S. 1049, A Bill Relating to the Indian Heirship Land Problem*, 88th Cong., 1st Sess, 1963, pt. III.

13. For a somewhat fanciful account of this episode by a nonparticipant, see Stan Steiner, *The New Indians* (New York, Harper & Row, 1968), chap. 18.

of the BIA superintendents that the Bureau establish a new policy of contracting with tribes so as to permit them to administer service programs traditionally administered by BIA employees. Udall circulated copies of the letter in which the superintendent had made this suggestion.

Unfortunately for the secretary, some of the legislative proposals of the Interior Department team were already known to the Indians because of the leak of an early draft which came into the hands of the NCAI leaders prior to the Santa Fe meeting. Thus, from the outset these proposals were identified with termination and the issue of Indian participation. Over the next ten months, Commissioner Bennett held many meetings with Indians to discuss the proposals, but he could not dispel their doubts. The legislation, with a number of changes based on comments made by Indian leaders, was introduced in Congress in May of 1967 as the "Indian Resources Development Act." In the face of heavy Indian opposition to parts of the bill, Congress took no final action on it.

During late 1966 and early 1967, the Indians also defeated an attempt to transfer the education functions of the BIA to the Office of Education. This effort had the support of such prominent senators as Robert Kennedy, and was also favored by some officials of the Office of Education, but Indian opposition was almost unanimous and the idea was abandoned.

While not able to enlist Indian support for the resources development bill, Bennett did manage to convince Indian leaders that neither he nor Secretary Udall favored a return to the policies of the 83rd Congress. During late 1967 and early 1968, the Interior Department solidly backed efforts to amend Public Law 83–280 so as to require Indian consent before legal jurisdiction over reservations could be transferred to a state. On April 11, 1968, such amendments were included in a civil rights bill passed by Congress.

A month before this important Indian victory over termination, President Johnson sent Congress a message in which he proposed a new policy of maximum choice for the American Indian, "a policy expressed in programs of self-help, self-development, and self-determination."[14] It was one of the strongest presidential messages on Indians in many years.

By early 1969, when President Johnson departed from office, the BIA's traditional role as the Big Daddy of the reservations had been greatly altered. Other federal agencies were channeling millions of dollars annually into Indian communities. Also, several million dollars worth of BIA programs were being administered by the tribes themselves under contract.[15] The legal staff of the Interior Department was assuming a greater advocacy role for Indians, as a result of which Secretary Udall, in the closing days of his administration, was able to take important actions favorable to such Indian groups as those of the Colorado River, Quechan, Salt River, and Palm Springs reservations. He also imposed a freeze on state selection of lands in Alaska which assured that some of the state's better lands would be set aside for the natives

14. "The Forgotten American," Presidential Message to Congress, 6 March 1968.

15. See "Remarks of Secretary of the Interior Rogers C. B. Morton Before the National Tribal Chairmen's Association," (Department of the Interior News Release, August 8, 1972), p. 2.

and hastened the passage of an Alaska native claims act.

THE REPUBLICANS RETURN TO OFFICE

Many Indians were apprehensive early in 1969 that Richard Nixon's return to Washington would lead to a resumption of the hated policies of the 1950s. His choice of Louis R. Bruce in August of 1969 to replace Bennett as commissioner was reassuring since Bruce, a Mohawk-Sioux enrolled at Pine Ridge, was known to be opposed to termination.

At his hearing before the Senate Interior Committee, Bruce announced that he intended to accelerate BIA contracting with tribes, to give special attention to discharge of the Bureau's trust responsibilities, and to undertake a complete restructuring of the BIA.[16] A few months after Bruce's hearings, Secretary of the Interior Walter Hickel announced a reorganization of the Washington office of the Bureau. Important to this effort, he said, was to be the recruitment of a "new team," including established Indian leaders, to occupy the BIA's top management positions.[17]

On July 8, 1970, President Nixon sent Congress a highly significant message in which he repudiated forced termination, and announced that he would propose legislation to expand the authority of the BIA and the Indian Health Service to contract with Indian tribes. "Self-determination without termination" was the slogan Nixon recited.

Responding to the president's message, Congress took steps to retreat from previous termination actions. It repealed legislation which would have terminated the Oklahoma Choctaws, restored the authority of the Five Civilized Tribes to select their own leaders, and authorized the Indians of Annette Island (Alaska) to share legal jurisdiction with the state. But, most important of all, it restored to the Indians of the Taos Pueblo sacred lands previously taken from them and incorporated into a national forest. The Indian Claims Commission had earlier confirmed that these lands, which included a shrine known as Blue Lake, had belonged to the Indians for centuries. However, the Claims Commission could not return the lands to the Pueblo, since its authority provided only for financial compensation. In awarding the Indians land rather than money, Congress repudiated a termination-related policy established more than 20 years before.

In October, 1970, two months before return of the Taos lands, Secretary Hickel announced the appointment of 15 Indians to key posts in the BIA's Washington office. For the most part, they were a totally new breed of BIA Indian, several having worked previously with the Community Action Programs of the Office of Economic Opportunity. Some were even said to be affiliated with the militant new American Indian Movement (AIM).[18]

In his message to Congress, President Nixon had indicated that new legislation would be sought to give

16. "Statement of Louis R. Bruce Before the Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs of the U.S. Senate," 11 August 1969.

17. "Executive Realignment Announced for the Bureau of Indian Affairs," (Department of the Interior News Release, 9 January 1970).

18. "Militant Indians Fight Apathy of Urban Brothers," *Arizona Daily Star*, 13 February 13 1972. See also "26 Indians Arrested in D.C. Protest," *The Washington Post*, 23 September 1971.

the BIA and the Indian Health Service greater contracting authority. This was felt necessary because the only authority of this kind which the Bureau possessed was based on a brief passage in a 1910 act primarily concerned with reservation resource development. Shortly after Nixon's message was delivered, the Interior Department proposed several bills related to contracting.

The members of the new BIA team were enthusiastic about contracting services to the tribes and moved vigorously ahead as if the Bureau already had all the authority necessary. Their exuberance alarmed certain key congressmen and officials of the Office of Management and the Budget. These persons communicated their concern to Secretary Morton, who decided to make some changes in the direction of the BIA which would assure that legal limits were not transgressed in the contracting process. Among these changes was the return to the Bureau of John O. Crow as Deputy Commissioner in charge of the day-to-day operations of the agency. Crow had occupied the same position under Commissioner Nash, but had been transferred in 1966 to the Bureau of Land Management as part of the transaction which eventually led to Nash's replacement by Robert L. Bennett. Although considered an able administrator, Crow was regarded as a conservative who, in the eyes of the new Bruce appointees, symbolized the old BIA. His return split the agency into two camps—the veteran employees, both Indian and non-Indian, who backed Crow and the reform-minded new crowd, who supported Bruce. In September, 1971, a small group of Indians from the National Indian Youth Council and the American Indian Movement attempted a citizens' arrest of Crow which led to an altercation between them and the police.[19]

As the feud seethed, Morton continued his crusade for new legislation. On December 18, 1971, the Alaska natives won a major victory with the passage of an act providing them the means to confirm title to 40 million acres of land, and receive payments of nearly a billion dollars.

INDIAN PROTESTORS OCCUPY THE BIA OFFICES

During the summer and early fall of 1972, leaders of the American Indian Movement recruited persons to go to Washington as part of a caravan called "The Trail of Broken Treaties." The trip was to conclude with presentation to government officials of a list of 20 points, many of them relating to treaties and the concept of Indian tribal sovereignty. Early in November, about 900 Indians reached the capital.

Following a series of misunderstandings and unanticipated incidents, many of the Indians seized and occupied the BIA headquarters building on Constitution Avenue. When threatened with expulsion, they barricaded themselves inside, destroying much of the interior of the building in the process.[20] White House negotiators finally persuaded them to leave, promising more than $66,000 to cover the expenses of returning to their homes.[21] On December 2, three weeks after the de-

19. "John O. Crow Appointed Deputy Commissioner of Indian Affairs," (Department of the Interior News Release, 23 July 1971). Also see "Morton Backs Down in BIA Flap," *Arizona Daily Star*, 18 August 1971.

20. "BIA Takeover Action Defended," *Arizona Daily Star*, 5 December 1972.

21. "BIA Raid Payoff Defended," *Arizona Daily Star*, 6 December 1972.

parture of the demonstrators, Secretary Morton announced that all authority over Indian affairs was being removed from Commissioner Bruce, Deputy Commissioner Crow, and Assistant Secretary Harrison Loesch, the man many Indians held responsible for Crow's return.[22]

For nearly a year after Morton's announcement, the BIA was without a head. During a part of this time, an Oklahoma businessman named Marvin L. Franklin (a member of the Iowa tribe) served as Special Assistant to the Secretary of the Interior for Indian Affairs. Franklin had barely arrived in Washington when a new confrontation broke out between Indian militants and federal marshals at Wounded Knee, South Dakota. White House officials again intervened in late March 1963.[23]

Under Franklin's aegis, the headquarters office of the Bureau was again restructured. Among the innovations was the establishment, for the first time, of an Office of Trust Responsibilities.

On November 28, 1973, the Senate confirmed the appointment of Morris Thompson, a 34-year-old Athapascan Indian from Alaska, as the new commissioner. Less than three weeks later, Congress passed the Menominee Restoration Act, repealing the termination law enacted nearly 20 years before. The following April it passed the Indian Financing Act of 1974, a measure which President Nixon had proposed in his 1970 message.

During Thompson's first year in office, the Interior Department solicitor issued several opinions which provided a legal basis for restoring Colorado riverfront lands to the Chemenuevi and Fort Mohave reservations, and proclaiming exclusive hunting, fishing, and boating rights in Washington's Lake Roosevelt for the Indians of the Colville and Spokane reservations.[24] In the federal courts, also, 1974 was a big year for Indians. Among the major decisions was one by Judge George Boldt which held that Indians who were members of treaty tribes in the state of Washington were entitled to half the massive fish catch from the waters of that area.

As the 93rd Congress prepared to adjourn in January 1975, it enacted two major pieces of Indian legislation. The first created an Indian Policy Review Commission to undertake a two-year study of Indian affairs and to propose revisions in federal policies and programs. The members were to be congressmen and Indians. The second bill was The Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act. It provided new contracting authority for the BIA and the Indian Health Service, and gave Indians greater control over the use of federal funds for educating Indian children in public schools.

During his term as commissioner, which ended in November of 1976, Thompson enjoyed relatively good relations with the Indians—in part, no doubt, because of the impressive legislative record of the period, and the great increase in BIA appropriations, which by fiscal year 1977 had reached nearly $800 million. However, inside the Bureau, things were more chaotic. New positions, created by the numerous reorganizations during the 1970s, were often

22. "Morton Takes Command of Effort to Put Indian Operation Back to Work," (Department of the Interior News Release, 2 December 1972).

23. "Wounded Knee: Where Did It Begin?" *Arizona Daily Star*, 18 March 1973.

24. *Indian Record*, 1974, pp. 6–8. (News letter of the Bureau of Indian Affairs.)

poorly defined and went unfilled for long periods, or were filled by a succession of persons, none of whom seemed to have a clear notion of what his responsibilities were. Thompson's failure to develop an internal policy to deal with preferential employment rights of Indians contributed to dissension between Indian and non-Indian personnel, relations between the two deteriorating to their worst point in history.

Court decisions of the 1970s, especially those relating to Indian water and mineral rights, created confusion in the minds of BIA employees as to exactly what their trust responsibilities were. To many the idea of trusteeship appeared to conflict with that of Indian self-determination. They found this conflict especially difficult to handle when implementing the new Self-Determination Act. The rules which the BIA promulgated for administration of the act ran to many thousands of words, and Indians complained of the red tape involved.

Early in 1977, the Policy Review Commission completed its work and submitted its final recommendations in May. The various task forces which had been involved in the effort produced a number of different suggestions about the BIA, one of which was to abolish it entirely and replace both it and the Indian Health Service with a new, independent agency.

THE TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY ISSUE

Encouraged by court decisions of the 1970s, Indian leaders have recently begun to focus on the issue of tribal sovereignty—a highly controversial concept which by early 1977 was creating an anti-Indian backlash in such diverse areas as Maine and Washington.[25] The Indian Policy Review Commission came down heavily in favor of the full exercise of tribal sovereignty, including tribal right to tax both Indians and non-Indians, to try both in tribal court, and to control waterways, as well as hunting and fishing.

Congressman Lloyd Meeds, Vice Chairman of the Commission, disassociated himself from its views in a lengthy dissenting opinion, and resigned as head of the Indian Affairs Subcommittee of the House. When a new chairman could not be found early in 1977, the parent Interior and Insular Affairs Committee merged the Indian and Public Lands subcommittees, thus leaving the Indians without a subcommittee of their own in the House. James Abourezk, lame duck champion of Indian rights in the Senate, narrowly averted abolition of the Indian Subcommittee of that body by having it set up as a "select" subcommittee with a two year life span.[26]

THE INDIAN BUREAU IN 1977

On July 12, President Carter sent forward to the Senate his nomination of Forrest J. Gerard as Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Indian Affairs, a title which will replace that of Commissioner of Indian Affairs.[27] Not pleased with the nomination, Senator Abourezk delayed until mid-September the scheduling of confirmation hearings.[28] Gerard, a

25. See the March, April, and May, 1977 issues of *Wassaja*, monthly newspaper published by the American Indian Historical Society, 1451 Masonic Avenue, San Francisco, California 94117.

26. "Select Indian Committee Seen," *Gallup Independent* (31 January 1977)

27. Department of the Interior News Release, 12 July 1977.

28. "Andrus Firm on Top Indian Nominee," *The Daily Oklahoman*, 10 August 1977.

member of the Blackfeet Tribe of Montana, worked briefly in the Indian Bureau in the late 1960s. His nomination had the support of the National Tribal Chairmen's Association.[29]

The new BIA head faces many complex problems, among them the internal personnel situation. Not only must he strive for more harmonious working relationships between Indian and non-Indian employees, but he must be alert to prevent conflict of interest problems with Indian employees who, in working for the Bureau, have, in essence, become their own trustees![30]

The whole concept of BIA trusteeship is extremely complex, and when combined with the self-determination thrust, creates new dilemmas for the Bureau. Because of the many recent Indian victories in the courts, the BIA is probably more conscious of its trust responsibilities now than at any other time in its history; yet, the new legislation obliges the agency to transfer as much of its authority as possible to the tribes while retaining all or most of the responsibility for the consequences.

One course of action the new Bureau head might follow is to go to Congress for a more precise definition of the trust responsibility. But, to do so now would be unpopular with the Indians who fear that the growing white backlash is converting Congress into a hostile or indifferent body. The Indian leadership prefers to leave unanswered questions to the friendlier courts.

Another area of potential difficulty, also related to the trust, is that of energy resource development on the reservations. High percentages of the nation's remaining deposits of uranium and low sulfur coal are on Indian lands, and tribes with these resources are joining forces to obtain the best possible prices for their development. In discharging its responsibility to help them in this endeavor, the Bureau may find itself again in the old frontier situation where it stood between the Indians and the combine of settlers and soldiers who wished to exterminate them.

29. National Tribal Chairmen's Association, *Highlights*, 14 July 1977

30 The Indian Reorganization Act provides for preferential treatment of Indians in employment with the BIA In the mid-1970s, the federal courts held that this preference extends to promotions and lateral transfers, as well as initial hiring This is the source of the present conflict between Indian and non-Indian employees. The latter are frozen in grade and in place with no prospects for promotions or transfers to more compatible jobs

ANNALS, AAPSS, 436, Mar. 1978

Identity, Militancy, and Cultural Congruence: The Menominee and Kainai

By GEORGE D. SPINDLER AND LOUISE S. SPINDLER

ABSTRACT: Recent movements of varying degrees of militancy on the part of American Indians can be better understood if we have a grasp of the kinds of adaptations Indians have made to the long-term and continuing confrontation with white culture, white power, and white world views. Native Americans do not constitute a single group. The Menominee are taken as an example of an Indian tribe with a hitherto unaggressive record that has recently engaged in militant activity. The diversity within the Menominee population is described in terms of four major types of long-standing adaptation that were observed as dominant in the 1950s and 1960s and that emerged some time before that. Recent militancy is regarded as a fifth type of adaptive response to the continuing confrontation between Menominee and white culture. Militancy is interpreted, in part, as an assertion of identity.

The responses of the Kainai, the Blood Indians of Alberta, Canada, to white culture and power are contrasted briefly at certain critical points to demonstrate the fact of diversity among American Indians in regard to current actions and to reinforce the interpretation that the degree of difference in cultures and world views between Indian cultures and white culture is a significant factor in the kinds of adaptive response to confrontation native American groups have made and will make.

George D. Spindler is Professor of Anthropology and Education at Stanford University, where he has been since 1950. Louise S. Spindler is Lecturer and Research Associate in the Department of Anthropology at Stanford, where, in 1956, she was the first person to receive the Ph.D. in anthropology. George Spindler received

his doctorate at the University of California at Los Angeles in 1952. They have done much of their field work together, in three American Indian communities, and most recently, in Germany, where over the past decade they have studied the influence of elementary schools on the adaptations children make to an urbanizing environment. Together they have published a number of books and articles, including one on the Menominee published in 1971, Dreamers Without Power. *The Spindlers were editors of the* AMERICAN ANTHROPOLOGIST *from 1963 to 1967.*

RESIDENTS of a wooded resort country area near Big Moose, New York, awoke one morning to find that in the predawn hours a band of American Indians[1] had taken over a 612-acre former girls' camp, now a forest preserve in New York's Adirondack State Park. The occupiers not only claimed this piece for their independent Indian nation, *Ganienkeh*, The Land of the Flint, but also an additional nine million acres in New York and Vermont. This militant action is in the pattern of the occupation of Alcatraz, a former prison island in San Francisco Bay, in 1969, and the area around Wounded Knee, South Dakota, in 1973, though each of these instances had its special features.

On New Year's Day, January 1975, 45 armed "warriors" from the usually peaceful Menominee of Wisconsin occupied the novitiate of the Alexian Brothers, (a Catholic order) near Gresham, Wisconsin, directly adjacent to their reservation boundaries. They claimed the unused 64-room novitiate building, an adjoining 20-room mansion, and 237 acres of land in the name of the Menominee, and for the declared purpose of developing a hospital and drug and alcoholism treatment center there. Though the Menominee had no direct legal claim to the property, the warriors (from the newly organized Warriors Society) occupying it said they took the vacated property because the land once belonged to the Menominee and should be returned to them for much needed health care facilities—they had lost their own hospital when the Menominee reservation was terminated by federal action in May, 1961. They pledged to fight and die, if need be. The occupation lasted for 34 days. More than 200 officers of the law and 250 national guardsmen patrolled the area during this period—as much to protect the Indian occupiers of the building from irate Whites as to constrain the Indians themselves. The affair ended with the Alexian Brothers pledging the property to the Menominee. Thirty-nine occupiers were taken to jail on charges ranging from armed robbery to criminal trespass. The legal spokesman for the warriors and their sympathizers said that it was not the Indians who would be on trial, but the United States government.

Militant actions of this kind are increasing among native American tribes and communities, and they have met with some success. The responsible leadership of the Menominee was not, in fact, in favor of the occupation and refused to accept the novitiate after the Alexian Brothers offered it. This was both a symptom and a cause of bitter dissension that has afflicted the Menominee since then, though internal

1. Our terminology will vacillate between American Indians and "Native Americans," as it does in the current literature

dissension and factionalism are not new to them.

What lies behind the militancy and the apparent divisiveness? There are many different kinds of answers to this question. Our anthropological research among the Menominee and other native American communities provides useful background, if not an answer, to understanding how these people are reacting to the continuing confrontation with white society—a confrontation that began when the first Europeans landed on the shores of North America to establish permanent settlements in the seventeenth century.

We have been privileged to do field research in three native American communities: the Menominee of Wisconsin, the Blood, or Kainai of Alberta, Canada, and the Cree of Mistassini, Quebec, Canada. In this article we shall focus on the adaptive responses of the Menominee to the continuing impact of North American-European (white) culture upon them and attempt to relate recent militancy and identity-seeking to the longer-standing responses our research has revealed.[2] We will also relate certain dramatic differences in culture and world view, between the Menominee and Whites, to the kinds of adaptations the Menominee made. We will mention the Kainai now and then to provide a contrast to the Menominee situation, but we do not have space to discuss them in depth.

In discussing the Menominee we will use an "ethnographic present" (a time period for which the present tense is used that may, in some ethnographies, be decades in the past) of the year 1975. The last two years have been a period of great trial and tribulation for the Menominee and of great internal divisiveness. We prefer to keep at least the minimal perspective that can be gained by largely ignoring these two years until we understand better what happened during that time.

We started our research with the Menominee in 1948 and have continued it intermittently to the present. We began with the Kainai in 1958 and have also continued to make observations up to the present. In our field work we live close to or with the people we are trying to understand and participate with them in as many customary activities as possible. We also do systematic interviewing and administer various psychological tests, some of them created by us for the particular situation in which we are working. We have built up a sample of individuals in both the Kainai and the Menominee communities of over 100 persons in each case. We have remained in contact with some of these individuals over the years.[3] Our research falls into the subdiscipline of anthropology called today psychological anthropology, formerly culture and personality, and is concerned with long-term psychological adaptations to culture change, urbanization, and modernization.[4]

2. The term "Whites" or "Whiteman" is used by many Indians to refer to all non-Indians in a general way meaning people who live in the United States in a mainstream, Anglo manner. We will use the term "white" as an adjective and "White" as a noun, as a convenience, to avoid cumbersome alternative terminology.

3. See George D. Spindler and Louise S. Spindler, "Fieldwork among the Menomini," in *Being an Anthropologist. Field work in Eleven Cultures*, ed. George D. Spindler (New York. Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970), pp 267–302

4. See George D. Spindler, ed., *The Making of Psychological Anthropology* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978) for an analysis of the history of the field and a chapter by Louise S. Spindler on the research with the Menominee and Blood.

The Menominee and Kainai are particularly useful examples to study because they are relatively small tribes (4,000 to 6,000, as compared to the Navajo or Sioux) but have rich resources—the Menominee their forest and lumber industry, the Kainai their prairie, cattle, wheat, and some oil—which they have battled to keep intact. But they have responded very differently to the white-dominated world about them. There is great diversity among American Indians. There was when the Europeans first came to the new world and there is now, though it is of a different kind.

The Menominee are deeply divided among themselves; culturally, socially, psychologically, and politically. The Kainai are more unified in these same dimensions. This basic difference is reflected in nearly everything that happens as these two tribes try to get along in today's world and improve their lot.

THE MENOMINEE

When the early explorers and missionaries first contacted the Menominee they ranged over a vast area of about 9.5 million acres that included their present reservation of 325,000 acres in east central Wisconsin. They were hunters of deer, moose, elk, and smaller animals, gatherers of wild fruits and roots, and fishers of the great sturgeon as well as the trout and lesser fish of the numerous lakes and streams. They also had gardens, though they were marginal horticulturalists. Of particular importance is the fact that they were harvesters of wild rice. The wild rice, from which they take their name, *Omehnomehneuw*, is extraordinarily nutritious, rich in vitamins, and stores well. These varied food resources meant that the Menominee could settle down in *semipermanent villages for much of each year and develop relatively complex social institutions and ceremonial organizations.*

When the fur trade began shortly after 1667 they shifted to a more nomadic way of life, depending less on their native resources and more upon what they could get for their furs. This shift required a reorganization of social structure and leadership. This was the first major adaptation by the Menominee to the impact of the Europeans on their way of life. The fur trade lasted until the 1830s, when it collapsed, leaving the Menominee destitute. They entered their present reservation area in 1848 and were settled in by 1852.[5] Some attempted to carry on a semi-nomadic hunting and fishing existence, but the majority began to plant gardens and look for work in the lumber industry which was getting underway in Wisconsin by the 1860s.

The traditional culture continues into the present, however, in forms we shall briefly describe later. The cultural differences between Whites and the Menominee were profound. Especially important for understanding the relations between Whites and Menominee are the seemingly irreconcilable differences between the two world views. The differences between these views of social relations, use of technology, the nature of power, relations with the "supernatural," decisionmaking, and desirable personality traits have influenced every relationship between Whites and Menominee,

5. See Louise S Spindler, "The Menominee," in *Handbook of North American Indians* (Washington, D.C.. Smithsonian Institution, forthcoming) for a synopsis of the history and ethnohistory of the Menominee

usually to the disadvantage of the latter, for they were only a handful against a multitude.

The confrontation

We must state the critical differences between white (Western) and Menominee world views in very broad terms, given limitations on space.[6] These differences appear to be the following: 1) In Western culture material power through use of technology is regarded as the way to achieve desired goals. In traditional Menominee culture material power was regarded as useless without spiritual power; 2) In Western culture people must be aggressive in interpersonal relationships to obtain recognition or success. In traditional Menominee culture aggressive people are suspected of being witches; 3) In Western culture extroverted emotional expressiveness is valued as personal salesmanship. People should be friendly, evocative, and lively. In traditional Menominee culture emotions are rarely allowed to surface and the pervasive attitude is "latescent," an expectant and almost passive waiting for action to occur; 4) In Western culture humans are supposed to determine their fate by energetic action and planning. In traditional Menominee culture humans are able to influence events only through living properly in relation to others and in relation to what Whites would regard as supernatural power; 5) In Western culture social interaction is fast and matched by a torrent of words. In Menominee culture social interaction is slow and words are paced and few; 6) In Western culture people are supposed to make decisions on the basis of rational and practical considerations. Among the traditional Menominee most important decisions were made on the basis of dreams.

The differences between the two world views were not easily resolved. A person acting in true Menominee style was usually seriously disadvantaged in the white world. The emerging culture of the United States of America was in theory egalitarian, pluralistic, and assimilative. For immigrants of Anglo Saxon and European descent, and to a lesser degree for the Japanese and Chinese who stemmed from complex civilizations, the system worked. It did not work for most other non-Westerners, and particularly not for people like the Menominee, who were both non-Western and dramatically divergent from Western norms in their way of life and particularly in their world views.

It is not possible to explain all the consequences of the prolonged confrontation between white and Menominee cultures on the basis of differences in world view or culture. Economic, political, and social realities set the stage for the interaction in which psychological and cultural differences play decisive roles. The relative prosperity when the fur trade era was at its height, followed by its decline, the loss of lands, the final confinement to a reservation which was only a fraction of the former area, and the attitudes of Whites towards all nonwhite minorities—these were crucial conditions affecting the continuing Menominee existence and the kinds of adaptations they had to make. But the differences in world view, in outlook, in personality, between the Whites and the Me-

6. Our understanding of the traditional Menominee culture and the confrontation with Western culture is developed in *Dreamers Without Power: The Menomini Indians* (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971).

nominee (and other tribes in various ways) were continuing, pervasive influences on the way in which the Menominee were treated by Whites, and the ways in which the Menominee could respond to this treatment.

This interpretation is reinforced by an examination of the Kainai world view, which is oriented toward aggressive action, acquisition of goods, manipulation, and expressiveness, and much more like that of the Whites. It seems significant that the adaptive responses of the Kainai were also quite different from those of the Menominee.[7]

The response

The Menominee responded to the confrontation between their culture and Western culture, and their respective world views, in different ways in different times. When the fur trade began the Whites were few and the rewards to be gained were great. The Menominee saw the advantages in iron tools and utensils, woven cloth, blankets and rifles, and they could only obtain them through trading furs. They lost much of their old sociopolitical organization and residence pattern by accepting the demands of the fur trade, but retained most of their religion, their language, their arts, and their world view. When the fur trade ended they had nothing to turn to but a very small section of wilderness the Whites did not want, and a dependent relationship with the white society and economy. Some individuals adjusted to the new conditions by adopting white ways as quickly as possible, even to the extent of forbidding their children to speak their native language in the home. Others withdrew further into the forest and attempted to carry on the old existence. Others turned to alcohol and the charity of relatives and white officials. Most just got along from day to day, without long-range goals or purposes.

Out of these varying responses emerged over time four major adaptations. During the period we have known the Menominee these four kinds of adaptations have been apparent, though their distinctiveness has blurred in the most recent generation. They affect the ways in which the Menominee continue to respond to the problem of getting along in a white world. We will consider them as background for a deeper understanding of current behaviors.

These four adaptations are: 1) the native-oriented, which consists of an attempt to revitalize and maintain as much as possible of the traditional way of life in a self-conscious manner; 2) the Peyote or Native American Church, which functions as a synthesis of beliefs and practices from both the traditional Indian and the white culture; 3) the transitional, which is in between the traditional Indian and the white world like the Peyote Cult, but where there is no systematic synthesis of cultural elements; 4) and the acculturated, which consists of individuals who compete with Whites on their terms and who are almost entirely culturally white (though we have some reservations about this last phrase, for we find that cultures almost never die in people). We will describe each of these briefly as adaptive responses to the continuing con-

7. See George D. Spindler and Louise S. Spindler, "The Instrumental Activities Inventory: A Technique for the Study of the Psychology of Acculturation," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology*, vol. 21 (1965), pp. 1–23 for a synopsis of Blood cognitive orientations.

frontation with Whites and white culture.

The Kainai are not divided by such different adaptive responses. It has been possible for a large number, perhaps a majority of Kainai, to retain significant traditional cultural features, including membership in traditional organizations such as the Horn Society and the speaking of the native language, and at the same time make a viable adaptation to white culture and society.

The native-oriented

Menominee culture has never remained static. It was changing before the Whites came and continued to change after their arrival, though probably more quickly. It was a culture of great sophistication, with a strong cosmological and philosophical orientation, quite different than that of the more activistic and less cogitative Kainai. It was never understood by Whites, including those, such as agents, priests, and teachers who were trying to "civilize" the Menominee.

The 35 or so adults and their children who constituted the native-oriented group during our period of most intense field work with the Menominee (1948–56) tried their best to keep the old culture alive. It seemed very much alive to us; during our field work we attended literally hundreds of ritual meetings, including those few held of the Mitäwin, or Medicine Lodge.

The intent of the Mitäwin is to prolong human life and to see to the final settlement of the souls of the dead in their future abode. The meetings, held infrequently—only once every few years during recent times—center around the funeral ceremony, held some time after the death of a member, the laying away of the ghost of the deceased forever, and the reinstatement or renewal ceremony that initiates a new member to take the place of the deceased.

Certain other ceremonies were and are today very important, including the Nemeheetwin, or Dream Dance (literally, "dancing rite") diffused from the western plains. The origin story of the Nemeheetwin centers on a young Sioux woman whose people had been killed by white soldiers. She hid for four days in the reeds by the river bank to escape, then a spirit (awe·tok) came to her and said "Arise! I will take care of you." The spirit then took her to the white camp where all were eating. He showed her a plate heaped with food and told her to eat, that she would not be seen by the white soldiers—to eat as much as she desired. Then he gave her the drum and the drumsticks and instructed her in their use and how people who belonged to the drum should act: to help oneself but also to be good to one another; that they should not kill one another; they should live clean and honorable lives and not fear the Whites. Peace and friendship are main themes, as is access to power, for the spirit told the Sioux girl that when the people hit the drum and sang, their voices would reach the Great Spirit making known their needs.

The symbolism is apparent. The Sioux had reached the end of their free life. They were militarily powerless, completely at the mercy of the Whites. The Nemeheetwin ideology rationalized for them a way of getting along in this sad new world. Eating from the table of the white soldiers, but invisible to them, is particularly poignant. The rite and its ideology spread over most of the west and middle west within a few

years, and the Menominee, along with the Ojibwa, Potowatomi, Winnebago, and other middle western tribes, adopted it, modifying it to suit their own tribal cultures.

These kinds of movements have often been termed "nativistic" by anthropologists. They are ways of making it possible to cope with altered conditions on native terms. The Mitäwin was probably something of the same kind at one time, though it began much earlier, perhaps only 50 years or so after the fur trade and its radical impact on native life had begun in the seventeenth century. But both the Mitäwin and Nemeheetwin had become so incorporated into the Menominee way of life that the people thought of them as ancient Indian religions.

Not only are these organizations nativistic movements, but the whole of the native-oriented group is a form of nativistic movement, or better, a revitalization movement. The members of it were not unaware of the changes that had taken place around them. Quite to the contrary, they self-consciously battled to keep the more destructive of these changes from destroying their culture and fought to keep the Nemehetween, Mitäwin, Chief's Dance (or War Dance), and a multitude of other traditional customs and beliefs alive. As one woman said, speaking of her children, "We've got to keep them on our side!"

It was a self-conscious choice. They wanted to stay Indian, in recognizable, explicit, ways. They held ceremonies, used medicine bags, spoke Menominee, raised their children to think as they did, brought them into positions on the Drum as soon as possible, and lived well off the main roads in substandard housing without electricity, built of tarpaper and bent saplings in the shape of the old wigwam. This was an adaptive strategy, a way of coping with the overwhelming impact of the Whites and their culture. It was not, as one priest said to us, commenting on the "people at Zoar" (the name for the general area), that they "liked to play Indian." It was a self-conscious exclusion of as much of the Whiteman's culture as possible, and an equally self-conscious attempt to maintain, even to revive, the old culture.

We believe that the native-oriented response is particularly significant as we look at current attempts by the Menominee and other native Americans to reestablish an Indian identity. Of course most attempts do not involve as complete a return to native ways, but even the wearing of plastic ornaments and dyed feathers ("polyethylene Indianism," as one Menominee phrased it) at a weekend of dancing at a political rally in San Francisco or Chicago is a kind of revitalization movement. It is an assertion of Indian identity. And the occupation of the novitiate, Alcatraz, the struggle at Wounded Knee, and the claiming of land for Ganienkeh have strong nativistic, revitalizing overtones. Many of the costumes worn by the participants in these actions show Indian, sometimes even specific tribal symbolism, and the spokesmen for the movements invariably assert that their aim is to restore the Indian to a place of dignity as well as to reclaim the lands that were stolen or forcibly taken by Whites during the settlement of the country. It is also noteworthy that membership in the Nemeheetwin has recently increased and more Menominee have taken to dancing at the "Pow-wows" (their term) than at any time during the fifties or early sixties.

There is no comparable move-

ment among the Kainai. Many dance, and traditional societies sponsor social dances that nearly everyone attends as a part of community life, but not as a movement.

The Peyotists

Most of the members of the Peyote, or Native American Church were brought up by parents who were traditional Menominee. All members had experienced doubts about the validity of native beliefs and practices in young adulthood, and had had considerable experience with the white world. All had some direct contact with Catholicism and a few had been baptized as Catholics. They felt themselves to be suspended between two ways of life.[8]

As one man said "I had been looking for something, somehow, somewhere. This Medicine Lodge was nothing for me. I danced, sung, and had a good time, that's all. I was in school. I looked over this Catholic religion. It didn't satisfy me. People go to church, they say prayers, they cross themselves. But it wasn't in here (taps chest). They didn't feel it in the heart. So I go to some Peyote meeting. I learn more. I listen to them sing songs. I watch people pray. Finally I see this is where we Indians belong. This is our church!"

What was it that satisfied him? The Peyote meetings would seem very "Indian" to an outsider. They are held in a Plains Indian-type tepee, around a carefully laid fire, the ashes of which are eventually formed into the shape of a thunderbird or a dove. People take peyote, the bud of the cactus lophophora williamsii, that grows in the American southwest and in Mexico (where the ritual originally came from), sing a special kind of song, quite high-pitched, with the traditional tight throat, and pound a small drum with water inside, with a very fast beat. Eventually people begin to pray, each in his or her own way, in their own tongues, and during this time one is likely to have vision experiences, since the cactus is hallucinogenic. This all seems very traditional American Indian. But the thirteen poles holding up the tepee represent Jesus Christ and the twelve disciples, and Christ appears in many of the songs and in many visions. God is often seen as a bearded Whiteman in long flowing robes, though Master Peyote is seen as a powerful Indian sometimes dressed in a policeman's uniform. Kese·manito·w is also there, and power concepts of a traditional kind operate. Whatever the combination of elements, there are Indian and white cultural symbols synthesized together into a synchronous whole and carried through the long night in a most solemn and sacred manner.

The Peyote Church helps resolve personal and cultural conflicts created by the divergence between Menominee and white world views. It is a way station between the traditional world and the new one. Many Menominee left the native-oriented way, entered into peyotism, and eventually went on to a more acculturated state; others remained in the Peyote Church; some did both.

The Peyote Church is another kind of adaptive response to the impact of Whites and their culture upon the Menominee. It is very widespread

8. The chapter on the peyote road in *Dreamers Without Power* combines the observations of the Spindlers and of J. Sidney Slotkin, who made a special study of the Native American Church (*The Peyote Religion. A Study in Indian-White Relations* [Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1956] and *Menomini Peyotism* [Philadelphia, Pa. American Philosophical Society, 1952]).

among Native Americans. The Kainai, however, never accepted it. They were not as conflicted as the Menominee; not as suspended between two worlds.

Peyotism appears to be dying out now among the Menominee. They seem to have passed beyond the need for this particular kind of conflict resolution. Peyotism does not aim at social or political change. Its ideology is accommodative. It accepts the deficits of the Indian situation and tries to provide the individual with a way of getting along with it. Native Americans seem to feel that the time for accommodation is past, and are taking more militant stands in the hope of causing changes in their favor.

The transitionals and militant identity seekers

Our analysis has consistently called attention to the transitional character of all groups so far discussed. The transitionals, as an adaptive category, are unlike the native-oriented or peyotists in that their conflicts and cultural losses are not resolved by either a revitalistic movement or by synthesis. The transitionals had early childhood experience with the traditional way of life but moved away from it, or were taken from it by the school and church. Few speak their own language or know anything specific about the old rituals. All have had formal schooling, still mainly in the hands of white teachers, but did not really receive the significant benefits of an education because the schools and teachers were not oriented to Indian needs. Some have tried to move further into the white-dominated society, but have been rebuffed by racist Whites, or have been unable to compete with better-trained white labor. Unlike the peyotists or the members of the Dream Dance, they have no primary group of their own and no stable social identity. They constitute a large part, probably a majority, of the generation now in its fifties and sixties.

Many of the young people in the Menominee community today are the offspring of transitionals. Nearly all are in the more general sense of the term. In varying degrees these young people have grown up with uncertainty about who they were, a vague sense of inferiority for what they were presumed to be by Whites, and few consistent cultural guides for behavior. There was little satisfaction in school for them, for their teachers could only communicate to them that they should give up being Indian and become like Whites, but that even if they did, it would not guarantee their acceptance. There was little satisfaction within the reservation community, where excessive drinking, family fights, and a generally disordered life resulting from the cultural losses of the transitional situation, were the only environments with which they were intimately familiar. Not all transitional households were like this, but the many of them that were produced a life experience marked by despair and smoldering resentment

Smoldering resentment coupled with tenuous identities can supply energy for radical social and political movements. However one judges the occupation of the novitiate or the events that have followed, some of them more damaging to life and property within the community than outside, it seems reasonable to interpret them as a kind of striking out that is expressive of pervasive resentment and conflicted identities. (This interpretation does not deny the

validity of political aims or the sincerity of participants.) These are people who are ready to occupy buildings, fight police, and "die if need be." They are a conducive base for power movements, and every revolutionary movement in history has used this energy. When the opportunity for militant behavior and identity assertion appeared, they took it. They occupied the novitiate and left only when they had won. Their victory was pointless in that the novitiate was refused by the duly constituted Menominee authorities as a white elephant, too expensive to keep up and too remote to serve as a hospital. Spokesmen for the Menominee Restoration Committee, the interim ruling body, called the occupation "anarchy" and "unethical." But as one acute observer from within the community said, "The whole situation is just a cause to give life a momentary meaning."

The native-oriented group gave their lives meaning by revitalizing the traditional culture. The peyotists did so by creating a ritual and ideology that brought together otherwise unresolvable differences. The transitionals we knew best often dissolved their problems in alcohol or retreated into apathy. The offspring of transitionals find meaning by asserting their Indianness militantly and demanding redress of grievances. Militant behaviors are an adaptive response for them, just as these other behaviors are, to the continuing confrontation with Whites, white power, and white culture.

The Kainai, in contrast, have not engaged in militant actions and have a reputation for moderation that has not made them too popular in some sectors dedicated to radical militancy. The Kainai have striven to separate their resources and facilities from white interference, even to the extent of rebuilding a community center and an industrial development within the heart of their reservation, both geographically and symbolically. But they are not hostile to Whites or to white help, when it is offered in an acceptable manner. The Kainai do not need to assert identity through militancy for it was never as seriously threatened as was the Menominee's, and they have fewer grievances to redress. Nor is there the same reservoir of transitionals to draw the energy from for extreme forms of militancy.

The acculturated and cycles of leadership

A number of Menominee started moving toward full acculturation as soon as they arrived on the reservation. They were quickly joined by others, but they always remained in the minority. Our sample of acculturated men and women from the 1950s includes entrepreneurs, lumber mill supervisors, office managers, trained technicians, and skilled laborers. Their incomes were substantial and in their homes, dress, speech, and habits they appeared to be white. It is from this group that the effective leadership of the Menominee has been drawn in recent decades. They struggled with the problems of partial self-government in the 1940s and 1950s, but always under the watchful eye of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. They struggled with the disastrous consequences of termination, which in May 1961 withdrew apparently forever all federal control and support from the Menominee. Their struggle with the disastrous aftermath of termination went on for more than a decade, with rising costs, lowered profits from the

Menominee lumber industry, which was the sole industry for the new county created out of the reservation, and a tax load that could not be met. Finally they engineered the sale of several thousand acres of Menominee land, in cooperation with a corporation that creates lakes and vacation lands, in order to provide a better tax base for the poorest county in the state of Wisconsin.

This was the trigger that set off a movement that had been smoldering ever since termination became a fact—the Restoration Movement. At first it seemed like a wild pipe dream, but after a long struggle, marked by superb political maneuvering and considerable militant but not unlawful or violent action, the Menominee won their case, and the United States Senate and the House of Representatives voted the Menominee back to semireservation status in December 1973. The old leadership, drawn from the fully acculturated, largely male contingent, was replaced by another leadership that was equally acculturated, but younger, and female rather than male, and uncontaminated by the taint of a "sellout" to Whites. This leadership, in turn, has recently been challenged by a combination of young militants, particularly the Warriors, some of whom occupied the novitiate, and a few old hands who were deposed from power. The revolt is ostensibly against a "dictatorship of women" and what they regard as its arbitrary and authoritarian behaviors.

Whether old or new, male or female, the responsible leadership of the Menominee in the long run will be more interested in stable progress within a recognizable framework of established law than in militancy for the sake of militancy, or militancy for the undeclared purpose of projecting or forming identities. They will be interested in the maintenance of a Menominee community but will recognize the necessity of getting along with the dominant society. Some of the younger militants, closer to a kind of transitional status and responding with militancy as a means of asserting identity as well as redressing grievances, want to create an Indian retreat where the Whiteman's law does not prevail.[9]

CONCLUSION

It is important for us to keep militancy in the perspective of adaptive response that is an integrating theme in this article. Militancy, for the younger Menominee, is a contemporary adaptive response to the deprivation inherent in the minority position of the Menominee, exacerbated, as it was, through time by the extreme differences in culture and world view that always influenced the interactions of Menominee and Whites. Whereas their parents chose to revitalize tradition, synthesize opposing beliefs with peyote, dis-

9. Others have done research with the Menominee during the past two decades, and we cannot catalogue their influence upon our thinking except to acknowledge that of William H. Hodge, in private conversations. Our interpretations differ, in part due to the different time periods in which we have worked, in part due to his focus on urban Menominee, and our focus on the native-oriented and peyote groups, and in part due to differences in our world views. His "Ethnicity as a Factor in Modern American Indian Migration: A Winnebago Case Study with References to Other Indian Situations," in *Migration and Development*, eds. H. I. Safa and B. M. Dutoit (The Hague, Mouton, 1975) has proven useful. Neils W. Braroe, *Indian and White. Self-Image and Interaction in a Canadian Plains Community* (Stanford, Calif. Stanford University Press, 1975) has also influenced our thinking about Indian-white relations.

solve the pain of life in alcohol or sink into apathy, or acculturate to white norms to the virtual exclusion of Indian or Menominee values, many of this generation have chosen militancy. However unproductive some of their behaviors may be, they should receive due credit for a fighting stance that has some promise for an improved self-image as well as an improvement in the conditions of their existence. One hopes that they will be able to capitalize on recent gains made and will not destroy or seriously degrade the chances for yet further improvements by thoughtless excesses and random, purposeless expressions of hostility toward all duly constituted authority, including their own.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 436, Mar. 1978

Legislation and Litigation Concerning American Indians

By VINE DELORIA, JR.

ABSTRACT: The period 1957–77 witnessed an increasing tendency to include Indians in programs and legislation that affected all Americans, particularly in the field of social welfare and development. Indians, as a whole, made good use of their eligibility for these new opportunities, and entered the mainstream of public social concern. Legislation dealing specifically with Indian rights and legal status was generally trivial because no administration made more than a perfunctory effort to define the larger philosophical issues that might have clarified and modernized the Indian legal status. In litigation Indians were unusually successful in some of their efforts, although, again, truly definitive cases that might have proved a fertile ground for long-term gains in the development of contemporary understanding were sparse. Generally, those cases which might have produced landmark theories or doctrines, the Supreme Court refused to take and the decisions, remaining on the federal circuit level, are not sufficiently strong or clear to provide a basis for further development. The era ended with a state of benign confusion, in which Indians seemed more concerned with funding programs than sketching out in broader and more comprehensive terms the ideologies and theories that are necessary for sustained growth. It was, basically, an undistinguished era, but one of maturing and awareness.

Vine Deloria, Jr., is an enrolled member of the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe of North Dakota. A former executive director of the National Congress of American Indians and former chairman of the Institute for the Development of Indian Law, he is an attorney, lecturer, and writer. He served as expert witness and legal counsel in several of the Wounded Knee trials. A member of the American Bar Association, Authors' Guild, and other organizations, he holds degrees in science, theology, and law. He is the author of Custer Died For Your Sins, God is Red *and the forthcoming book,* The Metaphysics of Modern Existence, *as well as numerous articles. He is presently engaged in a book on the theories of Indian law.*

AMERICAN Indians occupy a unique legal position within the political structure of our country. Individually Indians are citizens entitled to all benefits of federal and state programs. But in a corporate sense Indian tribes are alternately wards of the federal government, subject to severe and complete administrative supervision, and quasi-independent nations with customary laws originating long before the Constitution and modified only slightly by the relationship with the federal government. Legislation and litigation reflect this confused state of affairs. As Indians are able to clarify their goals the legal apparatus accommodates itself to support the demand for independence and sovereignty. But a profile too high generally invokes the traditional American belief in the equality of the races and produces a demand that treaty rights be abrogated, reservations dissolved, and Indians thrust into the urban slums like other minority groups. The legislation and litigation of the past two decades is representative of this polarization at work in the daily and practical events of American politics.

Beginning with the Hoover Commission Report of 1948 Indians were subjected to an era of forced assimilation and termination of special legal rights. Seeking justification of this program under a number of ideological banners, senators such as Arthur V. Watkins of Utah, Frank Church of Idaho, and Henry Jackson of Washington promoted rapid and forced termination of federal services until the late 1960s, when it became apparent that the trend of social thought prohibited such a policy. From 1961 until 1970, however, the Colvilles of Washington were under the constant threat of termination because of a rider attached to an earlier law which required them to prepare a plan of dissolution. Senator Henry Jackson, using the division of the Colvilles as an excuse, kept the waters of fear and discontent stirred by introducing numerous versions of terminal legislation during this period.

The Senecas, losing the best part of their reservation to the Kinzua Dam, were forced to agree to prepare a plan for termination in order to get compensation for the loss of their lands. When the time to submit the plan arrived the issue of termination was very deftly turned aside by Indian Commissioner Robert Bennett, who made it clear that such a move would prove counterproductive to the programs then being initiated by the government.

By the end of the 1960s it was clear that termination was no longer a feasible alternative to federal services. Under the leadership of Senator Fred Harris the Choctaw Termination Act of 1959 was repealed (P.L. 91–386). The Menominees of Wisconsin, one of the first tribes to be terminated in the 1950s, were successful in a number of efforts to demonstrate the futility of their situation, and in December 1973 the policy was officially reversed as The Menominee Restoration Act (P.L. 93–197) became law, ending the most traumatic period of Indian existence.

Although some senators supported termination during the 1960s, the trend in national legislation beginning with the New Frontier and continuing with the War on Poverty of the Great Society indicated that the mood of the American people was one of helping, not hindering, racial minorities. In 1961 under the Kennedy administration the Area Redevelopment Administration was created to support economic development in chronically depressed

regions of the country. Indian reservations were made eligible for this program and many tribes took advantage of the opportunity, building new tribal headquarters, community buildings, and making major capital improvements which had never been conceived in nearly a century of reservation existence. When the program was renewed and expanded in 1964 as the Economic Development Administration, all federal tribes were made eligible for the full scope of programs of this agency and tribes enthusiastically embarked on major economic development projects.

The social programs of the Great Society proved useful to reservation development, but it was not without a degree of irony that Indians were included. An American Indian Capitol Conference on Poverty was held in May 1964 as the Economic Opportunity Act was being considered by the Congress, and Indian poverty was highlighted by a thousand tribal delegates who covered the nation's capitol with visits to their congressional delegations. Being an election year, few politicians could avoid making some statement on the inclusion of Indians in the proposed programs, and the result was that when the Office of Economic Opportunity was authorized, Indians received a special desk.

With this victory under their belts, Indians became sensitive to opportunities that could be created by skillful lobbying efforts, and the favorite tactic was to insist that within the eligibility sections of new legislation the phrase "and/or Indian tribes," be added along with the states and local governments. As a result of this low-profile work, Indians became eligible for nearly every new program authorized during the onrush of social legislation. Thus when the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965 (P.L. 89–19) was passed Indians were made eligible for its provisions. And the renewal of Teacher Corps (P.L. 90–35), Headstart (P.L. 89–794), and VISTA (P.L. 88–452) saw Indians included as regular recipients of the programs. Tribal governments were also included in the Law Enforcement Assistance Act of 1972, and a number of programs designed to upgrade tribal courts and police forces were initiated under the programs funded by this agency.

Education became the focal point of legislative concerns in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Edward Kennedy assumed chairmanship of a minor subcommittee of Public Works following the assassination of his brother Robert, and began extensive hearings on Indian education. Although the investigations were premised upon traditional liberal assumptions which did not exactly fit Indian conditions, the high profile which Kennedy was able to give to Indian education soon made it a major item of congressional interest. A report entitled "Indian Education —A National Tragedy," exploited the wave of sentimental feeling invoked by Dee Brown's best selling book, "Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee," and became the chief item of evidence cited by Indians interested in educational reform.

The Kennedy Report on Indian Education recommended that the Indians take charge of their own education and soon local school boards were being organized to take advantage of this sudden and favorable shift in emphasis. In the Indian Education Act of 1972 a National Indian Education Advisory Council was created, with its members appointed by the president. Political

maneuvering, by both the Nixon administration and the Indian political organizations, blunted the impact of this committee because the appointments became more political than educational. Nevertheless it was a major step forward in addressing the subject of Indian education.

Senator Henry Jackson reversed his political position in the early 1970s, as the opportunity for the Democratic nomination seemed within his reach, and this shift in viewpoint created another important piece of legislation for Indians. The rallying cry of the tribes during the 1960s had been "Self-Determination, not Termination." Jackson used this slogan as the basis of new legislation which would enable tribal governments to contract with the federal government to perform some administrative functions which had formerly been the province of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. In 1975, under Jackson's leadership, the Indian Self-Determination Act (P.L. 93–638) was passed. Although it is too early to evaluate the impact of this piece of legislation, indications are that it could only become fully operative with the cooperation of reforms initiated by the Indians themselves in the manner of conducting tribal governments.

Looking at specifically Indian legislation during this two-decade period one is struck with the triviality of the legislation that was considered by the Senate and House Interior Committees. Much of it dealt with simple housekeeping and bookkeeping matters of restoring very small tracts of land, often under ten acres in area, to the respective tribes which had seen lands taken decades earlier for schools, roads, fire stations, and other government projects of the New Deal era. The Secretary of the Interior had been given ample authority to return these tracts to the different reservations in the Indian Reorganization Act. However this period saw a series of men occupy the position of Secretary of the Interior who were frightened at the thought of congressional criticism. They unanimously refused to make land restorations by administrative act and insisted on introducing pieces of legislation to perform this function, thus reducing the constructive activity of the Interior Department to an absolute minimum for Indians.

In order to highlight the legislation of this period, which specifically dealt with Indian matters, one must be selective and willing to view Indian matters in a broad perspective. P.L. 90–280, for example, repealed an old prohibition against the use of federal scholarship funds in sectarian schools. This law released funds for Indian education and broadened the scope of opportunity available in education for Indian youth, but was really something that could and should have been done a generation earlier. P.L. 90–287 recognized the Tiguas of El Paso as a federal tribe and gave responsibility for them to the state of Texas. A welcome respite, to be sure, but the law was needed because of the failure of the Bureau of Indian Affairs a generation earlier to cover all tribes who had federal rights and wished to organize under the Indian Reorganization Act. P.L. 90–597 enabled the Secretary of the Interior to intervene in the administration of Indian trust lands and estates on the Agua Caliente reservation in California, where there had been a notorious scandal in the handling of Indian moneys. Again, this law was welcome, but a couple of decades too late to be of any use to the Indians.

The early years of the Nixon ad-

ministration saw the use of executive powers to restore lands to tribes. Where this restoration could not be effected, legislation was introduced and received the support of the White House. Such a law was the restoration of the sacred Blue Lake to the people of Taos Pueblo (P.L. 91–550). In the passage of this legislation the White House had to fight very senior senators of the opposite party, such as Henry Jackson and Clinton Anderson, its own Bureau of the Budget, and the reluctant and treacherous Interior Department, which worked behind the scenes against its Indian charges. A great deal of credit must be given to the Nixon administration for keeping this type of promise to the Indians.

Legislation often revolved about personalities rather than legal issues. Thus the Apostle Islands National Lakeshore Act (P.L. 91–424), which confiscated some of the best shoreline lands of the Red Cliff Chippewas of Wisconsin, was regarded by many Indians as a personal bill of Senator Gaylord Nelson rather than a necessary development in the field of Indian policy. At least one congressional career was lost through support of important Indian bills. Senator Fred Harris of Oklahoma opposed the Indian-oil company combination in his native state in order to get P.L. 91–495 passed. This law enabled the people of the Five Civilized Tribes to elect their principal officers for the first time since 1906 when, as part of the dissolution of their tribal governments, the offices were made appointive by the president. The oil companies then worked against Harris in combination with a group of Indian politicians who had been receiving these appointments. By the time of the next election it was apparent that Harris could not win his senate seat and he embarked on an ill-fated effort to win the Democratic nomination for the presidency instead.

Oil companies figured prominently in another piece of major legislation during this period—the Alaska Native Claims Settlement Act (P.L. 91–925). The energy crisis had not yet become important, but it was apparent that the discovery of large oil reserves on Alaska's north slope and the need for transporting the oil to the lower 48 states would produce a settlement to the longstanding claims of the Alaska natives. The bill provided them with 40 million acres, nearly a billion dollars in cash over a decade, and the creation of regional corporations to administer the resources of the natives. A number of native spokesmen who helped get the bill through Congress were later discovered to have been also employees of some major oil companies, raising questions of whether the real natives understood the terms of the settlement. On the whole, however, the settlement has been regarded as more realistic than any of those proposed for Indians in the continental United States, and a minimum of criticism has been directed at the principals of the situation.

Two very pressing problems received legislative attention in this period—Indian civil rights and the federal relationship. For nearly a decade after the passage of P.L. 83–280, which gave jurisdiction to the states in all civil and criminal matters concerning Indians, the tribes had protested that the states purported to take jurisdiction but, in fact, did not provide sufficient law enforcement services to warrant the transfer. In the Pacific Northwest the law was used to justify state intervention in fishing rights and zoning of the reservations without providing any corresponding serv-

ices to the Indians. By the mid-sixties Indians were totally opposed to the law and sought its repeal but lacked the political strength to make themselves heard. The Senate and House Interior Subcommittees on Indian Affairs absolutely refused to hold hearings on repeal.

In 1968 as the black civil rights bill of that year was being debated in the Senate, Sam Ervin of North Carolina cleverly attached several provisions for Indians derived from extensive hearings that his Constitutional Rights Subcommittee of the Judiciary Committee had held, to the pending legislation. Acting at the close of business, Ervin was able to get the Indian amendments passed and the bill was sent to the House for consideration. Wayne Aspinall, then Chairman of the House Interior Committee demanded that the bill be directed to his Committee because of its Indian provisions. Apparently he intended to bury the bill there. But the liberal forces in the House denied his ploy and the House accepted the Senate's amendments. The repeal of P.L. 83–280 was accomplished without the assistance, and against the wishes, of the western congressional delegations who had Indian constituents and who wished to keep the Indians in this no man's land of jurisdictional turmoil.

The haste with which the Indian amendments were added had some inherent difficulties. Tribes were not prepared to upgrade their tribal courts to courts of record and perform many of the other functions which Anglo-Saxon courts must do as a matter of routine. The amendments appeared to conflict with traditional areas in which the federal government had been reluctant to intrude, such as the application of the Bill of Rights to the relationship of Indians and their tribal governments. Thus the years since the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Bill have been filled with a flood of minor litigation as lawyers and tribes seek to clarify exactly how this new relationship must be conceived.

The occupation of Wounded Knee sparked the nation's conscience and congressional delegations sought to appease the outpouring of concern and anger that followed in its wake. The result was the creation of the American Indian Policy Review Commission Act (P.L. 93–580) introduced by Senator James Abourezk of South Dakota in the summer following the occupation. Originally, the Commission was conceived to encourage extensive field visitations to reservations by members of Congress to observe the conditions which had been responsible for the era of discontent culminating at Wounded Knee. But the Nixon administration, now in the throes of Watergate, did not want an explosive investigation of the treatment of Indians to coincide with the investigations it was already confronting.

When the bill was heard in the Senate, Dewey Bartlett of Oklahoma suggested that the investigation be limited to a management study of the Bureau of Indian Affairs. When this suggestion was finally discussed in the House, the Commission was reduced to impotence by the addition of a number of Task Forces, to be manned by Indians, which would do the actual field work, members of Congress simply serving as sounding boards for reform proposals. The Commission was in existence two years and churned out an incredible amount of material, most of it miscellaneous background papers, and concluded its deliberations without much fanfare and vir-

tually no reforms. The original legislation gave the Commission subpoena powers but these were never used, the Commission staff being fearful that any aggressive activity on its part would jeopardize chances of future employment with the Interior Department.

The period can best be summarized by a line from a popular song, "Night Rider's Lament,"—"they must have gone crazy out there." Unlike other periods of Indian history, the last two decades lacked a strong congressional figure ablaze with ideological motivation, seeking reforms and final solutions. Legislation more often reflected personalities and the movements inside the Democratic party than it did issues. The only adequate way to characterize this period is as one of generally benign expediency.

In the corresponding field of litigation, Indian Affairs saw the dawn of a new, aggressive, and exciting era. A number of private legal service groups were organized which began to seek redress for the multitude of wrongs committed by the federal government in previous eras. Foremost among these new groups was the Native American Rights Fund which, although it handled few important cases, did inspire a generation of Indian attorneys. But the field of litigation made few advances in clarifying Indian rights because of the tendency of the Supreme Court to avoid controversial Indian cases or to deal with difficult Indian subjects. It became almost a rule of thumb that if a case had little precedent possibilities, it would be taken by the Supreme Court; if it involved difficult and unresolved ideas, it would be rejected without comment.

A number of major cases were decided that proved to be important to Indians. An early case, critical to the aspirations of the Arizona tribes, was *Arizona* v. *California*[1] which established water rights of the Arizona tribes living along the Colorado River. The federal reservation of sufficient water for the reservations was affirmed and allowed economic development of the Colorado River Indian Reservation as a three-crop-a-year agricultural region. A lesser case, but nearly as important to the tribe concerned, was *Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe* v. *Morton*[2] which required the Secretary of the Interior to justify any diversion of water away from the reservation, thus clearing the way for the tribe to affirm its rights to water for its lake.

Two cases decided the matter of Indian preference in employment in the Bureau of Indian Affairs. Both cases decided in favor of Indians. *Morton* v. *Mancari*[3] held that the Indian preference provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act were not discriminatory and *Freeman* v. *Morton*[4] held that this right extended to all vacancies in the Bureau, not simply to the initial openings which an Indian might accept. Following the *Mancari* victory the National Tribal Chairmen's Association petitioned Congress to cancel the decision by legislation, an ill-fated proposition suggested by Bureau employees to the pliable Indian group.

Fishing rights cases in Washington, Oregon, Wisconsin, and Michigan gave indication that this area of conflict would remain difficult. The state of Washington and the Indians had a running battle over the provisions of the Treaty of Medi-

1. 83 S. Ct 269.
2. 354 F Supp. 252
3. 94 S Ct. 2474.
4. 499 F. 2d. 494.

cine Creek of 1854. The Indians won a partial victory in *Puyallup Tribe* v. *Department of Game of Washington*[5] when the Supreme Court ruled that the state must not create discriminatory regulations for fishing. A ludicrous example of juridical nonsense was *State* v. *Moses*,[6] wherein a tribe, having changed its name to correspond with the name of its reservation, was found not to be a signatory of the treaty. But the climax of the struggle in Washington was *United States* v. *Washington*,[7] the famous "Boldt" decision, which awarded half of the fish in the state to the Indians. Interior Secretary Morton, allegedly the Indians' trustee, when told that the Indians had won, wanted to appeal the decision until informed that Interior had been supporting the tribes.

An earlier decision with a less satisfactory holding, but one that might have warmed Morton's heart was *Organized Village of Kake* v. *Egan*,[8] in which the fishing rights of the little village were declared to have been lost with the admission of Alaska into the union. In general Indians did fairly well with fishing rights cases at the higher federal court level. *Sohappy* v. *State of Oregon*[9] decided that the state was severely restricted in the manner in which it would attempt to regulate Indian fishing. Even more important was the decision in *Menominee Tribe* v. *United States*[10] in which the Supreme Court ruled that the termination of the Menominees had not affected their rights to hunt and fish within their former reservation. This holding led directly to the reversal of Menominee termination.

Struggles over the interpretation of state taxing authority on Indian reservations were prevalent throughout Indian country, but Minnesota and Arizona seem to produce the most important conflicts and decisions. In *Commissioner of Taxation* v. *Brun*,[11] the Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that the state could not interfere with tribal self-government by taxing tribal members for income earned on the reservation in tribal programs. *Warren Trading Post Co.* v. *Arizona State Tax Commission*,[12] decided by the Supreme Court, ruled that the federal government had already totally preempted the area of trading with Indians and eliminated the state from entering this field. The state came back by attempting to tax Navajo employees, but in *McClanahan* v. *Arizona State Tax Commission*,[13] another Supreme Court case, the decision was that such an income tax would intrude into a field occupied by the tribal government and therefore that Arizona lacked jurisdiction to tax the Navajos.

The Indian conflict with federal taxing authorities produced successful decisions also. In an early case in the 1950s, *Squire* v. *Capoeman*,[14] income from federal trust allotments was ruled exempt from income taxes but the Internal Revenue Service continued to seek a means of levying against this type of income. A 20-year battle ensued over the income from allotments purchased by the Secretary of the Interior for Indians under the provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act. In

5. 88 S Ct 1725
6. 422 P. 2d 775.
7. 520 F. 2d. 676.
8. 174 F. Supp. 500
9. 302 F. Suppl. 899
10. 88 S. Ct. 1064.
11. 174 N W. 2d 120.
12. 85 S. Ct. 1242.
13. 93 S. Ct. 1257.
14. 351 U.S. 1.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue Service v. *Stevens*,[15] such income was also held to be exempt from federal taxation.

The confusion resulting from the uneven application of P.L. 83–280, which gave states permission to extend their civil and criminal jurisdiction over reservations, produced a large number of minor cases. With the passage of the 1968 Indian Civil Rights Bill, the issue of jurisdiction became even more complicated and a number of important suits arose in an effort to clarify the questions of exclusive, joint, and concurrent jurisdiction of states and tribes in regard to tribal members and reservation areas. The first major case in this area was *Williams* v. *Lee*,[16] in which the Supreme Court found no right of jurisdiction inherent in the state of Arizona for cases arising on the reservation. A step toward resolution of this question was probably *Colliflower* v. *Garland*,[17] in which the tribal court of the Fort Belknap reservation was described as a federal instrumentality for some purposes. The doctrine was not extended universally, however, and *Kennerly* v. *District Court of the Ninth Judicial District of Montana*,[18] heard following the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act, seemed to indicate that tribal consent was requisite to any assumption or sharing of jurisdiction by tribal courts, undercutting to some extent both the *Colliflower* decision and the Indian Civil Rights Act.

City of New Town, North Dakota v. *United States*,[19] another effort to clarify the geographical area in which tribal jurisdiction could be exercised, produced the doctrine that unless and until the Congress specifically reduces the boundaries of reservations they are presumed to include all lands whether held by Indians or not. This doctrine was expanded by the Supreme Court in *United States* v. *Mazurie*,[20] in which the Shoshone-Arapaho tribes of the Wind River Reservation were supported in their effort to police white landowners on the reservation, the controversy in question being the regulation of a reservation liquor store.

A number of cases served to clarify specific points of law dealing with federal regulations and treaties. *Choctaw Nation* v. *Oklahoma*,[21] a Supreme Court case, affirmed the title to the bed of the Arkansas River and the minerals beneath to the Five Civilized Tribes whose boundaries by treaty included the river. In *Ruiz* v. *Morton*,[22] another Supreme Court finding, the Snyder Act of 1924 was given national application rather than the narrow administrative interpretation which had been promulgated by the Interior Department for nearly a half century. *Northern Cheyenne Tribe* v. *Hollowbreast*[23] held that the all-important mineral rights of this reservation should be held in common, thus preserving a semblance of tribal control over the incredibly rich coal lands of the Cheyenne. And *Running Horse* v. *Udall*[24] forever barred the activities of the Secretary of the Interior in allowing states to levy against the estates of deceased

15. 452 F. 2d. 741
16. 79 S. Ct. 269.
17. 342 F. 2d. 369.
18. 91 S. Ct. 480.
19. 454 F. 2d. 121.
20. 95 S Ct. 710.
21. 90 S Ct. 1328.
22. 94 S. Ct. 1055.
23. 349 F. Supp. 1302.
24. 211 F. Supp. 586.

Indians who had received old age benefits.

The inconsistency of the federal courts toward Indian rights during this two-decade period can be illustrated by reference to a number of cases involving the application of general statutes to Indians. In *Simmons* v. *Eagle Seelatsee*,[25] a federal court held that the plenary power of Congress extends over Indians even though they have received citizenship. *Seneca Nation* v. *Brucker*,[26] a case arising in connection with the construction of Kinzua Dam in Pennsylvania, brought forth the doctrine of implied consent of Congress in general statutes to override treaty provisions. Yet in *Crow Tribe* v. *United States*,[27] a case in the Indian Claims Commission, the 1851 treaty was held to be a recognition of internal sovereignty of the tribes, a doctrine that appeared to bolster the contentions of activists that Indian tribes were quasi-independent and that treaties could not be lightly abrogated or changed by implication. Even more strange was *Harjo* v. *Kleppe*,[28] in which the ruling resuscitated a Creek government thought to have been extinguished in 1906.

The Supreme Court avoided the question of tribal legal status when it refused to hear several cases involving a determination of the treaties of different tribes, leaving everyone puzzled at such holdings as the *Native American Church of North America* v. *Navajo Tribal Council*,[29] in which a federal court characterized tribal governments as "higher than states," and *Iron Crow* v. *Oglala Sioux Tribe*,[30] which seemed to bolster this ideology. *Gila River Pima-Maricopa Community* v. *United States*,[31] another case from the Indian Claims Commission, relied upon the peculiar doctrine that wardship, and the corresponding trustee responsibilities of the United States depend upon the particular statute or treaty under which the United States establishes a legal relationship with the tribe. But even a meeting of the minds involving Indians and the United States can be changed by Congress and when it is, according to *United States* v. *Kiowa, Comanche and Apache Tribes of Indians*,[32] the United States is held to the highest standards of trusteeship. To compound the confusion, one needed only to refer to the *Tuscarora Nation of Indians* v. *Power Authority of the State of New York*[33] to hear a federal court declare that the interest of the United States is in the general, not the specific, welfare of Indians.

As the period ended a potentially explosive situation was in process as eastern Indian tribes sought redress for several centuries of neglect. In *Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe* v. *Morton*,[34] the Indians of Maine successfully contended that they were a federal tribe under the Nonintercourse Act of the 1790s and therefore entitled to pursue land claims against the state of Maine—with the assistance of the Justice Department. In *Narragansett Tribe of Indians* v. *Southern Rhode Island Development Corporation*,[35] the doctrine of federal responsibility

25. 244 F. Supp. 808.
26. 162 F. Supp. 580.
27. 284 F. 2d. 361.
28. 420 F. Supp. 1110.
29. 272 F. 2d. 131.
30. 231 F 2d. 89.
31 140 F. Supp. 776.
32. 163 F. Supp. 603.
33. 164 F. Supp. 107.
34. 528 F. 2d 370.
35. 418 F Supp. 798

for eastern Indians was expanded with the holding that even studied neglect by the federal government was not sufficient to break the trust responsibility owed the Indians. The incoming Carter administration sought to prevent these cases from going forward to their logical—and inevitable—conclusion that Indians owned most of the Atlantic seaboard.

The litigation process is most difficult to control and the emergence of any sustained theoretical development must be accidental at best. Indian cases traditionally are subject to the whims of the courts in the sense that not all judges have sufficient familiarity with American history, the complexities of treaty negotiations, or traditional doctrines of Indian law to write comprehensive and comprehensible decisions which will bind the various strands of theory into a coherent whole. That federal court decisions bear little resemblance to corresponding contemporary developments in legislation is well-known and capable of documentation in any period of Indian history. But during this particular period, unless a case was politicized and obviously had the capability of resolving the ancient schizophrenia of ward-domestic dependent nation ideology, judges did not pay much attention to events and movements in the public arena.

Summarizing the two decades in the fields of legislation and litigation one could best describe them as years of confusion, in which a strong leadership by executive, legislative, or judicial branches of the government would have been welcomed but was absent. Indians made substantial progress in a tangible sense with the plethora of new social programs. They successfully defended themselves in the courtroom against intrusions on their self-government and reservation jurisdiction. And they made some progress in reasserting ancient treaty claims respecting land and hunting and fishing rights.

The missing ingredient in the formula for constructive change was a unified Indian community capable of articulating and interpreting future goals. No theoretical conception of the contemporary status of Indians emerged from the Indian community and without the ideological guidelines to act as boundaries for change, there was simply continuous movement to and fro between the twin poles of sovereignty and wardship. No single period of time can be expected to yield a rich harvest of leadership and constructive activity, and it may be that the seeds so carelessly planted during these tumultuous decades will bear positive fruit in the decades ahead. One thing was certain: Indians had broken the back of the termination mentality and had emerged from the shadows of social neglect into a better day. How much better the future would be was the unanswered question as the Indian community faced the last two decades of this century.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 436, Mar. 1978

The Indian Claims Commission

By NANCY OESTREICH LURIE

ABSTRACT: In 1946, when the Indian Claims Commission Act was passed, it was expected that the Commission would complete its work in ten years. The volume of dockets, about 650, and the time consuming methods of litigation required repeated extensions of the Commission's tenure, with the present cut-off date set for 1978. The Commission's work has been expedited somewhat by procedural reforms introduced in the 1960s, including expansion of the number of Commissioners from three to five. Generally, the Commission has been a disappointment to Indian claimants. Despite exceptionally broad grounds for suit stated in the 1946 Act, the Commission has favored narrow construals and parsimonious settlements. Tribes must obtain congressional approval of plans for the use of their awards. The Indians' usual preference has been for per capita distributions rather than for programmed use which the government prefers, such as investment in securities or tribal enterprises. Since 1974, except for unusual circumstances warranting otherwise, tribes must program 20 percent of their awards.

Nancy Oestreich Lurie is head Curator of Anthropology at the Milwauke Public Museum. She holds an adjunct professorship in Anthropology a the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee where she previously served on the ful time faculty. She received her Ph.D. in 1952 from Northwestern Universit Her field studies have included work with the Winnebago people of Wisconsin an Nebraska and the Dogrib people of northern Canada. She has testified in number of cases before the Indian Claims Commission and has published ex tensively on contemporary Indian affairs as well as on general anthropologica topics.

RETROSPECT[1]

THE INDIAN Claims Commission Act of August 13, 1946 (P.L. 79–726) was intended to overcome procedural and financial obstacles in the way of Indian tribes seeking restitution for grievances against the United States. Heretofore, a tribe had to obtain a special jurisdictional act from Congress to bring suit in the U.S. Court of Claims, where the grounds for suit tended to be construed so narrowly that more than two out of three claims were disallowed, and it was not unusual for several decades to elapse from the time attorneys were retained until a decision was rendered.

During the 1930s and 1940s, Congress repeatedly considered the creation of a special tribunal to deal fairly and expeditiously with Indian claims and assure that even poor tribes could have their day in court. The legislation of 1946, in effect a general jurisdictional act, permitted tribes five years to register claims with the Commission, which was expected to hear and adjudicate all cases by 1957. The act also eased the way financially for tribal claimants. Attorneys could enter into total contingency contracts with Indian clients and attorneys' fees were limited to no more than 10 percent of a judgment besides the costs of preparing cases. The Bureau of Indian Affairs had the responsibility of informing tribes of their right to bring suit.[2]

Claims could be brought by any "tribe, band or identifiable group" of American Indians through their governing councils or, if lacking a formal organization, by any member acting in behalf of the tribe, band, or group. The Attorney General was designated to defend the government and a special Indian claims staff was set up in the Justice Department to handle the increase in Indian cases. Hearings were to be conducted according to ordinary federal court procedures with either party having the right of appeal, first to the Court of Claims and then to the Supreme Court.

While operating much like a court, a commission, in theory, has more flexibility to deal with unusual and unprecedented circumstances. In practice, commissions frequently are reluctant to break new ground. The Indian Claims Commission was no startling exception in this regard. In some respects, the procedural provisions of the act itself encouraged conservativism. However, the act also incorporated two features which could have given the Commission the necessary latitude to develop new approaches to old problems. These were the grounds for suit (section 2) and the Commission's power to create an Investigation Division (section 12). In the actual promulgation of suits, neither of these provisions figured importantly.

A remarkable range of complaints was anticipated in the grounds for

1. Unless otherwise cited, material in this section is from Nancy Oestreich Lurie, "The Indian Claims Commission Act," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 311 (May 1957) pp. 56–70

2. The Bureau contacted only federally recognized tribes. Thus, many groups on the eastern seaboard were overlooked. Long unresolved claims are now being presented through the courts by Indian groups such as the Penobscot and Passamaquoddy of Maine For a discussion of wider legal issues regarding Indian affairs up to 1957, see the article by Theodore H. Haas, "The Legal Aspects of Indian Affairs from 1887 to 1957," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 311 (May 1957) pp. 12–22. On litigation, see Vine Deloria's article in this issue of THE ANNALS

suit, including elaborately specified claims in law or equity arising in regard to the Constitution, treaties and Executive Orders of the President, as well as claims sounding in tort or involving fraud, duress, mutual or unilateral mistake, and, finally, "claims based on fair and honorable dealings not recognized by any existing rule of law or equity." The door appeared to be open to almost anything, but once cases began to be heard it was shut, quickly and firmly, against any claims which did not deal with a limited number of highly quantifiable issues. In the vast majority of cases this has meant proving that the claimants had been paid less for their land than its fair market price at the time of taking. Awards consist of the difference between these figures minus offsets. Exceptions to this pattern are accounting claims, about 50 out of more than 600 dockets, and concern allegations of mismanagement of tribal funds, lands, and resources. Many of these cases have been transferred to the Court of Claims and are still in litigation. The emphasis in this article will be on land cases.

If employed at all, "fair and honorable dealings" has been mainly "color" in arguments based on unconscionable payments for land or uncompensated takings.[3] Attorneys for the Indians and the Justic Department assessed the sentime of the Commission as expresse in the earliest cases, 26 dismissa and only two awards by 1951, a settled for legal theories based acreage and cold cash. Even t grounds of fraud and duress, trac tional sources of Indian grievanc seemed to strike many attorne as more rhetorical than substanti issues. In fairness, it should be note that the hazards of contingency co tracts and 10 percent fees design to benefit the Indians also tended discourage lawyers from striki out in innovative directions.

Presentation of land cases so followed a routine format. Fir there is the need to prove the pe tioners' identity as the rightful d scendants of those who used a occupied the land in question. T concepts of use and occupancy fr quently became matters at iss until a kind of formula evolved o of the Commission's decisions. T Commission chose to honor trib claims where any kind of aborigin title to exclusive use and occupan was shown, if only ritualistic seasonal, but to disallow compens tion for intertribally shared lan although an important portion several tribes' sustenance mig have come from such areas. Whe the government moved several trib into an area and then moved the on, the Commission has recogniz such shared interests as a form legal title to given lands.[4]

If it is decided that a petition has a proper claim, a second rou of hearings considers the petitione

3. "Fair and honorable dealings" cannot be used in accounting claims transferred to the Court of Claims, but it has figured in the Commission's decisions in not allowing offsets where administrative procedures worked hardships on tribes. The difficulties of bringing suit on grounds of fair and honorable dealings per se are discussed by James Michael Kelly in a review of *Gila River Pima-Maricopa Community* v. *United States*. His discussion appears in "Recent Developments", *Saint Louis University Law Journal*, vol. 15, no. 3 (1971) pp. 491–507. Kelly concludes, "The holdings . . . did serve to solidify an historical American tradition and belief: Indians never win."

4. Imre Sutton, *Indian Land Tenure* (N York: Clearwater Publishing Co., 1975), p vides valuable analyses of Indian land ho ing, both aboriginal and under fede trust, and extensive discussion of Indi Claims Commission cases.

and government's evaluations of the fair market price of the land at the time it was relinquished. Finally, if the government is proved liable, the question of offsets must be argued. Hearings require extensive testimony by various kinds of expert witnesses, the introduction of hundreds of pages of documentation, and all the customary legal paper generated by opposing attorneys. By 1976, the Commission's records comprised 39 volumes, each averaging well over 500 pages.[5]

In effect, the Commission required the litigants to undertake and pay for much of the work intended for the Investigation Division and sought no major appropriation from Congress to make it an effective source of knowledge to illuminate their deliberations.

TWENTY YEARS LATER

When the Indian Claims Commission was first reviewed in THE ANNALS in 1957, it was observed that it had already become necessary for Congress to extend its tenure for five years and that the claims would "simply not be settled when the Commission expires in 1962." The life of the Commission has had to be extended four more times, most recently to September 30, 1978, when any remaining litigation will be completed in the Court of Claims.

The extended tenure of the Commission is due in part to the volume of cases greatly exceeding congressional expectations in 1946. By the 1951 deadline, 370 petitions were filed but because many included more than one cause of action, by September 1976, the Commission had gradually separated them into 615 dockets. Dockets are sometimes further subdivided into several issues so that the number of actual claims has been estimated in the neighborhood of 850.[6] The Commission could not possibly have wrapped up its work by 1957. The situation would have been even worse if some procedural changes had not been instituted.

Initially, for example, both the land area and its evaluation had to be decided by the Commission before either party could appeal to the Court of Claims. In 1960, an amendment to the original act allowed for interlocutory appeal when the extent of title alone had been ruled on, with evaluation argued only once, after acreage was determined.[7] With the slow settlement of claims, Indians' attorneys with a number of pending suits were often hard put to finance the preparation of their cases. In 1963, a revolving loan fund administered through the Indian Bureau helped attorneys pay for expert assistance of a nonlegal nature.

The most sweeping efforts to expedite the Commission's work occurred in 1967. The number of Commissioners (appointed by the President with the advice and consent of

5. Indian Claims Commission, *Annual Report* (Washington, D.C., 1976) p. 1.

6. Thomas Le Duc, "The Work of the Indian Claims Commission under the Act of 1946," *Pacific Historical Review*, vol. 26, no 1 (1957) pp. 1–16

7. In discussing the legislative history of the Claims Commission Act since 1946, I have relied heavily on "The Indian Claims Commission Act as Amended," a pamphlet edited and printed by the firm of Wilkinson, Cragun and Barker, Washington, D.C., May 1972. I am grateful to Frances Horn, a partner in this firm, for bringing this publication to my attention and for her patient kindness in answering, in personal correspondence and phone calls, my many questions regarding various developments in the work of the Commission incorporated in this article.

the Senate) was increased from three to five. By this time, Chief Commissioner Edgar Witt and Commissioner Louis J. O'Marr had retired and had been replaced respectively by Arthur V. Watkins (1960)[8] and T. Harold Scott (1959). The 1967 legislation called for new presidential appointments. Neither William M. Holt, the last original Commissioner, nor Scott was reappointed, and Watkins chose to retire. Thus, a completely new panel took office with the life title of Chief Commissioner abolished in favor of a changing chairmanship.

Since 1967, procedural streamlining has included prehearing conferences to get technical matters cleared away and regularizing a practice, employed occasionally after 1960, of farming hearings out to smaller panels rather than having the entire Commission hear each case. The most significant saving of time concerned expert testimony. Customarily, both sets of witnesses had presented extensive oral testimony. Since 1967, both parties to the suits have been required to present their experts' direct testimony in written form 30 days before trial so that hearings can begin immediately with cross examination based on the reports.

Appendix 1 of the Commission's 1976 *Annual Report* reveals that in the 18 years from 1949 to 1967, the Commission disposed of 232 dockets, 132 by dismissals and 100 by awards. In the next eight years, 68 dockets were dismissed and 180 resulted in awards, a total of 248 dockets. Despite an enormously accelerated pace of work, the first Chairman, John T. Vance, noted in 1969 that it was unrealistic to expect the Commission to complete, in the three years then remaining to it, more work than had been accomplished in the preceding two decades.[9] Vance called for activation of the Investigation Division to employ experts, assemble evidence and present proposed findings of fact to the Commission which would then hear further arguments from the interested parties to arrive at final opinions. Apparently, the enormous shifting of bureaucratic and legal gears and the necessary appropriation to institute a real Investigation Division met with less enthusiasm than the, by now, familiar technique of extending the life of the Commission to complete its work.

Size of awards

Although complete statistics are not yet available, it is possible to make some general observations as the work of the Commission finally draws to a close. By June 3, 1977, there had been certified to Indian claimants in 285 dockets a total of $657,151,090.33 before deduction of attorneys' fees. This amount must have been equalled, if not greatly exceeded, by the cumulative costs

8. The original Commissioners' lack of prior experience in Indian affairs was deemed an asset of open mindedness. However, when Watkins was appointed, arguments in his favor were that he was already an expert in Indian matters, having been the foremost proponent of the termination policy while he was a Senator (R. Utah)—hardly a qualification to inspire Indian confidence in the Commission. Greater sensitivity has characterized appointments since 1967, including Margaret Hunter Pierce, experienced in Indian claims in her previous positions as Clerk, Chief Clerk and Reporter for the Court of Claims, and Brantley Blue, a Lumbee Indian and formerly a judge.

9. John T. Vance, "The Congressional Mandate and the Indian Claims Commission," *North Dakota Law Review*, vol. 45, no. 3 (Spring 1969) pp. 325–36.

since 1946 for personnel and related expenses of the Commission itself, the Indian Claims Section of the Justice Department, the Court of Claims in appeals from Commission decisions, and the Congress and Bureau of Indian Affairs in regard to various continuing concerns with the course of Indian Claims.

Awards, to date, range from less than $2,500 (Ponca, Doc. 324) to over $29,000,000 in the eight combined dockets of the Indians of California (Docs. 31, 37, 176, 215, 333, 80, 80-D, 347). Some tribes' claims are presented in several dockets and in some cases several tribal groups share in a single docket. The average amount per docket which resulted in an award is under $3,000,000. On a per capita basis Indian people for the most part will realize only a few thousand dollars each from their tribes' awards. From their point of view, it must appear that the federal mountain labored long and mightily to bring forth a pretty paltry mouse, if any mouse was forthcoming at all. With few exceptions, interest is not allowed.[10] Land evaluations are low, offsets cut down the size of claims awards, and the costs of preparing Indians' cases are deducted from their awards.

Fair market value

While it would appear a simple matter to deduct the sum paid for land from the fair market value at the time of taking, historic land values are subject to many interpretive alternatives. Where cessions were small and surrounded by private land for which there was an active market, comparative appraisal is relatively easy. However, many cases involve large aboriginal holdings more or less remote from white settlement. Even appraisals based on contemporary sales of similar, unimproved lands raise technically, if not ethically, uncomfortable issues. As pointed out by historian Thomas Le Duc:

> . . . the United States, by virtue of its vast operations in the land market in the nineteenth century, held a monopolistic power over land prices throughout the country . . . the price of private land was substantially a function of public policy. After 1840, certainly, federal policy affected adversely the value of private land in the United States. . . The appraiser must, therefore, calculate values as they prevailed within the orbit of prices determined by government dumping of land at low prices.[11]

A number of ingenious formulas were brought forth by the Justice Department in the early hearings to arrive at land values, such as the attempt to set an average dollar amount per acre according to the price the government eventually got from sale of the land. However, included in this "average" were huge sections conveyed under other forms of entry than cash sales, veterans' land paper, and agricultural college scrip, for example. While such flagrant financial fudging was disallowed, demolishing such arguments entailed time and expense for Indian claimants.[12] The inexactitude of restrospective appraisal has

10. The Commissioners note a current state of uncertainty about accounting claims and ". . . the Government's duty or lack of duty to pay interest on tribal moneys it withholds from Indians." (*Annual Report*, 1976). In claims arising out of the Fifth Amendment of the Constitution (due process), interest is automatically included from the time of taking. Sale of "surplus" Indian land has figured in a number of Fifth Amendment claims.

11. Le Duc, "The Work of the Indian Claims Commission," p. 12.

12. Ibid., pp. 10-11.

been resolved increasingly over the last decade by stipulations in which both parties to the suits agree to a compromise between their respective experts' appraisals.[13]

Offsets

Offsets also have helped to reduce the size of awards, a few to the point of nullifying them. The following discussion of offsets draws heavily on a detailed study of the subject by John R. White.[14] The Act of 1946 probably would not have been passed without the inclusion of the offset provision. Figures as high as $3,000,000,000 were bruited about as the bill the government might have to pay on Indian claims. Although this sum was patently inflated, apparently it served to frighten legislators into allowing offsets. As White observes of the final form of the Indian Claims Commission Act, "It's as if the government was expressing a willingness to correct the error of its ways—providing the effort wasn't too costly."

Neither the Commission nor Court of Claims has been entirely consistent in determining what constitutes a proper offset. Generally, "money or property given to or funds expended gratuitously for the benefit of the claimant," is understood to mean expenses for group rather than individual welfare. Special considerations to chiefs have been disallowed as offsets but, as White shows, it is then difficult to understand why the government was allowed to offset the cost of funerals for indigent Indians in the Quapaw judgment of 1954.

The major justification for offsets is that if Indians had received proper compensation for their lands initially they would not have needed subsequent gratuities. Offsets are therefore part of the price paid for the land. However, offsets often turn out to be the price of things that Indian people neither wanted nor would have purchased if given a choice. Also, had tribes not been forced to relinquish the lands and resources which had supported them, they would not have required government gratuities to survive.[15]

As a general point of law, a defendant may not plead against a judgment a gratuity given a plaintiff. Monroe Price notes the questionable legality of Indian claims offsets in observing that "a person defending against a tort claim of rape cannot offset the award by the value of the incidental pleasure his victim enjoyed as a result of the attack."[16]

The Investigation Division

When the Commissioners decided to give the task of generating information to the litigants, they made the hearings unnecessarily time consuming and costly for all concerned, including the tax paying public. The expense of the cases would have been no greater if the Investigation Division had been properly

13. Indians' attorneys tend to feel that stimulations generally work to the tribes' benefit. At least, they hasten proceedings in cutting down the number of appeals by either side.

14. John R. White, "Barmecide Revisited: The Gratuitous Offset in Indian Claims Cases," *Ethnohistory*, in press.

15. The "Sioux Amendment" to the original Act, approved October 27, 1974 (88 Stat. 1499) states that "expenditures for food, rations, or provisions shall not be deemed payments on the claim" which, in effect, recognized that otherwise the Sioux Black Hills claim would have been virtually wiped out.

16. Monroe Price, *Law and the American Indian: Readings, Notes and Cases* (New York: Bobbs Merrill, 1973), pp. 497–98.

staffed and funded; it might have been considerably less. The number of researchers and experts hired by the Justice Department are paid for with public moneys which could have been shunted just as easily through the Commission itself, thereby also saving much duplicating of effort by opposing experts.

Not only are Indian claimants' awards reduced by the cost of experts, but there is the incalculable cost of the lack of experts. Indians' attorneys were not equally able to assume what turned out to be extremely long-term risks. There is the nagging possibility that when final analyses are made some of the early dismissals and very small awards will be shown to be the result of differential access to experts, especially before the revolving loan fund was established.

Disposition of awards

Until Indian groups present plans for the distribution of their judgments, their awards draw 4 percent interest in the federal treasury or, with tribal approval, the Indian Bureau invests their money at the highest rates obtainable. Until recently, Congress spent a great deal of time detailing exactly how the money was to be used in the disposition of each award. A general disposition act for Indian claims judgments, passed October 19, 1973, now delegates primary responsibility for review and approval of plans to the Secretary of the Interior. The lengthy rules governing the Secretary's work include the directive that "not less than twenty (20) per centum of judgment funds, including investment income thereon, is to be used for tribal programs unless the Secretary determines that particular circumstances of the affected tribe clearly warrant otherwise."[17]

The fact is that the majority of tribes have argued for complete and immediate distribution of their awards on a per capita basis despite urging by Congress, the Indian Bureau and some of their own members to husband their awards with investment programs or programs to serve the general interest.[18] If ill-advised, as some believe, the widespread clamor for per capitas is understandable.

In the first place, the implementation of the Indian Claims Commission Act coincided with the period of gathering congressional sentiment for termination of federal responsibility to protect Indian land and resources. As Indian people saw it, termination was likely to be the penalty for attempting to program their money. The Menominee tribe, the first to be terminated, was singled out largely because of its apparent "wealth." In 1951, after 17 years of litigation, the Menominee had won a net judgment of $7,600,000 in the Court of Claims. Added to working capital from their tribal

17. "Use or Distribution of Indian Judgment Funds," *Federal Register*, vol 39, no 10 (15 January 1974) pp. 1835–36.

18. A Bureau of Indian Affairs statement taken from a memo from the division of Tribal Government Services, Aug. 26, 1974, lists 109 judgment dispositions by special acts prior to the act of 1973. Of 100 plans with complete data, 49 (involving 36 tribes) are total per capita distributions and two more tribes have modified, "family plan" per capita distributions; 11 plans (involving 10 tribes) divide awards between per capita distribution and programming with the largest share in most cases going into per capitas, the remaining 38 plans are totally programmed awards, but 11 of these are accounted for by three tribes each with several awards. In one case a tribe with two programmed awards distributed a third and by far the largest in per capitas.

lumbering industry, they had some $10,000,000 in cash assets besides their substantial, tribally held estate in timbered land. The tribe voted $1,500 per capita payments from their judgment (since individual income had suffered over the years because of government mismanagement of their lumbering, the basis of their suit), setting the rest aside for community purposes, including the actual expenditure of about $250,000 for improving the hospital they maintained with tribal enterprise earnings.

By 1961 when termination became final, with the Menominee still protesting against it, the remainder of their judgment and money they had accumulated previously had gone down the drain in the process of getting them terminated. Virtually bankrupt, they even had to close their hospital and lost a sizeable piece of their land before they succeeded in getting their termination repealed in 1973. While the per capitas made no appreciable difference in individuals' lives, it was the only satisfaction the Menominee got out of their judgment. Had it not been distributed, it would have gone with the rest of their funds.[19]

Besides widespread Indian awareness of the Menominee story, practically every tribe has had its own historical experiences of money managed for their benefit, and when it was gone they were no better off than before. Problems with federal administration and tribal governments have created schisms in Indian communities and, for many tribes, arguments about disposition of claims awards have added to internal political dissent. Although delays of several years between certification of awards and approval of plans have increased judgments through accumulated interest, this fact fails to convince many Indian people of the advantages of investment programs. Explanations of how the equivalent of immediate per capita amounts could accrue from interest over a period of a few years, while leaving the award intact and still producing income, are not enough to overcome an abiding Indian suspicion that the two birds will fly out of the bush before they hatch any eggs.

Tribal business ventures or community improvements are considered at least as risky as investments. Furthermore, while "home" remains the reservation, many people spend much time away at jobs in urban areas and do not see locally-based programs as serving the general interest. Finally, Indian people are inclined to consider community development a federal financial responsibility, part of the promise they relate to treaties, which has never been fulfilled to their satisfaction.

It is less easy to understand why some tribes have chosen to program all or a large portion of their judgments. There is no discernible pattern of tribal programming of judgment funds in terms of geographical location, cultural similarities, or a particular period when Indian people might have felt more confident about programming. As far as my limited observations suggest, one of the persuasive arguments for programming is that future generations of the tribe have an equity in the

19. For more information on Menominee, see Debbie Shames, ed., *Freedom with Reservation* (Madison, Wisconsin. National Committee to Save the Menominee People and Forests, 1972), Nancy Oestreich Lurie, "Menominee Termination From Reservation to Colony," *Human Organization*, vol 31, no. 3 (Fall 1972) pp. 257–69.

award. The people deciding on disposition plans just happen to be alive now to collect on debts owed since their ancestors' time. There is also an element of respect for the memory of recently deceased elders, who initiated tribal claims proceedings in the 1940s knowing they might not live long enough to benefit personally, but worked for the on-going interests of the tribe.

The philosophical beauty of all this will be readily admitted by those who insist on per capitas, but they are convinced that inevitably Indian people will be bilked out of their money. Their reasoning is that if the present generation does not cash in, no one will. Moreover, philosophical considerations often are not very meaningful because the source of awards is not clearly understood. Few tribal representatives were able to attend their claims hearings, fewer still were called upon to testify to promote a sense of direct tribal effort in forwarding their claims; and often lawyers and ethnohistorians uncovered causes for suit of which the tribes had been unaware. Not only are many of the Indian people dead whose names appear on the original petitions, but many original attorneys of record have died or retired, their practices passed on to others who may not have maintained their predecessors' close contacts and frequent communications with their clients. There are now simply a lot of Indian people who, as long as they can remember, have heard about money the government owes them and who tend to perceive the awards as a kind of token compensation for personal hardships and grievances they identify generally with the fact of being Indian. Even where there is understanding that awards are based on lost lands, there is bitterness because often it is not understood that compensation is based on the appraised value of land at the time it was ceded and not on the wealth the land generated for the white man since then.

When per capita distributions have been approved, payments still can be held up for several years by the enormous amount of work entailed in arriving at a complete and accurate enrollment of everyone eligible to share in an award. Tribal membership usually is based on quantum of Indian "blood," a quarter for most tribes. Among the many complications to be dealt with are locating highly mobile Indian people who have lived away from their communities for many years and Indian children who have been adopted by white families. There are people who may be as much as "4/4" Indian but of such mixed tribal descent that they may have trouble proving that a full quarter of their ancestry derives from the tribe with which they may have a life-long sense of identification. Then there are individuals everyone in the tribe recognizes as members, but whose ancestors, through some historical oversight, did not get listed on an early roll used as a basis for checking genealogical credentials of present claimants.

It is too soon to tell whether tribes which programmed all or a large part of their awards will fare better in the future than those which disposed of all or most of their money in per capita distributions. However awards are disposed of, the fact of mounting inflation over the long period of time required to settle most of the claims has made the judgments less significant to the Indian interest than they would have

been ten or twenty years ago. If justice delayed has not been justice denied, it has been materially diminished through time.

INDIAN GRIEVANCES

Justice also may have been diminished because, prior to taking office, none of the original Commissioners whose work set the course for all the cases had any significant acquaintance with Indian affairs. Their early decisions limited severely the kind of information subsequently considered. The very first decision certainly had wide reaching effects. This concerned the Fort Sill Apache (Doc. 137) who alleged unfair imprisonment. All of them had been held in federal custody for many years because of depredations committed by the relatively small group led by Geronimo. The Commission dismissed the claim (1949) not for lack of possible merit but on jurisdictional grounds that it concerned a mere aggregate of individual grievances, albeit all derived from the same source, and not a collective grievance of a "tribe, band or identifiable group" specified in the Indian Claims Commission Act. It is possible that faced with hundreds of claims, the Commission simply panicked at the prospect of trying to put a price on mental anguish and similar intangibles and beat an expeditious retreat to high, legalistic ground to avoid the quagmire of moral questions.

Whatever their reason, the Commissioners automatically excluded claims from the start which on careful examination might have been both valid and reasonably manageable. Whether the distinction between an aggregate of grievances and a group grievance was inherent in the act or only an artifact of construal which attorneys were willing to live with, the difference apparently accounts for the absence of cases concerning allotment as unjust in effect, whatever its benevolent intent, in having reduced enormously the tribes' capital in land and fragmented what remained beyond use by the communities. It helped to further entrench an already repressive bureaucracy to confound the course of satisfying community life on allotted and unallotted reservations alike, right up to the present day.

Allotment meant that after the government granted land collectively to a group, it then aggrieved the group by imposing a policy without the group's informed consent to divide the land in severalty. This interfered with developing the land in the collective interest. It also conveniently reduced any future tribal grievance about the consequences of allotment to an aggregate of individual grievances outside the jurisdiction of the Commission which was created to settle Indian grievances. The only complaints which can be heard concerning allotment involve accounting cases claiming the government did not get the best price it could have in the sale of "surplus," unallotted land or that allocation of allotments was mismanaged in terms of the regulations concerning those qualified to receive them.[20]

Because there was no Investigation Division, there is no way of knowing whether it would have viewed claims in the broad perspective of the whole fabric of Indian

20 For a discussion of allotment and sale of "surplus" Indian land, see Price, *Law and the American Indian*, pp. 483–87.

policy, or whether the Commission would have heeded the Division in making different construals. The fact that the first Commissioners saw no need for an Investigation Division suggests that they reposed their faith in the workings of the law rather than evidence.

The Commission was further isolated from the full scope and nature of Indian grievances by the lack of meaningful Indian involvement in the cases, a point noted by Commissioner Vance, who suggests that there was nothing to prevent Indians from presenting their own cases. It was the Indian Bureau, according to Vance, which erred in interpreting its charge to inform tribes about the Commission as a directive to get competent counsel under contract.[21] Granted the old saw that anyone who tries to represent himself in court has a fool for a lawyer, there could have been Indian input if, at least as a first step, tribes had drawn up their own complaints. The Investigation Division, had there been one, could have systematized the patterns of complaint which would have emerged, researched tribal histories for further bases of claims, and recommended formal handling by attorneys as needed. Even attorneys have complained that most of their research had to follow upon submission of petitions they could only hope covered all likely issues.

No one really listened very carefully to the Indians. It should be remembered that the Commission was the direct result of recommendations in the Meriam Report of 1928:

> The benevolent desire of the United States government to educate and civilize the Indian cannot be realized with a tribe which has any considerable unsatisfied bona fide claim against the government . . . the conviction in the Indian mind that justice is being *denied, renders extremely difficult any* cooperation between the government and its Indian wards.[22]

It is my opinion that the Meriam staff, upon encountering a pervasive expression of grievance among Indian people across the land, drew an oversimplified conclusion about the nature of that grievance, a conclusion which continued to dominate the Commission's work more than 40 years later. That is, that Indians were complaining mainly about having been shortchanged in the treaty period. This was far from the only issue about which Indian people were becoming increasingly exercised by the 1920s. Inbued with the idea of educating and civilizing Indian "wards" out of their Indianness, the Meriam staff simply could not comprehend the Indians' meaning that it was this very philosophy underlying federal policy and programs, including allotment, about which Indian people were aggrieved.

In other contexts, the Report showed commendable insight in noting the socially damaging effects of the Indian Bureau's efforts to stamp out entirely all trace of Indian custom. However, the Meriam staff did not grasp the connection Indian people made to their current hardships when they talked about land and treaties. As an ethnologist, I submit that in the course of my field work going back to 1944, and of colleagues I have talked with who worked with a variety of tribes even earlier, and right up to Wounded Knee II and the occupation of the Indian Bureau building in the 1970s,

21. Vance, *The Congressional Mandate*.

22. Lewis Meriam, *The Problem of Indian Administration* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1928), p. 805.

the universal and persisting Indian complaint has not been bad treaties or cheap treaties or even fraudulent treaties. It has been BROKEN treaties. Never mind that it was not a treaty but rather an agreement or Executive Order that set aside land for Indians to occupy. A promise is a promise and governmental "bad faith," another favorite Indian rallying cry, is still bad faith.

The point is that whatever chicanery was practiced in the period when most reservations were established and however meager the consideration Indians received for their lands, they were dealt with as tribes, even "nations," as peoples with common interests and destinies. Certainly, tribes have resented and lamented having had to relinquish their territories for a pittance, but their ancestors negotiated as best they could, insisting that permanent homelands be guaranteed to them by the federal government as part of the low price for their vast domains. The deepest grievance has been with the government's unwillingness to uphold even these sorry bargains in failing to protect the remaining Indian estate and keep it intact.[23]

As Imre Sutton has observed, in this country ". . . only the Indians represent a truly 'territorial' minority, and their constant quest for equity in American society stands alone in being founded on a recognized body of treaties and laws . . . in a society that has openly promised to preserve historical guarantees. . . ."[24]

23. Cf. Kirke Kickingbird and Karen Duchenaux, *One Hundred Million Acres* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), also Edgar S. Cahn, ed., *Our Brother's Keeper. The Indian in White America* (Washington, D.C.: New Community Press, 1969), especially part III, pp. 68–112.

24. Sutton, *Indian Land Tenure*, p. ix.

BEYOND THE INDIAN CLAIMS COMMISSION

If Indian people did not benefit as anticipated from the Indian Claims Commission, both they and scholars derived indirect benefits. Anthropological interest was reawakened in documentary research. The Justice Department's arrangements with Indiana University to study midwest claims led to the creation of a large depository of source materials and the journal, *Ethnohistory*. The greatly increased call for data concerning Indian claims prompted major efforts at the National Archives, making available on microfilm whole runs of Indian Bureau records of general scholarly value. Two commerical publishing houses have deemed claims testimony and supporting documentation of sufficient importance to publish much of this information.

The Indian Claims Commission at least provided an unprecedented opportunity for tribes across the country to become acquainted with the potential of the courts and the operation of law in forwarding Indian interests.[25] The Commission, as well as the civil rights ferment of the 1960s, helped to inspire increasing numbers of young Indian people to enter law careers. A special legal program for Indians has been founded at the University of New Mexico, while law schools across the country are adding courses on Indian law. Two national organizations, founded and administered by Indians, have emerged within the last decade to assist tribes

25. Henry F. Dobyns, "Therapeutic Experience of Responsible Democracy," in *The American Indian Today*, eds. Stuart Levine and Nancy Oestreich Lurie (Baltimore, Md.: Penguin Books, 1970), pp. 268–93.

in legal matters: the Native American Rights fund in Boulder, Colorado, and the Institute for the Development of Indian Law in Washington, D.C.[26] *In this connection*, there has been important feedback from the Commission. The new Indian litigation has been able to draw upon both the enormous amount of source material now assembled[27] and a cadre of trained researchers familiar with Indian legal history.

An astounding number of cases are being heard on Indian issues from county courts to the Supreme Court, but since tribes must file in such a variety of jurisdictions, Vine Deloria, Jr., an Indian and a lawyer, sees the need for a Court of Indian Affairs. Recognizing the Commission's shortcomings, he still feels it holds potential as a model, especially with the current panel of commissioners, "because they had to deal with one subject matter—Indian law—[they] *have become more knowledgeable than most judges in the federal system about Indian history.*"[28]

Finally, a justification for going into what went wrong and what might have been. The Commission has stimulated world wide interest. People in Hawaii and the United States trust territories, as well as in Sweden, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and other nations, are in communication with people involved in Indian claims cases. The United States Commission dealing with Indian claims offers a precedent to be studied closely, improved upon and adapted to deal with grievances raised by other "territorial minorities."[29]

26. Cf. Robert McLaughlin, "Who Owns the Land? A Native American Challenge," *Juris Doctor*, vol. 6, no. 8 (September 1976) pp. 17–25, "The Native American Challenge: In Pursuit of Tribal Sovereignty," *Juris Doctor*, vol. 6, no. 9 (October 1976) pp 51–58.

27. Margaret Hunter Pierce, "The Work of the Indian Claims Commission," *American Bar Association Journal*, vol. 16, no. 2 (February 1977) pp. 227–32.

28. Vine Deloria, Jr., *A Better Day for Indians* (New York. The Field Foundation, 1977), pp. 26–29. Deloria notes that in accepting an award, the claimant Indians sign off forever any residual rights they might have to the land involved, an agreement they may regret.

29. I would like to express my special thanks for reviewing an initial draft of this article and for providing valuable data, comment, and criticism to Stephen E. Feraca, Division of Government Services, Bureau of Indian Affairs, Washington, D.C., Frances Horn (see footnote 7), and John R White, Anthropology Department, Youngstown State University, Youngstown, Ohio. Any errors and interpretive shortcomings are, of course, my responsibility.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 436, Mar. 1978

Current Demographic and Social Trends Among North American Indians

By SAM STANLEY AND ROBERT K. THOMAS

ABSTRACT: The American Indian population has continued to increase at a rate greater than other identifiable populations in the United States. The 1970 census returns indicate that 45 percent of the Indian population resides in urban areas. Indians have moved to urban centers and urban life has moved to Indians since many communities are surrounded by urban and surburban sprawl. The total Indian population has experienced cultural and language loss. At the same time more Indians are being educated up to and beyond the college level. Young Indians with institutional experience, whether in schools or prisons, are becoming either militant or bureaucratic. We infer that the turmoil which has characterized American Indian life since 1950 is a function of Indians' determination to maintain their identity and values in the face of overwhelming pressures to change. The future will feature more of the same unless Indians feel free to make their own adjustment.

Robert K. Thomas is Professor of Social Science, Weekend College, Wayne State University, Detroit, Michigan. He is a Cherokee Indian and has conducted anthropological research on reservations and in the city. He was co-director of the Carnegie Cross-Cultural Education Project from 1961 to 1966. He has taught at Wayne State since 1960.

Sam Stanley is Research Anthropologist at the Smithsonian Institution. He has a doctorate from the University of Chicago (1958) and has carried out research in Indonesia and with North American Indians. He has been at the Smithsonian Institution since 1966.

TWENTY years have passed since "American Indians and American Life" was published by THE ANNALS. Included in the volume was an article by the late J. Nixon Hadley on the "Demography of the American Indians."[1] It contained a short discussion of the aboriginal population, the history of population fluctuation, a short description of the modern population, and a few suggestions about future trends. In this article we propose to give some basic facts about American Indian population, but in particular we want to discuss trends since 1950.

In 1956, under the stimulus and leadership of Sol Tax, we compiled a population estimate for American Indians. The original estimate was confined to the continental United States and our data were mainly derived from congressional reports and ethnographic investigations. Later, with the help of Bruce B. McLaughlin, we expanded that estimate to include Alaska natives and all of Canada.[2] In the case of the lower 48 states, we counted only those who were listed as Indians by the B.I.A. and/or those who lived in Indian communities and were identified as Indians. Our total was 572,024, which was considerably more than the Bureau of Census total of 343,410 or the official B.I.A. total of 368,401. Most of the "extra" Indians were in Oklahoma, California, and the Dakotas. Presumably they were Indians who identified as such but might not have been living in Indian communities at that time. Our research showed that most American Indian communities had been slowly increasing since 1900, with a minority of the community's population moving into the general society. At the same time it was true that a few tribes like the Navajo were having a spectacular increase in situ.

But the research at the University of Chicago in the 1950s focused on more than simple population fluctuation.[3] There was an assumption, best articulated by Tax, that enduring strong relationships in an ongoing community are the corollary of a strong, continuous cultural tradition. We discovered that American Indian groups were slightly increasing cohesive wholes, conservative in their life patterns, and wholly continuous with their past. This was the case even though individuals often opted to join the mainstream. Length of exposure to non-Indians had not necessarily shattered Indian communities. Some groups, such as the Pueblos, with a long and enduring contact with Europeans, were among the most conservative and traditional. Except for Michigan and the West Coast, we found that the native language was the home and community language of most American Indian settlements in 1950. In addition we noted that life in most communities involved such pre-Columbian institutions as food habits, kinship behavior, and religious ceremonies. These overt characteristics of culture seemed to

1. J. Nixon Hadley, "The Demography of the American Indians," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 311 (May, 1957) pp. 23–30.

2. Expanded and published in 1960 as *The North American Indians, 1950 Distribution of Descendants of the Aboriginal Population of Alaska, Canada, and the United States*. It is available for $1.00 at the Center for the Study of Man, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C.

3. See, for example, Robert K. Thomas, "Population Trends in American Indian Communities," in *Reference Materials Compiled for the American Indians Chicago Conference* (The University of Chicago June 13–20, 1961), pp. 70–78.

be sustained and complemented by more covert levels (in those days called personality, values, and world view) which remained intact in most of the small cohesive communities. We also confirmed that, as a whole, American Indians were the worst educated, had the lowest income, and the poorest health of any group of people in North America.

Finally, we observed that excessive drinking was a problem in a great many Indian communities, although other social ills, such as juvenile delinquency and family breakdown, were evident in only a few localities. But excessive drinking is an old problem for North American Indians and has been since the arrival of Europeans in the New World. As of 1950, then, American Indian communities were relatively cohesive socially and very conservatively "Indian" despite their lack of formal education, their low income, and their poor physical health.

The data for our research at the University of Chicago utilized a variety of resources. We strove most of all to identify as Indian those individuals and communities which identified themselves as Indian. Our resources included tribal roll figures, census figures, and anthropological estimates—but only where those figures met our criterion of self-identity as Indians.

1970 CENSUS RETURNS

In 1970, the Census counted as Indians those who identified themselves as Indians. Despite the difference in criteria there is a consistent finding of continuing increase in the American Indian population, a population explosion which started in 1910. (See table 1.) In 1950, the Census reported 357,499 Indians; in 1960, 523,591; and 792,730 in 1970. The figures for 1970, however, show many new facets of American Indian life. In fact there seems almost to have been a revolution during the 20 years after 1950. No longer is the stable, rural community of 1950 slowly increasing and sending out individuals into the mainstream. Rather, we find that a surprising 45 percent of those people who call themselves Indian live in the towns and cities of the United States. (See table 2.) Many tribal groups had more members living in towns and cities, away from their rural communities and reservations, than at "home." Clearly some rural Indian communities lost population in the great migration to the cities that took place in the 1950s and 1960s. On the whole these migrants appeared to be culturally more marginal than those who remained. They were younger, more competent in English, better educated, and possessed more trained skills. The rural community remained a core of older and more culturally conservative people who cared for an almost equal number of young people under age 20. Almost half of the migrants to the city live in the large metropolitan areas. At the same time most of these metropolitan areas are close to Indian "country." Tulsa, Oklahoma City, Phoenix, Minneapolis, Seattle, Tacoma, Tucson, Albuquerque, and Buffalo are cases in point.[4]

We imagine that the people living in the above cities are still in close contact with their home communities, so that no appreciable separate city Indian life is forming in these centers. At the same time there are a

4. See footnotes 7 and 8 in the article by Sol Tax "The Impact of Urbanization on American Indians" in this volume. They contain references to the sources for our data for the 1970 Census.

TABLE 1

GROWTH OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN POPULATION SINCE 1900, BY STATE

	1900	1910	1920	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970
Alaska*	(NA)	11,244	(NA)	10,955	11,283	14,089	14,444	16,276
Alabama	177	909	405	465	464	928	1,276	2,443
Arizona	26,480	29,201	32,989	43,726	55,076	65,761	83,387	95,812
Arkansas	66	460	106	408	278	533	580	2,014
California	15,377	16,371	17,360	19,212	18,675	19,947	39,014	91,018
Colorado	1,437	1,482	1,383	1,395	1,360	1,567	4,288	8,836
Connecticut	153	152	159	162	201	333	923	2,222
Delaware	9	5	2	5	14	—	597	656
Dist. of Columbia	22	68	37	40	190	330	587	956
Florida	358	74	518	587	690	1,011	2,504	6,677
Georgia	19	95	125	43	106	333	749	2,347
Hawaii	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	(NA)	472	1,126
Idaho	4,226	3,488	3,098	3,638	3,537	3,800	5,231	6,687
Illinois	16	188	194	469	624	1,443	4,704	11,413
Indiana	243	279	125	285	223	438	948	3,887
Iowa	382	471	529	660	733	1,084	1,708	2,992
Kansas	2,130	2,444	2,276	2,454	1,165	2,381	5,069	8,672
Kentucky	102	234	57	22	44	234	391	1,531
Louisiana	593	780	1,066	1,536	1,801	409	3,587	5,294
Maine	798	892	839	1,012	1,251	1,522	1,879	2,195
Maryland	3	55	32	50	73	314	1,538	4,239
Massachusetts	587	688	555	874	769	1,201	2,118	4,475
Michigan	6,354	7,519	5,614	7,080	6,282	7,000	9,701	16,854
Minnesota	9,182	9,053	8,761	11,077	12,528	12,533	15,496	23,128
Mississippi	2,203	1,253	1,105	1,458	2,134	2,502	3,442	4,113
Missouri	130	313	171	578	330	547	1,723	5,405
Montana	11,343	10,745	10,956	14,798	16,841	16,606	21,181	27,130
Nebraska	3,322	3,502	2,888	3,256	3,401	3,954	5,545	6,624
Nevada	5,216	5,240	4,907	4,871	4,747	5,025	6,681	7,933
New Hampshire	22	34	28	64	50	74	135	361
New Jersey	63	168	100	213	211	621	1,699	4,706
New Mexico	13,144	20,573	19,512	28,941	34,510	41,901	56,255	72,788
New York	5,257	6,046	5,503	6,973	8,651	10,640	16,491	28,355
North Carolina	5,687	7,851	11,824	16,579	22,546	3,742	38,129	44,406
North Dakota	6,968	6,486	6,254	8,387	10,114	10,766	11,736	14,369
Ohio	42	127	151	435	338	1,146	1,910	6,654
Oklahoma	64,445	74,825	57,337	92,725	63,125	53,769	64,689	98,468
Oregon	4,951	5,090	4,590	4,776	4,594	5,820	8,026	13,510
Pennsylvania	1,639	1,503	337	523	441	1,141	2,122	5,533
Rhode Island	35	284	110	318	196	385	932	1,390
South Carolina	121	331	304	959	1,234	554	1,098	2,241
South Dakota	20,225	19,137	16,384	21,833	23,347	23,344	25,794	32,365
Tennessee	108	216	56	161	114	339	638	2,276
Texas	470	702	2,109	1,001	1,103	2,736	5,750	17,957
Utah	2,623	3,123	2,711	2,869	3,611	4,201	6,961	11,273
Vermont	5	26	24	36	16	30	57	229
Virginia	354	539	824	779	198	1,056	2,155	4,853
Washington	10,039	10,997	9,061	11,253	11,394	13,816	21,076	33,386
West Virginia	12	36	7	18	25	160	181	751
Wisconsin	8,372	10,142	9,611	11,548	12,265	12,196	14,297	18,924
Wyoming	1,686	1,486	1,343	1,845	2,349	3,237	4,020	4,980

SOURCE: U S Bureau of the Census, vols 2–52, *1970 Census*, table 17. Race by Sex· 1900–1970
* Does not include Eskimo and Aleut population figures.

TABLE 2

RURAL-URBAN DISTRIBUTION OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN POPULATION 1970, BY STATE

	1970 (URBAN) CENTRAL CITIES	1970 (URBAN) URBAN FRINGE	1970 (URBAN) 10,000 OR MORE	1970 (URBAN) 2,500 TO 10,000	1970 (RURAL) 1,000 TO 2,500	1970 (RURAL) OTHER RURAL
Alaska*	—	—	1,698	3,219	2,035	9,324
Alabama	501	250	222	234	72	1,164
Arizona	7,819	2,772	2,032	5,560	2,377	75,261
Arkansas	468	64	366	254	79	783
California	27,867	30,780	6,053	5,102	1,671	19,545
Colorado	3,249	1,636	394	438	130	2,989
Connecticut	982	517	156	134	54	379
Delaware	73	107	35	20	22	399
Dist. of Columbia	956	—	—	—	—	—
Florida	1,824	1,641	451	538	108	2,115
Georgia	618	607	234	157	63	668
Hawaii	421	197	235	132	36	105
Idaho	160	27	784	927	222	4,567
Illinois	7,222	2,307	482	328	204	870
Indiana	1,484	470	618	269	125	921
Iowa	1,211	216	278	257	95	935
Kansas	2,415	742	2,470	669	486	1,890
Kentucky	306	249	242	134	64	536
Louisiana	763	423	533	258	83	3,234
Maine	95	30	246	531	132	1,161
Maryland	1,740	1,576	128	156	54	585
Massachusetts	1,879	1,272	179	200	116	829
Michigan	5,175	3,505	1,231	1,298	662	4,983
Minnesota	8,454	1,861	667	860	985	10,301
Mississippi	230	22	189	182	48	3,442
Missouri	2,093	981	458	411	212	1,250
Montana	1,993	206	1,331	1,921	3,258	18,421
Nebraska	1,619	271	521	602	449	3,162
Nevada	1,013	592	610	742	575	4,401
New Hampshire	69	10	68	36	25	153
New Jersey	1,248	2,558	131	153	50	566
New Mexico	3,351	361	5,099	4,520	6,407	53,050
New York	14,545	3,469	669	839	398	8,435
North Carolina	2,174	2,344	2,060	814	1,475	35,539
North Dakota	174	3	1,257	457	1,888	10,595
Ohio	3,311	1,466	481	234	129	1,033
Oklahoma	17,618	5,176	11,462	13,427	7,470	43,315
Oregon	2,609	1,486	1,516	900	561	6,438
Pennsylvania	2,676	1,307	264	230	158	931
Rhode Island	541	241	115	217	45	231
South Carolina	175	341	175	179	83	1,288
South Dakota	480	49	3,048	4,950	2,301	21,537
Tennessee	783	67	316	172	45	893
Texas	10,041	2,742	1,413	1,068	421	2,272
Utah	1,509	1,241	589	443	771	6,720
Vermont	—	—	27	42	28	132
Virginia	1,249	1,492	116	165	60	1,771
Washington	7,766	4,755	2,814	2,375	1,245	14,431
West Virginia	131	43	79	37	52	409
Wisconsin	5,035	1,112	661	1,003	1,514	9,599
Wyoming	—	—	411	645	97	3,827

SOURCE: U.S. Bureau of the Census, vols. 2–52, *1970 Census*, table 17: Race by Sex: 1900–1970.

* Does not include Eskimo and Aleut population figures.

number of cities far removed from Indian country which boast large Indian populations. The Los Angeles area contains at least 30,000; San Francisco some 20,000; Chicago at least 8,000; Detroit 5,000; and Dallas-Fort Worth 7,000. In these cities we find a concerted attempt to form a separate Indian social group and separate Indian life.

TYPES OF INDIAN URBAN MIGRANTS

We hypothesize that in these large cities far from Indian country there seem to be three types of Indian migrants. The first, a very large group in the inner city, is still oriented to its home reservations, rural communities, and relatives in the city. Most move back and forth from rural area to metropolitan area in California, Illinois, Michigan, Texas or elsewhere.

The second category of Indian migrants is those who live in the outer city or working class suburbs, being skilled laborers or having steady laboring jobs. They seem to be most committed to city life and generally dedicated to some form of Indian community in the city. They are the people who are the core of Indian centers in California and the lower midwest.

Finally, there is a small group of professional, middle class Indians in the city. Some are divorced from their fellow Indians, but many provide "leadership" in Indian organizations and developing institutions in the city.

American city institutional structure

The most prevalent institution in American cities, the Indian Center, has been plagued with factional fighting and manipulation by outside forces. The real core of Indian social life in most cities today consists of networks of friends, kin networks, local bars, and alcoholics anonymous organizations. Parenthetically, we might observe that recent migrants to American cities—southern whites, Puerto Ricans, blacks, and American Indians—have not had the option of building their own institutions as did earlier migrants. This may be because the large American city is already complete institutionally, and new immigrants must find interstices in the existing institutional structure in which to build formal or informal organizations of their own. American Indians in cities are trying very hard to build together some kind of community life, or ethnic group perhaps, but against tremendous odds. They are a small minority, scattered throughout the metropolitan area, and struggling desperately to avoid becoming a part of the anonymous mass. Not only is the institutional structure already built and in the hands of others, but integrated schooling, urban redevelopment, and other such forces work against what remaining community life there is in the American city. Paradoxically, while many ethnic groups have been fighting to hold on to some kind of community life, American Indians have been struggling to develop some kind of community life. In the process a whole generation of Indians has been born and socialized in large metropolitan areas.

Urban and suburban sprawl

Not only were Indians moving to the city between 1950 and 1970, but the city was moving to them. Urban sprawl touched almost every Iroquois reservation in New York state. The Florida Seminoles found

themselves in the midst of the country's most rapidly growing region. Southern California's urban growth was encircling almost every reservation in that part of the state. Areas of the Southwest, in particular Tucson, Phoenix, and Albuquerque, were developing rapidly, and Indian communities not only experienced the influence of this expansion but found themselves being pressed to give up land and water to the growing society. This trend has been accelerating since 1970.

The 1970 census indicated that about 25 percent of all American Indians lived in small cities and towns. We do not, as yet, know how to assess this figure in social terms, but we have some guesses. Our hunch is that many are simply living in the small city or town closest to their rural home community. But for others, who are living in such locales far from home, it must be an extreme acculturative experience. Further field research would doubtless clarify the situation.

Language and culture loss

Another major shift since 1950 has been the tendency for American Indian groups to be much less conservative. In a score of years there has been extensive language loss in many areas. The vast majority of young Indians raised in the city do not know a tribal language. On the other hand tribal languages still thrive in eastern Oklahoma, the Southwest, some Rocky Mountain tribes, and some communities of the Northern Plains. Opposed to this as a phenomenon has been the loss of native language in the Great Lakes area (New York, Wisconsin, Minnesota), in western Oklahoma and in some areas of the Northern Plains. The language loss can be partially explained by the fact that marriage between members of different tribes has increased since 1950. Intertribal intermarriage is so prevalent in western Oklahoma that, of necessity, English has become the common language. A similar situation exists in the cities. Another factor in language loss has been the large number of marriages with non-Indians, with the accompanying need to use English to communicate.

However, the really spectacular loss has been in the rural communities of the Great Lakes area and those of the Northern Plains. We can only conclude that in these rural communities Indians have come to see themselves differently in the past 20 or 30 years and, as a result, have simply abandoned their tribal languages. Together with language loss in most of these communities there has also been loss of unique cultural traits. Since in many communities these particular traits have been replaced by Pan-Indian cultural items, many American Indian cultures are coming to look more and more alike. We could describe this process as a generalization of culture in many areas.

Education, economic development, and bureaucracy

Another area of spectacular change has been in the American Indians' level of education. Numerous American Indian children are attending integrated public schools and many Indians are now attending college. As late as 1956 it was very difficult to recruit even 30 Indian college students from all over the country to attend a summer workshop in Colorado. Now one could draw from a very large pool. On the whole, the educational level has risen markedly, especially in the cities, though there has been much less increase in the rural areas. The rise

in level of education has not been accompanied by a corresponding rise in Indian health or income.

Since 1970 there has been a proliferation of economic development programs on the reservation. This has been accompanied by the creation of large tribal, state, and federal bureaucracies dealing with Indians to insure that the "development" is accountable. Most of these bureaucracies are now staffed by educated Indians to the extent that one might suspect that American Indians have a larger percentage of their people in bureaucratic service niches than any other distinguishable population.

During the period of 1950–70 and extending to the present, there appears to have been a staggering increase in crime and other social ills. The number of Indians in prison has risen much faster than the increase in the general Indian population.[5] This can be inferred from the dramatic appearance in the late sixties and up to the present writing of numerous American Indian organizations within penitentiaries from coast to coast. Their publications list sizable memberships and the organizations feature consciousness sessions together with organized sports activities. Every issue of "Akwesasne Notes" contains numerous letters from inmates of Indian ancestry.[6] The fact that accidents are the leading cause of death among Indians and Alaska natives and that one out of five deaths results from this cause (compared with a national ratio of one out of sixteen) signifies in part that Indian social life is in some degree of trouble. The increase since 1955 of crude death rates from cirrhosis of the liver, suicides, and homicides points to the same conclusion. One cannot escape the impression that a great many Indian communities, both rural and urban, are in dire social trouble.

INTERPRETATION

In trying to understand the changes which American Indians have experienced over the last 20 years or so, we are reminded of some important points stressed by Sol Tax. He has emphasized that internal cultural change occurs only when a human group, a community, is undergoing a new experience which rearranges relationships and creates new cultural meaning within the group. A prime example of this process was the impact of the horse on some American Indian cultures and the revolutionary development of Plains Indian culture. He also emphasized that significant acculturation only came about when there was close association on an individual basis between members of different cultures—so close that there was communication of cultural meaning and new cultural experience. But these two processes only take place in the context of what is already there; that is, if the meanings that are already in the heads of

5. The Native American Rights Fund has instituted a new program for Indian inmates in five states (Montana, South Dakota, North Dakota, Nebraska, and Minnesota) and federal inmates within the same area. They estimate that there are 800 Indian inmates in these state penitentiaries and another 500 in federal penitentiaries for the same area. With a population of approximately 100,000 in these five states, this means that more than one out of 100 are in prison.

At the Smithsonian Institution we have also received requests from inmates and inmate clubs for assistance in supplying books, pamphlets, bibliographies, and other resources

6. *Akwasasne Notes* (Mohawk Nation, Rooseveltown, N.Y.). See especially the issues from 1971 to 1976 which contain numerous letters from inmates and inmate clubs.

the culture bearers. New experience is meaningful only in the context of old, and new meanings are built on old. And finally from Tax's and our own experience, we have learned that for North American Indian tribal members, their most precious possession is their identity as members of a tribe and the special and unique character of that group identity—their culture if you will.

When we look at the changes in American Indian life since 1950 in light of the above we can begin to see what the facts mean in terms of general social and cultural process. In the first place there has doubtless been a great deal of significant acculturation taking place during the last 25 years. Clearly American Indian individuals are now having very close ties with representatives of the general society. In particular, those born and raised in the American city have associated intimately with blacks and whites in great institutional complexes such as schools and factories. At the same time rural American Indian children, many of them now adults, have had close association with whites in public schools. The extensive language loss in some rural communities must reflect some intimate association with whites and new conceptions of the good and the right in such communities. Indeed it is our impression that American Indian young people, particularly in the cities, but in rural areas as well, now have a great deal in common with their white and black counterparts of the same generation—their mode of thinking, categories of thought, and rhetoric have much in common. At the same time it is important to recognize the range of individual acculturation in the city and to observe that many new social types have emerged in the process. Miraculously a few young Indians manage to learn their native language in the home, though they reside in the city. Many maintain close associations only within their families; others spend their summers at "home" in their ancestral rural communities. All this happens in the face of pressures which make it so easy for an Indian child in the city or suburbs to acculturate and assimilate to the larger society.

The combination of acculturative pressures and language and culture loss has produced a growing sense of identity loss for many American Indians, especially the young, in both urban and rural areas. This appears, however, to have generated a drive for cultural and language revival. Larger institutional complexes such as schools, tribal bureaucracies, Indian institutes in colleges, language and cultural courses in schools have tried to respond, and in many cases preempt, the new mood. Despite pressures toward acculturation, many grass roots Indian communities are continuing to control and bolster their own unique development. In many cases ceremonies have been revived and some young people are becoming apprentice Indian doctors and ceremonialists.

The increase in education and sophistication of American Indian groups, first evidenced in the middle sixties, has been accompanied by a rising nationalism. American Indians no longer hide their desire for social and cultural continuity from the larger society; they no longer hope to be overlooked. To use a current expression, they have come out of the closet. The educational experience, with exposure to middle class values, can supply people with the view that they are members of a legitimate minority. The new Indian nationalism is contributing to

the drive to create an "Indian" ethnic group in the cities and a pan-Indian movement generally, although, for the vast majority, the focus of nationalism is on the local tribe and only secondarily on American Indians as a whole.

Life in the cities for American Indians, particularly those born and raised in them, has been an urbanizing experience in the sense that as people become more aware of themselves and their situations, they become more analytic, more impersonal, and more aware of the existence of alternative life styles. For many young Indians, both rural and city, immersion in total institutions like schools and prisons seems to be an especially important urbanizing experience. They develop objectivity and analytic skills as a result of such a total institutional experience and many become very ideological and heavily committed to the Indian cause. Prisons and colleges are seedbeds for militant cultural nationalism and an antiestablishment stance. Some of these young people get recruited into the burgeoning Indian bureaucracy, while others have become the core of the militant movement. The latter have clashed with the Indian bureaucratic establishment at several places in the United States, most notably at Wounded Knee on the Pine Ridge Reservation in South Dakota.

The trends which we have discussed—acculturation, cultural revivalism, nationalism, and militancy—are not separate from one another. Rather, they are aspects of the American Indian's experience in grappling with life in modern America. Indians have become more educated, have had significant relationships with whites, blacks, and members of other tribes, and have looked reflectively at their own situation. Most of their efforts can be characterized as a cry for life—a search for identity, an attempt to preserve uniqueness and to bolster community. Some social scientists see these trends in American Indian life as third generation ethnic phenomena or as the last step before assimilation into the American mainstream. However, to us this is only the latest chapter in the struggle of North American Indians to maintain their identity and their culture, their peoplehood and their uniqueness in the presence of an overpowering, but not irresistible, civilization.

THE FUTURE

No one knows for sure how Indians will fare in the future. Their population appears to be increasing more rapidly (3 percent per annum) than any other definable group in the United States.[7] They should number close to a million by 1980. Their recent successes in federal courts have created a noticeable backlash. The recent report of the American Indian Policy Commission contains recommendations for sweeping changes in the Bureau of Indian Affairs and other agencies relating to Indians.[8] The only clear fact of the coming years is that Indians will continue to experience excruciating pressures to change, and they will continue to resist unless they perceive such changes to be consonant with their ageless values.

7. *Conversation* with Mr. Spector of the Indian Health Service. He estimates that the IHS population will be 627,000 in 1978. On the whole the IHS does not minister to terminated tribes, nonfederally recognized eastern tribes, and most urban Indians.

8. American Indian Policy Review Commission, *Final Report*, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1977).

ANNALS, AAPSS, 436, Mar. 1978

The Impact of Urbanization on American Indians

By SOL TAX

ABSTRACT. Native Americans are among the few peoples who maintain kinship and sharing cultures which contrast greatly with our large, economically oriented, individualized, impersonal, urbanizing society. Purely material requirements lead to rapidly increasing involvements. The question is "with what effect?" This paper suggests that Indians somehow frustrate attempts even to research the question by methods which suit the impersonal society. Answers will come from them when Indian people are given the means to find their own ways in the new environment.

Sol Tax is Professor of Anthropology at the University of Chicago.

WHAT IS the question implied in this title? By common agreement North America becomes with each passing decade more and more urbanized. Are we asking what effect this changing environment has on our Indian population? It is also evident that with each decennial census an increasing proportion of Indians are counted off-reservation and in or near urban areas. Do these two sets of data together imply that Indians are becoming more urbanized? In what sense: only in that they live more and more in urban areas, or also in that they behave more like urbanites?

Being or becoming urbanized; behaving like urbanites: with respect to North American Indians, these phrases imply a deep difference going far beyond the place of residence or the number of people per square mile. Until a few thousand years ago, humans lived in small, independent, cooperating groups of kith-and-kin, within which the position of each person was understood by all (which is a definition of the word "person"), and outside of which individuals were strangers. In recent millennia, and increasingly more rapidly, almost all of humankind has come to live instead in very large societies of strangers. Of the billions, only a few million have successfully resisted; and among these notably are native North Americans who maintain still their independent kin-based communities within a society which has gone as far as any in the world in the process of individualization. Drops in a bucket. The question is, how are they doing?

One answer is that they survive and grow in numbers. From one decade to the next it appears that there are more ill-fed, ill-clothed, ill-housed, and ill native people. It is not as clear who and where these increased numbers are; whether proportions are up or down from group to group among them; what happens to the ratios of needs and expectations to their fulfillment; how native Americans compare with other minorities. Whether or not their frustrated and angry leaders need more statistics to know whether their kinfolk are drowning not in 400 feet of water but only in 40, their friends and/or those responsible for fulfilling trust responsibilities surely need what facts there are. But all the figures may be less than useless if they are isolated from a clear understanding—preferably acceptance—of the native Americans' perception of their situation. One remembers the case of Helen Hunt Jackson's famous 1881 book, *A Century of Dishonor*, which was to do for Indians what *Uncle Tom's Cabin* had done for slaves; the author not only provided copies to every member of Congress but she personally engaged leaders, including Carl Schurz, the famous liberal who was Secretary of the Interior. The result was the 1887 Dawes (Allotment) Act arising from white misperceptions of Indian culture (as well as from avarice) which led immediately to the second century of dishonor.

I begin therefore with the basic sociology of the Indian situation taking into account what I understand to be their own perception.

GEOGRAPHY OF NATIVE AMERICA, 1977

In 1956 I presented at the American Anthropological Association a map of the distribution of Indians, in the then 48 states, showing why government policy was based on a patently false assumption that the problem of Indians would end as Indians inevitably became absorbed

into the general population. On this map, Sam Stanley and Robert K. Thomas had located Indians county by county and community by community. They counted only those people who were listed as Indians by the Bureau of Indian Affairs and/or those individuals who resided in Indian communities and identified with Indians. A variety of doubtful cases were rather excluded than included; nevertheless, their conservative estimates mapped 572,024 persons, as compared with the Bureau of the Census total of 343,410 or the Bureau of Indian Affairs total of 368,401. The largest numbers of "extra" Indians found were, in round numbers, 133,000 in Oklahoma (50,000 of them Cherokees), 28,000 in California, and 14,500 in the Dakotas. The map showed that many more people than supposed identified with virile societies of Indians which, from Maine to California and from Puget Sound to the Everglades, were largely in situ, except for those who had been removed to Oklahoma. In every part of our country Indians had simply been pushed off of their better lands to what had been their less desirable lands, and there they remained and increased.

In revised form[1] this map has been much appreciated by thousands of Indians who found on it the names of their own and other tribes and communities, and who occasionally supplied corrections. The map provided systematic information of what we vaguely knew. To most people, its implications were a revelation; but not to the Indian people, who not only know that they were there, but also are conscious of where they have been in the unbroken line from their first ancestors. They know their losses, and hint that their sorrow and anger are often brushed with hope for recovery of their lost lands.

The map also represents for many of them redefined social boundaries. Almost all native Americans originally lived in small bands. These now find themselves grouped together as tribes on reservations, sometimes two or three tribes or parts of tribes on a single reservation, often a tribe divided, whether or not along old lines of its own, on more than one. The Indians have long lived with, and have not themselves been confused by, such changes. Perhaps these years of occupation may not have made as much difference in their perception as we think. Mobile bands of Indians were once spaced out from sea to sea among virgin forests, mountains, prairies, and deserts, in most of which now also live strangers with machinery and cities. From whence the hunters brought in game, now there are jobs to be had, money to be earned to buy meat. Where once there were spirits, some of them evil, now there are strangers and din and bitter air, and also talk of great, insoluble problems in a world without wise elders or ways to listen. The strangers and the bad air and the bad news also penetrate some reservations. The defense, as always, is prayer and right living, and patience. But it is doubly hard to wait it out when living requires money which —to earn—requires wrong behavior. It is not surprising that some individuals are both tempted and able to change their ways and their values. Before Europeans came, similar alternatives were offered by Mexican civilizations. Apparently, then as

1. Expanded and published in 1960 as *The North American Indians, 1950 Distribution of Descendents of the Aboriginal Population of Alaska, Canada, and the United States* It is available for $1.00 at the Center for the Study of Man, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C.

now, most native North Americans rejected them, presumably happy in the ways of life they had themselves developed. Many of us, products of technologically advanced civilizations, may wonder at this. I turn therefore to the kind of life native Americans see as their own.

"A SCHEME OF LIFE"

I first lived with native American people in the summer of 1931, and have learned from them, in North and Central America, most of the little I know about human beings and the different ways we are taught to think and to behave. Among the lessons learned is that we cannot escape our own up-bringing. Like the proverbial Chinese philosopher, who once dreamed he was a butterfly, and could never thereafter feel sure that he wasn't really a butterfly only dreaming he was a man, I am confident I know the difference, but do not know when I describe the cultures of Indian people how much I may be overreacting to my own. Like many anthropologists, I am also increasingly sensitive to the rights of others not to be talked about—surely not wrongly or in stereotypes—and seek ways to let Indian friends speak for themselves. Thus, rather than citing one of the recent non-Indian descriptions of how a kinship society works, I quote sentences from a small book published in 1944 by the late Ella Deloria,[2] a Teton Dakota who was also an anthropologist, and which seeks precisely such understanding from church people imbued with the values of our civilization, the idea of progress, and the middle class work ethic.

The first sampling comes from a section (pp. 24–38) called "A Scheme of Life that Worked," describing the culture of her own people as it was "something more than a hundred years ago":

> Kinship was the all-important matter. . . . By kinship all Dakota people were held together in a great relationship. . . . Everyone who was born a Dakota belonged to it. . . . Camp-circles were no haphazard assemblages. . . . The most solitary member was sure to have at least one blood relative . . . through whose marriage connection he was automatically the relative of a host of people.
>
> The ultimate aim of Dakota life . . . was [that] one must be a good relative. . . . Every other consideration was secondary—property, personal ambition, glory, good times, life itself. To be civilized was to keep the rules. . . . Thus only was it possible to live communally . . . with a minimum of frictions and a maximum of good will.

[There follows a description of the kinship system in which one has as blood relatives very many mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers, uncles, aunts, sons, daughters, grandparents, and grandchildren and in which] "when your blood relatives marry, all their new relatives are yours too. . . .

> A proper mental attitude and a proper conventional behavior prescribed by kinship must accompany the speaking of each term. As you said "Uncle" . . . you must . . . assume the correct mental attitude in its fitting outward behavior and mien. . . . This exacting . . . obedience to kinship demands . . . made [the Dakotas] a kind, unselfish people, always acutely aware of those about them. . . . A socially responsible Dakota might not thoughtlessly indulge his moods lest there be within range . . . a kind of relative before whom his feelings must be suppressed. . . . Everyone had his part to play and played it for the sake of his honor, all . . . obligations and honorings being reciprocal. Kinship had everybody in a fast net of interpersonal re-

2. Ella Deloria, *Speaking of Indians* (New York Friendship Press, 1944)

sponsibility and made everybody like it, because its rewards were pleasant. . . .

The kinship appeal was always a compelling force. . . . Outsiders were deeply concerned over [a quarrel] until it was straightened out. . . . Two . . . influential men would visit the unhappy ones and appeal to them to cool off their hearts—for the sake of their relatives who were unhappy over their plight. Such an appeal . . . placed the responsibility for his relatives' peace of mind squarely on the troubled man, reminding him that no Dakota lived unto himself alone. He might not rightly risk even his very own life needlessly. . . . However slightly he valued himself, he must regard the relatives. . . . The quarreling men smoked the pipe together and were feasted before the council. Friends brought them presents. And thus peace was restored in the camp-circle to the relief of all. . . .

Everyone was related to all the people within his own circle of acquaintances. But all those people had other circles of acquaintance within the large tribe. All such circles overlapped and interlocked. Any Dakota could legitimately find his way to any other. . . . Thus, anyone could go visiting anywhere, and be at home.

The author then describes "Life in Tipi and Camp Circle," "Praying for Power," and "Education—by Precept and Example" and concludes the description with "Economics: Giving to Have":

The best teaching said things were less important than people; that pride lay in honoring relatives rather than in amassing goods for oneself; that a man who failed to participate in the giving customs was . . . something less than a human being. If someone made you a gift . . . he did not mean for it to grow old along with you. He expected you to use it when and as you chose to honor someone else, and, indirectly, yourself. . . . There was little pride in ownership of goods, but much pride in "honorship" of relatives. If you wished to honor me publicly, you did not load me down personally with presents. You made someone else glad in my name . . . and that is where the honor lay for me. . . .

Disdain for material things as against human considerations was the basis of the people's life and philosophy. But . . . do not imagine that they spent their days . . . ridding themselves of property. . . . The Dakotas could not afford to be shiftless and wasteful. For centuries . . . they had known of a vast variety of wild foods, both vegetable and animal, and the securing of them. . . . They made caches, great underground rooms [where] the stores of several co-operating families were piled around the walls as high as might be . . . each woman's rawhide containers painted with her own overall design. Now and then they had a famine, when snow was too deep for hunting, or when all the animals seemed to organize to keep out of range. As a people they did not dare let themselves drift into an easy, haphazard existence. They were wise in self-preservation, even though they were committed to constant hospitality. . . . The principle of giving-to-have was the very essence of Dakota community life. A man who showed [a] tendency [to use] the giving system . . . for enriching [himself] at the expense of others was suspect, as if he were not quite human. . . . Gifts of unequal value were happily exchanged. . . . A horse for a beautiful pair of moccasins or a blanket . . . the recipient of the lesser gift might be so startled and delighted by the compliment thus unexpectedly paid him that he unhesitatingly gave a horse to indicate his pleasure.

I quote this much to indicate how difficult it must be for people brought up in such a social system with such values and practices to be plunged into our impersonal, materialist, competitive society. The author devotes the next section of her book, "The Reservation Picture" to the coming of "a totally different way of life, far-reaching in its influence, awful in its power, insistent in its

demands." The last part of the book, "Indian Life in Wartime," takes the story to 1941 when many went into the armed services and into industries: "Whole families have moved into the cities and are meeting problems they have never faced before. As workers they are valuable. Skillful with their hands at tasks requiring meticulous care, they are extremely accurate, patient, dependable. . . . They will not stop to bargain for themselves; it is not their tradition to think of self first; and they will not grumble."

LIFE IN THE CITY

I have been an Indian-watcher in Chicago since the early fifties, when government "Relocation" began and the American Indian Center was organized; and I was kept involved personally and through a succession of Chicago graduate students including Thomas Segundo (Papago), Robert K. Thomas and John K. White (Cherokees), Leonard Borman, and Robert Rietz. Through other students, and/or visits I also knew something of Rapid City, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Milwaukee, and others through publications of colleagues.[3] Nevertheless, I do not understand at all what goes on in cities, even Chicago, even after a year-long seminar with students doing volunteer work in Indian organizations, and with some of their Indian friends. I begin to think that the ignorance and confusion with which I am forced to leave questions unanswered is in the reality and not in the minds of participants and observers. Instead of a describable structure, we may be dealing with a tangled web of mobile threads.

Local estimates of the number of Indians in Chicago at any one time range from 12,000 to 20,000. Opinions differ on migration patterns; are Indians in Chicago in summer when it is easier to find jobs in construction or in winter when money, hence food, is harder to come by on the reservation? The problem of how many, moreover, appears to be no great concern to Indians, except when pressed by government agencies or students doing research.[4] Talk about numbers of individuals or families, when and where, depersonalizes and qualifies the freedom Indians have always felt to come and go in pursuit of their own activities. However, talk about the number of tribes represented at any affair, or in any organization, personalizes Indians; for the tribe is the beginning of specification, which goes then to geographical location and family. Thus city organizations are ideally intertribal, whether general or for

3. The Indian Historical Press (1451 Masonic Avenue, San Francisco) publishes an annual *Index to Literature on the American Indian* which includes a classification "Urban." Among recent books that are especially useful are. Howard M. Bahr, Bruce A Chadwick, and Robert C. Day, *Native Americans Today: Sociological Perspectives* (New York. Harper and Row, 1972), Rudolph O. de la Garza, Z. Anthony Kruszewski, and Tomás A. Arciniega, *Chicanos and Native Americans, The Territorial Minorities* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1973), Jeanne Guilleman, *Urban Renegades: The Cultural Strategy of American Indians* (New York. Columbia University Press, 1975), J. O. Waddell and O. M. Watson, eds., *The American Indian in Urban Society* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).

4. To get suggestions for the 1980 count, the Chicago office of the Bureau of the Census called a meeting of American Indian leaders which Leonard Borman and I observed. The Indians were told that the Census had grossly undercounted minority groups, including Indians, which cost them federal funds allocated by numbers. Discussion quickly indicated that many Indians are reluctant to be counted in the city because they belong on the reservation. The economic argument backfired.

special skills and interests like dancing, photography, basketball, and the arts; for youth, educational, and recreational activities; or for problems like alcoholism; or welfare programs.

Although like others, Indians require the help of private and public welfare agencies, for whom they are impersonal clients, Indians in cities especially require their own organizations and services because they are not only poor and deprived and new to cities, but unlike any others they come directly from small independent kin communities without having shared several thousands of years in economically-oriented peasant societies. American urbanized culture is perhaps at one extreme of a continuum, and American Indian bands at the other. It is possible to argue that native Americans prone to overcome the difference have, over the years, had incentives and opportunities to do so, and those who have not done so are precisely those "not prone," whatever that may mean. Touchy even in their native social interrelations, they are uncertain and very uncomfortable in their contacts with non-Indians and are quickly put off, withdrawing embarrassedly either physically (if they can escape) or in alcoholism; more so in the strange environment of the city. They are honest and hard working people; but they have special problems on the job as well as in other situations, and so are often jobless. When they need help they especially need to relate to friendly people, and preferably kin or tribesmen. With strangers who are Indians they are in some ways more comfortable than with other strangers; but the differences of tribes can take on significance unimagined by the non-Indian, both when they are defined as historic enemies and when specific features of cultural behavior happen to conflict. Tribal stereotypes and/or antipathies that remain unconscious when they are hundreds of miles apart in their respective communities suddenly come into play when persons become interdependent, or competitors, in city situations. It is little wonder that organizations take much pride in whatever "all-tribal" character their members achieve by rising above not only old prejudices and newer religious differences but also assaults on their notions of good taste and right behavior.

Meanwhile, the most constant complaint continues to be that "we can't get along; if only we would stop pulling one another down, we could do great things." Nancy Lurie[5] suggests that Indian "factionalism" may be exacerbated by guilt feelings and that both might result from historic unfamiliarity with systems that support political parties. In any case, the result in cities is extreme instability of Indian organizations, so that one with a longer history changes its personnel about as frequently as others come and go, continually replaced with equivalent new organizations. In situations where continuing consensus—traditional Indian unanimity—is difficult to achieve, the alternative to stable organizational structure is in fact what Indians have in cities: ad hoc programs which come and go like traditional hunting or war parties. Such a system worries Indians mainly when it bothers non-Indian friends and sources of funding.

These remarks concern that fraction of the Indians in the city who participate actively in organizations.

5. "The Will-O'-The Wisp of Indian Unity," *The Indian Historian* (Summer 1976), pp. 19–24.

These are people who have put down roots in the city and who identify both with their tribes back home and with one another. They are sometimes blue-collar, trade union people, but more usually clerical workers and professional people (teachers, nurses, etc.), some of whom work in offices, institutions, agencies, and organizations inside, and others outside, the Indian community, or both serially. In Chicago and in other cities, around universities and in national meetings, and in Washington, these are virtually the only Indians I know. They include varying combinations of individual orientations thought of as traditional, radical, and professional.

Sam Stanley and Robert K. Thomas distinguish two other kinds of Indians in cities; those who do not participate in city "organization life" but are otherwise like the people I know, including, again, presumably traditional Indians who may participate in ceremonies back on their reservations; young radicals interested in Indian affairs but not in the local organizations; and professional people. The second kind are numerically most important; they are in the city for a few months or a few years, or come and go seasonally or occasionally, but in any case have sunk no roots. If they get into trouble of any kind they either go to Indian Agencies for help—providing the bulk of these agencies' clients—or alternatively return to their reservations. These people include in their number the poorest and the least educated of the Indians in the city, who may also disproportionately fill the bars favored by Indians, and get into difficulties with the police, thus providing statistics for studies about urban problems.

This floating population is like the paradoxical, fast-flowing stream of ever changing drops of water. Pas ing a point, or traced source to mout the stream as a whole is real; an so is each individual drop. It woul be as correct to say that there ai 10,000 Indians in Chicago (2,0C rooted, 8,000 floating at one time) ε to say that there are 18,000 (2,0C plus 16,000 different Indians durin the year). Since native Americar are few in numbers, might an expe imental census be devised that woul associate them with their home con munities and indicate the time fa tor? Indians in 1970 were asked the tribal identifications; and off-rese vation Indians could be asked th location of the tribes or bands the give. Indian reservations and othe Indian communities might provid names and locations of membe who presumably were being cei sused elsewhere. A sample of thos who checked out as identical pe sons (or families) in both place might then provide additional soci economic data which could test Wi liam H. Hodge's hypothesis[6] th the urban workforce, favoring health people with formal schooling, wh can quickly acquire work skills an adjust to a complex and changing er vironment, is likely to select, f young to middle aged adults, fror Indian communities not too isolate from industrial experience.

Numbers

But aside from hypotheses and r search it is of practical importance f Indians in their changing situatio to get a better handle on their nun bers.

Indians in tribes and reservatior

6. "Relocation and Urban Experiences," *Indians in Contemporary Society*, ed. d'Ar McNickle. (Vol. XI of the *Handbook of Nor American Indians*, Smithsonian Institutio Washington, D.C., forthcoming).

are traditionally "enrolled" and countable. The whereabouts of those absent from the community, whether or not on official rolls, are locally known; but to identify and locate them where they are, seems peculiarly difficult. When an Indian organization in the city seeks funding for a health center or a training or employment program, for example, its greatest difficulty is to provide data on the "unmet need" which is inferentially and anecdotally well recognized. How many Indian people and of what kinds there are in the city, is simply not known. The decennial census therefore becomes exceedingly important. For local purposes it lacks detail and by the time it is published it is out of date; but it is the only source from which systematic comparisons—and therefore reasoned inferences—can be made. Tables 1, 2, and 3 summarize, in as brief a form as possible, the 1960 and 1970 statistics directly relevant to the question of what is happening to native Americans under increasing urbanization.[7]

Table 1 shows for 1970 some characteristics of people who identified themselves and families as Indian *and* who named their tribes *and* who lived in Urban places with at least 3,800 Indians. Table 2 shows, for the 18 states with over 10,000 Indians, the increase in number of urban Indians between 1960 and 1970. It is ordered by the number in 1970. As table 1 provides tribal context, table 2 provides statewide context for table 3, which, in turn, shows changes from 1960 to 1970 in socioeconomic characteristics of Indians in 14 Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) and 11 tribes/reservations for which the censuses provide relatively comparable data.

Table 1 orders the tribes by their percent urban, and provides economic and educational data in which differences are often associated with urban life. Moving down the table it is evident that, as expected, the employment and income figures generally decrease and the percentages below the poverty line increase. The changes here supply some control for interpreting the ten-year changes in occupations, income, and com-

7. The published censuses in 1960 and 1970 consist of many-tomed Volume 1 *Characteristics of the Population*, and Volume 2 *Subject Reports*. For each state, Volume 1 includes the population of Indians in central cities, urban fringe; other urban over 10,000 and from 2,500 to 10,000; and rural from 1,000–2,500 and under 1,000. Volume 2, for 1960, includes a report on nonwhite races which includes six tables on American Indians based on the 25 percent sample which was used throughout the Census Volume 2, for 1970, includes an entire report—PC(2)-1F—on *American Indians*, which includes 18 tables, 17 of them based on a 20 percent and one (on mother tongues spoken) on a 15 percent sample, both used throughout the Census. The sample of households from whom special data were obtained turned out in 1960 to have overcounted Indians by 4.3 percent, and in 1970 to have undercounted them by 3.7 percent. The entire special report, *American Indians*, uses the mistaken lower figures including 763,594 total population instead of 792,730 which the Census found. The lost 32,158 people are mentioned only once in the Introduction, and never shown, and tend to get lost in other writings which use this report as "the census", for example Helen W. Johnson's widely-used *American Indians in Transition* (U S. Department of Agriculture, Economic Report no. 283, 1975).

In both 1960 and 1970, Aleuts and Eskimos were counted among "other races" so that separate data on them are not published, and hence are not included in my tables.

In addition to the published books, there are "public use samples" on computer tapes of material which can provide new unpublished combinations of data. But for Indians there appears to be nothing that goes beyond what is published. Only the Census Bureau itself could supply additional information, on request, for a charge.

TABLE 1

INDIANS IN 1970 IN TRIBES WITH POPULATIONS OVER 3,800

	Total	Urban Number	Urban %	% Over 16 Employed	Median Family Income	% Below Poverty Line	Median School Years Completed	% of High School Graduates
Census total	792,730	355,738	44.9					
Total from sample	763,594	336,420	44.1					
Tribes not reported	161,543	97,845	60.6					
Tribes under 3,800	92,962	43,357	46.6					
Tribes over 3,800	509,089	195,218	38.3					
Mohawk	6,105	4,551	74.5	79.1	$9,064	17.8	10.3	32.9
Chickasaw	5,616	3,790	67.5	70.0	6,640	20.3	10.9	41.9
Comanche	4,250	2,862	67 3	69.5	6,102	28.7	12.0	49.6
Kiowa	4,337	2,776	64.0	61.0	5,285	38.0	12.1	52.0
Oneida	5,673	3,542	62.4	75.8	8,183	19.2	10.2	33.8
Potawatomie	4,626	2,816	60.9	74.0	6,831	20.4	10.7	38.9
Zuni	7,306	5,871	58.7	54 8	6,401	35.6	10.6	34.9
Seminole	5,055	2,898	57.3	67.1	5,956	29.7	10.5	40.5
Creek, Ala., Coushatta	17,004	9,674	56.9	67.2	6,248	27.6	10.8	41.2
Cherokee	66,150	36,943	55.8	68.7	6,329	26.5	10.4	37.7
Kaw, Omaha, Osage Ponca, Quapaw	6,849	3,676	53.7	60.4	6,752	27.7	12.1	51.9
Choctaw, Huoma	2,356	12,558	53.3	67.3	5,925	30.2	10.1	37.1
Tlingit, Haida	7,543	3,755	49.8	59.1	7,477	26.2	10.6	37.8
Chippewa	41,946	18,738	44.9	66.3	5,928	33.0	9 9	29.6
Cheyenne	6,872	2,995	43.6	60.1	5,567	38.0	10.4	34.7
Onandaga, Tuscarora, Cayuga, Wyandotte	5,051	2,159	42.7	69.3	7,537	20.4	10.6	37.2
Sioux (Dakota)	47,825	19,842	41.5	59.5	4,734	44.2	10.2	33.5
Yuman	7,635	3,158	41.4	66.1	5,870	32.6	10.0	31.7
Seneca	4,644	1,856	40.0	70.3	7,580	18.7	11.1	42.3
Blackfeet	9,921	3,883	39.1	64.9	5,588	33.9	10.9	38.7
Yakima	3,856	1,427	37.0	61.6	6,123	32.4	10.6	35.6
Hopi	7,236	2,641	36.5	57.2	5,644	41.6	11.3	44.0
Shoshone, N. and S. Paiute and Chemehueve	14,248	5,039	35 4	63.5	6,032	26.3	10.3	34.7
Menominee	4,307	1,509	35.0	59.0	6,124	27.9	10.5	33.7
Apache	22,993	7,821	34.0	57.7	5,106	41.4	8.9	23.3
Papago, Pima	16,690	4,468	26.8	51.6	4,095	55.8	8.3	20.7
Ute	3,815	894	23.4	51.6	4,761	43.3	9.2	25.9
Tanoan	6,342	1,408	22.2	55.0	5,009	45.2	10.0	33.8
Kareson	10,087	1,895	18.8	56.8	5,638	35.9	10.4	37.1
Navajo	96,743	16,276	16.8	48.9	3,434	58.2	5.3	18.8
Lumbee	27,520	3,497	12.8	70.8	5,157	37.3	8.2	19.0

pleted school years shown in tables 2 and 3.

To American Indian specialists, the specific data of table 1 are also intrinsically interesting, requiring explanation in terms of particular data. For example, the Lumbee are only few and recently urban, and shown as poorer and less educated than any of the peoples east of the Rocky Mountains; yet one has to go almost to the top of the page to find the three groups who have a larger percentage employed. Or why are the Tlingit 5th in income but 21st in the percent employed? These are questions probably easily answered by those familiar with the cases. A more general and quite striking characteristic of the distributions is the comparatively high position of all of the Iroquois nations (Mohawk, Oneida, Seneca, Onandaga). This may be due to special circumstances in each case; but their long contact with the White man must also be significant. That the equally urban Southeastern nations (Chickasaw, Creek, Cherokee, Choctaw), which also had early white contacts, are poorer may be associated with the removal of most of them to Oklahoma while most Iroquois remained in situ in New York. Or will it be suggested that the nature of the cultures and the political organizations of these two sets of nations are also important in explaining the difference?

Tables 2 and 3 are geographically based in a way that table 1 is not. To clarify this difference, think for example of the Cherokee entry in table 1. These are all the people who identify as "Cherokee"—that was a free choice—who, by census definition, lived in urban areas, whether in North Carolina, where there is an

TABLE 2

URBAN INDIANS IN STATES WITH OVER 10,000 INDIANS

State	1960 Number	1960 % of All Indians	1970 Number	1970 % of All Indians	% Increase	No SMSA's with 2,500+ 1960	No SMSA's with 2,500+ 1970
California	22,574	55.8	67,202	76.1	66.4	4	7
Oklahoma	23,257	37.0	47,623	49.2	51.2	2	3
New York	13,257	63.1	17,161	67.1	22.8	2	2
Arizona	8,662	10.4	16,442	17.4	47.3	2	2
Washington	11,882	55.9	16,102	52.2	26.2	1	2
Texas	4,643	69.8	14,567	86.1	68.1	—	2
New Mexico	9,023	16.1	13,405	18.7	32.7	1	1
Minnesota	4,994	31.6	11,703	52.4	57.3	1	1
Michigan	5,064	51.2	10,541	65.8	52.0	—	1
Illinois	5,895	91.5	9,542	92.6	38.2	1	1
South Dakota	4,615	17.9	9,115	24.4	49.4	—	—
Wisconsin	4,062	21.2	7,439	39.6	45.4	—	1
Oregon	2,662	32.3	6,976	52.8	61.8	—	1
North Carolina	1,616	04.2	6,194	14.0	74 0	—	1
Montana	2,804	14.0	5,070	19.2	44.7	—	—
Alaska	3,745	25.3	4,696	29.2	20.3	—	—
Utah	1,990	28.6	3,689	35.0	46.1	—	—
North Dakota	1,193	10.3	1,810	13.3	34.1	—	—

TABLE 3

CHANGES 1960–1970 IN SELECTED PLACES AND CHARACTERISTICS

Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas	American Indian Population			Occupations %					Median Income of Individuals			Median School Yrs Completed		
				White Collar		Blue Collar		Change to White Collar	Dollars		% Change			
	1960	1970	% Incr	1960	1970	1960	1970		1959	1969		1960	1970	In-crease
Albuquerque, N.M.	3,253	5,822	44.1	34.3	47.3	36.9	29.4	20.3	1,698	3,627	53.2	9.9	12.2	2.3
Buffalo, N.Y.	5,567	5,606	50 6	13.0	21.7	63.5	53.3	18.9	2,484	3,471	28.4	8.9	10.0	1.0
Chicago, Ill.	5,329	8,203	35.0	28.9	36.0	52 6	51.5	8.2	2,684	4,230	36 5	9.9	11.1	1.2
L.A.-Long B., Ca.	9,330	23,908	61.0	23.5	36.2	56.2	47.1	21.8	2,459	4,136	40.5	10.3	11.8	1.5
Minn.-St P., Minn.	3,408	9,911	65.6	20.1	32.0	52.0	48.5	15.4	1,743	3,754	53.6	8.8	11.4	2 6
New York, N.Y.	8,112	9,984	18 1	36.9	48 2	43.4	30.5	24.2	2,902	4,194	30.8	9.4	11.2	1.8
Okla. City, Okla.	6.178	12,951	52.2	26.9	40.6	52.6	44.1	22.2	1,806	3,851	53.1	10.2	12.2	2 0
Phoenix, Ariz.	8,707	10,127	14.0	12.6	26.6	35.5	34.3	15.2	1,245	2,312	46.2	8.3	9.6	1.3
S. Bernardino-Riverside, Ontario, Ca.	3,949	5,941	33.5	15.9	26.2	62.0	49.7	22.6	2,037	3,544	42 5	9.3	11.1	1.2
San Diego, Ca.	3,365	6,007	44.0	21.5	31.7	44 1	45.3	9.0	1,909	2,394	20 3	10.4	11.6	1.2
San Francisco, Ca.	4,422	12,041	63.3	25 7	43.0	51.8	42.4	26.7	2,292	4,424	48.2	10.7	12.1	1.4
Seattle-Everett, Wa.	3,820	8,814	56.7	17.2	30.9	54.6	47.1	21.2	1,640	3,731	56.0	9.4	11.1	1.7
Tucson, Ariz.	7,007	8,704	18.8	07.1	20.1	48.4	48.1	13 3	1,000−	1,526	34.5	6.3	7.0	0.7
Tulsa, Okla.	7,534	15,183	50.4	29.5	36.9	49.3	43.9	12.8	2,099	3,579	41.3	9.9	12.0	2.1
Indian Reservations														
Blackfeet, Mont.	4,959	4,757	−4.1	26.7	34.2	17.6	30.7	18.6	1,000−	1,781	43.6	8.8	9.9	1.1
Cherokee, N.C.	3,223	3,455	6.7	19.4	20.5	49.8	54.4	−3.5	1,000−	1,977	49.4	8.3	9.0	0.7
Cheyenne River, S.D.	3,412	3,440	0.1	24.7	29.2	14.8	16.4	29	1,000−	1,402	28.7+	9.5	9.4	−0.1
Fort Peck, Mont.	3,351	3,182	−5 0	18.6	29.8	29.4	39.4	10.8	1,026	2,031	49.5	8.7	9.6	0.9
Menominee, Wis.	3,145	2,445	−22.3	12.2	24.9	70.2	60.1	23.0	1,000−	2,873	65.2+	8.3	10.2	1.9
Navajo	2,654	56,949		03.3	32 7	64.5	41.6	52.3	1,183	1,606	26.3	0.8	4.1	3.3
Pine Ridge, S.D.	7,476	8,280	9.7	17.5	31.2	29.7	24.3	19.1	1,000−	1,521	34.3+	8.3	9.0	0.7
Red Lake, Minn.	2,908	2,741	−5 7	19.4	26.2	60.2	43.4	23.6	1,419	2,346	39.5	8.9	9.6	0.7
Standing Rock, N. & S. Dak.	3,323	2,925	−12.0	32.8	32.9	20 7	17.8	3.0	1,000−	1,654	39.5+	8.8	9.7	0.9
Wind River, Wyo.	3,486	3,319	−4.8	16.2	29.4	29.1	33.0	9.6	1,000−	1,415	29.3	8.7	10.3	1.6
Yakima, Wash.	3,966	2,508	−36 7	16.6	28.2	30.6	36.8	5.4	1,109	1,772	37.4	9.0	10.0	1.0

official Cherokee reservation, or in Oklahoma, where most "enrolled" Cherokees live, but where reservations have long since been terminated; or in Manhattan, Anchorage, Miami, or anywhere else in the United States. Not all people in any Indian reservation or community are Indians, or Indians of the tribe that gives the community its label. When the Census groups people not only by the tribal identification they give, but also by the place where they live, needless to say they find many largely Indian communities, some of which are also official reservations. This is not the meaning of the "tribes" listed in table 1. The 1970 Census provides data also on "identified reservations" which together include only a minority of Indians. Both because the populations of reservations are, with few exceptions, 100 percent rural, and because they were not chosen in 1970 by the same criteria or frequently with the same names as in 1960, I have not made a general comparative table. But in table 3 I have, as a control, appended to the list of metropolitan areas corresponding data on 11 Indian groups which are probably identical in the two censuses, excepting Navajo which is too much smaller in 1960.

Table 2 shows that at least in all of the states with large Indian populations, except Washington, the number and proportion of urban Indians increased substantially. The last columns of table 2 show the number of Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas which had at least the minimum number of Indians—2,500—to be included in the published census report. The number of such SMSAs in these 18 states increased from 1960 to 1970 from 14 to 25. Table 3 includes data only on the 14 SMSAs for which data are published for both decades.[8]

Table 3 provides the most relevant census material for the question asked. I have tried in vain to learn also from the material on housing and related socioeconomic data, but interpretations here would require comparisons with other minorities, and probably more than my small experience in these matters. I am unable, also, to make much of the material on education in the last column. Apparently, with urban living, the amount of education increases; but rather than a result of urbanization, this may be largely a product of migration to cities by Indians who seek opportunities to use their higher education. The figures on income, comparing either the reservation and metropolitan areas or the two decades, seem obvious until one asks how much noncash income may be included in rural areas; how one can take into account the offsetting increased cost of living in metropolitan areas; and, of course, the inflation factor from 1960 to 1970.

The changes shown in occupations in the ten-year period are the distillation of a laborious process. The census used essentially the same definitions in 1960 and 1970:

White-Collar:
1. Professional, technical and kindred workers
2. Managers and administrators, except farm

8. The "Indian SMSAs" added in 1970 were Anaheim, et al., Sacramento and San Josè, California, Lawton, Oklahoma, Tacoma, Washington; Dallas and Houston, Texas, Detroit, Michigan, Milwaukee, Wisconsin; Portland, Oregon, and Fayetteville, North Carolina. In states with fewer than 10,000 Indians there were three additional "Indian" SMSAs (2,500 or more Indians). Baltimore, Philadelphia, and Washington, D.C.

3. Sales workers
4. Clerical and kindred workers

Blue-Collar:

5. Craftsmen and kindred workers
6. Operative, except transport
7. Laborers, except farm

Farm Workers:

8. Farmers and farm managers
9. Farm laborers and farm foremen

Service Workers:

10. Service workers
11. Private household workers

The order of these items was changed from one census to the next, and males and females were listed separately. The first tabulation suggested the need to combine the items as well as the sexes to get four figures for each community. These were translated into percentages for study.

In 1960 farm workers were a substantial minority in three metropolitan areas: Phoenix 29 percent, Tucson 23 percent, and San Diego 17 percent; in 1970, they fell to 16 percent, 6 percent, and 4 percent respectively. Eight of the 11 reservations had substantial minorities of farm workers: Yakima 43 percent, Cheyenne River and Blackfeet 39 percent; Wind River 37 percent; Pine Ridge and Fort Peck 36 percent; Navajo 26 percent; and Standing Rock 25 percent. These fell in 1970 respectively to 27 percent, 29 percent, 11 percent, 18 percent, 17 percent, 6 percent, 4 percent, and 15 percent.

The proportion in service occupations turned out to vary least, as can be seen in a listing following the order of table 3 (the 1970 figure is in parentheses): 24(22); 17(19); 17(12); 28(19); 20(21); 17(15); 22(23); 12(21); 17(19); 20(14); 22(21); 21(25); and 15(16) for metropolitan areas, and for the reservation 17(24); 22(24); 21(25); 15(25); 16(15); 6(22); 17(28); 20(26); 21(35); 18(19); and 10(8).

Deciding that these figures might confuse more than inform, I limited table 3 to the shift from blue-collar to white-collar, which appears to be universal, consistent, and substantial, with scarcely any exceptions. Explanations—or at least feasible hypotheses—will emerge for persons with experience in the communities listed. For example, it seems evident that the change in Chicago has different meaning from what seems to be a similar change in San Diego. The apparently similar quantitative small net changes from blue- to white-collar in Chicago and San Diego—or in Tucson and Tulsa—are probably, in fact, quite different. The Census does (for these same localities) provide data also on public versus private employment which might be useful in understanding some of these figures. Probably the largest help comes from understanding similarities and differences in the total contexts. For example, metropolitan areas in Indian country often include rural communities of Indians and even reservations. Some Indians may even come to the city in the sense that Indians come to Chicago; but they would be only a small part of the population of Indians included in table 3 as being part of the SMSA called Tucson, to use an obvious example.

The lesson is an old one. There are no "Indians," but rather different communities of Indians. And that goes for so-called urban Indians, as well. Indian people from time immemorial have explored and found ways to live in new environments without losing their identities or values. They "accepted the horse" fully, but nobody supposes they

should have become horses. They are, presumably, fully capable of learning to live with us without becoming like us.

Policy

The historic facts are that Europeans overran North America; that the native people have not assimilated into the larger new population but remain peaceful conscientious resisters and exemplars; that neither the inclinations nor the laws of the majority permit cold-blooded "final solutions"; and that therefore it lives uneasily with an unresolved problem. Yet, the remedy is obvious and at hand, dubious mainly because it asks that we relax our demand that the Indian people assimilate and instead exercise a fraction of the patience that they have so long shown.

Let us understand first that native Americans are as intelligent and adaptable as any people known to history. I would add "perhaps more so," thinking of cultural rather than biological factors, if there were need to do so. Everything anthropology knows about these people shows their remarkable capacity to change, to adapt, and to survive. In recent years few have had satisfactory options, and almost all of them live with adaptations that are far from good, for them or for the larger society. They await the one option that people everywhere desire, but which most are unable to use: to remove obstacles to finding their own ways. Though it is a bad figure of speech, again I mention horses to suggest removing both blinders and reins.

In 1961, in their "Declaration of Indian Purpose," a national assembly told what they wanted:

> When Indians speak of the continent they yielded, they are not referring only to the loss of some millions of acres in real estate. They have in mind that the land supported a universe of things they knew, valued, and loved.
>
> With that continent gone, except for the few poor parcels they still retain, the basis of life is precariously held, but they mean to hold the scraps and parcels as earnestly as any small nation or ethnic group was ever determined to hold to identity and survival.
>
> What we ask of America is not charity, not paternalism, even when benevolent. We ask only that the nature of our situation be recognized and made the basis of policy and action.
>
> In short, the Indians ask for assistance, technical and financial, for the time needed, however long that may be, to regain in the America of the space age some measure of the adjustment they enjoyed as the original possessors of their native land.

At that time perhaps there were no practical ways to do what was wanted except to begin ending the threats to Indian rights and identities embodied in the then explicit policy called termination; to continue to provide funds for health, education, and social services; and to transfer their control from outside bureaucracies to the Indian communities. But how individual families would make their living in their poor territories was an unanswered puzzle until more recent years.

Indian families need cash to live while they freely explore the new environment and discover ways, as the Mohawk high steel workers once did, to make their livings which suit their cultures. The answer, now at hand, is the federally-provided, but completely unadministered, minimum family income, perhaps through a negative income tax. If a general system is long delayed,

perhaps it could be tried out with American Indians. With cash income assured, no matter where they are, combined with health insurance and perhaps school vouchers, Indians will be free to explore abroad. But, also, more will probably stay in their communities, where living is cheaper. Here their funds could be used to add to their lands, but their cooperative spirit will also suggest ways to develop economic enterprises. If they can ward off the benevolent hearts and greedy hands of outsiders, we should soon learn from them, in our common new environment, how to adjust to externals without sacrificing inner values.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 436, Mar. 1978

The Integration of Americans of Indian Descent

By J. MILTON YINGER AND GEORGE EATON SIMPSON

ABSTRACT: When the members of two societies come into contact, changes in the direction of assimilation may occur on four different levels—biological, psychological, cultural, and structural, or, in more descriptive terms, amalgamation, identification, acculturation, and integration may take place. At present, most Indians favor integration but resist forced acculturation. The integration and cultural assimilation of Native Americans have been inhibited by a number of fundamental differences between the majority culture and the cultures of Indian peoples. At the same time, other factors have furthered integration and cultural assimilation. Migration, urbanization, education, economic changes, and intermarriage will facilitate structural integration, a shared identity, and cultural assimilation. In time, full assimilation, or the interaction of all persons without reference to ethnic or racial descent, may come about. For the immediate future, however, pluralism, associated with increasing acculturation and structural integration, seems to be the most likely pattern of relationship between most Indians and non-Indians.

J. Milton Yinger is Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at Oberlin College. Among his publications are Toward a Field Theory of Behavior, The Scientific Study of Religion, *and most recently*, Middle Start. An Experiment in the Educational Enrichment of Young Adolescents *(with Kiyoshi Ikeda, Frank Laycock, and Stephen Cutler). With George E. Simpson, he edited an earlier volume of* THE ANNALS *on American Indians (May 1957); and together they have written* Racial and Cultural Minorities, *now in its fourth edition. Professor Yinger recently served as President of the American Sociological Association.*

George Eaton Simpson is Emeritus Professor of Sociology and Anthropology at Oberlin College. He is the author of Melville J. Herskovits *(1973)*, Religious Cults of the Caribbean *(1970); and* Racial and Cultural Minorities *(with J. Milton Yinger), which won the Anisfield-Wolf Award in Race Relations in 1958.*

DESPITE decades of scholarly work, the concepts of integration, acculturation, assimilation, and related terms are used in a variety of ways. And lacking clear definitions of these basic intergroup processes, we cannot attain reliable measurement of them. In this paper we cannot hope to resolve these problems of definition and measurement; but we would like to suggest a mode of approach that may take us toward a solution and help us to clarify the situation of American Indians.

FOUR BASIC INTERGROUP PROCESSES

When the members of two societies come into contact, changes in the direction of assimilation—the blending of formerly distinguishable sociocultural groups[1]—may occur on four different levels: biological, psychological, cultural, and structural. Or, to use more descriptive terms, amalgamation, identification, acculturation, and integration may take place. These processes are strongly interconnected, but because they can proceed at different speeds and in different mixtures, we need to keep them analytically distinct in our minds. Each is a variable, of course, but lacking clearly specified units and techniques of measurement, we tend to speak of more or less, or in terms of broad categories.

Amalgamation, defined in strictly biological terms, is doubtless the least ambiguous of the concepts. An exclusively biological approach proves to be an inadequate index to assimilation or integration, however, when social factors become involved, as the following question suggests: What proportion of one's ancestry can be non-Indian and still allow one to retain the designation Indian? This is an issue wherever biological mixture has occurred, and the answer varies widely. Some persons with three Indian grandparents and one white regard themselves, and are regarded by others, as white. Other persons with one Indian grandparent are Indian.

It is also important, in discussing amalgamation, to distinguish between two modes of measurement: the proportion of individuals who have mixed ancestry and the proportion of the gene pool that is derived from the various stocks. Thus it is one thing to say that about 80 percent of black Americans have European ancestors; it is something else to say that about 30 percent of their ancestry—viewing them as a group—is European. Similar figures are more difficult to estimate for Indians, since it is likely that a larger proportion has passed over into the general society, even some persons with very little or no non-Indian ancestry. With respect to some particular group of native Americans, it would be possible to say, for example, that 40 percent of them had some European ancestors and that 30 percent of their gene pool was European (which would be the case if all those of mixed ancestry were one-quarter Indian).

One other aspect of amalgamation deserves comment. It is often stated that amalgamation occurs late in a succession of intergroup processes.[2]

1. George E. Simpson, "Assimilation," in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences* (New York: Macmillan and The Free Press, 1968), vol. I, p. 438.

2. Prodipto Roy, "The Measurement of Assimilation: The Spokane Indians," *American Journal of Sociology* 67 (March 1962), pp. 541–51; Lynn C. White and Bruce A. Chadwick, "Urban Residence, Assimilation, and Identity of the Spokane Indian," in *Native Americans Today: Sociological Perspectives*,

This may or may not be true, and the timing both reflects and affects the nature of intergroup relations. If two groups are quite unequal in power and status, amalgamation, as a result of sexual exploitation, tends to occur in the early period of contact. The rate of amalgamation may decline during a second period, even though acculturation continues. At a still later stage, if inequality and prejudice are reduced, intermarriage may become more common. It is estimated that now about one Indian in three marries a non-Indian.[3]

The psychological process of identification refers to a set of related concepts: the degree to which individuals from groups A and B have come to think of themselves as belonging to the same society—as many immigrants and their descendants think of themselves as Americans; the degree to which members of A identify themselves with society B; and the degree to which members of B identify with society A. All three of these processes may go on at the same time; and the nature of their mixture is a significant aspect of the relationship between A and B. Some Americans of Indian ancestry identify themselves simply as Americans. This is correlated with the degree of acculturation and mixed ancestry, but is analytically separate from them: many substantially acculturated persons of mixed background identify themselves entirely as Indians. Throughout American history, a few white persons have identified themselves as Indians, have lived in tribal villages, married Indian spouses, and have sometimes become chiefs.[4] And at least a few persons of European and of Indian background (as well as some of Asian and African ancestry) identify themselves with a new society that is neither A nor B, but the product of interaction among persons and cultures of many types.

If we think of acculturation as ". . . the process of cultural change resulting from intercultural contact,"[5] it is clearly a two-way process. It has been difficult to arrive at a widely agreed upon definition in part because of a failure to distinguish between individual and group referents. It is one thing, for example, to say that some individual white persons have absorbed various Indian values, perhaps thinking of themselves, and being thought of, as somewhat deviant as a result. It is something else for the dominant society to absorb various Indian values as part of its normative system, teaching them to its young through normal processes of socialization. And of course the same distinction between individual and group processes can be applied to Indians. If both processes are called acculturation, it is important to distinguish them conceptually, because their causes and effects are quite different.

Acculturation has been difficult to define and analyze also because it is empirically mixed in various ways with the degree of amalgamation, identification, and integration. Undoubtedly these processes are correlated, often highly correlated, but

eds. Howard M. Bahr, Bruce A. Chadwick, and Robert C. Day (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 240.

3. E. J. Kahn, Jr., *The American People* (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 207.

4. A. Irving Hallowell, "American Indians, White and Black: The Phenomenon of Transculturalization, *Current Anthropology* 4 (December 1963), pp. 510–31, J. Norman Heard, *White into Red. A Study of the Assimilation of White Persons Captured by Indians* (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1973).

5. Bahr, Chadwick, Day, eds., *Native Americans Today*, p. 193.

one can occur without the others, the pace may be quite different, and the sequence can vary. With regard to the last point, acculturation is often regarded as an early process, leading to integration, identification, and amalgamation. There are exceptions to this common sequence, however, particularly in contact between an overwhelmingly powerful society and one possessing few weapons with which to defend itself. Workers may be brought into the economy of the dominant power before anything more than minimal acculturation has taken place; sexual exploitation, as we have noted, may make amalgamation an early process; some members of a society, unable to defend its way of life, may identify with the dominant society before they are acculturated to its ways. Thus the place of acculturation in the sequence of intergroup processes is a question to be kept open for examination in each situation, as the papers in this volume by Sol Tax, George and Louise Spindler, Robert Havighurst, Murray and Rosalie Wax, and others indicate.

Integration, the term we use to refer to mixture in the social structure of persons from two or more formerly separate societies or status groups, can be associated with different levels of acculturation, identification, and amalgamation; and, like these other processes, it can occur at various points in the sequence of change. As with acculturation, it is important in discussions of integration to distinguish between individual and group aspects. Individual integration exists to the degree that persons from groups A and B belong to the same social groups, including private associations, and interact within those groups on the basis of equality. Group integration, which *we shall call pluralism, exists to the degree that A and B as groups are accorded the same rights and public privileges, the same access to political and economic advantages, and the same responsibilities as citizens and members of the total society,* while at the same time they are accepted as legitimate subdivisions of the society, with partially distinctive cultures. Integration into the economy, for example, implies similarity between groups in their occupational distribution and income. Indians have gained significantly in the last generation, particularly those residing in cities, but remain behind the national standard. Group integration, or pluralism, implies the continuing existence of separate groups and a continuing feeling of identification with those groups on the part of many members; but it can exist in the context of extensive acculturation and amalgamation. In fact, strongly acculturated persons of mixed ancestry are often leaders in movements to define the boundaries and win the rights implied by pluralism or structural integration.

Among American Indians, structural integration is occurring, or is being sought, on both tribal and national levels. The movement to secure equality before the law, recognition of group rights, and an equal share of economic and educational opportunities rests upon and implies, not separation from, but pluralistic integration with, the larger society. Aspects of this movement are discussed by Vine Deloria, Jr., Nancy O. Lurie, Sam Stanley and Robert K. Thomas, and other authors in this volume. The pan-Indian or national Indian aspects of pluralism, substantially but not entirely among those living in cities, are indicative of a shift from American Indian to

Indian American.[6] In it we see the search for new ground on which to stand as Indians, a new basis for identity, for pluralism rather than assimilation.[7] Among the tribes, there are significant differences in the extent to which integration has taken place, depending upon the aboriginal culture, the size of the population, the tribal economic picture, and other variables.[8]

We shall think of assimilation as a variable subsuming the biological, psychological, cultural, and structural processes and their interactions. If, in the contact between two groups, amalgamation, shifts in identification, acculturation, and integration have occurred to only a slight degree, we will say that assimilation has been minimal. If these processes have gone so far that the group boundaries have been wiped out, we can speak of maximal assimilation. Since each process is a variable, one might specify any number of values along an assimilation scale, but we are a long way from having the kind of data that would make such refined measurement possible.

INTEGRATION AND ACCULTURATION OF AMERICAN INDIANS

We turn now to a more direct application of some of these concepts to Indian Americans. The focus of our attention will be on the processes of integration, particularly pluralistic integration, and acculturation, which seem to us to be the most significant aspects of Indian-white relationships at this stage of American history.[9]

Who Is An Indian? We can scarcely discuss the process of integration without at first examining this difficult question. If one is speaking of "administrative" or "official" Indians, that is, those who are eligible for services from the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the number in September 1968 was 452,000.[10] These persons were members of tribes with federal trust land, who had one-quarter or more Indian blood, and who lived on a federal reservation or nearby. This number included all Indians, Aleuts, and Eskimos living in Alaska, a total of 54,000. Instead of the legal or "heirship" definition followed by the BIA, the Census Bureau employs a cultural definition of Indian. Criticisms of the variations in procedures used by enumerators led the Census in 1960 to make it possible for members of a household to classify themselves. (In the 1970 census, the questions under "Color or Race" included: White, Negro or Black, Indian [American], Japanese, Chinese, Filipino, Hawaiian, Korean, and Other. For Alaska, the racial categories Aleut and Eskimo were substituted for Hawaiian and Korean).

American Indians are currently increasing faster than the general population. The 1950 Census listed ap-

6. John H. Bushnell, "From American Indian to Indian American. The Changing Identity of the Hupa," *American Anthropologist* 70 (December 1968), pp. 1108–16.

7. Bahr, Chadwick, and Day, eds., *Native Americans Today*, pp. 401–4.

8. John A. Price, "The Migration and Adaptation of American Indians to Los Angeles," *Human Organization* 27 (Summer 1968), pp. 168–75.

9. For an account of earlier Indian-white contacts, see the excellent article by D'Arcy McNickle, "Indian and European. Indian-White Relations from Discovery to 1887," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 311 (May 1957), pp. 1–11.

10. Murray L. Wax, *Indian Americans: Unity and Diversity* (New York. Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 215.

proximately 350,000 Indians; the 1960 Census, nearly 525,000; and the 1970 Census, about 792,000. Population increases of Indians in recent decades, however, cannot be attributed solely to natural increase. For example, the 1960 Census included as "Indian" certain groups of mixed white, black, and Indian descent which had been variously classified in previous censuses. Also, after the passage of legislation and the establishment of a special court of claims under which Indian tribes could sue the United States government for taking their land in the past for insufficient compensation, many individuals who were only marginally Indian in ancestry, and not at all Indian in any other way, claimed a share of the awards. Similarly, federal benefits, such as access to the Indian branch of the Public Health Service, are available to individuals who can establish that their ancestry is at least one-quarter Indian. Finally, it has become fashionable in some circles to claim to be "Indian." In recent years, therefore, there has been a "drifting in" process which is comparable to the "drifting out" process of the previous two and one-half centuries and of the present time. It has been estimated that if persons were counted as Indian in the way that residents of the United States are counted as Negro, that is, any degree of Indian ancestry, the Indian population would number several millions.[11] This would surely be the case if the count included those Americans of Mexican background who identify with their mestizo heritage. Some refer to the Southwest as Aztlán—an Aztec term—and express a kinship with American Indians.[12]

11 Ibid., p. 34

12. Ibid., p. 179.

The definition of American Indian which appears in the Office of Native American Programs' Final Regulations states that:

> 'American Indian or Indian' means any individual who is a member or a descendant of a member of a North American tribe, band, or organized group of native people who are indigenous to the continental United States or who otherwise have a special relationship with the United States or a State through treaty, agreement, or some other form of recognition. This includes any individual who claims to be an Indian and who is regarded as such by the Indian community of which he or she claims to be a part. This definition also includes Alaskan Natives.[13]

With various rights to land, education, and health care dependent on tribal or racial identity, the question of who is an Indian will continue to be important and controversial. "Instant Indians" will be resented and federally recognized and urban Indians will face some conflict of interest.[14]

Indian-non-Indian acculturation in American society

In their well-known memorandum on acculturation,[15] Redfield, Linton, and Herskovits conceived this phenomenon as a two-way process, but in actual practice American anthropologists and sociologists have usually treated it as a one-way proc-

13. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of Human Development, "Native American Programs, Final Regulations," *Federal Register* 42 (19 January 1977), p 3785.

14. *The New York Times*, 21 March 1976, p. 38.

15 Robert Redfield, Ralph Linton, and M J. Herskovits, "Memorandum for the Study of Acculturation," *American Anthropologist* 38 (January-March 1936), pp. 149–52.

ess.[16] For example, in the May 1957 issue of THE ANNALS entitled "American Indians and American Life," Vogt referred to "our earlier expectations concerning the rate of American Indian acculturation and why full acculturation to white American ways of life is not occurring in the contemporary scene."[17] Using a terminology somewhat different from ours, Gordon distinguishes between cultural or behavioral assimilation (acculturation) and structural assimilation (large-scale primary group relations), but he regards the former process as "change of culture patterns to those of the host society."[18] In our view, acculturation is cultural change occasioned by prolonged contacts, face-to-face or through communications media, between representatives of different societies or between ethnic groups within a society, and overall it is a two-way process. The concept of two-way borrowing does not imply equal borrowing, quantitatively or qualitatively, by the different groups. On specific items, one-way borrowing may occur. Often both one-way and two-way cultural borrowing proceed faster than the spread of structural assimilation.

Among Native Americans, borrowing from whites has been greatest in material culture, where most of the Indian artifacts have been replaced by those of modern industrial society.[19] The borrowings of whites from the American Indian in the realm of material culture, however, have been numerous. Plants domesticated by American Indians, including "Irish" potatoes, corn, beans, squash, and sweet potatoes, provide almost half of the world's food supply today. Among native American drugs found in modern pharmacology are coca in cocaine and novacaine, curare in anesthetics, cinchona bark (quinine), ephedra in ephedrine, datura in pain relievers, and cascara in laxatives. The woolen poncho, the parka, and moccasins came from Indian cultures, and the commercial cottons of today are derived principally from the species cultivated by American Indians.[20] Another category of borrowing is found in the acquisition and use of Indian-made objects, the most striking examples of which are Navajo rugs, silverwork, and pottery.

In esthetics, many Native Americans have been influenced by contemporary developments in mainstream music, but American Indian music has strongly affected a number of American composers. In 1939, Charles S. Skilton asserted: "Many devices of the ultramodern composers of the present day have long been employed by Indians—unusual intervals, arbitrary scales, changing tune, conflicting rhythm, polychoral effects, hypnotic monotony."[21] In the early 1900s, a number of composers visited reservations in the western United States, borrow-

16. A. Irving Hallowell, "The Impact of the American Indian on American Culture," *American Anthropologist* 59 (April 1957), pp. 212–13.

17. Evon Z. Vogt, "The Acculturation of American Indians," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 311 (May 1957), p. 139.

18. Milton M. Gordon, *Assimilation in American Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 71.

19. Kenneth M. Stewart, "Retrospect and Prospect," in *The Native Americans*, eds. Robert F. Spencer et al. (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 503–4.

20. Alan R. Beals, with George and Louise Spindler, *Culture in Process* (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1967), p. 215.

21. Quoted in Hallowell, *Impact of the American Indian*, p. 207.

ing themes and gathering and arranging melodies. Parts of Euro-American literature have reached numbers of native Americans through the schools, the mass media, and direct contact, but American literature also reflects the influence of American Indians. Among the best-known of these works are James Fenimore Cooper's *Leather Stocking Tales* and Longfellow's *The Song of Hiawatha*.

A fascinating question concerning the "contributions" of Native Americans to American civilization is the possibility of a characterological "gift." In analyzing the historical development of an American national character, the psychological effects of frontier contacts with American Indians may prove to be of considerable importance.[22]

Two aspects of the nonmaterial culture that have persisted within the Indian world are the emphasis placed upon the extended family as the basic social unit and the importance of the role of Indian land. According to Witt, as the economic level of the Indian people rises, the extended family is strengthened despite the loss of some members through relocation. It is the basic element in tribal organization, and these two social units reinforce each other as they have in the past.[23] Tribal peoples who wish to be incorporated into industrial civilization favor partial inclusion while retaining the solidarity of the social group.[24]

Indian land itself constitutes a habitation site and an economic resource, and it provides a focal point for Indian culture and identity both for reservation and many nonreservation Indians.[25] In the past 25 years the movement toward termination and the individualization of tribal assets has been led mainly by factions with higher percentages of off-reservation members than have the opposing factions.[26]

Formal education is desired by Native Americans today, but for many, the purpose of education is to make Indian life better and to support cultural pluralism, as Robert J. Havighurst shows in his article in this volume. The concern is more with levels of living than complete assimilation.[27]

Among modern Indian tribes that have continued a traditional religious life, the Pueblos are outstanding. Although most Pueblos are employed in modern jobs that require a thorough knowledge of the white world, they retain religious beliefs and practices that have served them for many generations. In recent years, the increased interest of younger Indians of numerous tribes in the positive aspects of tribal culture has led to a demand for the restoration of traditional religious ceremonies. In addition, an effort is being made by the Indians of the Joint Strategy and Action Committees of major Protestant denominations to combine traditional Indian

22. Ibid., p. 211.

23. Shirley H. Witt, "Nationalistic Trends Among American Indians," in *The American Indian Today*, eds. Stuart Levine and Nancy Lurie (Baltimore Penguin Books, 1970), p 123.

24. Robert K. Thomas, "Pan-Indianism," in *The American Indian Today*, eds. Levine and Lurie, pp. 139–40.

25. Witt, "Nationalistic Trends," p. 123.

26. Deward E. Walker, Jr., "Measures of Nez Perce Outbreeding and the Analysis of Cultural Change," *Southwestern Journal of Anthropology* 23 (Summer 1967), pp. 155–56.

27. Nancy O. Lurie, "The American Indian Renascence," in *The American Indian Today*, eds. Levine and Lurie, p. 313, Harriet H. Kupferer, "The Isolated Eastern Cherokee," in ibid., p. 144.

beliefs and the modern Christian social gospel. A leading part in this movement has been taken by the Cook Christian Training School in Tempe, Arizona.[28]

Cultural pluralism and structural integration

Throughout the world, there are some minorities that do not want to be culturally assimilated, to lose their separate identity. In some countries, dominant groups permit cultural variability within the range they consider consonant with national unity and security. Whether viewed from the perspective of minorities or dominant groups, such positions are called cultural pluralism. The concurrent social process of integration implies full equality in health services, educational, political, and economic opportunity among all groups.[29]

At present, most Indians favor integration but resist forced cultural assimilation. They prefer partial assimilation. They want to adapt to modern life, keeping what they value in Indian cultures and adopting what they admire or need in white culture. In time, of course, full assimilation, or the freedom of all persons to interact free of constraints based on ethnic or racial descent,[30] may come about. Migration, education, economic changes, and intermarriage will facilitate structural integration, a shared identity, and cultural assimilation—in short, a much larger degree of assimilation than now exists or is desired by most persons of Indian descent.

Persistence of American Indian groups

Few Indian tribes have disappeared completely. Since attempts to exterminate whole groups were almost always thwarted, most American Indian groups in existence at the time of initial white contact are still present. The Indian population declined until 1900, but after that date significant and even spectacular population increases are evident for most tribes. The fact that virtually the same groups of Indians encountered by the original settlers are still represented strikes some Americans as surprising, especially in the light of the efforts at integration that occurred after World War II. In terms of the melting pot conception of democracy, namely, the fusion of diverse ethnic and racial groups into a composite American people, the American Indian situation indicates that these people are not being absorbed structurally into American society. Indeed, American Indian groups still retain many aspects of their own distinctive ways of life and have in only rare instances become fully Americanized. It is clear that Indian-white relations in the past have mitigated against both cultural and structural assimilation. One must recognize, however, that despite the relative lack of structural assimilation of Indians as groups, the process of integration has moved forward. There are still ongoing Indian communities, differing from one another and from the dominant American culture, yet forming parts of a complex society.

28 Vine Deloria, Jr., "Religion and the Modern American Indian," *Current History* 67 (December 1974), pp. 250, 253.

29. George E Simpson and J. Milton Yinger, *Racial and Cultural Minorities*, 4th ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), p. 19, E P. Dozier, G. E. Simpson, and J. M. Yinger, "The Integration of Americans of Indian Descent," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 311 (May 1957), p. 159.

30. Simpson, "Assimilation," p 438

Even the melting pot notion of democracy, however, has not been completely negated. Because of historical relationships between American Indians and the majority population, and because Indian groups persist, we have been relatively unaware of another process. This process has rarely been referred to in the literature. The important fact is that through the years many individual Indians have passed into the main American society. Although exact figures are difficult and perhaps impossible to get, there is reason to believe that the number has been large. At least as many Indians as are enrolled as tribal members today have been absorbed into the larger society. Throughout the country there are ordinary "white" American citizens, and "Negroes" as well, with enough Indian admixture to entitle them to be enrolled on a reservation. The reason that such individuals are not enrolled is that often a full-blooded Indian, who left his reservation and married an Indian from another tribe, a Negro, or a white, did not care to enroll his children in his own tribe—or his wife's tribe if she were Indian—or did not want to bother with the technicalities. In the case of a man marrying a white or black woman, his children and his children's children would all have been entitled to tribal enrollment as defined in many reservations because they possessed one-fourth or more "Indian blood." Thus the individual Indian who leaves his group and his descendants, including individuals up to the third degree of kindred, are excluded as Indians. The children growing up in an environment that is not Indian become culturally American and racially either white or black. This "drifting out" process was certainly an important factor in the American Southwest. There was a tremendous increase in the Spanish-American population in this area in the years from 1700 to 1900, from approximately 10,000 to 150,000, an increase which cannot be explained on the basis of natural increase and immigration from Mexico. Indeed, we have conclusive evidence that the population was fed from Peublo, Navaho, and Apache groups.[31]

American Indians appear not to be absorbed socially as groups, unless rewards for doing so are available in their indigenous environments. There are few instances of such successful transitions, although a favorable reservation locale with rich natural resources may bring them about. The Spindlers have described such a case among a group of Menominee who have undergone a psychological reorientation.[32] This example is a rather special case, however. Most Indians are absorbed as individuals, leaving their communities voluntarily to seek a livelihood elsewhere. Once they surmount social and economic barriers, they often remain indefinitely in new occupations and surroundings quite different from those of their reservation communities.

Factors limiting integration and assimilation

The integration and assimilation of Native Americans have been lim-

31 Dozier, Simpson, and Yinger, "The Integration of Americans of Indian Descent," pp. 160–61. The statement concerning the increase in Spanish-American population is based on Frederick Webb Hodge, *Handbook of American Indians, North of Mexico* (Washington, D.C., U.S. Bureau of Ethnology, Smithsonian Institution, 1972), bulletin 30, pt. 2, p. 325

32. George D. and Louise S. Spindler, "American Indian Personality Types and Their Sociocultural Roots," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 311 (May 1957), p. 152.

ited by a number of fundamental differences between the majority white culture and the cultures of the Indian peoples.[33] Among these differences are conceptions of time, decisionmaking, and being. In white culture, all activities and institutions are ordered by arbitrarily established units of time, and punctuality is a virtue. In contrast, most Indians have internalized a concept of natural time that is related to an ongoing continuum—sunrise and sunset and the changing of the seasons. Community meetings, for example, are held "this evening" rather than at six o'clock, seven o'clock, or eight thirty, and they continue until everyone who wishes to speak has spoken. Within white culture, decisionmaking is based on a concept of vertical authority. Following discussion or debate, decisions are made, often by a majority vote, and orders are issued that others then act upon. In Indian cultures, authority tends to be of a more horizontal type. The councils of many tribes meet for days because of the necessity of reaching unanimous decisions. Consensual agreements make the issuing of orders unnecessary. A third cultural difference of some importance is found in the identification of self and how one regards self in relation to the world beyond self. In white culture, individuals are brought up to think of themselves in a perpetual state of becoming. They are taught to live for the future, to plan all their lives to improve their situation. In Indian cultures, one is continually in a state of being rather than of becoming. One is what one is, and while one will become other things, the important thing is to improve oneself as he is now.[34]

Integration and assimilation (cultural and structural) have been limited also by the Indian's character, value system, and philosophy. The traditional Indian's character is "passive, deferential, and reflective," qualities not in keeping with a capitalist society. These tendencies hinder him in off-reservation competition for jobs, and discourage businessmen who might otherwise provide employment opportunities on the reservation. Among other Indian values, nepotism and factionalism are important. Also, a postulate that is widespread in Indian cultures, the Image of Limited Goods, holds that the world's supply of goods is limited and that if one individual acquires too much, others are deprived of their fair share. Another belief that affects the Indian's relations with non-Indians is his concept of man's harmony with nature. This belief has caused him to reject mechanization, special fertilizers, and improved seeds. His view that sickness is a result of disharmony in spiritual life has discouraged visits to health centers on the reservations, although this is less true today, as Patricia D. Mail makes clear in her paper in this volume. The view that immortality is achieved through the survival of one's descendants contributes to a birth rate that is two and one-half times that of the general population of the United States.[35]

33. Theodore D. Graves, "Urban Indian Personality and the 'Culture of Poverty,'" *American Ethnologist* 1 (February 1974), pp. 65–86; Weston La Barre, *The Ghost Dance. Origins of Religion* (New York. Dell, 1972), chap 4.

34. Robert Faherty, "The American Indian: An Overview," *Current History* 67 (December 1974), pp. 244–74. For a stimulating discussion of the implications of Indian-white cultural differences for factories located on reservations, see Robert J Bigart, "Indian Culture and Industrialization," *American Anthropologist* 74 (October 1972), pp. 1180–88.

35. Gerald S. Nagel, "Economics of the Reservation," *Current History* 67 (December 1974), p. 249

At the same time, a lack of understanding, as well as bungling and prejudice, on the part of whites has hindered the integration of Native Americans. For more than a century after 1820, the reservation policy in particular, and United States policy in general, denied the Indians the experience of managing their own affairs. These policies insured the continued helplessness of the Indians.[36] Of special importance now is the climate of rejection met by migrants to certain urban centers. Towns and cities which are located adjacent to reservations are widely known for the discrimination, including open hostility, that they show toward Indians who move into them. For example, several South Dakota and New Mexico communities are noted for their inhospitality to Sioux and Navajo families who wish to move from a reservation to these towns.[37] Most of the books on American Indians document how prejudice and discrimination on the part of whites have retarded the integration and assimilation of Indians.

In the cities, most Indians prefer to associate socially with other Indians, usually with relatives and members of their own tribal group. In their early years in the San Francisco area, migrants tend to go to Indian centers of interaction; later, the Indian himself makes the choice of association. Ablon refers to the constant psychological and social awareness of Indianness as "a neo-Indian identity."[38] Many individuals have not been aware that Indians have a shared heritage until they leave their reservation, with its limited interests, and meet Indians from other parts of the country. In the urban environment, pan-Indianism often provides a new dimension, and sometimes, a substitute for their tribalism.[39]

Factors furthering integration and assimilation

Despite the tendency of Native Americans to interact mainly with other Indians in towns and cities, the movement to urban areas that began at the middle of the twentieth century may prove to be the most important factor in the continuing integration and the ultimate assimilation of the Indian. The Bureau of Indian Affairs estimates that during the 1960s about 200,000 Indian people migrated to urban areas. By 1970, approximately 45 percent of all Native Americans resided in cities. Even if many of the urban Indian people eventually leave the city, the urban experience will have become a major influence in determining their attitudes and behavior.[40]

Conditions in the urban community lead the Indian away from tribal patterns. The range of occupational, religious, political, and recreational alternatives is vastly increased in the city. The relative social anonymity and high-pressure salesmanship in the city cause the Indian to make

36. Robert Berkhofer, Jr., "Commentary," in *Indian-White Relations*, eds. Jane F. Smith and Robert Kvasnicka (Washington, D.C.: Howard University Press, 1976), p. 84.

37. Joann Westermann, "The Urban Indian," *Current History* 67 (December 1974), pp. 259–61.

38. Joan Ablon, "Relocated American Indians in the San Francisco Bay Area: Social Interaction and Indian Identity," *Human Organization* 23 (Winter 1964), p. 304.

39. Price, "Migration and Adaptation," pp. 174–75.

40. Howard M. Bahr, "An End to Invisibility," in *Native Americans Today*, eds. Bahr, Chadwick, and Day, pp. 408–9.

choices that he would never make on the reservation.[41] Some Indians who migrated to the cities in earlier years, and their children and grandchildren, are truly urban Indians. Some have never visited their tribal homes, and a fraction of these have abandoned any sense of Indian identity. Intermarried and adapted to industrial culture, these city dwellers are merely Americans of a particular ancestry. It is true, of course, that some urban Indians have remained traditionalists despite years of residence in the urban community.[42]

An increasing intermarriage rate tends to promote integration and assimilation, and a significant proportion of Indian young men and women are marrying outside the tribe and race. In a study of migration of American Indians to Los Angeles, Price found that 64 percent of the marriages within the generation of the respondent's parents were within the tribe, but only 39 percent of the marriages in the respondent's generation were within the tribe. Approximately one-third of the married respondents had married whites.[43] Walker's analysis of the reduction of Nez Perce breeding isolation in the Plateau area showed that interbreeding with other Indian groups and racial minorities of Euro-American society is increasing, but that whites are contributing most to the reduction of Nez Perce blood quanta at present. The predominance of whites in these intermarriages is due in part to the fact that this is the largest non-Nez Perce group to which the Nez Perces are exposed. Part of the explanation lies, however, in the disapproval of Nez Perces of intermarriage with blacks, Latin Americans, and Shoshonean-speaking peoples to the south in the Great Basin. Walker found marked variations in outbreeding among different segments of the Nez Perce population. The off-reservation segment possesses much less Nez Perce blood quanta than does the on-reservation group. Also, the Lapwai people on the reservation are more outbred than the Kamiah population, largely because of the preference among the latter, almost totally Presbyterianized, group for endogamous marriages.[44]

Wax points out that intermarriage need not lead to a loss of Indian identity, but adds that the heirship definition of Indianness, in terms of blood quanta as written into the law, makes it almost inevitable that the children of Indian-white intermarriage will not be defined by themselves or others as Indian. In theory, absorption into the white group could be avoided if the married couple were to reside within an Indian community and bring up their children among Indian children. Actually, the tendency in intermarriage seems to be consciously toward the adoption of white ways. Among children who are the product of intertribal marriages, as among those who are raised in an urban environment where Indians from a number of tribes live, a generalized sense of Indian identity tends to emerge. The problem for the generalized Indian is that his role and his relationships with other Indians have not been clarified.[45]

41. Price, "Migration and Adaptation," pp. 174–75.

42. Westerman, "The Urban Indian," p. 260.

43. Price, "Migration and Adaptation," p. 172.

44. Walker, "Measures of Nez Perce Outbreeding," pp. 150–52

45. Wax, *Indian Americans*, pp. 191–92.

CONCLUSION

What can one say in summary about the extent of assimilation, using that concept to include the four intergroup processes we have discussed, between Indians and whites in the United States today? Amalgamation and acculturation are increasing, as we read the evidence, with both Indians and non-Indians being affected. The "gene pool" of the Indian population is slowly acquiring a larger "European" inheritance; but at the same time, the European-descended population is absorbing an unmeasured amount of Indian inheritance. The latter process involves a small proportion of the non-Indians, but it is probably no smaller in absolute terms.

Many Indians are in increasing contact, via the mass media, in school, in jobs, in the army, with the culture of the larger society. With approximately half of the self-identified Indians now living in cities, not to mention those with some Indian background who no longer regard themselves as Indians, the generations-long process of acculturation continues. But this is still a two-way influence. Among other factors, the disenchantment among some white Americans with the dominant culture and many recent public policies has renewed the attraction of Indian cultures. The attraction is doubtless quite superficial in many cases and may often be based on a romanticized picture of Indian life; but there are also sincere and informed choices being made in favor of life styles strongly influenced by Indian cultures.

It seems to us that acculturation may mean the giving up of some elements of one culture, with replacements from another, or it can mean, as well, simply the addition of values and norms and styles, creating a more complex cultural repertoire for those involved. Considering the great mobility many people have today, and the variety of groups within which they interact, it seems reasonable to think of acculturation as addition, not substitution, in some circumstances. This may help to account for the continuing strength of ethnic identities in many parts of the world today, in the face of powerful acculturating forces. It may better describe the situation of some urban Indians and of white Americans who are attracted to many aspects of Indian culture.[46] If acculturation is seen, in part, as additive, we need to begin to explore many questions related to it: What conditions make it most, or least, likely to work in this way? What aspects of culture can be added, which ones almost certainly can only be substituted? What are the consequences for the individuals and groups involved of this form of culture change?

Although Indian-white relationships are probably characterized by continuing amalgamation and acculturation, the situation with regard to identification and structural integration is different. In this day of renewed attention to one's ethnicity, most Native Americans identify themselves more strongly as Indians rather than shifting their identification to the larger society. We shall not here examine the reasons for this surge of ethnicity, but will only note that political and economic factors, cultural forces, and individual needs all play a part.[47] There is a danger

46. Malcolm McFee, "The 150% Man, A Product of Blackfeet Acculturation," *American Anthropologist* 70 (December 1968), pp. 1096–1103.

47. J. Milton Yinger, "Ethnicity in Complex Societies," in *The Uses of Controversy*, eds. Lewis Coser and Otto Larson (New York The Free Press, 1976), pp. 197–216.

that judgments are based on headlines, on the dramatic stories of Indian claims and reaffirmations, while the quieter process of identify shift goes unnoticed. Nevertheless, in our judgment that aspect of the assimilation process based on individual identification seems at this time in American history to indicate a lesser amount of assimilation.

There are counter currents affecting the process of structural integration of Indian Americans. In the last generation tens of thousands have entered the urban job market, as Alan L. Sorkin shows in his article in this volume, and an active movement for Indian rights has taken many into the political arena. (Several papers in this volume—see especially those by Raymond V. Butler, James E. Officer, Vine Deloria, Jr., and Nancy O. Lurie—document the defeats and victories for this movement: "the trail of broken treaties," but also the land restored, the fishing rights affirmed, the payments made to tribes for past losses.) These are indications of pluralism, of the integration of Indians, primarily on a group basis, into a multicultural society, with more nearly equal rights and opportunities.

Another trend, however, is more toward separation than pluralism. Some Indians now speak of "Indian countries," not reservations. In October 1976, the National Congress of American Indians resolved that "Indian Tribes possess all inherent powers of sovereignty and self-government".[48] We are not arguing for or against such a view (although we should note that this position tends to be matched with an anti-Indian organization, the "Interstate Congress for Equal Rights and Responsibilities"), but we call attention to the fact that structural integration of a society is different from treaties or accommodations between societies. In examining the situation of native Americans, it is important to try to understand the different consequences of these strategies.

If we assume a measure of free choice for individual Indians, no one policy or pattern is adequate in the United States today. Some Indians want to strengthen the tribal pattern (albeit with continual change often being recognized), whether pluralistically or in a more separatist sense. Some want to, or feel compelled to, live in cities, away from tribal communities, while still keeping their Indian identities. Some are more fully acculturated, perhaps married to non-Indians, and prefer a larger national identity.

A major scholarly task is to study the degree to which these several patterns are mutually compatible. A major policy task, if they are all seen as legitimate, is to design the ways by which the different goals can be attained, their contradictions recognized and accommodated, and the full rights of Indian Americans to select their preferred goals protected.

48. *International Herald Tribune*, 13 December 1976, p. 4.

ERRATA

In the January issue of the ANNALS, an error occurred in the article by Robert Parke and David Seidman entitled "Social Indicators and Social Reporting." The mistake occurs in the second paragraph of page 7. The entire paragraph is printed here in its correct form.

Given the view of the social indicators enterprise as the measurement of social conditions and social change, the major tasks can be seen as conceptual and methodological work toward the definition of measures of social conditions and social change; development of the data base; and the development of social indicator models. Social reporting is a fourth major task, implied not by the view of social indicators as the measurement of social change, but rather by the belief that one of the purposes of social indicators is to contribute to public enlightenment.

The ANNALS regrets that the paragraph did not appear in this form in the January issue.

Book Department

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND POLITICS

EDMUND BEARD. *Developing the ICBM. A Study in Bureaucratic Politics*. Pp. viii, 273 New York: Columbia University Press, 1976. $15.00.

Professor Beard poses this question: Why was the United States so slow (compared with the U.S.S.R.) to develop an ICBM? This carefully researched and nicely written study finds that after 1945 the Air Force was driven by two potentially incompatible perceptions of its own and the nation's interests. One was that missiles would someday supplant bombers; thus the Air Force must control those missiles. The other was that bombers would be supreme for years ahead, that the central Air Force mission was flying bombers, and that this should guide defense spending. The first perception led the Air Force to fight vigorously to monopolize long-range missile development. But the second led it to develop such missiles in lackadaisical fashion. The Air Force reconciled its interests via hypothetical missiles for the distant future and its beloved bombers in the present.

Until 1954 little was done to develop an ICBM; then it received top priority. Why the change? Beard points to efforts of people outside the service, in particular to those of a special assistant to the Secretary of the Air Force. This individual, believing strongly in missiles, organized a blue ribbon civilian panel stacked with ICBM proponents. That panel, and a parallel RAND report, concluded that missiles needed much more emphasis—with a separate Air Force command to supervise the program. These findings, plus the special assistant's maneuvers, aroused congressional attention and the support of top Pentagon officials, leading to adoption of the recommendations. The leader of the new command displayed masterful bureaucratic skills in sustaining his program's independence, direct access to the Secretary of Defense, and priority claims on resources. From 1954 on, the ICBM program moved smartly ahead, though too late to avoid the shock of Sputnik. Thus the often-voiced charge that the Eisenhower Administration let missile programs lag out of budgetary considerations is unfair—the fault lay with earlier Air Force foot-dragging, which the Administration managed to circumvent.

Beard's subtitle, *A Study in Bureaucratic Politics*, is misleading, for the book contributes more than the author suggests. In a bureaucratic politics model, issues are decided by struggles among actors whose arguments reflect their organizational interests. While this applies to many participants in the ICBM decisions, the book indicates it does not explain the behavior of all those involved. Beard does not point out, though

it is clear from his findings, that a bureaucratic politics approach is fruitful and that there is also more than bureaucratic politics behind government decisions.

PATRICK M. MORGAN
Washington State University
Pullman

DAVID MCCULLOUGH. *The Path Between the Seas: The Creation of the Panama Canal, 1870–1914*. Pp. 698. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1977. $14.95

WAYNE D. BRAY. *The Common Law Zone in Panama: A Case Study in Reception*. Pp. v, 150. San Juan, Puerto Rico: Inter-American University Press, 1977. $20.00.

The historical account of the creation of the transisthmian canal between the Caribbean and the Pacific by David McCullough covers the period of the French effort to the triumph of the United States in opening the Panama Canal to world commerce on the eve of World War I. The author is primarily interested in the human element in the story, and he has written it in accordance with the principle that history is biography. He has produced a living gallery of the men who made the Canal, from Ferdinand de Lesseps to Colonel George W. Goethals.

This eminently readable volume is written with a keen eye to the drama of the story, but never at the expense of scholarship. Though emphasizing personalities the author does not neglect the political, diplomatic, and social phases of the canal project. He is critical of the diplomacy of Secretary of State John Hay and President Theodore Roosevelt with Colombia in 1903, but he conclusively acquits them of any complicity in Panama's independence movement in that year, though he severely scores Roosevelt's later indiscreet and unwarranted explanations of the events of 1903. The author's carefully researched account of those events should go a long way toward correcting the error, shared by the news media and Washington policymakers, that the United States stole the Canal Zone and the Canal from Panama.

His account of the doleful experiences of the canal builders with the mammoth slides should administer a coup de grace to the chimerical project of a sea-level canal across the isthmus. His graphic description of the tremendous achievements of the chief engineer John Frank Stevens in rescuing the canal from chaos, organizing the transportation system to remove spoil from Culebra Cut, securing the "great decision" to build a high-level lake and lock canal, and ensuring the ultimate success of the Canal, makes Stevens a top candidate for election to the Hall of Fame of Great Americans.

Outstanding is the author's account of the triumph of Colonel William Crawford Gorgas, United States Army, in overcoming the dread diseases, cholera, malaria, and yellow fever in the building of the Canal, his unbiased discussion of race relations in the Zone, and his explanation in layman's language of the technical and mechanical problems of canal and lock construction.

This is a fascinating and timely account of the building of one of the world's greatest engineering marvels, which the Carter administration is now seeking to relinquish to Panama.

The McCullough story should have been must reading for Wayne Bray, author of the second book here under review, as a corrective to many of his unsubstantiated charges and false conclusions.

The immediate extension of the United States Bill of Rights to Panama by Executive Order of President Theodore Roosevelt on May 9, 1904, marked a first step in a gradual process of introducing the Anglo-American common law into the Canal Zone. Since the Hay-Bunau Varilla treaty made no specific provision for the exercise of the judicial power in the Zone, this process of gradual transfer of the common law to the Zone, including both common law procedures and equity, was corollary to the right of sovereign control which was granted to the United States in the treaty. This book gives a thorough and much needed de-

scriptive history of the judicial system in the Canal Zone since 1904, including useful analyses of the laws and judicial decisions by which the common law was extended in the Canal Zone.

The volume is, however, basically a political tract, marred by the opinions of the author and expressions of his prejudices. His excursions into political propaganda in the first 50 pages and the last 10 set an emotional framework for the study which largely detracts from the solid scholarship of the intervening chapters. He dismisses the decision of the United States Supreme Court in *Wilson* v. *Shaw* in 1907 as human error and ignores the corollary sustaining opinions in *Luckenbach S.S. Co.* v. *U.S.* (1930) and *U.S.* v. *Husband* (R) (1972).

This book is not worth the price.

DONALD MARQUAND DOZER
University of California
Santa Barbara

ANTHONY SAMPSON. *The Arms Bazaar: From Lebanon to Lockheed*. Pp. 352. New York: Viking Press, 1977. $12.95.

An aphorism of that perspicacious political pundit, Pogo, would aptly convey Anthony Sampson's main message in *The Arms Bazaar*: "I have met the enemy and they is us!" Perhaps we had not quite thought that about the venal shenanigans of the armaments/aerospace industry. Sampson does recount the intricate web of influence buying and peddling; of outright bribery, outrageous commissions, illegal political "contributions" and subordination; of self-aggrandizement and power-tripping, of mendacity, duplicity, naiveté, intrigue, and subterfuge; of crassest lobbying and logrolling; of any number of other heinous activities, all perpetrated upon humanity in the name of "business as usual" by such grand purveyors of weaponry as Krupp, Vickers, Dassault, Northrop and, not to be overlooked, Lockheed. We vaguely remember, or Sampson causes us to recall, extortions by, or bribes of, highest elected officials and of royalty (and not only in those countries where it is "the custom"), commissions of $106 million to one Saudi for a decade of "facilitating," payments of over $12 million, mostly bribes, in order to sell a few wide-bodied jets to a Japanese airline. We learn, too, of a puppeteer's ping-pong game, in which sophisticated weaponry is the ball and Israel and its Arab enemies the puppets, a game the more perilous after Nixon had sold to the Shah of Iran an arsenal as technologically up-to-date as our own making Iran the first Third World country to be permitted to overcome the arms-technology gap. We are—according to our particular fancy—furious, appalled, aggrieved, apoplectic, or merely distressed by these recollections. We are also fascinated, but no longer surprised, so jaded have we become.

Still, a good storyteller could have done this for us. Sampson does much more. He demonstrates that these events are inexorable, that these "actors" are inevitable, given (1) that there is a profit-motivated armaments/aerospace business at all; (2) that it is a pawn of both political maneuvering and international diplomacy; and (3) that its economic "structure" is what it has become. True to a well-tested hypothesis, here as elsewhere structure dictates the parameters of behavior and these jointly determine results. Since it is "we"—or rather our elected representatives—who set, or tolerate, the structure, it is "we" who are perpetrating ominous conditions on ourselves.

There is not room to elaborate sufficiently, so let us focus on a few obvious structural characteristics of the armaments/aerospace business. Note that both production and marketing are subject to vast economies of scale and therefore that the case of actors, even on a global scale, is small, and that weapons standardization, not just within a nation but among allies, is urgent, both conferring paramountcy to a single big sale. Observe that governments, certainly for major weaponry, are monopsonistic conduits, if not salesmen outright, for virtually every transaction, spawning a military-political-industrial nexus of awesome scope and power. Recal

that, with only one exception among major powers (Japan), a viable and technologically-advancing armaments/aerospace industry is deemed absolutely essential so that the industry and government are truly symbiotic. Among other things this gives rise, on the one hand, to various forms of government paternalism (sometimes allocating orders according to firm-by-firm survival rather than cost-effectiveness, sometimes arranging for production consortia or licensing agreements; financial "bailouts" when these schemes fail; pressures on other sovereign nations so that exports will augment flagging domestic sales) and, on the other, to firms that perennially overrun their own cost estimates and successfully insist on accommodation, that feel rapaciously victimized by their own and foreign governments and demand, and even get, redress; that are probably more cutthroat among themselves than firms in any other major industry; and that all-too-obviously cannot prosper in a truly free market which, perversely, they tout and glorify. When to this structure is added a consequent and all-pervasive secrecy it is easy to understand—but fatal to condone—the bizarre behavior and rationalizations that Northrop and Lockheed officers confessed to Senator Church's Subcommittee. And for those among us who might fear that "all will be forgiven and forgotten"—which does not seem unlikely—a perusal of Sampson's book will provide renewed energy, ammunition, and commitment.

M. O CLEMENT

Dartmouth College
Hanover
New Hampshire

HERBERT Y. SCHANDLER. *The Unmaking of a President. Lyndon Johnson and Vietnam* Pp vii, 419. Princeton, N.J.. Princeton University Press, 1977. $16.50.

A doctoral dissertation provided the foundation for this book. In addition to printed sources, the young author held interviews, used oral historical collections and personal correspondence. His style is lucid, his narrative is easy to follow.

Our taking over for France in French Indo-China in 1954 was the second attempt to replace French failure with American success. The digging of the Panama Canal was the first. Our involvement in Vietman, the author writes convincingly, was "a major decision made without much fanfare, deliberation or planning" (p. 20). As the world knows America's role in the war in Vietnam was a failure, if not a national disgrace. Quite a contrast to our success in digging the Panama Canal.

General William C. Westmoreland, supported by the General Staff and the Pentagon militants, repeatedly urged that more troops be sent to Vietnam and that they be allowed to do more fighting. The General was opposed by George Ball, Under Secretary of State, who was outvoted by the Secretary of State Dean Rusk and by President Lyndon Johnson.

After the Tet Offensive and over 500,000 American soldiers were unable to produce a victory, Clark Clifford, soon to become Secretary of Defense, persuaded President Johnson to reconsider the request of the military. After much debate and increasingly vocal public opposition, the President ordered a halt to the bombing of North Vietnam. Eventually negotiations began and Johnson announced his decision to retire to private life. According to this young scholar the chief impetus for changing America's course in South Vietnam came from Clark Clifford and not from L.B.J.

Dr. Schandler's conclusion that the Tet Offensive was the turning point in the war is not likely to be disputed. His careful analysis of the critical decisions that finally helped the United States extricate itself from the morass in Southeast Asia will be welcomed by students of the long traumatic involvement in Vietnam.

GEORGE C. OSBORN

Gainesville
Florida

JEREMY TUNSTALL. *The Media Are American: Anglo-American Media in the World*. Pp. 352. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. $14.95.

The Media Are American is the latest addition to the Communication and Society series edited by Tunstall and initially published by Sage. The book focuses on the role of British and American technology and models of organization in the structuring of communication media around the world.

The organizing locus for this study is the so-called "media imperialism thesis." In its most benevolent interpretation, this holds that through skillful commercial exploitation, superior know how, good timing, and an easily adapted professional ideology (that of "value neutrality"), but not through any purposeful conspiracy, Americans have come, both directly and indirectly, to dominate the style, structure, technology, and content of domestic mass communication in a majority of countries. In its more malevolent interpretation, as, for example, that of Herbert Schiller in *Mass Communications and American Empire*, these same effects are seen as the result of systematic actions by the American military industrial complex directed toward the ultimate subjugation of the world. In the end, Tunstall accepts much of the evidence supporting one or another interpretation of the thesis, but rejects the argument itself. In his view, American media, or more correctly Anglo-American media, have indeed had a disproportionate impact on the patterns of information dissemination, and in turn on the cultures, of many nations, but that impact is increasingly likely to be mitigated by local counterforces.

The style of the book, like that of Tunstall's earlier contribution to this series, is ponderous, and the organization of material within the various chapters, though not the organization of the chapters themselves, detracts from the coherence of the argument. In addition, one wishes for more empirical substantiation of many of the points that are made. Nevertheless, *The Media Are American* adds a significant new dimension to the study of American and world media history. Of particular value are the discussion of media development in the Third World (especially Africa) and the numerous tables summarizing media import patterns, market penetration, and program costs for various time periods and countries.

The Media Are American is a welcome addition to the growing literature on the international traffic in public information and entertainment. It is similar in style and provides a good complement to another recent contribution to that literature, Julian Hale's *Radio Power*.

JAROL B. MANHEIM
Virginia Polytechnic Institute
and State University
Blacksburg

DANIEL YERGIN. *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State*. Pp. x, 526. Boston. Houghton Mifflin, 1977. $15.00.

The origins of the cold war continue to be restudied as we seek answers to the big questions of our time: Who was responsible for starting that conflict? How was the "national security state" born in the United States? Was Soviet expansionism an imperative only to be countered by threat of force or were other interpretations plausible? In his detailed study of American policy making between 1945 and 1949 Daniel Yergin mercifully does not offer monochromatic answers to these questions. He does not advance any single cause theory. Instead, his focus is on the ideas and drives individual policymakers brought to international affairs and the decisions they made.

Yergin contrasts the two schools of thought interpreting the Soviet Union on what he calls the "Riga axioms" and the "Yalta axioms." The latter were favored by President Roosevelt but by few others. They included a wish to estimate Soviet power realistically, a willingness

to negotiate, and an implied recognition of "spheres of influence." Most of the book narrates how the Riga axioms came to command a consensus, first among the policymaking elite, and then in American public opinion. These axioms flowed from a belief that Soviet policies were coherent and inflexible, dictated by a theology of world revolution and by innate aggressiveness. This simplistic outlook furthered the ambitions of some men and frustrated those of others. It also led to a virtual abandonment of diplomacy as a tool of foreign policy in favor of military confrontation.

Yergin recounts the interplay of personalities and the sequence of events in smooth prose. Among a host of characters he shows us President Truman demanding sharp distinctions between right and wrong in foreign affairs; George Kennan, ideologue in 1946 and diplomat later, Dean Acheson, "selling" evangelical anticommunism and urging expansion of a military industrial establishment. He sketches in the institutional spurs to founding a national security state by describing dogfights for higher budget allocations among the armed services, the drive for power in Navy Secretary James Forrestal, the complementary needs of the Air Force and the aviation industry, and the 1945 Eberstadt Report calling for a realignment of governmental organization to serve an expanded vision of national security.

Yergin, unfortunately, leaves unexplored two very relevant questions: To what extent were American policymakers guided by the domestic economic implications of their decisions? What were, in fact, Soviet intentions in those years? He occasionally hints at possible responses other than his own humane conclusion: "There are no final answers, only the spectacle of men and women moved by ambitions and opportunities, beset by fears and dangers, struggling to find transient certainties midst the onrush of events."

SURJIT MANSINGH

The University of Texas
San Antonio

AFRICA, ASIA, AND LATIN AMERICA

GODWIN C. CHU. *Radical Change Through Communication in Mao's China*. Pp. vi, 340. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1977. $14.00

BILL BRUGGER. *Contemporary China*. Pp. 451. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1977. $22.50.

Since 1949, the Chinese Communist leaders have transformed their war torn and poverty-stricken country rapidly into a powerful, self-disciplined and developing socialist country. The above two books deal with the developmental process of the Chinese society under Communist rule for the past three decades, but they analyze it from different theoretical angles.

Chu's book avoids the chronological treatment of China's development experience. Its main purpose is to demonstrate, by using both original and secondary sources, that communication (particularly when used in a group setting) is an effective instrument of social change through an examination of six factors specific to development and through showing how communication in Mao's China has been used as a basic social process. In so doing, Chu's primary theoretical interest lies in the functional consequences of the various communication processes, through mass media as well as other channels, to individual members, their groups, and social system in the process of societal change. The author contends that Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues have successfully employed communication on a massive scale as a powerful mechanism to shake off the Chinese people's bondage to old traditions and values and push them on the road to new collective effort and development. Chu concludes that the Chinese developmental case is unique because the drastic and swift societal change has been brought about not by a revolution of technology, nor by the brutal application of force in Stalinist fashion, but rather, primarily by the skillful use of communication.

Based on a mass of material drawn largely from secondary sources, Mr. Brugger's book is intended to be a textbook for undergraduate college students interested in contemporary Chinese politics or history. The book gives a chronological account of events in China from the 1940s, and sociological tools such as models and cycles are employed merely to provide a relatively simple framework for understanding the dynamics of socialist transition and development in China during the mid-twentieth century. The author treats Mao's Communist revolution as a process rather than an art, and the main theme of his book is related to the interaction and the battle ("contradiction" in Maoist lexicon) between "conservatives," "radicals," and "ultra-leftists." All three groups probably agreed to the ultimate goals of building socialism and communism in China, but they emphasized different means to achieve them. The author identifies nine cycles (up to August 1973) of alternating radicalism and consolidation and asserts that these divergencies of political line have profoundly affected a cyclic or spiral pattern of China's revolutionary development.

Any definite consensus as to the best methodology for the study of contemporary China is virtually unknown among Western scholars of Chinese affairs. In this reviewer's opinion, our scholarly efforts on modern China, particularly on its Communist period, must of necessity be multidisciplinary in scope and nature, drawing on theoretical concepts and empirical findings primarily from the social science fields. For this reason, the publication of the above two books in 1977 (the immediate post-Mao era) is a welcome and timely event for our academic world. Chu and Brugger are to be commended for having produced the informative, useful, objective, and well-researched scholarly pieces. Their books deserve careful reading by all those interested in contemporary China, although readers may not accept all of their interpretations and judgments.

The two books are equally good in overall scholarly value, but Chu's work is better in terms of readability. Because of his writing style, readers may find Brugger's book not exactly exciting reading.

TAI SUNG AN

Washington College
Chestertown
Maryland

FREDERICK COOPER. *Plantation Slavery on the East Coast of Africa*. Pp. vii, 314. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977. $18.50.

Rising interest both in the institution of slavery and African history may, in some measure, be stated by this elaborated Ph.D. thesis. The reader, however, need hardly follow the path of this reviewer by reading its chapters in sequence for the conclusions adequately summarize its theme. Much of this diligently researched work consists of footnotes, and unfortunately, much of the text ought to be consigned to them.

Limiting himself to the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba (the world's great clove producing centers and which had most of the slaves) and the coastal cities of Mombasa and Malindi, Cooper traces the rapid growth of slavery in the territories of the Omani Arabs during the nineteenth century until it was outlawed in 1897 Throughout, he makes copious reference to slavery in the Americas.

In his view, East African slavery (as distinct from capture and transportation to the coast—and which he does not discuss) differed from that in the Americas in being less harsh. This was due to a combination of factors. The Omani need for dependents to augment their communal power required that they bring slaves into a more acquiescent, patriarchal arrangement. They knew, too, that there was an absence of any powerful political authority to enforce a rigid, tyrannical structure. East Coast Africans could escape more easily then American slaves. Although some did escape, most did not try. Cooper continually says that in an insecure world, slaves, themselves, felt the de-

sireability of "protection" in a communal group. They were also placated in part by being permitted to own their plots of land and by being given a large measure of social independence. Furthermore, manumission was more frequent. Slaves worked intensively during the clove-picking season, but even including the grain field work at Malindi, he repeats that pressure on slaves was not as great as in the New World. Nor was racialism as extreme on the Coast. Offspring of concubines became free. In fact, "Arab and Swahili slave-owners were willing to arm their slaves. Individuals and communal groups relied on the support of slaves for political and military strength" (p. 255).

Lest one think that East Coast slaves rejoiced in these conditions, he describes the variety of ways that Africans used to beat the system, from occasional rebellion, escape, selling covertly to Indian middlemen and, in an ideological irony, to using Islam to judge the slaveowners' greed and "to assert their own moral equality" (p. 257).

Within its confines, Cooper has amassed a great deal of data and statistics (sometimes minutia), making this a useful reference work.

WALLACE SOKOLSKY
Bronx Community College
New York

ALEXANDER ECKSTEIN. *China's Economic Revolution*. Pp. xii, 340. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977. $19.95. Paperbound, $6.95.

In this book the late Alexander Eckstein, one of the foremost authorities on the modern Chinese economy, presents a comprehensive analysis of economic development in the People's Republic. *China's Economic Revolution* concerns itself with broad issues of significance concerning one of the greatest institutional and technological metamorphoses of our time. Eckstein discusses the conception and implementation of economic policy, changing patterns of property relations and economic organization, the allocation of resources under socialist planning, and the degree to which China has successfully reconciled economic stability and growth. These topics are sandwiched between a concise overview of the pre-1949 economy and concluding chapters, which survey Sino foreign trade and assess China's relevance as a model for other developing nations.

Eckstein's conclusions will startle few scholars, but rarely have the problems and achievements of the present regime been set forth with such clarity and objectivity. China's economic heritage conveyed a burden of underdevelopment yet provided the nucleus of physical and human resources for rapid growth. Socialist transformation of that economy entailed persistent conflicts between ends and means, resulting in a succession of grand strategies which alternately accepted, rejected, and finally acculturated the Soviet model of development.

These strategic shifts were mirrored in varying forms of economic organization and resource apportionment. Chinese economic institutions crystallized along Soviet lines between 1955 and 1958, but their operation was infused with a profound consciousness that policy alternatives bore divergent social and ideological consequences. China's leadership assigned changing priorities to material production and socialist values, and oscillated between an emphasis upon centralized control and concern with operational efficiency. Planning in an economy still vulnerable to the ancient harvest cycle was necessarily confined to annual rather than five year periods. Inflation, the bane of Kuomintang authorities in the 1940s, was checked by state regulation of wages, a hyperabundant but controlled labor market, and official denigration of "consumerism." China sustained very high rates of fixed capital investment, greatly enhanced the quality of its labor force, and maintained an economic growth rate impressive in both historical and contemporary contexts. Although marginal to the economy as a whole, foreign trade played, and continues to play, a key role in economic

stabilization and providing access to advanced technology.

Eckstein sees China's economic revolution as essentially a sui generis phenomenon, requiring a mix of social controls, ideological motivation, and resource endowments, which has limited applicability to other underdeveloped societies. It is also very much a revolution in process rather than an accomplished fact. As Mao himself acknowledged, tension between the ideal of self-reliance and the need to import foreign techniques, clashes between egalitarianism and material inducements to spur production, and the contradiction between a mass-based and an elitist concept of socialist development remain to be resolved by future generations. Yet it is in the very posing of such apparent dilemmas, as much as in the fulfillment of more concrete goals, that China's economic revolution compels our attention and deserves our continual scrutiny.

ROBERT P. GARDELLA
United States Merchant
Marine Academy
Kings Point
New York

NANCY J. HAFKIN and EDNA G. BAY. *Women in Africa. Studies in Social and Economic Change*. Pp. x, 306. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1976. $15.00

These dozen essays discuss, on the basis of recent fieldwork, aspects of African women's life besides their domestic activities. This has not been a totally neglected subject. We have heard of women traders in West Africa, of the traditional Igbo women's councils, and of spirit mediumship as a "career" for women. But each of these topics is considered in the light of recent social changes. Margaret Jean Hay's study of Luo women farmers introduces a new subject. She shows that they have been much more open to innovation than is commonly supposed, some effort is currently being made in Britain to urge that agricultural instruction be directed to women rather than their husbands. Margaret Strobel's account of the dance societies created by Arab women in Mombasa and their development into political pressure groups is a new approach. So is Filomina Steady's essay on the church organizations of Creole women in Freetown, essentially conservative bodies strongly insistent on monogamous, indissoluble marriage, to which they look for economic security. Steady by implication, and Strobel explicitly, deplore the fact that these organizations are of but not for women. The Muslim Women's Institute of Mombasa raises funds for a nursery school (children not women) and for scholarships (boys as well as girls). This is not what they ought to be doing. Surely a very maternalist attitude.

Some of the contributors show a lack of proportion and of factual accuracy. "Colonialism" is reproached for employing only men in the industrial centers, but nothing is said about the nature of the work offered or the living conditions. These may be matters for reproach too, but in a different context. Some thought might be given to contemporary systems of migrant labor from one independent country to another. It is curiously naive to treat as peculiarly Victorian the assumption that only men should hold political authority It is not true that chiefs in the Gold Coast or anywhere else were appointed solely in order to make formal alienations of land, not that District Commissioners in Kenya decided what the limits of African land should be. Nor are we anywhere told what is actually meant by the statement that traditionally African land was communally owned. "Ordered anarchy" is a phrase used not by the British, but by Evans-Pritchard, and not describing the Igbo, but the Nuer, a people who have much less in the way of formal institutions.

LUCY MAIR
London
England

NEVILLE J. MANDEL. *The Arabs and Zionism Before World War I*. Pp. 282.

Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. $15.00.

The notion that Arab hostility to Zionism and to a Jewish state in the Middle East dates from either the Balfour Declaration in 1917 or from the ascent to power of the Grand Mufti in Jerusalem in the 1930s is clearly a mistaken one. In a meticulously researched monograph on *The Arabs and Zionism Before World War I*, Neville J. Mandel demonstrates quite convincingly that the Arabs in the Ottoman Empire—both those in the Vilayet of Beirut (what is now northern Israel) and those in the Mutasarriflik of Jerusalem—were quite aware of the coming of the Zionists from Europe, and for the most part feared and opposed this renaissance of Jewish nationalism on the site of the ancient Jewish states of Judea and Israel. Mandel's delineation of the relations between the emigrating Zionists and native-born Arabs on the soil of Palestine foreshadows much of the polemics, the economic and political tension, and the international rivalry between Israel and the Arab states since the establishment of Israel in 1948.

In the prewar years, the Ottoman Empire provided the forum for the legitimation of Zionist aspirations, the creation of a Jewish state, and the battleground between the two sides that, after 1945, was to be provided by the United Nations. Other parallels between pre-1914 conditions and those of the post-World War periods abound: the appointment of commissions to investigate the Arab-Zionist dispute and to establish policies for a peaceful resolution of the conflicts; the sense of solidarity between the Palestinian Arabs and those living in Egypt and in the northern areas of the empire (later to become the states of Lebanon and Syria); the Zionist issue as a part of world politics; Arab terrorism and the efforts of the Zionists to overlook the hostility of the local Arab population or to forge ahead in rebuilding the land despite this opposition. Mandel's review of the Arab-Zionist relations in the opening decades of this century leaves little room for optimism that an easy or durable solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict can be found in the closing decades of the century.

The Ottoman Empire of the 1890s, the decade in which Theodor Herzl gave organization and a voice to the Zionist impulse, was approaching its demise; on one hand, the Ottoman government did not have the strength (or the competence and honesty of administration) to bar Zionists from entry into Palestine; on the other, the Turks were in no position to ignore the protests of their Arab constituency. The result was several decades of vacillation on the part of the Turkish government (much like the British between the two World Wars), on one hand, trying to play off one against the other—with some success—and trying, on the other, to pacify both the Zionists and the Arabs—with little success. The coming of the Young Turks to power in 1908 did little to resolve the issue: the Zionists were not ideologically equipped to become obedient and loyal citizens of the Turkish government nor were they able or interested in halting their purchase of land; the Arabs—whether rural fellahin, Jerusalem patricians, or Christian Arabs—were not about to welcome the Zionist settlers, and the Turks were in no position to mediate or to dictate a resolution of the growing tension.

The mistrust between the Arabs and the Zionists stemmed from three sources: the economic fears of the local Arab population, the religious unity of Islam, and the political nationalism that was beginning to crystallize among Arabs outside of Palestine. Two major efforts to resolve these growing tensions were initiated and both failed. In March and May of 1911, lengthy discussions in the Ottoman Parliament on the Zionist issue failed to resolve the issues; and in 1913 and 1914 a proposed entente between the Arabs and the Zionists proved equally fruitless. By the outbreak of World War I, as Mandel notes, Zionists and Arabs in Palestine were on a collision course. In words that foreshadow the current conflict in the Middle East. Khalil al-Sakakini, a Greek-Orthodox

Christian radical living in Jerusalem added the territorial—and final—element to the economic, religious, and political arguments against the Zionists:

[The Jewish people's] conquest of Palestine is as if it had conquered the heart of the Arab nation, because Palestine is the connecting link which binds the Arabian Peninsula with Egypt and Africa. If the Jews conquer [Palestine], they will prevent the linking of the Arab nation; indeed, they will split it into two unconnected parts. This will weaken the cause of Arabism . . . and will prevent solidarity and unity as a nation.

Reviewing the historical rights of the Arabs and the Jews to the land, he concluded: "[The Jews'] right had died with the passage of time; our right is alive and unshakeable." This position, which over the decades to come developed as the normative one among the Arab nations of the Middle East and a cardinal precept of the Palestine Liberation Organization, could no more be accepted by pre-World War I Zionists than it could find acceptance by the leaders of Israel today.

Mandel's monograph is the product of a prodigious amount of research, well crafted, if occasionally turgid. The findings, 22 "conclusions" Mandel incorporated into a final chapter of his volume, provide the reader with both a summary of the volume as well as a demonstration of the text's stylistic weakness. While this reviewer might have sought a tighter and more interpretative narrative, no criticism can be levelled at the sources, both primary and secondary, employed by the author. Mandel has culled diplomatic material in Vienna, Paris, Berlin, London, Istanbul, and Washington, D.C., Jewish and Zionist material in many of these cities, as well as in Haifa and in Jerusalem, along with hundreds of periodicals and works in Hebrew and Arabic. Mandel's volume will certainly stand as the standard treatment of this theme for all scholars of the Middle East for the foreseeable future.

JULIUS WEINBERG
The Cleveland State University
Ohio

ADRIANO MOREIRA. *O Drama de Timor (The Drama of Portuguese Timor)*. Pp. 142. Braga, Portugal: Editorial Intervenção Lda., 1977. 80 escudos.

Between 1702 and 1976 Portugal officially ruled 7,400 square miles of the East Indian island of Timor. Though this overseas province was completely surrounded by the Indonesian archipelago, Lisbon—halfway around the world—was responsible for its 670,000 residents. As a result of other government priorities, Timor was in every way underdeveloped. At the end of 1974 the per capita G.N.P. was only $40.00. Barely 10 percent of the population was literate, and there were less than a dozen Timorese university graduates.

Until recently the great bulk of Timor's population appeared apolitical if not favorable toward Portugal's negligent rule. Indonesia disavowed any claim to the territory and early this decade refused to support Fretilin, a clandestine group advocating independence. Such was the situation when the April 25, 1974 revolution in distant Portugal resulted in a public promise by the new regime that "Timor will be whatever the majority of its people want it to be."

The subsequent tragic drama for the politically unsophisticated Timorese involved: complex maneuvering by three local political parties, each with completely different goals; abrupt changes in Portugal's attitude toward independence reflecting Lisbon's changing governmental ideologies; concern of Indonesia and Australia over a possible pro-Soviet "Cuba" base in an independent Timor; the critical policy shift toward annexation by Indonesia, resulting in outright occupation and "integration" of eastern Timor in 1976; a consequent civil war involving ideological countercharges, invading "volunteer" armies, and atrocity claims—with at least 60,000 Timorese dead or fled; and ultimately demonstrated frustration and impotence by the United Nations.

The sole problem posed by this fascinating book is publication in Portuguese. Few observers appear better qualified than its author to report and

comment upon events in this little-known political unit. Dr. Adriano Moreira was Minister for Overseas Provinces (1961–63)—the only political post of his career—and it is commonly believed that his dismissal resulted from his advocating too advanced a relationship between metropolitan and overseas Portugal. Subsequently he has served in many prominent positions with univeristy and semiacademic organizations related to Portuguese culture and overseas administration.

The author's stated purpose with this publication is to inform the Portuguese public of post-1974 developments in their most remote overseas province. Direct communications from Dili gradually ceased; and due to the political slant of the Lisbon news media, even official reports from the United Nations were largely ignored. *The Drama of Timor,* therefore, includes the full report of the U.N. Political Affairs and Decolonization Department concerning Timor; Dr. Moreira's comments upon various references in that publication; and a concise conclusion analyzing the report and its consequences.

RICHARD J. HOUK
DePaul University
Chicago
Illinois

WALDEMAR R. SMITH. *The Fiesta System and Economic Change.* Pp. viii, 194. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. $15.00.

The traditional fiesta system of Mesoamerica is one in which an individual household assumes responsibility for organizing and paying for one of the several folk-Catholic religious celebrations which take place in a village each year. What has struck most students of the area is the large expenditure required of the sponsoring household. Smith attempts to refute what he sees as the functionalist interpretation of the fiesta system and the willingness of people to assume the financial burden involved. This view, according to Smith, stresses religious generosity as a cause of Indian social and economic stability and as a consequence of being Indian. Instead, Smith argues that the "generosity" involved in the fiesta system is, itself, a consequence of economic and social stability and that support of the fiesta system is a reasonably chosen pattern of behavior, given the social and economic isolation of many villages.

Support for his argument is based on his fieldwork in an isolated and highly traditional Indian village, in a modernizing Indian town in the same region of Guatemala, and in two other communities which are more prosperous than the remote village but still ceremonially conservative. The remote village is one in which population has grown rapidly and the available land farmed in the traditional way is no longer adequate to provide sustenance for most households. Most of the residents have been forced to become seasonal laborers on lowland plantations. The number of fiestas per year has been reduced, the fiestas have become simpler, and attempts have been made to distribute the costs of each fiesta among a larger number of people.

In the bustling Indian town of San Pedro, Smith also finds fundamental changes in the fiesta system resulting, he argues, in large part from increased spending opportunities for individuals. In the two "intermediate towns" pressure on land is not intense, there are few new economic opportunities, and the fiesta system is relatively stable. This evidence allows Smith to conclude that economic change and the degree and manner of economic integration in the national economy are primary determinants of stability (and change) in the fiesta system.

Smith's comparative study of the four localities is well done and his argument that economic change causes changes in the fiesta system is persuasive. His interpretation of the mainstream functionalist approach and his insistence upon the novelty of his own approach are less persuasive.

ANNE MAYHEW
University of Tennessee
Knoxville

M. N. SRINIVAS. *The Remembered Village*. Pp. xvi, 374. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976. $9.50.

This work is a remarkable personal achievement and an important event in the study of rural India. M.N. Srinivas's writing on caste, social change, and rural life in Southern India has long since established him as an outstanding scholar of contemporary Indian society. Here he presents a document at once uniquely human in its warmth and searching personal honesty and especially valuable in the fresh detail and insights it offers on village life. Its tone and value are the products of an extraordinary feat: the overcoming of the loss of the author's field notes at the hands of arsonists in 1970.

The Remembered Village is an account of field work in village Rampura of Mandya district of southern Karnataka state. The recalled material is mostly drawn from Srinivas's residence there in 1948, supplemented by subsequent visits and contact with his informant/friends. It is the necessity of having to re-create the experience of the field work in order to re-establish the writer's findings which gives the account its distinctive quality. Accordingly there is great emphasis placed upon interpersonal relationships and much probing of their subjective as well as their behavioral dimensions. Among its highpoints are portraits of the village headman, of a powerful faction leader who is simultaneously the headman's friend and rival, and of the wiley clerk who served as Srinivas's assistant. The most significant anthropological contributions come in discussions of social relations and in specific analyses of household life, relations between men and women and between castes. Also included is a sharply drawn account of how the agricultural cycle is woven into the life of the community.

Srinivas's treatment of his own role is what makes this study unique. If anything, he pays more attention to his doubts, fears, mistakes, experiences, and subjective reactions as a sociocultural outsider than he does to his analytical accomplishments. What emerges, therefore, is a highly instructive description of the demands of anthropological field work.

The achievements of the book do not obscure the limitations inevitable in the circumstances of its composition. The discussion of Rampura as a social organism is incomplete and uneven. Its weaker families and jatis are admittedly given little attention. The chapters on post-1948 change and (surprisingly) on factions tend to ramble anecdotally. And, as must be expected, the economic data presented are impressionistically descriptive and are much less valuable than the insights into social relations.

Yet, these limitations must be put into perspective. This book will become a guide and an inspiration to students of Indian society and to anyone preparing to investigate small, rural communities anywhere.

RICHARD S. NEWELL
University of Northern Iowa
Cedar Falls

EUROPE

MICHAEL J. DEANE. *Political Control of the Soviet Armed Forces*. Pp. 300. New York: Crane, Russak & Co., 1977. $17.50.

In May 1976 Brezhnev promoted himself to the highest military rank of Marshal of the Soviet Union; and two months later he offered the same rank to his new Defense Minister, professional defense industrialist, rather than professional soldier, Ustinov. Are these two moves signs of the reassertion of civilian Party controls over the professional military? Or are they, on the contrary, symptoms of the growing militarization of Soviet society, including the militarization of high Party officials, which has been expressed in their ever more formidable defense appropriations, their renewed predilection for heavy industry and harsh suppression of political dissenters? In his book Dr. Deane plausibly

argues for the former proposition, revealing some friction between the late Marshal Grechko—a truly professional soldier—and Brezhnev on the eve of the last Party Congress in February–March 1976. In such political insights lies the strength of the book: the reviewer learned a lot about the political ties of the somewhat shadowy head of the Main Political Administration Yepishev. The book is certainly up to date.

But on the whole, the work is somewhat uneven. It promises to elucidate "the evolving character of political control, evaluate the changing relationship among the MPA, the Party, and the professional military, . . . and assess the future significance of political control in Soviet party-military affairs" (p. viii). Those themes are indeed touched upon in the book, but nowhere are they fully developed. The author does not give a graphic overall picture of the apparatus of the Main Political Administration, except possibly in the highly condensed Appendix B (pp. 281–83). The book ends abruptly, with the specific events of 1976, rather than with a general conclusion. The author is familiar with the work of Roman Kolkowicz, but does not consider the important, though admittedly article-length, challenge to Kolkowicz by William E. Odom in *Problems of Communism*, September–October 1973. Regrettably, Deane's book lacks a bibliography.

To sum up, the work contains some factual and theoretical gems, but they have not been properly set into a single piece of jewelry. It is a promising first effort rather than a well-rounded book.

YAROSLAV BILINSKY

University of Delaware
Newark

JOHN REDWOOD. *European Science in the Seventeenth Century*. Pp. 208. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1977. $13.50.

From the title of this book one might expect a discussion of the scientific revolution of the seventeenth century, one of the principal intellectual and social phenomena of the modern world. Rather, this is basically an anthology of extracts from writers of the period, including Galileo, Descartes, and Gassendi, but devoted mainly to English authors. The selections, seldom more than five pages in length, are arranged in four categories: Methods, Achievements, Institutions, and Persons. Brief introductory sections and some biographical sketches are supplied by the author.

In recent years several anthologies of writings bearing on the scientific revolution have appeared, representing a variety of purposes and differing widely in emphasis. The present collection will appeal more to nontechnical readers, who seek a broad sampling, than to students of the history of science. Inclusion of a selection from Kenelme Digby among the medical writings, for example, manifests the author's wish to have the word "science" broadly construed, while his selection of De Chales to represent Euclid in the late seventeenth century is very curious, when Isaac Barrow would seem far more appropriate from the scientific standpoint, particularly in England and as the teacher of Sir Isaac Newton. Galileo's *Il Saggiatore* (*The Assayer*) of 1623 is confused with his very different *Starry Messenger* of 1610 (p. 22), and the assertion that Blaise Pascal himself conducted the Puy de Dome barometric experiment (p. 71) is as mistaken as the accompanying remark that the mercury was found to rise during the ascent. Mr. Redwood's opinion that Galileo's father was neoplatonic in outlook (p. 72) would be very hard to support, since he vigorously opposed musical theory based on harmonic ratios; the same bias is found on p. 171, where the Cimento Academy is characterized as neoplatonic though it published only experimental researches illustrated by the extracts which follow.

From the standpoint of sociology of early science the selections and commentaries are more successful. Extracts from Francis Bacon, Thomas Hobbes, Jonathan Swift, and Thomas Birch are included to represent some philosophical, literary, and historical phases of the impact of early modern science in other

cultural fields, while John Ward and John Aubrey are allowed to speak as contemporary biographers of scientists.

A two-page selected bibliography of principal English-language books on the history and philosophy of science published during the past half-century, with running commentary, completes the volume. It is accurately and attractively printed, though the paper used is not of the best.

STILLMAN DRAKE
University of Toronto
Canada

CEILIA S. HELLER. *On the Edge of Destruction: Jews of Poland Between the Two World Wars.* Pp. xi, 369. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. $14.95.

They were a large and productive community, the Jews of interwar Poland, and their contribution to the culture and economy of that troubled state was a major one. They were a minority, but they had company: nearly a third of the population was non-Polish. There were Germans and Lithuanians who were identified with hostile neighbor states, there were White Russians and Ukrainians who had been beasts of burden for the Polish *pans*, and there were Jews.

Relying upon a variety of published sources and upon epitaphic literature from YIVO Institute archives, Professor Heller has sought to give a glimpse of the thriving, but mortally threatened, society into which, she notes, she was born. The world needs accounts like this, for the old *shtetl* is no more, Yiddish is a dying language, and the victims of the Holocaust will cry throughout time for mankind to ponder their supreme agony. This book will help; but the pity is that it could have done so much more.

There were probably more decent Poles than the author is willing to admit. After all, even Himmler complained that every German had his own good Jew, and that, of course, added up to a lot of Germans and Jews. Poland was not much different. There was unquestionably a great deal of anti-Semitism, unofficial and official; a major party, the National Democrats, sought that "Hitler class" and won it over easily. But Professor Heller goes a bit far in chiding Pilsudski for not being Masaryk, and few Slovaks—not to mention Sudeten Germans even before 1933—would have agreed with her that Czechoslovakia (which she holds up as a model for Poland) "fully implemented" the 1919 Minorities Treaty. Further, Professor Heller holds the "assimilationists" (called "Poles of Mosaic faith" or "Poles of Jewish descent") in the greatest disregard, and she rejects the mere possibility that even Poles wholly untainted by anti-Semitism might honestly have seen a threat to the Polish state in Zionism. Some reflection upon the Vilnius and Danzig problems might have produced a more balanced assessment.

WOODFORD MCCLELLAN
University of Virginia
Charlottesville

HERBERT R. SOUTHWORTH. *Guernica! Guernica! A Study of Journalism, Diplomacy, Propaganda, and History.* Pp. 563. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. $19.95.

The subtitle of this book accurately reflects its contents. Mr. Southworth, an historian, journalist, and broadcaster, began this study by asking "How was Guernica destroyed? By whom? Why?" The resulting book, however, tells us little new about the aerial bombing of the Basque town of Guernica on April 26, 1937. Instead, the book is about the powerful role of journalism and propaganda in a world dependent upon the media for its knowledge of "events."

Southworth begins with a painstaking account of the reporting of the event itself. On April 27, 1937, the British public learned that an open town had been attacked by German planes, which had dropped incendiary bombs and strafed the civilian population for more than three hours. That night, in response to world outrage over the bombing, Spanish Nationalist headquarters in Salamanca and Seville indignantly denied that any attack had occurred and falsely attributed the devastation of the

town to fleeing Basque arsonists. The initial British press reports and the Nationalists' public disavowals provided material for the controversy that followed.

The purpose of the present book is twofold: (1) to establish Nationalist responsibility for the destruction of Guernica and (2) to expose the faulty logic —if not the deliberate prevarication —of those who have defended the Nationalists' innocence. Because documentary evidence, directly implicating Nationalist headquarters in the attack is not available, the second purpose is more fully achieved than the first. Southworth examines every important contribution to the Nationalist myth of Guernica published during the last 40 years, although he focuses on the Civil War and the late 1960s, when "Neo-Franquista" historians refurbished the myth in response to the revival of Basque nationalism. Of particular interest are the sections in which Southworth links the development of the Nationalist myth to the working conditions of wartime journalists, the hypocrisy of the Non-Intervention Committee, and the ambiguous role of the French news agency, Havas, in reporting news from Spain.

The book enlarges our understanding of the value—or the perceived value—of propaganda in the twentieth century. Southworth argues that the Franco regime could not admit to the bombing of Guernica—either then or later—because of its negative impact on public opinion, especially among liberal Catholics in England and France Southworth does not develop his analysis fully because his loyalty to the Republicans makes him unwilling to label their exploitation of the Guernica episode as "propaganda" also. A true story, however, often makes better propaganda than a false one. It was precisely the continued Republican success of using Guernica as a symbol that forced the Nationalists to respond with the "lies and propaganda" that Southworth dissects with such expertise in this book.

The book is flawed by its polemical tone. During his long quest for reliable data, Southworth became a participant in the controversy that is the subject of his book. Some of the personal invective that has characterized that debate has been incorporated into the present study, where it diminishes the impact of the documentary evidence and textual criticism that alone would have supported his case.

CAROLYN P. BOYD
University of Texas
Austin

PETER VANNEMAN. *The Supreme Soviet: Politics and the Legislative Process in the Soviet Political System* Pp. vii, 256. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1977. $11.75.

RONALD J. HILL. *Soviet Political Elites: The Case of Tiraspol*. Pp. vii, 226. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977. $16.95.

Peter Vanneman's study is a very thorough analysis of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the most complete treatment of the subject since Peter Juviler's doctoral dissertation on the Soviet deputy nearly twenty years ago. Vannneman examines all aspects of the Supreme Soviet, with individual and very informative chapters on that body's commissions and its Presidium. As far as factual presentation goes, the description and analysis appear to be quite accurate, although, as will be indicated below, a number of his assertions were out of date long before the book was published.

The main difficulty with the book, in this reviewer's opinion, is not the description of the structure and operation of the Supreme Soviet, but with the author's exaggerated assertions concerning the importance of that body in the Soviet scheme of things. While criticizing several authors who find little or no significance in the institution at all, Vanneman moves too far in the other direction, stating that during "the past fifteen years the Supreme Soviet has been gradually but systematically moved closer to the center of political conflict and resolution as the tension between 'legality' and 'legitimacy' increasingly represents competing political forces" (p. 4). Statements of this kind are particularly prevalent at the beginning of the book. In this

reviewer's opinion, a study of the Supreme Soviet does not have to be justified on the questionable grounds that the institution has become considerably more significant in recent years. Whether a whole book ought to be devoted to such a study is a question people may disagree about.

The best chapter in the book is probably chapter 7, where the author elaborates on what he sees as the two major functions of the Supreme Soviet, as "an organ of legitimation" and as "an organ of efficiency" seeking to grease the wheels of government." Also useful are chapter 9 on the Communist Party in the Supreme Soviet and the portion of the final chapter on the differences between the East European legislatures and the Supreme Soviet.

The references to constitutional provisions apply to the now-superseded 1936 Constitution, and the author cannot be faulted on this. But in several other respects this 1977 publication is considerably behind the times: Chkikvadze (sic) is identified as Director of the Institute of Law and Government (read: "Institute of State and Law"), a position he left in the early 1970s; Gorkin, identified as Chairman of the USSR Supreme Court, retired in 1972; the Juridical Commission of the USSR Council of Ministers was replaced by the Ministry of Justice in 1970, some of the data, on the size of the Supreme Soviet commissions, for example, fail to take into account the changes made immediately after the 1974 elections. Finally, on an unrelated matter, why should one write about the power "to enact zakons?" Statutes would be a perfectly good English word to use.

In conclusion, although this thorough study constitutes more than most people would want to know about the Supreme Soviet, the reviewer had no problem in this respect. He had more difficulty with the inflation and misrepresentation of the rather modest significance of the Supreme Soviet in the Soviet political system.

Ronald J. Hill's engagingly written study of the city of Tiraspol in Moldavia also seems excessively concerned with explaining to the reader why such an analysis is justified. Mr. Hill has no reason for such concern. His book adds greatly to our understanding of local Party and soviet operations.

Hill lived in Tiraspol as an exchange scholar and had an opportunity to interview local political leaders. But he found these contacts of little usefulness and based most of his study on an analysis of local newspapers for the period 1950–67. Although he was largely limited to this source, he maximized its usefulness and was able to extract a good deal of interesting longitudinal information from it such as the growth in the size of the city soviet and the city Party committee over time and the changes in the departmental structure of the city soviet executive committee and the gorkom.

The results of the author's efforts were obviously based on a painstaking and time-consuming collection of data. In his conclusion he acknowledges that little that is new has come to light. Even this would be significant and worth the effort, since it would confirm once more the tentative conclusions of other scholars. But there are some small surprises in Hill's analysis and these nuggets make the study all the more worth while. He found, for instance, that the Tiraspol city soviet has always been made up of a strong majority of Party members, which is atypical for both the USSR generally and for the rest of Moldavia. Likewise, the Tiraspol soviet has been on the low side in the proportion of women among its members when compared both with Moldavia and the USSR as a whole. Mr. Hill offers plausible explanations for these exceptions, and if they are not completely persuasive, at least he has done all he could to find reasonable explanations, including making good use of available population data.

His analysis of membership turnover in the city soviet and Party gorkom are equally interesting. It is a pity, however, that the study did not go beyond the mid-1960s, since it would have been interesting to see whether the rate of turnover changed in the wake of Khrushchev's demise and the abandonment of his policy of renewal.

This short review cannot do justice to the completeness of Mr. Hill's analysis. His book amounts to a judicious counterpoint of data against theory, and is a welcome addition to the small number of studies of Soviet local politics.

DONALD D. BARRY
Lehigh University
Bethlehem
Pennsylvania

UNITED STATES HISTORY AND POLITICS

VICTOR BASIUK. *Technology, World Politics and American Policy*. Pp. viii, 409. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. $17.50.

Rather than producing another "Blue Sky" thesis filled with the world is going to blazes homilies, Victor Basiuk, an operational academician, has written a tempting treatise that is going to create constructive comments among the constituent groups who will read this book. It poses the right questions and provides some new answers with considerable merit. Analyzing the future impact of technology on international relations and societies by focusing on the developed societies, Basiuk works out a response this impact may have for U.S. domestic and foreign policy.

Beginning with now, the time frame is extended 75 years by organizing the book across time dimensions: the first four parts go out to the end of this century and part five continues for 50 years later. Part one orients the reader by explaining the author's view of the sociopolitical impact of technological trends. By employing a definition that permits technology *to do* this or that, readers are assisted in assessing impact that technology can make and quickly note that it may produce certain imperatives of its own because of its very impact.

Those developed societies—the United States, the Soviet Union, Western Europe, and Japan—with most of the world's GNP are exposed to a competent technological assessment in part two. Their strengths, weaknesses, problem areas, and prospects are considered, using thought-provoking scenario models to bring future trends and prospects to the surface.

In part three we are in a position to understand how technology is changing the world arena, particularly how it has changed the distribution of power to make up a "positive sum" process. Also considered is how this process may enhance international stability: its contribution to the integration of world society, to growing interdependence, and to international laws responding to society's reciprocal needs for stability are important in this respect.

The impact of these technological realities on current and future American policy are the subject of part four. Technologically speaking, no difference exists between domestic and foreign policy today. They have become a technological entity. In fact, Basiuk argues convincingly for a new national decisionmaking mechanism, permitting comprehensive planning and implementation of a "technological strategy" for the home front. Success in this area would end the ad hoc and compartmentalized efforts such as we have witnessed in developing an energy policy. Similar initiatives are required for the outside world, and Basiuk proposes an "Adviser to the President for a Future International System" to develop policy for these emerging circumstances.

Part five rounds out the forecast by extending it roughly 50 years into the next century. It analyzes what one day may be referred to as the "postindustrial revolution," in which man battles technology for control of his own destiny. An examination of America's national purpose in an international context provides an appropriate closing for this far-reaching book. Basiuk conceives America's purposes to be as standard as the *Preamble*, and he regrets attacks upon them. New national leadership will be required to defend old purposes, and it may be that we are witnessing the beginnings of this defense today in Mr. Carter's consuming concern for human rights and desire to right old wrongs, as evidenced, especially, in the recent

Panama Canal Treaty. In time these activities may help to recover some of America's ideological appeal and inspiration, both of which are essential for any degree of world leadership.

Russell Baker once said that the future begins in America. He was right, and the greatest contribution that America may make in the future technological world, described so well here, is to demonstrate how mature man can live peacefully within a global, postindustrial society.

JOHN D. ELLIOTT

The George Washington University
Washington, D.C.

CARL M. BRAUER. *John F. Kennedy and the Second Reconstruction.* Pp. vii, 396. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. $14.95.

This richly documented study of political history is a good addition to the literature of the Kennedy years. The theme of this work is that John F. Kennedy changed from a moderate stance on civil rights and a resistance to the kind of reconstruction imposed on the South following the Civil War, to an activist role and a central position in what the author describes as "The Second Reconstruction."

The irony posed by Carl Brauer is that Kennedy, as an "amateur historian in 1956," castigated Northern radical Republicans for their excesses in the first Reconstruction period; yet, within seven years of his writing on the subject, Kennedy became the most significant political figure in a new movement to abolish racial discrimination. Using the considerable resources of the Kennedy Library, collections from a variety of projects, organizations and people of the period, and personal interviews, Brauer gives full and informative citations to help others trace similar interests.

The book begins with a brief sketch of Kennedy's moderation or lack of interest in racial matters when he was a congressman and senator. His interest in international affairs and his flair for campaigning are noted, as well as his evolving acceptability to blacks and to Southern whites. Despite some arguments with leaders of the NAACP, Kennedy was able to keep on friendly and supportive terms with them throughout his presidential campaign. Southern leaders were attracted by his moderate stance.

Following his election to the Presidency, Kennedy was under pressure from both sides. He was able to satisfy both partially by taking executive action on some discrimination matters and avoiding legislative proposals which would arouse Southern politicians. Brauer draws a number of comparisons with Eisenhower's Presidency in which Eisenhower, despite the Brown Decision of 1954 and the Little Rock confrontation, seemed aloof from issues of civil rights. Kennedy, according to Brauer, was drawn into the issues by a series of dramatic events. Kennedy shifted during his Presidency from limited advocacy and action to a focal position in prodding legislative enactments, which came to fruition after his assassination and Lyndon Johnson's ascendancy.

In presenting Kennedy's movement from peripheral interest in civil rights to central concern, Brauer highlights the roles of leading figures of the civil rights movement, prominent Southern politicians, Robert Kennedy as Attorney General, and certain members of the White House establishment. Most of these portrayals are brief and unidimensional, but Brauer's treatment of Robert Kennedy shows more of the human complexity involved in politics.

The writing style in this book, unfortunately, tends to the dry, descriptive statement in the form of dissertations, which loses the drama of the times. The volume was drawn from Brauer's doctoral dissertation and generally lacks vividness and depth of character development, though it is a scholarly and soundly reasoned work. There are a few portions that are compelling reading: descriptions of Alabama during the Freedom Rides and beatings suffered there and the treatment of demonstrations in Albany, Georgia and at the University of Mississippi. Typically, however, the book provides well-documented detail but little insight into

the human condition or complex social situation of the times. The writing is not consistent with the excitement of the period.

In terms of the theme of Kennedy's shift from anti-Reconstructionism to dominance in the Second Reconstruction, Brauer provides no clear definition of Reconstruction, leaving it to the reader's prior knowledge or imagination. The study does show two shifts in Kennedy—from moderation to advocacy in civil rights and from executive action to legislative advocacy. These are not the only defining characteristics of Reconstruction, but Brauer does not provide his definition against which to judge Kennedy. Brauer also gives excessive credit to historians whose writings, he implies, were a major reason for Kennedy's shifts.

Given the volumes of material available, Brauer has done a careful and thoughtful job of pulling out important data and condensing it into a short book. It is worth reading.

JACK L. NELSON

Rutgers University
New Brunswick
New Jersey

DOMINIC J. CAPECI, JR. *The Harlem Riot of 1943*. Pp. ix, 262. Philadelphia, Pa.: Temple University Press, 1977. $15.00.

As the title suggests, *The Harlem Riot of 1943* is an account of a civil disturbance. The event was triggered by an incident involving a white policeman and a black serviceman, on leave in Harlem, on a hot Sunday evening in August. Some 3,000 persons initially collected in front of a police precinct station and later turned to breaking windows and looting. The event was contained by a largely white police force. The disturbance came to an end within 24 hours. It left six dead (all black), 85 injured (mostly blacks), property damage to 1,450 commercial establishments estimated between $225,000 and $5,000,000. A total of 590 persons was arrested.

Capeci covers antecedent events (both remote and proximate), the riot and its aftermath. The narrative begins with description of New York City and Harlem in the 1930s. Capeci describes public leadership with special attention to Fiorello LaGuardia and Adam Clayton Powell. Harlem life during the Depression is reviewed with emphasis on the employment problems experienced by blacks during the period. Capeci reviews black perceptions of World War II and their role in that conflict. A riot which occurred in Detroit earlier in the summer of 1943, and created concern in New York about the possibility of similar outbursts there, is discussed. Various explanations of the riot and reactions to it by public figures in New York are presented. Capeci offers his own view that black frustration about lack of access to social and economic rewards, compounded by their expectation that they participate fully in the War effort, contributed importantly to the outbreak. Capeci also offers the view that containment of the riot was quick. He attributes the success in controlling it to an efficient but restrained effort on the part of police. At the same time, Capeci is critical of the role played by Mayor LaGuardia and the police during the period. He argues that LaGuardia lagged in taking action to alleviate tensions known to have existed in Harlem prior to the riot and is also critical of LaGuardia's insensitivity to black concerns about police brutality.

As a contribution to an understanding of the causes of riots and the means through which racial tensions can be contained, the book is less satisfactory than it is as a historical narrative. Largely implicitly, the author emphasizes the role of public figures and the forces which led to the riot. In so doing he concentrates on matters which were contested during the period between black and white leaders. Public controversy, for example, regarding potential racial discrimination in tenant selection for a quasi-public housing project under construction in the Lower East Side receives attention. The connection between these public issues in black and

white relations and the frame of mind of the riot participants is not compellingly made. The historian's problem is that information is available on public leaders and public events; accordingly it is reported. Much less information is available about the ordinary citizens who are potential riot participants. By concentrating on available information, Capeci implicitly appears to overestimate the explanatory importance of the role played by civic leaders in contributing to the forces which led to the riot and the actions they might have taken to more effectively contain civil unrest. An alternate possibility is that riots result from enormously powerful social forces over which public leaders have very little control.

FRANCIS G. CARO
Community Service Society
New York City

EDWARD W. CHESTER. *A Guide to Political Platforms*. Pp. 373. Hamden, Conn., Archon Books, 1977. $20.00.

This book is an issue-oriented, non-quantitative history of political party platforms from their emergence in the 1830s to the present. As such, it serves as a useful complement to Porter and Johnson's standard compilation, *National Party Platforms 1840–1968*, and other more quantitative works.

Professor Chester draws on a wide range of sources, including scholarly analyses, journalistic reactions of the time, and, of course, the platforms and platform debate accounts themselves. His narrative style is direct and efficient, though not particularly engaging, considering the wealth of interesting characters and issues available for discussion.

The book is organized chronologically, with a section devoted to each presidential election from 1840 to 1976, the latter receiving a "tentative appraisal." Each election is presented in turn through a brief summary of the preceding administration and introduction to the current presidential candidates, a description and comparison of the major party platforms and their continuities and discontinuities with preceding years, a less extensive review of the minor party candidates and platforms, and finally a listing of the election results. Though this organization serves to present a large quantity of information efficiently, this reviewer found it repetitious. Though the author avoids the tedium of pure quantitative description, the reiterated organizational pattern detracts from the reading enjoyment possible in an issue-oriented narrative.

Despite this, there is no question of the book's comprehensiveness or utility. It contains a lengthy introduction which overviews the major questions and topics to be considered in analyzing and comparing party platforms (e.g., minority planks, third party innovation and reforms, platform rhetoric versus reality), and offers some conclusions based on this and other studies. There is a general and election-specific annotated bibliography of over 400 sources which provides an excellent beginning for future research and reading in this area. As this history shows, though frequently depreciated by commentators and ignored by politicians, political platforms offer an essential insight into the development of the American party system and election process.

JAMES M. GIARELLI
University of Florida
Gainesville

MELVYN DUBOFSKY AND WARREN VAN TINE. *John L. Lewis: A Biography*. Pp. v, 619. New York, Quadrangle, 1977. $20.00.

This valuable book will be must reading for anyone concerned with the history of the American labor movement. Paradoxically I find the biography a failure because it never succeeds in explaining John L. Lewis as a human being. Perhaps no one can Nothing more indicates this failure than the decision to begin and end the book with the murder of "Jock" Yablonski, which occurred over nine years after Lewis retired and six months after his death. Surely even Lewis, for all his undoubted sins, deserves to have the first and last passages of his biography directed at him. At one

point the authors snidely wonder how Lewis could square his well-to-do life style "with his public role as the captain of a mighty host of plebians" (p. 299), while elsewhere they snigger at his "appearing more the striving bourgeois than the emerging proletarian leader" (p. 17). Apart from the obvious conflation of roles, what anyone writing about the mainstream of the American labor movement must understand is that it was never proletarian but always bourgeois. Much (see chapter 13 notes) is based on oral interviews with individuals (e.g., Gardner Jackson) whose reputation for accuracy leaves much to be desired The authors freely state that "we may have relied on such information too heavily" (p. 593).

Along the way there are confusions —at page 12 the authors doubt Lewis's claim that he attended high school; six pages later they incorporate such attendance into their interpretation. There are also some curious judgments rendered: "most Americans enjoyed prosperity during the late summer and early fall of 1929" (p. 155); "by late summer of 1934. . . . full recovery from depression (was) no nearer than it had been during the Hoover days" (p. 207). The latter is part of the general put-down of FDR now so fashionable, but what inspired the caricature of Sidney Hillman (often from the memoirs of his Stalinist enemies) is difficult to fathom—Lewis would have enjoyed it. Yet, despite all these complaints, this is a book from which I learned much. It fleshes out and demythologizes Lewis's early career, but is best in treating Lewis's "glory years" (1933–1940, pp. 181–388). This part of the work can stand with the best labor history. The overall results suggest that the authors should not have attempted biography, certainly not the biography of a great man who was also a great rogue—or was it the other way around?

ROGER DANIELS
University of Cincinnati
Ohio

DALL W. FORSYTHE. *Taxation and Political Change in the Young Nation, 1781–1833*. Pp. x, 167. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. $15.00.

Professor Forsythe, a political scientist, investigates the early American national experience to formulate theses relating taxation to political change. Regarding government's power to extract revenue as the key to its dominion, he expects the growth of that power to play a crucial role in developing effective governmental systems.

Before drawing his conclusions, Forsythe provides a summary account of early controversies about federal taxation. He excludes nontax revenue sources from his discussion, although they yielded a significant minority of the government's income. Forsythe emphasizes the tariff, as the available literature does, although the great tariff controversies focused on protection more than on extraction of revenue as such. He relies in his narrative on standard secondary accounts and interpretations. His criticism of Louis Hartz's *The Liberal Tradition in America* (p. 6) suggests that perhaps political theorists value that work more generally than historians do.

In the analytical discussion which constitutes his main contribution, Forsythe presents a sophisticated revision of previous scholars' typologies of political events. Like many of his predecessors, he defines the political "regime" in narrowly constitutional terms and conceptualizes "political development" as a unilinear expansion of state machinery. In his typology an "authority crisis" (suggesting a revolutionary situation) exists when a policy controversy appears to concern the limits of the regime and the survival of the system appears to be in peril. "Normal politics" obtains when neither of those conditions is present; "regime politics," when only the former condition appears; and "environmental crisis," when only the latter does. (To avoid confusion, readers should notice that Forsythe changes the locations of his four categories in the related charts on pp. 114 and 118.)

In addition, the author formulates thoughtful descriptions of the political

structure's "allocative relations" to the social-economic substructure and its "authority relations" to the citizens in their mass political behavior. Forsythe carefully qualifies his claims for his models, but he considers them more useful than other political thinkers' corresponding constructs. His typology deserves careful attention. It leaves the reader speculating about its applicability to a wider range of historical events. One particularly wonders how he might treat the dynamics of "authority relations" and "allocative relations" in the origins of the American Civil War, which he recognizes as the only unequivocal "authority crisis" in the history of the United States to date.

JACK P. MADDEX, JR.
University of Oregon
Eugene

HUGH HECLO. *A Government of Strangers: Executive Politics in Washington.* Pp. x, 272. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977. $10.95. Paperbound, $4.50.

Were you a Republican in *Who's Who* in 1968 and thereby assured of consideration for a Nixon appointment? Did you receive an Atlanta-postmarked letter in the fall of 1976 bearing the news that your credentials had been placed in the Carter "Talent Inventory?" In either case, that extended moment of truth between Election Day and Inauguration sparked questions in the minds of those awaiting lightening's strike: What can I read to prepare? There was very little then—at least for those who assumed that playing an important part in executive politics means more than "living by the book." But now the gap is filled, and the result makes fascinating reading.

If Richard Neustadt's *Presidential Leadership* was Machiavelli's *Prince* for the American presidency, then Hugh Heclo's *A Government of Strangers* is the comparable handbook for the earldoms and baronies of presidential appointees. Helco's intention is to explore the relatively unknown process by which high-ranking political executives and top civil servants interact with one another, focusing on the people themselves rather than on institutions, doctrinal legalities, or jurisdictional boundaries. How do those interested in political control and those interested in administrative continuity take the measure of one another? Why do some presidential appointees do better than others in getting what they want? To what extent can any political leader hope to guide what government does—programs—by directing and restraining those who do it—personnel?

The author uses case studies, maxims, and telling interview quotations to reveal the little known everyday problems of executive leadership faced by hundreds of appointees in the executive branch. An assistant secretary describes his frustrations and progress in trying to start a program for minorities: "The bureaucrats I worked with were competent and hardworking, but damn, if they couldn't give reasons why any particular thing couldn't be done. . . . Later I found out they knew there were ways to do things, but they weren't volunteering that information" (p. 174). Heclo also illustrates why bureaucrats may deal cautiously or cavalierly with appointees. A high civil servant is quoted: "When our last assistant secretary was kicked out, it didn't affect us. He had no ties outside his office" (p. 162).

Heclo shows more than a narrow concern for groundruling effective manipulation within Washington executive suites. He is constructively interested in larger problems of democratic leadership theory as well. He contends that the politicization of the bureaucracy has been matched by increasing bureaucratization of leadership. He asserts that the changing nature of the political executive jobs to be filled has generally favored those with specialized technical abilities rather than those with broad political experience. Two important consequences follow from this trend. The patronage candidates with no technical training and who are ignorant of complex policies will be dropped from the final cut, thereby creating tensions with party leadership. Second, the changing trend in elite recruitment, which emphasizes managerial experience and technical

expertise, generates distance between the electoral coalition with which a president wins office and the executive coalition with which he must try to govern in the bureaucracy.

Having detailed the foibles and shortcomings in the face-off between higher level civil servants and political appointees (the Washington strangers), Heclo offers several proposals for change. He suggests reforms that would (1) promote more competent management by appointees, (2) reorganize the administration of the civil service personnel system, and (3) set up a new federal service of public managers. Proposals to create a new kind of federal executive officer, a central personnel agency, and better civil service safeguards should be calculated to insure good faith service from bureaucrats and greater responsibility on the part of top political appointees.

The point is to improve the strategic setting for executive politics. For this is the setting, Heclo convincingly demonstrates, in which statecraft for presidential appointees consists of getting the changes they want without losing the bureaucratic services they need.

RICHARD PIERRE CLAUDE
University of Maryland
College Park

GARY J. JACOBSOHN. *Pragmatism, Statesmanship, and the Supreme Court*. Pp. 214. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977. $12.50.

Should Supreme Court opinions reflect public opinion or should they educate the populace? Williams College political scientist Gary Jacobsohn's well-edited critique places pragmatism and statesmanship in juxtaposition, "pitting them like gamecocks for a test of consequences," as William Y. Elliott said

Pragmatism loses in the battle, John Dewey and William James notwithstanding. The futuristic orientation of pragmatism is evolutionary. Change becomes "an object of reverence" (p. 49), with creative emphasis on "the accumulation of empirical information" (p. 84) For the pragmatist, "there are only results" (quoted on p. 175). These results are interest-oriented, seeking "the good" through social engineering of "the spirit of egalitarianism" (p. 94).

Judicial statesmanship, in contrast, imposes restraints on innovations of Constitutional wisdom. It emphasizes prudence, compromise, and great subtlety. Statesmanship adapts to changing socioeconomic conditions without abandoning "the vision of the founding fathers" (p. 190). The statesman weaves a strong, resilient "judicial fabric" capable of withstanding "the wear and tear of modern society" while upholding positive principles of the American testament. Accommodation occurs between "demands of the past and those of the future" (p. 22).

In adversarial fashion, Jacobsohn presents winners and losers: Charles Evans Hughes serves "as a model of judicial statesmanship" (p. 190), while Felix Frankfurter was "not a judicial statesman" (p. 160). Although Wallace Mendelson, Frankfurter's key biographer, must be in distress, he is not alone. Such F. F. friends as Louis Henkin, Albert Sacks, Paul Freund, and Charles Wyzanski also would be prone to point out his greatness.

But greatness is not equated with statesmanship. Frankfurter is lauded for being "an unusually talented judge" with "enduring achievements" (p. 160). His attempt to separate constitutionality and wisdom, though, is criticized. In contrast Hughes, in the *Blaisdell* case on Minnesota's mortgage moratorium law, responded to public opinion "while seeking all the while to inform it" (p 191).

Jacobsohn's evidence for the pragmatic revolt of our high court is substantial: textual treatment of 24 cases, many more cases in 426 footnotes, and 211 bibliographical sources. The presentation shows clearly that pragmatism has become a positive word, much like democracy, so that modern judges want to be called pragmatic, but many are not, including Frankfurter.

A follow-up volume on judicial statesmanship would serve us well. Jacobsohn

otes that few of our justices have been tatesmen, but then does not elaborate. Perhaps statesmanship is elusive in "an essentially undemocratic institution" (p. 54) like the Court. Pragmatic faith should convince us, though, to look to the rainbow.

CHARLES T. BARBER
Indiana State University
Evansville

MERRITT ROE SMITH. *Harpers Ferry Armory and the New Technology: The Challenge of Change*. Pp. 363. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977. $17.50.

This study of the Harpers Ferry Armory contains two levels of discussion, each in its own way illuminating. There is first the study of the particular enterprise in its industrial, geographical, and political setting. The story of the Armory is perceptively treated from its founding in 1798 to its demise in 1861 The complexity of the organization, the technology and the labor responses are dealt with in a well-documented and, at the same time, readable way.

But it is on the second aspect of the book, summarized in the introduction and conclusion, that its claim to a place in the more general literature rests. These larger considerations have to do with the role of the state in industrial sponsorship, and the conditions of growth of the industrial capacity of the United States and, indeed, that of the world generally. For the manufacture of arms under government aegis at Springfield, Massachusetts and at Harper's Ferry, West Virginia, played a central role in the standardization of parts and the mechanization of production. But the story is not a simple one; it manifests a duality as exemplified in the two armories. Springfield, set in the industrial Northeast, was the progressive and inventive one; Harper's Ferry, as an implant in the rural context of the Potomac Valley, was derivative and conservative.

The author derives two general theses or lines of reasoning from his study. The first is that it is too simple to accept the judgment of the visiting British inventor and industrialist Joseph Whitworth, that the United States took painlessly, indeed eagerly, to machine technology, free of the resistances, rioting, and machine-breaking of Britain. Harper's Ferry provides an American example, of some importance, of resistance to Yankeeism in the industrial field, even to the murder by gunfire of a superintendent who tried to impose his will. The author, indeed, asks whether the national creed was so receptive to industry as has so commonly been thought, or whether this idea was held by "only a small segment of the population," which "tried to inculcate them through various agencies of economic and social control." There is a call for further "grass roots" investigations of what really went on in particular manufacturing situations.

In the meantime we have the case which Smith sets forth in his book. But the situation at Harper's Ferry seems to have been characterized by special circumstances (which he so excellently brings out), rather than to represent a general syndrome of resistance. It was George Washington, supported by local businessmen, who insisted that the armory be in West Virginia. The president of the new republic, supported by business sycophants, imposed an autocratic decision of a kind and scale that could never have entered the heads of George III and his court. From this a whole set of consequences followed. The works was isolated from the industrialized outlook of the Northeast, the armories insisted on their craft status and resented mechanization, there was a resistance (in the Jeffersonian spirit) to the demands of innovative, machine-governed industry. Politics in the armory and the town produced, through control of key offices in both, a powerful, paternalistic but recalcitrant oligarchy. So was constituted an elite of privileged families who acted as protectors of the community's values against both the new technology and the government which wanted it implemented. It is difficult to see how analogous cases could be found of such complete and intense hostility to new technology to establish a generalized paradigm of resistance. Of course, it is

possible to argue that any attempt at a progressive manufacturing establishment in the South would have yielded some such result, but how many such cases were there? The federal government was alone in the scale of its attempt, and this may provide a highly intriguing, but unique case.

The second of the broader implications of the book has to do with the role of the state in the industrializing of an advanced society. The author provides a quite striking example, in the manufacture of armaments, of the state as the great initiator and sponsor of new methods. It was the state, through its Ordnance Department, which impelled American industry toward standardization and mechanization of parts, and which provided the basis for a machine tool industry that was to take the initiative from the British in this critical area. But in so doing, the choice of site was very important: the state's initiative could thrive in Massachusetts, but languish in West Virginia. Even so, however, it was of profound overall importance, though it would presumably have been even more successful if both armories had been in the North.

In this way the obtuseness of the first president has provided the basis for an arresting case study, but one which may exhaust its own category. Professor Smith's study is a highly intriguing account of the relations among business, technology, and the state, brought to a sharp focus by a locational decision made by politicians.

S. G. CHECKLAND
University of Glasgow
Scotland

CHARLES H. TROUT. *Boston: The Great Depression and the New Deal*. Pp. xx, 401. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977. $15.95.

Boston: The Great Depression and the New Deal by Charles H. Trout makes two valuable contributions to American urban and political history. It gives a detailed description of the continuities and changes in one of America's leading metropolitan centers from the coming of the Depression to the coming of World War II. It also uses Boston as a case study of several commonly held assumptions about the impact of the "Roosevelt Revolution" on the nation's cities.

Trout's basic thesis is that continuity and conservatism prevailed over change and liberalism in Boston despite the influence of the Depression and the New Deal. He does not ignore or gloss over changes which do occur in areas as diverse as population and voting patterns, the rise and decline of membership in organizations, from the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People to the Chamber of Commerce, and Boston's economic decline relative to other cities. But Trout believes that this flux leaves Boston's basic institutions and ideologies intact.

One constant factor in city and state politics was the controversy surrounding James Michael Curley, mayor from 1914 to 1918, 1922 to 1926, and 1930 to 1934; governor from 1934 to 1936. His influence, popularity, and ambition helped split Democrats into factions based more on personality than ideology. Other enduring "institutions" included William Cardinal O'Connell, head of the Roman Catholic Church which "instructed three-quarters of the population" (p. 319), Irish political dominance, American Federation of Labor (AFL) control of most union workers, and many self-conscious ethnic neighborhoods. When New Deal programs began pouring new wine into these old bottles, some bent, but few broke. Indeed, Boston shaped the local operation of the New Deal as much, or more than, the New Deal shaped Boston.

Although Trout carefully shows the social and political diversity of Boston, he overemphasizes the underlying ideological unity within the first and second New Deals. He approves this unity and criticizes Boston for lagging behind the New Deal.

Trout correctly emphasizes the importance of a local perspective on the operation and modification of federal programs. But a national perspective on the complex, pragmatic, and developmental nature of the New Deal is also

important. A full understanding of the period will necessitate an analytical, comparative integration of such a national perspective with many state and local perspectives such as Trout's excellent, comprehensive study of Boston.

ROBERT G. SHERER

Wiley College
Marshall
Texas

RONALD G. WALTERS. *The Antislavery Appeal: American Abolitionism After 1830*. Pp. xvii, 198. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977. $11.00.

This book explores the ideas of immediate abolitionists after 1830, with special attention to those assumptions they held in common with their contemporaries. Ronald Walters joins the debate over whether the abolitionists were anti-institutional, and attempts to resolve it by showing that their style—righteous, sectarian, and evangelical—was after all the style of the whole antebellum reform movement. He also finds abolitionists typical in their religious concerns, not because they shared an orthodoxy, but because they were dedicated seekers, insisting on purity in faith and deeds. He finds their minds precariously balanced between racialism and environmentalism, but opportunistically using both points of view to indict slavery. He finds them dedicated to undefiled and perfectly controlled sexual behavior and to an affectionate and uplifting family life. Finally, abolitionists were conventional Americans in their faith in industrial progress and in their devotion to the historical mission of the United States to redeem mankind (a notion which Walters notes even among the disunionists).

Walters argues quite plausibly that these attitudes defined abolitionist propaganda. Slavery prevented the establishment of true Christianity; it led to sexual vice; it corrupted the families of masters as well as of slaves; it retarded the growth of industry; and it finally poisoned the entire nation.

Except for his discussion of sex hygiene, Walters reworks familiar material. Though less analytical, Alice Felt Tyler's *Freedom's Ferment* (Minneapolis, 1944) remains a richer and more accurate account of antislavery within the context of antebellum reform. Both Tyler and Walters assume rather than prove that reform reflected "the faith of the young republic." Did not the reformers themselves form a subculture, educated and influential, but still somewhat detached from a more lethargic majority? Committed to the methods and philosophy of behaviorism, Walters maintains an admirable objectivity with respect to the personalities of the abolitionists, but when he finds himself discussing issues he, too, often joins their party. He apparently believes that the antislavery movement had been genteel and ineffectual before 1830, that the churches remained silent and inert regarding slavery until the Civil War, that all Americans who supported the Colonization Society were more likely to perpetuate slavery than help emancipation, and that no one besides the immediatists really wished for, or worked toward, the end of slavery.

ROBERT MCCOLLEY

University of Illinois
Urbana-Champaign

JULES WITCOVER. *Marathon: The Pursuit of the Presidency 1972–1976*. Pp. ix, 684. New York: The Viking Press, 1977. $14.95.

This treatment of the 1976 presidential election is appropriately titled. Filled with the detail that makes the book a fascinating one, *Marathon* is an exhaustive, but not exhausting, analysis of the Carter-Ford confrontation.

Jules Witcover, a syndicated news columnist, devotes well over half this book to the complex nominating process, with particular attention given to the impact of the primary elections on the Democratic and Republican candidates. Particularly noteworthy is the author's tracing of the way in which developments within one party had major ramifications within the other. For example, after Wallace's candidacy had been demolished by Jimmy Carter in primary

elections in Florida and North Carolina, thousands of the Alabaman's supporters, cut loose from their hero, entered the Republican preconvention struggle and gave Ronald Reagan's sagging candidacy a much needed boost, badly damaging Gerald Ford in the process. Filled with first-hand interviews with candidates and key staff members, the author's analysis of the lengthy preconvention period is an important tool in understanding our most recent national election.

A second significant facet of the volume is Witcover's penetrating examination of the Ford presidency. Those who believe that Gerald Ford was defeated in 1976 essentially because of the Nixon pardon avoid the reality that Ford's presidency was weak and that this unelected president had severe and never corrected image problems. Indeed, the 1976 race was somewhat peculiar since it involved two presidential candidates whose personal style and/or character became important issues in the campaign's final outcome.

Although the book is lengthy, Witcover's appealing writing style makes it readily digestible, with his pungent descriptions of major personalities serving as tasty morsels. Among these, he portrays John Connolly as "ever-salivating," Senator John Tower as "sycophantic," George Bush as a man whom "everyone knowledgeable in Republican politics considered incompetent to be President," and Gerald Ford as "one of those big dolls with the rounded base that when hit bobs back up for another punch."

Despite its many strong features, *Marathon* does suffer some imperfections. There is, on occasion, inclusion of detail that is both needless and pointless. The author's reform proposal (regional primaries to be held after a lead-off primary in New Hampshire) is not adequately defended. Witcover seems too eager to defend the media for their coverage of the 1976 race. Understandable, considering his background, this seems out of place here. Finally, the book lacks any broader perspective in which the 1976 election could be set. Demographic and other changes ar largely ignored, although these coul have been illuminating.

In all, Witcover presents a valuabl historical record of the Carter-Ford elec tion. It should serve as a vital source boo for all students of the national politica process.

ROBERT E. GILBERT
Northeastern University
Boston
Massachusetts

VIRGINIA YANS-MCLAUGHLIN. *Famil and Community: Italian Immigrant in Buffalo, 1880–1930*. Pp. 265. Ithaca N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977 $12.50.

The reader steeped in the ever increasing volume of literature on th Italian-American experience will fin much that is familiar in Virginia Yans McLaughlin's new book on Italian im migrant families in Buffalo, New Yor from 1880 to 1930. Indeed it is temptin to say that the book is another case of ol wine in new bottles, except that it reall is not. Many of the old themes in Italia histography—family life, attitudes to ward women, work, and education—ar freshly illuminated by expertly jux taposing snippets of new and old sourc materials, plus interview data, in way that are thoroughly convincing.

The author's point of departure is th the models developed by historians an social scientists that depicted immigran families as succumbing to the pathologi cal conditions of urban life in the Ne World are not borne out in the case o Italian families in Buffalo. She present many persuasive arguments to defen her thesis. A sampler of these include th contentions: 1) that peasants who ha eschewed community involvement i Italy created sustaining networks o community relationships in the Ne World; 2) that familism was so strongl developed a concept among the arrival from the Mezzogiorno that they wer able to resist most of the blandishment of the New World, particularly th individualism of urban life; and 3) tha even the lethal threats to family life—

prolonged separation between husbands and wives, working mothers, unemployment, poverty, assimilative pressures from school and charitable agencies—did not cause family breakdown. The reason: the Mezzogiorno peasants had encountered these threats in the Old World and had worked out strategies to deal with them successfully there; thus, what worked in Sicily apparently worked in Buffalo. A particularly fascinating illustration of this claim is Yans-McLaughlin's analysis of the immigrants' adaptation to working conditions in New York. Specifically, she shows that there was a "goodness of fit" between the variegated work pattern of Sicilian peasants (most of whom were primarily agricultural workers, but routinely pursued off-season employment in sulphur mining, town industry, quarrying, and construction) and the employment opportunities for immigrants in Buffalo, which also required occupational versatility.

Much to Yans-McLaughlin's credit, these contentions are not pulled out of a hat and presented as fiat; rather, she provides impressive documentation culled from Buffalo newspaper editorials, scholarly journals, census tracts, and most especially, from the testimonials of the remnants of the immigrant generation and their immediate descendants. Yet anyone familiar with the subject, gets the impression that she acquired the outline for the book by reading the avalanche of materials on Italians (particularly on the way of their family life) and then hammered the Buffalo case into the categories of the outline. The yield from this exercise is generally commendable, but when compared to the corpus of existing materials on Italians, the findings are confirmatory rather than revelatory.

Parodoxically, the author's methodology is vulnerable to criticism on the same grounds that she emphatically wanted to avoid: Throughout the book the reader is told that statistical data often distort and mask the inner dynamics of family life; she hopes to correct this by introducing "literary and oral sources." But it seems to this reviewer that she actually used many statistical citations and few oral sources. I was surprised to discover that only eleven informants were listed in the bibliography.

Notwithstanding these flaws, the book represents a valuable contribution to the growing recognition that an earlier generation of scholars had erred in their understanding of immigrant families.

ALFRED AVERSA, JR.
Fairleigh Dickinson University
Teaneck
New Jersey

SOCIOLOGY

MARTIN BINKIN and SHIRLEY J. BACH. *Women and the Military*. Pp. vii, 134. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977. $7.50. Paperbound, $2.95.

Until times within living memory, the soldiery was the least attractive of occupations. Gentlemen chose to be officers, but hunger recruited the rank and file. Reviewing the troops he was about to lead in his victorious Peninsular Campaign, Wellington grumbled: "I don't know what effect these men will have on the enemy, but, by God, they terrify me." To him, the British volunteer army was the scum of the earth, to be flogged to its triumphs. Until World War II, volunteer peacetime armies were drawn from the margins of the labor market. The only women for whom the military had a use were the town whores and the campfollowers.

That has changed. For the last 35 years, women have infiltrated an increasing diversity of military occupations, successfully serving now in nearly every noncombat specialty. They are only barred from duties which call for their taking battle stations. At that point, social sentiment balks, and Congress has legislated their exclusion from combat units. The feminist reaction, as voiced by the National Organization for Women, is uncompromising: "Should women go into combat? To us the question is completely irrelevant. We only need to know that there are capable women who

want these jobs . . . (p. 73). The joining of this issue constitutes a national problem, and the Argus-eyed Brookings Institution detailed Binkin and Bach to its dissection.

Marshalling the data, meticulously noting gaps and inadequacies, the authors review the history, summarize policies and laws, and consider the shifting public attitudes. Their foundation laid, they execute an economic analysis. Despite opinions that the costs of sex integration will be prohibitive, they show that the outlay for modified barracks and separate lavatories would be trivial compared to the savings which would accrue from the significantly fewer dependents for whom the government would need to assume responsibility for support, travel, and medical care. The conclusion is startling: ". . . the average annual per capita cost associated . . . with housing, medical care, and transportation . . . is estimated to be about $982 less for military women than for men" (p. 58).

In other contexts the economics would be persuasive. Armies and navies are different; we must know what effect sexually integrated battalions and nuclear submarines will have on the enemy. The indications are not clear. In recent years, enlisted women have been much better educated than male volunteers Projected trends strongly suggest that the future of the volunteer army must depend on the increasing induction of women. The authors' study of the population pipeline shows that the services will draw from an eligible pool of males in 1992 which will be nearly 20 percent less than the same pool in 1977. The projected enlistments for 1992 will bring in less than 75 percent of the services' need for "highly qualified" males. Clearly, if the military need for technicians is to be met, more women must be attracted.

Whether they can effectively serve in the infantry or the fleet is still an open question, despite the achievements of Boadicea and Jeanne d'Arc. The Israeli army, which has had the most experience with women in combat, has withdrawn them from most fighting units. For tasks requiring great strength, fewer women than men can qualify. The social problems are at least quirky. The Navy's one experiment with women sailors—on a hospital ship—was enlivened with an order that personnel engaging in public displays of affection would be subject to nonjudicial punishment, a nice touch from a perplexed skipper.

Binkin and Bach conclude that the services should experiment with integrated combat units, persevering until women acquire enough experience to qualify as supervisors. Comparisons with all-male units would be indicative, but the final test would be in battle, where points are not allowed for good intentions and sexual egalitarianism.

This short book is an ornament to Brookings. Those questions that can be answered are posed and answered. The authors point to where missing information can be found, and suggest those questions which only experience can answer. As a model of concise exposition, it deserves applause and emulation.

JOHN P. CONRAD
Academy for Contemporary Problems
Columbus
Ohio

RICHARD W. COAN. *Hero, Artist, Sage, or Saint? A Survey of Views on What is Variously Called Mental Health, Normality, Maturity, Self-Actualization, and Human Fulfillment*. Pp. xiii, 322. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. $20.00. Paperbound, $6.50.

What is the ideal personality? Is there an optimal condition for humans? Professor Coan takes these classical questions as his subject, and offers a rapid survey and evaluation of theories of human nature. Each theory or model of man is considered in terms of its answer to the questions in the book's subtitle: What is mental health, or normality, or maturity, or human fulfillment?

The first third of the book gives a brief introduction to the most significant Eastern and Western positions. With a few pages for each, we are presented with early Greek thought, early Christianity,

he Renaissance, recent Western trends, :ontemporary religious responses, the nental health professions, Hinduism, 3uddhism, Tibetian Buddhism, Taoism, Confucianism, Zen Buddhism, and nodern Indian thought. Each view is pressed for its answer to some form of the question: What, if anything, is the ideal ifestyle? Of course, rapid surveys have heir faults and their uses. We each have complaints about the treatment of our own field. However, there is a service in collecting brief snapshots of each posi- ion and in looking for patterns. What patterns emerge? We read that in the West, nature is seen as a domain to be conquered (by science); in the East, harmony with nature is the ideal. The West has an orientation toward the uture; the East, toward "the immediate present experience of life." A familiar cliché, for many readers.

Two-thirds of the book is devoted to he Western psychologists and psychia- rists. There are separate chapters on Freud's and on Jung's views of the optimal human condition, and then short pieces on Adler, Rank, Fromm, Erikson, Assagioli, and Eric Berne. A chapter on he Existentialists gives us Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Heidegger, Jaspers, Marcel, Sartre, Binswanger, Frankl, and Laing. For other contemporaries, we have Skinner, Allport, Rogers, Maslow, and Perls, taking us from behaviorism to gestalt therapy and the human potential novement.

In the final chapter, Professor Coan comments on his own work, presented a ew years ago in his *The Optimal Personality*. This was a multivariate analysis of traits involved in concepts of in ideal personality. The work reduced o what the author calls five "basic modes of fulfillment;" efficiency, creativity, nner harmony, relatedness, and tran- scendence. These few pages make some nteresting suggestions, but result in nothing very convincing to Coan him- self. Is the question of an optimal personality a scientific matter? Coan raises the issue, discusses several strate- gies, and concludes that scientific re- search can provide pertinent informa- ion but not *the* solution. Despite a thin survey, and a vague conclusion, I don't know anything better on this question. Perhaps we should blame the problem and not the author.

SIDNEY AXINN

Temple University
Philadelphia
Pennsylvania

JAMES B. COWIE and JULIAN B. ROEBUCK. *An Ethnography of a Chiropractic Clinic: Definitions of a Deviant Situation*. Pp. xiv, 167. New York: The Free Press, 1975. $10.00.

This little book, written by two well-read sociologists, seriously studies the "marginally deviant" situation of a small chiropractic clinic which is anonymous, but apparently situated in Louisiana. The deviant status of such a clinic and of its central character, the chiropractor, is said to be imposed on both by the dominant culture, from without. By means of the chiropractor's own learned "methodography," however, this person is said to have "compensatory social power." This is because methodography here means the ability of the deviant person to see himself as both honorable and as uniquely correct in his beliefs and practices, and also to influence his associates and patients so that they constantly impart back to him acceptance of his claims to respect and his own confidence in his ability to remedy practically all human woes.

Since the chiropractor can dismiss patients who do not grant him such acceptance and confidence, retaining only patients who do, and can also surround himself with approving assistants and chiropractic consultants, he can create for himself an environment which sustains his belief in himself, in his "methodology"—here used to mean his methods of both treating and influencing patients—and in the professional excellence and true worth of both.

Of the book's two authors one, Cowie, conducted the study while serving as the paid, part-time assistant of the clinic's central figure the chiropractor. The book is thus largely the report of a participant observer. He views himself as an actor

with a role, and sees the subjects of his study, the chiropractor, the other assistants and associates, and the patients, as actors in other roles called for by this drama, while the clinic's rooms, equipment, and many publicity devices are its setting.

To make clear the basis of the chiropractor's beliefs in his own semiscientific philosophy, and hence in himself, Cowie describes at some length the history of the chiropractic movement. This begins with the discovery in Iowa, in 1895, by one, D. D. Palmer, of the "monumental" principle that the restoration of a person's misplaced or "subluxated" vertebrae, to their normal positions relative to one another, and the resulting removal of pressure on the nerves issuing from the vertebral column, cures what are called "diseases." The book reports also Palmer's establishment of the first infirmary and school of chiropractic. Previous to the great discovery, Palmer is said to have had no medical training whatever but to have been an adherent of Anton Mesmer's early conception of what is now called hypnosis, "animal magnetism" to relieve human suffering. The skeptical reader, therefore, can note that as a healer, Palmer had previously practiced a variety of "faith healing," or of what reputable medical authorities today call the "placebo" method, and that this was, and still is, highly effective with many patients. Treatment based on the momentous discovery, therefore, can be viewed as only a more sophisticated variant of placebo treatment, combined, perhaps, with some of the benefits of massage.

The present writer has long seen "straight" chiropractic, such as was practiced by the book's chiropractor, as chiefly such a variant, and of late years has buttressed this view by recollection of a painstakingly careful study of chiropractic's central principle, which appeared in the *American Scientist*, volume 61, 1971, pages 574–80. This study, "A Scientific Test of the Chiropractic Theory," was authored by Edmund S. Crelin, a highly accredited anatomist at Yale University's School of Medicine and it presented the verdict that the principle of vertebral repositioning is clearly false. It should be added, however, that those chiropractors to whom the book's "straight" chiropractor referred scornfully as "mixers"; that is, those who adhere to the subluxation principle but "mix" with it modifications of the patient's diet and health regimen generally, may be using not only placebo treatment and message, but good advice on health related matters as well.

The book ends with a plea for more research studies intended to discover the socioeconomic characteristics of the patients of chiropractors, why they turn to the chiropractor rather than the physician, and how and why they are initially "converted" to a deviant system of beliefs. This plea can only be seconded here. However, before viewing only chiropractors as engaging in self-advertising and deliberately influencing patients to see them as competent, admirable, and trustworthy, the reader is asked to observe that, in the usual physician's office and waiting room, in the doctor's manner and sometimes his impressive equipment, similar devices are also employed. We are all susceptible to such approaches, and doubtless our improved health is in large part brought about by such "methodography." The book, therefore, is well worth reading for these reasons and more valuable than its size suggests.

ELIZABETH J. LEVINSON

Orono
Maine

ROY O. GREEP, MARJORIE A. KOBLINSKY, and FREDERICK S. JAFFE. *Reproduction and Human Welfare: A Challenge to Research*. Pp. x, 622. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1976. No price.

Massive studies undertaken by blue-ribbon committees of experts often lack depth and coherence and contribute very little to our understanding of key problems. *Reproduction and Human Welfare* is a happy exception. Although three

foundations sponsored the work of no less than 160 scholars in 26 countries, the three primary authors deserve recognition for having condensed this mass of information into a comprehensive, but very thoughtful discussion of a critically important research field.

While this is by no means the first attempt at reviewing the progress of the reproductive sciences, it is perhaps one of the most well-balanced efforts to date. This balance results from the authors' concern not merely with scientific and technological advances, but also with the social and human dimensions of research and population control. The concise and rather technical presentation of scientific discovery appears in the second section of the book; it is preceded and followed by other considerations which place this research endeavor in its proper context.

In the first part of the volume, the authors outline the world population problem and evaluate the effectiveness of our current contraceptive technology in checking unwanted pregnancies. Available birth control methods, it is argued, are questionable not only according to biomedical standards, but according to social and psychological criteria as well. New developments must be safe, but they must also be acceptable and diverse enough to take into account the full range of mores, age requirements, levels of sexual activities, etc., that are found throughout the world.

The third section looks at the institutional and social climate in which contraceptive research is conducted. Here the authors consider the location of research facilities, the increasing role of the public sector, recent concerns with adequate testing and human experimentation, and the relationship of all of these factors to both past and future developments. Since scientific studies do not take place in an abstract world, it is to the authors' credit that they saw fit to investigate this dimension.

Finally, the book discusses financial support for reproduction and contraceptive research. It is very difficult to collect complete and accurate information on available research money, but the authors are conscious of this shortcoming, and what they present speaks eloquently for a reordering of our funding priorities in biomedical research. Progress has been made in the last 15 years, but the preoccupation is still with disease and postponement of death rather than with quality of life. The concluding section, as well as the entire volume, argues in a factual and measured way for a greater concern for life.

CHARLES S. BOURGEOIS
McGill University
Montreal
Canada

ROSABETH MOSS KANTER. *Men and Women of the Corporation*. Pp. 352. New York: Basic Books, 1977. $12.00.

This volume combines a case study of a corporation and a general discussion of the status of women in corporate management. Kanter analyzes the corporation as a male-dominated organization and contrasts the role of the male executive with three roles occupied by women—secretaries, executive wives, and women executives. Both the analysis of the particular corporation and the discussion of the general policy are based on the assumption that the size of the third group, women executives, should be appreciably increased.

Kanter first examines the obstacles for women for achieving executive positions. She discovers three clusters of conditions: blockage of appointments, lack of power, and numerical minority. The importance of each of these conditions is confirmed by reference to current theory and research in social psychology and organization theory. She also shows that the consequences of these conditions lead exactly to those traits which have been used to stereotype women and to throw obstacles into the path of their achievement Blockage and powerlessness lead to behavior which can be used to deny advancement, and the minority position among executives (frequently a minority of one) has consequences which make it exceedingly difficult for a woman to function in an executive role.

The argument is presented in a convincing way. It combines scientific rigor with compassionate insight and an effective style. The data in the organization were collected through a wide array of techniques, such as formal and informal interviews, group discussions, observation, and inspection of company records. They are woven skillfully into the general analysis of the company. This approach leaves a more convincing and attractive picture than a more pedantic, but traditional, method of data analysis could have.

Kanter excels in bringing to bear the general principles of social psychology, principally derived from laboratory experiments, on the living conditions within the corporation. One almost feels the author's excitement in finding instances of abstract and esoteric principles before her eyes and it is her special skill to recognize them. In addition, this rare link between laboratory restraint and spontaneous action gives better reliance on the data from one case study besides making an important contribution to sociology and social psychology.

Here one might regret that Kanter did not go far enough in generalization. The problems she shows are not unique to women, but are general human problems. For instance, Kanter discusses the conflict women executives experience, especially those promoted from clerical ranks. Either they maintain a special relationship with female secretaries and are looked at suspiciously by their male colleagues or they do not and are looked at as traitors to their sex. Such role conflict is the fate of every person who has an identity in addition to the occupational role. Neglect of this wider generalization leads sometimes to the facile overoptimism of the social reformer, namely that a few new rules and regulations and social inventions can solve intractable human problems. Kanter is too good a sociologist to overlook the essential human dilemmas due to psychological and social constraints. But, especially in the last chapters on contribution to practice, she is in danger of getting carried away with the hope that improvement of women's executive position can overcome tragic dilemmas of human society.

KURT W. BACK

Duke University
Durham
North Carolina

FRED H. MATTHEWS. *Quest for an American Sociology: Robert E. Park and the Chicago School.* Pp. ix, 277. Montreal, Ca.: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977. $16.00. Paperbound, $7.00.

Intellectual history is at best a difficult undertaking, especially if an author tries to summarize the lifetime work of an important scholar. Historian Fred Matthews has produced an informative book which paints Robert E. Park as an intellectual mixture of Yankee common sense, part-time social worker, and German idealism. Matthews especially admires Park's belief that conflict, rather than consensus, is the basis of social life. Matthews's focus is chiefly on Park, rather than on the Chicago School itself.

Told by William James that he was not intelligent enough to make a contribution to philosophy, Park at age 30 gave up journalism and set off to Germany to study sociology. Park's first book grew out of his dissertation dealing with the crowd, a force he felt was creative and not destructive. He then went to work for Booker T. Washington as public relations man and ghost writer until W. I. Thomas visited Tuskeegee, discovered "ein mensch," and invited Park to the University of Chicago. While there is no rule that an author must like or admire the person he chooses to write about, Matthews has a way of putting Park down as a nice person who just happened to make it to a major university. Unlike Marx, Matthews tells us, Park was not always profound or even particularly levelheaded, failing to see the profoundly reactionary implications of his writings

There are many interesting insights in this book, such as Matthews's observation that Park's "assumption that value resides in psychic qualities rather than specific ends foreshadows the therapeutic mentality characteristic of a relativis-

...ie age . . ." (p. 30), a view more fully developed recently by Rieff. As with many intellectuals of his age, Park was greatly concerned about the potentially harmful effects of city life. Unlike some at the University of Chicago, he believed that reform efforts were probably doomed to failure. Matthews finds Park's intellectual portrayal of the city as a natural social force a serious failure of intellectual nerve, especially since the Chicago in which Park lived had been described by others as the only completely corrupt city in the world.

It is distressing to note that a short book on intellectual history costs $7.00 in paperback and is produced with unjustified lines by photo offset. Corrections are clearly visible; editing, almost totally lacking. I recommend this book because of its wealth of material about an important figure in the field of sociology, for its useful intellectual insights, and its breadth of coverage. But its price and readability probably put it outside its potential market for courses on sociological theory, a pity, since sociologists need to be reminded of the historical development of their discipline.

GEORGE H. CONKLIN
Sweet Briar College
Virginia

WILLIAM MICHELSON. *Environmental Choice, Human Behavior, and Residential Satisfaction*. Pp. xix, 403. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977. $10.50. Paperbound, $6.50.

The assumption underlying this work is that families should be able to obtain the kind of housing which they prefer; the conclusion of a large empirical study is that a substantial proportion of middle-class families settle for something less. Persuasive factual information presented in this book gives the argument substantial weight.

Environmental Choice, Human Behavior, and Residential Satisfaction reports on a five-year study following nearly 800 Toronto families through the housing market. Elaborate questionnaires were employed, requiring as much as 90 minutes of a respondent's time and covering just about everything related to housing—the space and facilities of the house itself, the neighbors and neighborhood, social interaction, commuting by both husband and wife, household chores, shopping and recreation patterns—as well as subjective evaluations and expectations. The author and principal architect of the study is Professor of Sociology at the University of Toronto. His large undertaking was aided in various ways by several Canadian government agencies and a large number of private business organizations. Despite some problems it certainly seems these supporters are well repaid by this volume, and the book will be valuable to policymakers, business people, and scholars concerned with housing issues in many parts of the world.

Participant households were identified when they moved into certain preselected dwelling units; these units were first chosen to represent four basic housing types: downtown apartments; downtown single-family houses; suburban apartments; and suburban single-family houses. Units renting for less than $200 a month or selling for less than $35,000 were excluded, as were luxury-type dwellings. Thus, the households surveyed were middle-income, and families who were not married couples in child raising years were excluded. The panel of respondents, then, was not intended to be representative of all households in the Toronto area, nor can it be assumed to represent the market for all the housing types included in the study, a very significant weakness of the study, depending on who might make use of it. In particular, unmarried individuals, newlyweds, and older persons who might generally be thought to make up the primary market for apartments are ignored, as are postchildraising couples who often predominate in central city single-family house neighborhoods. The author does not misrepresent these limitations, but his conclusions fail to call attention to them.

The book presents a wealth of information about the housing choices and house-related behavior of the panel of

households; more than four-fifths of the original panel completed all four of the interview documents stretched out over four years. Some of the responses confirm common beliefs about housing choices, apartments are not considered suitable places for raising children, for example. People moving downtown cite convenience of location and easier commuting as primary considerations while homebuyers are principally interested in the social characteristics of their new neighborhoods.

Other responses conflict with the conventional wisdom on housing choices. While apartment dwellers are less likely than homeowners to make friends among their neighbors, they do have friends—mainly found at work—and they do entertain. Wives in downtown apartments were significantly more likely to begin childrearing than wives in other housing situations, and downtown mothers spend as much time ferrying their children about as do suburban women. Husbands who remained in downtown apartments throughout the study period (many such households moved to the suburbs), had the highest average commuting time at the close of the study; suburban wives, on the other hand, lived closest to their work if they were employed, as many were.

All this has to do with housing preferences, because it tends to support the hypothesis that families move toward the housing situations which fit their individual lifestyles. They do not adapt their behavior to the location or housing type in which they find themselves. Urban designers would thus mislead themselves if they expect high-rise buildings to politicize or socialize people who live in them, or expect suburban houses to induce citizenship. Whatever behavior characteristics are associated with a particular housing type, people tend to adopt that housing type because they already have those characteristics

But that is a weak conclusion. The author of this book presents a much stronger finding, and one which he apparently did not expect. Substantially all the households in his panel expressed overwhelming preference for the single-family home, downtown if they were already downtown homeowners, and suburban if they were not. Apartment dwellers among this panel were simply marking time until they could afford a house in the suburbs. Among the more interesting observations in this rich collection of responses is the sense of powerlessness of apartment dwellers to correct anything inconvenient about their present residences except by moving—and they move frequently. Home ownership means the ability to fix and change the residence without moving, and without undertaking collective action.

The study was designed to measure "satisfaction" with different housing types—a reasonable goal of sociological research. It unearthed a paradox, because apartment dwellers did not express great dissatisfaction, even though they earnestly aspired to home ownership. The fact was that these renters expected that in due course they would become homeowners; a large proportion did realize this goal during the study. As for the apartment: "It was a very pleasant place to live and suited our life-style at the time" (p 334). Housing preference, Michelson concludes, is a dynamic concept.

The final chapter of the book is a nearly polemical cry for more single-family houses to be built in downtown areas. It suggests that Michelson may have learned more from his study than he wanted to know, because the research project did not address the economics of urban land uses nor the spectrum of demographic analysis, two matters closely affecting the reasonableness of his final recommendations. Among his households those with less than about $12,000 in income were likely to become renters, primarily because they could not yet afford to purchase a home. Those families tend to regard apartment dwelling as a reasonably satisfactory interim arrangement, but Michelson seems to feel that the compromise of preference is unnecessary. He does not show convincingly that it is unnecessary; the study was

not designed with that issue in mind. He suggests that market processes are at fault, but overlooks the fact that housing markets in North America come closer to providing the kind of housing that families really want than do the largely governmental housing suppliers in so many other nations. This is not a major criticism; the last chapter of the book does not diminish the value of the remainder.

WALLACE F. SMITH
University of California
Berkeley

CAROLINE HODGES PERSELL. *Education and Inequality: The Roots and Results of Stratification in America's Schools*. Pp. v, 244. New York: The Free Press, 1977. $12.95.

The relationship of inequality and education has spawned a vast literature. The challenge now is to integrate these research findings into general theory. Toward this end, Persell synthesizes hundreds of studies into an overall conceptual scheme and she achieves an impressive analytical scope and density in her synthesis. Her sustained liberal value position does not undermine her scholarly objectivity.

After elaborating a four-level flow model of inequality and education, Persell moves incisively from the social stratification system (meritocracy) to influenced educational structures (bureaucracy) and educational dynamics (tracking and teacher expectations). Finally, she extensively investigates educational and life outcomes for students, and thus her exploration completes the causal loop in which educational outputs reinforce the ongoing system of structured inequality.

Her chapters on the "structures of dominance" (a neoelitist perspective) and on bureaucratized urban schools provide Persell with a framework for a thorough treatment of IQ testing, tracking, and teacher expectations. The author not only masses the criticism of IQ tests itself, but also of testing process problems. Similarly, she synthesizes the extensive research on the manifold negative consequences of tracking, such as impaired self-concept and opposition student cultures.

Crucial to her proposed stratification theory of educational inequality is evidence related to the genesis and consequences of teacher expectations about student performance. While it is now commonplace to assert that teacher behavior significantly depresses the achievement of lower class children, Persell provides a needed systematic survey of the sources and impact of these teacher expectations. She isolates and documents the range of the variables and points out useful research directions.

Countering research tendencies to dismiss the effects of the school itself, Persell closely explores 12 interacting correlates of school impact upon children, including integration and school climate. Finally, she analyzes how education shores up societal dominance structures through such supporting processes as insulation and work-setting analogue experiences. The vicious circle of stratification is thereby completed. Persell hopes, however, that growing skepticism about meritocracy will erode this self-perpetuating pattern of social inequality.

Writing with a lucid style, Persell fully controls her analytical direction while exploring multiple research nuances. Substantively, her work can serve as a useful handbook, and several chapters are themselves major bibliographical essays. Conceptually, Persell sets a precedent with a macroscopic model of educational inequality, which in itself deserves critical discussion as a descriptive framework, if not as true analytic theory. This is a major contribution to educational sociology.

EDWARD A. DUANE
Michigan State University
East Lansing

C. J. RICHARDSON. *Contemporary Social Mobility*. Pp. i, 340. New York: Nichols Publishing Company, 1977. $17.50.

As early as 1927, Pitrim Sorokin admonished social scientists for "speculating too much about mobility in American life and studying the facts too little." Given that period's belief in Horatio Alger's rags-to-riches ideology, it fell upon sociologists to take Sorokin's critique seriously and proceed with the task of testing a hypothesis that had somehow attained the status of fact. Today, after four decades of diligent research into "the facts" on rates and directions of social mobility, this area has emerged as one of the most thoroughly documented in social science.

Professor Richardson's study of mobility in Great Britain goes beyond previous work in several important ways. The work is based on sample data gathered in two interview surveys—one conducted in 1970 by the Institute of Community Studies (London), which collected data on 1,928 people aged 17 and over in the London Metropolitan Region. From this initial survey, Richardson conducted second interviews with a subsample of 117 men chosen to represent four different conditions relative to their fathers' experience. The groups were selected to be representative of the: (1) upwardly mobile; (2) downwardly mobile; (3) stable middle class (nonmanual); and (4) stable working class (manual).

The rigor of conducting second interviews and the detail afforded by the subjective accounts of the respondents distinguish this study from the start. A second distinguishing feature is its primary focus on the meaning and nature of downward mobility. This is in stark contrast to the main body of research—especially in the United States—which has as its major focus the nature of upward mobility. A third contribution of Richardson's study is the challenge it presents to the conventional wisdom of U.S. sociology regarding the high social psychological costs of movement up or down the social elevator.

With thematic emphasis on the meaning of mobility to those experiencing it, Richardson analyzes his four groups in three major sections. Part one deals with rates, routes, and patterns, part two presents a discussion of determina and conditions conducive to mobility including an excellent review of t theoretical literature on the soc psychology of family life, status strivir and entry to careers; part three focus on consequences, indicators, and subje tive perceptions of what it means to mobile. The final chapter in this se tion integrates and highlights the k findings and theoretical insights.

Several of the findings are provocati in that they challenge the main materi on mobility to date. First, it is demo strated that downwardly mobile m do not necessarily view their experien as failure or loss in any sense. Th is so because they come from wh Richardson calls "risen working clas backgrounds and are merely respondi to their parental socialization. Tl fathers of these men are predominant upwardly mobile individuals who ha remained on the periphery of the midd class and regret not having chosen skilled trade.

A second important finding sugge that about two-fifths of the social mobile travel routes other than tho paved with educational credentia Promotion on the job was one of the m common, though it was noted that th relatively unorthodox route rendered tl mobile person peripheral to the midd class and prone to maintain a worki class identity. The consequence seer to be downward restoration in the seco generation.

A third and particularly challengi finding of this study is that: "Althou ability and hard work undoubted played a significant part in the determ nation of who is likely to be upward mobile, 'luck,' 'chance,' and 'being in tl right place at the right time' were al seen by the respondents as being considerable significance . . ." (p. 28 What this means is that much of soc mobility remains unexplained after all the variables advanced by sociologis and psychologists together have bee exhausted.

One final finding is of interest. Th stable middle class men in the stu

expressed sentiments of relative deprivation in terms of both status and income. In what appears to be a notable case of Marxian "false consciousness," this group seems to direct its hostilities toward the working classes who appear to it to be leading a carefree existence. The irony of this finding is that it exists in a nation of continuing aristocracy, and in spite of the objective reality that middle class incomes in Britain continue to widen the gap between the two classes.

Richardson concludes his book with several policy recommendations, such as expanding apprenticeship programs and reducing academic emphasis. His assertion that the working classes are interested only in economic improvements seems debatable, at least, and should not be accepted at face value. Some other limitations to the study are that Professor Richardson admits to the neglect of women, mothers of the respondents, who clearly played a strong role in shaping their sons' attitudes. He also admits to skirting the issue of the consequences (or lack thereof) of social mobility for a more equitable distribution of resources in industrial society, though he does claim to be "sympathetic" to the radical critique of mainstream mobility studies. I would want to know what sympathy means if it is not reflected in the author's work. Finally, the study must be described as exploratory and in need of replication with much larger sample sizes before generalizations can be deemed reliable. The author seems to be straying too far from the data base in claiming that: "This is a study about the experience of social mobility in industrial society" (p. 19). It is, more accurately, a study about the experience of social mobility in the city of London, England in 1970–71. It is, nonetheless, a fine effort and an excellent contribution to the literature on social stratification

THOMAS J. RICE

Denison University
Granville
Ohio

PAUL C. ROSENBLATT, R. PATRICIA WALSH, and DOUGLAS A. JACKSON. *Grief and Mourning in Cross-cultural Perspective*. Pp. 242. New Haven, Conn.: HRAF Press, 1976. $9.00. Paperbound, $4.50.

The literature on death and mourning has, since the end of the Second World War and especially in the past decade, fortunately included some practically helpful and theoretically stimulating publications in the behavioral sciences. For example, psychiatry's clinical contributions—from Erich Lindemann's to Elisabeth Kübler-Ross's—and sociological studies by Anselm Strauss and Peter Marris have combined careful and insightful observation with conceptual enlightenment. Involving a fitting combination of study methods and theory, such writings have strengthened both our personal and institutional resources for meeting the pains of loss through death.

The intent of the book being reviewed is to add to such understanding and to influence social practices. More specifically, in seeking to discover common aspects of response to death as observed in a wide array of cultures, the writers of this book hope ultimately "to get a perspective on what goes on in the United States when a death occurs." To this end, over 80 variables are rated by readers combing ethnographies on 78 societies, and a host of hypotheses are tested by correlations of these ratings. With the best of intentions, the authors tuck into their appendixes a substantial report on their design and methodology and details on their quantitative work. This material is separated into the latter half of their text so that the first half of the book may be read by persons "without specialized education in the behavioral sciences as well as the behavioral science scholar and the scholarly practitioner." A wide audience of this kind is certainly desirable—if simultaneously addressable—for a subject like death and bereavement.

The most illuminating parts of *Grief and Mourning in Cross-cultural Perspective* are the extracts quoted from ethnographic sources, revealing varia-

tions in expressions of feelings in response to the death of a spouse, or "tie-breaking" customs, or "final ceremonies." Such illustrative material is reminiscent of the now quarter-century-old parent study to the one under review, Whiting and Child's *Child Training and Personality*, which drew on the Yale cross-cultural files. But unfortunately the quantitative findings of *Grief and Mourning* add little more to our perspectives on death and bereavement than do some of the questions for study. Ought we, for example, arrange for final ceremonies some months or longer after a funeral service in order to mark publicly the termination of the mourning period? Would such a ritual help to ease or shorten the grief felt by mourners?

The problems with this study's quantitative findings reside basically in its assumptions and conceptual underpinnings. The theoretical approach is baldly behavioral; and while it would be of value to discover, cross-culturally, whether burning or burying the possessions of the deceased with the body is helpful because this procedure removes stimuli that affect the grieving process, no useful criterion variable appears among the 87 strictly "objective" behaviors listed for ratings in the Code Book in appendix 7.0. The pool of ratings available for correlations includes only such items as "crying frequency" or "alcohol at final ceremony" or "isolation of widows," but no independent variables that might tell us what the effects on personal adaptation or on community cohesion are when "crying frequency" or "alcohol" or "isolation" are present in varying degrees. Moreover the meanings of "significant correlations" are difficult to interpret. For example, on page 15 in chapter 1 we are told "Sixty-seven of the sixty-nine societies were rated by both raters as having at least frequent crying at death, and fifty-six of these had the highest rating possible—a rating of 'very frequent' by both raters. Only the Balinese, with a rating of 'absent' and their near neighbors, the Javanese, with a rating equivalent to 'crying rarely present,' deviated from the worldwide pattern." Yet on page 106 the authors say, "It seems clear from the data presented in Chapter 1 that many bereaved persons in other cultures get along with little or no public crying. . ." What really is the meaning of the high ratings for almost all of the studied societies that could be rated on "crying frequency?" One can certainly learn something about the effects of "stimulus changes that reduce evocation of old response patterns," but not the whole story, if we assume that the stimuli reminding the bereaved of a dead partner lie only out there! And though there may be methodological advantages to studying grief and mourning if one "avoids the question of love" because "without independent measures of love, it seems unproductive and misleading to talk about love and bereavement," perhaps no genuine understanding of responses to death is possible without some reflection on—if not calibration of—the emotional ties that bind partners or other kin or close friends to one another.

Grief and Mourning in Cross-cultural Perspective quotes an Amazonian (Jivaro) woman saying, "O my dear husband, why have you left me alone, why have you abandoned me? . . . who will bring me game from the forest or the gaily-coloured birds which you used to shoot with your blowgun and your poisoned arrows? . . " This book's many generous, nicely identified and classified excerpts of this kind give us a rich sense of the universality of grief and mourning, as well as cultural variants of custom and personal response to death This kind of contribution is noteworthy.

HENRY S. MAAS

University of British Columbia
Vancouver
Canada

GAMINI SALGADO. *The Elizabethan Underworld*. Pp. 221. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1977. $10.00.

London and its suburbs form the major setting for this survey of literary accounts of Elizabethan England's social misfits and the institutions that segregated them from the rest of society. Among the misfits discussed are thieves, highway

robbers, prostitutes, the mentally ill, and a variety of swindlers sometimes posing as peddlers, tinkers, strolling players, or jesters. That is, the kinds of actors who find a place in the sociology of deviance dominate the pages of this book. In addition, gypsies, witches, astrologers, alchemists, and the poor are covered; and while this latter group is absent from contemporary textbooks on deviance, the activities of all, excepting some of the poor, properly belong in a comprehensive study of deviance.

However, the reader should expect a literary approach, heavily dependent on literary sources, rather than a social scientific one. Shakespeare, Ben Jonson, and Dryden exemplify the writers whose works contribute information. The social scientist will understandably suspect that exaggerations allowed by literary license will make the reliability of many conclusions questionable. However, Salgado in many instances clearly states the nature of the work (for example, chronicle, letter, play), thereby allowing some estimate of accuracy to be made. Of course, a knowledge of English literature would be helpful in judging the validity of claims; but readers with a slight acquaintance with English literature, like this reviewer, will wish that the author had conducted a more systematic evaluation of reliability.

It may be, though, that a careful comparison of Salgado's claims with the findings of more recent studies will show sufficient similarities between the two periods to reassure the most skeptical scientist. For instance, the most extensive involvement in deviance in Elizabethan and in contemporary times is found among the lower classes. Then, as now, prostitution is widely condemned but placed in clearly identifiable white houses (Elizabethan age) or red light districts (today). Also, today's functionalist claim that prostitution has a positive effect on the family is reflected in earlier arguments about prostitution in the suburbs having a positive effect on morality in London. And in both periods, it is suggested that some vices flourish because they are profitable to influential persons. It is also noteworthy that the institutions intended to relieve Elizabethan England of its misfits resemble in significant respects institutions with a similar purpose in our time. Moreover, there is also a similarity between our situation today and the abuses which occurred in Elizabethan institutions and their poor success record.

In addition, the main reason given for the existence of an unusually large population of deviants in the Elizabethan age is not unlike some explanations of recent increases in deviance. Salgado attributes causal significance to the destruction of many traditional relationships by the prohibition against keeping retainers, the closing of the monasteries, and the enclosure of the land. Likewise, social disorganization resulting from industrialization, urbanization, and immigration is sometimes regarded as a major cause of twentieth-century increases in deviance.

Although the book is relatively short, one tires of it before the end. But the careful researcher, interested in responses to deviance and poverty over time, will find valuable insights. Literary sources of data that are often ignored are suggested as fertile fields of explanatory ideas.

ROY L. AUSTIN
The Pennsylvania State University
University Park

ECONOMICS

FRANCINE D. BLAU. *Equal Pay in the Office*. Pp. xi, 158. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977. $15.00

"In command this afternoon is Captain John Osgood," said the voice of the stewardess as I read Blau's book; "my name is Marty and I'll be serving you in the cabin.' Women occupy different positions than men do; Elizabeth Janeway and others have sharpened our perceptions to this fact (and to the verbs we use). While the number of females employed has soared since 1950, their concentration in "female jobs" is not greatly altered. Francine D. Blau, ex-

perienced commentator on women and employment, has moved the discussion beyond occupational segregation (the pilot and the stewardess) to an analysis of intraoccupational and establishment-based sex segregation within industries. A model is presented, tested, and shown to be predictive. The key is not so much equal pay for equal work within a firm as between them. For example, "women employed in firms that hire only women into the occupational category earn less . . . than those employed in firms that employ both sexes . . ." (p. 43). Male advantage is more likely to be found among those firms which offer higher wages; they can, in effect, indulge discriminatory preferences (p. 34).

Blau examines the effect of the wage hierarchy among firms within a given labor market upon female workers Establishments do not, of course, operate in a free market in terms of employment practices—the size and type of firm and the strength of unionization influences the pay scale that individual firms offer. (The stronger unionization within the manufacturing sector, the fewer the women).

The author argues for greater reliance upon "pattern and practice" attacks on sex discrimination than upon individual case appeals; that is, a showing of the absence of women (related to their presence in the appropriate labor force) greater than would occur randomly should trigger action. It is surely easy to agree with the author that enforcement efforts have been largely unsatisfactory to everyone in the past. Multiple agencies are involved, their regulations deriving from a variety of statutes and executive orders. Individuals appealing to the Civil Rights Commission have waited up to seven years for action (p. 197); employers have been inundated by erratic, overlapping, and arbitrary directives. Blau wisely stresses the need for converting the unions to action (after all they need female-dominated working forces) and for full employment. However, her advocacy of the "establishment of a consolidated agency . . . with broad powers to enforce a single anti-bias statute" (p. 108), as called for by the Civil Rights Commission, appears to ig some facts of life. When different a cies are involved in any content policy area it is not due to sheer hu ineptitude but results from the acce: differing constituencies to the agen in question. The impulse to "con: date," to be neat, should not b antidiscrimination proponents to possibility that the newly minted age would not necessarily be responsiv their demands. Blau's suggestion o annual review of a sample of firms "v poor performance records" appears require political resources which reform elements may not possess. one—least of all Blau—will undere mate the difficulties of obtaining elusive "equal pay in the office."

This book should be a priority addit to the sizeable academic library. carries the discussion of a comp subject to another level of investigat and does so with clarity. It would appropriate not only for the special but also for the interested reader w some familiarity in the area and advanced undergraduates.

JANET HANNIGA

Lafayette College
Easton
Pennsylvania

VERNON M. BRIGGS, JR., WAL FOGEL, and FRED H. SCHMIDT. *Chicano Worker*. Pp. ix, 129. Aus University of Texas Press. 1977. $9.

The Chicano Worker surveys the la market experience, particularly in Southwest, of workers of Mexican ori Its main thrust is to ascertain th patterns of employment and unempl ment, the kinds of jobs they hold, ways they enter those jobs, the incon they earn, and the relative success efforts to help them surmount th problems.

The authors are conversant with kind of data required for a study of t kind; they have identified authentic a up-to-date primary sources of inform tion; and they have utilized meaning ways of tabulating and analyzing it. B of all, they have expanded their narrat

beyond the area of labor economics, linking it to the history and demography of the Spanish origin population in the Southwest; that population's cultural patterns; international and rural-city migration; American immigration policies; Chicano educational attainment; the goals and tactics of Hispanic interest groups and militants; and public responses to their needs. These rich and varied background materials provide the reader with a depth of understanding of this disadvantaged ethnic group that an outline of their labor experience alone could not possibly offer.

Cross-cultural understanding also enables the authors to develop realistic recommendations for Chicano workers' "public policy needs." They graciously avoid lecturing educators on how to perform their jobs, suggesting that Chicanos will achieve greater academic success only when their educational attainments are recognized by potential employers. The authors also recommend that equal opportunity officials concentrate on ascertaining whether job tests are related to job skills. Their most emphatic recommendations relate to immigration and group culture. They advocate a tight border policy: the flow of illegal immigrants undercuts efforts to improve the lot of resident Mexican-Americans, flooding the labor market with potential workers accustomed to a precarious standard of living. Finally, they request extensive research on the Chicano culture, so that government aid programs may be shaped to match the group's characteristics. Behind the last concept lies the experiences of those whose offers of help were not appreciated. Often barrio leaders were convinced that external assistance would entail loss of self-determination, and the Chicano masses hesitated to accept aid from formal organizations, perceiving it as Anglo attempts to manipulate them. The authors do not wish to convert government officials into sociologists; they are simply trying to avoid counterproductive administrative strategy.

Their concern for Mexican heritage disadvantaged groups is genuine. The reader may well ask, however, whether they are equally sensitive to the group's American-born middle and upper classes. In northern New Mexico, for example, the latter have attempted to dissociate themselves from recent immigrants. Yet in this volume they will find themselves bracketed with "Chicanos."

In summary, the volume fills a genuine need, synthesizing a large body of current census data on labor economics with insights into typical Chicano reactions to labor market conditions.

FREDERICK SHAW
Board of Education
New York City

STEPHEN P. DRESCH, AN-LOH LIN, and DAVID K. STOUT. *Substituting a Value-Added Tax for the Corporate Income Tax*. Pp. vii, 216. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1977. No price.

In this monograph, the authors study the economic effects resulting from the substitution of a consumption-type value-added tax (VAT) for the existing federal and state corporation income taxes (CIT). The discussion during the 1970s at the federal level concerning the possibility of such a substitution in itself would seem to justify the research. Moreover, the book may be useful, in a methodological sense, to the public sector economist who has observed the recent trend toward general equilibrium tax incidence analysis. However, what may prove valuable in this regard to the economist could prove tedious to the general reader who is not familar with the economics of public finance.

The research effort is carefully structured with its limitations clearly set forth. Its well-defined objectives are analyzed in a competent fashion. Of course, in testing only the "first-round effects" of the tax substitution (by industry and by final demand component), the study necessarily stops short of a pure general equilibrium methodology. Nonetheless, by entering the realm of relative price effects, it does move some distance away from the traditional partial equilibrium position. Moreover, in selecting an input-output model and data base, an appropriate mechanism has been chosen

for extending the analysis beyond pure partial equilibrium effects.

The specific framework of the study involves a testing of the effects of the substitution of VAT for CIT under conditions of both complete (100 percent) substitution and conditions of lesser proportions. These effects are integrated with the effects of several different CIT short-run forward tax shifting parameters, ranging from complete shifting to the absence of shifting. Meanwhile, the VAT is assumed to be fully shifted forward. After chapter 1 provides a broad overview of the study, the second chapter develops the input-output model which is used to test the relative price and profit effects of the tax substitution. The model is then applied to 1969 data in chapter 3 and the major results are described. The remaining four chapters consider some of the income distribution, investment, international trade, regional, intergovernmental, and other effects of the substitution.

Not surprisingly, the VAT is found to be superior to the CIT in terms of allocational neutrality, but not in relationship to distributional and other relevant criteria. Moreover, one clear-cut point emerges from the study, namely, that the substitution of one major tax for another cannot be accomplished without a myriad of complex economic effects resulting.

BERNARD P. HERBER
University of Arizona
Tucson

FRED HIRSCH. *Social Limits to Growth.* Pp. v, 208. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976 $10.00.

By the time this number of The ANNALS appears, *Social Limits to Growth* may already be at the center of economic discussion in this country. It will almost certainly intrude on economists' thinking for some time to come. So fundamentally and persuasively does it challenge the truisms and pieties of both right and left that even those who reject its fundamental theses are going to be obliged to justify their rejection by taking considerable note o it. Assuming this, and given the fact tha this is a very difficult book (not for speec readers), for Fred Hirsch elaborates these difficult ideas in 200 pages of spare if not Galbraithian prose, it would be a ludicrous effort to attempt here anything more than a statement of the general thesis.

Professor Hirsch sets himself three questions:

—why has economic advance become and remained such a compelling goal when its fruits are disappointing to those who achieve them?;

—why is society so concerned with the problem of distribution when it is clear that most people can improve their lot only through general growth?;

—why does the trend toward centralization dominate economic life while in other realms, such as aesthetics and sexual standards, individual freedom expands and is relentlessly extolled?

Unlike theorists of the physical limits to growth (whose case he regards as "not proven"), Professor Hirsch answers that the problem is social. He points out that as more people are able to afford certain goods previously seen as goals (for example, automobiles or, in our own time and land, a summer place), these are less satisfying. There is none of the pleasure in barrelling down (or sitting hare still) on the freeway that once accompanied motoring alone in the countryside in a Stutz Bearcat. Likewise, the more people able to afford summer cottages, the more crowded becomes "the country" in which they must be built, and the whole point of those goods is lost. In a word, growth is not the philosopher's stone of the good society for all, but destructive of it.

Other "positional goods" (if nothing else, Professor Hirsch has added a valuable concept and its label to economic discussion), include those which are scarce and therefore, by their very nature, unobtainable by the mass and, for that reason, especially coveted: the rewards of being a U.S. Senator (hurry, hurry! only 100 available!); authentic antiques; the mere foremanship

of the shop. Then Professor Hirsch deals with that other element of economy, about which exponents of growth must forget in order to sleep in peace, the fact that the individual's wealth is very much valued, not so much in terms of what it is absolutely worth, but in terms of how it compares to that of others.

Many of his ideas are recognizable as the inspiration of others such as J.K. Galbraith, Lewis Mumford, and Sir Roy Harrod. But Fred Hirsch takes his derivations to greater depths, and he has synthesized them into a comprehensive scheme which does explain the profound disappointments and (the word must be used) the contradictions of advanced consumer society. This review, to emphasize the point, barely examines two or three loops of an intricately woven tapestry.

What is to be done? Here, unhappily, the author strikes off in several directions, never pushing on to the end. He dawdles along the way with moral suasion but is too realistic a thinker to take it seriously He writes of the necessity of people acting in a social way while thinking they are serving their individual self-interests in the old competitive sense, and then he recoils at the idea of thought control and condemns it. The book is a brilliant explanation. But the seeker after solutions will close it disconsolate.

JOSEPH R. CONLIN
California State University
Chico

HARRY MAGDOFF and PAUL M. SWEEZY. *The End of Prosperity: The American Economy in the 1970s*. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977 Pp. vii, 136. $7.95.

This short book consists of ten essays which originally appeared in the *Monthly Review* between 1973 and early 1977. Devotees of the *Monthly Review* will already have them in their files. Nonreaders of the Magdoff-Sweezy journal will expect to find apocalyptic Marxist pronouncements, and they will not be disappointed.

The essays deal with aspects of the economic crisis of the 1970s: the depreciation of the dollar on foreign exchange markets, stagflation, the shaky financial structure of banks and corporations, the extent of unemployment (estimated by the authors to be at least 13.6 percent of the labor force in early 1975 rather than the official 8.9 percent rate), and the ineffectiveness of Keynesian economic policy. The economic malaise is explained by the Marxist theory of capitalist development: the attempt by monopoly capitalists to maximize surplus value leads to excessive purchasing power in the capitalist class, to the squeezing of the working class, and to the expansion of the reserve army of the unemployed. Keynesian fiscal and monetary remedies for stagnation are futile because they do not resolve the capitalist contradictions inherent in production for profit rather than for use. In the absence of major external stimuli such as war or overwhelming innovations like the nineteenth-century railroad or the twentieth-century automobile, Magdoff and Sweezy forecast continued stagnation. They also forecast a turn to "state capitalism" (apparently beginning with government loans to business), which for some reason will be backed by brutality. The only way out of the stagnation problem is for the working class to be stirred to action and to bring about the revolutionary socialism which is the only hope of a decent existence.

Nobody disagrees that the state of the economy is worrying: Unemployment was around 7 percent at mid-1977; inflation was at an 8.9 percent annual rate in the first half of 1977; the Dow-Jones is down to 1975 levels. What Marxists call bourgeois economics "still has its work cut out for it to come up with a solution to stagflation," as Paul Samuelson put it in the tenth (1976) edition of his *Economics* (p 820). Will the bourgeois economist find the solution in Magdoff and Sweezy? To him, the Marxist labor theory of value is an ancient relic of by-gone economics and the "whole of *Capital* a long drawn-out *petitio principii*" in its reliance on surplus value,

while Marxist social dogma is a "narrow prison of the mind." He will not be persuaded otherwise by this book.

CHARLES E. STALEY

State University of New York
Stony Brook

JACK M. NILLES et al. *The Telecommunications-Transportation Tradeoff: Options for Tomorrow*. Pp. v, 196. New York: Wiley, 1976. $22.95.

For a number of years now, we have been regaled by stories of the revolution in telecommunications and the impact that it will have on our lives. One of the more intriguing suggestions that has been made is the possibility of a telecommunications-transportation tradeoff. Could we substitute telecommunications for transportation in any meaningful way and thus cut down on our use of scarce petroleum products? Until the appearance of this volume, this question, as well as many other interesting ones raised by the observers of the telecommunication revolution, have remained pure speculation.

This book is a documentation of a research program begun in 1973 by an interdisciplinary research team at the University of California with the help of the National Science Foundation. It investigates the possibilities not only of substituting telecommunications for some portion of urban commuter traffic, but also "of the societal implications of widespread adoption of the substitutes" (p. v). The specific case used by the authors is a regional office of a major insurance company located in the central business district of Los Angeles.

After the authors investigate the structure of the insurance company in question and its requirements, especially with respect to personnel, they offer a choice of telecommunications systems which will permit the company to achieve its objective of decentralization in order to take advantage of a desirable work force. A cost-benefit analysis for different types of decentralization is offered as well as an investigation into some of the possible side effects of such a major reorganization, including the effect of a shift to telecommunications b the firm's clerical workers and resistanc to innovation. After a survey of a numbe of other possible tradeoffs and direct an indirect impacts, including problems o security and the effects of widesprea use of telecommunications on urba development, the authors discuss th policy implications and offer a number o recommendations for governmental ac tion. The book is completed with appen dices containing a survey of relatec research, a questionnaire used to deter mine attitudes towards telecommunica tions and its possible uses, and an index

The ultimate objective of the book according to the authors, is "to develop in readers with many different backgrounds an appreciation of some of the alternatives to the developments in contemporary society made possible by technologies that are here, or almost here, today" (p. v). It is the reviewer's opinion that the authors have gone a long way toward meeting that objective. It is a readable book and one that should have a wide circulation.

GEORGE A. CODDING, JR.

University of Colorado
Boulder

WILLIAM WISELEY. *A Tool of Power: The Political History of Money*. Pp. vii, 401. New York: Wiley, 1977. $16.95.

Despite its broad title, Mr. Wiseley's book in essence is a crisis-by-crisis account of how the relationship of gold to the leading monies of the world was progressively, and very likely permanently, broken between the heyday of the international gold standard before World War I and the early 1970s. Two background chapters, comprising a sixth of the text, deal with, respectively, the development of money from ancient times to 1815, and the rise of the international gold standard during the nineteenth century. The remaining ten chapters discuss the breakdown of the gold standard in World War I, the largely futile attempts to reestablish it after the war, the emergence of the gold exchange standard, in which gold continued to serve as money for central bankers but

not for ordinary people, the monetary strains of the Great Depression and World War II, the post-World War II Bretton Woods system of fixed exchange rates, the fundamental shift from worldwide dollar shortage to dollar surplus in the 1950s, and finally the abandonment of gold as a monetary base along with the emergence of floating or flexible exchange rates among the world's major paper monies between 1967 and 1973.

Wiseley's detailed account of these events and developments is quite effective in bringing out the personal qualities and beliefs of the major world figures involved, their politico-economic infighting and intrigues, and their ultimate recognition that the force of circumstances in the world economy was more controlling of their actions than a phenomenon they could control. To the extent that the book has any limitations in achieving its purpose, they are sins of omission rather than commission. What I miss in Wiseley's treatment is a discussion of the fundamental drawbacks of any commodity (e.g. gold) standard of money, and an evaluation of the prospects we face now that paper standards and flexible exchange rates have replaced gold. The gold standard was more myth than operating system; it worked only when people did not take very seriously its offer to convert paper money into gold. In principle the paper system of today is more rational. But will it continue to work in practice? That will hinge on whether and how soon the controllers of paper money learn, to paraphrase Wiseley (p. 75), that the real value or purchasing power of a currency is not related in any way to its gold backing or "cover," but rather depends on the quantity of circulation.

RICHARD SYLLA
North Carolina State University
Raleigh

OTHER BOOKS

ALLSWANG, JOHN M. *Bosses, Machines, and Urban Voters: An American Symbiosis*. Pp. vii, 157. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1977. $9.95. Paperbound, $5.95.

AMUNDSEN, KIRSTEN. *A New Look at the Silenced Majority: Women and American Democracy*. Pp. ix, 172. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977. $8.95. Paperbound, $3.95.

ARNOLD, GUY and RUTH WEISS. *Strategic Highways of Africa*. Pp. 178. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977. $12.95.

The Atlantic Council Working Group on the United Nations. The Future of the UN: A Strategy for Like-Minded Nations. Pp. 58. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977. $3.95. Paperbound.

BANKS, ARTHUR S., ed. *Political Handbook of the World: 1977*. Pp. xi, 604. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1977. $24.95.

BARBER, JAMES DAVID. *The Presidential Character: Predicting Performance in the White House*. 2nd ed. Pp. v, 576. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977. $7.50. Paperbound.

BARNDS, WILLIAM J. ed. *China and America: The Search for A New Relationship*. Pp. ix, 254. New York. New York University Press, 1977. $15.00.

BECK, EMILY MORISON, ed. *Sailor Historian: The Best of Samuel Eliot Morison*. Pp. viii, 431. Boston, Mass.: Houghton Mifflin, 1977. $15.00.

BELL, JOHN D. *Peasants in Power: Alexander Stamboliski and the Bulgarian Agrarian National Union, 1899–1923*. Pp. vii, 271. Princeton, N.J.. Princeton University Press, 1977. $16.50.

BENTLEY, MICHAEL. *The Liberal Mind 1914–1929*. Pp viii, 279. New York. Cambridge University Press, 1977. $19.95.

BHAGWATI, JAGDISH N., ed. *The New International Economic Order: The North-South Debate* Pp. vii, 390. Littleton, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977. $9.95. Paperbound.

BIALER, SEWERYN and SOPHIA SLUZAR, eds. *Radicalism in the Contemporary Age: Sources of Contemporary Radicalism*, vol. 1. Pp. xi, 396. Boulder, Colo.. Westview Press, 1977. $15.00.

BIRNBAUM, NORMAN, ed. *Beyond the Crisis*. Pp. v, 233. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977. $11.95. Paperbound, $5.95.

BLACKMER, DONALD L. M. and SIDNEY TARROW, eds. *Communism in Italy and France*. Pp. v, 651. Princeton, N.J.. Princeton University Press, 1977. $9.75. Paperbound.

BLAKE, DAVID H. and ROBERT E. DRISCOLL. *The Social and Economic Impacts of Transnational Corporations: Case Studies of the U.S. Paper Industry in Brazil*. Pp. iii, 133. New York: UNIPUB, 1977. $5.50. Paperbound.

BLOCK, RICHARD. *Violent Crime*. Pp. v, 121.

Lexington, Mass.. Lexington Books, 1977. $13.00.

BLUMENTHAL, ARTHUR L. *The Process of Cognition*. Pp. iii, 230. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977. $9.95.

BONNER, STANLEY F. *Education in Ancient Rome*. Pp. 416. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. $18.50. Paperbound, $10.95.

BRIGGS, ASA and JOHN SAVILLE, eds. *Essays in Labour History 1918–1939*. Pp. 292. Hamden, Conn. Archon Books, 1977. $15.00.

BRODEUR, PAUL *The Zapping of America: Microwaves, Their Deadly Risk and the Cover-Up*. Pp. 343. New York W. W. Norton, 1977. $11.95.

BROWN, ARCHIE and JACK GRAY, eds. *Political Culture and Political Change in Communist States*. Pp vii, 286 New York Holmes & Meier, 1977. $24 00.

BUNDY, WILLIAM P., ed *Two Hundred Years of American Foreign Policy*. Pp. v, 251. New York. New York University Press, 1977 $15.00.

BURCHETT, WILFRED and DEREK ROEBUCK. *The Whores of War: Mercenaries Today*. Pp. 240. New York: Penguin Books, 1977. $2.95. Paperbound.

BUTLIN, R. A., ed. *The Development of the Irish Town*. Pp. 144. Totowa, N.J. Rowman & Littlefield, 1977. $13.50

CARELESS, ANTHONY. *Initiative and Response: The Adaptation of Canadian Federalism to Regional Economic Development*. Pp. ix, 244. Quebec. McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977. $6.00. Paperbound.

CARROLL, PETER N. and DAVID W. NOBLE *The Free and the Unfree A New History of the United States*. Pp. 448 New York. Penguin Books, 1977. $4.95 Paperbound

CEDERBLOM, J. B. and WILLIAM L. BLIZEK, eds. *Justice and Punishment*. Pp. 160. Cambridge, Mass.. Ballinger, 1977. $16.50

CHALLINOR, RAYMOND. *The Origins of British Bolshevism*. Pp. 291. Totowa, N.J. Rowman & Littlefield, 1977. $16.00

CHANG, YUNSHIK, and PETER J. DONALDSON *Population Change in the Pacific Region*. Pp. 206. Vancouver, B.C.. Pacific Science Association, 1976. $4.00. Paperbound.

CLARK, MARTIN. *Antonio Gramsci and the Revolution that Failed* Pp viii, 255 New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1977. $15.00.

COHEN, STEPHEN S. *Modern Capitalist Planning: The French Model*. Pp. 351 Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. $17 50 Paperbound, $4.85.

COLEMAN, JAMES S. et al. *Parents, Teachers and Children*. Pp. v, 336. San Francisco Calif.: Institute for Contemporary Studies 1977. $5.95. Paperbound.

CONNELL, JOHN and MICHAEL LIPTON. *Assessing Village Labour Situations in Developing Countries*. Pp. 180. New York Oxford University Press, 1977. $6.25.

COOK, CHRIS et al. *Sources in British Political History 1900–1951: A Guide to the Private Papers of Members of Parliament: A–K* vol. 3. Pp. 281. New York: St. Martin's Press 1977. $17.95.

COOK, CHRIS et al. *Sources in British Political History 1900–1951 A Guide to the Private Papers of Members of Parliament. L–Z*, vol. 4. Pp. 272. New York: St. Martin's Press 1977. $17.95.

COOLING, BENJAMIN FRANKLIN. ed. *War, Business, and American Society Historical Perspectives on the Military-Industrial Complex*. Pp. 205. Port Washington, N.Y Kennikat Press, 1977 $12.50.

COOX, ALVIN D. *The Anatomy of A Small War The Soviet-Japanese Struggle for Changkufeng/Khasan, 1938*. Pp xxvi, 409 Westport, Conn. Greenwood Press, 1977 $25.00.

COSER, LEWIS A. *Masters of Sociological Thought Ideas in Historical and Social Context*. 2nd ed. Pp. 611. New York Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1977 $13.95.

CYR, ARTHUR. *Liberal Party Politics in Britain* Pp. 318. New Brunswick, N J Transaction Books, 1977 $12 95

DALLIN, ALEXANDER, ed. *The Twenty-Fifth Congress of the CPSU. Assessment and Context*. Pp vii, 127. Stanford, Calif Hoover Institution Press, 1977. $5 95 Paperbound

DASGUPTA, BIPLAB. *Village Society and Labour Use*. Pp. i, 229 New York Oxford University Press, 1977. $6.95.

DEETZ, JAMES *In Small Things Forgotten The Archeology of Early American Life*. Pp. 184. New York Anchor Press, $2.50. Paperbound

DELUCA, ANTHONY J *Freud and Future Religious Experience* Pp. xiii, 263. Totowa N.J.. Littlefield, Adams, 1977. $4.95. Paperbound.

DE SILVA, K. M. ed *Sri Landa. A Survey* Pp. v, 496. Honolulu. University Press of Hawaii, 1977. $22.50.

DOMES, JÜRGEN. *China After the Cultural Revolution. Politics Between Two Party Congresses*. Pp 293. Berkeley University of California Press, 1977. $15.00.

DUNG, VAN TIEN. *Our Great Spring Victory An Account of the Liberation of South*

Vietnam. Pp. v, 275. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977. $15.00.

DWYER, T. RYLE. *Irish Neutrality and the U.S.A. 1939–47*. Pp. ix, 241. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1977. $16.50.

EAMES, EDWIN and JUDITH GRANICH GOODE. *Anthropology of the City: An Introduction to Urban Anthropology*. Pp. iii, 344. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977. $8.95. Paperbound.

EBNER, MICHAEL H. and EUGENE M. TOBIN, eds. *The Age of Urban Reform: New Perspectives on the Progressive Era*. Pp. vii, 213. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1977. $12.95. Paperbound, $7.95.

ENDICOTT, JOHN E. and ROY W. SAFFORD, JR., eds. *American Defense Policy*. 4th ed. Pp. v, 626. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977. $22.50. Paperbound, $7.95.

ENGLISH, JANE, ed. *Sex Equality*. Pp. iii, 250. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.. Prentice-Hall, 1977. $11.95. Paperbound, $6.50.

EZELL, MACEL D. *Unequivocal Americanism: Right-Wing Novels in the Cold War Era* Pp. v, 152. Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1977. $6.50.

FAWDRY, MARQUERITE. *Chinese Childhood. A Miscellany of Mythology, Folklore, Fact and Fable*. Pp. 192. Woodbury, N.Y.. Barron's Educational Series, 1977. $10.95.

FEIN, HELEN *Imperial Crime and Punishment. The Massacre at Jallianwala Bagh and British Judgment, 1919–1920*. Pp. x, 250. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1977. $12.00.

FELDSTEIN, PAUL J *Health Associations and the Demand for Legislation: The Political Economy of Health*. Pp. 336. Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1977. $18.00.

FITZGERALD, C. P. *Mao Tse-Tung and China*. Pp. 197 New York: Penguin Books, 1977 $2.50. Paperbound.

Foreign Relations of the United States. Western Europe, 1950. Vol. III. Pp. 1839. Washington, D.C.. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. No price.

FRIEDEN, BERNARD J. and MARSHALL KAPLAN. *The Politics of Neglect: Urban Aid from Model Cities to Revenue Sharing*. Pp. ix, 295. Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press, 1977. $4.95. Paperbound.

FRY, MICHAEL G. *Lloyd George and Foreign Policy: The Education of a Statesman 1890–1916*, vol. I Pp. ix, 314. Quebec: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1977 $18 50.

GARVEY, AMY JACQUES and E. U. ESSIEN-UDOM, eds. *More Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey*. Vol. 3. Pp. vii, 248 Totowa, N.J.: Frank Cass, 1977. $22.50. Paperbound, $8.95.

GARVEY, AMY, ed. *The Philosophy and Opinions of Marcus Garvey*. Pp. vii, 412. Totowa, N.J.: Frank Cass, 1977. $25.00. Paperbound, $9.50.

GARVEY, GERALD. *Nuclear Power and Social Planning*. Pp. vii, 159. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977. $15.00.

GEERTZ, CLIFFORD. *The Interpretation of Cultures*. Pp. vii, 470. New York: Basic Books, 1977. $5.95. Paperbound.

GLASSCOTE, RAYMOND, JON E. GUDEMAN, and DONALD MILES. *Creative Mental Health Services for the Elderly*. Pp. iii, 190. Washington, D.C.: American Psychiatric and Mental Health Association, 1977. No price.

GOLEMBIEWSKI, ROBERT T. *Public Administration As a Developing Discipline*. Part 2: *Organization Development As One of a Future Family of Miniparadigms*. Pp. v, 209. New York. Marcel Dekker, 1977. $16.75.

GOLEMBIEWSKI, ROBERT T. *Public Administration As a Developing Discipline*. Part 1: *Perspectives on Past and Present*. Pp. v, 246. New York: Marcel Dekker, 1977. $16.75.

GRANT, WYN and DAVID MARSH *The Confederation of British Industry*. Pp. vii, 226. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1977. $16.50.

GUTKIND, PETER and PETER WATERMAN, eds *African Social Studies. A Radical Reader*. Pp ix, 481 New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977. $17.50.

GUY, J. A. *The Cardinal's Court: The Impact of Thomas Wolsey in Star Chamber*. Pp. vi, 191 Totowa, N.J.. Rowman & Littlefield, 1977. $15.00.

HAMMERMESH, DANIEL S. *Jobless Pay and the Economy*. Pp. v, 114. Baltimore, Md. Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977. $8.50. Paperbound, $3 25.

HARMS, L. S., JIM RICHSTAD, and KATHLEEN A KIE, eds *Right to Communicate: Collected Papers*. Pp. vii, 136. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1977. $5.00. Paperbound.

HAWKE, SHARRYL and DAVID KNOX. *One Child by Choice*. Pp. ix, 233. Englewood Cliffs, N.J . Prentice-Hall, 1977. $8.95. Paperbound, $3.95.

HAYES, DENIS. *Rays of Hope. The Transition to A Post-Petroleum World*. Pp. 240. New York. W.W. Norton, 1977. $3.95. Paperbound.

HERRICK, JAMES E. *Theory Building for Basic Institutional Change*. Pp. iii, 105. San Francisco, Calif.: R. & E. Research Associates, 1977 $9.00. Paperbound.

HIGLEY, JOHN, G., LOWELL FIELD, and KNUT GROHOLT. *Elite Structure and Ideology: A Theory with Application to Norway*. Pp. vi, 367. New York. Columbia University Press, 1977. $17.50.

HINTON, DAVID A. *Alfred's Kingdom: Wessex and the South 800–1500*. Pp. v, 228. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1977. $10.75.

HIRO, DILIP. *Inside India Today* Pp. ix, 338. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977. $15.00.

HIRSCH, HERBERT and ARMANDO GUTIERREZ. *Learning to be Militant. Ethnic Identity and the Development of Political Militance in a Chicano Community*. Pp. iii, 145. San Francisco, Calif.: R. & E. Research Associates, 1977. $10.00. Paperbound

HOLLIS, MARTIN. *Models of Man Philosophical Thoughts on Social Action*. Pp. vii, 195. New York. Cambridge University Press, 1977. $4.95 Paperbound.

HOWES, ROBERT C. *The Confession of Mikhail Bakunin*. Pp. 200. Ithaca, N.Y Cornell University Press, 1977. $12.50.

IDZERDA, STANLEY J., ed *Lafayette in the Age of the American Revolution Selected Letters and Papers 1776–1790*. Vol. 1. Ithaca, N.Y.· Cornell University Press, 1977. $18.50.

INBAR, MICHAEL and CHAIM ADLER. *Ethnic Integration in Israel. A Comparative Case Study of Moroccan Brothers Who Settled in France and in Israel* Pp 144. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1977 $16.95.

JACKSON, CURTIS E. and MARCIA J. GALLI. *A History of the Bureau of Indian Affairs and its Activities among Indians* Pp. iii, 162. San Francisco, Calif.: R. & E. Research Associates, 1977. $12.00 Paperbound.

JALÉE, PIERRE. *How Capitalism Works*. Pp. 128 New York. Monthly Review Press, 1977. $3.95. Paperbound

JOHNSON, RICH. *The Central Arizona Project, 1918–1968*. Pp. 242. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1977. $11.50. Paperbound, $5.95.

KASPERSON, ROGER E. and JEANNE X. KASPERSON, eds *Water Re-Use and the Cities* Pp. xi, 238. Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1977. No price.

KELLEY, DONALD R , ed. *The Energy Crisis and the Environment: An International Perspective*. Pp. v, 245. New York· Praeger, 1977. No price.

KING, ANTHONY. *Britain Says Yes. The 1975 Referendum on the Common Market*. Pp. 153. Washington, D.C.. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977. $3.75. Paperbound.

KIRSTEIN, PETER N. *Anglo Over Bracero. A History of the Mexican Worker in the United States from Roosevelt to Nixon*. Pp. iii, 113. San Francisco, Calif.: R. & E. Research Associates, 1977. $9.00. Paperbound.

KORBEL, JOSEF. *Twentieth Century Czechoslovakia*. Pp. vii, 346. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. $14.95.

KRAMER, FRED A. *Perspectives on Public Bureaucracy*. 2nd ed. Pp. 220. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977. $5.95. Paperbound.

KWARTLER, RICHARD, ed. *Behind Bars. Prisons in America*. Pp. x, 178. New York: Random House, 1977. $3.95. Paperbound.

LAISTNER, M. L. W. *The Greater Roman Historians*. Pp. 203. Berkeley. University of California Press, 1977. $8.75.

LASKY, VICTOR. *J F.K. The Man and the Myth*. Pp. 883 New York: Dell, 1977. $2.75. Paperbound.

LASSWELL, HAROLD D. *Psychopathology and Politics*. New Introduction by Fred I. Greenstein. Pp. vii, 339. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977. $5.95. Paperbound.

LEVINE, ARNOLD J. *Alienation in the Metropolis*. Pp iii, 111. San Francisco, Calif.: R. & E. Research Associates, 1977 $9.00. Paperbound.

LEVITAN, SAR A. and RICHARD S. BELOUS. *Shorter Hours, Shorter Weeks· Spreading the Work to Reduce Unemployment*. Pp. v, 94. Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977. $8.50 Paperbound, $3.25.

LEWIS, EUGENE. *American Politics in a Bureaucratic Age. Citizens, Constituents, Clients and Victims* Pp. v, 182. Cambridge, Mass.. Winthrop, 1977. $10.00. Paperbound, $5.95.

LINDBORG, KRISTINA and CARLOS J OVANDO *Five Mexican-American Women in Transition: A Case Study of Migrants in the Midwest*. Pp. iii, 111. San Francisco, Calif.. R & E Research Associates, 1977. $8.00 Paperbound.

LOSONCY, LEWIS E. *Turning People On: How to Be An Encouraging Person*. Pp. vii, 150. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977. $8.95. Paperbound, $3.95.

LOWE, ADOLPH. *On Economic Knowledge. Toward A Science of Political Economics* Enlarged Edition. Pp. v, 351. White Plains, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1977. $20.00.

MACAVOY, PAUL W., ed. *Deregulation of Cable Television*. Pp. 169. Washington, D.C : American Enterprise Institute for

Public Policy Research, 1977. $3.75. Paperbound.

MANDEL, ERNEST. *Karl Marx: Capital*. Vol. 1. Pp. 1141. New York: Vintage Books, 1977. $7.95. Paperbound.

MANSFIELD, EDWIN, ed. *Economics: Readings, Issues, and Cases*. 2nd ed. Pp. xvii, 473. New York: W.W. Norton, 1977. No price.

MATRAS, JUDAH. *Introduction to Population. A Sociological Approach*. Pp. iii, 452. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977. $14.95.

MCCLELLAND, PETER D., ed. *Macro-Economics 1977: Readings on Contemporary Issues*. Pp. 224. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977. $5.95. Paperbound.

MEAD, SIDNEY E. *The Old Religion in the Brave New World. Reflections on the Relation Between Christendom and the Republic*. Pp. 201. Berkeley. University of California Press. 1977. $10.00.

MEAD, WALTER J., GEORGE W. ROGERS, and RUFUS Z. SMITH. *Transporting Natural Gas From the Arctic. The Alternative Systems*. Pp. 111. Washington, D.C.. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977. $3.25. Paperbound.

MEINECKE, FRIEDRICH. *The Age of German Liberation 1795–1815*. Pp. 154. Berkeley. University of California Press, 1977. $12.50. Paperbound, $2 45.

MENNINGER, KARL. *Numbe Words and Number Symbols* Pp. xiii, 480 Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977. $9 95

MIDDLETON, LUCY, ed *Women in the Labour Movement*. Pp. 221. Totowa, N J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1977. $13.50.

MILLETT, RICARDO A. *Examination of "Widespread Citizen Participation" in the Model Cities Program and the Demands of Ethnic Minorities for a Greater Decision Making Role in American Cities*. Pp. iii, 151. San Francisco, Calif. R & E Research Associates, 1977. $8 00. Paperbound.

MINERS, N. J. *The Government and Politics of Hong Kong*. Pp. vii, 333. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977. $13.75. Paperbound.

MISCHEL, THEODORE, ed. *The Self Psychological and Philosophical Issues*. Pp ix, 359. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1977. $17.50.

MORAWSKA, EWA T. *The Maintenance of Ethnicity: Case Study of the Polish-American Community in Greater Boston*. Pp iii, 161. San Francisco, Calif.: R. & E. Research Associates, 1977. $9.00. Paperbound.

MORLEY, FELIX, ed. *Essays on Individuality*. Pp. 380. Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Press, 1977. $8.00.

NAGAI, YŌNOSUKE and AKIRA IRIVE, eds. *The Origins of the Cold War in Asia*. Pp. 448. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. $20.00.

NACEL, STUART S. and MARIAN G. NEEF. *Legal Policy Analysis*. Pp. vii, 327. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977. $21.00.

NIELSON, DAVID GORDON. *Black Ethos Northern Urban Negro Life and Thought, 1890–1930*. Pp. xix, 248. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1977. $14.95.

NORTHRUP, JAMES P. *Old Age, Handicapped and Vietnam-Era Antidiscrimination Legislation*. Labor Relations and Public Policy Series, no. 14. Pp. iii, 234. Philadelphia. University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977. $8.50. Paperbound.

Nuclear Fuels Policy. Report of the Atlantic Council's Nuclear Fuels Policy Working Group. Pp. ii, 137. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977. $5.95. Paperbound.

NWABUEZE, B. O. *Judicialism in Commonwealth Africa*. Pp. v, 324 New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977. $19.95.

OFSHE, RICHARD, ed. *The Sociology of the Possible* 2nd ed. Pp. ix, 380. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.. Prentice-Hall, 1977. $6.95. Paperbound.

PARSONS, TALCOTT. *The Evolution of Societies*. Edited by Jackson Toby. Pp. vii, 269. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977. $11.95. Paperbound, $6.95.

PATERSON, WILLIAM E. and ALASTAIR H. THOMAS, eds. *Social Democratic Parties in Western Europe*. Pp 444. New York. St. Martin's Press, 1977. $19.95.

PECHMAN, JOSEPH A., ed *The 1978 Budget. Setting National Priorities*. Pp. vii, 443. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977. $11.95. Paperbound, $4.95.

PEMPEL, T. J., ed. *Policymaking in Contemporary Japan*. Pp. 345. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977. $17:50.

PENNOCK, J. ROLAND and JOHN W CHAPMAN, eds. *Due Process: Nomos XVIII*. New York: New York University Press, 1977. $17.50.

RADIN, BERYL A. *Implementation, Change, and the Federal Bureaucracy: School Desegregation Policy in H.E.W., 1964–1968*. Pp. vi, 239 New York: Columbia University Press 1977 No price.

RANDALL, JOHN HERMAN, JR. *Philosophy After Darwin*. Edited by Beth J. Singer. Pp. ix, 352. New York. Columbia University Press, 1977. $17.50.

READING, HUGO F. *A Dictionary of the Social Sciences*. Pp. 231. Boston, Mass.: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977. $7.95. Paperbound, $3.50.

REYNOLDS, ALLAN G. and PAUL W. FLAGG. *Cognitive Psychology*. Pp. vii, 457. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977. $13.95.

RITZER, GEORGE. *Working: Conflict and Change*. 2nd ed. Pp. vii, 426. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977. $13.95.

RIVIÈRE, CLAUDE. *Guinea. The Mobilization of a People*. Pp. 262. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977. $16.50.

ROCKEFELLER, NELSON A. *Vital Resources. Reports on Energy, Food and Raw Materials*. Pp., 187. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977. No price

ROGERS, JOSEPH W. *Why Are You Not A Criminal?* Pp. ix, 160. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.. Prentice-Hall, 1977. $9.95.

ROSEN, GERALD. *The Carmen Miranda Memorial Flagpole*. Pp. 176. San Rafael, Calif.: Presidio Press, 1977. $8.95.

RUBIN, ROGER H. *Family Structure and Peer Group Affiliation as Related to Attitudes about Male-Female Relations among Black Youth* Pp. iii, 134. San Francisco, Calif.. R & E Research Associates, 1977 $9.00. Paperbound.

RUBIN, VERA and ARTHUR TUDEN, eds. *Comparative Perspectives on Slavery in New World Plantation Societies*. Vol. 292. Pp. 619 New York: New York Academy of Sciences, 1977. $40.00. Paperbound

SAFFRON, MORRIS H. *Surgeon to Washington: Dr. John Cochran, 1730–1807*. Pp. viii, 302. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. $17.50.

SAUGSTAD, PER. *A Theory of Communication and Use of Language: Foundations for the Study of Psychology*. Pp. 263. New York. Columbia University Press, 1977. $12.00. Paperbound.

SCHNEIDER, STEPHEN A *The Availability of Minorities and Women for Professional and Managerial Positions 1970–1985*. Pp. iii, 280. Philadelphia University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977. No price. Paperbound.

SCHNEIDER, SUSAN GILBERT. *Revolution, Reaction or Reform. The 1974 Bilingual Education Act*. Pp. iii, 238. New York. Las Americas, 1976. No price.

SCHWARTZ, FLORENCE, FRITZ A. FLUCKINGER and IRVING WEISMAN. *A Cross Cultural Encounter· A Non-Traditional Approach to Social Work Education*. Pp. iii, 134. San Francisco, Calif.: R & E Research Associates, 1977. $8.00. Paperbound.

SELIG, ANDREW L. *Making Things Happen in Communities: Alternatives to Traditional Mental Health Services*. Pp. iii, 99. $8.00 Paperbound.

SHORTER, EDWARD. *The Making of the Modern Family*. Pp. vii, 368. New York. Basic Books, 1977. $5.95. Paperbound.

SIRACUSA, JOSEPH M. and GLEN ST. JOHN BARCLAY. *The Impact of the Cold War: Reconsiderations*. Pp. vii, 208. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1977. $12.50. Paperbound, $6.95.

SITHOLE, NDABANINGI. *Obed Mutezo of Zimbabwe*. Pp. vi, 210. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977. $5.75. Paperbound.

SKAGGS, DAVID CURTIS, ed. *The Old Northwest in the American Revolution: An Anthology*. Pp. v, 497. New Berlin, Wisc.: Society Press, 1977. $21.50.

SMITH, DENIS MACK. *Mussolini's Roman Empire*. Pp. xi, 322. New York: Penguin Books, 1977. $3.95. Paperbound.

STEBBINS, RICHARD P. and ELAINE P. ADAM. *American Foreign Relations 1974: A Documentary Record*. Pp. iv, 613. New York: New York University Press, 1977. $26.50.

STEPHENS, JAMES C. *Managing Complexity: Work, Technology, Resources, and Human Relations*. Revised ed. Pp. 331. Mt Airy, Md.: Lomond Books, 1977. $16.50.

TROLL, LILLIAN E., JOAN ISRAEL, and KENNETH ISRAEL, eds *Looking Ahead: A Woman's Guide to the Problems and Joys of Growing Older* Pp. v, 216. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977 $8.95 Paperbound, $3.95.

TRUITT, NANCY S , et al. *Opinion Leaders and Private Investment· An Attitude Survey in Chile and Venezuela*. Pp. iii, 125. New York: UNIPUB, 1976. $5.50. Paperbound.

TYRRELL, RONALD W., FRANK A JOHNS, and FREDERICK HANOCH MCCARTY. *Growing Pains in the Classroom A Guide for teachers of Adolescents*. Pp. vii, 202. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.. Prentice-Hall, 1977. $9.95. Paperbound.

TYSE, AGNES M *International Education· The American Experience, A Bibliography*. Vol 2, part I. General, part II: Area Studies and Indexes Pp. iii, 1094 Metuchen, N.J Scarecrow Press, 1977. $37.50. Per Set.

VAN DALEN, HENDRIK and L. HARMON ZEIGLER *Introduction to Political Science People, Politics, and Perception*. Pp. v, 275 Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977. $6.95. Paperbound.

VENTURI, ROBERT, DENISE SCOTT BROWN, and STEVEN IZENOUR. *Learning from Las Vegas*. Revised Edition. Pp. xi, 192. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977. $9.95 Paperbound.

VAGNER, RICHARD E. *Inheritance and the State: Tax Principles for a Free and Prosperous Commonwealth*. Pp. 95. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977. $2.75. Paperbound.

WALDEN, RUSSELL, ed. *The Open Hand: Essays on LeCorbusier*. Pp. ix, 484. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977. $25.00.

WARREN, RACHELLE and DONALD WARREN *The Neighborhood Organizer's Handbook*. Pp. 248. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977. $9.95. Paperbound, $4.95.

WARREN, ROLAND L. *Social Change and Human Purpose: Toward Understanding and Action*. Pp. ix, 348. Chicago, Ill.. Rand McNally, 1977. $9.95.

WEISS, ROBERT S. *Marital Separation: Coping with the End of a Marriage and the Transition to being Single Again*. Pp. vii, 334 New York: Basic Books, 1977 $4.95. Paperbound.

WELBORN, DAVID M. *Governance of Federal Regulatory Agencies*. Pp. vii, 179. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1977. $9.50.

WETHERBY, TERRY. *Conversations: Working Women Talk About Doing a "Man's Job."* Pp. v, 269. Milbrae, Calif.: Les Femmes, 1977. $4.95. Paperbound.

WILSON, DICK, ed. *Mao Tse-Tung in the Scales of History*. Pp. xii, 331. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977. $19.95. Paperbound, $5.95.

WONDER, EDWARD F. *Nuclear Fuel and American Foreign Policy: Multilateralization for Uranium Enrichment*. Pp. ix, 72. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977. $3.95. Paperbound.

World Armaments and Disarmament: SIPRI Yearbook 1977. Pp. v, 421. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977. No price.

YIN, ROBERT K., KAREN A. HEALD, and MARY E. VOGEL. *Tinkering with the System*. Pp. v, 275. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1977. $16.00.

ZELDIN, THEODORE. *The Oxford History of Modern Europe: France 1848–1945*. Vol. II. Pp. vii, 1202. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977. $29.95.

ZIMBALIST, SIDNEY E. *Historic Themes and Landmarks in Social Welfare Research*. Pp. viii, 432. New York: Harper & Row, 1977. $10.95.

INDEX

INDEX

VOLUME 437 MAY 1978

THE ANNALS

of The American Academy *of* Political
and Social Science

RICHARD D. LAMBERT, *Editor*
ALAN W. HESTON, *Assistant Editor*

MEDICAL ETHICS AND SOCIAL CHANGE

Special Editor of This Volume
BERNARD BARBER
Columbia University, New York
(Barnard College, Graduate Faculties, and Center for Social Sciences)

PHILADELPHIA

Library of Congress Card Number 77-26530

MARION M. WILLIAMS, *Copy Editor*

The articles appearing in THE ANNALS are indexed in the *Book Review Index*, the *Public Affairs Information Service Bulletin*, *Social Sciences Index*, and *Current Contents: Behavioral, Social, Management Sciences* and *Combined Retrospective Index Sets*. They are also abstracted and indexed in *ABC Pol Sci*, *Historical Abstracts*, *United States Political Science Documents*, *Social Work Research & Abstracts*, *International Political Science Abstracts* and/or *America: History and Life*.

International Standard Book Numbers (ISBN)

ISBN 0-87761-227-7, vol 437, 1978, paper—$4 50
ISBN 0-87761-226-9, vol 437, 1978, cloth—$5 50

Issued bimonthly by The American Academy of Political and Social Science at 3937 Chestnut St., Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104. Cost per year $18.00 paperbound; $23.00 clothbound Add $2.00 to above rates for membership outside U.S.A. Second-class postage paid at Philadelphia and at additional mailing offices.

Claims for undelivered copies must be made within the month following the regular month of publication. The publisher will supply missing copies when losses have been sustained in transit and when the reserve stock will permit.

Editorial and Business Offices, 3937 Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104.

CONTENTS

CONTENTS

BOOK DEPARTMENT

PAGE

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND POLITICS

AFRICA, ASIA, AND LATIN AMERICA

CONTENTS

PAGE

EUROPE

UNITED STATES HISTORY AND POLITICS

ANNALS, AAPSS, 437, May 1978

Perspectives on Medical Ethics and Social Change

By BERNARD BARBER

ABSTRACT: Medical ethics are now in a period of great change. Some of the patterns, causes, agents, modes, resistance to, and costs of these changes are briefly described as a guide to the several detailed essays in this volume.

Professor Bernard Barber has been at Columbia University for 25 years, whe he is connected with Barnard College, the Graduate Faculties, and the Soci Science Center. A pioneer in the sociology of science, he has also written on th sociology of medicine and the sociology of professions. He has been a memb of the Drug Research Board (National Academy of Sciences-National Researc Council) and is presently a member of the Health Advisory Board, Office of Tec nology Assessment, United States Congress. He is the author or editor of eig books and a number of articles. His books include Science and the Social Ord (1952), Drugs and Society (1957), *and (with others)* Research on Human Subjec (1973). *He is presently at work on a book on informed consent in medical researc and therapy.*

AS THE several essays in this volume all excellently give evidence, medical ethics are now in a period of great change. The world of medical science and the society around it are now both undergoing great changes and it is these that inevitably cause the change that is occurring in medical ethics. Not that changes in medical ethics have not occurred before. Berlant's essay on the history of medical ethics describes and explains sociologically some of the changes that have taken place in the past, from Hippocrates forward. But the change occurring now is of a scope and rate that marks the present period off as a very special one in the history of medicine. For some laymen, the present changes are not fast enough; for some physicians and physician-investigators, they are all too fast; for everyone, there is no question that something of the first importance and novelty is now happening in medical ethics. This volume describes and analyzes the changes now occurring. It tells whence we have come, where we are now, and, since much is still unsettled, where we may be going.

Since the several essays in this volume lucidly offer so much by way of detail and circumstance on a wide variety of medical-ethical issues, there is no possibility of, or need to, summarize the papers in this essay. Instead, I will seek to provide, in great brevity, some integrating perspectives on what follows. A certain attention to the larger picture of causes, agents, modes, resistance to, and social costs of, the present changes will serve to guide the reader a little better in reading the more specialized topics each of my expert fellow authors has been assigned. Amplification and supporting evidence for several of the perspectives will be found in the individual essays.

SOME CAUSES OF CHANGE

At first glance, the great changes that have occurred recently in basic and applied medical sciences might seem sufficient cause of the changes that are occurring in medical ethics. On this premise, one might argue that the great new control that biomedical advances have given us over morbidity and health, life and death, might be a sufficient cause of the correlated changes in medical ethics. But this technological determinism will not do. Two other causes, working together with scientific changes, are necessary for a better explanation of the causes of the present changes in medical ethics. These other causes are changes now going on in two areas of values and interests that are of fundamental importance in our society. One of these areas of value-and-interest has to do with rationality; the other, with egalitarianism.

Rationality is a powerful set of values and interests in our society that predisposes people to search out the most efficient and effective means to their ends. With increasing education and increasing assimilation of the population into our fundamental values has come an increasing emphasis on rationality in all spheres of behavior. For ends so important to people as health and life, it is obvious that rationality commands people to get as much good medical care as they can. They know how much good it can do them; but they have also come to know that it can do them ill, that medical enthusiasms can sometimes bring harm, that people can be used as subjects in medical experimentation which is of no immediate benefit to them, and that

they may lose some of their autonomy and control over their ways of living and dying. Medicine, they have learned, has diverse consequences, for both good and ill, and they rationally prefer more of the good and less of the ill. They want medical ethics changed to maximize the good the doctors and physician-investigators do, minimize, without ever totally eliminating, the harm they also cause, however inadvertently.

Egalitarianism is another powerful set of values and interests in our society. It predisposes people to want to increase their autonomy, to reduce somewhat the consequential differences of resources and prestige between themselves and their fellows, to have somewhat more say in the vital decisions affecting their welfare that powerful authorities and elites may be making without their participation and consent. In our society, and elsewhere in the world, we see blacks as against whites, women as against men, young as against old, clients as against professionals, and patients as against doctors, asking for somewhat less authoritarianism, even somewhat less paternalistic benevolence, somewhat more equality. Equality is on the march against overbearing expertise, and one of our key problems is how to accommodate these two important sets of values and interests to each other more satisfactorily. One of the areas where we seek this more satisfactory accomodation between competing values is medical ethics.

SOME CHANGE AGENTS

Whatever its diverse and interrelated causes, social change in any area is not embodied in wholly impersonal mechanisms but operates through the actions of a variety of individuals who serve as agents of change. In the area of medical ethics, these change agents have been some insider medical professionals, a miscellaneous set of "humanists" or "bioethicists," some social scientists who have done policy-relevant research, and some people from government.

Insider change agents have been people like the late Professor Henry Beecher of the Harvard Medical School, whose 1966 article in the *New England Journal of Medicine* describing some 25 articles in the professional medical and research journals that showed evidence of unethical use of human subjects, stunned his colleagues into an awareness of the problem.[1] Unfortunately while Beecher raised the level of consciousness of the medical research world, his analysis was too individualistic, too psychologistic. He thought he was dealing just with "bad guys." What others have pointed out is that it was a "bad system" that was turning "good guys" into "bad guys."[2] Another important set of insider professional change agents has been an anonymous group of researchers and administrators at the National Institutes of Health (N.I.H.) who, since the early 1960s, have labored to construct effective regulations for local peer review of

1. Henry K. Beecher, "Consent in Clinical Experimentation: Myth and Reality," *New England Journal of Medicine* 195 (1966), pp. 34–35.

2. John J. Lally and Bernard Barber, "'The Compassionate Physician': Frequency and Social Determinants of Physician-Investigator Concern for Human Subjects," *Social Forces* 53 (1974), pp. 289–96. See also Bernard Barber, "Compassion in Medicine: Toward New Definitions and New Institutions," *New England Journal of Medicine* 295 (1976), pp. 939–43.

the ethical aspects of all biomedical research funded by them. Their great achievement has been creation of the 1966 N.I.H. Without Beecher and the N.I.H. professionals, recent changes in the medical ethics of human experimentation would have been less effective and less speedy. In other areas of change in medical ethics, such as problems of abortion, genetic counselling, and humane death, insider professionals have been equally important.

But insiders, as we shall see shortly, have been more resistant than receptive to these changes. Change would not have occurred without the set of outside change agents from the fields of ethics, philosophy, the law, and the humanities, who have all come to be known, inclusively, as "bioethicists."[3] These change agents have held conferences, written books and papers, given lectures, held seminars, and provided training facilities for all those newly interested in medical ethics and even established specialized institutes to consider its problems. The leading institutions investigating medical ethics are the Kennedy Institute of Bio-Ethics at Georgetown University and the Hastings Institute, a private enterprise headed by Daniel Callahan, one of our authors, and Willard Gaylin, a psychiatrist-turned-social-critic and moralist. The bioethicists have come from those fields where a general professional concern for moral values is important. Their involvement with medical ethics is only the latest, and certainly not the last, of the expressions of their general moral concern.

Another set of outsiders has been the professional social scientists who have carried out careful research on problems, such as human experimentation and the treatment of dying patients, and who have been much concerned for formulating better medical ethics and better social policy on the basis of the knowledge acquired in their research.[4] From among this group, Diana Crane and Bradford Gray have essays in this volume. These outsiders have felt that the availability of essential facts is indispensable for the rational processes of change to affect medical ethics. The kinds of abstract, unspecified, and unsupported statements, which are often forthcoming both from the insider professionals and from the outsider bioethicists are not adequate for successful change in ethics and policy.

Finally, some government people have been important change agents. Senator Javits of New York was responsible for inserting ethical review clauses into the Kefauver-Harris Drug Amendments of 1962. Senator Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts and his aids and advisors have had a long-standing, continuing, and key influence on the legislation for improving medical ethics, especially in connection with the legislation in 1975 for setting up the National Commission for the Protection of the Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, an agency which has provided an excellent model of how new regulations for medical ethics may be constructed with due regard to all the values

3. For a discussion of bioethics, see Renee C. Fox, "Advanced Medical Technology—Social and Ethical Implications," *Annual Review of Sociology* (1976), pp. 231–68.

4. Diana Crane, *The Sanctity of Social Life: Physicians' Treatment of Critically Ill Patients* (New York: Russell Sage, 1975); Bradford H. Gray, *Human Subjects in Medical Experimentation* (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1975); Bernard Barber et al., *Research on Human Subjects* (New York: Russell Sage, 1973).

and interests involved. Beyond congressmen, of course, there has been the important influence, referred to above, of the medical researchers working for the government in the National Institutes of Health. The combination of their professional concerns and the power of the National Institutes, as government funding agencies, has made their effects on change extensive and beneficent indeed.

MODES OF CHANGE

Important social change, such as is now occurring in medical ethics, does not proceed along a single path but through multiple and diverse modalities. One such modality is what sociologists call a "social movement." A social movement consists of a diverse, often diffuse (partly organized, partly not) aggregation of people and forces that push toward some new social goal. It is often more effective in raising a moral cry than in defining specific ways of achieving its goal, more successful in raising the level of social consciousness in the public domain about some new social evil than in carrying through the actual process of practical reform. The various people and forces pushing for change in medical ethics have something of this character of a social movement. Their diverse, diffuse, overlapping, somewhat conflicting energies are necessary for the birth of the idea of reform, but they are not enough. Moral change has to be supported, established, supplemented, and sometimes led by governmental and legal action.

Governmental and legal action is the other important change modality which has been so significant in causing important changes in medical ethics. But such action, if entirely unsupported by a strong moral base, would be ineffective; it can lead morality a little bit but can never get too far ahead of it. In the case of medical ethics, fortunately, the moral changes created by a social movement have been successfully implemented by a great variety of governmental and legal changes in many different areas of medical ethics. These changes in government and law have been described and analyzed in detail in the essay by our legal expert, Frank P. Grad. The legal and governmental changes, and their complex relations with morality, have been described in especially great and illuminating detail for the field of the medical ethics of abortion in the essay by Daniel Callahan. Since the relationships between social movements and governmental and legal actions, between morality and law, are of great consequence in all areas of social change, a close study of what has happened in the area of medical ethics should be instructive for those interested in change in other areas of society.

RESISTANCE TO CHANGE

On the whole, physicians and physician-investigators have been resistant to the changes presently occurring in medical ethics. They have been conservative in the literal sense, wishing to preserve the status quo. This is not surprising: All social groups tend to be conservative when they feel their central values and interests are being challenged and subverted, and physicians and physician-investigators now feel that their important values and interests, with regard to both autonomy and expertise, are being challenged and subverted.

What the doctors and the re-

searchers see as threats to their valued autonomy, of course, are seen by the reformers in medical ethics as necessary changes in effective regulation of powerful professionals, who either will not effectively regulate themselves or who have seized too much power and need the influence that laymen have a right to assert in the name of their own values and interests. Again, it is not surprising that physicians and physician-investigators resist some reduction in the great autonomy which is presently theirs and, in considerable measure, accepted as legitimate by the public. We live in a society where there is a constant tension between the claims for autonomy by powerful professions (and other social groups) and the demands for more effective governmental regulation and/or other forms of regulation by the public vitally affected by the established autonomies. What we see happening in the area of medical ethics happens elsewhere in the society: processes of conflict and resolution between competing claims for autonomy and demands for regulation. What is needed, of course, in medical ethics as elsewhere, is less fruitless conflict and more rational accommodation and resolution. Despite a good deal of persisting indifference, hostility, and resistance from those who oppose changes in medical ethics, on the whole, as the evidence in our several essays shows, rational accomodation prevails and results in the kinds of changes in medical ethics the different parties at interest can live with.

In our society, the two values of equality and expertise are in constant tension in many different areas, not just in medical ethics. Demands for changes in medical ethics come from many sources that seek to redress the balance of inequality that now gives too much authority, some call it "authoritarianism," to the medical profession. The claims of egalitarianism assert themselves in requests for laymen to sit on ethical peer review boards, to allow the individual to decide for himself or herself how to die, to obtain kinds of information that a reasonable, prudent person needs in order to give his or her informed consent to a medical procedure (a complex problem nicely discussed in the essay by Bradford Gray). The claims of medical expertise assert themselves in statements that only the expert can really understand what is going on in medical relationships and medical research. Obviously, this is an overreaching on the part of the experts, just as there is often overreaching on the part of egalitarians; for example, when they reject entirely the medical claim to some technical scientific knowledge and skill. (The laetrile controversy and gynecological self-treatment are cases in point.) Overreaching from either side is not what we need to work out new and effective accommodations between equality and expertise in the area of medical ethics. We need knowledge-based resolutions that will satisfy both laymen and powerful expert professionals that their respective values and interests are being recognized, respected, and maximized so far as is possible in the inevitable and unending tension between the two camps.

SOME SOCIAL COSTS OF CHANGE

Social change never proceeds without some social costs beyond the benefits that also are produced. Such costs occur for all the parties involved. Just now, for example, because changes in medical ethics

are not occurring as rapidly as they would like, many laymen are dissatisfied with medical professionals. There is much "murmuring of the masses," much expression of informal dissatisfaction, in addition to formal protests. On the other side, physicians and physician-investigators complain about the decline in trust and public confidence in their efforts. They view themselves as the benefactors and fiduciaries of the public's interests. They are not only affected in their pocketbooks by medical malpractice suits that inflate their malpractice insurance costs (after all, these can often be passed on to patients and third-party payers; physicians are hardly low-income people), they are morally outraged by attacks on their integrity and moral worth. On the other side, those laymen who enter suits for malpractice are similarly morally outraged, not only by the hurt they have suffered but also by the lack of effective self-regulation in the profession that would provide an arena, other than the civil courts, for airing their grievance.

There are social costs of other kinds. On the one side, many laymen find it hard to act in the more independent way the new medical ethics recognizes as their right; they have been trained to dependence, deferentiality, and submissiveness, and they cannot change. They also find it hard to participate effectively in the new mechanisms of regulation that give some place to laymen. What evidence we have, and it is not much, shows that "community" members on medical affairs boards are still very much dominated by the authoritative professionals who sit with them. On the other side, professionals brought up in the old modes of inequality and expert authority are impatient with, and resentful of, the changes required in their ingrained ways of feeling and behaving. This is what we mean when we say that social change is not easy to come by, that it is hard and slow. On both sides, or often on many sides of a changeful situation, the old ways are hard for people to abandon. Change has its strains and its social costs to all parties.

OUTLOOK FOR THE FUTURE

As the essay by Daniel Callahan on abortion illustrates especially clearly, strong and conflicting moral values surround many of the areas of medical ethics presently in process of change. When this is true, we cannot expect instantaneous or final resolutions of many of the existing tensions and conflicts. Medical ethics will continue to be changing for some time to come. It is clear, of course, that much beneficial change has already occurred; the last 15 years have been a remarkable period in the history of medical ethics. But as the processes of change continue, we hope with less conflict and more rational remedy, we will need all the dispassionate social analysis and objective empirical facts that we can get to help us along. This volume of essays is offered in that spirit, as a contribution to rational remedy for a social problem that will remain with us for some time to come.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 437, May 1978

Human Experimentation and the Convergence of Medical Research and Patient Care

By STANLEY JOEL REISER

ABSTRACT: This essay discusses the growth of experimentation on human subjects in the United States and Great Britain in the twentieth century and focuses on a linkage that developed in medicine between research and patient care. It examines circumstances that helped to forge this linkage: a notion that the uncertainty of outcome common to activities in medical research and practice basically joins the two; a concept of medical education that research training creates analytic skills essential in providing good patient care; government policies which fiscally link medical research to medical education; and the view that patient care and research can be simultaneously and ethically pursued by a given doctor on a given patient.

Stanley Joel Reiser is a founder and the present director of the History of Medicine Program at the Harvard Medical School. A graduate of Columbia University, he earned a medical degree at the Downstate College of Medicine of the State University of New York and both a master's degree in Public Administration and a Ph.D. in the History of Science at Harvard University. He has published articles in journals and books devoted to history, medicine, ethics, and public policy and is the author of Medicine and the Reign of Technology, *coeditor of the anthology* Ethics in Medicine: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Concerns, *and codirector of the Kennedy Interfaculty Program in Medical Ethics at Harvard University. Professor Reiser is also a Clinical Associate in Medicine at the Massachusetts General Hospital.*

MEDICAL research has been transformed during the past several centuries because of a gradual shift in the method used to gain new knowledge—from the observation of reactions to disease produced fortuitously by nature, to the observation of selected reactions to disease induced deliberately by man through experiment. An experiment consists of observations made under specified and controlled circumstances. Experimentation as a research strategy can liberate the scientist from the limits imposed by the natural random distribution of the phenomena he wishes to examine and can help free him from irrelevant events that modify and confuse his study. This essay discusses some of the consequences of the growth of experimental research involving human subjects which has occurred in the United States and Great Britain during the twentieth century. It describes how a basic linkage developed in medicine between research and patient care and examines the dilemmas this linkage created.

FROM CLINIC TO LABORATORY

During the nineteenth century there was a shift of medical research from the clinic to the laboratory, largely made possible by the growing application of knowledge from physics, chemistry, and physiology to medicine and by the development of accurate scientific instruments to analyze and measure biological functions in animals. However, during the early twentieth century the validity of assumptions about human beings based upon studies of animals was increasingly questioned. The gap between man and animal was large when the yardstick of structure was used; when function was the yardstick, the disparity was even greater. Man's upright posture, longevity, unrestricted food supply, and the disharmonies introduced by intensive mental and emotional activity separated him from animals. Animal investigation could not shed light on the subjective aspects of human experience.[1] In addition, although physics, chemistry, and physiology, as independent experimental disciplines, had provided insight into human biology and disease during the nineteenth century, the belief grew in the twentieth century that the subject of primary interest to physicians, disease in human beings, could not be studied adequately in terms appropriate to these sciences. The phenomena of disease were unique, not merely combinations of the forces known in physics, chemistry, or physiology. These disciplines might supply the methods for analyzing a disease event, but the event was something apart from, and more than, the factors which they could detect.

Further, by the start of the twentieth century, new technology permitted human beings to be measured as accurately as animals in the laboratory but without being subjected to hazardous techniques commonly used on animals, such as the internal insertion of electrodes or the withdrawal of large quantities of fluids for analysis. Inventions like the electrocardiograph (1901) and techniques which permitted comprehensive chemical analyses from small quantities of body fluids (circa 1910) allowed physiological moni-

1. Wilfred Trotter, "Observation and Experiment and Their Use in the Medical Sciences," *British Medical Journal*, vol. 2 (1930), pp 129–30, Lord Moynihan, "The Science of Medicine," *Lancet*, vol. 2 (1930), pp. 780–81

toring to be conducted safely on patients. The increasing precision with which human functions could be monitored enhanced the potential of bedside research. Thus, shifting the locus of scientific advance from the laboratory back to the clinic was increasingly possible and most appealing to physicians.

During the early decades of the twentieth century, many statements appear in the medical literature which suggest that to gain the most profound knowledge of human functions, research which used human beings was best, despite its restrictions. "There can be no doubt that one of the chief duties before medicine at present is the exploitation of the method of direct experiment,"[2] wrote the British physician Wilfred Trotter. It was thought possible, for example, to conduct "hominal" research during operations: "The ideal surgeon is not merely one who operates. . . . He possesses a mind to discover and examine all the clinical features of a case with a competence not less than that of a physician and with responsibility far greater, and then acts, when so required, not only as a therapeutic agent, but as one engaged in hominal research."[3] In this view, practice and experimentation were linked. The drug given, or the operation performed, increasingly appeared to provide an occasion to gain new knowledge. "Every item of physical or chemical examination is an experiment made to test the soundness of an idea about the case in hand," wrote Harvard professor of medicine Richard Cabot.[4] "Clearly every single dose of medicine, every act done to influence such occult conditions is an experiment. . . . We all when ill become the prey of experiment. Even the man who does nothing is not exempt. I suppose that there has never been a dose of medicine administered, however much we think to have divined its action, that has not been in some measure an experiment," noted the British clinician James Goodhart.[5]

Since such "experiments," meaning actions undertaken without a certain knowledge of the outcome, were inevitable in clinical practice, the argument continued, clinical experiments should be as controlled as procedures in the physiology laboratory. To the individuals participating in them, such experiments would mean a little sacrifice of time, comfort, and some risk, but their sacrifice would benefit many others. Sir Thomas Lewis, the British cardiologist, declared in 1932 that if he had a patient under his care who developed cardiac pain on exertion, he asked him to do in front of him what the patient habitually did daily: walk a given distance. He thus could determine how far and how fast the patient would have to go in order to feel pain. If the patient was induced to repeat the test under conditions of Lewis's choosing, such as before and after the administration of a drug

2. Trotter, "Observation and Experiment," p. 133.

3. Moynihan, "The Science of Medicine," p. 781. See also Carl Beck, "The Diagnostic Value of the Study of Pathologic Changes in Vivo," *Archives of Diagnosis*, vol. 11 (1919), pp. 173–74; William J. Mayo, "Contributions of the Nineteenth Century to a Living Pathology," *British Medical and Surgical Journal*, vol. 167 (1912), p. 752, C. M Jackson, "The Research Spirit in Medicine," *Lancet*, vol. 45 (1925), pp. 336–38.

4. Richard C Cabot, *Differential Diagnosis* (Philadelphia. W B Saunders, 1911), p 19.

5. James F. Goodhart, "The Passing of Morbid Anatomy," *Lancet*, vol. 2 (1912), p. 1133 See also L. J. Witts, "The Problems of Clinical Research," *British Medical Journal*, vol. 2 (1948), p. 458.

to prevent the pain, this was an experiment. Its findings benefited humanity and the patient.[6]

Lewis called this discipline that combined research and patient care "clinical science." Its practitioners sought by observation to describe disease effects as they occurred naturally in man and then to clarify the phenomena observed through experiment. The body of man, Lewis said, was accessible and indispensible to important scientific inquiries which were impossible to pursue through laboratory experiments. Only on the patient could one study the earliest phases of disturbed function, whose progress led to the end stages of disease, or the action of therapeutic agents on these disturbances. Lewis called on research workers to come to the bedside, to be inspired by direct contact with disease, to do research on patients.[7]

Other scientists echoed this counsel to forsake the laboratory for the bedside: "In the minds of all when this magic word 'research' is spoken there arises at once that other word 'laboratory'. Let it be respectfully pointed out that there can be, and is, such a thing as clinical research, and all that is needed is patients."[8] Another writer declared that each patient coming through the hospital admission desk was "a living question mark, which, theoretically at least, is to be erased before the dismissal blank has been filled out. In regard to each patient, the complex mechanism of the hospital is set in motion in the quest for truth behind the question mark and when that truth has been discovered, a contribution has been made to the sum total of human knowledge."[9] Hospitals were urged to encourage feelings of responsibility among their medical, nursing, and administrative staff to discover the causes of disease. A human life saved was of greater value when the circumstances yielded knowledge through which other lives could be helped. Even hospitals which lacked the resources for direct experimental work could conduct statistical research. They might, for example, statistically evaluate the effectiveness of different therapeutic procedures.

Thus some physicians viewed hospital patients as an experimental population from whom knowledge could be gained, and on whom students could also learn. The sick human being was not a laboratory animal but neither was he to be considered "completely outside the possibilities of sane, carefully controlled, watchfully supervised experimentation, which may bring health to himself and health to countless other beings."[10] To the patient, participating in a well-reasoned experiment might seem a privilege

6. Thomas Lewis, "The Relation of Clinical Medicine to Physiology from the Standpoint of Research," *British Medical Journal*, vol 2 (1932), p 1048

7 Thomas Lewis, "Research in Medicine: Its Position and Needs," *British Medical Journal*, vol. 1 (1930), p. 479, Moynihan, "The Science of Medicine," p. 784, Stanley P. Davidson, "The Evolution of Modern Medicine with Special Reference to Medical Research," *Edinburgh Medical Journal*, vol. 38 (1937), p. 122, Henry Moore, "Research in Clinical Medicine," *Irish Journal of Medical Science*, vol. 1, (1930), pp. 638–40.

8. Jasper Halpenny, "On Clinical and Laboratory Methods of Diagnosis," *Canadian Medical Association Journal*, vol. 14 (1924), p. 673.

9. Alphonse Schwitalla, "The Real Meaning of Research and Why It Should Be Encouraged," *The Modern Hospital*, vol. 32 (1929), p 77. See also George Newman, "The Place of Preliminary Science in the Medical Curriculum," *British Medical Journal*, vol. 2 (1920), p. 9.

10. Schwitalla, "The Real Meaning of Research," pp. 78–79.

that he would not forego, were the matter carefully explained to him.

THE FULL-TIME RESEARCH CLINICIAN

By the 1930s the full-time research clinician, emancipated from the problems of routine practice, was an increasingly familiar figure on the wards of hospitals in Great Britain and the United States.[11] Some doctors feared the influence he might exert. Having little continuing experience or contact with medical practice outside the hospital, interested in the refinements of research, research clinicians were portrayed by critics as having a scientific attitude towards patients and lacking a humanitarian attitude, solicitous of the life and comfort of the patients entrusted to their care. The critics were concerned that if the student were taught by such instructors in the university hospital to perform research upon patients, he might come to view the patient as "only a sort of advanced laboratory animal. Could he then reasonably be expected to disgorge his mind of all these impressions and become an honest servant of his patrons on graduation? Would he not feel justified in trying out his new ideas on them?"[12]

Nevertheless, as the 1930s ended, the professional clinical investigator was established on the medical scene, and research had become an integral part of hospital practice, even though it sometimes harmed a hospital's reputation. For example, when the University of Chicago clinics were opened in 1927, it had been hoped they could be operated completely for nonpaying patients. They were to be cared for but also used routinely in clinical research and teaching. When this goal was not achieved, and paying patients began to be used for these purposes, some staff physicians feared the clinics would develop a reputation for treating paying patients as guinea pigs. To some extent, the reputation of the clinics did suffer on this account, but many of its staff believed this harm was outweighed by the clinics' reputation for good medical care, which was produced by the friendly competition among physicians and among students learning and participating in research.[13]

THE MERGING OF RESEARCH AND PRACTICE

An interesting and new argument which had emerged in the early years of the twentieth century was now gaining a growing number of adherents in medicine and society: that patients in a research and teaching setting received more and better care than patients in hospitals not concerned with these pursuits. This view helped to justify the creation of an increasing number of clinical units established principally to conduct research with patients.[14] Thus

11. Lewis, "Research in Medicine," pp 479–83, W. W. C. Topley, "Medical Education and Medical Research," *Lancet*, vol 1 (1936), p 44, Raymond B. Allen, "Research and Medical Education," *Journal of the Association of American Medical Colleges*, vol 14 (1939), pp 311–16, Alfred E. Cohn, "The Meaning of Medical Research," *Bulletin of the New York Academy of Medicine*, vol 14 (1938), p. 282.

12. J. A. Witherspoon, "Medical Education, Past and Present," *Journal of the American Medical Association*, vol 80 (1923), p. 1194.

13. Emmet Bay, "The Use of Paying Patients in Clinical Research and Teaching," *Journal of the Association of American Medical Colleges*, vol. 21 (1946), pp 257–59.

14. James H. Means, *Ward 4: The Mallinckrodt Research Ward of the Massachusetts General Hospital* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1958), pp 13–14.

the distinctions between practitioner and investigator were becoming blurred. To many physicians the attitude of the investigator seeking to disentangle a problem seemed not to differ from that of the practitioner summoned to see a patient. The two seemed to use the same intellectual approach to problems and to use many of the same sophisticated techniques.[15]

But some incompatibilities were pointed out between patient care and medical research and between the clinical and the investigative mind and temperament; medical research and medical practice, some argued, were separate disciplines, whose workers differed in their objectives and methods. The clinician's task was to recognize the known, to relate his patient's symptoms to an accepted disease category. The task of the research worker was to face the unknown and to advance knowledge.[16] Curative medicine made a single individual the center of consideration; research medicine was collective in outlook, and the patient was a statistic. The doctor who was caring for a sick person sometimes would have to forego exact scientific diagnosis or even the interests of society for his patient's sake. The research worker looked to science and society for reward and would not succeed if concern for a patient totally filled his mind. Thus, while samaritanism was the guiding principle of medical practice, in research it played a lesser role. These were some of the doubts raised about the wisdom of combining patient care and human experimentation in the 1930s.[17]

POST-WAR MEDICAL RESEARCH

Of all the events of World War II, as they affected medical research in the 1940s, none evoked greater moral concern than revelations of the experiments conducted by German physicians on prisoners. Special hospitals, surgical wings, histological laboratories, and other medical arrangements were established at concentration camps, where wholesale experimentation with medical problems like infection, the action of poisons, surgical procedures, and sterilization was carried out on thousands of both healthy and ill people.[18] Later, as the lawyers at the War Crimes Trial at Nuremberg made ready to prosecute the persons involved, basic questions were raised concerning the ethical principles under which experimentation on human subjects was justified both within and outside medicine. The prosecuting lawyers at Nuremberg were troubled by a number of problems. Could any of the German experiments be justified? Were their results valuable? Was it proper to use prisoners in experiments? Was it

15. Abraham Flexner, *Medical Education in the United States and Canada* (Boston: The Merrymount Press, 1910), pp. 7–12, 210–22, "The Need for Co-Ordination," *British Medical Journal*, vol. 1 (1912), pp. 255–57; William Osler, "The Medical Clinic," *British Medical Journal*, vol. 1 (1914), p. 10.

16. Lewis, "Research in Medicine," p. 480; James B. Herrick, "The Practitioner of the Future," *Journal of the American Medical Association*, vol. 103 (1934), p. 883.

17. Lewis, "Research in Medicine," pp. 480–81, Topley, "Medical Education," pp. 43–44, Davidson, "The Evolution of Modern Medicine," pp. 122–24, Trotter, "Observation and Experiment," p. 131.

18. Kenneth Mellanby, "Medical Experiments on Human Beings in Concentration Camps in Nazi Germany," *British Medical Journal*, vol. 1 (1947), pp. 148–50; Andrew Ivy, "Nazi War Crimes of a Medical Nature," *Federation Bulletin*, vol. 33 (1947), pp. 132–46.

legal or ethical to experiment with human beings at all?[19]

During and after the trials, efforts were made to modify the attitudes and practices of physicians in clinical research by drawing attention to the ethical principles under which their work might justifiably be pursued. "It is an absolute rule of clinical research that one should never do to others what one would not do to oneself. Once break this rule and one is on the slippery slope that led so many Nazis to the abyss," wrote one observer.[20] The judges at the trials all agreed "that certain basic principles must be observed in order to satisfy moral, ethical and legal concepts"[21] when performing experiments with human beings. They outlined principles for researchers to follow which ensured the voluntary consent of subjects who had both the legal capacity to consent and the free power of choice. The subject must be fully informed of the nature, duration, and purpose of the experiment in which he is to participate, the means and methods by which the experiment is to be conducted, and the inconveniences and hazards that he might reasonably expect to occur. Experiments with human subjects should be undertaken only when the results are unattainable by other means; they should be based on prior animal experiments and a knowledge of the natural history of the disorder being investigated. The judges insisted the subject be free to withdraw from the experiment at any time, and that the investigator be scientifically qualified and bound to terminate the experiment if it appeared likely to produce unanticipated harm to the subject. These principles were among those that became known as the Nuremberg Code.[22] Many hoped that a formal statement of the rights of human subjects and the duty of the investigator to obtain consent and fully inform his subject of all risks would introduce a new morality into the conduct of clinical research.

During the 1950s, some medical organizations attempted to further define the responsibility of the investigator to his subject in experimental situations. These efforts often took the form of guidelines written by medical associations, which generally declared that under no circumstance could the welfare of the patient be overridden by the urgency of the research. Perhaps the strongest statement issued on human research during the 1950s came from Pope Pius XII: "Science is not the highest value, that to which all other orders of values . . . should be subordinated. . . . The confidential relations between doctor and patient, the personal right of the patient to the life of his body and soul in its psychic and moral integrity are just some of the many values superior to scientific interest."[23]

But the effect of these cautions was diminished in the 1950s by a new wave of excitement about research in the United States. "Never before has clinical research received such a glorified position or as much financial and spiritual support as today. The public demands it, Con-

19. Ivy, "Nazi War Crimes," p. 132.

20. Witts, "The Problems of Clinical Research," p. 458.

21. *Trials of War Criminals Before the Nuernberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10*, vol. 2 (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1949), p. 181.

22. Ibid., pp. 181–82.

23 Henry K. Beecher, "Experimentation in Man," *Journal of the American Medical Association*, vol. 169 (1959), p. 475.

gress has provided for it, medical schools clamor for it, and patients not only tolerate it but sometimes request it," wrote a researcher in 1954.[24] At most university hospitals and medical schools during this decade, research had become the keystone of the medical arch. "It is remarkable how research-minded American doctors now are. I met two physicians who earn their living in private practice but nevertheless find time to run a monkey house, and both are doing excellent basic research," wrote a British physician traveling in the United States.[25] Total expenditure for all medical research in America increased from approximately 18 million dollars in 1941, to 75 million in 1945, to 240 million in 1955, with the federal government transformed from a small contributor in 1941 to funding about half of all expenditures by 1955.[26]

In Great Britain, a similar desire for more medical research was expressed, though the money for it was limited. "A school's reputation now largely depends on the level of research there," wrote a professor of medicine at the University of Edinburgh.[27] In producing what was called a "mass conversion to faith in research,"[28] experience in the Second World War was crucial. Spectacular success was achieved by physical scientists in creating weapons such as radar, the atomic bomb, and the proximity fuse. During the conflict, medical research on the health of soldiers and on the handling of battlefield casualties yielded excellent practical results. This helped create a strong belief in the power of applied science, which continued in the 1950s and was used to gain money for medical research.[29]

Research in medicine was supported at this time not only for its contributions to the accumulation of knowledge, but also for its value in the education of students and practitioners. Research was supposed to provide the student with a capacity for logical thought. It required him to master the art of data collecting and developed the skill to sort results and recognize deficiencies of evidence. Research work was supposed to improve the doctor's judgment of conclusions reached in the studies of others and to make him suspicious of exaggerated claims and enthusiastic prediction. It stimulated curiosity and thereby encouraged attention to unexpected data. It provided lessons in teamwork and fostered a respect for routine. A quality of rational, informed skepticism, what Santayana called the "chastity of the intellect," was declared to be a natural outgrowth of research experience. Such qualities

24. Robert H. Williams, "The Clinical Investigator and His Role in Teaching, Administration, and the Care of the Patient," *Journal of the American Medical Association*, vol 156 (1954), p. 127.

25. A. P Meiklejohn, "The American Scene," *Lancet*, vol. 1 (1952), p. 46. See also Christopher Shaw and A. Paul Webster, "Procedure in Clinical Research," *Military Surgeon*, vol. 107 (1950), p. 92.

26. Williams, "The Clinical Investigator," p. 127; James A. Shannon, "Trends in Medical Research," *Journal of the American Medical Association*, vol. 160 (1956), p. 1030, Keith R. Cannan, "The Cultivation of the Improbable: Being Random Thoughts on Medical Research," *Bulletin of the Medical Library Association*, vol. 42 (1954), p. 407.

27. K. W. Donald, "Research and Clinical Medicine," *Lancet*, vol. 2 (1959), p. 801.

28. Shannon, "Trends in Medical Research," p. 1030.

29. Vannevar Bush, "Science in Medicine and Related Fields," *Medical Annals of the District of Columbia*, vol. 22 (1953), pp. 1–2; Leonard A. Scheele, "Medical Research and Medical Education," *Science*, vol. 114 (1951), p. 518.

would be of great help to the clinician in dealing with patients.[30]

In this 1950s climate of increased social and educational expectations from research and appropriations of large sums of money for it, the human being became an increasingly sought after experimental subject. For example, there was a marked rise in the number of new drugs tested on humans.[31] Frequently appearing in the medical literature was the litany that although prior animal experimentation was absolutely necessary, when possible, ultimately, every innovation intended for man must be tried on man, who "cannot and should not be excluded from the roster of laboratory animals."[32]

Growing Concern With the Ethics

Practitioners were governed by licensing and regulatory bodies, but no similar control existed on researchers.[33] In the 1950s warnings were heard that the zeal for knowledge could lead a scientist, whose technical background might overshadow his sense of clinical responsibility, to disregard the well-being of his research subject. Clinical research was equated by some with lack of trustworthy human concern in dealing with patients. Wrote one professor of medicine who engaged in such research: "Some members of our profession appear to genuinely believe that research is incompatible with efficient, compassionate medicine. Throughout my career, although I have never stopped clinical work, except in wartime, I have been asked: 'Do you actually treat patients?' After some initial irritation I have come to consider such inquiries naive rather than hostile."[34]

The stream of comments concerning the ethical aspects of medical research during the 1940s and 1950s became a river in the 1960s and 1970s. Attention focused particularly on the degree to which consent was given freely and fully understood by those who became subjects of experiments. This concern prompted the publication of guidelines for clinical research by organizations such as the American Medical Association, the Royal College of Physicians of London, the Medical Research Council of Great Britain, the U.S. Public Health Service, and the World Medical Association.[35] Panels of doctors, lawyers, philosophers, and ethicists discussed the moral

30. Victor Johnson, "The Value of Participation in Research as a Component in the Education of Doctors for the Medical, Graduate, and Postgraduate Student," *British Medical Journal*, vol. 2 (1959), pp. 332–33; Alan M Chesney, "Medical Education and Medical Research are Part and Parcel of the Medical Profession," *Maryland Medical Journal*, vol. 1 (1952), p. 370. Other valuable papers on this subject were presented at the 55th Annual Congress on Medical Education and Licensure and are reprinted in the *Journal of the American Medical Associaton*, vol. 170 (1959), pp. 430–49.

31. Stuart M. Sessoms, "Guiding Principles on Medical Research Involving Humans," *Hospitals*, vol 32 (1958), p. 44

32. Irving Ladimer, "Human Experimentation," *New England Journal of Medicine*, vol. 257 (1957), p. 18.

33. Beecher, "Experimentation in Man," p. 471.

34. Donald, "Research and Clinical Medicine," p. 802 See also William B Bean, "A Testament of Duty," *Journal of Laboratory and Clinical Medicine*, vol. 39 (1952), pp. 4–5

35. "Certain Codes, Declarations and Recommendations Concerning Medical Ethics and Human Experimentation," *Annals of Internal Medicine*, vol. 67, supp. 7, (1967), pp 71–77, Frank W. Hartman, "Human Volunteers in Biomedical Research," *Military Medicine*, vol. 130 (1965), pp 674–79, "Ethics of Human Experimentation," *British Medical Journal*, vol 2 (1964), pp. 135–36

problems of human experimentation,[36] and legal regulations proliferated, such as those drafted by the Food and Drug Administration which more strictly regulated the testing of new drugs in man.[37]

The climate of concern was further charged by a number of significant revelations concerning questionably ethical studies conducted by research physicians. Perhaps the most notable and most publicized episode occurred in 1963 at the Brooklyn Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital, where three doctors injected live cancer cells into 22 debilitated and elderly patients, without adequately informing them that live cells were being used or that the procedure was unrelated to their therapy.[38] Influential, too, was the 1966 essay by the Harvard physician Henry Beecher, in which he documented 25 clinical studies that had been conducted since World War II that exhibited clear disregard for human rights.[39] It received widespread commentary in the medical and public media.

This concern with the ethics of clinical investigation and the increasing legal regulation of experimentation with human subjects caused a decline in some types of research. For example, after the Food and Drug Administration regulations were enacted, many doctors withdrew from further participation in drug research, and some drug companies markedly curtailed the testing of new agents.[40] The uncomfortable vulnerability to legal action arising from experimental work hindered clinical research and led government agencies to insure contractors against suit.[41] Strong arguments again were made that the research role was incompatible with the doctor's healing function. Ethicist Paul Ramsey wrote in the *New England Journal of Medicine*:

> In community and research medicine there is a potentially unresolvable conflict between, on the one hand, an ethics of principles that protect physicians and their primary patients from violation and from moral self-violation and, on the other hand, the ethics of medicine's scientific mission in the conquest of all mankind's diseases—i.e., the social requirement upon medicine to do the greatest good for the greatest number of present and future patients altogether.[42]

How was medicine to deal with this conflict?

Some suggested that the person undertaking a research investigation

36. Harry F. Dowling, "The Regulation of Clinical Investigations: Some Historical Comments," *Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy* (1967), pp. 13–15, Paul B. Beeson, et al., "Panel Discussion. Moral Issues in Clinical Research," *Yale Journal of Biology and Medicine*, vol 36 (1964), pp 455–76

37. Robert Hodges, "Regulatory Requirements with Regard to the Use of Investigational New Drugs," *Antimicrobial Agents and Chemotherapy* (1967), pp 16–18.

38. Jay Katz, *Experimentation with Human Beings* (New York. Russell Sage, 1972), pp. 9–65

39 Henry K. Beecher, "Ethics and Clinical Research," *New England Journal of Medicine*, vol. 274 (1966), pp. 1354–60.

40 Austin Smith, "Legal Considerations in Drug Research," *Clinical Pharmacology and Therapeutics*, vol. 4 (1963), p 707, Robert C. Batterman, "The Clinical Investigator and the New FDA Regulations," *Proceedings of the Western Pharmacology Society*, vol 6 (1963), pp 53, 57

41. "Research Indemnification· New VA 'Insurance' Policy Offers Greater Security to Researchers," *Science*, vol. 145 (1964), pp. 798, 848

42. Paul Ramsey, "The Ethics of a Cottage Industry in an Age of Community and Research Medicine," *New England Journal of Medicine*, vol 284 (1971), pp 703–5. See also John Romano, "Requiem or Reveille: The Clinician's Choice," *Journal of Medical Education*, vol 38 (1963), p. 584

should not also be in charge of the patient. "The physician-friend and the physician-experimenter have different attitudes and interests, and when one doctor tries to combine the two parts there is risk—quite a big risk sometimes—that the energy of the experimenter will prevail and that the patient will be deprived of the friend to whom he is absolutely entitled."[43] Others believed consent was the key. The principle of the patient's informed consent to participating in an experiment expressed a mutual enterprise of doctor and patient, a covenant making them "joint adventurers in medical care and progress."[44]

Still others thought the overseeing of research by specially appointed committees of physicians and laymen could safeguard human rights. In 1966 the U.S. Public Health Service required all institutions to which it made grants to establish boards to review investigations involving human beings. This regulation was intended to safeguard the rights and welfare of research subjects, to ascertain whether the methods used to gain their consent were appropriate, and to evaluate the risks and benefits of the experiment. Although these boards, now a ubiquitous feature of medical research, may prevent the start of poorly designed and ethically unjustified experiments, critics point out that no mechanism has been developed to effectively determine whether investigators follow the approved experimental protocol.[45]

In the twentieth century several trends have caused a blurring of the distinctions between medical research and medical practice: an idea that the uncertainty of outcome common to activities in research and practice fundamentally linked the two; a concept of medical education based on the notion that research involves methods of analysis and attitudes of mind essential to good patient care; a government policy that financially tied medical education to medical research; and a belief that the goals of research and patient care could be pursued simultaneously and ethically by the same given physician on his patient.

We must reappraise these ideas and policies if we hope to balance equitably the goal of gaining knowledge through research and that of caring for patients through practice.

43 T F Fox, "The Ethics of Clinical Trials," *Medicolegal Journal*, vol. 28 (1960), p. 135

44. Ramsey, "The Ethics of a Cottage Industry," p 705

45 For an examination of the effectiveness of the human experimentation committee see Bradford H. Gray, *Human Subjects in Medical Experimentation* (New York: Wiley, 1975), pp 243–55.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 437, May 1978

Medical Ethics and the Law

By FRANK P. GRAD

ABSTRACT: Medicine, as a learned profession, has traditionally insisted that the conduct of physicians be governed by its own code of professional ethics. Increased government regulation of the practice of medicine, however, has largely substituted external, governmental regulation for earlier ethical constraints. Government regulations have been imposed both in response to greater risks in the practice of medicine and in consequence of ever greater government funding of health care. Though regulations reflect a contemporary consensus on ethical attitudes, their promulgation has narrowed the exercise of the physician's independent ethical judgment. While the physician is increasingly subject to legal requirements in his practice and in such areas as informed consent, the use of human subjects in clinical research, genetic and biological research, and the management of the dying patient, his ethical sensitivity in complying with such requirements is still essential for the protection of patients.

Frank P. Grad is Professor of Law at Columbia Law School and Director of the Legislative Drafting Research Fund, Columbia University. He received his B.A. degree from Brooklyn College in 1947 and his law degree from Columbia in 1949. He presently teaches courses in Legislation and in Environmental Law at Columbia Law School and courses in Public Health Law at the Columbia School of Public Health. He has participated in drafting public health legislation and has written extensively on public health matters and on aspects of medical practice. In 1975 he served as counsel to the New York State Panel on Medical Malpractice, and in 1977 he completed a study of medical discipline under contract with HEW. His books include Public Health Law Manual *and a three-volume Treatise on Environmental Law.*

IT IS a popular political stance in 1977 to be against government regulation, to echo the old libertarian and laissez faire position that government governs best when it governs least. The position is difficult to support, however, when it is asserted in the face of increasing hazards from widespread uses of dangerous technologies, hazards created by industry, or growing out of the very advances in medicine, biology, and psychology. Whenever the hazards become palpable, the population at risk—which is all of us—looks to the government, seeking the protection of sound government regulation.

INTRODUCTION: ETHICS AND THE LEGAL REGULATION OF MEDICAL PRACTICE

It is a part of our folklore that once we were a free people, with free professionals, physicians, lawyers, and others, carrying on their professions free from burdensome regulations, exercising their best professional and ethical judgments, responsible only to themselves and to their professional peers, in accordance with norms expressed in codes of professional ethics adopted by professional societies in which they were free and voluntary members. The historical facts do not match the folklore. Physicians have been a regulated profession for quite some time.[1] Indeed, the practice of medicine was one of the earliest fields in the United States to be subjected to licensure and to regulatory controls concerning education and training and elements of personal and ethical fitness.[2]

The notion of the self-motivated professional guided by his ethical commitment and concern for the patient generates much good and is likely to be of great significance in the physician's recognition of ethical problems and his sensitivity to them. The law has imposed many new obligations on physicians, but the traditional ethical imperatives will continue to affect as many professional choices as the requirements of law and regulation.

THE GROWING IMPACT OF LAW ON THE SCOPE OF ETHICAL DECISIONMAKING

What, then, is the relationship of law to professional ethics? In the accepted sense, ethical imperatives, including professional ethics, are personal and internal. Law, on the other hand, is external; it imposes certain requirements of conduct from the outside. It seeks not agreement or commitment but compliance. A person guided by ethical constraints need not look to the societal command embodied in law—he merely looks to his own ethical and moral imperatives and makes choices not because they are lawful or required, but because they are right in his own ethical judgment. A physician may obtain a patient's consent, after full explanation, to the performance of a novel and risky surgical procedure because of his ethical belief that a patient, as an autonomous human being, has a right to make

1. Medical licensure in America began in the colonial period in the mid-seventeenth century. For a history of medical licensure, see Robert Derbyshire, *Medical Licensure and Discipline in the United States* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1969), Richard Harrison Shryock, *Medical Licensing in America, 1650–1965* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967).

2. See, for example, *Lambert* v. *Yellowley* 272 U.S 581, 596 (1926); *Dent* v. *West Virginia*, 129 U S. 114, 121–122 (1889)

that decision, or he may merely get the patient's informed consent because the law requires him to do so. While the act of obtaining consent may be the same, the ethical quality of the act will differ, depending on the motivation which brought it about.

In the recent past, legal constraints have narrowed the physician's area for ethical judgment. In the case of informed consent, for instance, once there is a legal requirement, the physician's individual ethical judgment loses some of its significance because, as a law-abiding practitioner, he will obtain informed consent whether or not he has an ethical conviction on the subject. The law not only frees the physician from the need to agonize over ethical choices but also provides legal, if not ethical, exculpation. When the Supreme Court gave sanction to first trimester abortions, it not only freed some physicians from the need to make certain ethical choices, but it also provided exculpation from consequences which would have followed under earlier law in any case when a physician was subsequently found to have made a choice which might have been regarded as both legally and ethically objectionable.[3]

While law and ethical imperatives operate differently, they are rarely antithetical. Legal regulations of medical practice have freed the practitioner from making some ethical choices of his own by incorporating ethical attitudes in the general rule. In promulgating rules of professional practice, the state makes ethical choices—thus, at its best, the law reflects the ethical choices of the society, usually reflecting both a utilitarian bias and accepted societal norms.

This "legalization" of ethical choices seems to be a continuing process. Though government lawyers and legislators have not willfully set out to lord it over American medicine, a number of pressures have combined in the last 30 years, since the end of World War II, to lend impetus to the legal regulation of ethical medical practice. The very development of scientific medicine has stimulated legal regulation. The advances in drug therapy and in surgical and other treatment techniques have required a more rapid pace of clinical experimentation, and the need has grown for greater numbers of human subjects for clinical tryouts. The very promises of modern medicine, the advances in diagnostic techniques and in such dramatic techniques as organ transplants, have led to exaggerated expectations of the capabilities of modern medicine. There is an almost religious faith in the physician's ability to perform miracles, and any failure to cure or adverse outcome is regarded with angry disbelief. Moreover, many of the new techniques involve both greater risks and greater opportunities for cure. Modern scientific medicine places more emphasis on medical specialization, and specialization, together with emphasis on complex, technically sophisticated diagnostic tools, has changed the very direct personal physician-patient relationship that prevailed earlier. Patients' disappointed expectations from modern scientific medicine and the greater distance between the physician and his patient, in turn, have led to a precipitous increase in medical malpractice claims. This

3 *Roe v. Wade*, 410 U S. 113, 93 S.Ct 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973).

increase, in turn, has stimulated legal regulations of medical practice in order to assure that practicing physicians meet technical and ethical standards.[4]

A major factor in the growth of medical regulation in the last ten or twelve years was the enactment in 1965 of the Medicare and Medicaid laws which established government as the largest payer of medical fees. Government spending means government control. When the government disburses public funds, it must see that it gets what it has paid for and that what it has paid for is of adequate quality. Thus, government regulation of cost and quality is an inevitable consequence of government grants.

More pervasive regulation of medical practice has inevitably affected ethical regulations as well. The rapid pace of medical developments and increasing specialization raise the issue of the physician's obligation to his patient to keep up with the new knowledge in the field. The ability to prolong respiratory and circulatory functions raises the issue of the physician's obligation to use extraordinary methods to prolong life, and the issue of when it is ethically and legally permissible to discontinue life support systems. The ability to perform organ transplants or to use artificial organs (such as a hemodialysis machine) raises ethical issues of patient selection for life-prolonging therapies in the face of a scarcity of such medical resources as donor-provided hearts and kidneys or hemodialysis machines. The availability of promising, but not as yet totally accepted, therapies raises issues of informed consent, as does the entire field of clinical experimentation which must ultimately rely on human subjects. Government support for tissue studies—in cancer research and in new genetic research—itself leads to demands for government control to protect the clinical subject and the general public against known and unknown hazards. Such regulations limit not only the professional's freedom of action but also the range of his ethical decisionmaking.

Some Areas for Ethical Decisionmaking

The field of medical practice is vast and ethical issues arise frequently and unpredictably. What follows is not a catalog of ethical issues but merely a selection of recurring situations in which both ethical and legal questions are frequently raised.

The duty to treat. There is the threshold question whether a physician must provide treatment when called upon to do so. The "Principles of Professional Ethics" of the American Medical Association state that a physician "should" render help, and perhaps there is a general ethical obligation, part of our religious tradition, to help those in need.[5] Because a physician has

4. See, for example, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, Office of the Secretary, *Report of the Secretary's Commission on Medical Malpractice* 25 et seq (Washington, D.C.: USGPO, 1973); Committee on Medicine and Law, Association of the Bar of the City of New York, "The Medical Malpractice Insurance Crisis," *The Record* 30 (1975), p. 336.

5. American Medical Association, *Principles of Medical Ethics*, §5: "A physician may chose whom he will serve. In an emergency, however, he should render service to the best of his ability. . . ." For a general discussion of the guidance provided to physicians by the various Codes of Ethics, see R. Hunt and J. Arras, "Ethical Theory in the Medical Context," in *Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine* 1, eds. R. Hunt and J. Arras (1977).

chosen a care-giving vocation, he may accept that ethical imperative. But it is neither an imperative of medical ethics enunciated by the medical profession, nor is it a legal requirement. Both accepted medical ethics and the law give the physician the choice of whether to accept or refuse a patient. Neither medical ethics nor law require him to render medical service—even service to save life—unless he happens to be the physician in charge of a hospital emergency room.[6] A physician has the right to select his own patients and, although there may be a larger ethical obligation to serve, it must realistically yield to considerations of effectiveness—it would hardly serve to compel a psychiatrist to accept a patient for emergency surgery. But the issue extends beyond this obvious example. A surgeon driving to the golf course who observes the scene of a recent accident with many hurt and in danger may drive past, though he is qualified to render excellent emergency help. The ethics of the medical profession do not require him to be a good samaritan and neither does the law.[7] The law does grant him considerable protection if he decides to stop and render aid, but it does not reward him fully.[8] If the emergency treatment leads to a malpractice suit, our good samaritan surgeon will be free from liability for "ordinary" negligence under the circumstances, but he is still liable for the consequences of "gross" negligence. It is fair to add that there are hardly any reported cases in which a physician was held liable for such "gross" negligence at the scene of an accident, and physicians' reluctance to get involved cannot be justified by real fear of a lawsuit. If the physician perceives an obligation (though clearly not a legal one) to render first aid, he need not resist his ethical impulses.

The duty to tell the patient the truth. The question of the physician's obligation to tell the patient the truth may be roughly divided into whether to tell the patient the truth about his condition and whether to tell the truth about the nature of the treatment, particularly with respect to treatment by placebos. The issue of "informed consent" will be treated separately. Here we are concerned with less sharply defined questions. Whether we resort to utilitarian or Kantian ethics, truth-telling is preferred to lying. As a matter of law, there appears to be no express obligation for the physician to tell his patient the truth, though he should not actively mislead him, particularly when issues of informed consent are involved.[9] In the main, the matter is left to the physician's ethical discretion. There is a distinction between statements

6. See N L Chayet, *Legal Implications of Emergency Care* 3 (1969), *Wilmington General Hospital* v. *Manlove*, 174 A.2d 135 (Del. 1961), *O'Neil* v. *Montefiore Hospital*, 11 A D 2d 132, 202 N Y.S.2d 436 (1960).

7. *Hurley* v. *Eddingfield*, 156 Ind 416, 59 N E. 1058 (1901), *Randolph's Administrator* v. *Snyder*, 139 Ky.159, 129 S.W. 562 (1910), cf *Union Pacific Railroad* v. *Cappier*, 66 Kan 649, 72 Pac. 281 (1903), *O'Keefe* v *William J. Barry Co.*, 311 Mass. 517, 42 N.E.2d 267 (1942).

8 See Note, "Good Samaritans and Liability for Medical Malpractice," *Columbia Law Review* 64 (1964), p 1301.

9. See AMA Guidelines for Clinical Investigations, "Opinions and Reports of the Judicial Council," Chicago. AMA III–VII (1969), reprinted in Jay Katz, *Experimentation With Human Beings* (New York· Russell Sage, 1972), p 312, FDA, "Consent for Investigation of New Drugs on Humans," 21 C F.R. § 312.1 (1977) See also *Watson* v *Clutts*, 262 N.C 153, 1365 S.E 2d 617 (1964), *Putensen* v *Clay Adam Inc.*, 12 Cal App.3d 1062, 91 Cal.Rptr 319 (1970)

of fact relating to the nature of the patient's illness and statements as to the physician's prognosis. Since prediction of results in medicine is risky, most physicians will attempt to state diagnoses and prognoses in general terms.[10] If the patient is regarded as an autonomous person, rather than an object, as much candor ought to prevail in the physician-patient relationship as the patient's physical and mental state permits. How much to tell then becomes in part a matter of substantive professional judgment.

The question of truth telling related to therapy is perhaps even more difficult. There is no legal restraint on the physician in prescribing therapies he knows to have no direct physical effect. Yet the placebo effect—the improvement of the patient's condition caused by his belief that something is being done for him—is a well-known medical phenomenon.[11] The use of placebos, which involves lying to the patient, telling him he is getting effective medication when he is getting sugar pills, is justified by many physicians and ethicists on utilitarian grounds. It is said to benefit the patient without doing any harm to anyone, and it avoids unnecessary reliance on stronger medication. Often a placebo is "effective" medication, perhaps even the most effective under the circumstances. While the use of placebos may be considered a minor form of deception even by highly ethical physicians, and while the use of placebos for control groups in clinical tests is probably essential, some nagging ethical questions (with legal implications) remain.[12] Do placebos undermine trust and candor between physician and patient? If the patient discovers the deception, they clearly will. Will small deceptions grow into larger ones, and will the regular use of placebos end up in blunting the ethical consciousness of the professional? What about repeated charges to third-party payers for office visits to prescribe placebos? Finally, does the routine use of placebos undermine and compromise the concept of informed consent, which incorporates, more than any other legal requirement, the ethical concept of the autonomy of the person, an autonomy which he should not lose by becoming a patient.

Ethics and law relating to clinical experimentation. The need for more clinical experimentation to advance the science of medicine has been noted. With the increase in the use of human subjects has come greater concern for the safety of the subject and for assurances that the subject has fully consented

10 *Crawford v. Duncan*, 61 Cal App. 645, 215 P 573 (1923), *Marty v Somes*, 35 Cal App. 182, 169 P 411 (1917), *Vankooser v. Berghoff*, 241 N.Y Supp. 529 (1st Dept 1930), *Brooks v Herd*, 144 Wash 173, 127 P. 238 (1927)

11 The remarkable results of clinical studies testing the effectiveness of placebo treatment are described in F J. Evans, "The Power of a Sugar Pill," *Psychology Today* (April 1974), reprinted in *Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine* 1, eds Hunt and Arras p 271, H. Beecher, "Surgery as a Placebo," *Journal of the American Medical Association* 176 (1961), p 1102, reprinted in Katz, *Experimentation With Human Beings*, p 686, S. Wolf, "The Pharmacology of Placebos," *Pharmacological Reviews* 11 (1959), p. 689, reprinted in Katz, *Experimentation With Human Beings*, p 685.

12 See S Bok, "The Ethics of Giving Placebos," *Scientific American* (November 1974), reprinted in *Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine* 1, eds. Hunt and Arras, p. 278, L Lasagna, "Drug Evaluation Problems in Academic and Other Contexts," *Annals of the New York Academy of Science* 169 (1970), p 500.

to the experimental procedure. These concerns grew following disclosures at the Nuremberg trials of the horrors of so-called scientific experimentation by Nazi physicians on inmates of concentration camps.[13] These disclosures caused the adoption of international medical codes to govern the ethical conduct of clinical trials which became the foundation of American law on the subject.[14]

The basic ethical and legal guidelines are simple and find easy acceptance in principle.[15] The experiment must be scientific, not a random game of trial and error. It must be based on a sound protocol with the area of inquiry, the hypothesis and the nature of the clinical tryout so well defined that the need for using human subjects is demonstrated. Normally, this means that earlier scientific investigation, including tryouts on animals, has preceded clinical research on human subjects. The clinical experiment must reduce risks to human subjects as far as possible. If some risks to life and health cannot be avoided, human subjects may only be used if the reasonable expectation of the benefits to the patient, or to science and humanity, outweighs the irreducible risks. Every possible precaution must be taken to protect and save the human subject in the event of adverse consequences, and the subject must be free to withdraw from participation at any time. Over and beyond all of these requirements is the primary requirement that no human being shall be a subject of clinical experimentation unless he has fully consented, after he has been told exactly what procedures he will be subjected to, and what the anticipated consequences and risks of the procedure are.[16] The common legal requirement of informed consent is tautological, because both in law and ethics "consent" that is not "informed" is not consent at all. The legal requirement reflects the ethical judgment that a person must not be treated as an object.

The trouble with the ethical concept of the protection of personal autonomy has been that it has necessarily limited the freedom of investigators to perform, without outside

13 For an account of past abuses in human experimentation, see Katz, *Experimentation With Human Beings*, pp 1283–1321

14 The Nuremburg and Helsinki Codes are reprinted in I Ladimer, "New Dimensions in Legal and Ethical Concepts for Human Research," *Annals of the New York Academy of Science* 169 (1970), pp 230, 590–93. See generally, "Who Shall Decide When Doctors Disagree? A Review of the Legal Development of Informed Consent and the Implications of Proposed Lay Review of Human Experimentation," *Case Western Reserve Law Review* 25 (1975), p 472

15 See generally I Ladimer and R. Newman, *Clinical Investigation in Medicine, Legal, Ethical and Moral Aspects* Boston. Boston University Press, 1963, Ladimer, "New Dimensions in Legal and Ethical Concepts," pp 293–593, P. Freund, "Legal Frameworks for Human Experimentation," *Daedalus* 98 (1968), p 320, H. Jonas, "Philosophical Reflections on Human Experimentation," *Daedalus* 98 (1968), p. 231, R. D Mulford, "Experimentation on Human Beings," *Stanford Law Review* 20 (1967), p. 99, L. Lasagna, "Some Ethical Problems in Clinical Investigation," in *Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine* 1, eds. Hunt and Arras, p. 305, "Symposium. Medical Experimentation on Human Subjects," *Case Western Reserve Law Review* 25 (1975), pp 431–648.

16 See Food and Drug Regulations, 21 C.F R § 312 1 et seq. (1977); *Halushka* v. *University of Saskatchewan*, 52 W W.R 608 (Sask 1965), *Mitchell* v. *Robinson*, 334 S.W. 2d 11 (Mo 1960). See generally B. D. Hirsch, "The Medicolegal Framework for Clinical Research in Medicine," *Annals of the New York Academy of Science* 169 (1970), p 308, Mulford, "Experimentation on Human Beings"

interference, what often seemed to them important scientific investigations. While the great majority of medical researchers have always protected the safety and the autonomy of their experimental subject, a significant minority has shown a willingness to take undue risks and to operate with little attention to the informed consent of subjects.[17] In consequence, clinical experimentation, a field which had been free of legislative and regulatory controls, subject only to the self-control of the physician, in the sixties and seventies became increasingly the object of regulation, first in the field of new drug trials under Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act, and more recently in the field of clinical trials generally, under HEW regulation.[18] Disclosures relating to the Tuskegee Syphilis Experiment, and other disclosures in the works of such physicians as Beecher,[19] created a demand for the promulgation of laws and regulations designed to protect clinical subjects. Such regulations invariably limit the freedom of researchers. The regulations requiring review of clinical experiments by institutional review boards and providing special protection for children, persons in the armed forces, prisoners, and other persons in institutions reflect still another development.[20] Since most clinical research is conducted under government research contracts or grants, inevitably the expenditure of public funds brings with it increased regulation of the manner in which these funds are spent.

Much of the legal concern with informed consent has been addressed to the protection of persons who are not themselves capable of giving informed consent. Minors, or mentally ill or incompetent persons cannot give legally effective consent on their own; they lack the legal capacity to consent because the law assumes that they are incapable of appreciating the risks to which they are asked to consent.[21] Proxy consent by parents or guardians is not merely a question of finding a legally plausible form of consent but goes to the heart of the ethical issue of personal integrity. The ethical question whether any person should have the power to put someone else at risk has been answered in a variety of ways. Paul Ramsey would not allow any child or mentally ill person to be a subject of clinical experimentation unless the experimentation is

17 Bernard Barber et al., *Research on Human Subjects* (New York, Russell Sage, 1973), pp 34–35. Some 23 percent of researchers saw nothing wrong with doing a fairly risky clinical experiment without obtaining consent

18. See Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355, National Research Act, 42 U.S.C § 2891–2 (1974), 21 C F.R § 312.1 et seq., 45 C.F.R § 46.101 et seq (1976).

19 See H Beecher, "Experiment in Man," *Journal of the American Medical Association* 19 (1965), p 461, see Notes 13 and 18, supra. The statutes and regulations are discussed in G. P. Smith, "Manipulating the Genetic Code, Jurisprudential Conundrums," *Georgetown Law Journal* 64 (1976), pp. 697, 720–24.

20. Minn. Stat. Ann. § 145, 421–22 (Supp 1974); N.Y.Pub.Health L. § 2441–2444 (McKinney Supp 1977), U S. Health, Education and Welfare, Protection for Human Subjects, 45 C.F.R. § 46.201–2.1 (1977); Department of the Army, "Use of Volunteers as Subjects of Research," Army Regulation No 70-25 (1962), reprinted in Katz *Experimentation With Human Beings*, p. 1031.

21. *Bonner* v. *Moran*, 126 F.2d 121 (D.C Cir 1941), *Zoski* v. *Gaines*, 271 Mich 1, 266 N.W. 99 (1939), *Darrah* v *Kite*, 301 N Y S.2d 286 (App. Div. 1969), *Moss* v. *Rishworth*, 22 S.W.225 (Tex Comm. App. 1920), see generally, Mulford, "*Experimentation on Human Beings*", M. F. Ratnoff and J. C Smith, "Human Lab Animals, Martyrs for Medicine." *Fordham Law Review* 36 (1968), p. 673.

designed to treat a condition from which the subject himself is suffering.[22] This position—aside from its basis in a very strict view of human integrity and autonomy—is supported by past evidence of the rather limited protection parental or guardian consent has given such subjects. Physicians have been willing to expose minors and incompetents to substantial risks, and parents and guardians have consented to greater experimental risks for their children and wards than these subjects themselves would have consented to had they not been under a legal disability.[23] The present trend of the law is to require not only parental or guardian consent but also a special protective review of the experiment and of the consent by courts or designated agencies.[24]

Other subjects, though not under a legal disability, may be in situations where their consent may easily be coerced or obtained by undue influence. Persons in prisons or in the armed services are susceptible to promises of reward for consent or threats of harsh treatment for refusal, which may improperly induce them to become experimental subjects.[25] The consent of subjects under some restraint must therefore be carefully scrutinized, and ethical consideration ought to persuade the conscientous professional researcher to take special precautions. Because in the past persons under restraint were often abused and their rights disregarded, the law now requires special protective reviews of consent in such situations.[26] The problem is important to medical research because persons in the armed services and in prisons and other institutions are desirable subjects: they live in groups, in controlled environments, and by reason of the personal restraint upon them, they may be followed for extended periods of time. As has been noted, informed consent involves the right of the subject to withdraw from the experiment at any time, but persons under restraint are less likely to withdraw and get lost from experimental groups.

A more general ethical and legal issue cuts across the entire field of clinical experimentation. Is it permissible to subject any person to the risks of clinical experimentation that is unrelated to a condition from which he is suffering? Nontherapeutic clinical research, that is, making a well person, or a person suffering from an unrelated disease, the subject of clinical experimentation "uses" that person. The per-

22. P Ramsey, "Research Involving Children or Incompetents," in *The Patient as a Person*, ed P Ramsey (New York. Plenum, 1970), reprinted in *Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine* 1, eds. Hunt and Arras, p 297.

23. H. Beecher, "Ethics and Clinical Research," *New England Journal of Medicine* 274 (1966), pp. 1354, 1356–58.

24. See note 20 supra

25. J. D. Arnold et al., "A Study of One Prison Population and Its Response to Medical Research," *Annals of the New York Academy of Science* 169 (1970), p. 463, S. Smodish, "Recent Legislation Prohibiting the Use of Prison Inmates as Subjects in Medical Research," *New England Journal of Law* 1 (1974), p. 220; C. Cooper, "Medical Experiments on Prisoners," *New England Journal of Law* 2 (1976), p 261. See *MacKay* v. *Procunier*, 471 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973), *Runnels* v. *Rosendale*, 499 F 2d 733 (9th Cir. 1974), *Knecht* v. *Richardson*, 379 F.Supp. 388 (W.D. Mo. 1974)

26. See Ore. Rev. Stat. § 421.085 (1973), Cal. Penal Code § 2670 5 (Supp. 1977), Okla Stat. Ann. § 47.1–47.5 (1973); 21 C.F.R. § 310, 312, 314 (1974). See *Clonce* v. *Richardson*, 379 F.Supp. 338 (W.D. Mo 1974) (transfer to behavior modification requires a hearing). See Smodish, "Recent Legislation Prohibiting Use of Prison Inmates," p. 223.

son then is no longer an end but a means to accomplish an end. Ethicists with strong views on personal autonomy and the inviolability of personal integrity hold that it is always wrong to use persons as means, that to do so deprives them of their very humanity. Ethicists with more utilitarian or situational convictions take a less absolute view, one which is shared by present law.[27] To limit clinical experimentation to therapeutic research would severely limit the progress of medical science. Such a limitation would probably interfere with all research, because well persons or persons not suffering from the condition under investigation are needed as clinical controls. Law and regulations have not drawn the distinction between therapeutic and nontherapeutic research but allow well persons to subject themselves to clinical experimentation, whether for compensation or for the good of society, as long as the usual requirements of informed consent are met and as long as there is a sound balance of risks and benefits.[28] When compensation is provided, it must be scrutinized in order to assure that the promise of reward has not unduly influenced the subject to expose himself to substantial risks.[29]

The increasingly more pervasive regulation of clinical experimentation is the best example of legal intervention to take up the slack in ethical initiative and self-regulation. But though the law now compels what should have been freely rendered out of ethical concerns and compassion, it by no means eliminates the exercise of the physician's ethical judgment. There are not enough policemen to enforce the law everywhere and at all times. The physician's obedience to his own ethnical dictates will continue to be a significant safeguard. Bernard Barber et al. have drawn the profile of the middle-aged researcher scrambling for a breakthrough in his research.[30] He is willing to expose his clinical subjects to undue risks and pays scant attention to the niceties of informed consent. There is, however, another, compassionate physician who complies fully and unstintingly with the law and his own ethical dictates, not only in his research design, but also in making the rather considerable effort to assure that the consent of the subject is truly "informed."[31] It is not easy to explain medical procedures to untutored laymen, some of simple intelligence and not articulate enough to ask the right questions. But a conscientious effort requires just that. If substantial numbers of physicians and medical researchers fail to live up to these high standards, the profession will not be in any position to complain about increasingly burdensome legal regulations which are sure to follow.

Surgery and other therapeutic

27. Current H.E.W. regulations make no distinction between therapeutic and nontherapeutic experimentation on adults. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 et seq. (1976).

28. 45 C.F.R. § 46.101 et seq. (1976), 21 C.F.R. § 312.1 (1976). See *Hyman v. Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital*, 42 Misc.2d 427, 248 N.Y.S.2d 245 (Sup. Ct.), *rev'd* 21 App.Div. 2d 945, 251 N.Y.S.2d 818 (2d Dept. 1964), *rev'd* 15 N.Y.2d 317, 206 N.E.2d 338, 258 N.Y.S.2d 397 (1965), E. Langer, "Human Experimentation: New York Verdict Affirms Patient's Rights," *Science* 151 (1966), p. 663.

29. B. Adams and M. Shea-Stonum, "Toward a Theory of Control of Medical Experimentation with Human Subjects. The Role of Compensation," *Case Western Reserve Law Review* 25 (1975), p. 604.

30. Barber et al., *Research on Human Subjects*, p. 81.

31. J. Lally and B. Barber, "'The Compassionate Physician': Frequency and Social Determinants of Physician-Investigator Concern for Human Subjects," *Social Forces* 53 (1974), p. 289.

procedures requiring informed consent. A patient who sees the physician with an ordinary ailment that requires medication or routine office treatment is presumed to have consented to the physician's ministrations. He is there, he has offered himself for treatment, and he clearly consents to such "touching" by the physician as is necessary to diagnose or treat him. If either an invasive technique, such as surgery exceeding a minor procedure, is necessary, or if the physician proposes to use a therapy not as yet fully accepted, he had better make sure that the patient understands what he proposes to do to him, namely, that the patient give him "informed consent." In the absence of such consent, the physician undertaking to operate on the patient is liable for a "battery," which is the legal term to describe any unlicensed touching.[32] If the procedure results in an adverse outcome, failure to gain informed consent may also be treated as evidence of negligence.[33] In ethical terms, as well as under law, the issue is one of protecting the person's right to make decisions affecting his or her own body.

A person who is competent has a right to consent to surgery, or to refuse surgery, even if he is advised that the procedure is necessary to preserve life.[34] The ethical preference for truth-telling may yield to other considerations, at least in the ethical view of situationalists,[35] and this view is shared by the law as well. When a person is at death's door and surgery offers a last, desperate possibility of saving him, less information to the patient will be required to obtain his informed consent than in other situations because the law recognizes that a full disclosure of the critical situation may harm the patient and may adversely affect the outcome.[36] Normally, in such a situation, the consent of a close member of the family will be sought. So, too, when the patient is unconscious following an accident, the physician may proceed without consent, particularly if an effort to obtain consent from close relatives would cause impermissible delay. The law presumes that the victim would consent if he could.[37]

A recurring ethical and legal question is that of the right of the patient to refuse consent to life-preserving surgery or other procedures on religious or other grounds. Adults have a right to make such a choice.[38] The state has a duty to protect

32 *Fiske* v. *Stone*, 8 Ariz.App. 585, 448 P.2d 429 (1968), *Mohr* v. *Williams*, 95 Minn 261, 104 N W. 12 (1905), *Schloendorff* v *Society of the New York Hospital*, 211 N.Y. 125, 105 N.E 92 (1914).

33. See, for example, *Wilson* v. *Scott*, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967), *Nathanson* v. *Kline*, 186 Kan. 393, 350 P.2d 1093 (1960); W. Prosser, *Torts*, 4th ed. (St. Paul, Minn . West Publishing Co., 1971), p. 104

34. In re Yetter, 62 Pa.D. & C.2d 619 (C.P Northampton County, 1973), *Erickson* v. *Dilgard*, 714 Misc.2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup. Ct. 1962), N. L Cantor, "A Patient's Decision to Decline Life Saving Medical Treatment: Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life," *Rutgers Law Review* 26 (1973), p. 228.

35. J. Fletcher, *Situation Ethics—The New Morality* (Philadelphia, Pa . Westminster Press, 1966), pp 55, 65–67

36. *Patrick* v. *Sedwick*, 391 P.2d 453 (Alaska 1964), *DiFillipo* v. *Preston*, 53 Del. 539, 173 A.2d 333 (Sup.Ct. 1961), *Watson* v *Clutts*, 262 N.C. 153, 136 S.E.2d 617 (1964); *Wilson* v. *Scott*, 412 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. 1967), *Aiken* v. *Clary*, 396 S W.2d 688, 674 (Mo. 1965)

37. *Banett* v *Bachrach*, 34 A.2d 626 (Mun. App. D.C 1943), *Luka* v. *Lowrie*, 171 Mich. 122, 136 N.W. 1106 (1912); *Kennedy* v. *Parrott*, 243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956).

38. In re Saikewicz (Hampshire Co P. Ct.) aff'd sub nom., *Jones* v. *Saikewicz* No. 76–711, Mass. (1976), Petition of Nemser, 51 Misc.2d 616, 273 N.Y.S.2d 324 (Supp. Ct. 1966); *Erickson* v. *Dilgard*, 44 Misc.2d 27, 252 N.Y.S.2d 705 (Sup Ct. 1962).

children, however.[39] The state may insist that a child be given a life-preserving blood transfusion in situations where the parents, as Jehovah's Witnesses, would refuse to allow the child to be transfused.[40] Similarly, a parent's refusal to consent to an operation to save his child's life, based on the belief of Christian Science, could be treated as child neglect, and the state can obtain custody of the child and may authorize the operation to be performed.[41] In every one of these instances, the physician has the law on his side to help him do what needs to be done.[42] The physician's ethical obligation is nonetheless real. It is an obligation of caring—to see to it that the appropriate steps are taken to allow proper medical procedures to be used. The judicial and administrative machinery of the state will not function to protect children unless someone, usually a committed physician, initiates and sets in motion legal action. A proper petition to a court must be made to overcome parental objections and to arrange for the objecting parent to be relieved of custody for as long as necessary to treat the child.[43] In the absence of such legal steps, which the physician is not under any legal obligation to take, a child may die.

When an adult refuses to consent to a life-saving procedure, the physician's professional obligation and the patient's personal autonomy create an ethical conflict. If persuasion fails to overcome the patient's religious scruples, he has a moral and legal right to die by observing the dictates of his religion, rather than to live by disobeying them.[44] Although one or two courts have held to the contrary on extraneous and unpersuasive grounds, the law respects personal autonomy and allows the patient's wish to prevail.[45] When objections to treatment are not based on religious grounds, the problem is only superficially different. A person who has undergone several operations for cancer, for instance, may decide that he has had enough and may refuse to consent to yet another. It is an obvious subterfuge to suggest that a patient who

39. See *Prince v Commonwealth of Massachusetts*, 321 U.S. 158, 166, 64 S Ct. 438, 442, 88 L Ed 645 (1964)

40 *People v Labrenz*, 411 Ill 618, 104 N E 2d 769 (Sup Ct), *cert denied* 344 U.S 824, 73 S Ct 24, 97 L Ed 642 (1952), *Hoener v Bertinato*, 67 N J Super. 517, 171 A.2d 140 (1961), *Fitkin Memorial Hospital v. Anderson*, 12 N.J. 421, 201 A.2d 537, *cert denied* 84 S Ct 1894 (1964), *Morrison v. State*, 252 S W.2d 97 (K C Ct App. 1952).

41 *Prince v. Commonwealth*, note 39 supra, Matter of Vasko, 238 App.Div. 128, 263 N Y S. 552 (1933), Matter of Rotkowitz, 175 Misc. 948, 25 N Y S. 624 (1941), *Mitchell v. Davis*, 205 S.W 2d 812 (Tex. 1947), see D. L Sharpe and R F. Hargest, "Lifesaving Treatments for Unwilling Patients," *Fordham Law Review* 36 (1968), p. 695

42 Ill. Ann Stat. ch. 37 § 702–4(1)(*a*) (Smith-Hurd, 1972), N Y Social Services Law § 371 (4–2) A (McKinney Supp 1975) See notes 40–41 supra and Cantor, "A Patient's Decision "

43 For examples, see cases cited in note 41 supra.

44 See In re Yetter, 62 Pa.D & C.2d 619 (C.P. Northampton Cty 1973) (woman's refusal to submit to surgery for breast cancer sustained by the court), see also Petition of Nemser note 38 supra, *Erickson v Dilgard*, note 34 supra See generally, A M Capron, "Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment," *University of Pennsylvania Law Review* 123 (1975), p. 340, Cantor, "A Patient's Decision." Cf. R M Byrn, "Compulsory Lifesaving Treatment for the Competent Adult," *Fordham Law Review* 44 (1975), p. 1.

45. See Application of the President and Director of Georgetown College, 331 F 2d 1000 (D C. Cir.) *cert denied* 377 U S 978 (1964), *John F Kennedy Hospital v. Heston*, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1970). Cf. In Re Brooks Estate, 32 Ill.2d 361, 205 N.E.2d 435 (1965).

refuses consent in such a situation is not of sound mind, that he is incompetent to make the decision and that someone else ought to make it for him. The present legal position, which is probably sound, is that a refusal to consent to life-saving or life-prolonging surgery is not, by itself, sufficient proof of mental incompetence.[46]

Decisions to consent to or refuse surgery ought to be viewed, too, in the light of evidence that there is too much unnecessary surgery, that much "elective" surgery is for the benefit of the surgeon, not the patient. It has been said that in Western countries the frequency of surgery varies proportionately, not with the size of the patient population, but with the number of surgeons; the more surgeons, the more surgery.[47] The ethical issue is not very complex. Starting with the Hippocratic Oath, it has always been the physician's obligation to favor the patient over his own pocketbook. The evidence that some few physicians favor the latter has been largely responsible for legislative proposals and for third-party payer requirements that second opinions be obtained to verify the need for surgery.[48] So, too, Professional Standard Review Organizations (PSROs) and other review mechanisms, including hospital tissue committees and utilization review procedures under Medicaid and Medicare, are designed to reduce the amount of unnecessary surgery.[49] The legal problem is more difficult to resolve than the ethical one, because there is little agreement on what constitutes "elective" and "unnecessary" surgery. Particularly for operations that are not necessary to preserve life, there may be substantial cultural and social differences regarding the degree of discomfort and the kinds of cosmetic conditions and functional disorders that may be acceptable without surgical correction at a given time and place.

The unnecessary surgery problem has been aggravated in the seventies by the assertion that much of it is gender-connected, in that male surgeons are said to be too ready to interfere with female sexual and endocrine functions by removing ovaries and uteruses when no compelling reason for their surgical removal can be shown.[50] The allegation may impose additional ethical burdens on physicians to review certain diagnoses; it does not create legal issues or obligations which are different from those present in other surgical situations: there must be informed consent, and there must be a sound basis for the physician's diagnosis.

Some issues of life and death. Ethicists and lawyers agree that a

46. See *Erickson* v. *Dilgard*, note 38 supra. See generally Sharpe and Hargest, "Lifesaving Treatments", Capron, "Informed Consent," p. 340.

47. U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, "Cost and Quality of Health Care—Unnecessary Surgery," 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., January 1976. *New York Times*, 27 January 1976, p. 1, col. 6.

48. See Report of the Special Advisory Panel on Medical Malpractice, State of New York, January 1976, recommendation no. 5. The Blue Cross has also recommended a second opinion prior to surgery; see *New York Times*, 16 March 1976, p. 1, col. 5, and 16 November 1976, p. 109, col. 3.

49. For materials and testimony on the need for cost and quality controls generally, see U.S. Congress, Senate, Subcommittee on Health, *Hearings on the Implementation of PSRO Legislation*, 93d Cong., 2d sess., 8–9 May 1974, particularly part I. "Unnecessary Surgery," p. 164.

50. See U.S. Congress, House, Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, "Cost and Quality of Health Care"; see also *New York Times*, 6 August 1975, p. 28, col. 7.

physician is not obligated to fight for his patient's life when no hope is left. There is agreement that no physician is obliged to take "extraordinary" or "heroic" measures.[51] There may be disagreement on such medical issues as to whether there is any further chance of extending life and what constitutes heroic or extraordinary measures, as compared with usual or ordinary methods of treatment. There are few guideposts to direct the physician in making the crucial decision that nothing more can be done. and that therefore nothing more need or should be done. Legal precedents are few and likely to involve singular situations, and the physician is left to make a lonely decision based on professional and ethical considerations.

The decision to terminate further treatment as hopeless has been made even more difficult in recent years by technological advances in medicine. With the aid of the respirator, it is now possible to extend respiratory and circulatory functions almost indefinitely, and thus the traditional vital signs of respiration and heartbeat are no longer a clear proof that a person is "alive."[52] It is important to know whether a person is alive or dead for a variety of purposes. If he is dead, nothing more need be done for him, and his family can stop paying hospital bills, a real burden where a hopeless patient has been hospitalized and incurred huge bills for life-prolonging measures. The physician in charge of the case need no longer fear liability for failing to continue treatment. The patient's vital organs, heart, kidneys, corneas, become available for tissue transplants, and the lawyers can start proceedings to probate the will and make other necessary property arrangements which may have been in a state of suspense. All of this awaits the declaration of death, made by the physician in charge and evidenced by a death certificate required by law. If breathing or heartbeat or their cessation no longer provide evidence of life or death, other evidence must be found; the tests for "brain death," developed by an eminent medical committee and now incorporated into the laws of many states, is just such evidence.[53]

The declaration of death based on the cessation of brain function has ethical as well as legal implications It recognizes that a person is a human being only as long as he has a functioning brain, however minimal its function. The brain, as the seat of the human mind, has been granted a more central function as evidence of life than the heart.

51. H Beecher, "Definition of 'Life' and 'Death' for Medical Science and Practice," *Annals of the New York Academy of Science* 169 (1971), p. 471; R Collins, "Limits of Medical Responsibility in Prolonging Life," *Journal of the American Medical Association* 206 (1968), pp. 389, 390–91, reprinted in Katz, *Experimentation With Human Beings*, p. 705, D. J Horan, "Euthanasia, Medical Treatment and the Mongoloid Child," *Baylor Law Review* 27 (1975), p 76.

52. See Beecher, "Definition of 'Life' and 'Death' ", C. A. Friloux, "Death, When Does it Occur?" *Baylor Law Review* 27 (1975), p 10, Note, "The Tell-Tale Heart," *Baylor Law Review* 27 (1976), p. 157, J. D. Arnold et al., "Public Attitudes and the Diagnosis of Death," *Journal of the American Medical Association* 206 (1968), p. 1949, reprinted in Katz, *Experimentation With Human Beings*.

53. See, for example, Md Ann Code Art 43, § 54F (1974), Kan. Stat Ann. § 77–202 (1973) Va. Ann Code § 32–364,3.1 (1974), see Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School, "A Definition of Irreversible Coma," *Journal of the American Medical Association* 205 (1968), p. 339, reprinted in Katz *Experimentation With Human Beings*, p. 1074, also see World Medical Association, "Declaration of Sydney on the Definition of Death," *World Medical Journal* 15 (1968), p. 133.

which can be kept pumping indefinitely. When no brain function is evident, the physician may terminate life-support systems—he may "pull the plug" of the heart-lung machine without fear of being charged with homicide or sued for malpractice.[54]

The image of "pulling the plug" has stirred many comments on euthanasia. Terminating a life support system may terminate life—if there is any life left to terminate. If brain function is gone and the law recognizes brain death, then pulling the plug has neither ethical nor legal significance because the patient is already dead. Questions arise, however, when in the judgment of the physician the patient is alive, but his situation is hopeless, and continuing him on the heart-lung machine serves no useful purpose because under the circumstances it is no longer an extraordinary or heroic treatment. The problem arises from the ethical and implicitly legal distinction between "active" and "passive" euthanasia.[55] Active euthanasia, as has been noted, is an act of homicide. Passive euthanasia consists not of an act, but of the passive absence of treatment no longer considered purposeful in continuing life in any but a purely vegetative sense. If pulling the plug is considered an act, then, in the view of some, it is an act that terminates life, and hence may subject the physician to serious charges. If it is viewed not as an act, but as a mere cessation of supportive treatment which no longer serves any real purpose, then, in the view of some, pulling the plug ceases to be ethically or legally questionable. Neither ethical nor legal issues ought to turn on such verbal magic. Indeed, as a matter of medical practice there rarely is the dramatic moment when the plug is pulled. In practice, patients are gradually "weaned" from the machine, by taking them off the machine for increasingly longer intervals, and putting them back on in between. To characterize turning off the machine either as an act to terminate life or as a mere withholding of useless treatment, serves little purpose. The real issue involves the ethical determinants and the legal requirements for the decision that life support systems ought to be discontinued.[56] In the past, this was the physician's decision alone, aided possibly by the informal advice of a colleague.[57] The

54 The importance of statutory guidelines for physicians is described in A. C. Compton, "Telling the Time of Death by Statute. An Essential and Progressive Trend," *Washington and Lee Law Review* 31 (1974), p. 521. See state statutes, note 53 supra

55. See J. Fletcher, "Voluntary Euthanasia—The New Shape of Death," *Medical Counterpoint* 13 (June, 1970), pp. 17–23, reprinted in Katz, *Experimentation With Human Beings*, p. 716, S. Klagsbrun, "Symposium: Death as an Ethical Issue for the Professions," *Columbia University Seminar Reports* 3 (1975), pp 157–60; J. A. Robertson, "Involuntary Euthanasia of Defective Newborns. A Legal Analysis," *Stanford Law Review* 27 (1975), p. 213.

56 B. Boehnke and S. Bok, *The Dilemmas of Euthanasia* (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Press, 1975), J Fletcher, *Euthanasia* (Boston. Beacon Press, 1960), A A Morris, "Voluntary Euthanasia," *Washington Law Review* 45 (1970), pp 239, 251–55, R. B. Potter, "The Paradoxical Preservation of a Principle," *Villanova Law Review* 13 (1968), p. 784, A. Flew, *Principle of Euthanasia*, (Los Angeles: Nash Publishing, 1969), reprinted in *Ethical Issues in Modern Medicine* 1, eds. Hunt and Arras, p. 225.

57. The California legislature has enacted legislation providing for a "living will." See Calif Health and Safety Code §§ 7185–95. For a general evaluation of this legislation and the concept of the "living will" see Note, "Statutory Recognition of the Right to Die: The California Natural Death Act," *Boston University Law Review* 57 (1977), p. 148, S. Bok, "Personal Directions for Care at the End of Life," *New England Journal of Medicine*

situation just described was precisely that in the Karen Quinlan case.[58] Though Karen Quinlan retained some minimal neurological function, thus negating a finding of brain death, no hope remained that she would ever return to any kind of conscious existence. In the view of some ethicists, life support ought to be continued for as long as life of any kind is possible; otherwise life and death decisions would be based on a judgment that life is worth protecting only when it is of a certain minimal quality. Thus, the preservation of life would depend on a judgment of the physician as to what quality of life makes life worth living. The dramatic Karen Quinlan case—with the family and the physician in charge seeking aid of the court to "allow" the physician to withdraw the life support system—involved the law to a greater extent than it had ever been.[59] The court decided that a medical, not a legal, decision had to be made, but it foisted the legal machinery of consent by a hospital committee and by the family onto the physician's professional and ethical decision. In this instance, the physician, too, had asked to be freed of the burden of facing the ethical burden by himself. The case may be regarded as another example of the law entering into a situation to take up a slack in medical-ethical decisionmaking.

Similar life and death issues arise in the administration of pain-easing drugs to dying patients.[60] Most pain killers also depress and reduce body functions. If a physician increases the dosage of an analgesic when the patient needs more of the drug to achieve the same pain-killing effect, is his act of medicating the patient active euthanasia because he knows that sooner or later the analgesic will hasten the patient's demise? As a practical matter, the law will not interfere with the physician's judgment in this situation, whatever attenuated a view some ethicists may take.

SOME NEWLY EMERGING ISSUES: THE NEW BIOLOGY

Hardly any new medical development occurs without creating new ethical and legal issues. New developments in behavior control, which show that man can be readily manipulated through drugs, conditioning or psychosurgery, raise acute questions relating to human autonomy as well as to man's responsibility and

295 (1976), p 367, L Kutner, "Due Process of Euthanasia, The Living Will, a Proposal," *Indiana Law Journal* 44 (1969), p 539.

58 Matter of Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A 2d 647 (1975).

59. *Thomas* v *Anderson*, 96 Cal.App.2d 371, 215 P.2d 478 (1950)(survivorship case), *Sanger* v *Butter*, 101 S W. 459 (Tex Civ.App. 1907) (early living will case), *People* v. *Lyons*, Cal.Sup.Ct. of Oakland (1974) (what was the cause of death—gunshot or the removal by a physician of the organ for transplant), *Tucker* v *Lower*, Civil No. 2831, Court of Law and Equity, Virginia (1972) (brain death versus other traditional standards for determining death). See generally, N. L. Cantor, "Quinlan, Privacy, and the Handling of Incompetent Dying Patients," *Rutgers Law Review* 30 (1977), p. 243, R. Delgado, "Euthanasia Reconsidered—The Choice of Death as an Aspect of the Right of Privacy," *Arizona Law Review* 17 (1975), p. 474, Note, "The Tragic Choice: Termination of Care of Patients in a Permanent Vegetative State," *New York University Law Review* 51 (1976), p. 285, R. M. Byrn, "Compulsory Lifesaving Treatment for the Competent Adult," *Fordham Law Review* 44 (1975), p. 1.

60. See In re Saikewicz note 38 supra, Klagsbrun note 55 supra; J. Robitscher, "The Right to Die," *Hastings Center Report* 2 (September 1972), G. Williams, *The Sanctity of Life and Criminal Law* (New York. Knopf, 1957), pp. 261–64, Cantor, "A Patient's Decision," p. 259.

culpability for his acts.[61] If abuses and questionable practices become apparent, there is no doubt that stringent legal controls will be devised to govern the entire field, just as controls will be exercised over the development of the field by decisions to fund or withhold funding from certain lines of research.[62]

An area with similar incipient legal controls of ethical decisions is genetics and the new biology. Issues of public protection arising from breakthroughs in recombinant DNA research, with the apparent potential for creating new pathogens and dangerous new life forms, present few moral issues. If there are real hazards to the public health, the matter is no longer one for ethical self-regulation by the medical researcher, but a matter for public controls, however difficult, to assure the safe conduct of investigations.[63]

Other, less hazardous areas of biological research raise persistent questions about the nature of human life and the point at which such life is entitled to ethical and legal protection.[64] The ability of medicine to predict genetic disease or defects through amniocentesis has raised the question of the appropriate scope of genetic counseling because, invariably, genetic counseling raises the alternative of abortion to avoid the tragedy of a genetically defective child. Although most states have laws that authorize genetic screening programs, the scope of genetic counseling remains unsettled.[65]

The increasing probability of success in *in vitro* gestation has raised other problems. Assuming the likelihood of success of growing a baby to full term outside the womb, *in vitro*, questions of responsibility, both legal and ethical, abound.[66] But in the interim, until full *in vitro* gestation is accomplished, religious ethicists and others committed to a view of the inviolability of human life are worried about the right to life of blas-

61. See Katz, *Experimentation With Human Beings*, pp 357–65 for discussion of the design of psychological experiments including the Milgram tests See also L Alexander, "Psychiatry Methods and Processes for Investigation of Drugs," *Annals of the New York Academy of Science* 169 (1971), pp. 293, 344, E A Mearns, "Law and Psychosurgery," *Case Western Reserve Law Review* 25 (1975), pp. 565–603, American Psychological Association, "Ethical Standards of Psychologists," *American Psychologist* 18 (1963), pp. 56–60, reprinted in Katz, *Experimentation With Human Beings*, p 314.

62. "Beyond the Cuckoo's Nest, A Proposal for New Legislation," *Harvard Journal of Legislation* 12 (1975), p. 610, M H. Shapiro, "Legislating the Control of Behavior Control: Autonomy and the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies," *Southern California Law Review* 47 (1974), p. 237; "Medical Experimentation. A Symposium on Behavior Control," *Duquesne Law Review* 13 (1976), p. 673.

63. NIH Guidelines on Recombinant DNA Research, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902 (1976).

64. F. Grad, "Legislative Responses to the New Biology, Limits and Possibilities," *University of California Law Review* 15 (1968), p. 480.

65. Federal legislation permits the use of public funds for voluntary genetic screening and counseling for sickle cell anemia—National Sickle Cell Anemia Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3006–3006.5. A number of states also require screening for the disease, for example, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann ch 76 § 15A (Supp. 1974), N.Y Educ. Law § 904 (McKinney Supp. 1974). There are also a number of state statutes providing for genetic screening for various diseases in the process of obtaining a marriage license, see Calif. Civ. Code §§ 4300, 4302 (1977) and Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 76 § 15(B) (Supp. 1977) and ch 207 § 28(A) (Supp. 1977). See P. Reilly, *Genetics, Law and Social Policy* (Cambridge, Mass.. Harvard University Press, 1977).

66. See F. Grad, "New Beginnings in Life, a Lawyer's Response," in *The New Genetics and the Future of Man*, ed. M. Hamilton (Grand Rapids, Mich.. W. B. Erdmans, 1971), p. 64.

situation just described was precisely that in the Karen Quinlan case.[58] Though Karen Quinlan retained some minimal neurological function, thus negating a finding of brain death, no hope remained that she would ever return to any kind of conscious existence. In the view of some ethicists, life support ought to be continued for as long as life of any kind is possible; otherwise life and death decisions would be based on a judgment that life is worth protecting only when it is of a certain minimal quality. Thus, the preservation of life would depend on a judgment of the physician as to what quality of life makes life worth living. The dramatic Karen Quinlan case—with the family and the physician in charge seeking aid of the court to "allow" the physician to withdraw the life support system—involved the law to a greater extent than it had ever been.[59] The court decided that a medical, not a legal decision had to be made, but it foisted the legal machinery of consent by a hospital committee and by the family onto the physician's professional and ethical decision. In this instance, the physician, too, had asked to be freed of the burden of facing the ethical burden by himself. The case may be regarded as another example of the law entering into a situation to take up a slack in medical-ethical decisionmaking.

Similar life and death issues arise in the administration of pain-easing drugs to dying patients.[60] Most pain killers also depress and reduce body functions. If a physician increases the dosage of an analgesic when the patient needs more of the drug to achieve the same pain-killing effect, is his act of medicating the patient active euthanasia because he knows that sooner or later the analgesic will hasten the patient's demise? As a practical matter, the law will not interfere with the physician's judgment in this situation, whatever attenuated a view some ethicists may take.

SOME NEWLY EMERGING ISSUES: THE NEW BIOLOGY

Hardly any new medical development occurs without creating new ethical and legal issues. New developments in behavior control, which show that man can be readily manipulated through drugs, conditioning or psychosurgery, raise acute questions relating to human autonomy as well as to man's responsibility and

---

295 (1976), p. 367, L. Kutner, "Due Process of Euthanasia, The Living Will, a Proposal," *Indiana Law Journal* 44 (1969), p 539

58. Matter of Quinlan, 70 N J 10, 355 A 2d 647 (1975).

59 *Thomas* v *Anderson*, 96 Cal App 2d 371, 215 P.2d 478 (1950)(survivorship case); *Sanger* v. *Butter*, 101 S.W. 459 (Tex.Civ.App. 1907) (early living will case); *People* v. *Lyons*, Cal.Sup.Ct. of Oakland (1974) (what was the cause of death—gunshot or the removal by a physician of the organ for transplant), *Tucker* v. *Lower*, Civil No. 2831, Court of Law and Equity, Virginia (1972) (brain death versus other traditional standards for determining death). See generally, N. L. Cantor, "Quinlan, Privacy, and the Handling of Incompetent Dying Patients," *Rutgers Law Review* 30 (1977), p. 243; R. Delgado, "Euthanasia Reconsidered—The Choice of Death as an Aspect of the Right of Privacy," *Arizona Law Review* 17 (1975), p. 474; Note, "The Tragic Choice: Termination of Care of Patients in a Permanent Vegetative State," *New York University Law Review* 51 (1976), p. 285, R. M. Byrn, "Compulsory Lifesaving Treatment for the Competent Adult," *Fordham Law Review* 44 (1975), p. 1.

60. See In re Saikewicz note 38 supra, Klagsbrun note 55 supra; J. Robitscher, "The Right to Die," *Hastings Center Report* 2 (September 1972), G. Williams, *The Sanctity of Life and Criminal Law* (New York: Knopf, 1957), pp. 261–64; Cantor, "A Patient's Decision," p. 259.

culpability for his acts.[61] If abuses and questionable practices become apparent, there is no doubt that stringent legal controls will be devised to govern the entire field, just as controls will be exercised over the development of the field by decisions to fund or withhold funding from certain lines of research.[62]

An area with similar incipient legal controls of ethical decisions is genetics and the new biology. Issues of public protection arising from breakthroughs in recombinant DNA research, with the apparent potential for creating new pathogens and dangerous new life forms, present few moral issues. If there are real hazards to the public health, the matter is no longer one for ethical self-regulation by the medical researcher, but a matter for public controls, however difficult, to assure the safe conduct of investigations.[63]

Other, less hazardous areas of biological research raise persistent questions about the nature of human life and the point at which such life is entitled to ethical and legal protection.[64] The ability of medicine to predict genetic disease or defects through amniocentesis has raised the question of the appropriate scope of genetic counseling because, invariably, genetic counseling raises the alternative of abortion to avoid the tragedy of a genetically defective child. Although most states have laws that authorize genetic screening programs, the scope of genetic counseling remains unsettled.[65]

The increasing probability of success in *in vitro* gestation has raised other problems. Assuming the likelihood of success of growing a baby to full term outside the womb, *in vitro*, questions of responsibility, both legal and ethical, abound.[66] But in the interim, until full *in vitro* gestation is accomplished, religious ethicists and others committed to a view of the inviolability of human life are worried about the right to life of blas-

61. See Katz, *Experimentation With Human Beings*, pp. 357–65 for discussion of the design of psychological experiments including the Milgram tests. See also L. Alexander, "Psychiatry. Methods and Processes for Investigation of Drugs," *Annals of the New York Academy of Science* 169 (1971), pp 293, 344, E. A. Mearns, "Law and Psychosurgery," *Case Western Reserve Law Review* 25 (1975), pp. 565–603, American Psychological Association, "Ethical Standards of Psychologists," *American Psychologist* 18 (1963), pp. 56–60, reprinted in Katz, *Experimentation With Human Beings*, p 314

62. "Beyond the Cuckoo's Nest, A Proposal for New Legislation," *Harvard Journal of Legislation* 12 (1975), p. 610, M. H. Shapiro, "Legislating the Control of Behavior Control. Autonomy and the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies," *Southern California Law Review* 47 (1974), p. 237; "Medical Experimentation: A Symposium on Behavior Control," *Duquesne Law Review* 13 (1976), p. 673.

63. NIH Guidelines on Recombinant DNA Research, 41 Fed. Reg. 27,902 (1976).

64. F. Grad, "Legislative Responses to the New Biology, Limits and Possibilities," *University of California Law Review* 15 (1968), p. 480.

65. Federal legislation permits the use of public funds for voluntary genetic screening and counseling for sickle cell anemia—National Sickle Cell Anemia Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 3006–3006.5. A number of states also require screening for the disease, for example, Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 76 § 15A (Supp. 1974), N Y. Educ. Law § 904 (McKinney Supp. 1974). There are also a number of state statutes providing for genetic screening for various diseases in the process of obtaining a marriage license, see Calif. Civ. Code §§ 4300, 4302 (1977) and Mass. Gen. Laws Ann. ch. 76 § 15(B) (Supp. 1977) and ch. 207 § 28(A) (Supp. 1977). See P. Reilly, *Genetics, Law and Social Policy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977).

66. See F. Grad, "New Beginnings in Life, a Lawyer's Response," in *The New Genetics and the Future of Man*, ed. M. Hamilton (Grand Rapids, Mich.: W. B. Erdmans, 1971), p. 64.

tocysts and imperfect fetuses grown in a bottle.[67] Similarly, in tissue research using the products of voluntary abortion, a proposed HEW regulation at one time went so far as to require the consent of the father of the fetus, as well as the mother,[68] a curious requirement if it is recalled that the husband's consent is not required when a married woman seeks an abortion. It is clear that the hidden ethical, if not legal, agenda in many of the issues raised relating to genetic research are not concerned with that subject itself, but with the religious and political issue of recognizing the right of a woman to have an abortion against the alleged "right to life" of the fetus. And yet, these are minor issues when compared to the major issues of the new genetic research relating to gene manipulation for positive eugenics. Who is to determine the genetic composition of future generations, whether to plan for more engineers, musicians or poets, or more athletes and military men—the geneticists, guided only by their own ethical consciences, or the public, in accordance with some legal mechanism.[69] Here, too, will be a need for legally constituted standards and for the exercise of ethical judgments that reflect societal norms.

67. See J Fletcher, "New Beginnings in Life, a Theologian's Response," in *The New Genetics*, ed Hamilton, p. 78

68. H.E.W Proposed Regulations, 38 Fed. Reg 31738, 31742, 46 C.F.R § 46.38 (Proposed 16 November 1973)

69. See W. T Vukowich, "The Dawning of the Brave New World: Legal, Ethical, and Social Issues of Eugenics," *University of Illinois Law Forum* 197 (1971), p 189 and Smith, "Manipulating the Genetic Code," p. 697

ANNALS, AAPSS, 437, May 1978

Complexities of Informed Consent

By BRADFORD H. GRAY

ABSTRACT: Informed consent has emerged as an issue both of great importance and substantial uncertainty and confusion. This paper examines some of the conceptual and practical complexities of informed consent and suggests some implications of our empirical knowledge about consent. Among the issues considered are the purposes of informed consent, ethical versus legal functions of informed consent, the distinction between informed consent and consent forms, and whether informed consent is an ideal that can never be achieved. It is argued that informed consent is presently not a reliable method of protecting subjects and patients from harm because of limited commitment of professionals to the concept of informed consent, the tendency for procedures to be substituted for substance, the dependence of the quality of consent on many factors, including the characteristics of the subjects or patients, and the tendency of human subjects review committees to confine their attention to consent forms rather than to the process by which consent is sought.

Bradford H. Gray, a sociologist who received his Ph.D. from Yale University, taught at the University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill. His book, Human Subjects in Medical Experimentation, *was published in 1975. He served for three years on the staff of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects, where he collaborated with Arnold S. Tannenbaum and Robert A. Cooke of the University of Michigan in a major empirical study of human subjects review committees and the research that they review. He is now a professional associate at the Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences.*

INFORMED consent has assumed vital importance in both the ethics and law of research involving human subjects and, increasingly, of medical practice. Informed consent is also a matter of great uncertainty, both in concept and in application; the titles of articles about informed consent frequently include words like "myth," "fiction," "dilemma," and "illusion." Nothing more profoundly affects modern thinking about the importance of informed consent in research than the Nazi medical experiments. However, more germane to an understanding of the complexities that have developed regarding consent are the emergence of the field of bioethics,[1] with its concerns about ethical theories of informed consent; the increased occurrence of lawsuits in which informed consent is an issue; and the development of rather explicit governmental requirements regarding informed consent in research.

Since informed consent is of concern to individuals and institutions as disparate as ethicists, medical practitioners, researchers and the institutions that conduct research, the law, and governmental agencies that support research, it is hardly surprising that great variations exist in understanding of, and orientation toward, informed consent. Issues range from fundamental philosophical questions regarding human autonomy, to the nature and functions of informed consent, to such practical matters as when consent is "legally effective." That consent raises substantial practical difficulties is understandable when one considers that the three elements of informed consent—the communication of appropriate information, the absence of coercion or undue influence, and a degree of maturity and competence on the part of the subject or patient —involve (a) the behavior of professionals, (b) the structure of the situations in which informed consent is sought, and (c) the characteristics of the subjects or patients.

This paper examines some of the conceptual and practical complexities of consent, and attempts to use some empirical information to clarify our understanding of some of these complexities. Among the issues considered are the purpose of informed consent, whether informed consent requirements should be viewed as protecting patients or research subjects from harm, ethical versus legal functions of informed consent, the distinction between informed consent and consent forms, and whether informed consent is an ideal that can never be achieved.

CONSENT REQUIREMENTS

The requirement that human beings be involved in research only if they have given their informed consent is a key provision of the major codes of ethics for research involving human subjects. (The Nuremberg Code and the code of the World Medical Association are good examples.)[2] Informed consent is a central feature of governmental regulations pertaining to such research and of the mandate (Public Law 93–348) of the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects. In recent appropriations bills for the Department of Health, Education, and

1. Renée C. Fox, "Advanced Medical Technology—Social and Ethical Implications," *Annual Review of Sociology* 2 (1976), pp. 231–68.

2. Many codes of ethics for research involving human subjects are reprinted in an appendix to Henry K. Beecher's book, *Research and the Individual: Human Studies* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1970).

Welfare (DHEW), Congress has included informed consent requirements for research involving human subjects. Human subjects review committees now make consent a major object of their examination of proposed research, with recent data showing that modifications regarding informed consent were required in one-fourth of the proposals approved by these committees.[3] With regard to the practice of medicine, consent requirements have developed through case law rather than through the promulgation of guidelines or regulations. The legal staff of the American Medical Association prepares and disseminates compilations and summaries of court decisions on consent in medical practice, and some state medical societies similarly attempt to provide guidance to their members. Major texts on malpractice now frequently include chapters about informed consent. A final example of the growing prominence of informed consent was the inclusion of written consent requirements by Congress in the legislation establishing the swine flu immunization program.

Responses of the medical profession and the biomedical research community

The development of regulatory requirements and other legal formulae for consent has produced a variety of response from physicians and biomedical researchers.[4] While many physicians and researchers seem comfortable with the idea of informed consent by patients or research subjects, there are nevertheless indications that they often view informed consent with skepticism and even resentment, even though frontal attacks on the concept of informed consent are rare. An extreme example was produced in the mid-1960s by an article in *Science* concerning the New York Board of Regent's disciplinary decision regarding the investigators in the experiments at the Brooklyn Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital in which live cancer cells were injected beneath the skin of unconsenting geriatric patients.[5] In response to the *Science* report, Dr. Preston J. Burnham submitted a "proposed informed-consent form for hernia patient," which was designed to be as frightening as possible, which included among the risks of the surgery that the patient might slip in the hospital bathroom or be run over going to the hospital, and which concluded with the patient having to certify that "I understand the anatomy of the body, the pathology of the development of hernia, the physiology of wound healing, the dietetic chemistry of the foods that I must eat to cause healing, the chemistry of body repair. . ."[6] Dr. Burnham suggested that 1966

3. Bradford H. Gray et al., "Research Involving Human Subjects: An Empirical Report on Human Subject Review Committees" (Paper presented at the Meetings of American Sociological Association, 7 September 1977), pp. 14–17.

4. Although biomedical researchers are the focus of attention here, many of the same points apply to behavioral and social researchers. See Bernard Barber, "Liberalism Stops at the Laboratory Door" (Paper presented at Meetings of the American Sociological Association, August 1975).

5. Extensive materials on the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital case are included in Jay Katz's book, *Experimentation with Human Beings* (New York: Russell Sage, 1972), pp. 9–65.

6. Preston J. Burnham, letter on "medical experimentation on humans," *Science* 152 (22 April 1966), pp. 448, 450. The article that prompted Burnham's response was Elinor Langer, "Human Experimentation: New York Verdict Affirms Patient's Rights," *Science* 151 (11 February 1966), p. 663.

would be marked as the year in which "all medical progress ceased." Although not the sole example of this sort of medical response to the concept of informed consent,[7] this degree of publicly-stated, seemingly willful misunderstanding is unusual. Yet one can still find an academic surgeon wistfully noting that the doctrine of informed consent does not apply to "contractual arrangements in fields other than medicine," where caveat emptor remains the guide.[8]

One source of these reactions to the consent doctrine is that informed consent threatens certain established professional prerogatives and practices. Sociologists who have analyzed the source of professional authority and dominance attribute a key role to the professional's possession of expert knowledge.[9] Disclosure of information would reduce the physician's power vis-a-vis the patient. The theme that the patient is not equipped to make medical decisions is found often in physicians' writings about informed consent, and the feeling that disclosure leads to loss of professional control is quite apparent.

In light of a great deal of the empirical and theoretical work in the past 25 years in medical sociology, medical resistance to the concept of informed consent cannot be surprising. For example, empirical studies of medical education have noted the importance imputed therein to having the physician-in-training learn to assume medical responsibility for patients.[10] As Katz has noted, the traditional exercise of medical responsibility has often been limited to physical aspects of the patient's functioning. Katz argues that "once physical benefits are placed in the web of the patient's total situation, the patient may have to be given a greater role in the decision-making process."[11] But pressure on the professional dominance model of health care is not solely a response to the development of more holistic conceptions of patients' needs. As Barber has observed, the push for more egalitarian models of health care can also be seen as an aspect of more general social movements rooted in the value of equality.[12] The civil rights movement and the women's movement are examples. (It should also be noted, however, that the patient's desire for information about therapies and their possible side effects does not necessarily represent a demand for control over decision-making; information may be sought for its own sake or for its benefits in preparing the patient for the experience.[13] The current effort to require that information on side effects be provided to patients along with certain prescribed medications is also, in part, a reflection of this desire for information.)

7 See, for example, Lester L. Coleman, "Terrified Consent," *Physician's World* (May 1974)

8. Eugene G. Laforet, "The Fiction of Informed Consent," *Journal of the American Medical Association* 235 (12 April 1976), pp. 1579–85.

9. Eliot Friedson, *The Profession of Medicine* (New York. Dodd, Mead, 1970).

10. Howard S Becker et al , *Boys in White Student Culture in Medical School* (Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1961), pp. 224–31.

11. Jay Katz, "The Education of the Physician-Investigator," *Daedalus* 98 (Spring 1969), p. 485.

12. Bernard Barber, "Compassion in Medicine. Toward New Definitions and New Institutions," *New England Journal of Medicine* 295 (21 October 1976), pp. 939–43.

13. Ruth R. Faden, personal communication.

Informed consent as ideal

However, open scorn or ridicule for informed consent is not the most common orientation to informed consent among physicians who have published their reflections about these issues. More usual are expressions of various reservations regarding informed consent. Even the writings of medical spokesmen who attribute considerable importance to informed consent emphasize the difficulty of obtaining informed consent or the impossibility of obtaining "truly" or "fully" informed consent. Only an expert who is doing research in the field can provide such fully informed consent, it is sometimes said. Thus, it is suggested that informed consent should be viewed as an ideal, as a goal worthy of pursuit, even if it cannot ordinarily be fully attained.[14] (An alternative response to the perceived impossibility of attaining genuine informed consent is, as was previously noted, to conclude that seeking informed consent is a pointless ritual.)

Several points should be made about the conception of informed consent as an ideal. First, it calls attention to some unresolved issues regarding the purpose of informed consent Is informed consent itself the goal, or is it means by which more fundamental goals are pursued? If the latter, do these goals pertain to quality of decisions (for instance, rationality) or a quality of relationships (for instance, egalitarian) or an outcome (for instance, patient satisfaction)? Is the goal more readily stated in negative rather than positive terms (for instance, not imposing the will of one on another)? Second, the conception of informed consent as an ideal explicitly recognizes that being informed or being free of pressure is always a matter of degree. To see informed consent as an ideal is to recognize it as something that varies along a continuum of quality, not as an attribute that is either present or absent. Third, the conception of informed consent as an ideal provides little explicit guidance for behavior. It supplies no answer to questions about adequacy of disclosure or sufficiency of freedom from undue influence.

The courts and consent

The conception of informed consent as an unattainable ideal differs distinctly from the binary approach that the courts must take.[15] This contrast in orientation, which is not well recognized or understood, may be a source of confusion and tension between medicine and the law. The court has no reason to recognize the infinite shadings of consent along a continuum of quality; if a person brings suit on grounds of lack of informed consent, the court must decide whether or not informed consent had, in fact, been negotiated.

The threat of such lawsuits, although they follow only a minute percentage of encounters between doctors and patients (or researchers and subjects) has produced a number of responses. All indications are that protection against legal action has more salience for the consent-related behavior of physicians and researchers (and, as will be noted later, human subjects review committees, as well) than do arguments exhorting them to strive for a high,

14 Beecher, *Research and the Individual*, p. 24, Franz J. Ingelfinger, "Informed (But Uneducated) Consent," *New England Journal of Medicine* (31 August 1972), pp. 465–66

15. Michael Yesley and Tom Beauchamp called this distinction to my attention.

unattainable ideal. Informed consent, after all, is not the instrumental purpose that brings doctor and patient, researcher and subject, together. Rather, informed consent is one of many things that must be dealt with in the pursuit of goals to which more tangible rewards are attached. While concern about lawsuits involving informed consent may have heightened doctors' and researchers' awareness about the issue of consent, this awareness tends to focus on following a prescribed set of procedures that are seen as defensible in a court of law. The emphasis is placed on getting a signature on a consent form. Informed consent tends to be treated as if it were a formula, not as if it signified an important basis for action that had been mutually agreed upon by a doctor and patient or by a researcher and subject.

The advice that professional associations have begun to provide to their members in response to growing concern about suits involving informed consent is instructive in revealing this orientation. Little interest can be seen in the conception of a shared decision as the object of the informed consent process. Rather, the advice focuses on helping the physician with the concrete problem of what must be disclosed if one wants to avoid finding oneself on the losing side of a lawsuit over the issue of consent. An example is provided in the California Medical Association's advice to practitioners in the wake of court decisions (for instance, *Canterbury* v. *Spence*; *Cobbs* v. *Grant)* that attempted to define a new, relatively objective standard against which the adequacy of a physician's disclosures to patients could be judged in a lawsuit. The standard articulated was whether the information would have affected the decision of a "prudent person in the patient's position." This standard stands in important contrast to the more traditional standard under which the adequacy of disclosures was judged by reference to usual professional practices. The advice of the CMA noted that under the "prudent person" standard its members could be less concerned with informing patients when treatment is urgent, because under such circumstances the patient would have difficulty convincing a jury that a prudent or rational patient might have been expected to refuse treatment if disclosure of the risk had been made.[16]

The emphasis on process rather than purpose can also be seen in the regulations of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare for research involving human subjects. The regulations require that, except in highly unusual circumstances, consent should be obtained in writing, and they indicate that disclosure of a particular set of six items will make a consent "informed."[17] The regulations, however, provide no basis for making judgments about how detailed or specific the disclosure must be (regarding risk or the

16. These provisions of the CMA's advice to its members are described by Ruth R Faden, "Informed Consent: A Psychosocial Paradigm" (Ph.D diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1976), p. 23

17. This list includes (1) a fair explanation of the procedures to be followed, and their purposes, including identification of any procedures which are experimental; (2) a description of any attendant discomforts and risks reasonably to be expected; (3) a description of any benefits reasonably to be expected, (4) a disclosure of any appropriate alternative procedures that might be advantageous for the subject, (5) an offer to answer any inquiries concerning the procedures, and (6) an instruction that the person is free to withdraw . . . without prejudice. 45 *Code of Federal Regulations*, part 46

purpose of a research procedure, for example) or whether there are circumstances in which elements not on the list should be disclosed. Clearly the listing approach to disclosure has limitations.

The DHEW regulations project the impression that the important thing about informed consent is to obtain a subject's signature on a piece of paper that contains the proper bits of information. Although the main purpose of consent forms is to document the disclosure of the proper information, thereby protecting the investigator and the institution conducting the research, we should not be surprised if the documentation tends to substitute for the substance of consent. The frequency with which researchers use the term "consent form" to mean "informed consent" suggests that a displacement of goals may be taking place. But empirical evidence also exists. My own interview study of women who were participating as subjects in a study of labor-inducing drugs provides a vivid example.[18] Twenty of 51 women who were interviewed after the drug administration had begun did not know that they were participating in a research study, despite the fact that all had signed a consent form approved by an active and conscientious human subjects review committee. The explanation for this involved several factors, including the generally low educational levels of the unaware subjects, the investigator's delegation to subordinates of the task of obtaining consent, seeking consent in the labor room, and providing little oral explanation—"sign this and we can get started". The important point here, however, was that this breakdown in informed consent did not represent a devious effort by researchers to avoid the substance of consent; rather, it resulted from approaching informed consent as if it were nothing more than a set of procedures to be followed.

Further evidence of the extent to which consent forms have come to substitute for the substance of informed consent comes from a study recently completed for the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects. One-fourth of the 2,000 research investigators interviewed at a sample of 61 institutions indicated that their human subjects review committee had required some modification in the consent plans that were originally proposed for their study.[19] Modifications regarding consent occurred more than five times as frequently as any other type of substantive modifications (including changes in subject selection, changes to reduce risk, or changes to protect confidentiality) in proposed research. Despite this evidence of review committees' concern with consent, their efforts were directed almost exclusively at the consent forms, rather than at any aspects of the process by which consent was obtained. Reports of review committees' requiring modifications in the timing of consent, the physical setting in which consent was obtained, or who obtained consent were virtually nonexistant.[20] Despite

18 Bradford H Gray, *Human Subjects in Medical Experimentation. The Conduct and Regulation of Clinical Research* (New York. Wiley-Interscience, 1975).

19 Gray, *et al*, "*Research Involving Human Subjects*," p 14

20. Robert A. Cooke, Arnold S Tannenbaum, and Bradford H Gray, *A Survey of Institutional Review Boards and Research Involving Human Subjects: A Report to the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research* (Springfield, Va.: National Technical Information Service, 1977).

this attention from review committees, consent forms themselves tended to be both difficult to read and incomplete.[21]

ETHICAL VERSUS LEGAL FUNCTIONS OF CONSENT: THE SWINE FLU PROGRAM

No basic conflict exists between ethical and legal grounds for informed consent requirements. The reasoning supporting consent as a matter of ethics is quite similar to the reasoning that supports consent as a legal requirement. Yet, as was suggested above, the methods by which informed consent is sought may be affected in important ways by whether one is trying to attain a high standard of ethical conduct or one is seeking only to avoid legal liability. The federal government's swine flu program of 1976—ill-fated for other reasons—provides a good example of the importance of attending to this set of complexities.

The swine flu legislation included a seemingly simple requirement that a "written informed consent form" be developed and used. It is not clear whether this requirement was included as an acknowledgement of ethical principles regarding the importance of individual autonomy or as a response to the sorts of legal realities regarding liability that had frightened away the private insurance companies, thereby creating the need for the legislation. However, to judge by the methods used to disclose risks to the public and to obtain consent, it would appear that the purpose of the written consent requirements was primarily to help limit the government's liability. Great expense and effort was devoted to the publicity campaign to convince people to be vaccinated, and most people undoubtedly made their decisions, either directly or indirectly (that is, through friends or relatives), on the basis of information transmitted through the mass media. This information was largely confined to the hazards of not being vaccinated and the benefits of being vaccinated. Several known risks of vaccination were, however, included in the consent forms. Of course, these forms were given to people for their signatures only after they had made their decisions to be vaccinated and had come to a clinic or similar setting to have the vaccine administered. The signature of the average person on one of these consent forms, therefore, probably does not indicate that the information contained in the form was used in the decision to be vaccinated. However, in the absence of evidence of negligence in the manufacture or administration of the vaccine, it is possible that a court would disallow a claim made by a person who experienced a harm that was listed as a risk on the consent form on the grounds that the person knowingly accepted the risk. It is speculative whether this set of circumstances in this government program resulted from a lack of reflection about how people make decisions or whether it represented the resolution to a perceived conflict between the goal of vaccinating as many people as possible and the legal requirement of informed consent. However, it appears that the process used probably produced a great deal of documentation of apparent informed consent and relatively little actual informed consent and that this had some serious potential consequences for participants in the program.

21. Ibid., pp. 11–14, 141–56.

FURTHER COMPLEXITIES REGARDING THE PURPOSE OF INFORMED CONSENT

Professional resistance to the idea of informed consent may also be rooted in a particular conception of the purpose of informed consent. Physicians writing about consent seem to believe that the demand for informed consent is rooted in the idea that informed consent will protect the patient or subject from being harmed by the physician or investigator. Resentment by physicians, who believe that this impugns their concern for their patients, is not surprising, and physicians' writings on informed consent frequently assert that informed consent is woefully inadequate as protection of patients/subjects and that the unscrupulous physician/investigator can easily manipulate the patient or subject, no matter what provisions are made for "informed consent." Physicians thus frequently minimize the value of informed consent in providing protection for patients/subjects. This skepticism about the value of consent in protecting people from harm may also underlie the previously discussed tendency to attend to the form of consent, to the neglect of its substance.

This linkage of informed consent to protection of patients/subjects from harm is understandable. Arguments that such protection is needed have received much attention in recent years.[22] The DHEW regulations link the need for informed consent with the presence of risk. They are administered by the Office for Protection from Research Risks at the National Institutes of Health. Nevertheless, the idea that the basic purpose of informed consent is to protect people from harm contrasts strikingly with the dominant analysis that has developed in recent years in the writings of bioethicists.

One of the points of widest consensus among bioethicists is that the requirement of informed consent is not predicated upon the presence of risk. Ramsey, for example, sees the basis of consent as expressing a bond of fidelity between individuals.[23] Veatch sees the right to self-determination as the foundation of the requirement of consent.[24] Englehardt finds the need for consent to rest upon "respect for persons as moral agents," separable from the requirement to foster the best interests of research subjects.[25] Carney offers a similar argument.[26] Thus, one need not be concerned only with protection from harm to believe in the importance of informed consent.

The growing acceptance of such formulations have led a number of observers to suggest that a new ethic is coming to govern physician-pa-

22. Perhaps the best-known example is Ivan Illich's book, *Medical Nemesis. The Expropriation of Health* (London: Calder and Boyars, 1975).

23. Paul Ramsey, *The Patient as Person* (New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1970), p. 5.

24. Robert M. Veatch, "Three Theories of Informed Consent. Philosophical Foundations and Policy Implications" (Unpublished paper prepared for the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects, 2 February 1976), p 14.

25. H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr., "Basic Ethical Principles in the Conduct of Biomedical and Behavioral Research Involving Human Subjects" (Unpublished paper prepared for the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects, December 1975), p. 2.

26. Frederick S. Carney, "A Moral Analysis of Human Experimentation," in *Human Experimentation*, ed. Robert L Bogomolny (Dallas: Southern Methodist University Press, 1976), pp. 132–48.

tient relations and, by extension, professional-client relations in general. Barber, for example, sees the traditional doctor-patient relationship as characterized by "paternalistic benevolence" on the part of the physician, and believes that a more collegial pattern is emerging.[27] Similarly, Veatch sees the traditional Hippocratic ethic of "do no harm," as giving way to an ethic that emphasizes the self-determination of the patient or subject.[28]

Yet it is not only because we are in a period of change that explains why practitioners more than bioethicists see informed consent as intended primarily to provide protection from harm. The emergence of informed consent as a basis of legal action by patients is undoubtedly more responsible than the development of bioethics for raising physician awareness about informed consent. These cases link consent with risk, because, characteristically, these suits arise in situations in which the patient suffers a harm, the possibility of which had not been disclosed prior to treatment. As a result of these cases, the question regarding consent most frequently asked by practitioners probably pertains to the extent to which disclosure of risk is legally required.

Autonomy and paternalism

The argument that the purpose of informed consent rests upon respect for autonomy rather than on protection from harm raises several issues. It challenges, for example, the concept of "therapeutic privilege," which allows physicians to withhold from patients information that is judged by the physician to be potentially harmful to the patient. Even information about experimental drugs can be withheld on this basis, under the Food and Drug Administration's regulations for new drug testing. Unfortunately, evaluation of this issue is hampered by the lack of empirical evidence on the effects of disclosure of risk. Nor are there any widely recognized guidelines to define the circumstances under which such nondisclosure is justified. The common answer to questions about proper circumstances is that this is a matter for the individual physician to decide on the basis of the facts of each particular case.

This is troublesome because reliance on the judgment of individual practitioners sets the stage for possible serious abuse, such as were reported to have occurred at the Jewish Chronic Disease Hospital. Data do not exist on the frequency with which information is withheld from patients on the basis of "therapeutic privilege." It is likely that such data would show that nondisclosure reflects the needs and wishes of particular physicians as much as the needs and wishes of patients. It would not be surprising to find that some physicians always make certain disclosures while others do not. Such patterns are likely to fall outside the awareness of individual practitioners, who may believe that their disclosures are always based upon a somewhat objective assessment of consequences for patients. No one really knows the bases on which such assessments are made or the extent to which factors besides the patient's situation explain patterns of disclosure. Some evidence exists, however, to suggest both that (a) patients often receive

27. Barber, "Compassion in Medicine," p 639.

28. Veatch, "Three Theories of Informed Consent."

less information than they desire,[29] and (b) that the physicians' fears about the harmful effects of informed consent may be exaggerated.[30] However, these are matters about which a great deal more information is needed.

The argument that the purpose of informed consent rests upon respect for autonomy rather than on protection from harm also raises a question about the task of human subjects review committees. Under current regulations, these review committees examine proposed research to determine whether:

> (1) the risks to the subject are so outweighed by the sum of the benefit to the subject and the importance of the knowledge to be gained as to warrant a decision to allow the subject to accept the risks,
>
> (2) the rights and welfare of any such subjects will be adequately protected; and
>
> (3) legally effective informed consent will be obtained by adequate and appropriate methods . . .[31]

This set of duties raises some questions about autonomy and paternalism. Why, if the review committee believes that informed consent will be obtained, should the committee make its own risk/benefit judgment? Does this not represent the substitution by the committee of its own judgment for the judgment of the subject? On what grounds is this intrusion into the autonomy of the subject made?[32]

Existing empirical evidence about informed consent suggests one answer to these questions, although other grounds can be offered to defend a role for review committees in making risk/benefit assessments. One need not deny the importance of informed consent in supporting social values pertaining to autonomy and dignity of the individual to note that we know but little about how to make informed consent reliable. Although informed consent procedures may sometimes operate to protect people from risks to which they do not wish to be exposed, considerable evidence has accumulated to suggest that shortcomings in informed consent probably occur frequently.

This paper has touched upon several factors that tend to make informed consent unreliable, although none of this suggests that informed consent is an impossible or unrealistic goal. Among these factors are the limited commitment of researchers to informed consent; the tendency for procedures to be substituted for the substance of informed consent; the dependency of the quality of informed consent on a wide range of factors including the skill of the person seeking consent, the age, educational level, and health status of the subject, and the setting in which consent is sought; and the fact that human subjects review committees tend to confine their attention to the content of consent forms rather than examining the entire consent process.

29. See, for example, Jim McIntosh, "Processes of Communication, Information Seeking, and Control Associated with Cancer: A Selective Review of the Literature," *Social Science and Medicine* 8 (1974), pp. 167–83.

30 Ralph J. Alfidi, "Informed Consent: A Study of Patient Reaction," *Journal of the American Medical Association* 216 (24 May 1971), pp. 1325–29.

31. 45 *Code of Federal Regulations*, part 46.

32. This issue has been raised for the Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects by Tom Beauchamp, and is unresolved as of this writing. This discussion represents only my own views, not the views of the Commission.

In short, a problem of scale arises when thousands of research investigators approach tens of thousands of prospective subjects in research investigations reviewed by hundreds of review committees; something that is feasible in a given researcher-subject dyad is converted into something that is probably unreliable as a means of protecting subjects from harm. Furthermore, subjects cannot be relied upon to make the system self-enforcing. Subjects of biomedical research are frequently at a power disadvantage for a variety of rather obvious reasons. Furthermore, most have had no previous experience in research, and they may make their judgments primarily on the basis of a generalized trust of physicians and medical institutions. Some people believe that a physician would not ask them to do something that is not "safe" and have no conception of the differences between the ordinary doctor-patient relationship and the researcher-subject relationship. This confusion is most likely to occur in the common and important situation in which research is conducted as part of, or in association with, therapeutic or diagnostic activities.

Ramsey, in a paraphrase of Niebuhr's famous defense of liberty, wrote:

> Man's capacity to become joint adventurers in a common cause makes the consensual relation possible; a man's propensity to overreach his joint adventurer even in a good cause makes consent necessary.[33]

To this can be added, somewhat inelegantly: in research that presents an appreciable risk to subjects, our lack of knowledge about how to make informed consent reliable makes informed consent insufficient. Or, to state the matter differently, informed consent should not be the sole mechanism by which societal decisions are made regarding whether the risks of a research investigation are justified by its expected results. The unreliability of informed consent and the vulnerability of certain types of subjects (hospitalized patients, for example) constitute one basis for an argument that review committees concerned with the welfare of human subjects should be concerned with the risks and benefits of research and with the selection of research subjects, in addition to the matter of informed consent.

33. Ramsey, *The Patient as Person.*

ANNALS, AAPSS, 437, May 1978

Medical Ethics and Professional Monopoly

By JEFFREY L. BERLANT

ABSTRACT: The study of medical ethics should properly include codes of ethics issued by Enlightenment philosophers and modern medical associations. Official codes of ethics adopted by the medical profession in England and the United States have exhibited monopolistic tendencies which have strengthened over time. Examination of Thomas Percival's 1803 code of ethics reveals monopolistic rules in the areas of trust inducement, consultations, criticism, and fee setting. Another ethical code, written by John Gregory in 1770, provides evidence of antimonopolistic ethical attitudes during the Enlightenment which were not subsequently adopted by official professional bodies. The series of ethical codes issued by the American Medical Association since its inception in 1847 exhibits even more monopolistic rules than had Percivalean ethics. In contrast to the monopolistic tendencies of official medical ethics, however, trends are currently emerging toward nonmonopolistic counterethics in the areas of restraint of competition, patient decision-making, professional review mechanisms, and rational health care services planning.

Jeffrey L. Berlant holds a Ph.D. in sociology and an M.D., both from the University of California. He is a Diplomat of the American Board of Internal Medicine. He was a Research Fellow in the Program in Law, Science and Medicine at the Yale Law School during the 1975–76 academic year. He has recently published Profession and Monopoly: A Study of Medicine in the United States and Great Britain. *He is also the author of numerous conference papers.*

THE RECENT surge of interest in medical ethics has all but obscured the fact that codes of medical ethics have existed through many centuries of Western history. A survey of medical ethics reveals the remarkable variety of forms these medical ethics have taken. Hippocratic ethics, the oldest known form of medical ethics, probably date back more than 2,000 years, and since that time, systems of medical ethics not sharing Hippocratic attitudes have periodically appeared. The consideration of medical ethics should properly include medieval ethics, Enlightenment ethics, and official codes of ethics promulgated by modern medical associations.

In the essay which follows, my purpose will not be to chronicle medical ethics but to examine a series of codes in search of the organizational, social, and political roles that medical ethics have played in the past. First, it is my contention that medical ethics, though ostensibly pertaining to the doctor-patient relationship, have, in fact, addressed the structuring of relationships among doctors. Second, many prescriptions for professional behavior can be discerned in medical ethics, which, if adhered to, would result in a highly monopolistic form of social organization of professionals. Third, historically, official medical ethics have increasingly served the collective interests of physicians through the gradual innovation of monopolistic uses of medical ethics. Paradoxically, documents which manifestly call for the protection of patient interests have actually been more concerned with furthering the interests of physicians and may have helped forge the Anglo-American medical profession into a collectively organized group.

Essentially, the history of medical ethics reflects and parallels the history of the social organization of the medical profession in Western Europe. Each sequential code issued by the official medical profession has faced up to organizational problems which may not have affected preexisting codes, so that each code gives the appearance of a change of phase, as one problem after another is tackled. Some codes have integrated physicians into an interest group and have attempted to reduce internal competition. Others have called for eliminating association with external competitors; others, for building cordial relations with political authorities and legislators; others have adapted to new legal restraints; and still others have sought to build favorable public opinion.

In this essay, I would like to present a modest summary of the content of Thomas Percival's Enlightenment medical ethics and then follow out the changes which the modern American Medical Association introduced as it attempted to make use of Percivalean ethics in response to different historical and social conditions. In so doing, I hope it will become clear how, under modern conditions, medical ethics have been able to serve monopolistic purposes. Perhaps I can also throw more light on how social conditions can alter seemingly inviolate normative codes for behavior.

Condemnation or denouncement of the medical profession for attempting to engage in monopolistic behavior is not the purpose of this essay. Rather, I wish to clarify the causal role that ethics have played in its institutionalization. The reader should not interpret this essay as an exercise in cynicism, debunking, or vulgar economic reductionism. On the contrary, I would offer that

ethics have had, and still have, value for the provision of effective and sensitive medical care and in many instances reflect the moral sincerity of professionals. Ethics are not mere superstructures or hypocritical rationalizations for interest pursuit but an integral part of the structure of the organization of the profession. It must be emphasized that not all medical ethics have been monopolistic. It is, however, to those ethics which have played a role in furthering the profession's monopolization that I now turn for more extensive investigation.

PERCIVALEAN ETHICS AND MONOPOLIZATION

Thomas Percival (1740–1804) is best remembered as the foremost spokesman for the most conservative wing of the medical enlightenment in England. His *Medical Ethics*, published in 1803, was written in 1794 in response to a request from the medical staff of the Manchester Infirmary "to draw up a scheme of medical conduct relative to hospitals and other medical charities" following a dispute over a death in 1789 that had led to resignations. Percival had close friends on both sides of the dispute, and his work apparently had a conciliatory effect.[1]

A large part of Percival's section on general or private practice is devoted to the problem of building trust in patients. The bulk of these trust-building prescriptions consists of general ideals of moral conduct: attention, steadiness, humanity, secrecy, delicacy, confidence. Others pertain to the physician's quality of mind: temperance for the sake of thought, and retirement when senility sets in. Others have to do more specifically with the handling of the patient: reasonable numbers of visits, not abandoning doomed patients, admonitions to patients suffering from "the wages of sin," observance of the sabbath except in case of emergency, abstention from gloomy prognostications to maintain hope and comfort in the sick.[2]

These gentlemanly virtues directly bear on monopolization. To be sure, inducing trust increased the market value of medical practices and, to a lesser degree, may have integrated physicians into a more cohesive group. In those situations where professional licensing has been salient, pronouncements of intention to protect the sick had obvious legitimizing value in the eyes of legislators and other political figures. Yet the most important impact has been the creation of a paternalistic relationship toward patients which has helped to undermine the creation of consumer organization for self-protection among patients and has thereby maintained consumer atomization. Essentially, trust inducement persuades the patient that he need not protect his own interests either by himself or by organized action. Through atomization of the public into vulnerable patients, paternalism results in the profession's dealing with fragmented individuals instead of with organized groups. Moreover, by appealing to patients' salvation fantasies, trust inducement can actually stimulate interpatient competition by increasing each patient's desire to see that nothing stands between the physician and himself. Much of the emotional power of the sentiment expressed in the phrase "the

1 Chauncey D. Leake, ed., *Percival's Medical Ethics* (Baltimore: Williams & Wilkins, 1927), p. 31.

2. Ibid., sections I–III, XIII, XXIX–XXXII, pp. 90–91, 97–98, 107–11.

doctor-patient relationship" resides in the wish of the patient to save himself, regardless of any cost to himself or to others. The sick or dying patient, afraid of any obstacle between himself and the doctor, becomes willing to accept the profession's autonomy. Implicit in all such trust-inducing devices of this sort is the paternalistic tendency to transfer responsibility for critical decisions about treatment and the fate of patients from patients to professionals. Such paternalistic trust-inducing devices, insofar as they become persuasive appeals to patients, become sources of domination of the profession over patients.

Yet the use of paternalism to dominate patients is not sufficient to create a monopolistic form of professional organization. The bulk of Percival's code is directed toward reducing the internal conflict among physicians and creating, to use Percival's words, a positive esprit de corps. It is preoccupied to an extraordinary degree with the suppression of intraprofessional comparisons. Many of Percival's ethical prescriptions, directed at the problem of the practice of physicians stealing patients from one another, addressed two areas: regulating the performance of medical consultations and the suppression of criticism of one practitioner by another. In the event of a consultation, Percival advised the consulting physician to conduct it in the presence of the physician who called him into the case. Both physicians should try to arrive together, to examine together so that "the unnecessary repetition of questions may be avoided," and discuss the findings with the patient or his friends only after having agreed what the patient should be told and what the prognosis should be. If the patient is already under the care of another physician, the previous physician's general treatment of the patient should be followed unless conditions warrant otherwise, in which case the previous physician should be consulted. A second physician called in by a dissatisfied patient should first consult with the previous physician, ostensibly to better understand the case. An anxious patient, who cannot wait for consultation, should be similarly handled. A physician should intervene with his own judgment only if a consultation is precluded by the "lateness of the hour" or by the urgency of the situation. No consultation is called for when stepping in for a sick or absent physician. A physician questioned by a patient about treatment of another physician need not consult with the other physician but should not "interfere in the curative plans pursued but should even recommend a steady adherence to them, if they appear to merit approbation."[3] That is, in such cases a physician should continue the initiated therapy and, when possible, praise it.

Essentially, the rules of consultation attempt to discourage intraprofessional competition for patients by preventing patients from comparing the advice of doctors and thereby "shopping around" and, in the extreme, by discouraging physicians from trying to steal patients from one another. In the same vein, Percival has several passages which call for the suppression of all forms of criticism.

Percival's comments on criticism of the medical profession as a whole and of individual practitioners overlap in certain respects. Criticism of

3 Ibid., sections VI–VIII, X–XII, XIV, XXVI–XXVII, pp. 38, 93–97.

the profession as a whole is antimonopolistic in the sense that it opposes trust inducement. Physicians should refrain from criticising individual practitioners as well as the profession as a whole. A physician should not publicly criticize another for incompetence uncovered during consultation or during temporary treatment of another's patient, or for incompetence discovered in any other way. Other means for influencing the course of treatment should be employed privately. He should also not make public the existence of controversy over the proper course of treatment; he should submit such controversies *in private to an arbitration board* of professionals who may then make a public stand.[4] In other passages, Percival explicitly calls on physicians to defend the honor of the profession by withholding criticism:

> The *Esprit de Corps* is a principle of action founded in human nature, and when duly regulated, is both rational and laudable. Every man who enters into a fraternity engages, by a tacit compact, not only to submit to the laws, but to promote the honour and interest of the association, so far as they are consistent with morality, and the general good of mankind. A physician, therefore, should cautiously guard against whatever may injure the general respectability of his profession; and should avoid all contumelious representations of the faculty at large, all general charges against their selfishness or improbity; and the indulgence of an affected or jocular skepticism, concerning the efficacy and utility of the healing art.[5]

Criticism of individual practitioners undermines monopolization through three mechanisms. It can be a competitive device for winning patients over from other physicians, that is, a market substitute for lower fees. Criticism can invite outsiders to apply self-protective controls over professional activities by implying that the profession cannot regulate itself or keep its own house clean. Criticism of individual practitioners can also contribute to criticism of the profession as a whole, since failure to self-regulate implies misplacement of public trust in the profession. All criticism is antimonopolistic in another sense: when made in private, it tends to counter the fraternization of practitioners. It is a latent source of conflict which can divide the profession and lead *to group dissolution*.

In keeping with his thoroughgoing disapproval of criticism, Percival introduced the so-called retrospection clause. In this passage, Percival raises the moral importance of looking back at cases, particularly at fatal cases, to learn from them. The course of treatment should be reviewed, with "the most scrupulous impartiality." He states,

> Let no self-deception be permitted in this retrospect; and if errors, either of omission or commission, are discovered, it behooves that they should be brought fairly and fully to the mental view. Regrets may follow, but criminality will thus be obviated. For good intentions, and the imperfections of human skill which cannot anticipate the knowledge that events alone disclose, will sufficiently justify what is past, provided the failure be made conscientiously subservient to future wisdom and rectitude in professional conduct.[6]

Reasonable as this may sound at first, what Percival in fact is proposing in this passage is that a physician's mistakes should not be punished as long as the physician learns

4. Ibid., sections IV, IX, XIV, XXIII, XXIV, pp. 92–93, 95–96, 98, 104–5

5. Ibid., pp 104–5

6. Ibid., pp. 106 ff

from them. There is contained in this a very strong bias against what we would today call peer review, or the holding of physicians to account for their mistakes, whether or not they should learn from them. Historically, Percival's leaving the accountability for mistakes up to individual conscience rather than to collective professional action has tended to be the dominant position taken by official medical professional groups. The 1847 "Code of Ethics" of the American Medical Association, for instance, states that "there is no tribunal other than his own conscience to adjudge penalties for carelessness or neglect."[7] Similarly, in American disciplinary actions, incompetence has rarely been the cause for license revocation.[8]

Aside from addressing the problem of suppressing intraprofessional rivalry, Percival attempted to deal with the problem of price competition by professionals. It is somewhat difficult for us in the presence of a relatively wealthy medical profession to realize that until recent decades the medical profession was in a marginal economic position. Part of the problem, indeed, had to do with price competitive practices by physicians who quite frequently underbid one another for patients. Percival's solution to this problem was the sliding scale, phrased in honorific terms:

> Some general rule should be adopted by the faculty in every town relative to the pecuniary acknowledgments of their patients, and it should be deemed a point of honour to adhere to this rule with as much steadiness as varying circumstances will permit, for it is obvious that an average fee, as suited to the general rank of patients must be an inadequate gratuity from the rich, who often require attendance not absolutely necessary, and yet too large to be expected from that class of citizens who would feel a reluctance, in calling for assistance, without making some decent and satisfactory retribution.[9]

While this passage may sound generous to modern ears, in historical perspective it takes on a different appearance. I would offer that the important part of this passage deals not so much with charging less to poorer patients but rather the injunction against undercharging the wealthy. Clearly directed against price competition in the medical market, it encourages the practice of charging as high a fee as possible according to the means of the patient. Percival even makes a point of specifically warning affluent physicians of the danger of their not always charging the affluent, because "it is an injury to his professional brethren. The office of physician can never be supported but as a lucrative one; it is defrauding, in some degree, the common funds for its support, when fees are dispensed with, which might justly be claimed."[10] Percival is at first confusing when he claims that wealthy physicians should maintain full fees in behalf of the profession's solvency, since the members of the profession do not share income. He implies, however, that physicians may collect all they can from a patient, but should not collect less, for price competition might develop. The temptation is particularly great for wealthier physicians, who can afford to charge less, per-

7. Ibid., p. 219.

8. Jeffrey L. Berlant, *Profession and Monopoly. A Study of Medicine in the United States and Great Britain* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), p. 79.

9. Leake, ed., *Percival's Medical Ethics*, section XV, pp. 98–100.

10. Ibid., p. 105.

haps for the sake of prestige, and can divert solvent patients from poorer physicians. In this sense, Percival is correct that maintaining full fees helps the profession's collective solvency, but only because wealthier physicians forego competitive advantage. It also furthers professional solidarity by encouraging physicians to think of their mutual interests. The portion which deals with the provision of health services to the poor is a mixture of a humanitarian promise to provide universal health care, an economically rational fee-pricing policy, and a politically monopolistic stance. While a sliding scale does not seem to be as monopolistic as uniform fees, there is little question that it is economically rational, at least when there is a shortage of patients. To accept whatever patients can afford can be more profitable than to turn away those who cannot afford a fixed fee. More important, however, by accepting responsibility for even the poor, Percival declared a monopoly for physicians over the care of all patients. This claim for authority over the medical market was part of an emergent ideology of the modern medical profession as it sought to eliminate external as well as internal competitors.

GREGORY'S MEDICAL ETHICS

In contrast to Percival's ethics stands the work of John Gregory, a professor of medicine at the great medical school at Edinburgh, who issued a thoroughgoing antimonopolistic treatise on the profession in 1770. Gregory's criticism struck directly at the type of professional organization Percival and other conservatives advocated: an autonomous, self-regulating body of elitist experts who made a living by treating patients, and who sought to maximize the distance between medical man and patient, using secrecy and systematic ignorance to accentuate the disadvantageous position of the patient. Gregory believed, however, that confiding practice "entirely to a class of men who live by it as a profession, is unfavorable to the progress of the art." The love of and devotion to medicine as an art, differentially distributed among physicians, "is often checked by a necessary attention to private interest."[11]

Gregory posed for himself this problem: granted, the public cannot evaluate physicians accurately and so cannot direct itself to the best doctors; only the physician's own profession can judge his merit and direct patients to men of superior merit. But the collective interests of the practicing profession require that superior merit be concealed to prevent competition.[12] Therefore, the private interests of the profession lead to the concealment of information which might benefit the medical interests of patients.

Gregory's solution was to encourage medical learning outside the confines of the practicing profession. Gregory's comments were directed toward "gentlemen" who were by definition literate and liberally educated; yet they might as well have been applied to anyone with education. Gregory's position was that, for the layman, any knowledge of medicine is better than none. The task was to educate nonpractitioners in medicine, a task he found plausible.

11. John Gregory, *Lectures on the Duties and Qualifications of a Physician* (London: Strahan and T Cadell, 1772), pp. 213, 215. Cf. also Berlant, *Profession and Monopoly*, pp. 88–97.

12. Gregory, *Qualifications of a Physician* p 216.

His criticisms of the practicing profession, then, became an analysis of the causes of public inability to evaluate practitioners. As a consistent rationalist, he believed that if the public were sufficiently well educated, competent practitioners would not be placed at a disadvantage. It would effect a good influence on the medical profession to have a well-educated public, for physicians would then be conduced to improve their technical skill rather than to develop sales techniques for "the most ignorant, and consequently, the most conceited part of mankind," the public with its prejudices and caprices born of ignorance.[13]

The division between Percival's conservative and Gregory's liberal versions of Enlightenment medicine is best captured in comparing their positions. For Percival, the Enlightenment and rationality were available only to elites paternalistically bound to assuming the burden of protecting the public. For him, the only conceivable authority in medical matters was the practicing medical profession as represented by the licensing bodies of the Royal Colleges. From his perspective, if physicians would only rise above the temptations of personal interest, society would be well served. Gregory would have rejected much of this formulation, claiming that the public was capable of assuming more responsibility for its own medical welfare than Percival would allow, and that medical practitioners compromised the goals of the profession. Practitioners permit much harm by letting private interests intrude in the form of increasing the value of medical services through systematically ensuring that the public remain medically ignorant.

For Percival, the strength of the profession lay in the corporate body of practicing professionals whose group identity encouraged the development of a personal ethical commitment to mankind. For Gregory the strength of the profession lay in the individual mind's capacity to uncover medical knowledge and use it, despite the constraints of professional rituals and formalities, authoritarian orthodoxy, and economic inducements to play to the public's medically irrational and irrelevant demands. Above all, economic advantage from medical knowledge was not to be sought at the expense of humanity; professional organization that monopolized and exploited medical knowledge for economic ends was deplorable, not because it traded medical help for money, but because it impeded the spread and development of medical science.

Gregory was much troubled by the problem of creating an elite for the promotion of medical science in the presence of a dominant elite devoted to preserving its favorable position on the basis of demand for its services. The first elite is generated, in principle, by the ability of individuals to be selected on the basis of their meritorious development and dissemination of information. The second is created by the exclusion of practicing competitors by a professional group's monopolization and concealment of expert information, in the manner of a secret society. Gregory also recognized that these elites were not totally compatible: a well educated public encourages the development of an elite of technically excellent practitioners, if the public is free to

13. Ibid., pp. 218–23, 228, 233–35.

select its practitioners; but to minimize this incompatibility, information must be allowed and encouraged to spread to all sectors of society. The prime responsibility of the profession, then, is to produce and disseminate medical knowledge to the rest of society. The satisfaction of the personal interests of physicians should be turned to the advantage of the patient by spreading knowledge so that competitive, meritorious service can be recognized and rewarded. Organizational devices that satisfy the personal interests of physicians without promoting superior care, using appeals to the honor of the profession and other mutually protective devices, should have no place in ethical medicine.

THE AMA'S MEDICAL ETHICS

Gregory's medical ethics have been dwelled upon to emphasize that nonmonopolistic ethics existed in English Enlightenment medicine which were not incorporated in subsequent ethical codes. When the American Medical Association (AMA) was founded in Philadelphia in 1846, for example, it was Percival's, and not Gregory's, ethics which were adopted. Even from the inception, however, and with succeeding revisions of ethical codes, the AMA's use of medical ethics has been even more decidedly monopolistic than Percival's. Of more interest is the fact that the AMA found new ways in which to use medical ethics monopolistically, as examination of parts of these codes will demonstrate. The AMA's codes went a long way toward clarifying the ethics of fee setting, particularly with respect to fee splitting, fee competition, and the rights of physicians to collect fees.

The most distinctive change in American medical ethics was the adoption of fee fixing instead of the sliding scale. While the 1847 "Code of Ethics" retained the rule that wealthy physicians should charge for services, it omitted the sliding scale altogether. Percival, it may be recalled, had called for each physician to know the means of his patients: "Some general rule should be adopted by the faculty in every town relative to the pecuniary acknowledgements of their patients," but this general rule should be varied according to circumstances.[14] The AMA simply called for "some general rules" to be established in every town or district, relative to pecuniary acknowledgments from their patients, which should be adhered to as "uniformly" as possible.[15] The sliding scale was replaced by what today would be called the "usual, customary, prevailing rate," a uniform charge for everyone in a local area delimited by the local medical society. The 1903 "Principles" went a step further and suggested that "some general rules" be adopted "relative to the minimum pecuniary acknowledgment from their patients." The new code thus permitted a physician to price his services above the going rate, letting him risk pricing himself out of the medical market. The advantage of this permissive upper limit was that a physician could raise his fees for his established following, that is, his "practice," and increase his income, even though he might not engage in competitive undercutting. In this way, ethical conduct could help maximize both the profession's col-

14. Leake, ed., *Percival's Medical Ethics*, section XV.
15. Ibid., p. 235.

lective interests and the individual practitioner's personal interests. The profession could price services above competitive market value; the practitioner could try for an income as high as he might command.

Most remarkably, all recommendations for setting fees were omitted entirely in the 1912 "Principles of Ethics" of the AMA. Only a section prohibiting fee splitting and defending the right of physicians to charge for referrals appears.[16] Though the disappearance of rules for economic conduct (except for fee splitting) might be interpretable as an example of actual demonopolization, the profession's contemporary political setting suggests why these rules were omitted in 1912 from official documents. As early as 1898, price fixing had been found by the courts to violate section one of the Sherman Antitrust Act, inasmuch as it gave offenders "the power to charge unreasonable prices had they chosen to do so." Not until 1927, however, was price fixing illegal per se.[17] Antitrust legislation probably was not very threatening to the medical profession at first because of the infrequency of prosecution. But during Taft's administration, antitrust suits, instituted by the Justice Department between 1909 and 1913, rapidly increased in number and peaked in 1913, the year following the revised code of ethics of the AMA.[18] Presumably, an official document of the profession which called for uniform fees was an open invitation for prosecution at a time when the targets of prosecution were uncertain, but increasing in number.

The AMA's ethics also extended Percival's attack on the premodern conception of what constitutes medical services. Prior to the Enlightenment, the mission of medical service was healing or curing—not palliation. One medieval commentator, Henri de Mondeville, in fact refused to accept incurable patients, for he believed that would constitute fraud.[19] Percival broadened this definition by insisting on treating incurable patients. But in so doing, he expanded the range of commodities which the profession had to offer, a sort of diversification of services and dissociation of the right to receive payment from the obligation to cure. The AMA in both the 1903 and 1912 "Principles of Ethics" similarly urged diversification when it opposed fee splitting. Defenders of fee splitting argued that general practitioners found fee collection for referrals difficult, for a referral often did not seem to be a reputable medical service to the patient. Within the context of the patient's desire to be cured, triage diagnosis and referral are only instrumental to cure, so these require legitimation to become salable. The practice of fee splitting, therefore, represented a failure to break from the premodern concept of service as cure and was inconsistent with diversification Not surprisingly, one of the most important arguments against fee

16 Ibid., p 269

17. A D Neale, *The Antitrust Laws of the United States of America. A Study of Competition Enforced by Law* (Cambridge, Eng. Cambridge University Press, 1962), p 35

18 "During the 49 years from 1891 to 1939 it had instituted an average of less than nine cases a year and a maximum of 27 cases a year (in 1913)" Fritz Machlup, *The Political Economy of Monopoly Business, Labor, and Government Policies* (Baltimore. Johns Hopkins Press, 1952), p. 184, n. 4.

19. Berlant, *Profession and Monopoly* p 98.

splitting was that practitioners failed to place "a proper evaluation on their services."[20]

Percival's code clearly begins the modern consciousness of the economic interests of the profession as a collectivity, above and beyond the interests of its individual members. By 1903, the American organized profession had taken the stand that doctors are ethically bound to collect fees. To do otherwise would degrade the purported value of the profession's services and might encourage price competition. The president of the AMA in 1899 expressed this positive attitude toward the virtue of fee collection:

> The physician who willingly allows his *clientele* to dictate terms to him, or is willing to make reductions to suit and please his patients, is doing his profession an irreparable injury, and he should be ashamed to do so. It is undignified and brings the profession into disrepute, besides being unjust.[21]

An astonishing transformation had occurred over the centuries: what had originally been a necessary evil to be overcome became a fully ethical, principled practice. Good medicine now required charging an "honest" price. What had been defended by Percival as necessary for the existence of the profession, a century later became ethical in itself. As conditions of relative oversupply of physicians gave way during the twentieth century in America to relative undersupply, this attitude contributed to the rapid increase in the income of the profession.

20 Donald E. Konold, *A History of American Medical Ethics 1847–1912* (Madison University of Wisconsin Press, 1962), p. 66.

21. Joseph McDowell Mathews, *How to Succeed in the Practice of Medicine* (Louisville, Ky.. J. P. Morton, 1902), pp. 111–12.

CONCLUSION

The AMA's medical ethics also responded to changing social institutions during the first half of the twentieth century. The appearance of group practices, third-party insurance plans, innovations in health care organizations, such as prepaid plans, and the spectre of nationalized health services coming to the United States as they had to Great Britain in 1948, prompted a series of ethical regulations pertaining to such arrangements. The 1949 "Principles of Ethics," which will not be reviewed in detail in this essay, repeatedly asserted the ethical requirement of professional hegemony in all such new arrangements.[22]

During the 1960s and 1970s, however, we are witnessing the appearance of several new social institutions which directly assault traditional official medical ethics. Furthermore, these new institutions are generating a set of less monopolistic counterethics which might come to supplant the old ethics.

The traditional ethics regarding fee fixing and the prohibition of professional advertising have recently come under attack in a series of court actions by the Federal Trade Commission and analogous state agencies. These actions have not focused exclusively on the medical profession but have also addressed other professions, notably law and pharmacy. In California, the Relative Value Scale, prepared by the California Medical Association so that insurance carriers might have a table of the comparative value of medical services expressed in the

22. Berlant, *Profession and Monopoly*, pp. 107–11

form of ratios, is currently being assailed as an instance of price fixing. Against these practices is the assertion of a liberal belief in the ethical superiority of price competitive practices.

Percival's emphasis on trust inducement, and the paternalistic uses to which it has been put, has also recently been questioned in the wake of a series of court decisions which have established the doctrine of informed consent in common law. Underlying the doctrine of informed consent is an ethical theory of the primacy of self-determination, which essentially states that persons own their own bodies and have a right to decide how they shall be treated. This belief tends to transfer therapeutic decisionmaking powers back from physician to patient.

Percival's retrospection clause, asserting the ultimate court of accountability to be individual conscience, has been questioned in two important new areas: Professional Standards Review legislation and the increase in malpractice court actions by private parties. The innovation of professional review and arbitration boards, composed of both professional and law members, as an alternative solution to malpractice suits for dealing with patient grievances may soon further discredit the old ethic. More public mutual criticism by professionals may also increase soon: some hospitals have been considering changing staff bylaws to require personnel to report questionable practices by physicians to administrative officers for investigation and possible revocation of hospital privileges. In these instances, there appears to be an emergent belief that it is more ethical to protect patients from the harmful actions of physicians than to protect physicians from criticism.

On the horizon is the possibility of a national health insurance plan. Faced by problems of inflationary cost containment, policymakers are considering various means of cost regulation for both hospitals and physicians. One interesting idea actively being considered is the refusal to reimburse nonefficacious procedures (such as surgical correction of a tipped uterus). Behind such an administrative proposal lies the very recent interest in cost-effective accounting, which essentially attempts to identify which therapeutic and diagnostic interventions demonstrably improve health to a degree sufficient to justify investing in them. The belief that only efficacious treatments should be reimbursed stands in contrast to the Percivalean definition of medical service as something more than "curing" and, more indirectly, to the beliefs in diversification that underlay the injunction against fee splitting. It may come to pass that national health insurance will refuse to pay for routine health examinations because they only reassure patients and do not yield sufficient correctable illness to justify their cost. Currently, however, there is little well-formulated ethical theory for such a development. Concern over the proper use of social resources becomes a problem of the protection of society rather than of the individual and requires a separate ethic. Nonetheless, rational planning for health care services raises serious questions about the adequacy of traditional official medical ethics. Perhaps contemporary ethics will in time raise

similar questions about the soundness of the rationalization of health care planning.

Clearly, we are in the midst of a reformulation of medical ethics. Some of the new counterethics, particularly the doctrine of self-determination, promise to undermine the traditional ideological struts of professional monopoly. Yet, perhaps the medical profession can find a new type of strength in these changes. Gregory's words, written some 200 years ago—before Percival, before the AMA—may leave u with some measure of optimism:

> The true dignity of physic is to l maintained by the superior learni and abilities of those who profess it, l the liberal manners of gentlemen, and l that openness and candour, whic disdain all artifice, which invite to free inquiry, and thus boldly bid d fiance to all that illiberal ridicule ai abuse to which medicine has been much and so long exposed.[23]

23. Gregory, *Qualifications of a Physicia* pp 237–38.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 437, May 1978

Individual Will And Social Conditions: Toward An Effective Health Maintenance Policy

By AMITAI ETZIONI

ABSTRACT: Many prominent health experts now assert that major improvements in the health of the American people must come from individual efforts to alter unhealthy personal habits and lifestyles rather than through medical services and technology. But it does not necessarily follow that a more ethical and feasible national health policy would focus primarily on exhorting Americans to mobilize their individual willpower to change to more healthful personal habits. In determining the nature of such policy, three main points are essential. First, the "health and individual responsibility" argument may overestimate the health benefits which will accrue from personal habit changes. Second, that argument tends to overlook or misconstrue the nature of societal constraints on individual will. It fails to specify the sociological conditions under which millions of individuals can change their lives significantly and the role social conditions play in maintaining unhealthy behavior and attitudes. Finally, the focus on individual decisionmaking deemphasizes the role of collective efforts, of public policy, in securing higher health standards. In essence, then, we suggest that a health policy that promotes curbing unhealthy habits and encourages healthy ones through societal action is more ethical and feasible than one focusing on "health as individual responsibility."

Amitai Etzioni is Professor of Sociology at Columbia University and Director of the Center For Policy Research. His main works are The Active Society, Modern Organizations, Political Unification, *and* Genetic Fix, *which was nominated for the 1973 National Book Award in the area of science. His most recent work is* Social Problems. *Dr. Etzioni has consulted for government agencies and has written widely for professional journals, as well as* The New York Times, The Washington Post, *and* The Wall Street Journal. *Among his research projects he has conducted studies for the Department of Labor, The National Science Foundation, and The President's Commission on the Causes and Prevention of Violence.*

AMONG THE more prominent and thoughtful experts concerned with the relationship between health and society, the following kind of consensus appears to be emerging: in the years to come, new breakthroughs in medical research, increased availability of medical services and traditional public health measures will be increasingly unable to produce the dramatic improvements in health that the public has learned to expect from them. A major revolution in public perceptions is needed: citizens of advanced industrial nations must be taught that they will achieve the greatest health gains—especially against such major killers as heart disease, cancer, stroke, and accidents—by looking to their own *individual* efforts. Principally, this means changing careless and unhealthy personal habits and lifestyles; stopping smoking, drinking alcohol only in moderation, and maintaining proper weight and diet, for example. Additional health habits individuals are to adopt include: regular exercise, adequate sleep (generally defined as seven to eight hours nightly); slower, more careful driving; and avoidance of "stress" —a term which encompasses a variety of consequences resulting from overwork, excessive worry, or fast living.

Dr. John H. Knowles, President of the Rockefeller Foundation and former professor at Harvard Medical School, concurs: "the next major advance in the health of the American people will result from the assumption of individual responsibility for one's own health."[1]

Dr. Keith Reemtsma, of the Columbia University College of Physicians and Surgeons, sees the policy issue as one of mass education: "Today, health is largely a matter of individual choices. How should 215 million Americans be persuaded to take care of themselves?"[2] And according to Alvin R. Tarlov, Chairman of Medicine in the University of Chicago's Division of the Biological Sciences and the Pritzker School of Medicine, the medical profession should learn from Madison Avenue and develop techniques of "social marketing" to change such health- and self-destructive behavior as careless driving, alcohol and drug abuse, cigarette smoking, overeating, poor nutrition, avoidable stress, and lack of exercise. "One must recall the enormous effectiveness of our advertising industry," he said in an address to the 72nd Annual Congress of Medical Education, "the billions of dollars poured into advertising annually by the industrial establishment have effectively sold ideas and goods which the people previously were unaware they wanted."[3]

Representative of the kind of mass education that Dr. Tarlov recommends, and illustrative of the emerging consensus on health care, was a public service advertisement issued recently by the California State Department of Health. The ad urged Californians to increase their life and health expectancy by following seven "good health practices" which included moderate drinking, good nutrition, and adequate sleep.[4]

1. John H. Knowles, "The Struggle to Stay Healthy," *Time* (9 August 1976), p. 62.

2. Keith Reemtsma, "Your Fault Insurance," *New York Times* (14 October 1976).

3. "Market Good Health," *Intellect* 105: 2380, (January 1977), p. 214.

4 California State Department of Health, 1973–74 study by Lester Breslow, M.D., M.P.H., Dean of UCLA's School of Health. The New York State Department of Health has also issued a public service advertisement admonishing radio listeners to devote

It should be noted that the proponents of increased individual responsibility for health care substantiate their arguments with data rather than relying solely on philosophical or moral reasoning. With respect to longevity, Dr. Knowles observes that the improvements in medical science and services achieved between 1900 and 1965 added only 2.7 additional years to the life expectancy at 65.[5] In contrast, he cites studies by Breslow and Belloc[6] of nearly 7,000 adults followed for five and a half years which suggested that many more years could be added to life expectancy if individuals observed the following basic health habits: (1) three meals a day at regular times and no snacking; (2) breakfast every morning; (3) moderate exercise two or three times a week; (4) adequate sleep (7 or 8 hours a night); (5) no smoking; (6) moderate weight; (7) no alcohol or only in moderation. The studies suggested that a 45-year-old man who practiced none to three of these habits had a remaining life expectancy of 21.6 years (to age 67), while one practicing six to seven of these habits had a remaining life expectancy of 33.1 years (to age 78). In other words, proper health habits could add 11 years to the average life expectancy at age 65.

Of course, in the past, medical care and public health measures have been enormously significant in adding to the numbers of people surviving to age 65. They lowered infant mortality rates and virtually eradicated such contagious diseases as diphtheria, rheumatic fever, smallpox and polio. Between 1900 and 1965, Knowles points out, these factors added 21 years to average life expectancy at birth.[7] But as of 1977, most of the gains that occur through these methods have already been made.[8] Though Knowles argues for a societal attack on pollution and other environmental health hazards, he accords such efforts lower priority than reform of personal habits and lifestyles.[9]

As we see it, the argument that American society has accorded too high a priority to medical services and too low a priority to other means of improving health has some persuasiveness. It does not necessarily follow from this, however, that a more ethical and feasible national health policy would be to focus primarily on exhorting Americans to mobilize their individual will power in order to change to more healthful personal habits. Our thesis in the following pages is that sociological analysis suggests otherwise. Our ar-

the same amount of care to their bodies that they would customarily devote to the care of their cars

5. John H. Knowles, "The Responsibility of the Individual," *Daedalus* 106.1 (Winter 1977), p. 60.

6. N. B. Belloc and L. Breslow, "The Relation of Physical Health Status and Health Practices," *Preventive Medicine* 1 (August, 1972), pp. 409–21, see also "Relationship of Health Practices and Mortality," *Preventive Medicine* 2 (1973), pp. 67–81, cited in Knowles, "The Responsibility of the Individual," p. 61.

7. Knowles, "The Responsibility of the Individual," pp. 61–62

8. Although the relationship between income and infant mortality has weakened in developed countries, those families with incomes below a minimum level of $3,000 do have a higher rate of infant mortality. A 1972 study showed that as family incomes increased into the $5,000 to $7,000 range, the infant mortality rate diminished significantly, and for incomes above this range, there was no further decline. See National Center for Health Statistics, *Infant Mortality Rates: Socioeconomic Factors*, ser 22, no. 14 (Rockville, Md.: Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, March 1972).

9. Knowles, "The Responsibility of the Individual," p. 58.

gument consists of three points. First, the "health as individual responsibility" argument quite likely overestimates the magnitude, and certainly the health benefits, that will accrue from personal habit changes. Second, it tends to overlook or misconstrue the nature of the societal constraints on the individual will, and hence fails to specify the sociological conditions under which millions of individuals are able to change their lives significantly and the role *social* conditions have in maintaining *un*healthy behavior and attitudes. Finally, the focus on individual decisionmaking deemphasizes the role of collective efforts, of *public* policy, in securing higher health standards. Our thesis, we suggest, defines a more ethical and feasible national health policy than the policy of "health as individual responsibility."

THE KNOWLEDGE BASE OF SOCIAL POLICY

Our review of the relevant research suggests that proponents of greater individual responsibility tend to advocate habit changes whose causal links to specific health outcomes are well established, along with ones whose health value is much more in doubt or little known. The causal relationship of smoking to lung cancer and emphysema is well documented. Likewise, the role of excessive drinking in bringing on cirrhosis of the liver, as well as needless deaths and disabilities due to drunken violence and drunken driving, are solidly established. The significance of slower driving for auto accident prevention is also clearly documented.

In contrast, evidence regarding the ill effects of drug use, other than cigarettes and alcohol, is in many cases weak and uncertain. Hence medical, as opposed to purely moral, arguments against such drugs as marijuana, cocaine, and heroin tend to be much less compelling. (Evidence of physiological harm is particularly poor for marijuana, but not completely compelling even for heroin.)[10]

What is most important for the majority of Americans is that the relationship between lowering the likelihood of heart disease, stroke, and other similar serious diseases and such oft-prescribed personal behavior changes as losing weight, maintaining a restricted diet to try to reduce serum cholesterol, and engaging in various forms of regular exercise is also unclear and unproved. *Science* recently reviewed numerous studies of the causes of the cardiovascular diseases.[11] The studies available provide uncertain evidence either to support or reject the usefulness of weight control, proper diet, and exercise. While there is a relatively strong correlation between proper weight and low mortality and morbidity, this does not demonstrate that persons who have been overweight for years and then succeed in losing, say, 25 pounds will thereby gain the same protection as persons who have been, and remain, slim as a result of genetics, metabolism, or life-long proper nutrition and exercise.

Regarding cholesterol, comparative national rates of heart disease

10. For an overview of marihuana research see, *Marihuana and Health In Perspective*, (Washington, D.C. National Institute on Drug Abuse, 1975) See also, "Heroin," *National Clearinghouse for Drug Abuse Information*, vol. 33, no 1 (January 1975) and *Cocaine, 1977* (Washington, D.C., National Institute on Drug Abuse).

11. "Epidemiology of Heart Disease: Searches for Causes," *Science* 194 (29 October 1976), pp. 509–12.

have been found to correlate significantly with both serum cholesterol concentrations and with the saturated fat intake of the populations studied. *Thus, the Japanese and the Finns, who eat low fat diets, have the lowest rates of both cholesterol and heart disease.* However, investigations point out that since different populations have different genetic backgrounds, one is on scientifically uncertain ground in predicting that changes in diet could produce similar results for Americans. Indeed, most studies in which investigations have tried to determine whether a switch to a proper diet does decrease serum cholesterol found only modest (approximately 10 percent) reductions. *And, the data did not show that coronary mortality was curtailed as a result.* The *Science* report adds that although most researchers believe individuals who exercise decrease their chances of developing cardiovascular disease, studies have generally been unable to demonstrate such a relationship.

Perhaps the strongest argument for caution is that some of the prescribed self-help may turn out to be harmful, not merely ineffective, though we freely admit that this evidence often is as uncertain as the other. For instance, some reports suggest that jogging, especially for those not used to physical exercise, may trigger, rather than help avert, heart attacks. Pressuring people to diet may also prove harmful, because so many dieters rely heavily on special diet products, high in artificial sweeteners and other chemicals, which a growing number of experts fear may eventually prove carcinogenic. In addition, most of those who lose weight soon gain it back, and this "yo-yo" syndrome is hardly likely to be healthier, indeed may well prove to be much less healthy, than staying at a higher weight.[12] Finally, as people find themselves repeatedly unable to do what is prescribed, their failure becomes a source of shame and guilt and self-deprecation, hardly healthy physically or mentally.

In addition, many observers have noted the growing phenomenon of the "worried well," a group whose ranks may swell as the "self-help road to health" movement catches on. According to Lewis Thomas, M.D., mass health education efforts have led to a widespread public misconception that "the body is fundamentally flawed, subject to disintegration at any moment, always on the verge of mortal disease, always in need of continual monitoring and support by health-care professionals."[13] He goes on to say that it is not only the medical care establishment which feels these concerns, "even the proponents of good hygiene, who argue publicly in favor of regular exercise, thinness, and abstinence from cigarettes and alcohol, base their arguments on the presumed intrinsic fallibility of human health."[14] In this atmosphere individuals tend to become overly

12. Dr. Hilde Bruche, author of several books and articles on the problems of weight and eating disorders, writes that many dieters "clamor for quick reduction" and because they are often disappointed when their high aspirations are not fulfilled, they enter into the cycles of "drastic losses and rapid regaining." " 'Dieting' to such patients . . . becomes a magical tool that will bring fulfillment of impossible aspirations. Without a corrective reappraisal of their fantastically high aspirations they are bound to be disappointed and will regain the painfully lost weight." Hilde Bruche, "The Psychology of Obesity," *Medical Opinion* (August 1973), p. 39

13. Lewis Thomas, "On the Science and Technology of Medicine," *Daedalus* 106:1 (Winter 1977), p. 43.

14. Ibid.

concerned about minor or nonexistent health problems, overload the medical care system, and fall prey to over-the-counter drug hypes.

At a December 1976 symposium on sleep disorders, sleep researchers agreed that one of the most common causes of insomnia is no cause at all. That is, when sleep patterns of a person complaining of insomnia are monitored in the laboratory it becomes clear that they have overestimated how long it takes them to fall asleep or how long they are awake during the night and thus underestimate their actual amount of nightly sleep. According to Dr. Sidney Cohen, psychiatrist at the University of California, insufficient sleep for one or two nights is not debilitating, contrary to what many people believe. "The major debilitating factor is related to the worry about not having slept." The sleep researchers also agreed that such "pseudo-insomnia" may result from widespread public ignorance that not all individuals require eight to nine hours of sleep a night.[15]

In short, to the extent that one seeks to mobilize individuals to treat themselves as a way to improve the public's health, one clearly should limit oneself to treatments whose benefit is clearly established. Otherwise, at best, individual mobilization will lead to needless effort and, at worst, the inadvertent harm may exceed the benefits.

We now turn to our second and major theme. To urge Americans to accept individual responsibility for their health is to underestimate the role of society in creating conditions under which individuals both need to and are able to mobilize their will power and to ignore the constraints societal factors impose on the impact of individualistic efforts.

THE TECHNOLOGY [SIC] OF WILL POWER

Dr. Knowles writes:

> Prevention of disease means *forsaking* the bad habits which many people enjoy—overeating, too much drinking, taking pills, staying up at night, engaging in promiscuous sex, driving too fast, and smoking cigarettes—or put another way, it means doing things which require special effort—exercising regularly, going to the dentist, practicing contraception, ensuring harmonious family life, submitting to screening examinations.[16]

Granted that some personal habits, such as drinking to excess and smoking, do require modification, it is far from self-evident that the most effective way to bring about large-scale behavior change is by exhorting millions of individuals to mobilize ever higher levels of will power to achieve ever greater degrees of self-control.

A taken-for-granted assumption underlying this approach is that the required behavior changes are of necessity effortful, unpleasant, or unenjoyable and thus require considerable amounts of self-denial. Because, in addition, the amount of personal effort needed is viewed as "fixed," it is taken for granted that what must be jacked up is the amount of "will power" each individual puts behind his or her health effort.

In contrast, we suggest that, rather than focusing on creating (and even more difficult, sustaining) the motivation to make difficult, unenjoyable habit changes, the emphasis should be on how to make adopting or

15. *New York Times*, 15 December 1976.

16. Knowles, "The Responsibility of the Individual," p. 59.

keeping to a healthful regimen easier to accomplish. By reducing the effort, tension, and strain needed to overcome unhealthy habits and sustain healthy ones, the same amount of will power or motivation to change would go a much longer way.

In some cases, technological shortcuts in the form of various medical interventions may prove helpful. For example, alcoholism is one of the major afflictions whose treatment has traditionally been viewed as requiring a mobilization of will power. Thus, it is generally stressed that alcoholics must be willing to admit to themselves and to others that they are alcoholic, must truly want and seek help, must recognize the seriousness of the problem, and agree to try hard not to drink again. The fact, however, is that most alcoholics who go on the wagon fall off it again. (As Mark Twain put it: It's easy to stop smoking; I did it many times.)

The problem seems to be that while many alcoholics have some motivation to stop drinking, it is insufficient for the difficult regimen of breaking their addiction. However, should antabuse, given in small dosages (such as 0.25 grams) prove safe, it might help a significant proportion of these alcoholics because it requires much less will power to take this medication regularly than to refrain from drinking. The medication acts by causing alcohol consumption to have highly unpleasant effects. Soon after ingesting the alcohol an individual who has taken antabuse may experience a burning sensation in the face and neck, a severe headache, and often, a feeling of faintness leading to vomiting. In the words of the physician who first detected the effects, Dr. Erik Jacobsen, "The discomfort is so intense that, once experienced, it prevents an overwhelming majority of patients from further attempts to take alcohol as long as they are influenced by antabuse."[17] The drug has been used infrequently because when it was first administered, in high dosages, it was believed to have caused a fatality. More recent studies, however, using lower dosages, are reported safe and effective, although the use of antabuse is still far from reliably indicated on either ground.[18] The drug serves better to illustrate an idea than as a prescription.

Similarly, unwanted pregnancies would be curbed if means of control were developed besides those requiring intervention before each intercourse (condom, diaphragm), regular intake (the Pill), or one which is anxiety-producing, difficult to reverse, and requires surgical intervention (sterilization and vasectomy). The required new procedure would be easily reversed, require one intervention until reversal was required, and involve no pain and no anxiety (the IUD used to be considered a fair approximation). With a given level of will power, such a technique would provide a means of preventing unwanted pregnancies superior to any other.

Seat belts and air bags do a thousand times more for safer driving than driver education does. We mean that literally; a study of the cost

17. E. Jacobsen and O. Mattensen-Larsen, "*Treatment of Alcoholism with Tetraethylthiuram Disulfide (Antabuse)*," *Journal of the American Medical Association* 139 (1949), p. 919.

18. For additional discussion see Amitai Etzioni and Richard Remp, "Technological 'Shortcuts' to Social Change," *Science* 175, 4017 (7 January 1972), pp. 31–38.

per death averted suggests that seat belts are 1,000 times more effective than driver education.[19]

All this is not to suggest that people should not "do their share," but rather to propose that in our moral predisposition for "strong" individuals, we are overlooking the fact that the most effective way to healthier lifestyles may be not in changing people's preferences and habits, but in recognizing their inclinations and easing their efforts with the help of science and technology.

SOCIAL CONDITIONS AND INDIVIDUAL WILL

Nor are the level of individual "strength" and wise conduct largely subject to self-control. They are, to a significant extent, dependent on social conditions. To illustrate the point from another area of human conduct, it has long been recognized that individuals are better able to resist government encroachment on their political and other liberties if they are members of "organic" communities, are bound together in voluntary associations, or are otherwise well integrated into the social fabric. No one is considered more vulnerable to government tyranny than an isolated, "atomized" individual. *The same holds for wise versus unwise health practices*. The mass society makes people vulnerable to exploitation through mass appeals, fashions, and fads. Dr. Beverly Winikoff of the Rockefeller Foundation has written:

> We offer nutrition and health education at the same time that we offer barrages of commercials for soft drinks, sweet snacks, high-fat foods, cigarettes, and alcohol. We tell people to stop smoking, and we subsidize the production of tobacco. We put candy machines in our schools and cigarette machines in our offices. . . . I do not think it is appropriate to expect the public to swim upstream against powerful currents of commercial information and socioeconomic pressures.[20]

It is not that those in well-integrated communities will necessarily follow wise health policies; that depends largely on what patterns their communities approve and disapprove, promote and discourage or condemn. It is a matter of what they define as wise conduct and how highly they value health versus other values, from conquest to success. True, persons who are committed to change their unhealthful habits can, to some extent, turn the impact of patterns of social and cultural communities to their advantage. For example, individuals seeking to overcome alcoholism, drug addiction, smoking, and compulsive eating tend to be more successful when they join a supportive peer group, such as Alcoholics Anonymous, Synanon, or Weight Watchers, than when they try to rely only on their own will power. Most individuals, however, find themselves unable to join such intensive group life, and even those who do must deal with the pressures of the larger society and culture, of which they are also members. A survey examining the role of environmental variables related to alcoholism concluded:

> An individual who is a member of a culture in which there is both pressure to drink and culturally induced guilt and confusion regarding what kinds of drinking behavior are appropriate, is

19. Elizabeth B. Drew, "HEW Grapples with PPBS," *The Public Interest* 8 (Summer 1967), p. 8

20. Beverly Winikoff, "Nutrition. A Global Problem," *RF Illustrated* (May, 1977) p. 4.

more likely to develop trouble than will most other persons.[21]

As another observer put it, there are very few alcoholics in Saudi Arabia.

In the same way, smoking has its social causes. It still carries cultural connotations of being "grown up" and "sophisticated," and starting to smoke still operates as a kind of "rite of passage" to many adolescents. This and related factors help explain why so many teenagers start smoking, although they are aware of the health risks.

Thus, while there is a significant individual element involved, a very high proportion of both the temptation to act unhealthily and the capacity to resist, or, to put it positively, to act healthily, is much less individually, than it is socially, determined.

THE SOCIETAL PROJECT

Beyond immediate peer group pressure, ethnic background and the general culture, is what we may call "America's project." Each society may be viewed as organized chiefly for one purpose, while other purposes take secondary and tertiary places. During a period of transition or disorganization, of course, no clear project may be visible. Thus, in the crusaders' day, medieval societies might be said to have seen their prime object in holy wars; traditional China had a great interest in cultural products; Athens, in public affairs. In our society, most of our time, resources, and attention are spent on production and consumption. These economic activities are the most valued and highly rewarded. A "societal project" is typically more responsive to certain of what humanist psychologist Abraham Maslow termed "basic human needs" than others. The American "work hard, play hard" consumer society is indeed so committed—if not addicted—to material and comfort needs of its members that its capacity to serve their health needs is thereby lowered.

Concretely, the societal project deeply affects all aspects of our life: work, leisure time, family life. Its impact on health—or unhealthy impact—is visible in each of them. At work, these affects are correlated with rank; thus, for those at the top, corporation leaders, advertising executives, management personnel in general, the main danger seems to be stress-related illness. "Making it" requires long hours and intense commitment as well as considerable self-discipline and competitive behavior, all of which are reported to be associated with high blood pressure and hence with a predisposition to a variety of illnesses, especially cardiovascular troubles. In the lower ranks, semiskilled, unskilled, and other members of the labor force and their families face health risks posed by the uncertainties of the production cycle. Studies suggest there is a positive, albeit complex, correlation between economic recession and infant and maternal mortality, mental hospital admissions, suicides, auto accidents, heart disease, and cardiovascular-renal disease.[22]

21. T. F. A. Plaut, *Alcohol Problems. A Report to the Nation by the Cooperative Commission on the Study of Alcoholism* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1967), cited in *Alcohol and Health* (Washington, D.C.: Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, December 1971), p. 34.

22 M. Harvey Brenner, "Fetal, Infant and Maternal Mortality During Periods of Economic Instability," *International Journal of Health Services* 3 (1973), pp. 145–59 and his *Mental Illnesses and the Economy* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973)

Meanwhile, the average worker is at risk from the estimated 12,000 on-the-job deaths and 2.1 million job-related injuries that, according to the National Safety Council, occur annually.[23] The Occupations Health and Safety Act of 1970, overwhelmingly passed by Congress, has been under attack by labor groups for failing to provide the worker with the protection promised in the legislation. A study prepared by the Department of Labor Subcommittee revealed that 96 percent of all covered employers had not experienced an inspection by the Occupational Health and Safety Administration during the Act's first three years of existence.[24] Although steps have been taken to provide adequate staffing for inspections and promulgation of standards, it seems that the Occupational Health and Safety Act affords inadequate protection for the problems of death and injuries on the job.

The consumer role that is central to the market economy is equally hazardous. Our leisure and recreational hours often center around use of hazardous products. The automobile is the main killer of those aged 15–24 and a major killer for all age groups. It has been predicted that 1,100 out of every 100,000 males in the United States will die from motor accidents. Using, for comparative purposes, the incidence of death due to polio when that disease was at its worst, the death rate due to motor accidents is 20 times as high.[25] By the time a white male in America reaches 35, his chances of dying in a motor accident are reduced by one half. For nonwhite males, however, the chances remain high, with nearly 800 out of every 100,000 likely to die from such accidents.[26] While it used to be widely held that it is the driver's unwise driving which is the main cause of accidents, Ralph Nader's book *Unsafe at Any Speed* and scores of studies have shown that the auto and road design are at least a major source of the problem.

Many children's toys are hazardous. The bicycle, for example, leads the Consumer Product Safety Commission's "Ten Most Wanted Products" list. To arrive at a product's ranking, both frequency and severity of injuries are taken into account with injuries to children and older people given extra weight.[27]

The traditional approach to consumer health hazards was to stress individual choice and responsibility. Caveat emptor—let the buyer beware. Moreover, the impossibility of eliminating all risk factors has long been stressed. As one popular argument goes: the only way to make certain you will never be in an auto accident is to stay at home and never go anywhere. It is assumed that each decision to consume a particular product entails an implicit balancing of risk against enjoyment.

The conclusion is that apparently the individual consumer prefers enjoyment to health. As columnist George Will puts it:

> Everyone says life is "priceless," but 75 percent of Americans do not use their cars' safety belts (only 4 percent use the shoulder harnesses) and would not buy them if the government gave them a choice. Every politician says what Senator Henry Jackson said when he en

23. *Accident Facts 1977 Preliminary Condensed Edition* (Chicago: National Safety Council, February, 1977).

24. Ibid.

25. Victor A. Fuchs, *Who Shall Live?* (New York. Basic Books, 1974), pp. 41–42.

26. Ibid., pp 43–44.

27. Steven Kelman, "Regulation by Numbers," *The Public Interest* 36 (Summer 1974 pp. 83–102

dorsed a plan to spend God only knows (certainly Jackson doesn't know) how many billions of dollars on expanded government health programs: "There is nothing more precious to any of us than our health." Those obviously false words are refuted by actions, by people routinely choosing the satisfaction of appetites over the improvement of health.[28]

The problem, as Dr. Irvine H. Page, editor of *Modern Medicine*, defines it, is how "to persuade a pleasure-loving, affluent and undisciplined society to accept the necessary warnings."[29]

Realistically, however, the consumer frequently has no knowledge of and no means of obtaining the needed knowledge concerning the health risks of various products. There are thousands of chemical compounds used in the processing and packing of food, soft drinks and the coloring of fruits, for example, which have not been tested for toxic or carcinogenic effect. Not even if every consumer were to go shopping with a van containing a chemical lab and a trailer full of monkeys to conduct his own tests, would it be possible through such individualistic efforts alone to establish the long-run effects of old and new dyes, additives, colorings, flavor agents. Similarly, when individuals buy health foods, they cannot check whether these products are really pure or just differently packaged and as chemically dosed as the rest. These are jobs for public agencies, for which citizens pay their taxes. Often the only effective way to express our will is through collective, public efforts.

Red Dye No. 2 provides a case in point. In wide use at least since 1970, it had never been permanently approved by the United States Food and Drug Administration (FDA) due to unresolved safety questions. As a result of a review by the FDA's National Center for Toxical Research which, near the end of 1975, concluded that there was a "statistically significant increase in a variety of malignant neoplasms [cancerous tumors] among tested rats," the dye was banned. It was only by means of a sophisticated biostatistical analysis that Red Dye No. 2 was found to be a possible cancer-causing agent.[30] Moreover, a person purchasing an ice cream cone has no way of knowing whether or not it contains Red Dye No. 2 or any other dye. Typically, until the government intervenes, there has been little the citizen can do.

The consumer's preferences and capacity to choose are also shaped by market availability. If Americans eat so much junk food, a major reason is that it is so alluringly packaged, so conveniently accessible, so temptingly ready to be eaten. It is ever-present to shoppers in supermarkets, to children in their refrigerators and school lunches—to everyone just about everywhere outside the home in fast food stands and vending machines. On the other hand, try to buy a piece of fruit in most subway, bus, or train stops.

In a similar vein, potential car buyers are saturated with appeals based on styling rather than safety. Dealers are well prepared to handle personal preferences for one color over another and such standard comfort options as a fancier exterior or a tape deck, but the individual interested in safety features, such as

28. George Will, "Run For Your Life," *Newsweek*, 19 April 1976.

29. Irvine H. Page, "Preventive Medicine," *Science* 193:4256 (3 September 1976), p. 1.

30. "FDA Outlaws Dye Used in Drugs, Food and Cosmetic Items," *New York Times*, 20 January 1976.

airbags, will find the marketing system much less accommodating.

The point is not that the individual has no degree of freedom, no personal responsibility for his or her own health. Where the unhealthy consequences of particular behaviors are clearly documented and widely known, and where choosing the more healthful behavior does not entail an unrealistically high sacrifice such as giving up one's job, the accountability of the individual is great. Thus, if an individual persists in smoking and develops lung cancer, or refuses to wear a hard hat on a construction job and is hurt by a falling brick, the decision ultimately was his to make and he is responsible for its consequences. The main point of the preceding analysis is to stress the importance of societal factors in setting both health hazards and ill-health temptations and in shaping the ability of the individual to cope with them.

As far as health policy follows, those who call on individuals to act wisely should spend more of their time addressing themselves to the existing sources of power which shape society, be more concerned with environment, workers and consumer protection, and, more deeply, with the nature of the societal project. Individuals have a better chance of improving their health by acting publicly, as voters and members of civic pressure groups, than as consumers, or workers, or homemakers, or parents. The ability to curb unhealthy habits and to evolve healthy ones lies largely on the societal, collective level.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 437, May 1978

Ethics, Justice, and Medical Care Systems

By DAVID MECHANIC

ABSTRACT: As medical costs mount and as government assumes increasing responsibility for financing, explicit forms of medical care rationing are likely to be introduced. This paper considers the benefits and costs of different approaches to rationing and their implications for a just medical care system. Rationing may be imposed through financial barriers for the patient in the form of coinsurance and deductibles or in limitations on the funds, facilities, and services made available to the population. It is argued that imposing barriers to access on the theory that consumers are in a good position to make necessary differentiations places the burden of rationing on the patient who is least able to make the decision rationally, and places the poor, who have the least medical knowledge and background, in particular jeopardy. Other alternatives include either the introduction of fixed budgets that require professionals to establish priorities or administrative decisions that prescribe the facilities and types of services made available to varying population groups. Rationing techniques have different behavioral and ethical implications, and existing research indicates that the consequences of some rationing approaches are inconsistent with theoretical assumptions.

David Mechanic is John Bascom Professor of Sociology and Director of the Center for Medical Sociology and Health Services Research at the University of Wisconsin, Madison. His books include Public Expectations and Health Care, Politics, Medicine, and Social Science, Mental Health and Social Policy, Medical Sociology, The Growth of Bureaucratic Medicine, *and* A Right to Health *(coauthor). He is presently a Guggenheim Fellow working on issues of health policy.*

This article was supported in part by a grant from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation.

AS FINANCING of medical care increasingly has become a governmental responsibility, the key fact about making decisions on health care distribution is that some explicit form of rationing must be adopted. No country in the world is likely to invest sufficient funds in medical care to allow providers and patients to use resources without limitation. To the extent that the provision of medical services remained in the private marketplace, rationing took place through a process of supply and demand. While large inequities resulted in the ability to obtain needed services, government could help correct these without facing major decisions on the overall distribution of care. But as government has assumed responsibility for a larger proportion of total costs, and as scientific and technological developments pose new and costly possibilities for increased consumption, government must more fully participate in decisions on the rules for allocating the available resources. Making such decisions in a just and ethical way is extraordinarily difficult, not only for political reasons, but also because of dilemmas inherent in the medical care enterprise. This paper considers some options for rationing health care services relative to certain standards of ethics and justice, examines certain theoretical implications of using these rationing techniques, and finally scrutinizes empirical results, where they are available, to assess the relationship between theory and reality.

Being neither an ethicist nor a philosopher, I have no elaborate theoretical views about what is just or ethical. Like most others, I have certain value preferences. As a just goal, I value a system of medical care distribution that results in the highest level of effective outcome, reduced disability, and enhanced comfort possible within a given range of available resources. My criteria for judgment are more pragmatic than theoretical; I am more interested in what works in fact than what seems logical in theory and, from my point of view, justice and ethics involve empirical, as much as they involve normative, issues. By this, I simply mean that decisions must be evaluated by their actual consequences, which can only be known through empirical study.

Justice in the provision of medical care is amenable to a variety of definitions. It can refer to equal access to care, equal use of care, use of care proportional to level of acute need, use of care proportional to existing health status, use of care proportional to expected benefits, and so on. Justice, or its absence, however, resides less in the formulation of such grand definitions than in the thousands of smaller decisions concerning allocations to varying facilities, personnel, disease groups, technologies, or whatever. Assuming there is no single answer to the question of what is just in any concrete case but rather a continuing and changing set of answers with changing social circumstances and in respect to particular patients, it is still necessary to establish clear norms that are a guide to action and that provide a framework for making and implementing decisions.

PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING JUST DISTRIBUTION

Whether any particular pattern of care is equitable depends on the assumptions and value commitments of the population, but these are very

difficult to know. Although some data are available from opinion polls, and we can observe the behavior of political figures who at least in theory represent the value choices of the population, this information is so general that it is not particularly helpful. In deriving a mechanism for making decisions we can either proceed from some theoretical theory of ethics or rights or attempt to approximate what the population would desire, assuming it had full information concerning needs, the real costs and benefits of medical care, and the existing distribution of care.

The population, however, is an amorphous collection of individuals and groups having varying degrees of information, experience, and understanding of human problems. Some feel strongly about human concerns while others remain apathetic. Thus, even if we knew how to pose the precise questions concerning allocation choices, it would not be clear, with all of the necessary contingencies, how to weigh the responses so as to arrive at an accurate portrait of the population's perceptions of what is just. But even more difficult is communicating to the public, in a fashion it understands, the nature of the policy issues that must be grasped to arrive at meaningful decisions. Having information in statistical or narrative form is quite different from appreciating the nature of the experience of others who find themselves in a situation of unfulfilled need. Can a person who has never seen a schizophrenic or a psychotically depressed patient really appreciate what it means to have such a patient in a family setting? Can an average person understand the anguish and coping needs of a mother who has a severely retarded youngster or a child with a profound physical disability? However difficult to achieve, unless such appreciation is part of the decisionmaking process, seemingly rational decisions can be very insensitive to human problems.

Such considerations pertain to the decisions of experts as well as of the general public. In such faddish fields as the management sciences and operations research, planning tools are frequently applied in a way that reveals only a superficial and excessively rationalistic understanding of the problems for which policy is being devised. Such planners often neglect human factors and lack appreciation of the burden of responsibility for those who must make very difficult and subtle decisions concerning the fate of others. While distance may provide a wider field of vision, it may also sometimes result in a callousness that would not occur if the planner saw the problem as the patient and the therapist have to see it.[1]

In reality, the needs of one social group or another are communicated by the ability of that group, or that of its advocates, to arouse an emotional response in those holding the powers of decision. To most people, for example, a mental hospital, a prison, a patient with chronic uremia or multiple sclerosis are abstract entities. As long as these remain abstractions, it is not difficult to maintain sentiment for holding the line or even reducing existing programs. Yet, the average person, brought face to face with the real contingencies of these institutions and patients, may develop very different views of need, the value of treatment, and

1. For a revealing discussion of how distance affects the willingness to harm another person, see Stanley Milgram, *Obedience to Authority* (New York: Harper, 1974).

budgetary allocations in general. Thus, advocates for any particular disease group or type of institution must compete to raise the public's consciousness about the problem with which they are concerned. The problem is that different disease lobbies have greatly varying resources, organizational potential, and persuasiveness; and thus the views resulting from such organizational efforts may distort reality.

WHO SHOULD RATION?

There are a variety of views among those who accept the necessity and inevitability of rationing about who should exercise this responsibility. In the traditional practice of medicine, office-based physicians sold their services to those who could purchase them, and thus economic access was the main determinant of the distribution of care. A great deal of care was provided to indigent patients by both physicians and hospitals, either as charity or on a sliding scale. While it was understood that physicians treating private patients in community hospitals were also to provide free services to the indigent, patterns of care that emerged on private and public services were quite different from each other.[2] Public services were the major source of patients for teaching and research, and the participation of the poor was assumed to be the quid pro quo for the care they received. Thus, patients' access to care and the amount of care they consumed were products of their desire and ability to buy available services or the result of their ability to involve physicians in their care either because they were interesting cases for research and teaching or because they were able to elicit altruistic responses. While such rationing resulted in large inequities, it avoided the dilemma of deciding how to distribute scarce resources. Each physician made his own determination of where he would give his time and effort. Those patients who could pay would get all that medical science made possible, and there was relatively little questioning of the justice of this arrangement. It is significant, however, that the House of Delegates of the American Medical Association, as early as 1959, declared that physicians should ration services for welfare patients:

> The individual physician and the medical profession as a group must also be concerned with maintaining a proper balance between adequate medical care for the welfare patient and economical use of public funds. . . . The individual physician, as the key person in the care of the welfare patient, must, therefore, take into consideration not only the medical but the financial aspects of various acceptable modes of treatment.[3]

As federal subsidy for the aged and indigent and health fringe benefits gained through collective bargaining for the bulk of the population became the most common modes of financing health care, incentives for controlling the consumption of medical services became much weaker. With increased third-party coverage, neither the doctor nor the patient had any incentive in doing less than what was possible in any given instance; and both developing medical technology and the doctor's bias to take whatever action he could re-

2. See, for example, Raymond S. Duff and August B Hollingshead, *Sickness and Society* (New York: Harper, 1968).

3. Quoted in William R. Roy, "Shattuck Lecture—An Agenda for Physicians and Legislators, 1976," *New England Journal of Medicine* 295 (9 September 1976), p. 593.

gardless of cost[4] provided a great impetus to medical care consumption.

Most of the inhibitions on consumption came through financial barriers for the patient in the form of coinsurance and deductibles or in restrictions on the types of care covered under federal programs or insurance contracts. Physicians were free to make decisions without any consciousness of cost within the range of guaranteed services, and any rationing was to come through the patient's restraint in requesting medical services or through the pressures patients might bring on physicians to be more cost conscious because of cost-sharing features involved in their insurance program. But such cost-sharing features—very much like the direct fee—have greater inhibitory effects on the poor than on the more affluent and continue existing inequalities in distribution.

Deductibles and coinsurance, beyond being simple methods of cost reduction, are justified in the belief that medical care consists of more basic and more discretionary components, and that patients can differentiate their need for these two types of service. While there is wide agreement that basic services ought to be available to all, other aspects of care are seen as no more necessary than a wide variety of other goods and services. If the consumer is, in part, at risk for the costs of care—so the theory goes—he or she will judge carefully whether particular medical services are really essential and will exercise more prudence in utilization. While some aspects of care are clearly discretionary, the assumption that patients have sufficient understanding of their needs and problems to distinguish the seriousness of their condition is highly exaggerated. While cost sharing may inhibit the patient from seeking care, it is just as likely to do so in instances where care is essential and significant benefits can be obtained. Patients tend to respond to symptoms that disrupt functioning.[5] Such symptoms may not be very serious from a medical standpoint, while others that appear to the patient as relatively benign may require immediate treatment. Indeed, if the issue of what illnesses require care is as simple as proponents of the theory would have us believe, it is difficult to explain why well-trained physicians must incur such large expenditures in evaluating these patients. The fact is that such assessments are often not simple at all; to impose barriers to access on the theory that consumers are in a good position to make necessary differentiations places the burden of rationing on the patient who is least able to make the decision rationally, and places the poor, who have least medical knowledge and background, in particular jeopardy.

This is not to deny that many instances of care are of questionable value relative to their cost. To the extent that such instances are definable, they are better handled by exclusion from insurance coverage or through special insurance provisions than as part of a general coinsurance and deductible provision. Such special provisions are frequently used to cover dental, orthodontic, and psychiatric services because these services are expensive, and there would be large demand for them if

4. Victor Fuchs, "The Growing Demand for Medical Care," *New England Journal of Medicine* 279 (25 July 1968), pp. 190–95.

5. See David Mechanic, *Medical Sociology: A Selective View* (New York: Free Press, 1968), pp. 115–57

they were not rationed in some fashion. Whether such services should be provided as a matter of "right," or treated more like other consumer goods, depends on concepts of equity current at a particular time and on the assumed importance of the service for the health status of the population.

For example, it could be argued that orthodontia is not sufficiently important for health to include it in a public program. Although there are large disparities in the use of such services between the affluent and the poor, this is not of great concern because no reasonable health proposal would seek to equalize access to everything simply because disparities exist. The fact that this service has always been categorically separate from medical care makes it simple to exclude it, and a similar situation pertains to dental, ophthalmological, and psychiatric services. There are, however, procedures more directly within the context of medical care that are relatively worthless, expensive, and may pose dangers to health as well. Insurers rarely tamper with exclusion of such services because to do so implies interference with the practice of medicine and the physician's prerogatives. It would be more rational, however, to evaluate scientifically and exclude public subsidy of certain medical and surgical procedures that are relatively worthless than it is to assume that consumers can make effective decisions about what care is truly necessary. Politically, however, it is easier to place the burden of decision on the consumer than it is to challenge the social authority of the physician. Because physicians make the most costly medical decisions, the emphasis on rationing through the consumer is misplaced.

There is fear that eliminating cost-sharing features would greatly increase the demand for medical care, the burdens on the medical care system, and total cost. Because of the reasons already noted, as well as my belief that patients should have access to the system of care when they feel they have a problem, I believe it is undesirable to maintain financial barriers to primary care. However, it would be prudent to structure the first level of care so as to meet the needs of patients at much lower cost and with much greater dependence on nonphysician personnel. If it seems plausible that untutored laymen can differentiate symptoms that require care from those that do not, then it should be even more apparent that many decisions can be made by nurse practitioners, nurse clinicians, and physician assistants.[6] It is a strange logician who argues that the ordinary patient can make these distinctions, but then recoils at the suggestion that anyone besides a physician with eight or ten years of medical training is capable of judgment.

If services are not rationed to the consumer through economic barriers, they may be controlled through allocative and regulatory decisions by health care planners or through physician decisionmaking.[7] While the former mode depends on inclusions and exclusions of benefits, decisions concerning manpower and facility allocations, and social regulation of medical work, the latter de-

6. Charles Lewis, Rashi Fein, and David Mechanic, *A Right to Health: The Problem of Access to Primary Medical Care* (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1976).

7. David Mechanic, "The Growth of Medical Technology and Bureaucracy: Implications for Medical Care," *Health and Society: The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly* 55 (Winter 1977), pp. 61–78.

pends on encouraging physicians to make allocative decisions in the process of delivering patient care. Each of these approaches has potentialities and dangers that deserve some extended consideration.

The single most important condition that affects any mode of rationing is whether it takes place within the context of an open-ended or a fixed prospective budget. Attempts to control costs in the open-ended situation involve such mechanisms as exhortation to encourage cost consciousness among physicians, utilization review, rate review, and auditing of charges. One of the major motivations for the Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs) is cost control, although if such review were to be performed conscientiously, it might very well increase, rather than decrease, total costs. Because outcome studies are relatively rare, review of medical work is likely to depend on process norms. The development of such norms as minimal standards of care is as likely to increase the number of procedures and associated costs as it is to decrease them. The irony is that the attempt to maintain the open ended, fee-for-service system within manageable economic limits has necessitated the growth of bureaucratic and administrative mechanisms that in all likelihood are more elaborate than those required by a totally nationalized system of health care. As the cost crisis becomes more acute, one regulatory device after another is introduced, each requiring personnel and funds for its implementation, and each putting an additional bureaucratic burden on provider organizations and individual practitioners. The result is an unwieldy and costly apparatus that not only adds complexity, but also fails to achieve what it was designed to accomplish.

The success of any regulatory structure, such as rate review or utilization review, depends on who carries out the review, the standards they develop, and how rigorously they apply them. The politics of the evolution of such groups, however, inevitably involve major participation and usually control by those who are to be regulated or at least those who share their conceptions of things. The result may be that review becomes a justification for, rather than a check on, increased costs. Moreover, because of the private nature of the health sector, much of the expertise necessary for critically scrutinizing and evaluating justifications for rate increases lies in the organizations that are to be regulated, and it is difficult for government to develop a countervailing capacity. Thus rate review often fails to achieve its purpose, although it imposes one more bureaucratic chore on both private and public sectors.

The most effective and simple device to control costs is simply to move toward a fixed prospective budget and to maintain a limit on total expenditures for medical care. Within such a structured budget, allocative decisions can be made either administratively, through professional medical judgment, or by some combination of the two. The advantage of allowing physicians to allocate available funds among competing needs is that they are closest to the actual problems and, thus, in a better position to see firsthand the human consequences of rationing decisions. Administrators may have a broader perspective and more aggregate information, but they are further from the clinical contingencies.

RATIONING AND THE PHYSICIAN

The basic theory implied by rationing through a fixed prospective capitation, or a similar type of fixed payment, is that the clinical service, or the physician who is closest to the problems on a day-by-day basis, can make wise allocation decisions in determining what needs have to be met and which ones are more discretionary. It is believed that such a process will, if the budget is ample, contain costs without violating important patient needs. Because it is assumed. that physicians are both ethical and sufficiently preprogrammed to want to do the best for their patients, they are in the best position to decide when it is appropriate to ration.

The behavior of doctors, however, is influenced in a variety of ways contrary to the above assumptions. First, much of medical care is uncertain, and no clear norms exist as to when services are more or less discretionary. Physicians have been taught to do all they can, and they tend to favor those services that are more technologically elegant. Thus, given the uncertainties of the value of many treatments, physicians are likely to give less priority to the more mundane, unexciting, and routine forms of care than to the possibilities that are more stimulating for them. Like any other professional, physicians seek out interesting, nonroutine tasks and other people who are attractive and fun to work with. They also aspire to engage in the types of work that are more highly recognized by their colleagues who are associated with greater prestige and that allow them to maintain and perfect their skills—aspirations that are all reinforced by existing patterns of medical education. Given these value orientations and personal needs, it is not at all self-evident that physicians make rationing decisions in a manner that fits closely some objective rational assessment of need. In systems where capitation is the primary mode of payment, physicians often engage in behaviors that seem to be inconsistent with good practice or the most effective use of manpower.[8] Capitation, for example, encourages physicians to devote less time to their practices,[9] to refer patients to specialized services when they could be effectively evaluated and followed by the primary physician,[10] and to be less involved in the caring aspects of the physician's role.[11] There is also some fragmentary evidence that the more aggressive, sophisticated, and interesting patients (who are usually more affluent) obtain more services in capitation systems than those more needy, suggesting that capitation by itself is an inadequate remedy to the problem of distributing scarce services equitably.[12] We have no reason to believe that the personal and professional influences that affect the physician's behavior in other contexts will not continue in capitation systems. Indeed, once remuneration is no longer at issue,

8. William A. Glaser, *Paying the Doctor: Systems of Remuneration and Their Effects* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970).

9. David Mechanic, *The Growth of Bureaucratic Medicine: An Inquiry into the Dynamics of Patient Behavior and the Organization of Medical Care* (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1976).

10. Gordon Forsyth and Robert F. L. Logan, *Gateway or Dividing Line? A Study of Hospital Outpatients in the 1960s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968).

11. Mechanic, *Growth of Bureaucratic Medicine*.

12. Robert Hetherington, Carl Hopkins, and Milton Roemer, *Health Insurance Plans: Promise and Performance* (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1975).

it may be that capitation tends to accentuate those other factors that influence physicians' decisionmaking. The final determinant of how physicians ration services, thus, will not be the mode of financing, but rather the relative importance of varying personal and professional interests the physician may have. Unless equity of distribution of his time and efforts is a major concern to the physician or to the clinical staff, capitation, by itself, will not bring rationing about. Nor does a capitation system necessarily cause redistribution of resources at the social level.[13,14]

Developing a means of rationing services that is equitable and responsive to patients, that provides incentives to the physician for good care, and that is sensitive to the public need to contain expenditures is a formidable task. It is increasingly advocated that this could be achieved by putting the physician at risk in some fashion when he overutilizes services. While such mechanisms have been developed by Kaiser-Permanente and some other insurance programs,[15] there is no evidence that such devices put the physician sufficiently at risk in any context to test seriously its implications for the delivery of care. For example, in Kaiser-Permanente, the impact of a physician's being at risk at the remuneration end of the equation seems to be small and the influence of the individual physician's behavior on savings too little to compete with personal or professional influences. If such an incentive is to work, it must make the entire group cost conscious and result in peer pressures within the group supporting such behavior; but there is no evidence that this really occurs. It seems far more likely that the savings achieved by the Kaiser-Permanente groups reflect controls over inputs of professional manpower and facilities such as hospital beds.

A crucial question in the evaluation of any system that provides incentives for the physician to economize on the provision of services is whether the physician, in fact, feels at risk of losing remuneration by not rationing. Moreover, if physicians' incomes are already high—and they are—then such attitudes among physicians as to whether they have a responsibility to ration and whether they ethically should benefit economically by withholding services from their patients become important. Some physicians clearly regard such bonuses as unethical and would probably forego them in contrast to changing how they practice, particularly if their incomes are already high. Of course, an administrative solution to such problems is to increase the risk to the physician to the point where noncooperation would be economically painful, but it is not clear that the political clout to institute such a system will exist for a long time to come.

In sum, then, the attempt to develop incentives for physicians to ration must confront a variety of realities. These include the philosophy or ideology of the physician,[16] the extent to which he actually feels at

13. Robert F. L. Logan, "National Health Planning—An Appraisal of the State of the Art," *International Journal of Health Services* 1 (1971), pp 6–17.

14. Michael Cooper, *Rationing Health Care* (New York. Wiley, 1975).

15. Scott Fleming, "Anatomy of the Kaiser-Permanente Program," in *The Kaiser-Permanente Medical Care Program A Symposium*, ed. Anne Somers (New York. Commonwealth, 1971), pp 23–32.

16. Eliot Freidson, *Profession of Medicine A Study of the Sociology of Applied Knowledge* (New York: Dodd-Mead, 1970).

risk, and the strength of peer influences. It also depends on whether physicians truly understand the system of incentives, their desire to make the incentive system work, and their interest in doing the right thing, whatever they believe that to be. Many a program has faltered because the administrative incentives were not really understood by the people they were to affect or were manipulated so as to thwart their basic objective. Given what we know about the peer review system and the physician's ideology of autonomy and responsibility, it seems unlikely that an incentive system operating on a large group of physicians in the aggregate will be very effective in contrast to one that operates in relationship to the individual physician.[17] It is instructive that fee-for-service groups, such as the Palo Alto Clinic, have developed very elaborate means of evaluating each physician's productivity in order to arrive at an appropriate level of remuneration.

Whatever the success or failure of the incentives in affecting the physician's stance, the more important question of what effect such incentives have on the quality of medical work and on the relationships that emerge between patients and physicians remains to be answered. The types of incentives being envisioned are effective precisely because they put the physician's and patient's interests to some extent at odds. If the physician holds back on providing services in discretionary situations, he can economically benefit. The incentives operative in most programs thus far have probably been too weak to have much effect, but when we consider making such incentives more powerful, we also must take into account the impact on the doctor-patient relationship.

Doctor-patient relationships are already undergoing change.[18] Patients are more demanding, fewer are likely to accept the authority of the physician, and they are generally more suspicious. Although trust and openness are important aspects of the relationship, these elements appear to be eroding. Moreover, the growing bureaucratization of medicine, the increasing discontinuity of services with growing subspecialization, and the characteristic impersonality of large organizational settings further strain trust. When a patient feels in need of a particular service and denial of it is made in the financial interests of the physician, the opportunity to develop desirable relationships between doctors and patients becomes further eroded. Because physicians are likely to feel these strains as strongly as patients, they may do whatever they can to avoid denying services the patient feels he or she needs. The likely result is that more services will go to the informed, sophisticated, and aggressive patients than to the less educated, more passive, and less assertive ones, thus leading to new inequities. The dilemma is that the incentives required to make the physician cost conscious, not only about his own behavior but also about referrals and supplementary services, are also likely to exacerbate growing frictions between doctors and patients, and may contribute to undermining

17. Eliot Freidson, *Doctoring Together: A Study of Professional Social Control* (New York: Elsevier, 1976).

18. Marie Haug, "The Erosion of Professional Authority: A Cross-Cultural Inquiry in the Case of the Physician," *Health and Society: The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly* 54 (Winter 1976), pp. 83–106.

an essential aspect of their relationship.

A traditional way of dealing with these kinds of problems is to put responsibility on an outside authority which shifts the client's anger away from the physician, whom he can see as his ally, on to some administrative or bureaucratic rule. The possible threat to the physician-patient relationship implicit in rationing argues for making as many rationing decisions administratively as seems consistent with good medical practice. In any endeavor as uncertain and complex as medical care, one would want the professional to have many options and a great deal of discretion. Thus, to specify in any precise way what should or should not be done in any specific case is likely to have a demoralizing effect on medical care. But administrative guidelines, if carefully formulated, can set reasonable boundaries in which physician discretion can remain operational and will, at the same time, strengthen the physician's position relative to the patient and also limit the most expensive variabilities in behavior.

There are a variety of administrative options that do not depend so directly on the physician's personal knowledge of the patient. The administration of a plan can decide on the inputs at the primary, secondary, and tertiary service levels. It can determine the mix between physicians and other types of professional and paraprofessional manpower. It can set limits on the abuse of certain very expensive services by limiting which professionals have direct access to such services. It can require prereview of services most likely to be misused or abused. And it can provide an outside authority to take responsibility when conflicts in viewpoint exist between patient and doctor and thus reduce the stress between doctor and patient. Within the context of these limitations, physicians could be relatively free to make the decisions they feel necessary in caring for their patients. Obviously there are points of conflict; administrative control will inevitably limit the autonomy and discretion of the doctor. The issue is no longer whether such autonomy should be limited; it is now how to define a framework for rationing that conserves resources, where they can reasonably be saved, without sacrificing the provision of good care or the morale and commitment of the physician. Such a system, moreover, must be structured to take account of the contingencies that only the physician can know because he knows his patient. Developing such a framework will require a great deal of trial and error and careful experimentation.

In conclusion, rationing can never be just in the sense that it promises each patient the same services or equal units of service.[19] Moreover, because it is impossible to control the human contingencies of the complex interactions and judgments that surround illness, and the medical venture is basically an uncertain one, rationing cannot promise that all patients with comparable problems will be treated alike. The provision of medical care—no matter how organized bureaucratically—is an individualized and personal process. Much of the value derived from this kind of service is dependent on the trust that evolves between patient and physician and on the ability of the health professional to assess,

19. David Mechanic, "Rationing Health Care. Public Policy and the Medical Marketplace," *Hastings Center Report* 6 (February 1976), pp 34–37.

treat, and support the patient in a manner appropriate to his or her personal circumstances, medical characteristics, and life history. In this context, justice refers not to any specific quantity or type of service but to the establishment of a rationing process that is as explicit as possible, and yet where the rules for rationing are based on sound clinical judgment, rather than on arbitrary social categorizations. In short, the issue is not whether health services ought to be rationed, for we have always rationed them in one manner or another. The key point is that the means we develop for rationing must encompass equity, as well as efficiency, and produce care that is dignified and personal.[20]

20. See Jan Howard and Anselm Strauss eds., *Humanizing Health Care* (New York: Wiley-Interscience, 1975).

The Making of the Compassionate Physician-Investigator

By JOHN J. LALLY

ABSTRACT: The author draws upon a number of studies to examine the multistaged process of selection and socialization—from medical school through internship and residency and into the research career—that pertains to the development of research physicians with an ethically informed concern for human subjects. Recent changes relevant to this process are discussed, deficiencies are analyzed, brief recommendations for remedies and improvements are made, and the need for supplementary controls is reaffirmed, all in the interest of more rational and better protection of subjects' welfare and rights.

John J Lally is Associate Professor and former Chairman of the Department of Sociology at Herbert H. Lehman College of the City University of New York. He earned his bachelor's and master's degrees at Fordham University and his doctorate in sociology from Columbia. Coauthor of the book Research on Human Subjects, *he has also contributed articles on the sociology of medicine to various professional journals. Professor Lally has served as a consultant to the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research as well as to the Task Force on Religion and Psychiatry of the American Psychiatric Association.*

Acknowledgment is made to Bradford H. Gray for his useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper.

ANY SYSTEM of controls designed to safeguard the welfare and rights of persons who serve as research subjects is much more likely to succeed if each experimenter is predisposed to protect subjects' rights. With regard to biomedical research, Bernard Barber and I recently discussed the part played by the compassionate physician-investigator in the protection of subjects, focusing upon situational determinants of researchers' concern for their subjects.[1]

The present paper will complement that study. In it I will examine the multistaged process of the introduction of a compassion for human subjects into the education, or socialization, of those who become research physicians, that is, as they progress through medical school, internship and residency, and into research careers.

In referring to "compassion for human subjects," I use the term "compassion" broadly, to mean a composite quality, having both affective and cognitive dimensions and involving not only an attitude and internalized values, generally unarticulated, but also learned, explicit norms and ethical principles and techniques—what in its entirety might be said to comprise an ethically informed concern for individuals who serve as subjects. A compassion for subjects must be ethically informed if it is to be effective in the face of the complex, changing, and conflicting issues, like those related to disclosure, consent, risk and benefit, which are involved in human experimentation. The more tacit and often deep-seated value and attitudinal elements of such compassion are more likely to be demonstrated than taught; that is, transmitted in practice, largely through role models, as, for example, when the intern works with compassionate research physicians. The more articulated ethical-normative components are learned through discussion and reflection on formal teaching or reading, as well as on one's own experience and the example of significant others.[2]

"Education is a cornerstone for any meaningful attempt to construct a system of control of . . . medical experimentation."[3] However, the outcome of socialization is partly dependent upon selection—both self-selection by those who seek the education and selective recruitment of those to be educated by the socializing institution. That is, new socialization must work "with" or "on" those qualities with which recruits, who have been molded by previous socialization, are admitted.[4] Consequently, I will pay some attention, also, to the process of selection, at each stage of medical education, as it pertains to development of research physicians with an ethically informed concern for research subjects.

1. John J. Lally and Bernard Barber, "'The Compassionate Physician'. Frequency and Determinants of Physician-Investigator Concern for Human Subjects," *Social Forces*, vol. 53 (December 1974), pp. 289–96.

2. Larry R. Churchill, "Ethos and Ethics in Medical Education," *North Carolina Medical Journal*, vol 36 (January 1975), pp. 31–32.

3. Jay Katz, "The Education of the Physician-Investigator," *Daedalus*, vol. 98 (Spring 1969), p 494.

4 Julia Loughlin Makarushka, "Learning to be Ethical· Patterns of Socialization and their Variable Consequences for the Ethical Standards of Bio-Medical Researchers" (Ph.D. diss., Columbia University, 1971), chap. 3

In short, in this article, insofar as data are *available*, *I will discuss* the process of the making of the compassionate physician-investigator and its deficiencies. I will include treatment of recent changes affecting this process, and, in conclusion, will briefly make recommendations for remedies and improvements in light of the shortcomings disclosed.

In executing these tasks I will draw upon my colleagues' and my own recent work, particularly upon findings from our 1970 interview study of 307 research physicians in two hospitals, representing a large number of the institutions where clinical research is conducted.[5] Besides this "Two-Institution Interview Study," I will also use a number of other studies, especially some newer ones. I turn now to examination of socialization and selection at the undergraduate medical school level.

MEDICAL SCHOOL

Socialization

In the Two-Institution Interview Study, 307 physician-investigators were asked to recall and to discuss when and how they had been made aware of the ethical issues involved in biomedical human experimentation, that is, those issues concerning the rights and welfare of research subjects, especially informed consent and risk-benefit ratio. Queries concerning the extent to which medical school experiences had contributed to such awareness elicited the following information.

5 Bernard Barber et al., *Research on Human Subjects Problems of Social Control in Medical Experimentation* (New York: Russel Sage Foundation, 1973). Unless otherwise indicated, findings used will be from chapter 6 or 7.

Responses indicated that there had been little treatment of the issues of research ethics as a planned component of the medical school curriculum. Only 13 percent of the researchers reported that they had had a seminar, a lecture, or part of a course devoted to the issues, and only one researcher said that he had had a complete course dealing with them.

A much larger number of ethically sensitizing experiences was reported which appear not to have been explicitly intended to teach research ethics, or which were ad hoc; that is, cases where ethical socialization was a latent consequence of more deliberately arranged training during preclinical and clinical years. Roughly half the researchers recalled that, as medical students, their ethical reflection had been occasioned by one, or in some cases more than one, experience. Examples are: discussion with fellow students or teachers about ethical aspects of specific research that came up in reading or in class; experimental work with animals; serving as a research subject; the example of ethical clinical research conducted by particular instructors; contact with patients which dramatized the need for research; or learning of research that harmed subjects or was done without subjects' consent.

In sum, then, the evidence shows that in medical school there was a minimum of deliberate and systematic socialization of future researchers into ethical concern for experimental subjects, and that, although there was considerably more unplanned and ad hoc ethical socialization, such experiences were neither consistent nor universal.

Supplementing these findings is

the conclusion suggested by Agnes Rezler's recent review of the literature on attitude change during medical school: that generally "medical education . . . does not seem to increase student humanism or benevolence; at best it leaves these attitudes intact in those students who exhibit them to a high degree at entrance."[6]

At the same time that socialization of future researchers into compassion for subjects has apparently been quite limited, there does seem to have been more of another kind of socialization impressing them, both during medical school and later educational stages. As a consequence of the Flexner Report in 1910 and as the practice of medicine became more and more pervasively scientific, the substance of medical education at all levels was increasingly limited to scientific knowledge. And accompanying this great inculcation of the scientific substance was a heavy emphasis on the value of scientific research in medicine and little emphasis on ethical concern for the subjects of that research.

Although generally prevalent in medical schools, this imbalance in emphasis has been greater in the socialization of some medical students than in that of others. For one thing, the learning environments in some medical schools—particularly in the prestigious schools—have been more oriented toward research and academic medicine than the environments in other schools.[7] Furthermore, even in the same school, research-oriented students and clinically-oriented students tend to travel different paths and to be influenced by different instructors, preceptors, and peers.[8]

Suggestive evidence that such an imbalance in emphasis leads to more permissive standards on the consent and risk-benefit issues comes from the Two-Institution Interview Study. It was found that physician-investigators who said they had reacted to their first experience involving ethical issues of human experimentation with an increased concern for the advancement of science were more willing to permit disproportionate risk to subjects and were less alert to the requirement of informed consent (as indicated by their responses to two hypothetical research proposals) than those whose first experience had led them to feel concerned because subjects' rights or welfare had been neglected in favor of research.

Thus, it seems not so much that professional socialization cannot be effective, but that it may be of the wrong kind for certain purposes, or be given in the wrong proportions. A too casual attitude toward research subjects, when it exists, may exist not only because of a lack of socialization into specific knowledge about and serious regard for their welfare and rights as individual persons, but also, we conclude, because of the more effective imparting of values central to the medical research profession: in particular, the importance of new medical knowledge, but also of priority in scientific discovery and of the pro-

6. Agnes G. Rezler, "Attitude Changes During Medical School. A Review of the Literature," *Journal of Medical Education*, vol. 49 (November 1974), p. 1025.

7. Stephen J. Miller, *Prescription for Leadership* (Chicago: Aldine, 1970), p. 62.

8. Edward Gottheil, Irwin N. Hassenfeld, and Elizabeth Gronkiewicz, "Students' Perceptions of Medical School and Their Attitudes Towards Patients," *British Journal of Medical Education*, vol. 3 (December 1969), p. 358.

fessional autonomy of the individual physician and scientist.

Selection

During the Flexnerian era medical school entrance requirements and recommendations reflected the development of the highly science-oriented medical school curriculum. It has been observed that, facing difficult competition for getting into medical school, "the typical premedical student during the 1940's, the 1950's, and the 1960's" *felt* "compelled to concentrate on the biological and physical sciences—and compelled to deemphasize the *humanities*."[9] *Although throughout* that period admissions committees seem to have chosen applicants with at least moderate interest in people and service,[10] academic capability was increasingly stressed as a criterion for admission.[11] Moreover, "the values that faculty and admissions committees have established have permeated the public so that those who select these professions have already done some self-screening or have been screened out by counselors or others in terms of the expectations of the role."[12]

With regard to selection more specifically relating to the physician-scientist role, certain of the more prestigious medical schools have been known to emphasize the training of academic and research physicians. Their admissions committees reportedly have paid particular attention to candidates' achievement in such subjects as organic chemistry and "independent scientific research" in college. Many premedical students interested in research or academic careers and most premedical advisors have been aware of these things and have acted accordingly.[13] Also, as implied above, such students, when in medical school, commonly have selected, or have been selected for, more science-centered socializing experiences than other medical students.

Recent changes

Since the 1960s, society and the federal government have exerted pressure for training more doctors who are interested in primary care and prevention rather than research and specialized medicine, so that a more adequate and affordable health care to all segments of the population in all geographical areas of the nation might be provided. An informed public has become aware of ethical and social questions raised by improved resuscitative and life-prolonging medical procedures, by behavioral and genetic manipulation, as well as by legalized abortion, and has been alerted to abuses as well as uses of biomedical human experimentation. The government has issued regulations for, and required institutional

9. Lowell E. Bellin, "How Medical Practitioners Get the Scars That Distort Their Human Values," *Columbia University Seminar Reports*, vol. 3, no. 7 (1975), p. 137.

10. Daniel H Funkenstein, "Medical Students, Medical Schools, and Society During Three Eras," in *Psychosocial Aspects of Medical Training* eds. R. H. Coombs and C. E. Vincent (Springfield, Ill.. Charles C. Thomas, 1971), pp. 243–50

11. John S. Wellington, "Changing Values and the Selection Process for Medical School," in *Ethics of Health Care*, ed. L R. Tancredi (Washington, D.C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1974), p. 180.

12. Anne Kibrick, "Commentary," in *Ethics of Health Care*, ed. Tancredi (Washington, D C.: National Academy of Sciences, 1974), p. 188.

13. Interview with Dr. Mary Jane Kingkade, Pre-Medical Advisor, Lehman College, CUNY, 29 March 1977.

review of, the clinical research it supports and also has established a national commission to help ensure protection of research subjects.

As a result of, or related to these developments in society, in medical schools there have been the following changes relevant to the making of compassionate physician-investigators.

Medical school enrollments have expanded. There have been increased proportions of minority group members and females among those accepted. Most of the premedical graduates admitted still are science majors, but there appear to be more than before who have majored in the social and behavioral sciences and in the humanities.

There is some evidence that, associated with these admissions changes, the late 1960s saw a "new breed" of applicants emerging and entering medical school.[14] The "new" medical student was, reputedly, a more socially and ethically concerned, critical, egalitarian, and activist person, who placed higher value on sensitivity and compassion in the doctor-patient relationship.[15]

In response to pressures from society and the government, as well as from the new students, and with the advocacy of many medical administrators and some faculty members, modifications have been made in medical school curricula. Relevant curricular changes include increases in the amount of training in the social and behavioral sciences, in the humanities, and in medical ethics.[16]

Specifically with regard to the last subject, since about 1970 there has been considerable growth in the number of medical school courses, even programs, and, especially, conferences and lectures, on medical ethics. Not infrequently these include treatment of the specific issues of human experimentation; in other cases, the general question of informed consent in medical interventions is commonly discussed. A 1974 national survey, conducted by Robert Veatch and Sharmon Sollitto, showed that all but 10 of 107 American medical schools responding had some form of medical ethics teaching.[17] Over half the schools reported that they offered symposia, workshops, clinical case conferences, single lectures, or a lecture series in medical ethics. Also, elective courses, specifically in medical ethics, were available in 47 institutions, and required courses existed at five. In addition, 69 schools indicated that they offered courses (often behavioral science or humanities courses) or clinical experiences in which medical ethical issues arise but which were not designed primarily to teach medical ethics; and, furthermore, only 19 of these institutions listed no other form of teaching in medical ethics.

How much difference have these various changes in society and medical schools made in the values and

14 Funkenstein, "Medical Students, Medical Schools, and Society During Three Eras," pp. 237–50.

15. Renée C. Fox, "Is There a 'New' Medical Student? A Comparative View of Medical Socialization in the 1950's and the 1970's," in *Ethics of Health Care*, ed. Tancredi (Washington, D.C.. National Academy of Sciences, 1974), pp. 217–18.

16. Ibid., p. 212, see also Sam A. Banks and E A. Vastyan, "Humanistic Studies in Medical Education," *Journal of Medical Education*, vol. 48 (March 1973), pp. 248–49.

17. Robert M. Veatch and Sharmon Sollitto, "Medical Ethics Teaching. Report of a National Medical School Survey," *Journal of the American Medical Association*, vol. 235 (8 March 1976), pp. 1030–31.

attitudes of students graduating from these schools? Apparently not very much, at least thus far.

Lately, at one medical school, Rodney Coe, Max Pepper and Mary Mattis did a longitudinal study of attitudes held by successive entering classes between 1970 and 1975, surveying the entering classes of 1970 and 1971 both as freshman and as seniors.[18] The study suggests that to some extent there was a "new" type of student being admitted to medical school in the early 1970s. However, to a great extent this more liberal and socially concerned entrant seems to have been a temporary phenomenon, corresponding to the transitory sociopolitical events which occurred around that time, and to have been succeeded by a more conservative type since 1973.

The study furthermore indicates that during their medical school training, there was a decline in the liberal responses of the "new" students. By graduation their attitudes approached the generally more conservative positions of their preceptors and their predecessors. The authors infer that this has occurred because the institutionalized processes of medical school socialization have not been affected very much by the relatively modest curricular reforms of the last decade.[19]

As reported above, nearly all of the new medical ethics teaching consists of rather short programs, nonrequired courses, or informal and ad hoc discussions intermingled in nonethics courses. But, by themselves, short, noncourse encounters have been found to be "not enough";[20] students most in need of the education seem often the least likely to take elective courses;[21] and unsystematic, ad hoc medical ethics teaching is probably not very effective. Medical students, bright and ambitious, have little difficulty ascertaining—through contacts with faculty, house staff, and peers, as well as through reflection upon the curriculum—where a school's priorities are. Attempts to persuade students to spend less time on the "hard" subjects, the required scientific and clinical courses, and more time on nonrequired or "extra" subjects, such as medical ethics or social science, tend to be unsuccessful. That is, such attempts tend to be ineffective insofar as the faculty are still more research-, academically-, and cure-oriented than ethics-, socially-, and care-oriented in their classes, rounds, and professional behavior, and insofar as there are still enormous pressures in the crowded curriculum for students to develop their scientific and technical competencies in biomedicine and to leave

18. Rodney M. Coe, Max Pepper, and Mary Mattis, "The 'New' Medical Student. Another View," *Journal of Medical Education*, vol. 52 (February 1977), pp. 89–98

19. Two earlier studies did not find a decline in liberalism or social concern during medical school. What is important to note here is that one found neither decrease *nor increase* in political liberalism, while the other showed an *increase in social* concern but a *decrease in humanitarianism*. See Lee Goldman and Arthur Ebbert, Jr., "The Fate of Medical Student Liberalism. A Prediction," *Journal of Medical Education*, vol. 48 (December 1973), pp. 1095–1103, and Philip J Perricone, "Social Concern in Medical Students A Reconsideration of the Eron Assumption," *Journal of Medical Education*, vol. 49 (June 1974), p 541–46

20. Robert M. Veatch and K. Danner Clouser, "New Mix in the Medical Curriculum," *Prism*, vol. 1 (November 1973), p 65

21. Curt Canning, Robert Kane, and Robert Gray, "Attitudes and Electives. Predicting Enrollment and Measuring Effects," *Journal of Medical Education*, vol. 49 (October 1974), p. 988.

other interests for a later time.[22] While there is often "a generalized expression of approval" for a proposed medical ethics, humanities, or behavioral science course or program among administrators and even faculty, "the same individuals who approve in the abstract" often find themselves with competing loyalties, which tend to be resolved in favor of the traditional disciplines during conflicts concerning scarce curriculum time and funding.[23]

Finally, it should be noted that throughout the last decade, despite the shifts relating to the medical school selection process outlined above, curricular pressures have generally continued to force premedical students "into an intensive competition for competence and achievement in the biomedical sciences,"[24] and apparently academic capability and traditional personal qualities have commonly continued to be the characteristics weighted most heavily by medical school admissions committees.[25]

To summarize, it seems that there are at work social forces, both external and internal to medicine, which may favorably affect the development of more ethically aware and concerned physicians and researchers, at least partly through the agency of the medical school. Already there has been some significant movement in this direction, but there are formidable obstacles to be overcome.[26]

LATER STAGES

Internship and residency

Although respondents in the Two-Institution Interview Study were not asked at which hospitals they had served as interns and residents, most would have served at a research-oriented institution, frequently a "name" hospital or a hospital affiliated with a "name" medical school. Respondents probably often had attended medical schools with reputations for teaching and research, and being averse to futures as general practitioners but not to careers as scientists and teachers of medicine, they commonly would have been attracted by, and admitted to, graduate medical education at hospitals with cultures and structures that further encouraged their commitment to the values of scientific medicine. Consequently, the large majority of them eventually received, or "drifted into," academic or research appointments at "University Hospital and Research Center" and a smaller number of them into appointments involving research at "Community and Teaching Hospital."[27]

22 Bernard Barber, "Compassion in Medicine. Toward New Definitions and New Institutions," *New England Journal of Medicine*, vol 295 (21 October 1976), pp. 941–42, Roger J Bulger, "Commentary," in *Ethics of Health Care*, ed Tancredi (Washington, D C. National Academy of Sciences, 1974), pp 225–27, and Rezler, "Attitude Changes During Medical School," pp 1025–29 See also Wendy Ann Carlton, "Three Perspectives in the Clinical Setting Their Importance in the Training of Physicians and the Practice of Medicine" (Ph.D diss , University of Pennsylvania, 1976).

23 Veatch and Sollitto, "Medical Ethics Teaching," p. 1032.

24. Bulger, "Commentary," p. 222

25 Wellington, "Changing Values and the Selection Process for Medical School," p. 180.

26 Cf. Renée C Fox, "Ethical and Existential Developments in Contemporaneous American Medicine Their Implications for Culture and Society," *Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, vol 52 (Fall 1974), pp 472–73

27. See Miller, *Prescription for Leadership*, pp 43, 56–89, and Emily Mumford, *Interns* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1970), p 22.

Fifty-nine percent of these interviewees indicated that they had been sensitized to the ethical issues of clinical investigation in some new way—13 percent, for the first time—during their clinical training as interns or residents. All the socializing experiences reported were informal, unintended, or ad hoc. For some respondents, for example, ethical awareness had been fostered by having, as house officers, responsibility for patients whom researchers wished to use as subjects; for others, by having administered experimental drugs or performed experimental procedures on patients for researchers. It was thus during the internship and residency years that many of the interviewees had begun their research apprenticeships. Furthermore, some research, and often some first publications, tended to increase their chances for appointment to a post in institutions like University Hospital and Research Center. (Ethically sensitizing experiences that occurred during internship or residency, but which respondents viewed as related to the beginning of their own independent research, rather than to their clinical training, have been counted in the next section.)

Although during internship and residency the future researchers were found to have been learning a more specific set of values and norms through their subordinate place in the research hierarchy, in many cases the emphasis seemed, once again, to have been on the importance of research for the advancement of science and for the advancement of a research career, rather than on patient-subjects' rights and welfare. Data are scarce concerning recent changes at the graduate level of medical training. Up to now, it seems, efforts to promote socialization into ethically informed concern for patients and subjects have been concentrated at the medical school level.[28] Nevertheless, there is some evidence that house staff have been invited or required to participate in the new medical ethics programs which include clinical case conferences or "ethics rounds" introduced by several of the medical schools, including research-oriented schools,[29] and in various of the medical ethics seminars, lectures, and workshops now offered by the majority of medical schools.[30] Also, insofar as interns and residents are involved in a clinical research apprenticeship or in responsibilities regarding their patients being used as experimental subjects by researchers, it is very likely that they are now either directly informed about the DHEW regulations governing human experimentation and ethical review or at least alerted to the relevant issues through confrontation with institutional review procedures.

The research career

There has often been some on-the-job ethical socialization of physician-scientists. In addition to the 29 percent of the researchers in the Two-Institutional Interview Study, who claimed that they became aware for the first time of the issues of human experimentation only after they had begun their research careers, another 24 percent said that

28. Edmund D. Pellegrino, "Medical Ethics, Education, and the Physician's Image," *Journal of the American Medical Association*, vol. 235 (8 March 1976), p. 1044.

29. Howard Brody et al., "Integrating Ethics into the Medical Curriculum: One School's Progress Report," *Michigan Medicine*, vol. 74 (February 1975), p. 116.

30. See, for example, Veatch and Clouser, "New Mix in the Medical Curriculum" p. 66.

they had had some experience during their research careers which further developed their attitudes concerning the issues. The majority of them, as might be expected, reported experiences which had been directly related to their own research rather than to that of other investigators. Sometimes colleagues had exerted influence. In a few cases, formal control procedures set up to protect subjects' welfare and rights had alerted them to the ethical issues. But there were no formal, planned socializing experiences, such as courses or lectures, reported.

A biographical sketch of one young investigator in the Study was particularly suggestive about the probable influence of the reward system of science upon the values and attitudes of many who espouse research as a career.

> . . . The investigator came to realize that his rewards as a researcher lay in publishing, and that his more honest, detailed informing of patients rather frequently resulted in their refusal to be subjects so that it would take him longer to do studies (if he could get enough subjects to do them at all) and, therefore, to gain a name and advancement. His attitudes changed from being prejudiced against the researcher to being prejudiced in his favor, as his role, self-image, and rewards changed. In retrospect, he now sees his earlier attitudes as somewhat naive. . . . If important research is to get done and he is to publish, "salesmanship" is necessary. . . .

Along related lines, when the respondents were asked, "What three characteristics do you want to know about another researcher before entering into a collaborative relationship with him?" (and four-fifths of the clinical investigations reported were collaborative studies), the highest proportion of respondents, 86 percent, indicated "scientific ability" whereas the lowest, only 6 percent, indicated "ethical concern for research subjects." While salient criteria and actual criteria for selection of collaborators are not necessarily the same thing, nevertheless, here once more, the prominence of concern for research science over concern for subjects shows itself.

There is not much evidence available on recent changes pertaining to the ethical development of physician-investigators during their research careers. However, some formal continuing education in medical ethics is apparently now offered to faculty, and sometimes to attending and other physicians, in several of the longer and many of the shorter programs mentioned above. Additionally, the amount of informal and formal ethical socialization of research physicians related to the submission of their research proposals to the ethical scrutiny of review panels in funding agencies and review boards in their own institutions has certainly increased during the last decade, as also undoubtedly, though to a lesser extent, has the amount of ethical learning that stems from service on such panels and committees.

THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT

The Two-Institution Interview Study, in the two hypothetical research proposals mentioned earlier, avails us of a rough measure of the cumulative effect of the socialization and selection that had involved the interviewees since before medical school and up to the point then current in their research careers, upon their values, attitudes, and knowledge regarding the welfare and rights of human subjects of biomedical research. In other words, I

use the responses which those physician-investigators made to the two study proposals to indicate their degree of compassion or ethical concern for subjects.[31]

In regard to the first proposal, involving slightly increased risk of leukemia and no benefit for a control group of healthy children, 54 percent of the researchers disapproved the study as it stood, no matter what the probability of an important medical discovery, but 16 percent approved even when the chances of such a success were as slim as 1 in 10, the rest approving various higher probabilities. In respect to the second proposal, lacking provision for obtaining informed consent to do an experimental procedure which involved some risk, 24 percent of the respondents objected to the study at once and another 40 percent disapproved after a probe by the interviewer, but 17 percent explicitly said that informed consent need not be required. (Unfortunately, in the remaining 19 percent of the cases, there was no probe on the consent issue when it was not raised by the interviewee.) Thus, according to these two measures, at least a significant minority of research physicians seem not to have had the standards of concern for subjects which were expected of them as researchers and physicians, so that they approved human experimentation which was ethically objectionable to most of their peers.[32] This evidence suggests that, for those researchers, all the socialization and selection that had operated at the various sequential stages up to that point in their lives, had not made them sufficiently compassionate toward subjects. However, for the rest of the researchers apparently, it had. Nevertheless, the possibility exists that much of the ethical sensitivity for experimental subjects which was characteristic of the latter group stemmed from moral socialization that had antedated medical school and, consequently, to a large extent, from general orientations concerning the rights of others.[33] These general moral perspectives, however, may not always be adequate to ensure ethical handling of the specific issues raised by human experimentation.[34]

None of this should be surprising considering the limited, much-less-than-universal, mostly unplanned, or ad hoc socialization in ethical concern for subjects, combined with the relatively large emphasis on the value of science and research in both socialization and selection that we found at each step of the respondents' medical training. The recent, continuing changes in society and modifications in the ethos of medicine and the curriculum of medical schools may hold great promise of producing more compassionate physician-investigators. But, if so, the little evidence available has suggested that these forces, though not without effect, have not yet made a major difference.

CONCLUSION

Because selection and socialization bearing upon the production of

31. See Barber et al., *Research on Human Subjects*, chap 3.

32. Cf. Earl R. Babbie, *Science and Morality in Medicine* (Berkeley. University of California Press, 1970), chap. 2, in which, according to the indicators used, majorities of both more and less "science-oriented" academic physician-scientists showed relatively low levels of compassion and of respect for human subjects.

33 Ibid., pp. 178–84. See also Barber et al., *Research on Human Subjects* pp. 97–99

34 Ibid., pp. 111–12.

ethically aware, competent, and concerned research physicians is deficient, but even more because, as we have discussed elsewhere, the ethical values, knowledge, and attitudes that researchers have very often interact with and depend for their efficacy upon social structural and situational conditions,[35] it is clear that internalized controls alone cannot ensure adequate protection of the rights and welfare of experimental subjects. External, social controls, such as the now widely-used institutional review process, are necessary.

However, recent assessment indicates that most institutional review boards have been limited in their impact on the actual conduct of clinical research.[36] Moreover, any realistic system to protect subjects must depend in significant part on the competence and ethical predispositions of clinical investigators, not only for the ethical conduct of their own research, but also for effective formal or informal peer control of each other. Clearly, both internalized and external controls are needed and both require improvement and invention, although they should interfere with medical scientific advancement as little as possible. With respect to improving the development of the internalized safeguards, I will sketch three general recommendations. These are derived from the preceding analysis combined with other sources.[37]

First, every research physician, but also every other physician, who at some time may be responsible for the care of patients that are sought as experimental subjects, who will serve as a formal peer reviewer of clinical research, or who will be in a position to exercise informal colleague control over research, ought to have a compassion for subjects. Therefore, to reach all student physicians and physicians, to impress upon them that this is as important and continuing a concern as competency, autonomy, and achievement in scientific medicine, and to provide effective reinforcement, socialization fostering informed ethical regard for subjects' (as well as patients') welfare and rights should be integrated into, and structured throughout, undergraduate and graduate medical training. It is a concern that should continue throughout the professional career in systematic continuing education. There ought to be formal, required educational components specifically in research ethics—including portions of medical ethics, humanities or behavioral science courses, entire research ethics seminars, and ethics rounds and practica—matched to the form and content of scientific and clinical training at different career stages. In addition, there should be some planned treatment of ethical issues in discussions of clinical research by teachers during clinical and scientific training. The example of compassionate attitudes and behavior toward students, patients, and subjects, ought to be given by those in any position to teach—faculty members, preceptors, house officers, supervising physi-

35 Ibid., pp. 69–73, 110–14, 129–32, and chaps. 4–5, and Lally and Barber, "The Compassionate Physician," pp. 292–96.

36. Bradford H. Gray, "An Assessment of Institutional Review Committees in Human Experimentation," *Medical Care*, vol. 13 (April 1975) pp. 318–28.

37. Brody, et al., "Integrating Ethics into the Medical Curriculum," pp 111–12, and Rezler, "Attitude Changes During Medical School, pp. 1028–29. See also The Commission on the Teaching of Bioethics, *The Teaching of Bioethics: A Report* (Hastings-on-Hudson, N.Y. The Hastings Center, 1976).

cians, senior researchers, and institutional review committees.

Second, to help build the faculty and staff support necessary for those kinds of socialization, to provide the teachers and positive role models to accomplish and reinforce it, and to give added incentive for individuals to develop such qualities, institutional recruitment and reward policies should elevate ethical awareness and concern to the same status for purposes of hiring and promotion that scientific achievement and excellence have long enjoyed.

Third, there ought also to be selective recruitment of students who already possess at least a basic concern for patients and subjects as well as requisite intellectual abilities. This would not only be directly conducive to education and graduation of more ethically concerned physicians and researchers, but would probably also expedite *the formation of student subcultures more supportive of effective socialization into humane perspectives.*

If implemented, these measures could, I believe, contribute significantly to the development of more compassionate physicians and physician-investigators,[38] and hence to better protection of research subjects. Insofar as such protection is not provided by the profession, increased governmental controls are likely to be deemed necessary, and hostility to biomedical research is likely to grow, at the expense of both scientific and public interests and values.

38. For indications that other, critical changes in medical education are also needed if it is to instill effective bases for either individual internal control or colleague control among physicians, see the important new study by Rue Bucher and Joan G. Stelling, *Becoming Professional* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1977), especially pp. 279–85 and the preface by Eliot Freidson.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 437, May 1978

Consensus and Controversy in Medical Practice: The Dilemma of the Critically Ill Patient

By DIANA CRANE

ABSTRACT: In response to the problems of coping with chronic disease, physicians are moving toward a social definition of life, that is, towards defining an individual as being alive if he is capable of performing his social roles, rather than if he simply meets physical criteria for life. A study of how physicians in four medical specialties say they would treat different types of critically ill patients shows that there is considerable consensus among physicians about the treatment of salvageable patients with physical damage and unsalvageable patients with mental damage but little consensus concerning those who are mentally damaged but salvageable or physically damaged and unsalvageable. Over 70 percent of the respondents in each specialty indicated that they would accept irreversible cessation of brain function as a criterion for death, permitting them to cease maintaining the patient's respiratory functions. Examination of hospital records showed that physicians tend to overestimate on the questionnaires their likelihood of treating critically ill patients. In other words, there may be more consensus about not treating certain types of patients than the questionnaires suggest. The lack of consensus on these matters in other social institutions, such as law and religion, is also discussed.

Diana Crane received her bachelor's degree from Radcliffe College and her Ph.D. from Columbia University. Since then, she has taught at Yale University and The Johns Hopkins University and is currently Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Pennsylvania. She has held a Guggenheim Fellowship and has been a Visiting Member of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton. She is the author of Invisible Colleges: Diffusion of Knowledge in Scientific Communities, The Sanctity of Social Life: Physicians' Treatment of Critically Ill Patients *and of numerous articles.*

DURING the course of the present century, our lives have been freed of much of the trauma of acute illness, but it has become more and more difficult to cope with chronic disease. The process of dying has been attenuated so that many of us continue to live in greatly debilitated conditions for long periods of time. What should be done in such situations is a subject of considerable controversy among professionals and laymen alike.

I will argue in this article that physicians are moving toward a social definition of life, in other words, towards defining an individual as being alive if he is capable of performing his social roles, at least to some degree, rather than if he simply meets physical criteria for life. The situation is complicated by the fact that physicians are more willing to apply a social definition of life to some kinds of patients rather than others. Even concerning a particular type of patient, there is nothing like the unanimity regarding the application of the social criteria for life that has existed in the use of physical criteria.

The movement toward the social definition of life was greatly accelerated in 1968 when a committee at Harvard decided that cessation of brain function could be considered equivalent to cessation of respiratory and cardiac function in determining whether or not a patient had died. This definition of death has been widely accepted, as we will see, although the medical profession is by no means unanimous on this point either.

A medical controversy over the social definition of life that recently erupted into public view concerned the use of extraordinary treatment in the case of Karen Quinlan. This case received a great deal of attention in the press but it is, in fact, only one of a large number of difficult cases which occur every year. Because Karen Quinlan's case is a good example of the controversies surrounding dying patients, I will briefly review it. Karen Quinlan is a 23-year-old woman who has been in a coma since April 15, 1975. In the fall of 1975, her parents took legal action to obtain the withdrawal of intensive medical procedures, specifically the use of the respirator which was maintaining her breathing. They had requested the neurologist in charge of the case "*to discontinue all extraordinary measures.*" The physician refused to do so. Consequently, the Quinlans took their case to court.

Quinlan's case was complicated by the fact that she does not meet the technical criteria for brain death.[1] On the other hand, all the physicians who examined her agreed that she is in a "chronic vegetative state" and will never recover the ability to function as a human being. They disagreed on what should be done for her. For example, her own physician refused to withdraw extraordinary treatment, but Dr. Milton D. Heifetz, Chief of the Department of Neurological Surgery at Cedars-Sinai Medical Center in Los Angeles, said that he believed that treatment should be suspended.

The Superior Court of the State of New Jersey refused the parents' request that extraordinary measures cease. The Court said: "The power of the parents to exercise the constitutional right is found lacking. . . . The right to life and the preserva-

1. As set by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine Brain Death. See "A Definition of Irreversible Coma," *Journal of the American Medical Association* 205 (5 August 1968), pp. 85–88.

tion of it are 'interests of the highest order' and this Court deems it constitutionally correct to deny plaintiff's request." In other words, the interest of the Court is to preserve the life of an incompetent patient, and the wishes of the family have no bearing on this issue. This has been the stand traditionally taken by law courts on these questions but, in recent years, there have been a few examples of courts granting requests by families for the withdrawal of extraordinary medical treatment from such patients.[2] A few months later, the Supreme Court of New Jersey reversed the Lower Court decision provided that attending physicians and the hospital's ethics committee could agree that there was "no reasonable possibility" that Quinlan would recover "a cognitive, sapient state." Extraordinary treatments were withdrawn, and, surprisingly, Quinlan continued to live. At this writing, she is still alive in a nursing home in New Jersey.

This case and others like it have led to considerable controversy concerning how doctors should and do handle such cases. These debates are based largely on speculation. For this reason, it seemed to me, a few years ago, when I was asked by the Russell Sage Foundation to undertake some research on problems surrounding dying and death, that it would be useful to find out how physicians actually treat difficult cases —not only cases like Quinlan's but a broad range of complex medical problems.

2. See Robert M. Veatch, *Death, Dying and Biological Revolution: Our Last Quest for Responsibility* (New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1976), chap. 4.

DESIGN OF A STUDY OF MEDICAL CONSENSUS AND CONTROVERSY

I originally planned to examine the relationship between what doctors say they do and what they actually do in hospital settings. In other words, I intended to compare information obtained from interviews with observations of actual behavior on hospital wards. During the winter of 1969–70, I conducted over 125 interviews with physicians in several teaching hospitals on the East Coast and came to the conclusion that, in order for my findings to be convincing to skeptical members of other disciplines and professions, I would need to have a large number of cases, many more than I could hope personally to interview. Therefore, a mailed questionnaire seemed desirable. I decided to send questionnaires to physicians in four medical specialties—neurosurgery, pediatric heart surgery, internal medicine, and pediatrics. The questions in each questionnaire had to be suitable for a particular specialty but in such a way that the results of the different questionnaires would be comparable. While the study lost the richness of detail it might have had if it had remained a study of medical subcultures, it gained in precision and comparability of results by shifting to a large questionnaire survey.

In comparison with the initial informant interviews, the mailed questionnaire was much more specific. For example, in interviews with pediatricians, I asked: "How actively would you treat a mentally retarded child who developed pneumonia?" On the mailed questionnaire, the same sort of question became the following:

A 1500 gram infant is born with all the clinical characteristics of a mongoloid (Downs' syndrome). Six hours later, he develops severe respiratory distress. Chest film is read as compatible with hyaline membrane disease or pneumonia. The mother of the child, whose husband is a physician, has 4 healthy children of normal intelligence and does not appear to be anxious to save the child. Which of the following would you be likely to perform? (Check yes, maybe, or no for each item)

Yes	Maybe	No	
☐	☐	☐	*31.* Perform appropriate cultures (blood, CSF, etc.).
☐	☐	☐	*32.* Treat with antibiotics.
☐	☐	☐	*33.* Correct acidosis.
☐	☐	☐	*34.* If he develops pneumothorax, would you aspirate the chest?
☐	☐	☐	*35.* If he stops breathing for two minutes, would you bag-breathe him for two to three hours?
☐	☐	☐	*36.* Would you place him on a respirator if he continued to have apneic spells?
☐	☐	☐	*37.* If he then has a cardiac arrest, would you resuscitate him?

In interviews with neurosurgeons, I asked them whether they would be more likely to operate on patients with physical damage than on patients with brain damage. On the questionnaire for neurosurgeons, the problem was posed in the following manner:

A 40 year old right-handed married lawyer with a past history of mild hypertension has suffered a large, intracerebral, left, deep frontal hematoma. He has severe aphasia, moderate right hemiparesis, and mild nuchal rigidity. He is drowsy but is able to say his name in a garbled manner. BP is 190/100. Arteriogram shows 1 cm. shift of anterior cerebral artery to right and no evidence of tumor, aneurysm, or A-V malformation. During the first 12 hours of observation, his level of consciousness has steadily declined. Needle evacuation of the hematoma has been attempted but only a negligible quantity of liquified blood could be aspirated. Although trans-cortical incision with direct surgical evacuation of the hematoma might prove fatal, he might also die if the hematoma is not evacuated. Assuming that he survives surgical evacuation, it is very likely that he may have severe residual intellectual and neurological impairment. Under these circumstances, would you operate? *(Check one of the following).*

☐ 1. Would *usually* perform.
☐ 2. Would *sometimes* perform.
☐ 3. Would *rarely* perform.

In this same patient, the hematoma has occurred in the nondominant right parietal-occipital area and the residual deficit has left him with a visual field-cut and left hemiparesis but no significant intellectual or speech impairment. In this instance, again, needle evacuation of the hematoma was ineffective and it appears that the patient may die if surgical evacuation is not performed. What would be your likely course of action with respect to surgical evacuation of the hematoma? *(Check one of the following).*

☐ 1. Would *usually* perform.
☐ 2. Would *sometimes* perform.
☐ 3. Would *rarely* perform.

Similarly, on the interview schedule, the informant's attitude toward the issue of brain death was queried as follows: "If you were maintaining a patient's life on a respirator and *had done everything that could be done for the patient, under what conditions would you turn off the machine?*" This question became the following:

A 25 year old man with head trauma is in deep coma on a respirator. There is no evidence of intracranial hematoma. He has had two flat EEG's over a 2-day period and is unresponsive to painful stimuli. Brain stem reflexes are absent. Cardiac activity is present but there is no spontaneous respiratory activity. Which of the following would you be likely to do? *(Check one of the following).*

☐ 1. Leave respirator running until spontaneous cardiac activity ceases.
☐ 2. Turn off respirator without consulting colleagues or family.
☐ 3. Turn off respirator after consulting colleagues and finding a consensus of their opinion in favor of doing so.
☐ 4. Turn off respirator after consulting family and finding that they will accept this decision.
☐ 5. Turn off respirator after consulting both colleagues and family and finding both groups in favor of it.

In the informant interviews, I asked physicians directly if, for example, the patient's attitude toward life, or his family's attitude toward him, affected their decisions. On the questionnaires, in order to tap more accurately what the physician would actually do, I used different versions of the same questionnaire, so that the social characteristics of the patients such as social class, age, patient and family attitude, could be varied.

In spite of the fact that some of the questions were quite sensitive, the response rates were over 70 percent in all four specialties. The samples were large: pediatrics: 922; internal medicine: 1,410; neurosurgery: 650; pediatric heart surgery: 207. Respondents in neurosurgery and pediatric heart surgery were selected randomly from lists of professional associations. In pediatrics and internal medicine, I drew samples of hospitals from the American Medical Association's *Directory of Approved Internships and Residencies* which were stratified in terms of the degree of the hospitals' involvement in teaching programs, a rough indicator of hospital prestige. I then wrote to hospitals asking for their cooperation and for lists of staff members from which respondents were selected randomly. In these two specialties, both physicians and residents were included.[3]

The case histories were received favorably, although a few respondents commented that they did not believe that they defined in sufficient detail the complexities of the clinical situations which physicians actually face. There is, however, an upper limit to the amount of information which can be presented in a questionnaire format. Other physicians were concerned that they would not respond to the question-

3. For further details about the methodology of the study and for a detailed presentation of the results, see Diana Crane, *The Sanctity of Social Life. Physicians' Treatment of Critically Ill Patients* (New York: The Russell Sage Foundation, 1975). Also published by Transaction Books in 1977.

naire in the same way if it were administered on two different occasions (test-retest reliability). In my view, this is not a serious difficulty. The decisions which were being studied are central to the physician's daily activity and they are decisions which he takes very seriously; his answers are unlikely to be superficial or ill-considered. Still other physicians felt that no hypothetical situation could accurately reflect medical practice. Confronted with an actual situation, the respondent might react differently from the way he had indicated on the questionnaire. In other words, are the responses to the questionnaires valid? An attempt to validate the questionnaire responses was made using studies of hospital records. This will be described briefly later.

HYPOTHESES AND FINDINGS

The hypothesis that I was testing is that physicians evaluate the chronically ill or terminally ill patient not only in terms of the physiological aspects of illness but also in terms of the extent to which he is capable of interacting with others. In other words, the treatable patient is one who, if treated, is capable of resuming his social roles even minimally and temporarily. The untreatable patient is one for whom this possibility must be permanently excluded. For example, the severely brain-damaged patient is completely incapable of performing his social roles while the physically damaged person may be able to resume some of them.

The patient's potential capacity to perform his social roles can be determined in a number of ways. First, the physician attempts to decide whether or not the patient is "salvageable." Can the patient be restored to health or can a chronic condition be controlled for an indefinite period of time? Alternatively, is the patient's condition one which will sooner or later be the cause of his death? In general, decisions concerning salvageability are based on the known prognoses of various types of diseases. Obviously, from time to time, the prognoses of certain diseases change, but at any particular time, there is likely to be a high degree of consensus among physicians concerning the prognoses of most diseases.

A second decision concerns the quality of life which the patient can expect to lead. Is the patient physically damaged or mentally damaged in the sense that he has suffered irreversible physical or intellectual impairment or both?

The salvageability of the patient indicates whether it is likely that the individual will resume his social roles; the degree of irreversible damage indicates his capacity for resuming them. If physicians are following the traditional medical norm regarding medical treatment, that is, defining the patient's potential solely in physiological terms, no distinction should be made among cases which differ on these two variables with respect to level of treatment. If the patient's potential is being evaluated in social terms, distinctions will be made depending upon the patient's prognosis and the type of damage which he has sustained. The priorities based on the extent to which the patient is likely to be incapacitated in the performance of his social roles are: (1) salvageable patients with physical damage; (2) salvageable patients with mental damage; (3) unsalvageable patients with physical damage; (4) unsalvageable patients with mental damage. In all four specialties, physicians were most likely to say

FIGURE 1

AMOUNT OF CONSENSUS AMONG PHYSICIANS BY TYPE OF CASE

TYPE OF DAMAGE SUSTAINED BY PATIENT	PROGNOSIS OF PATIENT	
	SALVAGEABLE	UNSALVAGEABLE
Physical only	1. High	3. Low
Mental or Physical and mental	2 Low	4 High

NOTE. See text for definition of consensus The numbers in the cells indicate priorities for treatment as described in the text

that they would treat the first type of patient and least likely to say that they would treat the fourth type of patient.

In reviewing the findings from the study, I will stress the extent to which there was agreement or consensus among physicians concerning these different types of cases. What kinds of cases produced the most consensus or controversy? A level of high consensus among physicians concerning the decision to treat or to withhold treatment from a patient is indicated if over 75 percent of a sample took the same posi tion (that is, to treat or not to treat). A level of low consensus means that 51 percent to 75 percent took the same position concerning a patient.[4]

In general, there was the greatest amount of agreement about cases of types 1 and 4 (see figure 1). In the first case, there was a high degree of agreement that salvageable patients with physical damage only should be treated. In the second case, there was a high degree of agreement that unsalvageable patients with mental damage should not be treated. There was much less consensus about patients who were mentally damaged but salvageable or physically damaged and unsalvageable.

These distinctions show up most clearly among the surgeons. For example, with respect to the salvageable patient with a cerebral hematoma who is described above in the question from the neurosurgery questionnaire, 89 percent of the neurosurgeons would operate if the damage were physical only, exhibiting high consensus, but only 55 percent would operate on him if the damage were mental, exhibiting low consensus. The neurosurgeons were also presented with a case of a patient with solitary metastatic brain tumor. Only 22 percent said they would operate on this unsalvageable patient if the tumor affected the patient's mental faculties, representing high consensus concerning the withdrawal of treatment. However, 50 percent would operate if the tumor affected the patient's physical capacities only, indicating a low consensus concerning the treatment of that type of patient.

Pediatric heart surgeons were pre-

4. For purposes of this analysis, the pediatric and internal medicine samples were divided into two groups. those who said that they would be likely to treat a particular type of patient very actively and those who would treat less actively. The surgical samples were also divided into two groups: those who said that they would usually operate upon a particular type of patient and those who said that they would sometimes or rarely operate upon such a patient.

sented with a series of cases involving children with cardiac defects that needed repair combined with some other problem, either physical or mental. When the cardiac defect was combined with another physical problem, there was high consensus among the surgeons that an operation should be performed. Eighty-two to ninety-three percent, depending upon the particular case, said they would operate in this situation. When the cardiac defect was combined with mental retardation, the surgeons were almost evenly divided on whether or not to operate.

A high proportion of the pediatricians agreed that unsalvageable newborns with severe physical and mental damage should not be treated, although more thought that the physically damaged *infant* should be treated than they thought the mentally damaged infant should. As one would expect, they were evenly divided on the treatment of salvageable infants with mental damage. They were also evenly divided on the desirability of treating a physically damaged, salvageable infant. The latter was a myelomeningocele, described as having no nerve function in his legs and no bladder or rectal sphincter control. He was thus unlikely to have a more meaningful social existence than the mongoloid infant with whom he was being compared.

Contrary to what one would expect, there was not a level of high consensus among the internists concerning the treatment of a physically damaged, salvageable patient *who was quite debilitated* (67 percent would treat him). On the other hand, there was more consensus than was expected concerning the desirability of treating patients of types 2 and 3. About 70 percent said that they would not actively treat a salvageable patient with a moderate degree of mental damage and unsalvageable patients with physical damage.

In view of the Quinlan case, it is interesting that only 16 percent of the 1,410 internists said that they would actively treat a severely mentally damaged, salvageable patient, indicating a level of high consensus concerning the withdrawal of treatment. This patient, although less damaged than Quinlan, is the case in my study that, except for age, most closely corresponds to hers. The paient was described on the questionnaire as follows:

A 65-year-old woman with severe cerebral atrophy cannot walk, feed herself or communicate meaningfully with others. She is admitted to the ward service dehydrated and septic.

What effect does the attitude of the patient or his family have upon this situation? If a physician is basing his decision concerning treatment in part upon the patient's social situation, and not entirely upon his physical status, the attitude of the patient toward himself and of his family members toward him would be expected to influence the physician's decisions.

In the case of a physically damaged, unsalvageable patient, the patient's negative attitude toward treatment pushed the physicians toward consensus on the withdrawal of treatment. Only 22 percent said that they would treat him actively. When the same case was presented with *the patient in favor of treatment*, consensus disappeared. The physicians were equally divided on the desirability of treatment or withdrawal of treatment.

The family's attitude seemed to have little effect on decisions to treat

adult patients but considerable effect on decisions to treat children. In other words, if a family did not define a brain-damaged child as socially dead, was the physician's judgment of the case affected? In three medical specialties, pediatrics, pediatric heart surgery, and neurosurgery, the family's concern for a brain-damaged infant or child had a considerable influence upon the physician's decision regarding treatment.

Ironically, the effect in some instances was to reduce the amount of consensus about treatment. When the family's attitude was negative, there was considerable agreement that the patient should not be treated. When the family's attitude was positive, the physicians were divided equally on whether or not the patient should be actively treated in almost every case. However, in cases of cardiac damage combined with other physical—but not mental—problems in children, parental attitude had no effect. There was a high degree of consensus among the pediatric heart surgeons that the children should be treated, regardless of parental attitude.

EUTHANASIA AND THE DEFINITION OF DEATH

Finally, how much consensus was there among these physicians concerning the practice of euthanasia and the definition of death? Responses to a question in the pediatric questionnaire concerning the direct killing of an anencephalic infant (one born without a brain) were overwhelmingly negative. Only 1 percent of the respondents said that they would be likely to give an "intravenous injection of a lethal dose of potassium chloride or a sedative drug" to an anencephalic infant; 3 percent said that they might do so.

On the other hand, internists were asked to indicate whether or not they would increase the dosage of narcotics for a patient in the last stages of terminal cancer to the point where the dosage might risk, or would probably lead to, respiratory arrest. Eighty-one percent of the physicians and sixty-eight percent of the residents were willing to take some risk or high risk of inducing respiratory arrest in the patient by increasing his dosage of narcotics. Specific questions to test their perceptions of the act were not included in the questionnaire, but comments in the interviews suggested that some physicians defined this treatment as euthanasia while others argued that it was not a true example of euthanasia on the grounds that the physician's intention is to suppress pain and not to cause death.

Physicians in all four specialties were asked whether they would consider cessation of brain function, apart from cessation of respiratory and cardiac function, as a terminal event under certain precisely defined conditions. In the four specialties, respondents were presented with cases appropriate for their specialties which were described as having brain death, as defined by the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School to Examine Brain Death. In these four specialties, between 70 and 76 percent of the respondents indicated that they would accept irreversible cessation of brain function as a criterion for death, permitting them to cease maintaining the patient's respiratory functions. This is very close to high consensus. In other words, for these physicians, *irreversible loss of the capacity for social interaction* was a more important consideration than the continua-

tion of the physiological indicator of life, heartbeat.

In order to validate the findings from the questionnaire, it was necessary to compare them with data on the actual behavior of physicians. It was possible to obtain complete lists of patients who had died on the nonprivate service of a large teaching hospital during a calendar year and of patients who had been resuscitated on the same service. Obviously these two populations overlap but that was no problem. The advantage of the two groups lay in the completeness with which they were enumerated. The seriousness of the events made it necessary for hospital personnel to be accurate in their recordkeeping. Additional information about these patients was obtained from hospital records. Only information that was so important that it would be recorded without fail could be used reliably.

In order to validate one of the pediatric questionnaires, I obtained a complete listing of all cases of mongoloid children who had been catheterized between 1964 and mid-1969 by the pediatric cardiology department in a major teaching hospital. Unfortunately, the sample was small —33 cases—due to the relative rarity of this problem, that is, mongolism combined with heart defect. Again, the records of these cases were searched for additional information.

In general, these studies showed that physicians tend to overestimate on the questionnaires the likelihood of their treating critically ill patients. The records suggest that they are less likely to resuscitate patients than they indicate on the questionnaires. In a hospital where the pediatric service was very much in favor of treating mentally retarded children, the proportion of mongoloid children who received cardiac surgery was also lower than the questionnaire results would suggest. For example, the questionnaire data showed that mongoloid children with heart defects are much less likely to receive operations than children whose heart defects are combined with physical anomalies. Eighty-two percent of the pediatric heart surgeons said they would treat a child with a diagnosis of atrioventricular canal combined with a urogenital anomaly, while only fifty percent said they would treat the same kind of heart defect in a mongoloid child. The hospital records study suggested that the proportion who would actually treat the latter type of child is even lower. Among the 14 cases in the sample of mongoloid children who had a diagnosis of atrioventricular canal, 29 percent received surgery. In other words, there may be more consensus about not treating these children than the questionnaires suggest.

CONCLUSIONS

To summarize, there was considerable agreement among physicians concerning the treatment of salvageable patients with physical damage and unsalvageable patients with mental damage. In the first case, they agreed that the patient should be treated; in the second, they agreed that the patient should not be treated.

With respect to the other two types of cases, salvageable patients with mental damage and unsalvageable patients with physical damage, physicians tended to be about equally divided for and against treatment. Ironically, if the family or the patient were in favor of treatment, this tended to increase discensus, particularly if, in the absence of this variable, the physicians were in

agreement about the withdrawal of treatment. However, this reaction to patient or family attitude occurred only if the patient were unsalvageable or brain-damaged or both. If the patient was salvageable and physically damaged only, the family's negative attitude toward treatment seemed to have no effect.

It appears that many physicians no longer approach certain types of critically ill patients as if physical life were sacred. Social life has replaced physical life as the criterion for treatment in such cases. At the same time, as we have seen, there is by no means complete agreement among physicians on the application of social criteria in the evaluation of the patient's potential for treatment.

In the United States, the medical profession has not set guidelines for physicians in these matters, although the American Hospital Association has issued, as a statement of its national policy, a "bill of rights" for patients which includes that of refusing treatment "to the extent permitted by law." The Swiss Academy of Medicine has gone much farther in this direction by publishing guidelines that permit doctors to cut off life-prolonging treatment for dying or comatose patients.[5] Given the authority of the Academy, the directives amount to acceptance of passive euthanasia by the Swiss medical profession. By contrast, the American Medical Association applauded the first court decision in the Quinlan case which did not permit the withdrawal of treatment.[6]

As the Karen Quinlan case illustrated, there is a lack of consensus on these matters in other social institutions, such as the law and religion. In her case, one court in effect insisted upon a physical definition of life, while a higher court applied a social definition. Veatch's review of legal cases of this kind[7] suggests that there has been a tendency in recent legal decisions to view these cases in terms of their social, rather than their purely physical, potential for life. State governments are responding slowly to the necessity of legalizing the social definition of life by permitting physicians to cease treatment in certain kinds of cases, although laws of this kind have been considered in a number of states. At this writing, only California has passed legislation granting competent terminally ill persons the right to authorize the withdrawal of life-sustaining procedures when death is imminent.[8] It does not, however, permit guardians of incompetent patients to do the same.

There is probably more variation within than among religious faiths with respect to these issues. It appears that each major faith has spokesmen for and against passive euthanasia. During the Quinlan case, a group of 14 Protestant and Catholic theologians praised the Supreme Court's decision not to let Quinlan die.[9] However, many other American theologians supported the opposite point of view. In Italy, eminent Catholic theologians took diametrically opposed positions on the issue of keeping her alive.[10]

5. "Swiss Medical Guidelines Approve 'Passive' Euthanasia," *International Herald Tribune*, 21 April 1977

6. Peter Kihss, "Religious and Medical Leaders Back Court's Decision in the Quinlan Case," *New York Times*, 11 November 1975.

7. See Veatch, *Death, Dying and Biological Revolution*, chap. 4

8. Les Ledbetter, "California Grants Terminally Ill Right to Put an End to Treatment," *New York Times*, 2 October 1976

9. Kihss, "Religious and Medical Leaders Back Court's Decision."

10. Christina Lord, "Issues in Quinlan Case Divide Catholic Clerics," *New York Times*, 25 October 1975.

Not surprisingly, the public is also divided on these matters, although the questions which are presented to it in public opinion polls are usually so general that its commitment to a social interpretation of life can only be surmised. In 1973, an American poll found that 62 percent of those polled were in favor of withdrawal of treatment for the terminally ill, 28 percent were against it; and 10 percent did not state an opinion.[11]

What little trend data we have indicates gradual acceptance of passive euthanasia, both within the medical and legal professions and among the general public.[12] Does this suggest decreasing respect for life, as the opponents of euthanasia claim? Alternatively, it may reflect greater respect for the principle of individual self-determination and bodily integrity,[13] which is also observable in other areas of social life. Although unfortunately we cannot show it with data available from this study, it is possible that the absence of consensus among physicians concerning the treatment of certain types of patients is due in part to the fact that physicians vary in their acceptance of changes in the doctor-patient role, changes that lead to more autonomy for the patient and his family.

11. Veatch, *Death, Dying and Biological Revolution*, pp. 98–99

12. Ibid., and chap. 4

13. Cantor has argued that this principle could be used to support legal decisions in favor of termination of death-prolonging treatments at the request of patients. See Norman L. Cantor, "A Patient's Decision to Decline Life-Saving Medical Treatment. Bodily Integrity Versus the Preservation of Life," *Rutgers Law Review* 26 (Winter 1973), pp. 228–64

ANNALS, AAPSS, 437, May 1978

Ethical Considerations in Selecting Subject Populations for Drug Research

By JOHN D. ARNOLD

ABSTRACT: The implications of the literal interpretation of established ethical codes versus the application of ad hoc moral principles are discussed and the concerns of minimizing risk, maximizing the scientific value of data, and providing adequate subject indemnification are examined. It is concluded that the paramount ethical consideration in selecting subject populations is the diffusion of risk and the provision of adequate indemnification. Judicious selection of subject populations is essential and ad hoc moral principles should prevail at times over the use of established written codes.

John D. Arnold, earned his M.D. at the University of Chicago. A recipient of a Legion of Merit award in 1951 for his work on antimalarial agents, he has participated in malaria missions to Nicaragua, Japan, and Korea for the Surgeon General. In 1975, Dr. Arnold founded the Quincy Research Center, an organization specializing in pharmacological investigations in human subjects. He is particularly concerned with the ethical issues surrounding research on human subjects and has participated in numerous conferences and symposia dealing with ethical safeguards for research subjects, drug research in prisons, rights and privileges of volunteer subjects, and peer review in human research.

RECENT revisions of thought in medical ethics have had a significant effect on the choice of subjects for medical experimentation. A notable example is the restrictions surrounding the use of prison volunteers. In the past, prison volunteers constituted the majority of subjects in certain types of medical research. However, by the early seventies, participation in medical research by institutionalized subjects was generally considered unethical on the grounds of the subject's limited freedom of choice.

The currently established ethical principles governing medical research are set forth in such international codes as the Nuremberg Code of Ethics in Medical Research and the Declaration of Helsinki. Others have been enunciated by the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects and by the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. Still others are embodied in unwritten ad hoc moral principles which are a component of what we loosely call "professional judgment." It is possible that the strict application of the written guides for ethical behavior in the development of new drugs may actually lead to greater potential for injury to the subject than ad hoc decisions would. Consequently, a further rethinking of the ethical principles governing medical research is indicated.

It is unfortunate that there is a paucity of hard data in the area of ethics in drug research, especially concerning the choice of subjects. Some limited data exist with respect to the use of normal volunteers for the initial determination of human tolerance and safety of medications. We are also beginning to see imposed on protocol design certain principles taken from the ethical codes rather than from ad hoc concerns about safety. An example of this literal interpretation of rules is that, as an overriding criterion for patient selection, a given drug that must have the potential for benefit to the subject.

In general, a potential new drug undergoes extensive trials in several species of animals before it is given to the first human volunteer, although the animal studies do not always reveal safety hazards or provide a reliable estimate of the degree of efficacy in man. There are no quantitative measures of this discordance, and in nearly every case the discrepancy between the results in man and animal species is unpredictable. This means that a real and unmeasured degree of risk must be assumed by volunteers in early drug trials. In fact, the appearance of unexpected reactions to a drug may occur for as long as a drug is used.

Because most, if not all, adverse drug effects are dose-related, it has become a standard practice to introduce a putative new medicine to man in relatively small doses and to use small, increasing dose increments in subsequent studies until the general profile of the drug response is outlined for man. This stage of study of a new drug has been called Phase I by the Food and Drug Administration and is essentially the first step in determining tolerance and toxicity.

In the Phase I stage we are primarily concerned with: 1) the selection of an appropriate sample group, sufficiently representative of the general population to be called "random"; 2) minimization of the risk of significant and irreversible injury to subjects; and 3) the indemnification of the injured subject.

The primary concern of the general public about medical experimentation probably involves the po-

tential for physical injury. Assaults against the dignity of a subject, most psychological injuries, and other negative factors seem to have a lower rank order in public concern. Assuming the potential for irreversible physical injury is at the top of our rank order of concerns, we may examine this potential in various classes of studies.

It may be instructive to consider a specific example: the case of a new antibacterial agent with the potential for injury to the kidney and internal ear. A group of compounds known as the aminoglycosides has these properties and has been developed with success for the treatment of human infections. However, the tolerance of man to such new compounds must be established at some early point, and the problem is how to determine its safety and efficacy with minimum risk to the subject.

There are several options available. If we interpreted the Helsinki Declaration literally, we would give this medication only to patients suffering from an infection for which the drug is indicated. If we assume that the medication is expected to be an improvement over existing medications, then a therapy already exists. However, we have learned by repeated experience that for maximum safety we should give a single, small dose of the experimental drug. This may be followed, after a suitable time, with increasingly larger single doses of drug, either for the same or for different subjects.

What are the safety and scientific problems of executing such a protocol in patients with active infections? First, the patient should not have concurrent antibacterial or other therapy because it will obscure the effects of the experimental drug. Second, the initial and some subsequent doses of medication will be so small that little, if any, therapeutic effect will be expected. Third, the infection will produce many chemical, hematological, and physiological changes so that it may be difficult, if not impossible, to distinguish between injury as a consequence of disease and injury as a consequence of the clinical trial.

When this exercise is completed, we find we have the following problems: 1) a real increase in the potential for mortality or injury from the disease itself due to the removal of previous therapy and the small dosage of the experimental drug; 2) the concurrent complication of the potential for injury from the disease by the potential for harm by a new, untested drug—potentials which may be additive in a subject already imperiled by a serious disease, and 3) much of the scientific benefit from this study is lost because data on adverse effects and drug intolerance may be obscured by the major abnormalities induced by the primary illness. This means that many additional subjects will be put at risk until the drug's potential for harm can be carefully established.

From the hypothetical case of a new bacterial agent, we can extract several concerns of ethical importance:

1) What is the relative safety of a given protocol design on patients versus "normals?"

2) What is the scientific merit of the data from patient versus "normals?"

3) Does the subject benefit in any real way aside from the pious, but unsupported, hope that a miracle will occur?

Naturally, not all drug trials will follow the example of the antibacterial. However, the practices of using small initial doses, increasing the dose by small increments, and

using healthy volunteers have established a rule in clinical trials which could be stated: distribute and diffuse the risk as widely as possible, so that no one individual carries the entire hazard. As a guide to the design of clinical studies, this rule has appeared to minimize the incidence of significant and irreversible injury in actual practice.

Another concern not considered in the written codes, but closely related to the selection of subject populations, is that of indemnification. If a clinical trial has a risk—and this is nearly always so—then how should the risk be distributed? The issue of indemnification brings this to the forefront. Should the subject bear the risk of physical disability, or even death, as well as the associated economic burdens? This hardly seems fair, especially when much of the cost of human experimentation is borne by government or as a cost of marketed goods by pharmaceutical companies.

The selection of a subject population depends a great deal on the distribution of risk. A patient with a disease is in a much more difficult position with regard to indemnification claims than is the normal volunteer. This is true because of a technical problem alluded to earlier—that of distinguishing between the injury as a consequence of disease and an injury as a consequence of a clinical trial. No-fault indemnification for injuries in a patient population is many orders of magnitude more difficult than is no-fault indemnification for injury of normal subjects. Another ethical barrier to the use of patient subjects for early drug studies is the real danger of misleading the patient. A putative therapeutic agent will often be confused for a real therapeutic agent unless vigorous methods of explanation are used. The normal subject suffers from [illegible] such illusions. When dosage and method of therapy are clearly not therapeutic, even though the drug may have this potential, it is important that this be clearly specified.

While the concept of no-fault indemnification for injury to experimental subjects is not yet included in accepted rules or regulations, it is implied in the traditional informed consent agreement. If anyone doubts this fact, let him do the following experiment: Devise the customary "informed consent" to which is added the following statement—"There are no provisions for indemnification for injury. If an injury should occur it is doubtful that the resources of the scientist will be adequate to compensate you for professional fault. You will need to sue and if you win there may be insufficient funds to pay you." If this, or something similar, were a part of each "informed consent," then how easy would it be to recruit subjects?

If the risks of a clinical study are explained to the potential volunteer and are adequately understood, then it follows that if the volunteer does not ask about indemnification, he simply is naive. In our experience with the indoctrination of potential volunteers, it is rare that the volunteer does not ask for our provision about indemnification. We believe that if we did not have such an arrangement, few, if any, subjects would volunteer. In fact, we would be very suspicious of the motivation and judgment of one who did volunteer in the face of a straightforward statement that indemnification was not provided. However, in some instances, both volunteer and investigator may be unaware that the usual kinds of insurance coverage and professional liability insurance, that is malpractice insurance, may not

cover the risks of an investigational new drug.

A new phenomenon has become apparent in that product liability insurance may not be operational in the case of an investigational drug. While self-insurance by large pharmaceutical firms is a reasonable substitute for commercial insurance, self-insurance by most investigators is not a satisfactory protection for the volunteer. It is unfortunate that the present insurance market is so difficult, but the responsibility for indemnification is as important as, indeed is an integral part of, an informed consent agreement.

Since we like to live and function by rules, more specific guidelines from agencies such as the FDA and HEW are inevitable for research supporting the development of new drugs. When these guidelines are drafted we would like to see provisions included to lead us in directions which minimize the risk to any given individual. This requires the flexibility of ad hoc moral guidelines in the interpretation of earlier established codes. We can recognize that in most cases the normal subject best fulfills the scientific needs of a Phase I study. We can then choose our subject population to permit minimum risk and more sharply defined indemnification against injury. The diffusion and minimization of risk should have top priority in our hierarchy of ethical concerns. Unfortunately, this is not always possible when the strict interpretation of established codes is used.

In conclusion, it is emphasized that the paramount considerations in selecting subject populations for drug research are the diffusion of risk to individual subjects and the adequate protection of subjects through indemnification. We believe that the application of ad hoc moral principles facilitates this process while the strict interpretation of currently established ethical codes appears to inhibit its success.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 437, May 1978

Abortion and Medical Ethics

By DANIEL CALLAHAN

ABSTRACT: Despite the Supreme Court decision in 1973, *Roe* v. *Wade*, making abortion legally available without impediment during the first two trimesters of pregnancy, neither the legal nor ethical problems of abortion have been solved. Congressional opposition to federal financial support of abortion, as well as a wide disparity in availability of abortion, indicates the still unsettled state of public policy on the issue. In medical ethics, a number of problems have surfaced in the past few years, which together form a complex set of both moral and legal issues. Fetal research, on the one hand, and the prospect of in vitro fertilization, on the other, both point to issues which recent Supreme Court decisions have not clarified. The rapid development of amniocentesis as a major tool of prenatal diagnosis highlights some of the new dilemmas. If the Supreme Court decision is read literally, there would appear to be no grounds for a physician to refuse to perform an abortion except for a clear threat to a woman's health from the abortion itself. Yet many, and perhaps most, physicians appear morally opposed to using abortion for sex selection or in those cases where simple postnatal treatment is available to correct a genetic defect. What are the rights of physicians in such cases and what, if any, are the limits on the rights of women to have abortions? Lurking in the background is the growing power of medicine to push back the time of viability of an infant earlier and earlier. Both new legal and ethical problems are bound to result. Abortion remains as deeply complex a moral issue as ever.

Daniel Callahan is Director of the Hastings Center, Institute of Society, Ethics, and the Life Sciences, Hastings-on-Hudson, New York. He received his B.A. from Yale and his Ph.D. in philosophy from Harvard. He has taught at Brown University and the University of Pennsylvania and is an elected member of the Institute of Medicine, National Academy of Sciences. He is the author of Abortion: Law, Choice and Morality, The Tyranny of Survival, *and* Ethics and Population Limitation.

LIKE THE tides in some infernal sea, the abortion debate rises and falls with bewildering rapidity, subject all the while to undertows, sudden storms, and crashing waves. It is a sea well known to be inhospitable to politicians, pundits, physicians, and bishops. If the ship of state has hard going in its treacherous waters, so also does the bark of Peter.

One might ask why this should be so. After all, public opinion is divided on many issues, hysteria is not unknown in other quarters, and Supreme Court decisions rarely result in unanimous ecstasy. Yet abortion debates are different—they cut across the usual party lines, evoke uncommonly deep feelings, and can even divide husbands and wives. But they seem always to have been different, in all times and in all places. If even primitive tribes were reported to have found the issue troublesome, the wild fluctuations in laws throughout the world in recent years—a relaxing of laws in Western Europe and the United States, and a tightening of them in Eastern Europe—indicate that little has changed. Why should it? Only a grossly insensitive minority will deny that abortion poses a moral issue. For most people, the apparent need to balance off one set of high values for another (a fetus for the welfare of a woman or the welfare of a woman for a fetus) is only an occasion for anguish. Perhaps that is the way it should always be—abortion is not the kind of moral issue that is once and for all solved.

Yet if that is the case at the moral level, laws and court opinions need to be more decisive. They have to establish fair standards for everyone and create a public policy that is minimally coherent and systematic. Whatever one may think of the Supreme Court abortion decision in 1973, *Roe* v. *Wade*, it did choose one classic and long-honored way out of a morally and politically divisive problem. It left the final decision to individuals. The court did not say that women must have abortions. It said only that, if they choose, then they may have an abortion. This is a coherent and systematic, even if controversial, public policy. The Court recognized the ambiguity of the moral situation, leaving some free to continue to say no to abortion and others free to make use of it, while at the same time saying that it did not and could not have the wisdom to resolve that ambiguity.

THE SUPREME COURT DECISION OF 1973

I choose the Supreme Court decision in 1973 as a convenient and symbolic point of departure. It represented, on the surface, a decisive triumph for those groups that had worked long and hard for a change in the earlier, highly restrictive American state abortion laws. Prior to that decision, a number of states had already made changes in their abortion laws, public opinion polls were indicating a shift in a more permissive direction, and the feminist and civil rights movements had opened up new lines of argumentation in favor of far less restrictive laws. In comparative terms, the Supreme Court decision came with great rapidity. The abortion reform movement was barely underway in the late 1940s and during the 1950s, and only began to take on real force in the 1960s. If a favorable Supreme Court decision is the great legal prize in our country, it was a stunning prize, indeed, for those in favor of reform.

Yet the reaction to the decision shows that the problem itself has

hardly been solved in any wholly decisive way. That those opposed to abortion reform of any kind should have found the decision unacceptable is hardly surprising. But there were also complaints even from those who had won a major victory. Instead of breaking entirely new ground, the decision was a patchwork quilt of the old and the new. For one thing, it made even first trimester abortions a matter of "medical judgment," seeming to leave the decision finally in the hands of physicians. Though it talked about the "right to privacy," and alluded to women's rights, it was simply not clear finally just what unilateral rights women actually have. For another, it did not satisfy the most ardent proponents of reform that third trimester abortions would be subject to medical and state control. Those opposed to abortion, could, for their part, readily find some weak reasoning in the decision. Though the Court disclaimed it could solve the "speculative" problems of the morality of abortion, it declared de facto that the fetus has no rights, up through the first two trimesters. Who needs a decisive philosophical judgment when a court can make a decisive legal judgment?[1]

The most important outcome of the decision, however, was not so much that it settled at least most of the legal arguments, but that it was not able, and has not been able to, since, to settle the moral arguments. Of course no Supreme Court decision can do that, but in this instance there have been some important consequences. To this day, there is an enormous disparity in the availability of abortion services, with the greatest number being clustered in New York and California. Over one million legal abortions are performed annually in the United States, making abortion one of the most commonly performed surgical procedures. In 1974, 169,160 abortions were performed in New York and 159,520 in California. By contrast, 380 were performed during the same year in Mississippi and only 30 in West Virginia.[2] A refusal on the part of hospitals in many places, and a refusal on the part of many physicians, to perform abortions has meant that abortion is simply not equally available to all. At the same time, a significant political effort by right-to-life groups has intimidated many politicians, has led to some active efforts for a constitutional amendment, and has had a significant impact on the provision of abortion services to the poor. In short, if the abortion problem has not disappeared as a political issue, it surely has not disappeared as a moral issue, and there is no indication that the situation will change for some time to come.

DEVELOPMENTS AFTER 1973

In the context of medical ethics, abortion has remained a heated and central issue. On the legal front, the 1973 decision left a number of issues up in the air, many of which, but not all, have been dealt with in later decisions. In particular in the 1976 decision, *Danforth* v. *Planned Parenthood of Missouri*, the Court tried to take on in more detail the question of "viability," and concluded that, in constitutional terms, viability will be construed as "that stage

1 For a variety of critiques of *Roe* v. *Wade*, see "Abortion, The New Ruling," *Hastings Center Report*, vol 3, no. 2 (April 1973), pp 4–7

2 Edward Weinstock, et al., "Abortion Need and Services in the United States, 1974–1975," *Family Planning Perspectives*, vol. 8, no 2 (March/April 1976), pp. 58–69

of fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside of the womb by natural or artificial life-support systems. . ." It also determined that a state may require a woman to give her written and informed consent to have an abortion, that a state may not require the consent of a spouse to an abortion during the first trimester, that a state may not constitutionally require, in the case of an abortion for a minor, the consent of a parent or parents during the first trimester, and that a state may require records of some kind to be kept, so long as they remain confidential.

If that decision gave comfort to those concerned about a watering down of the original *Roe* v. *Wade* decision, another development was far less comforting. A major effort in Congress to limit federal Medicaid benefits for elective abortions met with considerable success. In June 1977, the House of Representatives voted to prohibit the use of federal funds "to pay for abortions or to promote or encourage abortions." Just three days after that vote the Supreme Court ruled on three cases (*Maher* v. *Doe*, *Beal* v. *Doe*, and *Poelker* v. *Doe*), all of which involved either the government's obligation to pay for abortions or its obligation to require public hospitals to perform abortions. The most important, *Maher* v. *Doe*, held that a state participating in the Medicaid program was not required to pay for nontherapeutic abortion even though it paid for childbirth. Shortly after that decision, the Senate voted to bar the use of federal money for abortion except in cases of rape, incest, and medical necessity. At this writing, a Senate-House Conference Committee has not been able to resolve the differences between the Senate and House versions. Proponents of what has now come to be called the pro-choice position saw in the Supreme Court decisions and the legislative action a clear assault on the right of poor women to procure a safe abortion. The pro-life groups saw the same events as a legitimate way of distinguishing between a right to privacy in abortion decisions and a right of entitlement to state support in carrying out a decision to have an abortion.

THE PRESENT LEGAL SITUATION

From the viewpoint of medical ethics, the present legal situation conceals as much as it reveals. Most of the legal struggles have turned on the rights of the father, the rights of minors, and federal support of abortion programs. Yet a number of other issues have arisen since the Supreme Court decision which, if they have not resulted in fierce legislative struggles, have been the subject of considerable soul searching among those working in the field of ethics.

The ethical issue which received the most attention within the past few years was fetal research. In late 1974, Congress established the National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research. The Commission was specifically mandated to examine the issue of fetal research, particularly research on living fetuses, and to recommend to the Secretary of the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare whether and under what circumstances such research should be conducted or supported by that Department. Not surprisingly, the issue proved particularly heated. For those opposed all along to abortion, it was simply offense added to injury that fetal research should even be con-

templated on living fetuses. Even to those in favor of the Supreme Court decision, the issue posed some difficult dilemmas. For some, the fact that some fetuses were destined to die by abortion was, in itself, sufficient grounds to use those fetuses for medical investigation. At the least, since they were destined to die, further harm could hardly be done to them. At most, the fact of their death might mean that some significant medical discoveries could be made, thus rendering their deaths not wholly meaningless.

THE ISSUE OF FETAL RESEARCH

On July 25, 1975, the Commission presented its results to the Secretary of HEW. In general, it approved both therapeutic and nontherapeutic research directed toward the fetus, on the condition that there be little or no risk to the fetus. The most difficult issue it had to face was that of nontherapeutic research directed toward the fetus during the abortion procedure, and nontherapeutic research directed toward the nonviable fetus ex utero. In setting conditions for that last category of research, the most significant provisions were that there should be "no significant procedural changes . . . introduced into the abortion procedure in the interest of research alone, and no intrusion into the fetuses made which alters the duration of life."[3] But those conditions raised a number of research problems, since some of the most effective potential research would involve a violation of precisely those conditions. At that point, the Commission recognized it had a problem on its hands, and recommended that such research "presenting special problems related to the interpretation or application of these guidelines" could be conducted or supported by the Secretary of DHEW only after such research "has been approved by a national ethical review body." As it happens, however, there existed at the time no such entity as a "national ethical review body," and as this is being written one has still not been established.

The debate on fetal research caused a number of ethical issues to surface. For one thing, it implicitly raised the question of the rights of a fetus destined to be aborted. For those who hold that the fetus should at least be the subject of some respect, even if not of full legal standing, it was hard to swallow the notion of the fetus as a research subject. It also raised the question of the extent to which the fetus should be seen exclusively as the property of the mother. If the mother gives permission for research, why should there be regulations at all bearing on research in the fetus? As I will discuss later on, the 1973 Supreme Court decision by no means solved all of the logical dilemmas posed by a free choice on the part of a woman. Is the fetus simply her property, to be disposed of as she sees fit? The Court did not say that, but then it did not

3. The National Commission for the Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, *Research on the Fetus. Report and Recommendations* (Washington, D.C.. DHEW Publication no. (OS) 76-127, 1975), p. 74. For other discussion of the ethics of fetal research, see Paul Ramsey, *The Ethics of Fetal Research* (New Haven, Conn : Yale University Press, 1975), Karen Lebacqz, "Important Elaborations Fetal Research· Response to the Recommendations," *Hastings Center Report*, vol 5 (October 1975), pp 11-13, and Willard Gaylin and Marc Lappé, "Fetal Politics. The Debate on Experimenting with the Unborn," *Atlantic Monthly*, vol. 235 (May 1975), pp. 66-73.

say just what rights resided in the woman concerning her fetus once she had made a decision to abort it, nor did it say what other use could be made of the fetus.

If a fetus has no moral standing whatever, then there is no obvious reason to quibble over its moral status as an experimental subject. Yet if the fetus does have some moral standing, but not a full legal standing, then what rights, if any, does it have? To my mind, a striking feature of the debate on fetal research relates to what I will call "ethical sensibilities." Emotionally, even many who supported the Supreme Court decision reacted against treating the fetus simply as one more experimental object. At the same time, it has proved exceedingly difficult to articulate a strong argument to defend those sensibilities, since one seems to be moving in an uneasy area between moral intuitions and the state of the law. The issue is perhaps most difficult for those who hold that, on balance, the right of a woman to choose an abortion takes precedence over the right of the fetus to life. But that leaves unresolved the question of just how respect may be shown to the fetus and yet, at the same time, take full account of the fact that the courts have decided that the fetus really has no rights.

If that issue poses some obvious difficulties, the research case for the use of fetuses poses still others. A major and accurate claim of those researchers who want to use fetuses for research purposes is that such research will contribute, in the future, not only to healthier lives for babies, but in many cases to the saving of their lives. Yet there is surely a paradox here. What is it that makes those babies, whose lives may be saved in the future, of greater value than the lives of those otherwise healthy fetuses being aborted now? The obvious answer of course is that, in the case of the fetuses being aborted, they are not wanted. The premise of the research argument, though never fully stated, is that the lives of wanted babies in the future can be saved as a result of medical advances, not the lives of all babies. A similar paradox exists in the development of the field of neonatology. A major development in recent years has been neonatal intensive care units, whose aim is to reduce both morbidity and mortality of premature and otherwise endangered babies. In that case, enormous expenditures of time, dedication and money go into saving the lives of a comparatively small number of babies. Yet in the very hospitals where neonatologists are working to save lives, perfectly healthy fetuses are being aborted in other parts of the same hospital. The very bestowal of the term "patient" is indicative of the paradox here. In the case of abortion, it is the mother who is the patient, not the fetus. In the case of the endangered fetus of a mother who desires to have a baby, the fetus becomes the patient. It is a troubling matter, not easily resolved simply by talking in terms of the wanted or the unwanted child.

Analogous problems are raised by the prospect of in vitro fertilization, that is, the fertilization of an egg outside of the womb (in a culture dish), and its reimplantation in the womb. The technique, still not developed, would, according to its proponents, have a research value for reproductive biology as well as a practical value for some infertile women (particularly those with blocked oviducts). Precisely because the procedure is now in a very primitive stage, however, there are moral dilemmas. First, it is a form of human

experimentation. There can be no certain way of predicting whether the embryo and fetus will develop normally; deleterious effects of the procedure may not become evident until after birth. Second, the process of experimentation may, and probably will, require the destruction of fertilized eggs and early embryos for close examination, thus becoming, in effect, an abortion procedure carried out for purely experimental purposes. Third, when the technique is in the experimental phase, and eggs have been donated for research purposes, then to whom do the fertilized eggs belong—the "mother," the "mother" and "father" together, or to the researchers? And if the fertilized egg is reimplanted in a womb other than that of the woman from whom the unfertilized egg was taken, who would then be the "mother?" Needless to say, these are difficult questions.[4]

The development of prenatal diagnosis, in its many forms, has raised still another array of ethical dilemmas. Amniocentesis, involving the analysis of a sample of amniotic fluid drawn by needle from the pregnant woman, is able to provide evidence of a number of chromosomal and other abnormalities early enough to permit a legal abortion. This allows certain knowledge in many cases that a child is defective, most notably in the instance of Down's syndrome (mongolism), and it becomes possible for a woman to have an abortion to obviate bearing such a defective child. Recent studies have shown this to be a safe procedure, and it is increasingly being used in women over 35, those most at risk for having a defective child. Other experimental techniques of prenatal diagnosis include the development of fetoscopy, which may make possible the drawing of a blood sample from the fetus, and the art is developing to a state where direct visual scanning of the fetus may soon also become possible. Ultrasound is still another technique of examining the fetus for a defect, and there are an increasing number of tests available which analyze the mother's blood for the likelihood of her carrying a defective fetus.

SEX CHOICE

In one sense, the development of these techniques simply opens up scientific possibilities for those women who do not care to bear a defective child. Since a "fetal indication" for abortion was broadly recognized in some states even prior to the Supreme Court decision, it might be expected that no special problem would appear by the development of these techniques. Yet as the techniques develop further, there is the problem of the extent of real or potential fetal damage which could serve as a moral justification for abortion. A harelip, for instance, is certainly a defect, but it is a surgically correctable defect. Would the avoidance of the harelip child serve as adequate moral justification for abortion? If one follows a strict logic of leaving the decision entirely to a woman, then of course any justification is a sufficient justification. But, even so, how far should that logic be pressed? Amniocentesis makes possible the detection of the sex of a child, thus allowing a woman to abort the child of an undesired sex. There is a great deal of resistance among those able to use the technique of amniocentesis to use it for

4. Leon Kass, "Babies by Means of *In Vitro* Fertilization, Unethical Experiments on the Unborn?," *New England Journal of Medicine*, vol. 285 (18 November 1971), pp. 1174–78

purposes of sex choice. Some have argued that it is a poor allocation of what is, at present, a scarce resource. But however true that may be, it evades a more fundamental moral issue. If the only "defect" a child has is being of a sex not wanted by the parents, this would seem to leave the fetus with no moral status whatever. Intuitively, many reject that position, and it can pose a nasty dilemma for a physician trained to perform amniocentesis. The Supreme Court decision, as noted, did not leave clear the extent to which the abortion decision is the woman's or the doctor's. It spoke, basically, as if it were meant to be a joint decision, and yet at the same time it did give a very heavy weight to the "medical judgment" of the physician. If one places the emphasis entirely on women's rights, then the physician becomes merely a technician—and thus should, like it or not, carry out amniocentesis for the sake of sex choice. On the other hand, if there are no medical contraindications to amniocentesis for sex choice, the physician can hardly take refuge in "medical judgment" as a reason for not using the technique for that purpose. Yet many physicians are quite unwilling to play the role of technician, or to carry out abortions for what may seem to them utterly trivial reasons (particularly second trimester abortions, a necessity in the case of sex determination by amniocentesis), and it is not clear that the Supreme Court ever intended them to be merely passive.[5]

5. A good survey of the issues, medical and ethical, can be found in David N Leff, "Boy or Girl: Now Choice, Not Chance," *Medical World News* (1 December 1975), pp. 45–66, see also Marc Lappé and Peter Steinfels, "Choosing the Sex of Our Children," *Hastings Center Report*, vol. 4, no 1 (February 1974), pp. 1–4.

PRENATAL DIAGNOSIS

The problem is likely to intensify in time, since the possibilities of prenatal diagnosis are almost unlimited. It will be possible to detect more and more defective fetuses in utero as time goes on. At the same time, there is also a greater possibility of finding ways to treat a fetus in utero for some defects and also a greater possibility of correcting defects once a defective fetus has been born. Some harsh policy choices are posed by these dual developments. Should resources be allocated to increasing the range and possibilities of prenatal diagnosis, and thus the possibilities of the use of abortion to deal with the problem of genetic defects? But does it make sense to allocate resources to the treatment of genetic defects in utero or ex utero, particularly if the process will be slow and costly? One argument, of course, is that both alternatives should be developed, since this would provide a maximum of free choice for a woman. But how much research money should be invested to increase available options?

Another troubling issue with prenatal diagnosis turns on the question of the "welfare of the child." Some have argued that every child has a right to be born with a healthy genetic constitution, though it is by no means clear just what such a right entails. If it is understood to entail the right of every defective fetus to be aborted, for its own welfare, it is surely a very strange kind of right, the only one I can think of where death, or not being born, is the only way to have one's rights fulfilled. Equally puzzling is a determination of just what should count toward the "welfare" of the child. It is clear that many defective and deformed human beings have lived satisfactory

lives, and our whole national effort of late toward taking the lives of the handicapped seriously indicates a recognition that such lives can indeed be tolerable, with adequate social support.

For some time now, the discussion of prenatal diagnosis has been subject to a great muddle. There are at least three considerations possible in determining the fate of a defective fetus. the rights of the fetus, the rights of the family, and the rights of society. Unfortunately, much of the discussion is confused by lumping all three rights and considerations together. It is generally known that, however difficult life may be for Down's syndrome children, they usually do not suffer in any notable way, and the same is even more true in the case of one of the worst of all of the genetic defects, Tay-Sachs disease. In the latter case, a child becomes vegetative at about six months and will die by the age of four or five. But the child does not suffer, so it really makes no sense to talk about the abortion of a Tay-Sachs child in terms of avoiding suffering by that child. It is the parents who suffer, and it is society, which frequently bears the expensive burden of caring for such children (in the range of $25,000 a year) But if the moral issue is to be cast in suffering, then it should be cast in terms specifically of the burden on the parent or society, it is simply an evasion to act as if it were solely the welfare of the child being considered. We are here in an area well beyond the law, where moral issues are surely at stake. Again, to follow one abortion logic, the fetus simply has no rights and parental desires can take total precedence. But it is interesting that there is usually a strong attempt made to speak in terms of the welfare of the child, even when that is clearly not the real issue.

While the symptoms so far are mild, there is increasing evidence of social pressure on parents not to bear a defective child. Increasingly, the argument is being made that certainly women over the age of 35, those most at risk, should undergo prenatal diagnosis. Beyond that, one can find evidence that prenatal diagnosis is "medically indicated" in any situation where there is some significant risk for the bearing of a defective child. While one can understand a general movement toward making use of a powerful new technique, one can also foresee some significant conflicts of values. Abortion was legalized in this country primarily as a means of giving women a wider range of options Freedom of choice on the part of the woman has been the critical ethical argument. Ironically, social pressures which, in effect, tell women how they ought to make use of the freedom of abortion, in the case of potentially defective children, could well subvert the very argument for free choice which was made in the first place. If abortion serves women, abortion can also, under different circumstances, serve society as well —at least that is the argument of those who have pointed to the value of abortion for population limitation and also for reducing the incidence of genetic defects in society. Even now, some specialists are unwilling to carry out prenatal diagnosis unless there is a prior agreement on the part of the woman to have an abortion should a defective fetus be detected. This is reasonable enough, since there seems little point in going through with the procedure if no action is to be taken. At the same time, it is difficult to see how our society will avoid social pressures upon

those at risk for bearing a defective child since it is rarely easy to both foster the principle of freedom and at the same time take that freedom so seriously that people are not manipulated toward what society considers responsible choices.

In addition to the reasons offered in favor of prenatal diagnosis for the child, the family, and society, there have been frequent references in the literature to its potential biological value to the species as a whole. However, population geneticists seem considerably divided on this point, not only because of the difficulty in determining the long-range implications of the elimination of some genetic diseases, but also because it is far from clear that elimination of specific conditions is necessarily of biological value. Many genetic diseases are thought to have certain compensatory biological values for various groups within the species, and the absence of clear knowledge on these points gives rise to considerable hesitation about whether the welfare of the gene pool as such is a significant reason for prenatal diagnosis. If there is anything to be said on this point, it is that at present the strongest moral reasons for prenatal diagnosis would center on the welfare of the family, and perhaps of the society as a whole, seen from an economic perspective.

THE PROBLEM OF VIABILITY

If the moral dilemmas posed by prenatal diagnosis, fetal research, and sex choice have turned out to be the most prominent in recent years, the potentially most troubling issue of all may be the next to arise. That is the problem of "viability." As cited above in the *Danforth* decision, the Court defined viability as "that stage of fetal development when the life of the unborn child may be continued indefinitely outside of the womb by natural or artificial life-support systems." In *Roe v. Wade* the Court declared that "For the stage subsequent to viability the State, in promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life, may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health of the mother." The *Danforth* decision thus clarified what the Court means by "viability."

But it is an elastic definition. The developments in neonatology, mentioned above, also include an increased ability to keep smaller and younger infants alive by "artificial life-support systems." In *Roe v. Wade* the Court was using what was then the generally accepted time of viability, about 28 weeks, but going as low as 24 weeks. But the technological possibilities here are in principle unlimited, subject only to our present lack of skill and knowledge. It is thus not only conceivable, but also likely, that it will soon be possible to keep babies alive outside of the womb down to 18 weeks, then 15, and so on. "Viability" does not, therefore, represent a fixed biological point, but is a function of technical capacity. Clearly, such a development will force a reconsideration of the Supreme Court decision, and the legal implications are tremendous. The moral implications are no less important, for a removal of viability as a significant biological point would also undercut its use as a significant moral dividing point.

THE CONCEPT OF POTENTIALITY

Philosophers and theologians have argued interminably about the significance of (to use the Court's

words) "the potentiality of human life." Viability has frequently been used (and so the Court used it) as a biological dividing line where a significant potentiality had at that point been realized—independent life outside of the womb. But that line will probably soon cease to mean much of anything biologically, and thus not only the Courts, but society as well, will be forced to reconsider the concept of potentiality and its moral significance, if any. Both the Courts and the medical profession, and probably much of the public, have for some time tried to find a congenial fit between biological stages in human development and ethical norms for the respect due persons. The concept of viability represents one attempt at such a fit (for others, including this author, the biological stage of development reached by the end of the first trimester—particularly the development of a cerebral cortex—has appeared a more compelling point for such a fit).[6] What both the demise of the notion of viability, and serious philosophical questions about fastening on to one particular developmental stage as ethically critical, may mean is the posing of a much starker moral question—a straightforward moral decision to declare certain types of human life beyond the pale of rights or respect, with no evasion of that decision possible on the basis of biological arguments. Speaking as one who has supported the Supreme Court decision and who, in earlier writing, tried to make the most possible of biological stages of development, it is not a prospect I look forward to.

6. Daniel Callahan, *Abortion: Law, Choice and Morality* (New York, Macmillan, 1970), pp 349–94

CONCLUSION

Since I have already introduced a personal note, I would like to conclude with some further personal observations. I think it fair to say that, for many working in medical ethics abortion remains the most difficult problem of all. For one thing, there seems little new to say about a problem that has been fiercely debated for more than a decade; for many who have tried to find a good and coherent answer, there is a feeling of real frustration. For another, as legislators have discovered to their pain, the debate releases the most unfettered emotional appeals and outbursts, as if moral passion on the subject would be compromised or diluted by recourse to rational arguments.

Yet I believe that since the Supreme Court decision there has actually been a higher and more sober level of discourse than there was earlier. The best evidence of this is the very fine array of carefully argued articles and books which have been published by philosophers[7] and a more general willingness, it seems to me, for more people to take the moral problem seriously. Prior to the Supreme Court decision, when the battle was almost purely partisan and political, there was little tendency for anyone to take a nuanced approach, politically never a very helpful tack, little tendency to consider the long-term effects of available legal abortion, and little tendency to bring suppressed doubts

7. See especially Marshall Cohen et al., eds., *The Rights and Wrongs of Abortion* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press 1974), a collection of articles which originally appeared in the journal *Philosophy and Public Affairs*.

into the open. These are now beginning to happen and on both sides of the fence. For some, originally strongly opposed to abortion, it has become evident that the Supreme Court decision has not meant instant moral armaggedon. For others, eager to have the laws changed, it has meant the realization that legalization has seemed to imply to many moral approbation and thus a recourse to abortion for reasons that seem to carry little moral weight, routinization of the "procedure" seems to point in the direction of moral trivialization. The history of abortion debates in other nations, the fact that people do appear to change what they think are settled moral convictions, and the inherently difficult ethical questions raised by abortion, all promise that abortion will remain a central and perennial issue for medical ethics.

ANNALS, AAPSS, 437, May 1978

Ethics in Epidemiology

By MERVYN SUSSER, ZENA STEIN, AND JENNIE KLINE

ABSTRACT: There is almost no step in the research process in epidemiology in which ethical issues do not exist. In this paper we follow the thread of our own experience in balancing values of scientific rigor against values concerning the interests of the people under study. Ethical issues in epidemiology are illustrated in the choice of research questions; in the choice of study designs to explore the questions; in the maintenance of confidentiality; in obtaining the participation of populations; in experimental studies; and the giving or withdrawing of treatment.

Mervyn Susser, Sergievsky Professor of Epidemiology at Columbia University, graduated in medicine from the University of Witwatersrand in 1950. He taught in the Department of Social Medicine at Manchester University from 1957 through 1966 and has been head of the Division of Epidemiology at Columbia University since 1966.

Zena Stein is Professor of Public Health (Epidemiology) at Columbia University and Chief of Research, New York State Psychiatric Institute. She graduated with a masters degree in history from Cape Town University in 1943 and in medicine from the University of Witwatersrand in 1950. She was a Research Fellow at Manchester University before she came to Columbia University in 1966.

Jennie Kline is Research Associate (Epidemiology) at Columbia University and Senior Research Scientist at New York State Psychiatric Institute. She obtained her B.A. from the University of Chicago in 1972 and her Ph.D. in Epidemiology from Columbia University in 1977.

EPIDEMIOLOGY is the study of the distribution and determinants of health states in human populations. The value of studying the human species rather than others in order to garner knowledge about human health is self-evident. From the first, however, the specific address of epidemiology to human beings has imposed limitations as well as conferring strengths. The limitations stem primarily from the necessity to respect ethical standards, that is, human norms and values, in carrying out research on human subjects.

A comparison with experimental biology points up the problems of epidemiology. Several struts support the experimental method when it is applied to animals. The design of the experiment hinges on the random allocation of carefully bred animals of known characteristics to different experimental groups. Ideally these groups differ only with respect to the treatment under evaluation. There are few constraints on the nature of the treatment, its anticipated consequences, and the measures of outcome. The measures of outcome may include any useful observation; sacrifice of the animals is a commonplace. Finally, regardless of the outcome of the treatment, the experiment may be replicated many times, by the initial experimenter and by others, and it may be varied step by step to test explanatory hypotheses.

The epidemiologist who aspires to impose these experimental standards on his work can rarely, if ever, attain them. He must depend on consistency with varied strategies, rather than on strict replication, to validate his observations. The data he obtains are often imperfect and his estimates crude. The strengths *of epidemiological studies lie elsewhere. Thus they often have immediate relevance and application* in public health. Yet to achieve the relevance that can only come from valid results the epidemiologist must meet standards of scientific rigor. At the same time, he must meet ethical standards of respect for human beings, both in individual and population terms. Thus like the clinical scientist, the epidemiologist must have the willing participation of the people he studies, and avoid obtrusion on body and mind. He must have regard for the social values and institutions on which he may impinge.

An examination of ethics in epidemiology is thus an examination of the way in which the values of science and its potential benefits to public health are balanced against the values of individuals and communities. Such equations can be complex, difficult to construct, and difficult to resolve. To make things harder, these equations of values cannot be fixed and timeless as are the equations of the physical world: they are necessarily relative and changing. In this paper, we shall discuss the ethical considerations that inhere in the choice of research questions, and in the choice of study designs to explore the questions. We shall consider also the matter of confidentiality of records, and the manner in which the participation of study populations is achieved. Finally, we shall consider the problems special to experimental studies, and the consequences of both giving and of withholding experimental treatment. These questions are selected out of many in our own experience as those that most often present ethical dilemmas in epidemiology.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The choice of a research question raises broad issues. New knowledge is assimilated, so Thomas Kuhn and Karl Marx before him have led many to recognize, within the bounds of dominant scientific paradigms that are, in turn, dependent on the social structure and values of the time. Knowledge may remain true through the vagaries of thought and ideology. The same constancy is not secured for the place of knowledge in the conceptual schemes that guide the pursuit of new knowledge or the use of old. The measurable benefits of knowledge depend on its utility, and the utility of any piece of knowledge may be readily superceded, and may just as readily shift from peripheral to central.

From the scientist's viewpoint, what is most important is the scientific ideal of free inquiry and the pursuit of truth for its own sake. The epidemiologist, by definition, requires that his research endeavors have application to health, and his choice of research questions is determined, at least in part, by his personal values. It is surely proper to argue that a thoroughly ethical position requires the accommodation of the elite scientific ideal to the public interest.[1] Yet the public interest is most readily and most usually defined by the perceptions of public and legislative agencies, and it is far from obvious which classes among the public are thereby represented. Scientists need to be aware on whose behalf they labor. Presidents, industry, and big business have welcomed technology but have tended to treat the science that created it as expendable. Traditional socialists have had a naive and abiding faith in science, if often an hostility to its misapplication in technology. The history of the modern expansion of science suggests that power interests, as much as the public interest, have brought about the accommodation of scientific ideals to the practical world.

The choice of research questions is complicated by processes at many levels. The assessment of the relevance of a proposed epidemiological study is now usually in the hands of a variety of funding agencies. Their mode of functioning raises problems of values, political, moral and scientific, which lie at the very source of the large-scale research enterprises of our times. These value conflicts are bound to have ethical implications. Agency policies stimulate and, more subtly, limit the choice of questions open to researchers. It may be objected that the National Institutes of Health, the major funding source in the United States for at least three decades, uses elaborate mechanisms of peer review in order to ensure that objective, scientific judgments will accept or bar any given study. Further, the leading administrators of the institutes tend to be drawn from the ranks of scientists themselves. The intent is to safeguard the scientific ideal of free inquiry. Yet public and political values clearly enter into the process of guiding the direction of research.

The criteria and knowledge selected by agencies to assess relevance are only partially determined by the utility of the research to public health or by the directions suggested by recent research. Scientific administrations work within bureaucracies that require officials to compete for advancement and even survival, and the measure of

1. J. Monod, "The Code of the Scientist and its Relationship to Ethics," cited by A. Cournand, *Science* 198 (1977), pp. 699–705.

success is the budget of the department. The directors who must reward or deny this competition must themselves compete for budget in congress and through the executive. The dominant themes of research in the United States are now set by the political process. It is well understood that the fillip given to mental retardation research in the Kennedy era, and to cancer research in the Nixon era, flowed from presidential choices made on political or personal grounds. In times of large-scale studies and funding, political processes will inevitably be brought to bear. In such a context, scientists have an ethical responsibility to ask the old Roman question: who benefits?

From the point of view of the scientist, the shifts and turns in funding policy have an element of caprice. Does the epidemiologist, who has selected psychiatric disorders for study on grounds of scientific interest and potential public benefit, abandon the field for cancer when funds dry up? The obvious ethical answer may seem to be no. Yet less gross shifts in emphasis constantly occur, not because of a change in scientific interest or judgment, but for the sake of survival. Research endeavors in our time have become entrepreneurial. Investigators are obliged to compete for funds which will sustain their own salaries and those of the teams that are essential to the serious contemporary pursuit of epidemiological problems. As an unhappy result, many find themselves undertaking makeshift studies that are of little importance or interest and even unlikely to be productive.

The lack of continuity and security in the life of a present day investigator does violence to personal values and to the scientific ideal of free inquiry and the pursuit of truth for its own sake. The discovery of truth brings rewards of prestige and power that, even under the best conditions, may seduce investigators into research and activities which they might otherwise not undertake.[2] Ethics is nothing if it is not the reconciliation on moral grounds of conflicts of value between different groups or domains. Makeshift research on this view is perhaps harmless and the drain on the public purse less wasteful than it would be to provide unemployment and welfare benefits in lieu of salaries. We have learned, of course, that research may not be harmless. The good and the indifferent, alike, impinge on ethical concerns. It is at the level of the design of particular studies that questions of the harm and benefit of the research become cogent.

STUDY DESIGN

A brief account of research strategies employed in epidemiology may clarify our later discussion. Descriptive epidemiological studies are observational: they aim to discover the distribution of health states in populations. These distributions indicate what services may be needed, what changes have occurred and what control measures should be applied. The associations observed in descriptive studies lead to a central activity of epidemiology—the generation and, more particularly, the testing of hypotheses about the causes of health disorder. Analytic epidemiological studies test hypotheses, and they may be either experimental or, more usually, observational. Observational studies

2. Bernard Barber et al., *Research on Human Subjects* (New York: Russell Sage, 1973).

may, in turn, be divided into case-control and cohort studies.

Case-control studies begin with the assembly of cases that manifest the outcome of interest and suitable controls that do not manifest the outcome. The exposure of cases and controls to the hypothesized causal factor is compared. Cohort or longitudinal studies begin with the assembly of a population exposed to the hypothetical causal factor and suitable controls that are unexposed. The frequency of the outcome of interest among exposed and unexposed individuals is then compared. Case-control studies are usually less laborious than other forms of study and are undertaken when a condition is rare or the hypothetical risk factor under study has not been previously examined. Cohort studies are undertaken when a condition is common or when a longitudinal study is necessary in order to establish time sequence.

Experimental studies involve some form of intervention. They are usually undertaken when observational studies do not suffice to demonstrate that an association is causal and such a demonstration is of importance in either the prevention or treatment of a condition. Many associations do not lend themselves to experimental manipulation. The bearing of children, or exposure to hazards, or personality type, are not normally subject to experiment.

The choice of a study design is always influenced by concerns for rigor, for utility, and for feasibility. These concerns turn as much on ethical standards as on issues of scale and cost. Ideally, the choice of a study design depends on the state of knowledge at the time of the proposed investigation. Prevailing knowledge should influence the question addressed, and should also influence the approach taken to answer the question. In the light of current knowledge, also, potential risks to subjects must be considered in the choice of the design. Even over short time periods, the assessment of the state of knowledge and of potential risks may change. Reliability of judgment about these matters is often sought through consensus among reviewers. Unfortunately, the reliability of such assessments has never to our knowledge been tested. The assessments present the characteristic problems of all judgments. Among these are not only the varying opinions and attitudes of observers, but the varying composition of the observer group charged with making the judgments. The evaluations of a single project by two successive groups of reviewers is illustrative.

Ten years ago we set out to determine whether the development of offspring, both at birth and subsequently, was affected by nutritional intake of the mother during pregnancy. An experimental study was designed to determine whether nutritional supplementation during pregnancy had an effect on birthweight.[3] Women at high risk of bearing low birthweight infants were to be randomly assigned to treatment groups. Three treatment groups were proposed in the first design: the first group was to be given a nutritional supplement, the second group was to be given nutritional education (to control for the so-called "Hawthorne effect"), and the third group was to obtain the services of the regular prenatal clinic.

It turned out that the prevailing

3. D Rush et al., "The Prenatal Project: The First 20 Months of Operation," in *Nutrition and Fetal Development*, ed M. Winick (New York, Wiley, 1974).

sentiment among the members of the review group which evaluated this proposed research was skeptical of the idea that nutritional supplementation during pregnancy would raise birthweight. Therefore it was felt that the study, if it was worth doing at all, should use all available means to obtain an effect. Two treatment groups, it was suggested, might achieve this: one to be given the maximum possible treatment (both nutritional supplement and education) and a second group, for control, to be given the regular clinic treatment. Having maximized the chances of finding an effect, the distinction between the effects of the supplement and education could be left to a later experiment. The researchers were sent back to their calculators.

The second group of reviewers, assembled a few months later, was of a different temper. The prevailing sentiment among the members of this group was that protein supplementation was bound to have an effect, that it was important to demonstrate such an effect, and that to determine the precise effects of the supplement was essential. The ethics of leaving any group untreated was questioned. Thus a study was proposed in which there were to be two treatment groups, one treated with a high-protein supplement and the other with a low-protein supplement. Both were to have nutritional education. A sleeping control was comprised of women attending the regular prenatal clinic. This latter design was in fact carried out with unanticipated results that we shall discuss below.

CONFIDENTIALITY

Although observational and experimental studies differ in that only in the experimental studies are participants subject to intervention, there is considerable overlap in many essential design elements and in the ethical issues faced by epidemiologists in conceiving and carrying out both types of studies. The research question and design largely determine the definition of the appropriate study population. Other determinants include the availability of records, the ease of access to the study group, and the probability of acquiring informed consent from participants.

In epidemiologic studies, records from vital statistics systems, health care facilities, military registration, schools, and other large data sets often provide the study information. Sometimes these records serve as the sole source of data for the investigation; at other times, the records are used to trace and contact individuals in order to invite participation in the study. The utility of record systems in advancing knowledge of associations with disease, and of the detrimental effects of treatment is discussed by Gordis et al.[4] A host of such discoveries as the causal association of smoking with lung cancer, of nasopharyngeal cancer with furniture manufacture, of diethystilboestrol with adenocarcinoma of the vagina, and of high oxygenation of incubators for prematures with retrolental fibroplasia and blindness depended on the use of hospital records. They provided a crucial epidemiologic resource. Only by epidemiological methods can environmental causes of health disorders be established, or the behavior of known disorders be moni-

4. L. Gordis, E. Gold, and R. Seltser, "Privacy and Protection in Epidemiologic and Medical Research: Challenge and Responsibility," *American Journal of Epidemiology* 105 (1977), pp. 163–68.

tored, and the availability of records is the basis for many of these investigations.

In the past, the epidemiological researcher was almost always a physician. He was readily accorded the privileges of access to patients and records of the health care team. In recent years the ethics of opening medical records to research has been called into question. It has been suggested that to give access to records without the patient's consent is to violate the confidence between patient and doctor. There is every reason to respect that confidence. At the same time there is a powerful public interest in providing access to records. Indeed, the notion that a patient's hospital record is open only to the eye of the doctor is a myth, or at best a legend of the past. In the modern hospital, large teams of professionals and other workers are likely to inspect or make entries on the record.

We have but slowly come to understand that the role, values, and interests of the researcher, whether epidemiological or clinical, are different from those of the professional providing care, even when combined in the same individual. The recognition of this conflict of interest, and vivid examples of the violations of the patient's best interests that may follow from the conflict, was a main motive force of the recent reforms to regulate research.[5] In the matter of records, it is always possible that the information is sensitive and that its dissemination could harm the patient. Perhaps the most notorious example is the effort made by the Nixon administration to obtain psychiatric information on Daniel Ellsberg after he distributed the "Pentagon Papers" to the press. And a dramatic illustration of the harm such data can do was the damage done to Senators McGovern and Eagleton in their 1972 campaign against President Nixon by the revelation of Senator Eagleton's psychiatric history.

If past collections of records are to continue to yield the crucial knowledge they contain for research purposes, however, no ready means of improving the level of confidentiality that now exists are evident. In the future, we may anticipate that patients will be routinely asked for consent to use their records upon their entry to the treatment agency. These matters are of the highest moment to epidemiologists. Legislation has been placed before Congress, for example, that would curtail all access to medical records except for investigating Medicaid and Medicare fraud. Such a law would effectively end one of the main resources of epidemiological research and retard the understanding and control of environmental causes of disease inordinately.

VOLUNTARY AND INVOLUNTARY PARTICIPATION

The issue of voluntary participation is well illustrated in the studies of Joseph Goldberger, a great American epidemiologist of the first part of this century.[6] His major contribution was to demonstrate that pellagra, then a disease widespread among the poor in the southern United States, was caused by a specific dietary deficiency of the vitamin niacin. Pellagra caused typical changes of skin and mucous membranes, peripheral neuritis, dementia and, if untreated,

5. Jay Katz, *Experimentation With Human Beings* (New York, Russell Sage, 1972).

6. Milton Terris, ed., *Goldberger on Pellagra* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1964).

death in as many as 40 percent of the cases. Although various dietary hypotheses had been advanced to explain the distribution of the disease in the late nineteenth century, when Goldberger began his research a predominant view in the United States held that pellagra was caused by infection. Goldberger's solution of the problem led quite rapidly to the disappearance of the disease in all but a few unusual circumstances; for instance, in cases of alcoholism, or of senility in people living alone.

In one crucial study, Goldberger wished to demonstrate that lack of certain types of foods raised the risk of pellagra.[7] For an experiment in which he aimed to produce pellagra Goldberger recruited twelve volunteer convicts at the Rankin Farm of the Mississippi State Penitentiary. The study was designed to continue for six months. During that time the volunteers were fed diets which had been associated with a high prevalence of pellagra. Of the twelve volunteer subjects, one was released from the study because of another infirmity, and six developed pellagra. The subjective symptoms first appeared during the second month of the study, and by the close of the study six men had developed the skin changes, accompanied by other symptoms commonly associated with pellagra.

At the end of the study the convicts were pardoned, as had been promised when they volunteered. Although there is every indication in Goldberger's description of the study that the convicts were fully aware of the risks they were taking, the recruitment of this population for research would not be admitted as appropriate today. Members of captive populations, in which the reward is freedom, are not considered capable of giving informed consent.

In another experiment, Goldberger aimed to avert pellagra by supplementing the diet with meat, vegetables, milk, and eggs.[8] For this purpose, he used the residents of two orphanages that had a known high risk of pellagra. There is no indication that the children, aged 6 to 12 years, were asked for their consent, nor is it at all likely that they were. Given that the subjects in this study were orphans, and thus without parents and guardians who could give informed consent, it is likely that the experiment would not be approved today.

Goldberger's genius was to recognize that the orphanages provided a rare environment in which diet could be varied under controlled circumstances. The study demonstrated the preventive action of the supplementary diet. Although benefits could not be completely predicted at the outset of the experiment, there was no evident risk to the orphans. At the end of the experiment, however, the supplements had to be withdrawn from the orphanages, exposing the children once again to pellagra. This step, almost certainly not in the researcher's power to influence, involved withdrawing a treatment that had been shown to be beneficial. Nowadays, researchers are generally expected to avoid withdrawing what is beneficial, but like

7. J. Goldberger and G. A. Wheeler, "The Experimental Production of Pellagra in Human Subjects," *Hygienic Laboratory Bulletin* 120 (February 1920), pp 7–116, reprinted in *Goldberger on Pellagra*, ed. Terris.

8. J Goldberger, C H. Waring, and D. G. Willets, "The Prevention of Pellagra A Test of Diet Among Institutional Inmates," *Public Health Reports*, vol. 30, no 43 (1915), pp. 3117–31, reprinted in *Goldberger on Pellagra*, ed. Terris.

Goldberger, they may be powerless in this respect.

Goldberger's work stands among a very few historic epidemiological investigations that are great at once for their originality and brilliance, for their remarkable discoveries, and for their immediate public benefit. No one, now or then, would doubt his motives or grudge him his honor. As we noted earlier, however, standards change with time. The design of an epidemiological study is conceived and evaluated within the context of the prevailing scientific perspective. Given the constant shifts in perspective as new knowledge is acquired, retrospective evaluation of either the rigor, the utility, or the risks of a particular epidemiologic study will not always be in accord with evaluation of the study at the time it was carried out.

That Goldberger's studies might not meet the ethical requirements of our day may relate not so much to lower ethical standards at that time as to the enormous changes in the course of this century in the nature of the medical scientific enterprise. An activity that was the preserve of a small band of unusual and venturesome medical men has burgeoned and become a requirement for any physician who would seek an appointment in a medical school or even in a first-rate hospital. At the same time vastly expanded numbers of patients, more aware of their rights and more educated than ever before, enter facilities for medical care in which they are exposed to research. Developments on so large a scale at once multiply the possibilities of abuse, and not only invite but require regulation. The ethical standards of research practice must be raised, not through reliance on superior ethics among individual researchers, but through the institutionalization of standards and norms.

A rigid application of the rules of informed consent, it is worth noting, is not always in the interest of the patient. In one of our studies, patients with spontaneous abortion were identified through hospital records.[9] It was within the regulations of the hospital and the Human Investigation Committee to carry out a genetic investigation of the aborted conceptus without the patient's consent, as the aborted conceptus was considered to fall in the same category as specimens of tissue, blood, or excreta. A patient and the hospital staff could only be informed of the results of the genetic investigation, however, if the patient had given consent to the examination. A patient who had not given consent, either because she had left the hospital before contact could be established or had refused to participate in the study, as well as her doctor, had to be kept in ignorance of crucial findings.

When, on more than one occasion, the findings indicated that a patient ran serious and preventable risks of producing a malformed child, a simple classificatory change enabled recurrences to be avoided. The genetic examination of spontaneous aborted conceptions was declared part of the hospital routine (pathologic examination of the products of conception) and the information could be entered in the patient's chart. A less concerned service, bound to the letter of the rules, might not have allowed patients thus to benefit by a simple bureaucratic maneuver.

9 J. Kline et al., "An Epidemiological Study of the Role of Gravidity in Spontaneous Abortion," *Early Human Development* 1 (1978), pp. 345–56.

The need is to regulate in a manner that will safeguard patient interests and still not stifle the genius of a Goldberger. This must be more than a pious sentiment if research is to sustain its momentum. Historical examples of institutional impediments to the development of science are the many laws against the dissection of cadavers, for instance, which retarded the study of anatomy for centuries. While it is true that religious beliefs and social norms sustained those laws, there is little doubt that the laws impeded medical research. Despite cutbacks of finance and new controls, in the present abundance of biomedical research there is perhaps not much to fear. Yet the proposed legislation on the confidentiality of records, and the limitations on fetal research that were proposed if not enacted after the Ederer case, show that there needs to be vigilance, not only to curb abuses by researchers, but also to curb excesses among those who would correct the abuses.

EXPERIMENTS AND ISSUES OF INTERVENTION

The epidemiologist, like the scientist working with experimental animals, aspires to specify and equalize the environments of the experimental and comparison groups in his study. Complete control of all aspects of the environment is impossible in studies involving humans. The main reason for inadequate control in experimental studies stems from the diversity of behavior of free-living human beings. Those who are not so free, like prisoners or institutional patients, may be atypical in their responses, but also they may not be in a position to give or withhold consent.

Other difficult problems are posed by the ethics of giving or withholding treatment. In both observational and experimental studies in epidemiology, control of all factors except the one under investigation is achieved in part through the design of the study and in part through statistical control during the analysis. The basic device for isolating the effects of the factor under investigation is the construction of study and comparison groups that are as similar as possible in all respects but the factor under investigation. Whenever possible, the epidemiologist takes advantage of naturally occurring situations rather than undertaking an experiment. Observational studies are more parsimonious and encounter fewer ethical difficulties than experimental studies. In some instances, however, the experimental intervention offers the best or the only solution to a research problem.

An experience from the work of our team well illustrates the differences in both parsimony and ethical issues between observational and experimental studies. Some years ago, as mentioned above, we became convinced of the importance of understanding the effect of maternal diet during pregnancy on the viability and mental competence of the offspring. We formed the opinion that observational studies alone, however carefully constructed, could not provide satisfactory answers, and that an experimental approach was essential.[10] Two studies were designed. One was an observational study that made use of a natural experiment (the Netherlands famine of 1944–45) and thus escaped the need to manipulate human subjects

10 L. Bergner and M. W. Susser, "Low Birth Weight and Prenatal Mortality," *Pediatrics* 46 (1970), p. 6

intentionally.[11] The second, which has been referred to above, set out to supplement the diets of women during pregnancy.

The study using the natural event of the Netherlands famine was accomplished with relative speed and economy. The ethical issues were limited to those involving confidentiality, and simple solutions could be sought. The second study, using a contrived experiment, has had to face conflict between scientific and human considerations from the start. We had no great difficulty in framing the preliminary scientific requirements of the study: to select women at risk of having babies of low birth weight, to allocate them at random to varying levels of supplementary diet, and to monitor the outcome of their pregnancy.

A critical issue that the study could never resolve with entire certainty, however, was to ensure that the experimental intervention actually took place. Epidemiologists have learned that large proportions of patients do not adhere to prescribed treatments. With food, there was the further risk that the treatment might simply replace, rather than supplement, the regular diet or be distributed among other family members. Our consultant, the late Dr. Shirley Starr asked, only partly in jest, "Wouldn't the best thing be to give each woman a daily injection?"

Instead of this ethically and practically doubtful expedient, we developed an elaborate system of taking diet histories, counted the unused cans of dietary supplement left on the shelf at each replenishment, measured the output of a biochemical marker in the urine, and observed weight changes in the women, all measures aimed at monitoring the intake of the nutritional supplement. No measure provided entirely secure information about the amount of supplement consumed by individual women, although the information enables groups to be compared with some confidence.

The lack of firm knowledge in the field of human nutrition is owed essentially to just this problem: nutrient intake cannot yet be measured with precision in large, free-living populations. Once again this weakness resides in the inability of epidemiological investigations so far, whether natural or contrived, to reconcile scientific with human demands. Many closely controlled environments, as with Goldberger's orphans and prisoners, or as with those in mental hospitals, no longer lend themselves to the repetition and development of experimental studies.

In observational studies ethical issues are not entirely limited to procedures to protect confidentiality and to ensure informed consent. It is not infrequent that the researcher must decide to intervene for the benefit of the patient when a problem is discovered, even though the intervention disturbs the observational field. In most observational studies the benefits are in the longterm, that is, to advance scientific knowledge and to control disease. Given that there are rarely direct benefits to the participant, the risks to the participant must usually be either nonexistent or slight.

In experimental studies a broad number of ethical issues must be considered and the risks and benefits to both the treated and untreated study groups weighed.[12] Whether it is ethical to undertake a clinicl trial is re-

11. Z. Stein et al., *Famine and Human Development. The Dutch Hunger Winter, 1944–45* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975).

12. J. W. Tukey, "Some Thoughts on Clinical Trials, Especially Problems of Multiplicity," *Science* 198 (1977), pp 697–84.

lated to beliefs regarding the risks or benefits of the new treatment. Sir Austin Bradford Hill argued that it is unethical not to conduct a controlled clinical trial of a new and untested treatment.[13] The manner in which such a treatment is introduced, however, has often created a social climate that makes a trial impossible.

The ethical issue arises not only because dangers attend an untried treatment but because dangers are felt to attend the withholding of treatment. The new and elaborate techniques of fetal monitoring during labor are already considered to be ethically beyond the reach of clinical trial, although by no means all pediatricians and obstetricians are convinced of the presumed benefits.

Similarly, the social and scientific climate may precipitate a clinical trial before the safety of the agent has been satisfactorily demonstrated in animal experiments. The massive poliomyelitis vaccine trials conducted under the auspices of the National Foundation (March of Dimes) were considered by many, in retrospect, to be premature in terms of safety.[14] The Foundation had mounted perhaps the first great publicity campaign to accomplish a scientific goal, and was under the pressure of its own publicity to demonstrate this accomplishment. In launching the trial, there was the added pressure of millions of anxious parents. The Foundation was confronted with the urgency of a predicted summer outbreak that would cripple many thousands of children, and more especially middle- and upper-class children. In the event the trials proved to be a great triumph even though they were marred by the attacks of poliomyelitis transmitted in the Cutter vaccine disaster.

Trials of prophylactic measures, such as vaccines, face particular problems. Because they direct intervention at well individuals who have but a small chance of being affected, large numbers of subjects are required for an adequate test. A great deal hangs from such trials, and a rigorous design is even more requisite than with regular clinical trials. For example, once Almroth Wright's typhoid vaccine was accepted on somewhat uncertain evidence and used in World War I, 50 years passed before anyone could dare to withhold prophylaxis for this sometimes fatal disease.[15] A new test of its efficiency could then be attempted because of the advent of chloromycetin, an effective antibiotic.

Thus, whether a clinical trial is conducted can be determined by the social and political climate as well as by the preparatory evidence that the new agent may be efficacious. In fact, the introduction of Wright's vaccine for the British Army led to a flaming scientific controversy between Wright and the biometrician Karl Pearson. In the event, its adoption was determined by the political judgment of Lord Haldane, the Secretary for War.[16]

A most persistent question about intervention trials that presents in the guise of an ethical issue is the

13 Austin Bradford Hill, *Statistical Methods in Clinical and Preventive Medicine* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962).

14. John R Paul, *A History of Poliomyelitis* (New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1971)

15 M. Susser, "Judgment and Causal Inference: Criteria in Epidemiologic Studies," *American Journal of Epidemiology*, vol. 105, no. 1 (1977), pp 1–15

16 Biometrics Society, "Report of the Committee of the Assessment of Biometric Aspects of Controlled Trials of Hypoglycemic Agents," *Journal of the American Medical Association*, vol. 231, no. 6 (1975), pp. 583–608.

withholding of a treatment that is untried but is believed by some to be efficacious.[17,18] *Opinion prevailing at the initiation of a trial that* the "untreated" group is at a disadvantage, and thus exposed to undue risk, has many times been stultified when put to trial. Passions are sometimes aroused in these instances. Thus our trial of protein supplementation in pregnancy was several times castigated in print as genocide by an obstetrician who maintains a passionate campaign for better nutrition in pregnancy. That there should have been control groups who were not supplied with high protein supplements, he charged, was immoral. In the result, the protein supplement did not raise birthweight. Indeed, to our dismay, it had entirely unanticipated adverse effects.[19] (A fully documented case history of this kind is the University Group Diabetes Trial of widely-used oral treatments for certain types of diabetes. The treatments were not only found to be inefficacious, but to cause an excess mortality from heart disease.[20])

The untreated control group characteristically is the focus of both ethical concern and confusion in these instances. The expression of this concern is not confined to the uninformed, nor to passionate advocates of the treatment under trial. A proposal we submitted for a follow-up from the trial of protein supplementation in pregnancy yields still another example of the problem.[21] It was intended that the subsequent development of the children born into the project should be observed. To add to the depth of this large-scale and expensive undertaking, we proposed further to assign the preschool children randomly to a program of social and cognitive stimulation, and to compare those exposed to the special program with the children who had the ordinary experience of home and day care. By this means we hoped to discover the effects of social stimulation, and the relative size of such effects compared with prenatal nutritional supplementation, and the joint effects of the two forms of intervention.

A private foundation approached for funding turned down the proposal on the following grounds:

> . . . because of certain ethical issues which are involved in the original design of the study, through the provision of nutritional supplements to some children and not to others We are aware of the opposing viewpoints on this issue, but prefer not to become involved in any project in which the morality of our having provided support might be called into question. For your information, this view is best expressed in the opinion of one of our consultants, as follows.
>
> "I find a moral issue here of substantial importance, namely, should we support, and should Susser be engaged in, experimentation on black children (any children?) which withholds from some of them certain additions to their lives

17 Tukey, "Some Thoughts on Clinical Trials"

18 J P Gilbert, M Buckman, and F. Mosteller, "Statistics and Ethics in Surgery and Anaesthesia," *Science* 198 (1977), pp 684–89

19 M Susser, Z. Stein, and D. Rush, "Prenatal Nutrition and Subsequent Development," in *Biomedical Aspects*, vol. III, ed. Peter Mittler (Baltimore, Md : University Park Press, 1977), pp. 311–26 Published for the International Association for the Scientific Study of Mental Deficiency.

20. Biometrics Society. "Report of the Committee of Trials of Hypoglycemic Agents"

21 D Rush, "Studies of Prevention and Intervention," in *Epidemiology of Prematurity*, eds., Dwayne M. Reed and Fiona J. Stanley (Baltimore, Md.. Urban and Schwarzengerg, 1977).

which we have good reason to believe are beneficial?

The argument in favor has generally been that the gain in knowledge by society outweighs the injury to the deprived subjects. I can accept this in some instances of social research (also medical research), but not in studies of nutritional or educational supplements. The stress should be put on an 'experimental' design in which whole groups are treated, then compared with other groups—in other cities, etc.—that the researcher did not have the funds to treat, even at some cost to the preciseness of the knowledge gained. (If the effects are important, they should be evident anyway in a cruder design.) Or, some way of using the subjects as their own controls should be sought. Or—some other design—i.e., locating 'natural' experiments in different schools, cities."

Thus we find a professional reviewer unconsciously converting an issue of expediency into an issue of ethics, since it is difficult to see any moral distinction between depriving children in the immediate study group and those at an unspecified distance.

CONCLUSION

In the preceding pages we have followed the thread of our experience in balancing the values researchers hold about scientific rigor against the values they hold about the interests of the people they study. ***There is almost no step in the re- search process in epidemiology in which ethical issues do not exist. The issues may lie latent; they are*** nonetheless present. Institutionalized controls on research help to prevent researchers from consciously or unconsciously violating people's rights. Like all such mechanisms, these controls exact a price. They limit scientific endeavors; they divert scientist's energies from science to the avoidance of bureaucratic snares; they substitute the processing of proposals for the conduct of research. This price, multiplied across the nation, is bound to be considerable.

The world of politics has at last begun to pay attention to the impact on individual rights of the large and powerful organizations that characterize the modern state. Responsible scientists must welcome these developments of the past decade. They need to be aware that they are members of a loosely organized interest group that has found its place in the polity. As an interest group, the interests of scientists reflect more than altruism and the pursuit of knowledge and do not always coincide with the interests of others. That need not prevent scientists from pleading that the imposition of new constraints on research be tempered by mercy for science in its ideal form.

PUBLICATIONS FROM UNITED NATIONS

PUBLICATIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

The publications of the International Court of Justice are available from United Nations Publications. They are divided into five series:

1. Reports of Judgments, Advisory Opinions and Orders
2. Pleadings, Oral Arguments, Documents
3. Acts and Documents Concerning the Organization of the Court
4. Yearbook
5. Bibliography

UNITED NATIONS TREATY SERIES

Every treaty and international agreement that has been registered by Member States of the United Nations since the coming into force of the United Nations Charter in 1945 is reproduced in this series Texts are published in their original languages followed by translations in English and French.

Price $11.00 per volume, except reprints which are $16 00 per volume. This series is available on a standing order basis For further information request our Standing Order Service Guide

ON MICROFICHE

The United Nations Sales Section can now fill orders for microfiche of certain of the Official Records:

- Verbatim and Summary Meeting Records
- Supplements and Special Supplements
- Annexes and Resolutions of the following main organs of the United Nations
  - General Assembly
  - Security Council
  - Economic and Social Council
  - Trusteeship Council

  Also available:
  - Major yearbooks and continuing series
  - Treaty Series
  - UNCTAD

Price list will be sent on request Please indicate which Official Records are of interest to you when you request information on availability or price

UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS
Room A-3315
New York, N Y 10017

UNITED NATIONS PUBLICATIONS
Palais des Nations
1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland

Book Department

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND POLITICS

GUNNAR ADLER-KARLSSON. *The Political Economy of East-West-South Cooperation*. Pp. 208. Vienna, Austria: Springer Verlag, 1976. No price.

Gunnar Adler-Karlsson of Roskilde University Center in Denmark has followed his monograph *Western Economic Warfare 1947–1957* by several valuable books and papers, of which the present work is assuredly the most challenging.

The first part of the book discusses the distribution of the economic power throughout the world and the relationship between its main regions. In the second part, the author probes the degree to which what he calls the "Three E's" (Equality, Employment and material Essentials) are to be found in the three main regions under discussion. The third and the main section investigates the impact of the nationalization of the means of production, and underscores its insufficiency as an instrument for "shifting the balance of power in international economic relations."

As the scope of the subject is extensive, "nothing more than a general survey was aimed at." The political economy of the regions is the subject here rather than the cooperation among them. (The title might suggest the analysis of, for instance, interregional communication mechanisms, financing and credit systems, and preconditions for joint ventures.)

The book does achieve its stated goal—it is indeed "a challenge for thinking about or for rethinking some of the established truths." In this context a number of important propositions made by Adler-Karlsson may be disputed.

The author draws a definite distinction between "economic" and "political" democracy and states that the "Three E's," the linchpin of the economic democracy, "has been better realized in the socialist nations than in the West." Is democracy divisible? It is true that unemployment and the differences between the poor and the rich are not as striking in Eastern Europe (where the social inequality is rooted in the system of privileges) as in the market economies. The employment policy of the Eastern block countries has a direct effect of low productivity and low wages. Economic democracy can hardly be attributed to a country where the state decides on production and distribution, and where the trade unions are the instruments of that same state, as is the central planning board. A telling fact is that the Soviet Five-Year plan for 1976–80 provides for the increase of the industrial production by 37 percent and of wages by only 21 percent.

One may disagree with the statement that "while formal ownership certainly is

a very important issue, both from a political and economic point of view, the distribution and control over the economic functions inside the totality is even more important for the distribution of factual economic power" (p. 23). In the countries of the Eastern region, the nationalization of the means of production placed central planning boards as sole controlling mechanisms over the economies. The author himself seems to relax the quoted opinion later in the book. The terms "socialism" and "dictatorship of proletariat" do not appear applicable to the political system of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

The author offers an extensive discussion of the relationship between the Eastern block and the less developed countries. I would, however, take issue with the statement that the volume of Eastern credits to the less developed countries was so small as to be insignificant.

Last but not least, I do not think that the East-West cooperation should be considered a violation "of the central concept of the socialist ideology" (p 44). This cooperation, which consists predominantly in the import of the Western technology, partially financed by Western credits, strengthens the Eastern economy and helps to maintain the viability of the ideology

Several points that I have taken up in this review are indicators of the book's relevance and value in the analysis of the politico-economic determinants of today's world. Adler-Karlsson's latest book will certainly engender a wide discussion.

ADAM ZWASS
Institute for Comparative
Economic Studies
Vienna
Austria

RICHARD K. BETTS. *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises* Pp. vii, 292. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977. $15.00.

The analytical focus of this volume is an evaluation of the impact of "military advice and influence on the use of force in United States decisionmaking during the Cold War era. Betts suggests that the military element in decisionmaking is distinguished by two dimensions: degree of explicitness, or form, and affect toward the use of force. These two dimensions interact to yield four levels that are used to characterize military influence as: (1) direct and positive, (2) direct and negative; (3) indirect and positive; and (4) indirect and negative. Thus, an explicit recommendation by military advisers against the use of force is categorized as direct and negative influence Indirect military influence is that which structures the decisionmaker's frame of reference for or against the use of force.

In order to discern how, and at what level, military influence has been most significant, the author employs a comparative case study approach to identify, discuss, and illustrate the importance of a multitude of factors—most importantly, organizational, psychological, and role variables—that determine military influence. Betts concludes, on the basis of the available evidence (and he admits its limitations) that. (1) military advisers have had at least an equal amount but no more influence in Cold War decisionmaking than their civilian colleagues; (2) military influence has been most effective when it was direct and negative; and (3) the real problem is to recognize that indirect military influence may play a critical role in setting the decisional context in situations where the committal of United States forces or the escalation of conflict is in question.

The strength of Betts's analysis is his mastery of the diverse materials and evidence upon which the study is based. One can, however, point out certain weaknesses For example, although the two dimensional scheme for assessing the level of military influence is useful as a beginning, it is not refined enough to explain how this influence is achieved. Clearly, Betts's manipulation of the available evidence is devised to illustrate how one set of actors is able to structure influence by using various strategies to increase or decrease the

ability of other actors to communicate, cooperate, or compete, but because of the bluntness of the four level analytical scheme, the reader is left on his own to pick out these strategies. In another vein, one theme that is consistently underdeveloped throughout each case analysis is the notion of the military politicizing their own advice. The work does not ignore this topic, but the excessive emphasis on civilian politicization of military advice tends to decrease the author's consideration of military usage of the political process.

Despite these minor deficiencies *Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises* is a brief, well-written book on a topic that has, until this time, been subject to more speculation than scholarship. Besides stimulating further research, the volume should serve as an excellent text for classes on foreign policy and military affairs.

LAWRENCE V. GOULD, JR
Purdue University
Lafayette
Indiana

ROBERT W CAMPBELL. *Trends in the Soviet Oil and Gas Industry*. Pp. vii, 125. Baltimore, Md.: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977. $10.00.

ARTHUR JAY KLINGHOFFER. *The Soviet Union and International Oil Politics*. Pp. vii, 389. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. $16.50.

A. YODFAT and M. ABIR. *In the Direction of the Gulf: The Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf*. Pp. vii, 167. Totowa, N.J.: Frank Cass & Co., 1977. $19.50.

In the last several years a global awareness has developed with respect to the emerging changes in international oil politics. This new awareness is mainly derived from problems concerning: (a) rapid increases in consumption of crude oil and natural gas resources; (b) oil embargoes and/or production cutbacks resulting from Middle East conflicts; (c) crude oil and natural gas price increases, (d) discovery and development of new oil and gas resources due to the depletion of earlier sources; and (e) the minor contributions of alternative sources to the overall supply of energy. Reasons for this global awareness are clear: energy resources in general and strategic nonrenewable energy resources, such as crude oil and natural gas, are seen as the bases of both security and opulence; they are viewed as the foundation of power and wealth; and they are treated as the primary determinants for constructing industrial bases, for implementing national development plans, and for promoting national and international interests.

By concentrating upon the overall effects of these issues on Soviet national and international policies, the authors of the three books reviewed here seek to analyze the energy policies of the Soviet Union with respect to emerging changes in international oil politics. From their respective analysis, four major policy trends can be identified.

(1) The general state of the Soviet oil and gas industry. The Soviet Union is currently the world's largest crude oil producer with a present output of over 500 million metric tons per year. In addition, the Soviet Union possesses the largest proven reserves of natural gas. Soviet production of both oil and natural gas has, for the period extending from 1965 to 1975, increased at an average rate of 7.0 and 8.2 percent per year, respectively. The production of higher oil and gas outputs from the new sources located in western Siberia and of higher quality Soviet oil products are being limited by adverse geographical terrain, by shortages in labor and construction capacities, and by weaknesses in technical, organizational, and economic possibilities. The highest priority of the industry continues to be quantitative expansion to avoid forecasted shortages for the 1980s. Thus, the industry has become dependent upon assistance from the Western industrialized nations in ways ranging from transfer of technology and import of manufactured products to more direct cooperations in bilateral/trilateral projects, since expansion in production from the remote sources represents difficult technological, financial, and logistical problems.

(2) Relations with the CMEA states: The Soviet Union's oil and gas outputs account for 95 percent of total production by the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance states. This unbalanced situation has frequently provided the Soviet Union with opportunities to use oil and gas trades as instruments of economic pressure to achieve political ends in its relations with the CMEA states. Energy consumption in the CMEA states is now increasing more rapidly than in Western European states and present trends indicate their growing dependence upon more imports from the Soviet Union or other sources of supply. In view of those increases, the Soviets have been encouraging several of the CMEA states, where possible, to shift their energy needs from oil resources to natural gas, coal, and nuclear power sources, and to arrange barter deals with Middle East oil producer states

(3) Relations with the Third World. Soviet energy relations with the Third World, and particularly with oil producer states of the Middle East and North Africa, are multifaceted. The Soviet Union acts as importer, exporter, and middleman, and also provides assistance in prospecting, production, refining, and marketing of oil and gas resources. Generally, Soviet energy policies have been politically motivated to undermine traditional Western hegemony in the Middle East and North Africa. Economic considerations have also played a significant role in their decisions as the Soviets have supported oil embargoes and nationalization acts undertaken by some oil producing states. Oil sales to Third World states, however, have been unprofitable on occasion, and the provision of equipment and technicians have, in some cases, deprived the Soviet Union's own oil industry of some valuable resources. To overcome these shortcomings, the Soviets are likely to seek more barter deals exchanging industrial equipment and/or military hardware for crude oil imports.

(4) Relations with the West: Soviet energy relations with the West are primarily based on financial and technical frameworks. Unlike Soviet energy policies with CMEA states, Soviet sales of oil and gas to Western European states are rarely manipulated for political ends. The great bulk of Soviet Union's rising oil deliveries are made to the highly industrialized states in Western Europe as important means of earning hard currencies which the Soviets need to pay for their own imports. In addition, the Soviet Union is in the process of increasing its oil and gas outputs and it is largely dependent upon Western assistance to ease some of its difficult technological, financial, and logistical problems. The politicization of the energy trade could only hinder the Soviet Union's own economic aspirations. The situation, however, could change if the need arose.

On balance, the authors of the three books provide valuable information to the general reader. Their respective analyses, however, lack a theoretical treatise and their approach for the most part remains within descriptive frameworks. Of the three books, Campbell's, which is an updated edition of his earlier work, *The Economics of Soviet Oil and Gas* (1968), uses the most elaborate statistical information to illustrate recent trends in the Soviet oil and gas industry. Campbell's treatment of the various phases of the industry is rewarding, even though his analysis mainly emphasizes economic issues. Klinghoffer's book, on the other hand, primarily discusses the politicization of Soviet foreign trade and the use of oil as a political weapon aimed at furthering Soviet foreign policy interests. Klinghoffer's economic analysis of the Soviet policies is considerably limited and his discussion of overall Soviet energy policies, although highly informative, is often reiterated. In comparable fashion, Yodfat and Abir's accounts of Soviet policies for the most part remain political and historical in nature. Their analyses lacks objectivity and, on occasion, their assumptions about the international political system are somewhat simplistic.

AMIR H. AHANCHIAN

Purdue University
Lafayette
Indiana

HERBERT CORKRAN. *Mini-Nations and Macro-Cooperation*. Pp. i, 229. Washington, D.C.: North American International, 1976. $10.00.

Any book ostensibly concerned with "the possibilities for viable combinations by the mini-nations and microstates of the world" is good news in both the Pacific and the Caribbean, the two highly fragmented areas compared in this study of regional integration. Corkran assumes that the "helpless and hopeless isolation and backwardness" small island nations face if they choose to go it alone is obvious to the most nationalistic patriot of either region, though the Palauans and the Marshallese have been arguing the reverse at the Micronesian-United States negotiations to resolve the future status of the U.S. Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands. Most of this book chronicles the rise and demise of regional bodies beginning with the Anglo-American Caribbean Commission in 1942 and the South Pacific Commission in 1947—both for many years low-key, minimally-financed creatures of the metropolitan powers, until they had to become organizations where newly independent nations could assert their international dignity. In the Caribbean this led to the collapse of area-wide cooperation, in the Pacific the new island states formed a parallel but more political organization, the South Pacific Forum, where the French and their bombs could be assailed with impotent gusto. It is for the most part a dismal history, unrelieved in the telling by the author's fondness for long citations from official rhetoric. He is understandably anxious to document the good and useful fruit of cooperation: his survey of the activities of regional bodies is very detailed. In a rare moment of personal indulgence Corkran tells how he could bring tears to the eyes of islanders of both regions by describing the "cruel dilemma of modern times": in turning their backs on progress and cooperation, did they want to return to a "thirty-year life span, rotting teeth, the inability to cope with deformity and accidents . . ." and so "join the ranks of the bum and beggar nations of the world?"

Although the author's sincerity seems greater than his tact, the book does not transcend moralistic enthusiasm for regional cooperation to the point of producing a single original recommendation that would advance his cause. His "normative" conclusions are that regional organizations are a good thing, they should be broadly inclusive and flexible, provide a representative forum for delegates to expound on political issues, and be working towards the creation of a common market. Generally he is more at home in the Caribbean than in the Pacific. He fails, for instance, even to mention the potential many islanders see in the Pacific Council of Churches to mobilize their strong sense of Christian identity in ways that may yet breathe new life into regional cooperation.

TIMOTHY J. MACNAUGHT
University of Hawaii
Honolulu

GALIA GOLAN. *Yom Kippur and After: The Soviet Union and the Middle East Crisis*. Pp. x, 350. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977 $18.95.

ALVIN Z. RUBINSTEIN. *Red Star on the Nile: The Soviet-Egyptian Influence Relationship since the June War*. Pp. viii, 383. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1977. $25.00. Paperbound, $9.95.

For two centuries the British maneuvered to keep Russia from penetrating the Eastern Mediterranean and the Middle East. After World War II the United States replaced Great Britain and, to contain Russia, constructed a defense tier composed of Greece, Turkey, Iraq, and Iran. In 1955 Russia ignored and leaped over this perimeter and plunged directly into the politics of the Arab states engaged in a campaign against the newly created Israeli state. From the beginning conditions in the area seemed to play directly into the Kremlin's hand: decolonization and the rapid loss of British and French influence in the area, the ambitions of Nasser for leadership of

the Arabs, the slowness and ineptitude of American diplomacy in the area, and the viability and alleged threat of Israel to the Arab world. At first the Soviet Union sought only to balance Western predominance and share with it influence in the area. Then the disasterous defeat of the Arabs at the hands of the Israelis in June of 1967 seemed to offer the Russians the opportunity to become the dominant influence in the Arab world and gain important strategic positions in Egypt. From a strong position in Egypt the Soviet Union would be able to dominate the Middle East and penetrate the Indian Ocean and Africa The Soviet Union rushed in with all kinds of aid and established what appeared to be a strong presence including military and naval bases. But the Soviet-Egyptian alliance did not run smoothly from the beginning, and after 1971 deteriorated rapidly to the point where, in the aftermath of the Arab-Israeli war of October, 1973, the Soviet position as coequal to the United States in the area has been threatened.

Yom Kippur and After and *Red Star on the Nile* are two of the foremost studies which analyze what led to the discord and the decay of Soviet-Egyptian relations and what this has meant to the Arab-Israeli conflict. Not having the inside track to the Kremlin, both studies have had to rely on published sources and broadcasts. But since the outpourings of the Soviet press and broadcasts are carefully orchestrated by the Kremlin, much can be learned from them. Of particular value in the Middle East situation have been the communiques issued after the numerous meetings between Arab officials and Soviet representatives. Although they do not tell everything, careful analysis of the euphemisms used, of omissions and of exact phraseology reveals a great deal about the attitudes, agreements, or lack of agreement between the governments.

Galia Golan in her volume, *Yom Kippur and After*, minutely scrutinizes Soviet-Egyptian relations, but in a limited way. Her study covers only the years 1972 through 1974, and while she exhaustively examines the Soviet sources, her use of Arab and other materials is much more limited. Furthermore, in analyzing Soviet attitudes and behavior she keeps very close to the materials and limits her speculating and exploring of various possible explanations. Nevertheless, the study is as careful and as accurate a narration of day-to-day events and Soviet-Egyptian exchanges during these crucial three years as it is possible to reconstruct without the opening of the Soviet archives. It is a very useful reference.

Alvin Z. Rubinstein's *Red Star on the Nile* treats the same period in a more free-wheeling manner. He begins with the June War in 1967 and surveys Soviet relations with Egypt through 1975. Rubinstein is much more willing to speculate and explore the various ramifications of the relationship. He makes wider use of Arab materials, insider reports and secondary analyses. As a result it is a much more thoughtful volume in looking at the wider implications of Soviet-Egyptian relations Sometimes, however, the author is not too careful in separating his speculations from the facts which he can verify. Also, when he tries to expand the scope of his study by placing it into a broad conceptual framework, measuring influence in international relations, he is singularly unsuccessful. Fortunately this overly contrived framework is just tacked on at the beginning and at the end and does not detract from Rubenstein's interesting analysis in the body of the study.

In conclusion both studies represent a high level of thorough scholarship and thoughtful analysis Both volumes come to basically the same conclusions and point up the difficulties the Soviet Union had in keeping its alliance with Egypt, as for example, pursuing detente with the United States while trying to exclude the United States from the Arab world, and being able at certain times to make tremendous gains and wield great influence only to be rebuffed easily at others. But because the sources are limited, both studies could only speculate inclusively about Soviet motivations and designs or whether and how the Kremlin was divided on issues.

DAVID T. CATTELL
University of California
Los Angeles

IAN V. HOGG. *Fortress: A History of Military Defense*. Pp. 160. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977. $15.00.

At first glance, this work appears a slightly undersized "coffee table book" of narrow interest. But a student of military affairs will find it an engrossing account of the history of fortifications. The author's credits make him an expert on offensive, not defensive, weaponry, and in this work he did sometimes drift too much into the methods by which forts have been destroyed. But fair enough; his theme is that the development of armor and armaments raced each other throughout history, from ancient earthworks to contemporary missile silos.

The construction of fortresses was highly complicated Read the jargon in Hogg's glossary, for example, which he, himself, introduced with tongue in cheek. From the eighteenth century up to 1940, the enterprise developed into a full-scale science, complete with apparently immutable mathematical laws, controlled by captains of the industry like Vauban and Brialmont, and sensitive to advances in concrete and metalurgy. Some of the fortifications remind one of Picasso's cubism, others, of a Kafka nightmare.

But on balance, it would seem that these monsters were unable to achieve either of the stated goals of (1) allowing a smaller force to repel a larger, or (2) permitting a less well-trained defense to withstand a better attacker. Hogg's account describes the Maginot Line, of course, but the less well-known failures of 1832 Antwerp, 1854 Malakov, and 1945 Fort Drum also support the assertion. As Hogg wrote, the human ingenuity that could build the forts could also overcome them. Orthodoxy called for complex approaches, involving sapping and paralleling, accompanied by heavy bombardment. So fell Antwerp. But far more successful and less costly were daring attacks on the steel and concrete behemoths by relative handfuls of highly trained and technical elites. So fell Malakov, Eben Emael, and Fort Drum, among many others. One comes away from the book believing that all the time, energy, and resources expended on the fortresses were perfectly wasted.

The book, then, may be most useful as a look back in time which can instruct us about the present and the future. Hogg wrote in his epilogue that we may be entering a new age of fortifications. The proposed MX mobile underground missile system probably proves his point. After reading his book, we ought to demand from the new Vaubans, who are planning such things as the MX, that they give us assurances that their new fortresses will be more successful than the old ones ever were.

W. T. GENEROUS, JR.
Choate Rosemary Hall
Wallingford
Connecticut

AKIRA IRIYE. *From Nationalism to Internationalism: U.S Foreign Policy to 1914* Pp. v, 368. Boston, Mass.: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977. $14.00.

In this work Akira Iriye describes the development of United States foreign policy in an international context. To Iriye the study of American diplomacy based on any thematic unity does not work well, when accounting for shifts and turns in United States foreign relations, something more is needed. Rejecting as inadequate two often used analytical thematic concepts, moralism and the systematic urge to expand, he advances his own formula. That is, by mid-nineteenth century America was interacting with the world community through five levels or modes: geopolitical factors, internationalist ideas, national interest considerations, special interests, and mass culture. Although he focuses on policy development after the Civil War, Iriye surveys the historical background from the Confederation period in order to identify the inception of his five elements. The decade before the Civil War manifested all the elements, whether geopolitically as in the suggested acquisition of Cuba, or mass culture, as the American people welcomed and responded to the visit of a Japanese embassy in 1860.

After establishing the above in an introductory chapter Iriye divides the

remainder of his volume into four chapters: European Imperialism and U.S. Expansion, The Growth of Nationalistic Expansionism, The United States in World Politics, and Co-operation and Competition. In each he treats foreign policy from the standpoint of his five element formula.

The author compares American foreign relations from the end of the Civil War until 1890 with the policies of European nations within the then contemporary international environment rather than using the more assertive United States role in the 1890s, as other scholars are inclined to do. Although American diplomacy in 1890 was still characterized as traditional, primarily concerned with national security and the protection of economic interests, especially in the Caribbean and Pacific areas, a great change would take place within ten years. The change occurred in part because Americans began to view their country as emotionally and intellectually ready to be a world power and to justify its greater participation in world affairs as an agent of a beneficent Western civilization prepared to take its blessings to various parts of the world. Further, the Cuban question, the Sino-Japanese War, and European expansion in Asia, the Pacific, and the Middle East all contributed to an enlargement of what Iriye calls the foreign policy public and the influence of that public upon policy.

America's decision to intervene in Cuba and the resultant overseas acquisitions precipitated the United States into world power politics. The new position was reflected in more intervention in the Caribbean, an increasing sensitivity to Chinese affairs, cooperation with, then estrangement from, Japan, and an understanding with Britain. Roosevelt attempted to use America's developing power to contribute to a global balance of power. Taft sought to promote an interdependent international society by expanding United States economic and political influence overseas. And Wilson developed his own brand of internationalism by combining the country's new power with American concepts of liberty and justice to promote a new world order under his leadership.

The author is to be commended for producing a fine interpretive work enhanced by 79 documents illustrative of the various stages of American foreign policy. He may be faulted for an occasional factual error exemplified by stating (p. 98) that the McKinley Tariff provided a two cents per pound bounty for sugar cane rather than for raw sugar. The publisher is to be reproached for offering the public a $14.00 book rendered in offset printing.

GARLAND E. BAYLISS

Texas A&M University
College Station

AFRICA, ASIA, AND LATIN AMERICA

DON AITKIN. *Stability and Change in Australian Politics*. Pp. 301. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977. $18.95.

R. W. CONNELL. *Ruling Class, Ruling Culture. Studies of Conflict, Power and Hegemony in Australian Life*. Pp. xii, 250. New York. Cambridge University Press, 1977. $19.95. Paperbound, $5.95.

Each of these books makes a serious effort to explain basic features of Australian society. Aitkin does so from a political standpoint, emphasizing popular attitudes and voting behavior. Connell does so from a sociological perspective, dwelling mostly on how the dynamic of actual influence is organized and employed.

These studies have interest and value, but carry limitations of coverage or emphasis. Aitkin relies predominantly on two national surveys conducted in the second half of the 1960s, and on other survey and electoral data mainly collected until that time. His book therefore misses the 1972, 1974, 1975 and, of course, 1977 federal elections plus the survey data of the 1970s, and thereby does not test movements in the public mood during the Whitlam period and

onward. Connell's study is more up-to-date, but by the author's admission is essentially a collection of essays rather than a comprehensive account of class structure, even though the "ruling class" concept is at the center of his work. Moreover, while Aitkin's presentation is detached, Connell's is argumentative as well as analytical, an attack on prevalent ruling class conditions and a call for more critique and construction on the part of socialist intellectuals.

Substantively, both authors have much to say, and say it in a way that merits close attention. At bottom, both maintain that Australian society is characterized by persistent, patterned qualities. For Connell, the power of the ruling class emanates from the pervasiveness of the institution of property. It is therefore far more diffused than simplistic notions of "big business" or of formal "executive authority" imply. He maintains that the ruling class need not be, and usually is not, mobilized in any literal, conspiratorial sense, and that it suffers from its own, internal conflicts. At such times, it becomes easier for reformist (but decidedly not radical) politics to take the helm in Australia, as Labor did in 1972. But when reformism becomes impertinent and the ruling interests can reconsolidate, their power is felt Hence, for Connell, the fall of Whitlam and his Government in 1975 was a demonstration of the ruling class's ability to mobilize itself against an offending force.

Wherein Connell underplays public calculations and electoral choice in his analysis of what drives politics, this is Aitkin's thrust. His data tell him that while occupational class is the dominant cleavage in Australia, it really is not particularly devisive; "class labels are worn lightly by many Australians." Political salience is high, and so is systemic legitimacy. A variety of historical influences have maintained long-term stability in electoral outcomes. And, while Aitkin does not embellish the point, Connell would likely welcome the opportunity to render a critique of Aitkin's observation that while parties and their traditional images have remained stable, this has occurred in the context of a changed, now postindustrial setting.

HENRY S. ALBINSKI

The Pennsylvania State University
University Park

HALIM BARAKAT. *Lebanon in Strife: Student Preludes to the Civil War*. Pp. xi, 242. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1977. $12.95.

It has long been recognized that the Arab world by no means represents a monolith or even united bloc. Diversity and divergent policies are everywhere to be found and often a paper unity is affected only to rise against that which is perceived to be the common foe. Such differences are defined in ethnic, religious, social, economic, and national terms, with a myriad of detailed subdivisions within these more usual variables. Thus while differentiations between Muslims and Christians are easily noted, there are salient cleavages between the Shrite, Sufi, and Sunni as between the Malchite, Maronite, and Coptic.

Nowhere has this diversity been more pronounced, or its consequences more unbalanced, then in tiny Lebanon. Established as a multinational, multiconfessional state, its parliamentary delegations are proportionate to the religious configurations of the forties. For fear of toppling the weak base upon which it is built, no census has been possible in Lebanon since WWII, lest new confessional proportions emerge to displace the precarious balance. Further, locked as it is between Israel to the south and Syria to the north, Lebanon is often caught in a cross-fire not of its own creation. The situation is exacerbated by the Palestinian use of its southern sector as a guerrilla base and the nation's inability to police its southern border from these or Israeli incursions.

It is to study this precarious balance and the civil war that has replaced it, that Halim Barakat presents us within *Lebanon in Strife*. American educated, Barakat has taught at the American University of Beirut and is presently

with the Center for Contemporary Arab Studies at Georgetown University. His essential theses are two: (a) that forebodings of the present civil war were already evident in prior student activism and present student attitudes, and (b) that contrary to much of the scholarly literature, Lebanon was never a well-integrated, pluralist society with strong democratic traditions.

These premises are documented amply well. Barakat offers extensive survey data showing clearly the cleavages between and among university students at major Lebanese institutions. Invariably these differences conform to a Moslem versus Christian continuum. Socioeconomic status, family relations, and radical attitudes are demonstrably correlated to confessional affiliation as well as to sympathy with the Palestinian cause. But Barakat does not attempt to define causitive factors, a more interesting and suggestive subject. The reader is left alone to decide whether confessional affiliation precedes socioeconomic status and attitudes or vice versa. He establishes only their association.

Equally, by means of case studies of student protest in the past and the analysis of major sociopolitical structures, Barakat attempts to demonstrate that Lebanon is by no means pluralistic but is rather a "stratified social mosaic" (p. 25). This is defined as a social system in which there lacks a consensus on fundamental national values and goals. In the words of one socialist leader.

> This society is not a society in the real sense of the word because there is no such thing as a Lebanese community There is no Lebanese social unit Lebanon is a collection of sects and socioreligious communities . That is why the state in which the society reflects itself is very weak, so weak it might collapse any minute There is no such thing as Lebanese nationalism (p 28).

Though interesting, there are weaknesses of both a structural and substantive nature in Barakat's presentation. He makes use of statistical tests, notably the chi-square, though rarely is this incorporated into his text. At times significance levels are unclear, as are the derivations or degrees of freedom upon which the data depend. This merely distracts the reader, detracts from the argument being made, and should have been deleted.

More serious, however, is Barakat's evident bias which is overt, keenly felt, and at times borders on compromising his scholarship. In particular this is apparent in his discussions regarding ". . . the Arab-Zionist War . . . and the uprooting of the Palestinians from their country" (p. 153). His barbs are aimed, as well, at present Arab society, which, he claims is "essentially opposed to human beings: opposed to their well-being, growth, self-realization, transcendence of misery and creative involvement vis-a-vis themselves and their environment" (p. 4). Such editorializing is clearly out of place.

On balance, *Lebanon in Strife* is a valuable analysis of student politics in the Middle East. It offers data not to be found elsewhere and is a novel approach to a pressing issue. It should be read carefully, however, for it is filled with the author's biases with respect to the larger and yet more pressing problem of the Middle East

DAVID J. SCHNALL
College of Staten Island
City University of New York

CLAUDE A. BUSS. *The United States and the Philippines. Background for Policy*. Pp. 152. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977. $3.75.

LELA GARNER NOBLE. *Philippine Policy Toward Sabah: A Claim to Independence*. Pp. vii, 267 Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1977. $10.50. Paperbound, $4 95.

Claude Buss was an excellent choice to write this "intelligent layman's" account of recent events in the Philippines and their implications for future Philippine-United States relationships. Dr. Buss, formerly of Stanford University, served as a member of the American administrative bureaucracy of the Philippines before the Second World War and afterwards taught in the country. He has keen insights into Philippine society and is a sincere, if critical, admirer of Filipinos. His book is strongly

recommended for those who are not experts on Philippine-American affairs but wish to be better informed to anticipate and possibly contribute to the formation of future policy development between the two nations.

The book deals with three basic topics. (1) the evolution of American policy and the unrest that led to Marcos's declaration of martial law in 1972; (2) Marcos's development of Philippine policy before and after martial law; and (3) the current reassessment of American interests and policy since the end of the Vietnam War. Although others may disagree, the section on Marcos's past presidency and current dictatorship is well balanced. However, the author admits that the full story of this complex subject cannot be told by relying solely upon sources available in this country. This reviewer wished he had included a brief section on the attitudes and activities of the nearly 500,000 Filipinos in the United States. Their growing impact on Philippine-American policy formation should not be underestimated.

One cannot quarrel with Buss's advice, at the end of his excellent report, that Americans must be willing to make reasonable concessions to Philippine nationalism, while Filipinos must recognize American concern for the fate of democratic ideals and human rights in their republic. The value of this book would have been enhanced had Buss added an index and selected, annotated bibliography for readers who wished to read more extensively on Philippine-American relations and future policy trends.

Philippine Policy Toward Sabah is a detailed and careful study of a modest incident in modern Southeast Asian history that one suspects both the Philippines and Malaysia may wish to forget. Noble asserts that while "The Philippine claim to Sabah is puzzling . . . ," the enigma is understandable if one accepts the assumptions that Filipinos pursued the claim to enhance their national image as an independent nation and also because it promised some return without any cost. It seems that the only profit this endeavor generated went into the pockets of the wily lawyers hired by Filipino heirs to push their ancient, if confused, claim to Sabah.

The book examines, with critical and insightful use of sources and the author's research in Manila, various stages of this incident that had its roots in pre-Hispanic relations between Sulu and Borneo. It was not until 1962 (largely as the result of the raucous sponsorship of the *Philippines Free Press*) that President Macapagal claimed Sabah from Great Britain. The following years saw the Philippines and Indonesia as allies opposing the birth of Malaysia, the rupture of Philippine-Malaysian diplomatic relationships, the unsuccessful Bangkok conference, the Corregidor "incident," the "annexation law" of the Philippine Congress and, finally, President Marcos's wise decision to forget the whole affair to improve his nation's regional relationships in Southeast Asia. With the advent of Marcos, domestic policy became more important to Filipinos, while "national honor" replaced "independence" as a key term in Philippine foreign policy.

Unfortunately, the venture was not without cost to the Philippines. It resulted in severe damage to Philippine-Malaysian relationships and encouraged Mustalpha to help Filipino Muslim separatists in their struggle against the national government. The Malaysians overreacted to the annexation law and needlessly exacerbated the issue by their failure to expose their true feelings on the issue. Noble believes that one positive result of the struggle was that more Filipinos became better acquainted with the realities of Southeast Asia.

For specialists seeking a scholarly assessment of the Philippine claim to Sabah, Noble's book will rightly remain the primary source in the near future. The Association for Asian Studies is to be congratulated in publishing Noble's research, and particularly for making available an inexpensive paperback edition. Unfortunately, the format is amateurish, the editing is careless, and the index appears to be an afterthought.

DONN V. HART

Northern Illinois University
Dekalb

RAUL A. FERNANDEZ. *The United States-Mexico Border: A Politico-Economic Profile*. Pp. 182. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977. $10.95.

The author of this book, an associate professor of social science and comparative cultures at the University of California at Irvine, has attempted to provide readers with a socioeconomic history of the United States-Mexico border region. The material is presented in seven substantive chapters: the first four are mainly historical, and tell of the colonization, social and economic organization, and development through time of what is now the United States Southwest. The latter three chapters relate to the contemporary border economy, and discuss three vital policy issues: migration, urbanization, and industrialization.

Professor Fernandez's objective has been that of "organizing and giving coherence, with the aid of a theory, to a body of historical data already, for the most part, available." The "theory" referred to is Marxist historical materialism—complete with frequent quotations of the writings of the Master himself. The reason for this unusual choice is that, as stated in an introductory essay containing a surprisingly strong denunciation of current disciplinary research methods, none of the major contemporary social sciences is capable of adequately explaining or suggesting solutions to the problems being encountered in the border area.

As a careful reading of the book makes evident, however, the choice of historical materialism as a theory to be tested seems to be quite unfortunate and useless since it fails to provide good answers to the many interesting issues raised by the author. The transition from feudalism to capitalism in the Southwest was not primarily due to the appearance of "usury capital," the author admits, but mainly due to other factors, such as the outbreak of competition among agricultural producers, the struggle over land titles, natural catastrophes, and the coming of the railroads. Similarly, the state of social property relations in Mexico, the author explains, cannot adequately account for the early rise of Mexican migration to the Southwest: technological innovations in the United States, such as large-scale irrigation and the advent of refrigerated train cars, for example, were largely responsible for the farm boom in the area and, therefore, for the increased demand for alien labor.

Towards the end of the book, in fact, even the trappings of historical materialism are conveniently abandoned as the author discusses important contemporary issues—lamentably, without the aid of a useful theory of the most rudimentary knowledge of economic research. For instance, Mexico's recent balance-of-payments difficulties are blamed, not on deficit spending and inadequate monetary and exchange rate policies, but on the failure of import-substituting industrialization aggravated by "mounting repatriation of profits and other income by foreign investors, by the increase in the ratio and total volume of reinvestment of earnings rather than new foreign investment by foreign firms and, finally, by the practice of 'over-pricing' and 'over-invoicing' of transnational corporations. To the author, for example, the border industrialization program (here labeled "a paradigm of a new panacea") is to be deplored as "an abandonment of the traditional Mexican policy of strengthening the local border economy against American business encroachment."

In view of all of the above, one can only conclude that the United States-Mexico border area remains wide open to serious investigation by disciplinary—as opposed to nondisciplinary—social scientists.

ARTURO C. PORZECANSKI
Morgan Guaranty Trust Company
New York City

ROGER HOWARD. *Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese People*. Pp. 394. New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977. $16.50.

It is most difficult for a reviewer who has not been in China during Mao's leadership to appraise his behavior towards his countrymen. The author spent

four years there traveling through 15 provinces, working in factories and communes and teaching at universities. He should have some well-founded ideas about the reaction of the people to Mao, but little evidence is offered of his personal contacts with them. He notes that the Chinese people, as distinct from their officials, are largely silent on paper and only speak through their acts. The book turns out to be a panegyric to Mao, derived mainly from numerous quotations from his writings and speeches, the presentation of his many poems, and excerpts from books of those long known to have had friendly attitudes towards the Communists.

Briefly related are Mao's early years, the foundation of the Chinese Communist Party, its early alliance with the Kuomintang, the Civil Wars of 1924–27 and 1927–34, the Long March of 1935 (on which 100,000 started but only 25,000–30,000 finished), resistance to the Japanese, the years of 1945–49, and finally the problem of the founding and development of the People's Republic.

The successful transference of land ownership from the landlords to the peasants is seen as the pivot on which the whole revolution turned. Mao's conviction was also said to be that a truly revolutionary working class, with no bureaucracy putting brakes on it, would turn its spiritual force into material force and output would increase. He insisted that the strength of the revolution lay in its identity with the people and that its cadres must continually correct any tendency to become separate from those they served and led. However, whatever progress was made was not achieved without divergence of methods and internal conflict. This is evidenced by the departure of President Liu, Shao-chi, the expulsion from the Party, and subsequent suicide of, Kao Kang, one of the founders of the Soviet movement in northwest China, the denunciation as a rightist of Teng, Hsiao-ping, the General Secretary of the Party, and the aeroplane death of escaping Lin Piao, once slated as Mao's successor.

Some of Mao's statements seem curious to Western ears, such as "Students should be permitted to doze off when a lecturer is teaching. Instead of listening to nonsense, they do much better taking a nap to freshen themselves up" and "The thought, culture and customs which brought China to where we found her must disappear, the thought, culture and customs of proletarian China, which does not yet exist, must appear." While the book contains some interesting descriptions and details, one could have wished for a more impartial outlook.

ALBERT E. KANE

Washington, D.C.

HENRY F. JACKSON. *The FLN in Algeria: Party Development in a Revolutionary Society.* Pp. xix, 254. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1977. $17.50.

After seven violent years, Algerians regained independence in 1962. Houari Boumedienne's Armée de libération nationale, prevented by the "Meurice-Challe Line" from participating in the war, thereupon proceeded from Tunisia to Algiers and threw its political weight behind Ahmed Ben Bella, who had spent the war years in a French prison. With army assistance, Ben Bella moved to maximize personal control, shackling the trade unions and disbanding the guerrillas, replacing both (on paper) with a reorganized Front de libération nationale, which he had co-opted from the real winners of independence. A reinvigorated party and a ballooning state bureaucracy both beholden to him would, he calculated, enable him safely to return sufficient power to union and guerrilla leaders to remove Boumedienne. This he attempted, and Boumedienne, in turn, executed a bloodless coup in 1965

Henry F. Jackson's clearly written and expertly organized account of these events is one of a handful of books which must be read by anyone wishing to comprehend the modern Maghreb, the trials successful liberation movements face, and comparative Third World party systems. The author's sense of Algerian realities is first-rate, his sympathy with Algerians (though often concealed), deep; his impressive primary sources

bespeak vast tact and patience, and their donors' full confidence in him.

Jackson recognizes that "party politics in Africa, so important in the independence euphoria of the 1960s, is fast becoming an attraction of the past," but his study was researched and executed during that euphoria: only the last chapter applying Algerian lessons to Angola draws upon scholarship since 1972. Thus the book, though excellent, is already dated. Party studies are now considered elitist, and this one is particularly so as it relies entirely on French sources. This, perhaps, leads Jackson to underrate Berber particularism as a factor in Algerian politics. A 30 percent minority, the Berbers were the last to submit to French imperialism and the first to revolt in 1955, Berbers formed a fairly firm core of opposition after independence. Jackson rightly castigates easy generalizations about "tribalism" in African politics, but I wonder if we might not profit from examining African *regionalism* in broad comparative perspective (cf the American South), rather than simply removing particularism from our analyses.

Annoying gallicisms (e.g., "relation" for "relationship," "unique" for "sole") are due to sloppy editing, but habitually referring to Algerians as "Muslims" (even to the point of "Muslim Communists!") is jarring.

RICHARD DEAN SIGWALT
Radford College
Virginia

JEFFREY L. KLAIBER. *Religion and Revolution in Peru, 1824–1976.* Pp. 272. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1977. $14.95.

This book of 200 text pages consists of an introduction, eight chapters, and a conclusion, followed by 55 pages of helpful notes and bibliography. The first six chapters comprise a somewhat detailed historical account of the intertwining of Indian customs and beliefs with practice and doctrine of the Peruvian Catholic Church, and in turn the admixture of these factors with politics in narrower definition.

Most readers can skip lightly from the introduction to chapter 7 ("Aprismo Alone Will Save Peru! The Aprista Martyrdom, 1931–45"), chapter 8 ("Long Live Christ the King! The Church and the Military, 1945–76") and the conclusion. The Apra movement sought to establish a radical, quasi-Marxist Socialist, ostensibly scientific, political economy and culture in Peru, to accomplish drastic reforms that had been talked and attempted sporadically for some three centuries. The Church was able to appeal to custom and superstition and maintained strength with the elite and with a majority of Indians. Aprismo failed, partly because its leaders never even proposed a radical land reform.

Fernando Balaunde Terry was helped to power by the military in a special election in 1963, but failed to cope effectively with urgent social pressures, and was replaced by a military junta in October 1968. The generals labelled their program the Peruvian Revolution, and immediately expropriated foreign oil ownership and enacted sweeping agrarian reforms They have mixed socialism with private property, somewhat à la Yugoslavia and Israel, seeking to gain support of middle classes and poverty-stricken masses. The Church, however, it appears to this reader, has moved to prevent such political identification, in effect continuing to play its standard role of spoiler of radical reform. The Church now talks of outreforming the reformers.

> The new image of a progressive and socially sensitive church, however, could not entirely obscure the fact that the priests, nuns, and laypersons who pushed for change were still a minority within a generally conservative and tradition-laden church . . . In the seventies, only a few new bishops . . . have distinguished themselves as champions of social justice The rest of Peru's more than fifty bishops, while far from opposing social change, have been at best cautiously slow in implementing the recommendations either of Vatican II or of Medellin in their dioceses (p 182)

In recognition of this intransigence, one may, contrary to the apparent intentions

of the author, propose the slogan, "Long Live the Reform Orientation of the Military."

FLOYD B. MCFARLAND
Oregon State University
Corvallis

BERNARD REICH. *Quest for Peace: United States-Israel Relations and the Arab-Israeli Conflict*. Pp. 495. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1977. $29.95.

This is an exhaustive study into certain aspects of the Mid-East conflict. Given the grave dangers posed by this complex and perpetually confusing confrontation, it should be very useful to officials and scholars anxious to develop new understandings or alternatives.

As the subtitle indicates, the focus of the book is on United States-Israel relations rather than the Arab-Israeli conflict per se. It reviews those relations from the birth of Israel as a nation to the first month of 1976. The author's main coverage is from the June 1967 War to the September 1975 Sinai II agreement. The analysis is basically descriptive in the best sense of the term. The value judgements that invariably appear (such as U Thant's withdrawal of UNEF [forces] in 1967 being described as "precipitous") are reasonable and hardly objectionable except from a highly partisan perspective. The theme, which is thoughtfully underlined in the last chapter and in an appendix of statements by American officials, is the unique and constant commitment of the United States to the survival and security of Israel.

There are a number of unanswered questions raised by the analysis of the 1973 war and its aftermath. Was the United States military alert really necessary and was the President in control of the policy process during October of 1973? Would a shattering defeat of Egyptian forces (as Israel hoped to accomplish even as the United States pressured for the implementation of a cease fire) have resulted in a more polarized military confrontation only a few years later? Was Henry Kissinger's step-by-step diplomacy the only real alternative during the postwar period, or was a comprehensive approach a more promising long-term strategy? Would Anwar el-Sadat's electrifying initiative of 1977 been possible were it not for that shuttle diplomacy?

The feeling here is that the achievements of Sinai II and the comprehensive (Geneva) approach emphasized by the Carter administration during its first year created the tensions that encouraged Sadat to reassess his own needs and the leverage he had with other Arab leaders as well as with Israel. Sadat's dramatic trip to Jerusalem was an unanticipated outcome of the two somewhat contradictory American policies.

Because policy formulation is viewed as a rational process, there is little room for substantive policy criticisms. Given the descriptive nature of this research that is all well and good. Also because Reich's framework is based on the assumption of a rational process, there is little emphasis on unique personalities and bureaucratic forces which shape policies. Specific decisions or events seem coherent but are not explained in as fascinating, nor as satisfying, a manner as in some "bureaucratic politics" case studies. For example, Edward F. Sheehan's analysis of Kissinger's shuttle diplomacy which first appeared in *Foreign Policy* (22) is rich in anecdotal data that Reich ignores. The latter's concern is with the flow of policies rather than with the spicy minutia of decisions.

My enthusiasm for Reich's scholarship is clear, my presentation of the kinds of information not developed in this study should be equally clear. The background to P.L.O. politics is not discussed in detail (Arab refugees become Palestinians who are first mentioned on p. 42), nor is there much discussion of diversity among numerous Arab states. The background of key leaders such as Kissinger or Sadat—so important to scholars interested in tensions between political needs and the values of leaders—is generally neglected in the text. For those who see individuals as the cutting edge

of social change (as Robert Isaaks put it), this book may have limited value. Such comments need not be construed as critical; the author delivers exactly what is promised in his preface.

Virtually every page of Reich's text is balanced by almost a page of documentation. By my count there are only seven more pages of text than those devoted to notes, appendix, and index. Indeed, the extensive footnotes are as lucid and as interesting as the text itself. Such scholarship deserves wide appreciation.

PAUL CONWAY

State University of New York
College at Oneonta

EUROPE

FREDERICK C. BARGHOORN. *Détente and the Democratic Movement in the USSR*. Pp. vii, 229. New York: The Free Press, 1976. $12.95.

PETER H. JUVILER. *Revolutionary Law and Order: Politics and Social Change in the USSR*. Pp. vii, 274. New York: The Free Press, 1976. $13.95.

Barghoorn in his work has presented us with an up-to-date and scholarly definition of détente and the status of the dissidents in the USSR.

In spite of détente, in Soviet-American relations the impression is given that diplomacy gave way to strategy. Although diplomacy may, and often does, involve strategy, basically it implies the settlement of disputes through negotiation and mutual compromise. Baron Strang, a member of the British foreign service, who served in Moscow in the 1930s, has provided a suitable definition:

> Diplomacy is the method by which governments talk and write to each other and make agreements with each other. One of the essential purposes of diplomacy is negotiation . . .

Diplomacy, in other words, does not look for "unconditional surrender" or "nothing less than victory." Strategy (generalship), on the other hand, is a military term, implying a plan of action against an opponent: "Outflank the enemy" (*obsiti flang protivnika*). This will explain Soviet involvement, directly or indirectly, in acquiring footholds to outflank the enemy in spite of détente. For years Tsarist Russia applied strategy to land only; now the USSR extends it also to water and air.

Barghoorn's main contribution in this book is his treatment of Soviet dissidents. Experts and students of Russian literature, especially of the nineteenth century, would also greatly benefit from the author's description of the Soviet dissidents in chapters three and four of this work. For instance, Andrei Sakharov and Alexander Solzhenitsyn strongly remind us of Ivan Turgenev and Fyodor Dostoyevsky; Sakharov and Turgenev are designated as "liberal Westerners" and Solzhenitsyn and Dostoyevsky as "Slavophiles." The latter two also have Siberia in common, for Dostoyevsky was exiled there under the Tsarist regime and Solzhenitsyn was forced to Siberia by order of Soviet tyranny.

Another aspect of utmost importance, with respect to the Russian dissidents, is that in the prerevolutionary era the majority of the Russian people respected them and regarded them as martyrs, whereas under Soviet rule, the dissidents, with the exception of a handful of scholars, are resented. It is easy to understand why this is so, for the press is controlled by the Communists and very few of the people have access to *Samizdat* or other illegal literature. Thus the majority of the people are under the influence of the official propaganda.

In discussing the sensitivity of the Soviet regime toward the dissidents—as the author himself experienced it in 1963—(p. 143), he adds another reason: "This sensitivity may to some extent be a product of the mingled inferiority/superiority complex toward the West inherited from the pre-revolutionary past . . ." (p. 145).

Juviler's *Revolutionary Law and Order* is the product of a new methodology, namely, a troika: political science, history, and law. These three disciplines are closely interwoven here. However, it is law that dominates the study of his work. He justifiably credits Professor

John W. Hazard for pointing the way to using law as a key to social and political change in the USSR.

Using almost the author's own words: The book explores the Soviet response to crime in its political and social setting from 1864 to the present, from the early Tsarist reforms and first Bolshevik hand bills through the drumhead tribunals and massive purges of Stalin, to the elaborate Soviet crime-fighting now entering the computer age. . . .

Moreover, this study contributes to the understanding of Soviet political and social history as well as Soviet criminal policy. Everyone concerned with human rights will find this work an excellent synthesis, giving broad historical scope to the recent Soviet quest for law and order.

As in the case of Barghoorn, Juviler devotes the bulk of his work to the dissidents. In retrospect, he says, the Tsarist easing of the plight of its dissidents and amelioration of unpopular laws weakened the establishment. On the other hand, Soviet changes strengthened the Bolshevik regime. The reason for this phenomenon is very simple: The Tsarist reforms, especially since 1905, were forced from below, whereas the Soviet alterations originated from above, and no struggle was involved.

Boris Rabbot's "A Letter to Brezhnev" (*New York Times Magazine*, 6 November 1977) substantiates the plight of Soviet dissidents as described by Barghoorn and Juviler.

Finally, it should be noted that the basic research of these two books is the result of material emanating from primary sources of unquestioned veracity.

IVAR SPECTOR
University of Washington
Seattle

JOHN CAMPBELL. *Lloyd George: The Goat in the Wilderness, 1922–1931* Pp. ix, 383. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1977. $19.50.

David Lloyd George, perhaps the most fascinating twentieth-century British politician, has increasingly come under the scrutiny of the historian's spyglass. Books about his career are tumbling from the presses on both sides of the Atlantic. Surely someone will soon publish a psychobiography of Lloyd George. For now the latest is Mr. Campbell's narrative, *The Goat in the Wilderness*, an allusion to his shaggy white appearance, political agility, and sexual proclivities. The years from 1922 to 1931 were extremely turbulent ones politically. They began with the break up of Lloyd George's wartime coalition in 1922 and culminated in another coalition, the 1931 national government, from which Lloyd George and the Liberals were excluded. In 1922 his eclipse seemed temporary; but in 1931, with the Liberal Party all but destroyed, his residence in the Wilderness had become permanent.

Mr. Campbell's thesis is that Lloyd George remained the most potent force and personality in British politics from 1922 to 1931 even though he was out of power. For several years after 1922, he was something of an exhausted volcano, but he cast a long shadow. After 1924 it appeared that the volcano might erupt once again. Politicians of all stripes, including many of his Liberal colleagues, trembled every time he made a public speech or raised a point of order in Commons. The Conservative leader, Stanley Baldwin, remained particularly obsessed by the real and imagined threats posed by Lloyd George. This thesis, however, is no longer new. His importance to the politics of the interwar years was first suggested by C.L. Mowat in 1955. Others have taken up the theme since, but Mr. Campbell has thoroughly explored and demonstrated the argument with a wealth of contemporary evidence Therein lies his achievement.

Looking backwards towards those years, one wonders what all the fuss was about. Why did Lloyd George loom so dominantly over British politics? During the twenties, no one knew for sure that the Liberals had expired; perhaps they were only comatose. Once D.L.G. replaced the doddering Henry Herbert Asquith in 1926, many thought that the "dynamic force," Baldwin's pejorative pet name for him, would lead a Liberal revival, but it was not to be. Despite the

fact that Lloyd George and the Liberal intellectuals formulated the ideas and policies which would inform politics for the next decade, momentum—that ineffable political essence—had already shifted away from the Liberals. Even though the other two parties had neither leaders nor ideas of the Liberals' quality, they appealed successfully to the electorate while the Liberals floundered helplessly. The Goat remained in the Wilderness.

NEAL A. FERGUSON
University of Nevada
Reno

GRAHAM CLEVERLY. *The Fleet Street Disaster: British National Newspapers as a Case Study in Mismanagement.* Pp. 176. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1976. $12.95.

Graham Cleverly, who has had both journalistic and managerial experience in the newspaper field, has written a provocative book which focuses on the commercial operation of the British press. In spite of the growing literature in the communications field, this aspect of newspaper production has received little attention. Cleverly examines profits and the profit motive, advertising, circulation, earnings, decisionmaking and controls, journalists, business management, managers, and craft and unskilled unions and union tactics. In addition, he devotes two chapters to case studies which for him exemplify mismanagement. One of these cases involves the initiation and failure of a color magazine supplement by *The Mirror* and the other describes the payment of an 8 percent wage increase to clerks when it was not necessary.

The author is very convincing in his description of inept management. He argues that these shortcomings have not received the public attention they deserve because much important information is kept secret. Furthermore, even journalists know little of what occurs on the management side of newspapers; and even when they are knowledgeable, they generally choose not to write about it.

The author attempts to dispel the myth that publishers will do anything for a profit. He does not make a case for altruism among publishers or a devotion to public service. Instead, he argues that there is a basic lack of understanding of the goals and purposes of organizations among publishers and other managers. Furthermore, fear of tarnishing their images keeps them from developing organizational skills. Cleverly cites errors in fixing advertising rates and unrealistic perceptions of circulation increases as two major problems for managers. Also, he blames management to a large degree for permitting a situation to develop in which labor costs are excessive in relation to work outputs.

The unions are described with begrudging respect. However, their contribution to the difficulty of the British newspaper industry is clearly established. Still, according to the author, union leaders seem to have a better understanding of the industry and develop clearer information on many things than does management.

It is noteworthy that journalists are not spared the author's criticism. Apparently, the journalists learned from the operation of the unions and when they did they pushed their wages up considerably and rigidified their profession.

The unflattering portrayal of the managers is based primarily on attitudinal failures. The managers are insecure and afraid of innovation and uncertainty. Cleverly prescribes bringing in managerial experts from outside the newspaper industry. However, he recognizes that this kind of move would be unacceptable to the managers, hence, this book, while very useful for understanding the difficulties of Fleet Street, is very pessimistic.

STEPHEN P. KOFF
Syracuse University
New York

JERRY F. HOUGH. *The Soviet Union and Social Science Theory.* Pp. viii, 275. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977. $16.50.

Political observers of the Soviet Union have come a long way since the days when deep significance was attached to the positioning of individuals atop Lenin's tomb and terms such as "monolith" and "democratic centralism" dominated their vocabulary. But, Professor Hough emphatically argues that matters have not moved far enough, and that our approach to an understanding of the Soviet Union must be firmly grounded upon the same social science assumptions and methodologies with which we investigate other societies, including our own. He asserts that American specialists in the Soviet area constitute a ghetto in the scholarly community, existing outside the mainstream of social theory, at least partly in the belief that the Soviet system is some kind of an aberration that cannot be approached by current modernization theories.

Professor Hough rejects these assumptions and provides enough in the way of preliminary investigations to provide strong support for his contentions that the Soviet bureaucratic state and its society is considerably more pluralistic than previous studies adhering to more totalitarian positions would allow. To some extent, Professor Hough is responding in this work to the study by Brezinski and Huntington, *Political Power USA/USSR*, which serves him both as a foil and an inspiration, but he goes much farther. For one thing, he feels that the application of social science theories to the Soviet experience may challenge both the assumptions and the methodologies we apply to the study of our own society, so that not only may we better understand the Soviet Union, but social science theory itself will be advanced. Some of Professor Hough's own preliminary conclusions are very intriguing. For example, he sees essential continuity even when forms change. He finds that participation in the political process is somewhat different from, but comparable to, that in the West. He finds the press to be much freer than the totalitarian model would allow, and criticism of circumstances and the conduct of affairs by both the press and by individuals also to be greater than the model would allow. Perhaps most importantly, he sees the large bureaucratic-state as both pluralistic and responsive to "inputs," producing both variation and a sense of participation.

Professor Hough's book is bound to be controversial, but it is restrained despite the vigor of the author's arguments. He does not, for example, seek to define the boundaries of the pluralism he finds but leaves the matter open for the investigation by the scholars of the next decade. Whatever the outcome of those researches, this work reasonably asks why the investigative tools that help us to understand other complex societies and organizations cannot be used to better understand the Soviet Union, and the author's own studies suggest the value that these methodologies will have.

FORRESTT A. MILLER

Vanderbilt University
Nashville

CHRISTOPH M. KIMMICH. *Germany and the League of Nations*. Pp. vii, 266. Chicago, Ill.: The University of Chicago Press, 1976. $17.50.

While considerable attention has been paid recently to German foreign policy before and during World War I and the Nazi period, much less has been to the intervening decade. This work helps fill the gap and thereby provides an insight into the complex but fascinating problem of continuity between Hitler and his predecessors.

Kimmich has written a classic diplomatic history: exhaustively researched, clearly written, chronologically organized, mercifully brief, and combining careful attention to detail with awareness for broader issues. He argues that

> all German statesmen from Stresemann to Hitler regarded the League as a means for advancing German interests and all endorsed it to the extent that it in fact advanced these interests. None prized it for the advantages and protection it could offer a defeated and disarmed country, none recognized it as a new approach to old problems of international disorder and insecurity (p. viii)

German statesmen and diplomats never understood the League's potential and remained—at least until Hitler—"committed not only to traditional diplomacy but also to traditional objectives," namely, revision of the Versailles Treaty, which "could not be realized within the framework of the League and the new diplomacy" (p. ix). Kimmich feels that Germany was thereby an "accessory to undermining the vitality of the League and hastening its decline" (p. ix). This attitude toward the League was shared by most Germans, who doubted

> that the League's ideals of open diplomacy, collective security, and equality of nations had much practical value. Most believed that German membership ought to yield results (whether, as in 1918–19, an easy peace, or, as after 1926, an early revision of the peace terms). . . . German policy toward the League, then, was as much a response to public pressures as it was an instrument for manipulating public opinion (p. viii).

Although Kimmich's account is generally convincing, his evaluation of German policy toward the League is not entirely persuasive. Certainly, to the extent that it contributed to the outbreak of World War II, German policy toward the League can be condemned. But Kimmich's repeated implication that German leaders were more cynical and hypocritical in their pursuit of German interests is patently invalid. French, British, and American policies toward the League, and generally, were equally self-serving. Since all governments, and the vast majority of their publics, felt the proper role of policy was to defend and if possible extend national power, no leader could afford to subordinate perceived interest to peace. In this sense German leaders were typical of "the traditionalist world of the interwar years" (p. ix). Germany was distinguished less by its cynicism than by its power and, after 1933, by Hitler's determination to take traditional aims to their ultimate extreme.

L. L. FARRAR, JR.

Trinity College
Hartford
Connecticut

BEN PIMLOTT. *Labour and the Left in the 1930s*. Pp. 259. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977. $13.95.

Labour has been one of Britain's two major parties for almost 60 years. During that time, it has enrolled millions of members (mostly through the trade union movement) and won five general elections. Yet the Party's history has been troubled: revolts and expulsions, a scarcity of first-rate leaders, and wrangling over doctrine have plagued Labour politics all along the way. Legislatively, the Party's cumulative record must be judged less than outstanding. Excepting National Health Insurance, probably the single most popular social reform enacted in this century, Labour governments have sponsored few really innovative legislative proposals. Most importantly, while the Party has never relinquished its avowed commitment to "socialism" (never clearly defined), its actual economic policies have been neither particularly radical nor particularly effective; Britain's economic decline has in fact proceeded apace regardless of which major party has been in power.

In *Labour and the Left*, Professor Pimlott offers a coherent (but not wholly adequate) explanation for this dismal performance. Pimlott sees the thirties as Labour's watershed decade, during which the Party might have laid the foundations for ideological self-renewal and political aggrandizement. Electoral defeat and the startling defection of Ramsay MacDonald, long-time Party spokesman, had potentially cleared the way for a younger generation of leaders. Concomitantly, the Depression, a regional, but nonetheless devastating, affair in Britain, was prompting Labourites to exchange their outworn economic shibboleths for the promising new economics of John Maynard Keynes.

Unfortunately, Pimlott argues, the Party—or rather, its left-wing militants—muffed the opportunity. Composed primarily of intellectuals and led by the brilliant, but politically erratic, Sir Stafford Cripps, the Left, in Pimlott's view, played an essentially divisive

role throughout the decade. Impatient with the political processes of a "corrupt and unsalvageable" system, left-wingers indulged in revolutionary rhetoric and actively collaborated with the Communist Party, which was only too willing to exploit their political naivete. At the same time, much energy was frittered away organizing meetings, demonstrations, and petition drives—all in the vain hope of mobilizing the masses and gaining converts to full-blooded socialism. Such activities, Pimlott observes, satisfied the Left's quasi-religious passion for symbolism but did little to advance its cause. On the contrary, the intelligentsia's infantile leftism only served to stiffen resistance to constructive change, both inside and outside the Party. By conspiring to form an anti-Fascist united front with the Communists, the Left obstructed conclusion of a far more meaningful alliance between Labour and those dissident Conservatives who opposed the government's economic orthodoxy and appeasement of the Nazis. And by rejecting a Keynesian-based reform of the existing system, left-wingers merely enhanced the political fortunes of Labour's more cautious elements. The ultimate beneficiaries of leftist folly, Pimlott concludes, were the so-called "revisionists," who did favor greater state intervention but only in a diluted form which stopped short of "an all out attack on the existing distribution of wealth."

Pimlott thus makes a strong case against the often shrill and doctrinaire excesses of the radical intelligentsia. Predominately middle-class and London-based, the Labour Left lacked any real roots within the working class or, for that matter, any real appreciation of the practical and theoretical complexities of socialism. The incongruity of its position was perhaps best personified by Cripps, a barrister who had earned a large fortune representing the very class he sought to overthrow, and a keen ally of the Communists who had never read a word of Marx.

Pimlott rightly catalogues such absurdities but unfortunately does not balance them off with any detailed appraisal of the Left's many constructive, and occasionally even prescient, initiatives—for example, its support for industrial democracy and opposition to the Morrisonian conception of public ownership. Indeed, Pimlott is so eager to indict the Left, and thereby exonerate the Party as a whole, that he neglects to focus on more cogent explanations for Labour's dismal record. These include, most notably, domination of the Party's machinery by an inert trade union establishment almost as supportive of the status quo as the Tories themselves. Had *Labour and the Left* been written from this perspective, that is, as a kind of case study in Michels' iron law of oligarchy, it might have done much to explain why British workers continue to be politically apathetic and why "their" nominally socialist Party remains supinely accommodating to capitalist interests and priorities. As it is, Pimlott has only partially and inadequately explored the wellsprings of Labour's failure.

DAVID H. KATZ
Michigan State University
East Lansing

STEPHEN A. SCHUKER. *The End of French Predominance in Europe: The Financial Crisis of 1924 and the Adoption of the Dawes Plan.* Pp. xi, 444. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1976. $18.95

The London Conference of the summer of 1924 was a major turning point in international relations between the two world wars. It halted the confrontation between France and Germany which dominated European politics since the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, and which prolonged their wartime struggle by different means. The London Conference was called to ratify and implement the report that an international committee of experts was drafting in Paris in the early months of 1924 under the chairmanship of the American general and banker Charles G. Dawes. The Experts aimed for a restoration of the economy of Germany through foreign investments, so as to enable that country to resume payment of reparations to

which it was obliged under the terms of its treaty of peace. During the greater part of 1923 Germany found herself in the throes of a runaway inflation, which threatened a nationwide political, economic, and social collapse. This seemingly uncontrollable rise in prices was fueled by the German government's prodigal use of its printing press as a device for continuing the payment of wages to the striking workers of the Ruhr. For the government of the Reich had ordered passive resistance in January of 1923, when French and Belgian troops occupied Germany's industrial heartland to force a recalcitrant nation to renew payment of reparations by monetary transfers, to collect forthwith reparations in kind, and generally to assure the integral application of the Treaty of Versailles. At the beginning of 1924, while the Dawes experts were at work on their report, the French franc in its turn declined sharply on international money markets, though its fall was not as precipitous as that of the mark during the previous year. The French government early in March of 1924 accordingly turned to its American banker, the Wall Street firm of J. P. Morgan & Company, for a loan to reestablish the exchange value of its currency. It is Stephen A. Schuker's contention that, though the crisis of the franc had passed by the time of the London Conference, the chronic weakness of French finances and the French government's continued dependence on the goodwill of the international banking community compelled its negotiators at the forthcoming talks to abandon any effective sanctions against Germany in the event of another flagrant default. France thus accepted the unfettered revival of the industrial giant of Europe, thereby acquiescing in her own demise as a great power on the continent.

Though the author argues this thesis in lavish detail that he has culled from a whole array of archives—French, British, German, and American, public as well as private—and though he develops it with a thorough mastery of the complexities of international economics and diplomacy, he has not succeeded, in this reviewer's opinion, in establishing it convincingly. To mention only a few major objections that can be raised against it, we may be certain that the French Premier, Raymond Poincaré, acted from motives other than a realization of the disarray of the state finances late in November of 1923, when he agreed to a negotiated solution of the reparations problem, thereby setting the stage for France's eventual acceptance of the Dawes Plan. Moreover, as Schuker himself shows, it was primarily the British government, which at the London Conference exerted pressure on the new premier, Edouard Herriot, to adopt the Experts' report, rather than again turn to the American bankers to whom the French were exclusively beholden for the recent rescue of their currency, and who did not in any case evince a marked enthusiasm for the flotation of the Dawes loan. With regard to France's alleged loss of great power status when the bulk of her army of occupation evacuated the Ruhr in the spring of 1925, it is a matter of historical record that her government continued until the middle 1930s to display a real initiative in guarding the nation's security within a European-wide framework. Thus, French statesmen firmed up military alliances with Poland and the Little Entente in the middle and later 1920s, blocked a projected customs union between Germany and Austria in March of 1931, and concluded a treaty of mutual assistance with Italy as well as a diplomatic pact with the Soviet Union in the spring of 1935. Only from 1936 onward, when France began to subordinate her vital interests to the British initiative, can she be said to have forsaken an independent foreign policy, and simultaneously relinquished the rank of a first-rate power on the European continent.

PAUL ROSENFELD

Rutgers University
Newark
New Jersey

UNITED STATES HISTORY AND POLITICS

JERALD G. BACHMAN, JOHN D. BLAIR, and DAVID R. SEGAL. *The All-Volunteer Force: A Study of Ideology*

in the Military. Pp. vi, 210. Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1977. $10.95.

The idea that America should have an army composed exclusively of volunteers is both intriguing and controversial. The pros and cons of the concept have been debated at length by soldiers, social scientists, politicians, and ordinary citizens. This debate is by no means over; in fact, it seems that all the protagonists have been supplied with some new ammunition by the authors of *The All-Volunteer Force*. The authors of this recent publication, Jerald Bachman, John Blair, and David Segal, addressed the questions of who should serve in the United States armed forces and what relationship should exist between the military and civilian society. They by no means give definitive answers to these questions, but their efforts are interesting.

The authors used survey research techniques in an attempt to discover how soldiers, sailors, and civilians felt about the role of the United States armed forces. They utilized survey questionnaires and asked a sample of these three groups to respond to the same basic questions. Their findings are interesting and to the authors a bit alarming. In the introduction the authors admit that they have a strong preference for so-called citizen soldiers who do not intend to make the military a career, and this bias spawns their dismay over their findings.

The responses to the questionnaires indicate that present recruiting practices and present retention patterns will lead to a more career-oriented military. The responses also indicate that a more narrow promilitary ideology will dominate the thinking of the armed forces. Conceivably this might be a beneficial result, and the authors do not assert that it is necessarily bad. But they do argue that it would be better to have a well-integrated relationship between civilian and military, and they do imply that the more isolated the military, the less likely it is to be responsive to civilian leadership. They suggest that the ideals of integration and responsibility can be endangered by the lack of the civilian perspective in the all volunteer army.

After discussing their research and spelling out their findings at great length, the authors finally return to their own suggestions and policy judgments. At this point the book falls a bit flat. After extensive research they simply repeat the familiar suggestions that we can encourage one term civilian, as opposed to career, soldiers by providing better pay, better educational benefits, and a better articulation by our civilian leaders of the military's mission. These suggestions may be meritorious, but they are so familiar that it makes one wonder if this book were necessary. Perhaps a journal article would have been a more suitable vehicle to express the authors' views.

PHILIP J. HANNON

Texas Tech University
Lubbock

RICHARD BEN-VENISTE and GEORGE FRAMPTON, JR. *Stonewall: The Real Story of the Watergate Prosecution* Pp. 410. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1977. $11.95.

Another inside story of the Watergate investigations and prosecutions, by two young former assistant special prosecutors. *Stonewall* helps us understand the internal and external politics of the special prosecutor's office as it closed in on the President's subordinates, then the President himself, and made its decisions not to indict Richard Nixon as President or as ex-President or to oppose his pardon.

There is a sprinkling of tasty anecdotes (old Pennington, the supposed cat burglar, police outside the White House honking twice for impeachment, even the discovery that Nixon was a crook) and a good recounting of the larger story. But the real reason for Watergate buffs to read it is the one Graham Allison gave in *Strategy of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, that the classical model of decisionmaking (Kennedy versus Khrushchev, Nixon versus Congress and the special prosecutor) needs supplementing with analysis of bureaucratic politics and organizational processes. This is, above all, a study of organizational processes, of prosecutors' standard operating procedures. For better or

worse, the performance of the office was affected by its responses to low-level problems, such as when to grant immunity in exchange for testimony, when to prosecute a potential witness in order to improve his believability, how to manipulate a grand jury, how to select an agreeable trial jury, and how to get a conviction.

The authors interrupt the narrative with useful primers on each of these topics and others. Another underlying organizational process illustrated by the book as a whole is the exercise of discretion by willful prosecutors. They make choices at every step, notably in this case, between proceeding forcefully to vindicate the criminal justice system, as they put it, and giving due deference to the executive. The tendency of the young and zealous staff was to prefer moving full steam ahead. But Leon Jaworski, the special prosecutor during most of this story, preferred deference and had the last say. And there lies the limit, also, of this book's explanatory power. Ben-Veniste might have a go at matching Jaworski's ego, but not his authority, and it was Jaworski who decided not to prosecute Nixon, who offered President Ford advice which encouraged him to grant Nixon a pardon, and who was willing to let subordinates find other work if they disagreed with him.

ROBERT J. SICKELS
University of New Mexico
Albuquerque

RAOUL BERGER. *Government by Judiciary: The Transformation of the Fourteenth Amendment* Pp. ix, 483. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1977. $15.00.

The American Constitution is venerated by many for its "majestic generalities" and "conveniently vague" phrases which have permitted judges to reinterpret constitutional principles to fit changing times. That the Supreme Court was able to strike down racial segregation in the schools, malapportioned legislatures, bans on contraceptives, and questionable police practices on the basis of new interpretations of the "equal protection" or "due process" clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment is evidence of the strength of the American constitutional system, according to the conventional wisdom found in most works on American government. Raoul Berger, a retired legal historian at Harvard University, challenges this conventional wisdom in *Government by Judiciary*, a work that is attracting wide attention because of its attacks on the legal reasoning underlying the landmark decisions of the Warren Court, particularly the school desegregation and legislative apportionment decisions.

Berger attacks the Warren Court for reading into the Fourteenth Amendment protections which the framers of the amendment deliberately left out. He presents an impressively documented history of the amendment showing that the Congress, which proposed the amendment, intended to give blacks only the most basic rights, such as the right to own property and enter into contracts. To permit a majority on the Supreme Court to arbitrarily impose new meanings to words in the Constitution is, Berger asserts, "to strike at the very root of our Democratic system." The purpose of a written constitution is to place limits on the arbitrary use of power, whether the power is used for noble or ignoble ends. Berger argues that the American system of justice is committed to the principle of "equal justice under law" rather than "justices above the law."

Professor Berger received national attention in the early 1970s when his books on impeachment and executive privilege became major reference works in building the abuse of power case against Richard Nixon. Berger believes that the same principle of government under law, which was threatened by Watergate, is similarly threatened by court decisions in which justices redefine constitutional passages to conform to their own values. He argues that if no president is to be permitted to act above the law, no court should be either.

Berger, who identifies himself as a life-long liberal, acknowledges that he

would not want the Court to repudiate its "unconstitutional decisions" of the past 25 years. The purpose of the book, he explains, is to make the public aware of past judicial abuses of power in order to check the Court from intruding still further into policy areas not involving clearly defined constitutional rights.

Government by Judiciary is a major work that already has provoked spirited debate over the proper role of the Supreme Court. It tends to overstate the certainty with which the original meaning of constitutional language can be determined and exagerates the arbitrariness of court decisions, but the book's central thesis, that Supreme Court judges in major decisions have ignored clear constitutional guidelines in pursuing their own sense of justice, deserves serious consideration. Those who so enthusiastically agreed with Berger in the Nixon battle over executive powers —that the principle of rule by law is an absolute and that no one should ever be above the law—are challenged in this work to apply the same principle in evaluating the Warren Court's efforts to secure basic social justice outside of clear constitutional guidelines.

JAMES DAVID FAIRBANKS
University of Houston–Downtown College
Texas

DOUGLAS S. BLAUFARB. *The Counterinsurgency Era. U.S. Doctrine and Performance 1950 to the Present.* Pp. ix, 356. New York: The Free Press, 1977. $12.95.

Students of recent American foreign relations will want to read this overview of American policy on post-World War II counterinsurgency. In nine chapters Blaufarb focuses on the development and application of United States policy to combat the new "insurgency" format that occurred in several frontier regions of the American attack on communism. For background, he discusses the concept of modern-day insurgency as it developed from Mao Tse-tung and the variations that applied in different parts of the emerging Third World. Some detail is supplied concerning the successful American counterinsurgency experience in the Philippines and the British approach in Malaya. Both episodes gave John F. Kennedy's policymakers operational models to use against the proliferating "people's wars."

The Kennedy administration was indeed the starting point for the first thorough development of a United States counterinsurgency policy that included both military and civilian components. This is one of Blaufarb's best chapters, as he points out the optimism as well as the gloomier prognosis of Kennedy officials. The application of the policy, with its developing variations through the experience and circumstances of the sixties, is the focus of the remainder of the book, as Blaufarb analyzes American strategies in Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam, with a shorter look at the success and failures in Latin America.

Blaufarb places a good share of the blame for the failure of the American policy on the military. He cites it for treating counterinsurgency as merely another mission of conventional units rather than giving the whole concept the unique emphasis he feels it warrants. He is more lenient with the CIA and AID although they, too, are criticized

A third of the book is spent on Vietnam, and this reviewer agrees with William Bundy, who wrote the forward to the volume, that Blaufarb's treatment of the 1967–72 period is the "best analytical critique of the conduct of 'pacification'" that has been written. His analysis of the aftermath of the 1968 Tet offensive is particularly instructive and should provide the framework for further studies on this tragic period in Vietnamese history.

The theme threaded throughout the book is whether the United States, with all its management skill, technology, doctrine, and recent experience, can make a positive difference in the outcome of a war in a nation beset by insurgency and stricken with an ineffective government. It is a perplexing question; one that Blaufarb sheds some light on, but cannot adequately answer.

He does provide the context and the mood of the counterinsurgency experience. But he leaves us with the continuing thought about the extraordinary difficulty for the United States to learn anything practical from it.

GEORGE T. MAZUZAN
The National Archives
Washington, D.C.

LEONARD DINNERSTEIN and DAVID M. REIMERS. *Ethnic Americans: A History of Immigration and Assimilation*. Pp. vii, 184. New York: New York University Press, 1977. $12.00.

Ethnic Americans is a competent, readable book which nevertheless leaves one wondering why it was written. It covers the coming of various peoples to the United States from colonial times to the present, with separate chapters devoted to immigration restriction, socioeconomic mobility, and the future of the melting pot. However, 156 pages of text are too few for in-depth treatment or the presentation of original material. In fact, very little new material is presented. Apparently, Dinnerstein and Reimers simply surveyed the basic monographs in the field and recapitulated their basic findings. Few articles or specialized studies are cited in the bibliography, and the complete omission of footnotes further undermines the scholarly value of this book.

Perhaps the authors intended *Ethnic Americans* to serve as a textbook, but here, too, it falls short. Other surveys contain more detail, and while this one is newer, it fails to incorporate any of the recent, exciting theoretical and statistical work on topics such as prejudice and social mobility. These topics are by no means ignored, but the authors handle them in a very conventional manner. For example, the story of Senator John Pastore is cited (more than once) as proof of mobility and assimilation among American ethnics. Such superficiality limits the book's general value to anyone other than a layman with a passing interest in and little knowledge of the subject.

However, Dinnerstein and Reimer's work has its virtues. Like other surveys, it can serve as a reference book, and there are some useful (though unoriginal) tables, plus a list of important legislation relating to immigration. In their text, the authors successfully bring out the continuity of the immigrant adjustment problem in America, emphasizing that the specifics changed but the general experience was similar for most groups. Finally, *Ethnic Americans* includes significantly more material on the post-World War II immigrants than most surveys, and in fact has a complete chapter on the nation's second largest minority—Spanish-speaking Americans.

In his introduction, an editor proudly claims that this is the first study to accept the fact that the melting pot "has really not worked out" and that the reader should use this as a basic premise. The statement is somewhat misleading. For one thing, the authors end up with an unusually confident prediction of the ultimate assimilation of all ethnic minorities. Even if they had rejected the melting pot idea, the fact remains that neither this premise nor anything else in the book is very original. However, it is still worthwhile reading for those new to the field, especially those with a particular interest in twentieth-century immigration.

LAURA L. BECKER
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia

ROBERT J. DONOVAN *Conflict and Crisis. The Presidency of Harry S. Truman, 1945–1948*. Pp. ix, 473. New York: W. W. Norton, 1977. $12.95.

Robert J. Donovan was White House correspondent for the *New York Herald Tribune* when Harry Truman was President of the United States; yet, this is not a book about the reporter's experience in covering a president. The readability of a good reporter's style is there, but this book is really a solidly researched, thoughtful account of the chaotic years encompassing the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War.

Indeed, if one did not read the flyleaf or footnotes, he would not know this book had been written by a reporter. On only two occasions does the author intrude on the narration, and then unobtrusively.

Donovan has done his research well, examining the wealth of archival material which has become available in recent years, and incorporating much recent scholarship into this volume. It is well documented, and although the footnotes are inconveniently placed at the back of the book, they provide enough detail for the serious scholar to check Donovan's sources. It is, in short, a solid piece of historical workmanship.

Foreign policy considerations dominated Truman's first term and dominate this book as well. The Potsdam Conference, the decision to use the atomic bomb, the creation of the State of Israel, the Truman Doctrine and the Marshall Plan, troubles in China, Czechoslovakia and the Berlin Blockade, and the creation of the Central Intelligence Agency are all interwoven in the narrative to make a coherent fabric. Domestic issues are not slighted: The immense economic problems of reconversion after the war, labor troubles (particularly with John L. Lewis and the Mine Workers), political conflict with Wallace, Ickes, New Dealers, and Democratic liberals, the loyalty program, the Eightieth Congress, and the Civil Rights report.

In treating each of these issues the author avoids much of the current wrangling among historians and, although sensitive to the issues, manages not to assess blame. Instead he explains the decisions and mistakes of the time against the background of confusion, uncertainty, and perspective of the period, and against the sympathetically drawn, yet not overcomplimentary picture, of a very human Harry Truman. The author conveys the pressures on the President, the complexity of the decisionmaking process, the interplay of domestic and foreign policy considerations, and the personalities with whom Truman had to cope. In late March 1948, for example, Truman had to make major decisions on the Palestine question at the same time the Russians were blockading Berlin, conditions were getting worse in China, John L. Lewis was threatening a coal strike, Czechoslovakia was being taken over by the Communists, the Army and Navy were fighting with the Atomic Energy Commission over control of the atomic bomb, and the presidential campaign was getting into full swing. This portrayal of the diversity of forces competing for the attention of the President at once is one of the strongest features of the work.

The book concludes with an account of the dramatic Truman victory in the 1948 campaign, and readers are left with a promise of another volume to follow this one. One hopes that Donovan's second volume will be as good as this one.

DONALD B. SCHEWE

Franklin D Roosevelt Library
Hyde Park
New York

THOMAS HOLT. *Black Over White. Negro Political Leadership in South Carolina During Reconstruction*. Pp. 269. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977. $12.50

RAYMOND GAVINS. *The Perils and Prospects of Southern Black Leadership: Gordon Blaine Hancock, 1884–1970*. Pp. vii, 221 Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press, 1977. $11.75.

Revision of the neo-Confederate Dunning-Bowers school of Reconstruction history was more-or-less completed about a decade ago. With this important study of South Carolina's black Reconstructionists, Thomas Holt establishes a postrevisionist model of scholarship which other students of the subject might emulate for years to come.

Of the nearly 500 men elected to state and federal offices in South Carolina between 1867 and 1876, more than half were black. This fact attracted international notice a century ago and explains the extraordinary attention scholars have lavished on the Palmetto State since. Yet with the exceptions of a few famous individuals, R. B. Elliott and Robert Smalls, for example, little has been known of these Afro-American political

pioneers. Holt has attempted with considerable success to study every officeholder. A long appendix lists names, offices held, residences, prewar status (slave or free), color, birthplaces, education, and financial conditions. The appendix alone is a remarkable achievement in research. But Holt has also analyzed the performances of these men, especially members of the constitutional convention and the legislatures. Tables and figures throughout the volume chart quantitatively the black leadership's composition, positions, and its cohesion or lack thereof. The volume is also compelling narrative history, a tragedy with some strong moralizing.

Holt argues that South Carolina's majority of "black peasants" was led by a cadre "basically bourgeois in their origins and orientation" who "oftener than not failed to act in the interests of the black peasants." Thus "more of the blame" for the failure of Reconstruction "must be laid at the door of Negro leaders than heretofore" (pp. 3–4). The leadership was neither ill-educated nor incompetent; rather, it was fatally flawed by division. The largely free-born, light-skinned, and urban faction—the bourgeoisie—held disproportionate power; and at crucial legislative moments, it revealed lack of commitment, even antagonism, towards the masses of land hungry (and dark-skinned) ex-slaves.

Class and color analysis of an American black community is extraordinary. Negroes (including those partly caucasian) are conventionally treated as a single caste which behaves as such. Holt probes deeply below such typecasting, notably in his chapter, "Black and Brown," which demonstrates the real, if seldom recognized, differences between dark- and light-skinned Negroes. Yet on this—as well as on the subjects of voting behavior, relations with white conservatives, and white Republican Daniel H. Chamberlain's chicanery—Holt's presentation is both careful and hedged by citations of exceptions to his arguments. No review of this length can do justice to such a book. It should be studied.

Raymond Gavins's biography of a rather obscure black Virginian is also a fine history of the southern interracial movement from the 1920s through the 1940s. Gordon Blaine Hancock was born of humble South Carolina parents in 1884. A Benedict College-educated Baptist minister, he went North during World War I and earned additional baccalaureate and divinity degrees at Colgate, then did graduate work in sociology at Harvard. In 1921 he accepted a position teaching sociology at Virginia Union University in Richmond. There he also became pastor of a large city church, began writing press releases, touring, and speaking. Hancock aspired to be a spokesman for his people.

Like most of his southern black contemporaries, Hancock was a latter-day Bookerite until the end of the 1930s. Ambivalent about racial segregation—it was evil, but blacks should capitalize upon it and build strong communities and enterprises—he campaigned for racial pride and solidarity both as preacher and pedagogue. Hancock was skilled as a publicist and phrasemaker. During the interwar period, he coined the "double-duty dollar" slogan, promoting consumer trade with businesses which hired blacks.

In 1942 he was an architect of the Durham conference of southern black leaders which produced an important manifesto against discrimination. This led in turn to a tenuous union with southern white liberals, culminating, in 1943–44, with the formation of the Southern Regional Council. As a founder and member of the SRC's executive committee, Hancock pressed reluctant white liberals to move publicly against segregation. This protracted struggle—finally successful in 1951—was perhaps the crowning achievement of Hancock's career. Thereafter the rapid movement of the human rights struggle in the age of Martin Luther King, Jr. left him behind, personally and ideologically.

Gavins's treatment of southern black strategy and ideology during these years is so full and fair that Gordon Hancock virtually disappears, particularly in the second half of the volume. The book does not quite succeed as biography; but

perhaps this may be explained partly by Hancock's own apparent stiff reserve, and partly by Gavins's commendable determination to place Hancock properly in a crowded and complicated world. Gavins's sources include an array of private papers and personal interviews heretofore unexploited. Until someone produces a full-scale history of the southern interracial movement before King, Gavins's *Hancock* will do very well.

JACK TEMPLE KIRBY
Miami University
Oxford
Ohio

DONALD L. HOROWITZ. *The Courts and Social Policy.* Pp. 309. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977. $11.95 Paperbound, $4.95.

The basic theme of this scholarly, well-written book, is that American courts are currently involved in dealing with broad, changing social issues which they are not equipped to handle well. Courts are suited to the resolution of cases involving specific parties and turning upon the identification of past facts which lend themselves to determinable remedies on which parties can act. It is one thing for a court to decide in a contract case that the defendant is obliged to pay the plaintiff a fixed sum of money. It is quite a different matter for a court to adjudicate a claim asserted by a prisoner, the decision of which may embroil the judge in the many complex aspects of prison management. As Horowitz puts the matter, whereas litigation has historically been concerned with answering grievances, today it is often obliged to solve social problems that far transcend the immediate interests of the parties. There has been an "increasing subordination of the individual case to judicial policy making" (p. 9)

Horowitz points up the rather widely recognized limits of the judicial process. Judges are more apt to be generalists than specialists. They rely upon parties to bring in cases, and cannot take the initiative. The focus of courts is on rights, not on later possible alternatives. Adjudication is piecemeal and incremental, and the sort of fact finding that takes place in courts is ill-adapted to determining social facts. Furthermore, courts are not equipped to review policy or to assess what may be called "consequential facts."

To illustrate this general theme, Horowitz devotes four chapters to a rather detailed analysis of four cases: the *Area-Wide Council* case (1969–72), which dealt with a dispute, in the lower federal courts, about the meaning of "widespread citizen participation," as prescribed in the Model Cities Act, in Philadelphia; the *Hobson* case (1967–73), decided in the courts of the District of Columbia, and concerned with the problem of racial segregation in the public schools, the *Gault* case (1966), which decreed changes in the juvenile court system of paternal justice, and the *Mapp* case (1961), wherein the Supreme Court first applied the exclusionary rule to the states, thus barring the use in state courts of evidence secured in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Horowitz demonstrates, through a close analysis of what happened during and after the process of adjudication had run its course, that these decisions either did not decide the controversy, as in the Philadelphia case, or created so many new problems that serious doubts about the costs involved were raised For example, the exclusionary rule, he argues, has, among other things, encouraged the police to resort to more harassment, to perjury and to corruption, to circumvent a rule designed to keep them in line.

Horowitz argues that, since courts cannot avoid taking the cases that are brought to them by interested parties, they must learn how to use social science data through the invention of new rules of evidence. While I believe that this is a meritorious suggestion, I think that a greater measure of judicial self-restraint is also in order Thus, in the Philadelphia case, the court could well have avoided making the mistakes that developed by showing greater deference to the judgments of HUD, the enforcement agency.

While the construction of statutes is a proper judicial function, a court is not obliged to disagree with the way the administrative officials construe a statute. Furthermore, courts have many devices available for refusing to get involved in problems they cannot handle effectively, or as well as, other governmental institutions: the standing doctrine, the ripeness doctrine, the political question doctrine, the substantial evidence rule, and the exhaustion doctrine, to name but a few. In fact, I think Horowitz might well have called attention to decisions of the Supreme Court in which the very shortcomings he points up were specifically recognized as setting limits to what courts are equipped to do, as, for example, in the remarkable opinion of Justice Douglas in *United States* v. *Paramount Pictures, Inc.*, 334 U.S. 131, 162-3 (1948).

DAVID FELLMAN

University of Wisconsin
Madison

JAMES R. KILLIAN, JR. *Sputnik, Scientists and Eisenhower: A Memoir of the First Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology.* Pp. xi, 315. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977. $14.95.

No event in the recent American experience was so thoroughly devastating to the national pride as was the launching of the *Sputnik I* by the Soviet Union on October 4, 1957. Its impact was immediate, widespread, and deeply felt. It created shock waves of immense proportion throughout the nation, verging virtually on mass hysteria. The nation was so completely demoralized and panic-stricken that President Eisenhower was moved to reassure the American people, in a special broadcast, that American science and engineering had not lost its vitality and that the flow of the very best scientific advice was being institutionalized as an important element in the making of national policy.

It was in that message that the President informed the nation that a new position of Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology was being created, so that scientific information could be integrated for the advancement of national goals. The President announced the appointment of Dr. James R. Killian, President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a distinguished educator who had considerable experience in working with the government, to that position. The events that led to the creation of the Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology and the flurry of activities which transpired during the next two years revolving around science, education, and national defense is ably recounted by the author in this volume.

The Soviet breakthrough was a severe blow to the American scientific and technological enterprise. It immediately brought into sharp focus the entire structure of American science and engineering, and, indeed, pried open questions concerning the values and goals of American education. Even the performance of the American sociopolitical system was increasingly being subjected to scrutiny. The most serious target of concern was American national security, which, being based on peculiar American technical ingenuity, was long felt as unsurpassed in the realm of technological superiority until the Soviet challenge. The science advisory paraphernalia established during the Eisenhower era was quickly supposed to restore the American preeminence in scientific endeavor.

Dr. Killian's appointment as the science advisor to the President was in reality the culmination of an historic relationship between science and government, which had assumed some degree of earnestness in 1941. As the defense establishment came to rely more and more on scientific knowledge for the development of its weapons systems, it became virtually inevitable that the use of scientific information, as an instrument of national policy, would be pursued. In this volume Dr. Killian recounts how science became permeated into the determination of all aspects of national power. In particular, he gives insights into events that led to the launching of the United States space program, the

founding of NASA, the development of the intercontinental ballistic missile system and, finally, the reopening of discussions with the Soviet Union on limiting nuclear tests and other arms controls initiatives.

While strengthening of the defense capability of the nation was clearly the foremost consideration, the very fact of having the science advisory machinery in the White House made it easier for the policymaker to obtain the scientific information he needed in his policymaking role and to use it with confidence. The foundation laid by Dr. Killian was to become a permanent feature of the national government and it was instrumental in bringing together the scientific community and governmental decisionmakers. That office also gave impetus to broadening and strengthening of the edifice of science and education to such an extent that the United States recaptured its hegemonial position almost overnight.

Dr. Killian presents us with a superb narrative of some very exciting years in the government that were to alter the course of the nation's educational enterprise for many years to come. In this highly personal memoir he "conducts the reader on a guided tour through the corridors of power in the White House that are not opened to the public." Anyone interested in public policy, as it relates to education in general and science in particular, would find in this volume substantial, interesting material on the operation of the national government and the policy process.

GHULAM M. HANIFF

St. Cloud University
Minnesota

DOUGLAS KINNARD. *The War Managers*. Pp. vii, 216. Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New England, 1977. $14.00

The Vietnam War, as President Ford indicated, may be behind us, but its effects, in terms of influence on governmental initiative and attitude, will be lurking in the background of United States policy for decades to come. Serious writers are only now beginning to come to grips with the lessons we should have learned in Vietnam. One of these efforts, and a unique one because of its perspective, is a new book by Douglas Kinnard, *The War Managers*. This book is unusual because it is an analysis, based on exhaustive questionnaires, of views of the war effort by American army generals.

Professor Kinnard, who, himself, was an army general in Vietnam for several years, sought information from more than 170 active and retired general officers who had served substantial time in the Vietnamese theater. General officers were chosen because their responsibility for, and knowledge of, the events that took place in Vietnam between 1960 and 1975 were the broadest and the most complete. The results of Kinnard's research, though in some cases not widely divergent from what one might have previously guessed from television interviews and newspaper accounts, serve as solid evidence of the need for the reorganization of Army practice and procedure in the areas of command responsibility and toleration of dissent.

Among the conclusions of the study are that generals were quite critical of a number of specific aspects of the war: the poor performances of South Vietnamese military leaders, the lack of clearly stated goals by American civilian leaders, and the disruptive influence of media coverage of the war. Despite the general consensus on these issues, Professor Kinnard found it surprising that there was as much disagreement among respondents to the survey as there actually was, particularly in view of the strongly homogeneous nature of the group questioned. Criticism of military performance is fairly widespread in the study, at least now that the officers in question are no longer on the scene. Professor Kinnard's analysis correctly raises the question of where these critics were, for example, when the false body counts they acknowledged were being reported.

Woven throughout the analysis of the responses made by the generals is a notably trenchant summary of the major events occurring during the course of American military involvement in Viet-

nam. Professor Kinnard's treatment of North Vietnamese objectives, American military tactics, army careerism, and the pacification program are all valuable contributions to the slowly growing literature on our involvement in Southeast Asia.

One failing of the book, and this is in part a result of the understandable requirement of anonymity in the responses given, is the difficulty one has in getting any feeling for the personalities and particular interests of the individual officers questioned. One would hope that in future writing Professor Kinnard will focus on the private experiences and thoughts of a few military leaders so that our understanding of events of the past 15 years will have depth as well as breadth. For the present this is a well-balanced, informative, and nonpolemical study of an important topic.

JAMES R. SILKENAT

New York City

SAMUEL A. KIRKPATRICK, DAVID R. MORGAN, and THOMAS G. KIELHORN. *The Oklahoma Voter, Politics, Elections and Parties in the Sooner State* Pp. vii, 305. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1977 $12.95.

The clear, concise style of most of *The Oklahoma Voter* will appeal to scholars, politicians, and concerned citizens. This otherwise outstanding study is marred by the chapter on patterns of state referenda voting Only specialists will fully understand or have much interest in "the results of these regression equations including the standardized partial regression coefficients (beta weights) and the percentage of explained variance (R^2)" (p. 226). Such specialists would probably be familiar with the version of this chapter already published. In addition to its excessively technical language, the chapter on voting patterns sacrifices the historical accuracy of the first chapter to ease of statistical comparisons by using ten-year periods as the bases of comparison, despite important changes within several of these decades. The rest of the book, however, is an important contribution to our understanding of voting in Oklahoma.

The book opens with a brief survey of Oklahoma's political history. After devoting six pages to events before 1955, the authors turn to examining partisan and referenda elections, primarily in the sixties and seventies. Although the focus is always on Oklahoma, the study frequently relates state developments to similar events in the South or in the United States as a whole.

In discussing partisan voting, the authors strive to be objective and balanced. They frequently point out how and why Democratic or Republican, scholarly or activist analysts might differently interpret various sets of data. Still, Republican readers might perceive a Democratic bias when the authors assign positive (+) values to Democratic votes and negative (−) values to Republican votes. Also, the authors agree with Democrats that the recent strong showings of Republicans in Oklahoma are deviations, not indications, of basic, partisan shifts toward making Oklahoma a Republican state.

After a comprehensive discussion of party composition, differences, competition, finance, and structure, the authors explain voter turnout, voting for congressmen, and suburban voting patterns in the Oklahoma City area. The most impressive chapters are the analyses of partisanship and partisan change. First the authors show some problems with several traditional measures of partisanship—party registration, party identification, and behavioral partisanship (aggregate voting patterns)—in explaining past or predicting future electoral behavior or trends. Using their voter surveys, they argue that one can best understand Oklahoma politics by using the concept party image—"the sum of a voter's evaluative beliefs about the parties or how a voter perceives the parties" (p. 113). They then use party image to explain the extent and nature of partisan change in Oklahoma, especially rising Republican votes due to in-migration and the erosion of partisan intensity in most voters.

ROBERT G. SHERER

Wiley College
Marshall
Texas

JOHN BARTLOW MARTIN. *Adlai Stevenson and the World*. Pp. 946. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1977. $15.00.

In the concluding volume of his two-volume biography of Adlai Stevenson, John B. Martin presents Stevenson as a man largely shaped by historical events who was nevertheless able to substantially influence the policies of others who gained the presidency.

Stevenson was in 1948 an obscure, newly elected Governor of Illinois. Throughout his career, he had always been someone else's assistant, an able aide, but not a person himself destined for greatness. His governorship changed that. Stevenson's progressive record combined with his wit and sharpness of intellect to make him for many Democrats the obvious successor of Harry S. Truman. Stevenson wanted the Democratic nomination for president, but on his own terms: he did not want to be thought the hand-picked successor of an unpopular president. Stevenson had come along at the perfect time to become the Democrats' candidate, but fate cast him against the unbeatable Dwight Eisenhower in both 1952 and 1956. By 1960, Stevenson found that the American public was beginning to accept his ideas but wanted them carried out by new political leaders.

Martin's first volume (*Adlai Stevenson of Illinois*, Doubleday, 1976) took the Stevenson story to his 1952 defeat. Martin now picks up the story to show how Stevenson became the spokesman for the progressive thinking of the 1950s that helped pave the way for the programs of John Kennedy and Lyndon Johnson. Occasionally Martin, a one time Stevenson speech writer, gives too much credit to his former boss, but generally his judgments are very sound.

Martin shows Stevenson as an occasionally petty man, but rarely petty about large issues. He demonstrates that Stevenson was much more politically ambitious than he appeared to be, but also that he was unusually hesitant about risking political failure, a quality that would have deeply injured his chances for a successful presidency. Stevenson is presented as a highly intelligent man, but not an intellectual, not one who read, pondered, and created new concepts. Rather, his gift was to be able to synthesize the ideas of others.

There are many sad moments in this biography—Stevenson's fatal accidental shooting of a child when he, himself, was only a boy, his tragic marriage; the unfulfilled political hopes. But the saddest moments are the last years of Stevenson's life, during which he served as a largely uninfluential United Nations ambassador, aware that time had passed him by, and that others were carrying out the political policies he had been so instrumental in bringing to the public consciousness.

Martin's biography is a monument not only to Stevenson but also to intelligent historical writing. His work is, and will most likely remain, the definitive study of Adlai Stevenson

FRED ROTONDARO
National Center for Urban Ethnic Affairs
Washington, D.C.

RAYMOND K. PRICE, JR. *With Nixon* Pp. vii, 398. New York: The Viking Press, 1977 $12.95.

This is an important book Raymond Price, a journalist of repute and an editor of the *New York Herald Tribune*, joined Richard Nixon's staff in 1967, stayed with him through his presidency, and became his chief speechwriter, confidante, and personal friend. Out of that association and experience, Price has written a detailed and sometimes repetitious account in 18 chapters, several with fancy names ("Here Endeth . . . ," "Ghosts of Presidents Past," "Not With Woolly-Headed Idealism," "The Old College Try"), the purpose of which is to explain and defend Nixon. "I liked and admired him. I still do. I believed in what he was trying to achieve. I still do."

Mr. Price finds it admittedly difficult to explain Nixon, referring to psychiatry, psychoanalysis, and the "left side/right side" of his behavior. "One part of Richard Nixon is exceptionally considerate, exceptionally caring, sentimental, generous of spirit, kind. Another part is coldly calculating, devious, craftily ma-

nipulative. A third part is angry, vindictive, ill-tempered, mean-spirited." The White House staff had somehow to determine which Nixon they were dealing with at any moment.

There is, however, no problem in the defense of Nixon, for Price is an unabashed believer in the president's right to use whatever means seem necessary to achieve his purposes. He considers the "calculating, devious, manipulative parts [of Nixon]" as "necessary tools of statecraft." As for Watergate and other situations, Price proclaims his theory of the presidency above the law. "He may have to cut legal corners to meet a national emergency or to serve the national interest In Watergate I was less concerned with whether there had been an obstruction of justice than I was with whether Nixon would have a chance to complete what he had begun, domestically and internationally. . . . I care less about whether a President breaks a law than I do about whether he keeps the peace "

It follows that there was no case for the impeachment of Nixon, since, according to Price, Nixon did only what other presidents had done, his crime being that he was caught. Moreover, the investigations were entirely partisan, the careful collection of evidence by the Rodino Committee and the appointment of Archibald Cox as Special Prosecutor, although by a Republican Attorney General, being indications of a conspiracy to get Nixon. The evidence against Nixon thus collected was, however, so overwhelming that Price became one of the most insistent that Nixon resign in order to escape impeachment.

There are some good features about this book. It is exceptionally well written, so well that it makes fascinating reading. It reveals a good deal about the White House operations. There is a very good description of the revolutionary situation, with some special attention to the college campuses, when Nixon took office. There is an excellent chapter on the press and other media, being a critique of the media by one experienced in both journalism and government and, at the same time, a further revelation of Nixon methods. "We did often lie, mislead, deceive, try to use them, and to con them, and I could appreciate their resentment." On the whole, Price's defense of Nixon falls flat.

CLARENCE A. BERDAHL
University of Illinois
Urbana

MORTON SOSNA. *Southern Liberals and the Race Issue: In Search of the Silent South*. Pp. xvi, 275. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. $11.95.

The expression, "the silent South," given currency by George Washington Cable in 1885, and used frequently afterwards, seems never to have had any precise or generally accepted meaning. To Cable it meant the enlightened element of white Southerners who wished justice for the Negro, but an element whose weak voice went largely unheard because of the indifference or hostility of the majority. The term, "Southern liberal," was likewise vague, it often was used to designate those white Southerners who wished an improved lot for the Negro, but beyond this generality, there was no agreement as to its meaning It was very appropriate therefore for Mr. Sosna to give his own definition of the term (p. viii), so that readers would not expect discussions going beyond it. Says he: "My test of the white Southern liberal lies in his stance on the race issue " Further, "the ultimate test of the white Southern liberal was his willingness or unwillingness to criticize racial mores "

Mr. Sosna shows that it was on the issue of racial segregation that the Commission on Interracial Cooperation, the Southern Conference for Human Welfare, and the Southern Regional Council met their greatest obstacle to unity. For in the main these liberal groups sought to help the Negro—improve his schools, combat lynching, and secure a more equitable economic deal for him—but at the same time operate within the framework of segregation and the separate-but-equal doctrine. To attempt more than this, ran the theory, would

antagonize the great majority of white Southerners and do the Negro more harm than good. But while this was the view of such liberals as Virginius Dabney and Howard Odum, it was in sharp contrast to the thinking of a smaller group of liberals represented by Aubrey Williams and Lillian Smith, who wished to challenge segregation immediately and forthrightly.

It seems clear from this account that because of the racial inhibitions of most of them, Southern liberals did much less to set the stage for *Brown* v. *Board of Education* (1954) and the Civil Rights Act (1964) than did the New Deal and World War II. For after all, it was not "the silent South," but Negroes themselves, assisted by massive federal intervention, who were to revolutionize the life of the South's and the nation's black minority Mr. Sosna's carefully prepared book is a helpful introduction to these recent events and is also a contribution to the history of Southern thought during a critical period.

JENNINGS B. SANDERS

Kensington
Maryland

NELSON WIKSTROM. *Councils of Governments. A Study of Political Incrementalism*. Pp. ix, 173. Chicago: Nelson–Hall Inc., 1977. $11.95.

What is the council of governments phenomenon? This six-chapter volume addresses itself to the definition, development, formation, and structural attributes, activities and functions, problems, and significance of councils of governments in the United States. A chapter is devoted to each of the above topic areas. The author contends that "massive governmental structural reform is neither needed nor desired in the American metropolis, since councils provide an ideal, responsible, democratic mechanism for program coordination, policy direction, and management in the metropolis. . . ." (p. xiii). Wikstrom's research methodology consists of a review of the appropriate literature and field interviews, with particular attention devoted to the councils of governments covering the metropolitan regions of San Francisco, Atlanta, Washington, D.C., Salem, Oregon, Seattle-Tacoma, Philadelphia, Los Angeles, Detroit, and Hartford, Connecticut.

Wikstrom briefly reviews the consolidationalist's view of the metropolis, which suggests that fragmented governmental structures are to blame for the many service and leadership problems engendered in metropolitan areas. An area-wide metropolitan government has been advocated as a remedy for these ills. Yet this approach has been adopted only by a few areas in the United States. Wikstrom attributes this failure to voter disbelief in area-wide governments, the view that this approach disturbs the political status quo, and contradicts certain community values. Because of the lack of formal governmental structures to promote cooperation between governmental units in the metropolis, increased voluntary horizontal cooperation has occurred. Contractual arrangements, voluntary associations of public officials, regional conferences, and councils of governments are examples of this activity.

Wikstrom notes that the council device has grown rapidly, from one in 1954 to about 450 in 1974. He attributes the rapid proliferation of councils of governments to the desire of locally elected officials to collectively discuss and respond to common problems and to federal and state policies and programs that have promoted regionalism at the local level. While the need for councils of governments is widespread among locally elected officials, Wikstrom observes that only a few dedicated individuals have been responsible for their actual formation. Once operational, councils of governments secure the majority of their financial support from federal grants (50 to 60 percent), with the remainder from state supports and grants and membership dues and contributions. Councils of governments activities and functions include: 1) a forum for locally elected public officials; 2) involvement in regional physical and social planning activities, 3) providing representation of

members before appropriate state legislative and executive officials; and 4) serving as a regional review agency for the federal government in local project funding.

Wikstrom identifies several problem areas and limitations of councils of governments which may inhibit their growth and future development. First, councils primarily engage in noncontroversial and systems maintenance activities. They seldom substantively engage in human and social problems. Second, there is limited representative commitment and involvement by members because of their job duties and commitments elsewhere. Third, representation and voting apportionment are among the most serious problems confronted by councils. Fourth, they are overly dependent on federal financial assistance. Fifth, their relationship with other governmental bodies is suspect, particularly with special districts. Sixth, blacks are divided over the benefit of councils to their communities. Seventh, councils of governments have not generated citizen involvement and participation in their activities.

Despite these problems, Wikstrom argues that councils of governments have furthered the concept of regionalism, served as vehicles for incremental political change, facilitated functional and regional planning, brought about greater horizontal and vertical intergovernmental cooperation, and emerged as the fourth component or layer in our federal system. For Wikstrom the council device offers an alternative to the consolidationalist's metropolitan governmental reform movement.

This book is must reading for elected officials, scholars, and students of metropolitan politics and intergovernmental affairs. The book represents an admirable attempt to explain the council device movement of the last two decades in the metropolitan arena.

MITCHELL F. RICE
Southwest Texas State University
San Marcos
Texas

SOCIOLOGY

J. BRONOWSKI. *A Sense of the Future*. Pp. vii, 286. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977. $12.50.

This work is a collection of essays about the scientific enterprise, its methods, and epistemology—in short, about the nature, philosophy, and ethical implications of the scientific enterprise. Mr. Bronowski, the author of *Science and Human Values* and other books, and who, before his death in 1974, was for many years a Senior Fellow at the Salk Institute for Biological Studies, clearly is well-intentioned; he wants, in a sense, to humanize science, to demonstrate that the scientific enterprise is not and cannot be divorced from values and from morality, that a person may be a scientist but that he should also be concerned about the moral aspects and implications of the scientific enterprise, and whether the knowledge that is attained through the efforts of the scientist will be put to moral or immoral use.

Unfortunately, well-intentioned though he may be, Mr. Bronowski's propositions and arguments lack the kind of philosophical acuity and precision that is much needed and required in any thoughtful discussion of any proposed relationship between science and philosophy. For example, in his essay, "The Values of Science," Mr. Bronowski contends, "Respect, honor, and dignity are necessary to the stability of science as of any other social activity, and their value can therefore be demonstrated from the conditions for the practice of science. . . ." He moreover observes: "The point of my analysis has not been to defend science from its critics. My point has been to attack what I believe to be a fundamental error of method in the critics: the error for looking for values outside our activity."

The problem with Mr. Bronowski, as with other well-intentioned scholars seeking to counter the deleterious influences of positivism and scientism and bridge the gap—artificial or real

between science and philosophy, between science and ethics, is his failure to distinguish between science and the philosophy of science, between the scientist qua scientist and the scientist who steps outside his expertise, pronounces a moral judgment on a certain scientific subject, project, or experiment, and in so doing steps into another area or field of knowledge; namely, philosophy.

The scientist qua scientist is concerned with observable and empirically verifiable phenomena: He sees something happen in common, everyday experience: for example, he notices that a baseball that is thrown into the air almost always comes down; he wants to explain it, so he formulates an explanatory hypothesis, the veracity of which he tests through the techniques of the laboratory, or through an appeal to common experience, or even perhaps through a combination of both. In seeking to explain why a baseball thrown into the air almost always comes down, the scientist qua scientist is not concerned about ethics or morality; he is merely concerned with seeking a scientific explanation of why and how the phenomenon occurs; he is solely concerned with making descriptive statements and scientific judgments.

But when the scientist begins making moral judgments and prescriptive statements such as "We should not throw baseballs through windows," he no longer is speaking as a scientist qua scientist but, rather, is entering into another area of knowledge: philosophy, of which ethics is an important branch.

In his altogether admirable desire to counter and overcome the pernicious effects of positivism, that is, the view that the only valid knowledge, truth, and reality is that kind which is ascertainable through, and verifiable in terms of, the experimental techniques of positive (or laboratory) science, Mr. Bronowski, alas, has overstated his case, has mixed scientific and philosophical arguments, and has left himself vulnerable to the virulent assaults of those who like to eliminate completely from the public conversation any consideration of the ethical implications and consequences of the scientific enterprise.

HAVEN BRADFORD GOW
Arlington Heights
Illinois

JOHN W. CONNOR. *Tradition and Change in Three Generations of Japanese Americans*. Pp. ix, 336. Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1977. $18.00.

Dr. John W. Connor is a Professor of Anthropology at California State University at Sacramento and is married to a first generation Japanese. His identification with the Japanese community in the United States is thus that of a participant observer. In this book he has summarized his investigations of "certain psychological and behavioral characteristics of three generations of Japanese-Americans to determine the degree to which the various generations have retained certain characteristics which are distinctively Japanese or have replaced them with ones which are distinctively American" (p. 5)

Using social psychological quantitative schedules, he and his students questioned a sample of 2,000 first generation (Issei), second generation (Nissei), and third generation (Sansei) individuals of Japanese descent to determine what proportion of each group accepted American or Japanese values

The American values included stressing individualism, independent goals, an emphasis upon achieved status, and a sense of optimism. The Japanese values emphasized reliance on the group, docilely obedient and dependent children, mother-son bonds (as the closest of emotional ties), emphasis on duty and hierarchy, a submissive attitude toward authority, compulsive obedience to rules and controls set by others, ascribed or inherited status, restriction of personal relations to a small group, a sense of fatalism, and success through self-discipline.

As expected, the first generation, born in Japan, accepted the Japanese values almost unanimously, while the third generation, born in the United States

(the grandchildren of the immigrants), tended to accept American values almost completely. The second generation (or those born in the United States as children of the immigrants) tended to be in the middle, though it accepted American values more readily than Japanese ones. In other words, the more distant the descendants of Japanese immigrants, the more Americanized they became—an unstartling conclusion. Like other ethnic groups in the United States (including the Wasps), the third generation was still aware of its own distinctive identity; the members saw themselves as Americans of Japanese descent, or Japanese-Americans.

Although a good part of the book is concerned with stating the obvious (a trait which anthropologists share with sociologists), still the results are definitive and a contribution in identifying certain cultural values in American, as well as Japanese, behavior. While we have studies indicating the degree of cultural change that has been taking place in Japan since the beginning of the Meiji Period in 1868, not many studies have been done on the Japanese community in the United States and the rates of change that occur within the generations. From this point of view, Connor's study is a welcome addition

DAVID RODNICK

Furman University
Greenville
South Carolina

ROBERT FISHMAN. *Urban Utopias in the Twentieth Century: Ebenezer Howard, Frank Lloyd Wright, Le Corbusier.* Pp. xiv, 332. New York: Basic Books, 1977. $13.95.

Nineteenth-century industrialization created cities but these were ugly and squalid. Together with machinery's profound redefinition of labor, urbanization tended to destroy human dignity. Probably every art and science in the twentieth century reflects revulsion at the realities of early factory towns and none more so than the urban planning profession, an extension of architecture from structures to infrastructure. Robert Fishman, a professor of history, has captured the flavor of this challenge and response in a book that chronicles lifetime efforts by three major urban planners, Britain's Ebenezer Howard, America's Frank Lloyd Wright, and Swiss-born Charles-Edouard Jeanneret, who styled himself Le Corbusier.

All three were appalled at the impact of late nineteenth-century machine technology upon every worthy aspect of human life—liberty, family security, and pride of workmanship. They all came very early to the conclusion that the remedy was not to abandon the machine but to design an environment with which it would be compatible and even support those essential, life-enhancing values. The environment, they all recognized, had to be more than physical; the design had to encompass political, economic, and social systems. In short, they each wanted to provoke a revolution in human behavior, mainly by means of laying out a workable scheme of organizing land uses and activities so obviously superior to what had evolved that acceptance and realization would come very quickly. Their schemes differed but they had a common genesis. All were sufficiently impressed by Henry George's work to blame much of urban dysfunction upon the land market.

Ebenezer Howard supported himself as a stenographer while he drew up plans for Garden City, a community of ideally 30,000 people living in tidy cottages and enjoying the amenities of modest civic culture. Their cooperative factories were but a walk or a bicycle trip away, but so tucked away as to cause no discomfort to the rest of the community. In an agricultural belt beyond, much of the town's food would be raised, but the town would be linked to the rest of the world by well-behaved railroad service. Land would be communally owned when eventually repurchased from public-spirited investors. Howard was more of a promoter or developer than a planner; when the first garden city was built it was, in fact, shaped by a prominent architect-planner team following the spirit of Howard's conception. Hopes that this moderately successful demon-

tration town would bring workers and ndustrialists pouring out of the noisesome cities were disappointed.

Frank Lloyd Wright called his concepion Broadacre City. It was hardly a city t all, with virtually no center, but a quilt f one-acre holdings allowing each famly partial self-sufficiency. Other worklaces and markets were widely disersed in a grid of automobile roads. 'amily landholdings were to be absoutely unalienable, and the family, thus ecured, was to perform most of the ultural and governmental functions of ociety. In all it was Jeffersonian democacy grudgingly adapted to the age of the actory and the motor car.

Le Corbusier's Radiant City was the pposite extreme, the population uthlessly centralized in high rise owers. Unlike his earlier schemes, this lan was egalitarian in principle, space vould be allocated by needs and by plan ather than by economic status. Indeed, nlike Wright and Howard, Le Corusier had written off free enterprise. His plans embodied an economic system alled syndicalism but close to Mussoini's corporate state, allowing participaion in production decisions, but firmly overned by a philosopher-king whom e Corbusier was too modest to name. Physically the city was designed to ermit efficient performance of each rescribed activity, like a factory; for nost purposes the elevator seemed the referred form of transportation, and the igh-rise tower had some aesthetic advantages as well. Le Corbusier waited in ain for an authoritarian government to mpose his scheme.

Each of these planners saw in his ketches and models a machine to detroy oppression, an actual weapon to ncourage and accomplish political revoution. By showing in great detail how ndustrialism could be consistent with he best of human values through planing of the physical environment, each elieved society would be moved to lestroy the laws and institutions which ad spawned the nineteenth-century ity. They were all disappointed and to lifferent degrees embittered.

Were they naive? Fishman does not make that judgment, for it would weaken the lesson he apparently wants to draw. Politicians and bureaucrats addressing today's urban issues may be as much utopians as Howard, Wright, or Le Corbusier, without realizing it. The vision of cause and effect is so often illusion, wishful thinking, or a kind of medicine show There are in fact no scale-model people to test the table-top city or drafts of legislative programs. The stories told in this book may help us deflate less pretentious, but perhaps even sillier, schemes for dealing with the urban environment that come along every other month. This book is a critique of utopianism, not of specific physical schemes. The three endeavors in utopian planning involved extraordinary intellectualizing by truly gifted people, resulting in their separate recognition that only certain human traits would be consistent with a particular plan. Each believed that the traits implied by his own scheme to be elemental and constant—love of family, cooperative spirit, individualism, instinct of craftsmanship, acceptance of authority, to name a few components. It is, indeed, very useful to know that any large physical scheme implies great simplification of human values and behavior.

For resolution of specific planning issues that perplexed his famous trio of utopians, Fishman refers the reader to the works of Jane Jacobs, an aggreeably surprising move. He succeeds in leaving himself out of the book except in understated excellence of style. As an historian of ideas, Fishman makes a fine mark for himself with this book

WALLACE F. SMITH
University of California
Berkeley

LOUIS J. HALLE. *Out of Chaos* Pp. vi, 657. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977. $20.00.

This work is a book about almost everything. It appears to be Halle's final summing-up. Mixing sober "realities" with witicism and earthy analogies, Halle attempts to describe and summarize the world as we think it is in the

last of the twentieth century. Unbelieveably, like Goethe in his time, almost all topics are covered including religion, physics, chemistry, music, art, and a hundred other topics. However, he constructs his argument logically in this monstrous mass of material. Starting with the physical realm, from the very small to the very big, noting with humility what might lie beyond each, he builds from micro entities of life to the emergence of the "mind" and "civilization." Concluding with what the mind has created and its implications, he asks "Where are we going?" The immediate future appears to him to dim, but from the ashes there may rise a new order and a vision recognizing the interdependence of all of life.

According to the author, at what seems to be the bottom of things is chaos and each ascending level builds upon it, in its own erratic way. Randomness, indeterminacy, uncertainty and its numerous extensions keep building and building to a contradiction. Order. As most organicists would note of any discipline, there is a transcendent, usually unseen phenomena, that the whole is larger than the sum of the parts. At this point, Halle suggests that, given the proper distance, not only society, but an individual's life, has meaning.

The author is particularly impressed with the mind of the genius which is creating a new sonnet or theory when the streets are filled with war, vice, and anarchy. Again, mind rises above chaos. Critics may argue that Halle has started with teleological or evolutionary, deistic assumptions and made the facts to fit the theory. On the other hand, the author is quick to note his assumption, state his case, and present a master work in nondogmatic terms.

As he notes towards the end of the work, a mystic (of most any persuasion) feels there is a flow, a "whole," a "way," an essence. Though man has "mind," and therefore tension, at another level of consciousness and vision, one can see beyond the chaos to a grander scheme. It is like being on a mountain top and feeling only casual replies from a chaos now only dimly viewed in the valley below.

This is a book for many and for all seasons.

JOEL C. SNELL

Dana College
Blair
Nebraska

THOMAS L. HASKELL. *The Emergence of Professional Social Science: The American Social Science Association and the Nineteenth-Century Crisis of Authority*. Pp. vi, 276. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1977. $12.00.

This is a very valuable book, not only for the gap it fills in the study of the emergence and professionalization of the social science disciplines, but also for its interpretation of the origins and distinguishing features of modern social thought. Haskell treats three topics of general importance: the nineteenth-century crisis of intellectual and social authority, the transition from amateur to professional social science; and the reorientation of American social thought and casual explanation during the 1890s His own strategy of explanation is excellent. By focusing upon the American Social Science Association, its concerns, its failure, and its supercession by professional associations based upon the new social science disciplines, Haskell is able to show the interrelation among the crisis of authority, the processes of professionalization, the diminution of the individual as a casually potent agent, and the growing interdependence of modern society.

The ASSA was founded in 1865 in an effort to establish the authority of educated professional men in matters of social thought and policy and in imitation of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (itself the subject of an excellent, complementary study by Sally Gregory Kohlstadt, *The Formation of the American Scientific Community: The American Association for the Advancement of Science, 1848–1860*). The initial organizational structure of the ASSA reflected the traditional division of professional labor among ministers, lawyers, and medical doctors, and the Association ultimately failed to

accommodate itself to the redefinition of professional endeavor associated with the rise of academic disciplines claiming special knowledge and expertise in the study of society. Between 1884 and 1905, specifically professional associations based upon the new disciplines and focusing upon professional concerns and the creation of communities of disciplined inquiry among historians, economists, political scientists, and sociologists were founded; and these organizations finally supplanted the ASSA. They did not, however, assume its role of social advocacy. Whereas the ASSA had sponsored civil service reform and various innovations in penal and charitable work, the American Historical Association sought single-mindedly to promote historical studies, and the other new associations also concentrated upon professional interests. During the nineteenth century, the growing interdependence of American life, and the growing awareness of this interdependence, undermined the voluntaristic theories of causation espoused by the gentlemen amateurs of the ASSA; and at the end of the century, the new social sciences revolutionized American thought by creating systems of explanation capable of analyzing multiple and interdependent casual elements while rejecting the most extreme forms of positivism. The ASSA died officially in 1909, but it had been moribund for some time prior to its final expiration. After its rejection of a proposed merger with the better funded and more academically oriented American Academy of Political and Social Science in 1896, the ASSA's last years were devoted to pathetic efforts to reassert the authority of outworn traditions of thought, taste, and philanthropy.

Haskell's book is deserving of praise. It deals lucidly and gracefully with a complex subject matter, and it addresses the interests both of historians of the social sciences and generalists seeking to understand the intellectual and cultural consequences of modernization and industrialization. Haskell's interpretation in all of its complexity will not receive unqualified acceptance. His treatment of the relationship between scientific investigation and the advocacy of reform within the new social sciences, for example, differs sharply from that of Mary O. Furner's prize-winning study, *Advocacy and Objectivity: A Crisis in the Professionalization of American Social Science, 1865–1905*. But this book will command the attention and respect of scholars for a very long time.

THOMAS M. HILL

Miami University
Oxford
Ohio

MARJORIE HOPE and JAMES YOUNG. *The Struggle for Humanity. Agents of Nonviolent Change in a Violent World*. Pp. x, 305. Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 1977. $8.95. Paperbound, $4.95.

Written by widely traveled participant observers of nonviolent efforts at social change, this is a practical book, counsel and reinforcement for those who would practice nonviolent procedures. It does not deal with the pacifism of turning the other cheek. As the authors point out, "Most pacifists do not practice nonviolent resistance, and most of the people who do practice it are not pacifists. Today nonviolence has become a new kind of militancy."

The men and women dedicated to this type of work for social change whom the authors visited, studied, and describe analytically all make their efforts on a variety of levels—interpersonal, community, national, and international. To achieve their common goal of a more peaceful and humane society, they all realize that they must seek "a radical restructuring of economic and social relationships, with a corresponding change of personal values."

The principal persons dealt with in the book, all living, include those involved in the Movement for a New Society centered in West Philadelphia, Lanza del Vasto or "Shantidas"—"Servant of Peace," as Gandhi called this disciple of his from the West; Danilo Dolci, often labeled "the Sicilian Gandhi," Dom Helder Camara, Roman Catholic Arch-

bishop of Recife and Olinda in Brazil, a critical "voice of the Third World"; Cesar Chavez, the head of the United Farm Workers' Union; Thich Nhat Hanh and Cao Ngoc Phuong, leaders of the Buddhist neutralist "third way" in Vietnam; and Kenneth Kaunda, President of Zambia, with his policy of "relative nonviolence" and his advocacy of "Zambian Humanism."

Hope and Young say that the men and women "described are simple human beings who started where they could, usually in their own backyards. They are united not by a single philosophy or even by heroism, but a sense of commitment, a willingness to wait years to see the fruits of their labors, and an open spirit impelling them to join hands with those who hold other faiths or beliefs." Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., and the persons mentioned offer wisdom that all these nonviolent partisans attempt to apply. In doing so, they look forward to "a balanced international economic system, combined with a no-growth pattern for the United States." They realize "how often the vassal becomes the exploiter after a takeover of power," and they try to work for an egalitarian rather than an elitist type of organization. They see as a challenge the fact that all human beings are to some degree both oppressors and oppressed.

The authors admit that nonviolent confrontations have many times failed, but they point out that violent efforts many more times have also failed. They advocate nonviolent methods not for solely sentimental or religious reasons, but more strongly on the grounds that they can and do produce constructive results at less cost in human suffering, with fewer long-lasting scars.

The book is a fascinating chronicle of dedicated living for practical goals and also a guide and an inspiration to those who would practice nonviolent efforts at social change. It is beautifully written and contains, as the product of extensive participant observation among both male and female partisans, many keen insights into human affairs.

ALFRED MCCLUNG LEE
Brooklyn College of
The City University of New York

VANCE PACKARD. *The People Shapers*. Pp. 398. Boston: Little, Brown, 1977. $12.50.

Vance Packard may well be America's favorite alarmist. From *The Hidden Persuaders* in 1957 through *A Nation of Strangers* in 1972, Packard has managed to awaken the middlebrows to one or another national peril. This time Mr. Packard has expanded his horizons to the uttermost, uncovering potential means of controlling human behavior and even of reshaping the processes of human birth, development, and thought. Along the way we are reminded of problems of free will, determinism, and human nature which have puzzled philosophers, psychologists, and theologians since the beginning of our cultural history. A neat job, if you can accept the *Reader's Digest* treatment of profound subjects.

It would be nice to believe that well-educated readers could lightly dismiss books like this, but they cannot. In fact, we nonnatural scientists are generally quite ignorant of cloning, manufacturing memories, IQ enhancement, artificial wombs, personality surgery, mood manipulation, biofeedback, hypnotic induction, sex control, negative eugenics, and the other saucy notions clipped and pasted together in this encyclopedia of scientific anecdotes.

Of course, the trouble with this book is that it has the germs of seven or eight other, more thoughtful books. The projects mentioned here—and Packard seems to have done a good deal of interviewing as well as article clipping—range from the truly frightening to the absurd and fanciful The author seems to be equally alarmed even by projects so far-fetched that only fans of old Hollywood movies would credit them. Yet, by nibbling at the frontiers of psychological and medical research, he does discern some genuine rascals pursuing questionable, possibly dangerous goals. He also seems to slip off the subject when he treats jury analysis and invasions of privacy.

In the infancy of our Republic, Benjamin Rush attempted to inform the citizenry of the potential benefits of medical and psychological research. An

early modernist, Rush anticipated some of the moral and religious problems of advancing the frontiers of knowledge of human behavior. Mr. Packard, fed by the grim fantasies of Aldous Huxley and other counterutopians who saw the dangers of an overly scientific society, properly warns us that we, the nonscientists, will have to begin to regulate scientific research in the social interest. This is a very important issue of the near future. We should remember that Dr. Faustus was no mere mad scientist but was in league with a powerful devil, which certainly suggests a lack of ethical standards.

JAY A. SIGLER

Rutgers University
Camden
New Jersey

LANGDON WINNER. *Autonomous Technology: Technics-out-of-Control as a Theme in Political Thought.* Pp. x, 386. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1977. $17.50.

Autonomous Technology is a wise book—a bit warped, perhaps, but wise. What Leo Marx did for the theme of disruptive technology in literary thought, Langdon Winner tries to do for "technics-out-of-control as a theme in political thought." The major inspiration is Ellul's *The Technological Society.* The method is that of political philosophy or theory—rigorous, erudite, systematic, thorough. The concern is that of the Berkeley student movement as conditioned by Winner's subsequent teaching at MIT. This is not a mere rehash of *Future Shock* or *Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance*, then, but an extraordinary exegesis of "a mode of human relationships that I here describe as technological polities" (p. ix). Hence Winner suggests an extremely revealing analogy: "The *Technological Society* is similar in its historical position to *The City of God* and in a perverse way attempts to serve the same function" (p. 123). Ellul has revived the teleology of Christ and the sagacity of Marx in the face of the bankruptcy of liberal political thought—that is, the dead end of Western "technocracy." Out-of-control technology cannot be controlled by legislation, as updated *Federalist* theory would have it, because "technology in a true sense *is legislation* . . . technology is itself a political phenomenon" (p. 323). What is needed is a new constitution, a new start—a new metaphysical stance.

For humankind now has "Frankenstein's problem"—Victor's problem, that is, not his creature's—because responsibility for the "unfinished *creation*" called technology has been shunned. What we believe about technology comes not from Mary Shelley's *Frankenstein*, but from husband Percy Bysshe Shelley's *Prometheus Unbound*—that technology is a tool. This outdated belief has two corollaries which are now false. First, something created by humans is assumed to be understood by, controlled by, and neutral toward, humans, whereas, in fact, contemporary evidence suggests that more and more people are infantilized, manipulated, and heavily affected, for good and ill, by advanced technology.

Second, a political style is assumed.

> In our traditional ways of thinking, the concept of mastery and the master-slave metaphor are the dominant ways of describing man's relationship to nature, as well as to the implements of technology . . . One importance of the idea of autonomous technology is that it sets out to debunk the dream of mastery by showing that it has gone awry in practice (pp. 20, 25).

Hence Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley's story of Victor Frankenstein as "a modern Prometheus" is true in the epic sense. humankind *must complete its* creation by setting it in context—that is, a political context assuring priority to human concerns. Teleology before technology, purpose before politics—and "membership, participation, and authority founded on consent" as the proper political style (p. 20)—should emerge from right reason applied to the concept of out-of-bounds technologism.

Winner draws all the fathers of the new faith around him in his attack on the pagan Faustian liberalism: Hobbes, Marx, Weber, Spengler, the Frankfurt School, Marcuse, Henry Adams, the

Goodmans, Mumford, Mario Savio, the New Anarchists, and the New Alchemists—and over this entire spectrum of Jew and Gentile, Roman and barbarian stands Ellul's *summa*. Winner is discerning, aphoristic, and even critical, faulting Marxists for statism and even Ellul for minor miscues. Yet his argument seems flawed in three respects. First, the liberal notion of controlling technology through legislation and regulation is known only through its enemies. Winner's refutation of this point of view, by critiquing Price's *Scientific Estate* and Galbraith's *New Industrial State*, appears incomplete, and his dismissal of the evaluation-and-assessment approach is so abrupt as to create a strong yearning to see how he would react to, say, Loth and Ernst's review of legal cases in *Taming of Technology*. Second, the proposed method for escaping mindless yea- and nay-saying seems simplistic and unworkable. An "epistemological Luddism," in which selected technologies are abandoned on a trial basis, would seem to offer few real world opportunities not now provided by poverty, the Amish, and alternative lifestyles. Third, most would no doubt argue that Winner assigns too strong an influence to political ideas as opposed to practice. His defense against reification and anthropomorphism on Ellul's part and his own amounts to "You're another." (See pp. 41–42.) But despite these drawbacks, *Autonomous Technology* remains one of the most complete tracts for the new "technological politics"—in its academic guise, at least.

THOMAS J. KNIGHT

The Pennsylvania State University
University Park

ECONOMICS

YORAM BARZEL and CHRISTOPHER D. HALL. *The Political Economy of the Oil Import Quota*. Pp. vii, 96. Stanford, Calif.: Hoover Institution Press, 1977. $8.95.

As an individual intimately familiar with the Oil Import Quota Program, both as a lawyer specializing in energy and formerly legislative assistant to Senator Proxmire, I eagerly looked forward to reading this small book which claimed to use rigorous economic analysis in examining the Oil Import Quota Program. Unfortunately, the book was not worth the effort. The book concludes that the standard economic analyses of quotas are inaccurate because when limits are imposed on imports, in this case crude oil, importers will maximize their benefits by importing higher value products. While it may be news to some academic economists that businessmen are not merely price takers, that they actively try to mold government programs to their own interest, it is not news to anyone who reads a decent newspaper. Businessmen long ago realized prices are more often influenced by government programs than by some mythical free market. For an example of how one company tried to manipulate the Oil Import Quota see *Fragile Structures* by Peter Bradford (now a Commissioner of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission).

Economics does not function in a vacuum. It reflects decisions by politicians. Anthony Downs pointed out in his classic work, *The Economic Theory of Democracy*, that politicians tend to act in an economically rational fashion, but that the currency they deal in is votes, information, and pressure, not in hard cash—albeit there are some flagrant cases in which cash is substituted for reasoned analyses. Most of the economic aberations caused by government programs are due in large part to the biased information supplied by self-seeking interest groups.

Barzel and Hall seem to have discovered for the first time that government acts in response to pressure. The Oil Import Quota Program was devised in response to pressure from oil companies whose profits were being threatened by destabilizing imports of low-cost foreign crude oil. It came into existence because the independent producers were able to mobilize large amounts of political capital through some *fairly well placed individuals*, including Robert O. Anderson, John J. McCloy, and

Herbert Hoover, Jr. As the program developed, other interest groups whose financial welfare was affected by the quota program expended their political capital to change the program to their benefit, or at least to neutralize its impact upon them. For some specific examples of the pressures on the Oil Import Quota Program see "Red, White, Blue & Gold: The Oil Import Quotas" which I published in the August 1970 issue of *The Washington Monthly*.

The lesson to be learned from this book is that, while economic models may be a valuable tool in predicting the past, before they can be useful in predicting the future, economists will have to gather better data and will have to develop a understanding of the political process. Far more attention must be focused on the behavior of oligopolies and their interaction with government. We no longer have a classic free enterprise system, these large oligopolies operate within a system that encourages them to socialize risks and capitalize profits.

Barzel and Hall have taken a small, albeit inadequate, step in the right direction. But before economists can make some realistic projections of behavior, they will have to demand that the government collect better data and open its process of developing programs benefiting businesses to much closer scrutiny. Perhaps, if economists were to volunteer their skills to public organizations such as Common Cause, rather than turning out irrelevant monographs, we would all be better off.

MARTIN LOBEL

Washington, D.C.

NEIL W. CHAMBERLAIN. *Remaking American Values: Challenge to a Business Society*. Pp. v, 192. New York: Basic Books, 1977. $9.50.

Professor Chamberlain, in this most perceptive volume, highlights the theme that the America Business is most likely to emerge from among the ranks of business itself. It is the major business institutions that have been the carriers of American values, values which they have fostered and under which they have thrived. Business has been the cutting edge of a way of life which Americans have found congenial.

Chief opposition to the new business class came not from the ranks of northern democracy but from the southern aristocrats. Old South leaders had had a spiritual kinship with the natural aristocracy of the revolution and the country's founding. The defeat of the South gave control of its state governments and its economy to the national government, to the victorious North, where the interests of business were identified with national interest. Corporate leadership in the period following the Civil War continued to draw from two quite separate pools, the old aristocratic families and the new self-made men.

The top business leaders at the turn of the century, due to their aristocratic solidarity, were likely to be of colonial ancestry, from British and New England stock, of the Episcopal, Presbyterian or Congregational denominations, urban well-educated, from an upper-class family identified with business affairs. After World War II business leadership changed, the large corporate executives providing more than ever its personnel, but the characteristics of corporate executives became less homogeneous, accommodating a diversity of ethnic background educational pedigree, and religious affiliation.

The ideal of saving for investment and reinvestment in one's own enterprise became increasingly remote as the national market expanded and new technologies stimulated mass production, more sophisticated forms of business organization and administration developed, and financiers became more important in the conduct of business. Shifts from a small producer to mass consumer orientation was facilitated by the growth of the advertising industry. Advertisements in newspapers and magazines increased 80 percent in the decade of the eighties and by a third again in the nineties (p. 46).

Since World War II strong unions have bargained and continue to bargain for substantial wage increases within a political and economic context that stresses full employment. Among corporate leaders there is, according to Professor

Chamberlain, emerging a small number who are willing to entertain the necessity of social change, but who are also beginning to ask themselves whether the corporation may not be the best instrument for bringing that change about.

Professor Chamberlain has provided us with an invaluable treatise on the modern corporation and its impact on consumers, the community, the nation, and the world. The interrelationship of social theory to the study of business is an especially valuable aspect of the book.

CLAUDE M. URY
San Francisco State University
California

RICHARD P. NATHAN and CHARLES F. ADAMS, JR. *Revenue Sharing: The Second Round*. Pp. ix, 268. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977. $9.95. Paperbound, $3.95.

This is the second of three volumes by the Brookings Institution to monitor the political and economic consequences of the revenue sharing program. The book analyzes the 1972 law and the 1976 extension to evaluate the actual effects of the program compared to its goals and the various fiscal and structural changes the program could produce.

The approach to monitoring the uses of revenue sharing funds by the different political units was to use field associates to interview public decisionmakers, to review budgeting documents and expenditures, and to use their expertise to control other factors that influenced expenditure patterns. This methodology has the advantages of time series and cross-section survey data without the reliability problems of either. The authors investigated the use of revenue sharing funds for the first two rounds for sixty-five jurisdictions of state, county, city, or town governments.

The first objective is to evaluate the fiscal effects of revenue sharing on the various types of spending jurisdictions. This involved classifying receipts either into new spending programs, including new capital expenditures, expanded operations, and increased pay and benefits or into substitution programs, which included program maintenance, tax reduction, tax stabilization, avoidance of borrowing, increased fund balance, and restoration of federal aid lost from categorical grants. Local government units utilized a larger percent of the revenue sharing funds for new spending than did state governments, but for all four types of government units, the public sector impact of new and maintained spending exceeds the private sector impact of tax reduction and revenue stabilization uses of funds. This allocation was influenced by the level of fiscal pressure the units were faced with; that is, those under the most extensive fiscal pressure utilized the funds for tax stabilization or reduction purposes. The social impact on disadvantaged groups of the second round of expenditure was less than the first; however, even though the direct expenditures for social service programs were minimal, the spread effects of general expenditures on health, recreation, and education were deemed to be considerable but unquantifiable. The criticism that the revenue sharing expenditures fail to significantly help the disadvantaged was not invalidated by the study. In general, revenue sharing had lesser new spending effects and greater substitution effects than other federal grants.

The effect of revenue sharing on central cities is similar in its impact on the disadvantaged, that is, it is beneficial, but not a panacea. The nation's twenty-five largest cities received 36 percent more shared revenue per capita than the average of all local units; however, this differential is not significant enough to offset the urban crisis. The study also revealed that the civil rights provision against discrimination in use of shared funds has had little or no effect on most reporting jurisdictions. The decentralization of political decisionmaking from the federal to state and local government units moved power from the specialized bureaucracies to the generalist officials, but has not brought a dramatic redistribution of power in the budgetary process of state and local units.

The dire and diverse predictions con-

cerning the structural effects of revenue sharing on intergovernmental relations was not substantiated by the study. Since there is no direct incentive for local units to use shared revenues to establish cooperative arrangements with other government units, it was argued that these funds would delay the formation of more efficient comprehensive, regional institutions; the study, however, does not validate this effect. Cooperative activities have not been any more affected by this funding than have the political and economic forces which determine the structural effects of revenue sharing.

The evaluation of the revenue sharing program is measured against four criteria or goals. The first goal of reducing fiscal disparities between governmental units has been relatively limited in its impact, but suggested improvements in the law could enhance this distributional objective. The second goal, to produce a more progressive national tax structure, has been achieved as there is less reliance on sales and property taxes to finance state and local expenditure. The third goal was to assist in financing state and local services, and the program has generated new spending programs as well as allowed for program maintenance. The final goal was to decentralize the decisionmaking process by reducing the control and constraints placed on use of funds from the federal government.

The Brookings study is a comprehensive, balanced evaluation of the political and economic effects of the revenue sharing program. The structure of the program is sound, but there are persuasive arguments to revise the distributional formula and the level of expenditures if the impact of the program is to fully meet the goals established for the program. The structural problems of public finance, as well as the social objectives desired by various political and interest groups, cannot be achieved by this program; however, the experience has been productive and has not generated the negative external effects feared by its opponents. It is neither the holy grail nor an ugly duckling, but a sound, pragmatic attempt to solve the problems inherent in the American system of public finance. This volume should be required reading for those interested in political science and public finance. Perhaps the greatest contribution is the methodology used for program evaluation.

WILLIAM E. SPELLMAN
Coe College
Cedar Rapids
Iowa

MORGAN REYNOLDS and EUGENE SMOLENSKY. *Public Expenditures, Taxes, and the Distribution of Income: The United States, 1950, 1961, 1970.* Pp. 145. New York: Academic Press, 1977. $14.00.

There is a considerable range of opinion among economists about the importance of the distribution of income. At one extreme, the position is taken that the normal functioning of factor markets leads to the observed inequality in income distribution. The market, the other extreme argues, is so dominated by imperfections, such as monopoly, that observed patterns in income are in fact the result of nonmarket forces directed by politically and economically powerful elites. An accompanying question, which initially appears to be a technical one not involving serious value judgments, simply asks what the distribution of income is. This book is concerned with the measurement problem. Reynolds and Smolensky compare the size distribution of income in the United States in 1950, 1961, and 1970 after the expenditures and taxes of all levels of government have been allocated across households.

This study is definitely a technical one. It will not be easily read by those unfamiliar with the theoretical and empirical work on the distribution of income. For those aware of this literature, a new set of empirical estimates of the size distribution of income will be found. The years 1950 and 1961 were selected because much of the relevant data had already been assembled in two previous studies by others, the year 1970, because of the availability of data from the

Current Population Survey and the United States Department of Labor. The authors then adjusted these three data sets to make them comparable.

The basic result of the study is that the size distribution of income has not changed significantly over the three data points. Government does appear to have had some redistributive effect in each period, but this has not changed over time. Finally, an examination of the tax system indicated a shift from a progressive to a proportional, or possibly slightly regressive, system by 1970. They cite the rapid rise in Social Security payments to the nonpoor as a factor contributing to this third result.

For the nonparticipant in this field, the book provides a terse statement of important problems involved, and raises some interesting questions to be pursued. With respect to the former, the notion that to properly measure the effect of government activity you have to estimate the pregovernment income distribution is critical. Should the assumed counterfactual be an economy with no government at all, one with a government that improves resource allocation, or one operating in terms of a specified social welfare function? Each will lead to a different estimate of redistribution. The authors suggest that it remains of primary importance to develop a set of more accurate and reliable data. Without this, the assignment of the burden of various taxes and the benefit of government expenditures by income class becomes particularly troublesome.

The question still remains to be answered as to the effect of government activity on the size distribution of income.

GERALD GOLDSTEIN
Northwestern University
Evanston
Illinois

ALAN WOLFE. *The Limits of Legitimacy: Political Contradictions of Contemporary Capitalism*. Pp. vii, 432. New York: The Free Press, 1977. $14.95.

THEO NICHOLS and HUW BEYNON. *Living With Capitalism: Class Relations and the Modern Factory*. Pp. viii, 204. Boston, Mass.: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977. $12.75. Paperbound, $5.75.

In method these two volumes could hardly be more dissimilar; yet each seeks to explore the impact of contemporary capitalism on life in Western society.

In *The Limits of Legitimacy*, Wolfe argues that the ideological bases upon which the American political system supposedly rests (namely, nineteenth-century economic liberalism and classical democracy, the latter characterized by participation and equality) are inherently and persistently contradictory. For Wolfe such liberalism is wedded to a capitalist mode of production. The liberal ideology is translated into political arrangements "that attempt to facilitate the accumulation of capital by removing traditional encumbrances to the market in labor power, encouraging a conception of man based on self-interest, and creating a government structure that facilitates control over the system by those with ability in economic affairs rather than social standing" (p. 4) The opposite of such a liberal is not, he argues, a conservative, but a defender of pre- and post-capitalist social relations.

Wolfe concludes that, with the exception of civil liberty, liberalism and democracy work toward quite contrasting goals, creating societies that "will be torn by conflict, replete with contradiction, under continuous pressure, and unable to face the future without substantial change." Until recently, some reconciliation between the two traditions was achieved through a compromise known as liberal democracy, "not an eternal truth but an expedient that has served its purpose and may no longer be relevant" (pp. 6 and 8).

The Limits of Legitimacy is perhaps the most significant treatise in American political economy since Theodore Lowi's *The End of Liberalism* (1969). Wolfe is not, of course, the first to recognize the contradictions in the American political ethos. But he does provide a well argued, often brilliant defense of the position that our political system (and its major national institutions) cannot long survive under the weight of such contradiction.

Liberal democracy has taken many forms in an attempt to mollify such continuing tensions; Wolfe writes that the United States has passed through "six solutions"—all of which are explored at length. In the last ten or fifteen years, we have moved into a "late capitalist state . . . characterized by outmoded or hybrid forms that cannot satisfy the political needs they create" (p. 10). The end result is reification of the state—a worship of the state which, in turn, is called upon to solve more and more social problems, with an increasingly greater potential power. Yet the result is political stagnation and impotence.

In his chapter on reification, Wolfe examines the late capitalist state in detail as the contradiction between increased power and decreased options continues. "The single most noteworthy feature of the public life of late capitalism is the intransigence of bureaucracy" (p 262) Wolfe explains that bureaucracy is now called upon to solve problems once left to the marketplace. Taking a strangely dated view of bureaucrats as "neutral competents," he suggests that nonpolitical administrators now are called upon to decide who gets what, when and how, decisions once left to class struggle and the political process. Irrespective of Wolfe's characterization of bureaucratic roles, one is hard pressed to deny that the locus of conflict and contradiction in late capitalism lies within administrative agencies.

Does this late capitalist stage point, as Wolfe suggests, to an authoritarian alternative? Here, as with all prophesy, one is overcome with equivocation. Wolfe's conclusion is a logical extension out of or beyond the late capitalist state.

Living With Capitalism, written by two British sociologists, is an extensive case study of class relations and factory roles in a chemical plant (pseudononymously called ChemCo) in the south of England. The authors have focused upon ChemCo and its Riverside plant because the "chemical industry plays a fundamental role in modern capitalist society" (p. xiv). Their interest further is in "process technology"—a second industrial revolution to some—under which management is supposedly more concerned about human relations, whilst highly automated production creates working conditions much more satisfying socially and much less taxing physically. Nichols and Beynon take issue with such generalizations as they apply to contemporary working conditions in the chemical industry. Conditions are far from improved, they argue, and class conflict, if anything, is exacerbated by the profit motive which interests industrial capital. "The surplus goes *to* capital It comes *from* the working class" (p. 70).

The authors make no attempt to portray what working conditions are or might be within socialist society: in this respect the reader must assume that the evils of living with capitalism might be less severe in a different economic system and political culture. One is left to assume further that the causal link between capitalist motives and the denigration of work is established.

Wolfe suggests that in late capitalist society the "decline of politics and the degradation of work proceeded together" (p. 294). In this regard, these two works share a pessimism that, if nothing else, deserves an audience.

ROBERT G. SEDDIG

Allegheny College
Meadville
Pennsylvania

OTHER BOOKS

ABRAHAMSON, MARK *Functionalism*. Pp. v, 113. Englewood Cliffs, N J. Prentice-Hall, 1978. $5 95. Paperbound

ABRAHAMSSON, BENGT *Bureaucracy or Participation The Logic of Organization*. Beverly Hills, Calif Sage, 1977 $14.00. Paperbound, $6.95

AI CAMP, RODERIC *Mexican Political Biographies 1935–1975* Pp. vi, 468. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1977 $27 50. Paperbound, $8.95

ALLEN, THOMAS J. *Managing the Flow of Technology Technology Transfer and the Dissemination of Technological Information Within the Research and Development Organization* Pp xi, 320. Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press, 1977. $20.00.

BALL, HOWARD. *No Pledge of Privacy The Watergate Tapes Litigation* Pp. xi, 144.

Port Washington, N.Y: Kennikat Press, 1977 $9.95.

BALL, TERENCE, ed. *Political Theory and Praxis: New Perspectives*. Pp. vii, 281 Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977 $16.75.

BELLOC, HILAIRE. *The Servile State*. Pp. 207. Indianapolis, Ind.: Liberty Classics, 1977. $8.00. Paperbound, $2.00.

BELOHLAVEK, JOHN M. *George Mifflin Dallas: Jacksonian Patrician*. Pp. xi, 233. University Park: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977. $12.75.

BERKI, R. N. *The History of Political Thought: A Short Introduction*. Pp v, 216 Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1977. $11.00. Paperbound, $5.50.

BERKSON, LARRY C., STEVEN W HAYS, and SUSAN J. CARBON *Managing the State Courts* Pp iii, 366 St Paul, Minn.. West, 1977 No Price.

BERMAN, MAUREEN R and JOSEPH E. JOHNSON, eds *Unofficial Diplomats* Pp. 268. New York. Columbia University Press, 1977 $15.00 Paperbound, $5.95.

BLAKE, JOHN W *West Africa: Quest for God and Gold 1454–1578*. Pp. ix, 246. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1977 $9 00

BLECHMAN, BARRY M. et al *The Soviet Military Buildup and U.S Defense Spending*. Pp vii, 61. Washington, D C. The Brookings Institution, 1977 No price

BLINDER, ALAN S. *Toward an Economic Theory of Income Distribution*. Pp ix, 176 Cambridge, Mass . MIT Press, 1977. $4 95 Paperbound.

BRAHAM, RANDOLPH L. *The Hungarian Labor Service System, 1939–1945* Pp. vi, 159. New York. Columbia University Press, 1977. $11.00.

BROOM, LEONARD and F. LANCASTER JONAS. *Opportunity and Attainment in Australia* Pp v, 154 Stanford, Calif . Stanford University Press, 1977 $12 50

BROWN, PETER G. and HENRY SHUE, eds. *Food Policy The Responsibility of the United States in the Life and Death Choices*. Pp v, 344 New York The Free Press, 1977. $14 95

BROWN, RICHARD MAXWELL. *Strain of Violence Historical Studies of American Violence and Vigilantism*. Pp viii, 397. New York. Oxford University Press, 1977. $4 95 Paperbound

BUCK-MORSS, SUSAN *The Origin of Negative Dialectics*. Pp vii, 335 New York: Macmillan, 1977 $15.95.

BUNCE, JAMES E. and RICHARD P. HARMOND, eds *Long Island as America: A Documentary History*. Pp xi, 202 Port Washington, N.Y. Kennikat Press, 1977 $12.95

CASTELLS, MANUEL. *The Urban Question* Pp. v, 502. Littleton, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977. $25.00.

CAUGHEY, JOHN and LA REE CAUGHEY. *Los Angeles: Biography of a City*. Pp. 523. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. $6.95. Paperbound.

CHAY, JOHN, ed. *The Problems and Prospects of American-East Asian Relations*. Pp. ix, 252. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977. $18.50.

CIPOLLA, CARLO M , ed. *Contemporary Economies*. Vol. VI, part two. Pp. 378, 779. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1977. $17.50.

CIPOLLA, CARLO M., ed. *The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*. Vol 2. Pp. 640. New York: Barnes & Noble, 1977. $17.50.

CIPOLLA, CARLO M., ed. *The Twentieth Century, 1920–1970* Vol. V, part two. Pp. 404, 810 New York Barnes & Noble, 1977. $17.50

CLEVELAND, HARLAN *The Third Try at World Order U.S Policy for an Interdependent World* Pp. iii, 119. Palo Alto, Calif. Aspen Institute for Humanistic Studies, 1977 $3 95 Paperbound

CLISSOLD, STEPHEN. *The Barbary Slaves*. Pp. vi, 181 Totowa, N.J.. Rowman & Littlefield, 1977 $10 00.

COATES, THOMAS J and CARL E. THORESEN. *How to Sleep Better A Drug-Free Program for Overcoming Insomnia* Pp x, 324 Englewood Cliffs, N J. Prentice-Hall, 1977. $9.95 Paperbound, $4.95

COCKBURN, J S ed *Crime in England 1550–1800* Pp. vii, 364. Princeton, N J . Princeton University Press, 1977. $18.00

COFFEY, JOSEPH I *Arms Control and European Security A Guide to East-West Negotiations* Pp 271 New York Praeger, 1977 No price

Congress and the Nation, 1973–1976. A Review of Government and Politics. Vol IV Pp. v, 1217. Washington, D.C.. Congressional Quarterly, 1977. $49 50

CULYER, A. J., J. WISEMAN, and A. WALKER. *An Annotated Bibliography of Health Economics* Pp vii, 361 New York: St Martin's Press, 1977 $27 95

DAVIS, MORRIS. *Interpreters for Nigeria. The Third World and International Public Relations* Pp viii, 197 Urbana. University of Illinois Press, 1977 $10.00

DE MAUSE, LLOYD and HENRY EBEL, eds *Jimmy Carter and American Fantasy. Psychohistorical Explorations*. Pp 136 New York: Two Continents, 1977. $8.95.

DIRENZO, GORDON J., ed. *We, The People. American Character and Social Change* Pp xiv, 339. Westport, Conn : Greenwood Press 1977 $22.50.

DOUGLAS, JACK D., PAUL K. RASMUSSEN, and CAROL ANN FLANAGAN. *The Nude Beach*.

Pp. 248. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977. $15.95. Paperbound, $6.95.

DOUGLAS, W. A. B. and BRERETON GREENHOUS. *Out of the Shadows: Canada in the Second World War*. Pp. 287. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977. $16.95.

DRUCKMAN, DANIEL. *Negotiations. Social-Psychological Perspectives*. Pp. 416. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977. $25.00.

DUNN, DENNIS J. *The Catholic Church and the Soviet Government*. Pp. viii, 267 New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. $17.00.

EVANS, E. W. and S. W. CREIGH, eds. *Industrial Conflict in Britain*. Pp vii, 292. Totowa, N.J.: Frank Cass, 1977. $24.00.

FABER, HAROLD, ed. *Luftwaffe: A History* Pp. vii, 267. New York· Quadrangle, 1977. $15.00.

FELD, WERNER J and JOHN K. WILDGEN *Domestic Political Realities and European Unification. A Study of Mass Publics and Elites in the European Community Countries*. Pp. xii, 177. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977. $16.50.

FERLING, JOHN E *The Loyalist Mind: Joseph Galloway and the American Revolution* Pp 157. University Park. The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1977. $10 00

FINK, GARY M. and MERL E. REED, eds *Essays in Southern Labor History Selected Papers, Southern Labor History Conference, 1976*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1977. $19 95.

FROOMKIN, JOSEPH T., DEAN T JAMISON, and ROY RADNER, eds *Education as an Industry*. Pp. 489 Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1976. No price.

GIDDENS, ANTHONY. *Studies in Social and Political Theory* Pp 416 New York. Basic Books, 1977. $15.00.

GITHENS, MARIANNE and JEWEL L PRESTAGE, eds. *A Portrait of Marginality The Political Behavior of the American Woman*. Pp. vii, 428. New York. Longman, 1977 $6.95. Paperbound.

GIVEN, JAMES BUCHANAN. *Society and Homicide in Thirteenth-Century England* Pp. viii, 262 Stanford, Calif.. Stanford University Press, 1977. $12.50

GOIST, PARK DIXON *From Main Street to State Street. Town, City and Community in America*. Pp 180. Port Washington, N Y.: Kennikat Press, 1977. $12 50.

The Great Ideas Today, 1977 Pp. 473. Chicago, Ill.. Encyclopedia Britannica, 1977. No price.

GREENBERG, DAVID F., ed. *Corrections and Punishment* Vol. 8. Pp. 304. Beverly Hills, Calif.. Sage, 1977. $17.50. Paperbound, $7.50.

GUINDEY, GUILLAUME. *The International Monetary Tangle: Myths and Realities*. Pp. 122. White Plains, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1977. $10.00.

GUTTENTAG, MARCIA, ed. *Evaluation Studies Review Annual*. Vol. 2. Pp 736. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977. $29.95.

HAAS, J. EUGENE, ROBERT M. KATES, and MARTYN J BOWDEN, eds *Reconstruction Following Disaster*. Pp xii, 331. Cambridge, Mass . MIT Press, 1977. $12.95.

HARMS, L. S. and JIM RICHSTAD, eds. *Evolving Perspectives on the Right to Communicate*. Pp. 285. Honolulu, Hawaii University Press of Hawaii, 1977 $7 50 Paperbound.

HEIZER, ROBERT F and ALAN F ALMQUIST. *The Other Californians: Prejudice and Discrimination under Spain, Mexico, and the United States to 1920* Pp 289. Berkeley. University of California Press, 1977. $3.95 Paperbound

HELLER, FRANCIS H. *The Korean War: A 25-Year Perspective* Pp. x, 251. Lawrence. Regents Press of Kansas, 1977 $13.00

HERMAN, SIMON N *Jewish Identity A Social Psychological Perspective*. Pp 264. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977 $14.00. Paperbound, $6 95

HOLMES, MICHAEL S *The New Deal in Georgia An Administrative History* Pp xi, 364 Westport, Conn. Greenwood Press, 1975 $14.95

HOPKINS, JACK W. *Latin America in World Affairs. The Politics of Inequality*. Pp iii, 226 Woodbury, N Y. Barron's Educational Series, 1977 $2 95 Paperbound

HSIAO, GENE T *The Foreign Trade of China. Policy, Law, and Practice* Pp 312 Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977 $22.50.

HUNT, BARRY and ADRIAN PRESTON, eds *War Aims and Strategic Policy in the Great War*. Pp 131 Totowa, N J Rowman & Littlefield, 1977 $13.50

INGERSOLL, DANIEL, JOHN E YELLEN, and WILLIAM MACDONALD, eds *Experimental Archeology* Pp ix, 423 New York· Columbia University Press, 1977 $25 00

JANOWITZ, MORRIS *Social Control of the Welfare State* Pp viii, 170 Chicago. University of Chicago Press, 1977 $3.95 Paperbound

JEFFERY, C RAY *Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design* 2nd ed. Pp. 352. Beverly Hills, Calif.. Sage, 1977 $17 95. Paperbound, $7.95

JOHNSON, BARBARA and MARK W. ZACHER, eds. *Canadian Foreign Policy and the Law of the Sea*. Pp. 407. Vancouver, CA.. University of British Columbia Press, 1977. $19 00. Paperbound, $6 50

JUI, LI *The Early Revolutionary Activities of*

Comrade Mao Tse-tung. Pp. ix, 355. White Plains, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 1977. $25.00.

KEMPER, ROBERT V. *Migration and Adaptation.* Pp. 224 Beverly Hills, Calif., Sage, 1977. $11.00. Paperbound, $6.00.

KENYON, J. P. *Revolution Principles: The Politics of Party 1689–1720* Pp. viii, 248 New York: Cambridge University Press, 1977. $19.95.

KERR, CLARK. *Labor Markets and Wage Determination: The Balkanization of Labor Markets and Other Essays* Pp. 232. Berkeley. University of California Press, 1977. $10.95.

KLANG, DANIEL M *Tax Reform in Eighteenth-Century Lombardy.* Pp. 110 New York. Columbia University Press, 1977. $10.00

KNIGHT, MAX *A Confidential Matter The Letters of Richard Strauss and Stefan Zweig.* Pp 153. Berkeley University of California Press, 1977. $8.95

KOHN, MELVIN L *Class and Conformity: A Study in Values.* 2nd ed Pp vii, 316. Chicago, Ill., University of Chicago Press, 1977 $6 45 Paperbound

KOURVETARIS, GEORGE A and BETTY A DOBRATZ, eds *World Perspectives in the Sociology of the Military.* Pp x, 294 New Brunswick, N J Transaction Books, 1977 $14.95

KUSHNER, DAVID. *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism 1876–1908.* Pp ix, 126 Totowa, N J : Frank Cass, 1977. $22.50

LAND, AUBREY C, LOIS GREEN CARR, and EDWARD C PAPENFUSE, eds *Law, Society, and Politics in Early Maryland.* Pp. vii, 350. Baltimore, Md . Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977. $17.50

LANDIS, BROOK I. *Value Judgments in Arbitration A Case Study of Saul Wallen* Pp 184 Ithaca, N Y . Cornell University Press, 1977 $10 00

LARKIN, MAURICE *Man and Society in Nineteenth-Century Realism.* Pp. vii, 201 Totowa, N J . Rowman & Littlefield, 1977 $16.00

LA ROSSA, RALPH. *Conflict and Power in Marriage Expecting the First Child* Pp. 176 Beverly Hills, Calif · Sage, 1977. $14.00 Paperbound, $6 95.

LEUCHTENBURG, WILLIAM E and GENE BROWN, eds *Political Parties* Pp 415 New York Arno Press, 1977 $35 00.

LEVERNIER, JAMES and HENNIG COHEN. *The Indians and Their Captives* Pp. xxx, 291 Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1977 $17 50.

LOEWENSTEIN, LOUIS K *Urban Studies: An Introductory Reader* 2nd ed. Pp ix, 488 New York The Free Press, 1977. No price.

LOWE, PETER. *Great Britain and the Origins of the Pacific War: A Study of British Policy in East Asia 1937–1941.* Pp. vi, 318 New York: Oxford University Press, 1977 $19.50.

LUBY, SUE. *Hatha Yoga for Total Health Handbook of Practical Programs* Pp. vii, 254 Englewood Cliffs, N.J., Prentice-Hall 1977. $9.95. Paperbound.

MACAVOY, PAUL W. and JOHN W. SNOW, eds *Regulation of Entry and Pricing Truck Transportation* Pp. 301. Washington, D.C., American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977. $5.75. Paperbound.

MAGDOL, EDWARD. *A Right to the Land. Essays on the Freedmen's Community.* Pp. xiv, 290. Westport, Conn : Greenwood Press, 1977. $16.95.

MARCUS, MAEVA *Truman and the Steel Seizure Case. The Limits of Presidential Power.* Pp ix, 390 New York Columbia University Press, 1977. $14 95.

MARSH, ALAN. *Protest and Political Consciousness* Pp. 272. Beverly Hills, Calif · Sage, 1977. $14.00. Paperbound, $6 95.

MARTIN, CURTIS H. and ROBERT A LEONE *Local Economic Development.* Pp v, 138. Lexington, Mass . Lexington Books, 1977. $14 50.

MARTIN, REX *Historical Explanation· Reenactment and Practical Inference.* Pp. 267 Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1977 $15 00.

MARVICK, DWAINE, ed *Harold D. Lasswell on Political Sociology* Pp 456 Chicago University of Chicago Press, 1977. $22 00.

MCLELLAN, DAVID *Karl Marx. Selected Writings.* Pp x, 625 New York. Oxford University Press, 1977 $12.00 Paperbound, $6.00

MCNEILL, WILLIAM H *Plagues and Peoples* Pp. 340 New York. Anchor Press, 1977. $3.50 Paperbound.

MCQUADE, LAWRENCE C *East-West Trade. Managing Encounter and Accommodation* Pp. x, 194 Boulder, Colo : Westview Press, 1977. $5.95 Paperbound

MEHLMAN, JEFFREY *Revolution and Repetition* Pp 132 Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. $7 50.

MELADY, THOMAS and MARGARET MELADY. *Idi Amin Dada. Hitler in Africa.* Pp. ii, 184 Mission, Kans SA & McM, 1977 $7.95.

METTERNICH, TATIANA. *Purgatory of Fools A Memoir of the Aristocrats' War in Nazi Germany.* Pp vii, 285 New York: Quadrangle, 1976. $15.00.

MEYERS, JEFFREY *A Reader's Guide to George Orwell* Pp 192. Totowa, N.J.: Littlefield, Adams, 1977. $3.50. Paperbound.

The Middle East U.S. Policy, Israel, Oil and the Arabs. 3rd ed. Pp. v, 196 Washington,

D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1977. $5.25. Paperbound.

MILLER, DELBERT C. *Handbook of Research Design and Social Measurement*. 3rd ed. Pp. iii, 518. New York: David McKay, 1977. $14.95. Paperbound, $7.95.

MULDER, JOHN M. and JOHN F. WILSON. *Religion in American History: Interpretive Essays*. Pp. v, 459. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1978. $12.95. Paperbound, $8.95.

NAGEL, STUART S., ed. *Policy Studies: Review Annual*. Vol. 1. Pp. 704. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977. $29.95.

NAGEL, STUART S. and MARIAN NEEF. *The Legal Process: Modeling the System*. Pp. 216. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977. $14.00. Paperbound, $6.95.

NELKIN, DOROTHY. *Science Textbook Controversies and the Politics of Equal Time*. Pp. viii, 374. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977. $12.95.

NORDYKE, ELEANOR C. *The Peopling of Hawaii*. Pp. ix, 221. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1977. $10.00. Paperbound, $4.95.

ODAJNYK, VOLODYMYR WALTER. *Jung and Politics: The Political and Social Ideas of C. G. Jung*. Pp. ix, 190. New York: New York University Press, 1977. $8.95.

PAIGE, GLENN D. *The Scientific Study of Political Leadership*. Pp. ix, 416. New York: The Free Press, 1977. $17.95.

PALEN, J. JOHN. *City Scenes: Problems and Prospects*. Pp. v, 326. Boston, Mass.: Little, Brown, 1977. No price. Paperbound.

PANIKKAR, K. M. *An Autobiography*. Translated by K. Krishnamurthy. Pp. vi, 372. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977. $12.50.

PARMET, HERBERT S. *The Democrats: The Years After FDR*. Pp. viii, 371. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977. $4.95. Paperbound.

PEARCY, G. ETZEL. *World Sovereignty*. Pp. iv, 288. Fullerton, Calif.: Plycon Press, 1977. $9.95.

PECHMAN, JOSEPH A., ed. *Comprehensive Income Taxation*. Pp. vii, 311. Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1977. $11.95. Paperbound, $4.95.

PINCUS, JONATHAN J. *Pressure Groups and Politics in Antebellum Tariffs*. Pp. viii, 237. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. $15.00.

PRANGER, ROBERT J. and ROGER P. LABRIE, eds. *Nuclear Strategy and National Security: Points of View*. Pp. 515. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1977. $6.75. Paperbound.

PRICHARD, ELIZABETH R. *et al.*, eds. *Social Work with the Dying Patient and the Family*. Pp. xi, 350. New York: Columbia University Press, 1977. $17.50.

RABINOW, PAUL. *Reflections on Fieldwork in Morocco*. Pp. 177. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977. $9.50.

RAPPORTEUR, ROBERT SOLOMON, WILLIAM MCCHESNEY MARTIN, JR., and FRANK A. SOUTHARD, JR. *The International Monetary System: Progress and Prospects*. Pp. ix, 86. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977. $3.95. Paperbound.

REUBENS, BEATRICE G. *Bridges to Work*. Pp. v, 275. Montclair, N.J.: Allanheld Osmun, 1977. $18.00.

ROSENTHAL, DOUGLAS E. *Lawyer and Client: Who's in Charge?* Pp. vii, 228. New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 1977. $4.95. Paperbound.

ROTHENBERG, MORRIS. *Whither China: The View From the Kremlin*. Pp. v, 310. Washington, D.C.: University of Miami, 1977. $12.95. Paperbound, $8.95.

ROVERE, RICHARD H. and GENE BROWN, eds. *Loyalty and Security in a Democratic State*. Pp. 399. New York: Arno Press, 1977. $35.00.

SAGARIN, EDWARD, ed. *Deviance and Social Change*. Pp. 320. Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1977. $17.50. Paperbound, $7.50.

SANDERS, IRWIN T. *Rural Society*. Pp. ix, 170. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1977. $8.95. Paperbound, $4.95.

SARASON, SEYMOUR B. *et al. Human Services and Resource Networks*. Pp. ix, 201. San Francisco, Calif.: Jossey-Bass, 1977. $12.95.

SARGENT, LYMAN TOWER. *Contemporary Political Ideologies*. 4th ed. Pp. vii, 197. Homewood, Ill.: Dorsey Press, 1977. $5.95. Paperbound.

SAUVANT, KARL P. and HAJO HASENPFLUG, eds. *The New International Economic Order: Confrontation or Cooperation Between North and South?* Pp. xiii, 474. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1977. $25.00.

SCAMMON, RICHARD M. and ALICE V. MCGILLIVRAY, eds. *America Votes 12: A Handbook of Contemporary American Election Statistics*. Pp. i, 415. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1977. $35.00.

SCASE, RICHARD, ed. *Industrial Society: Class, Cleavage and Control*. Pp. 221. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977. $16.95.

SCOTT, A. F. *Every One A Witness. The Roman Age*. Pp. v, 351. Totowa, N.J.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1977. $12.50.

SHERRILL, KENNETH S. and DAVID J. VOGLER. *Power, Policy, and Participation: An Introduction to American Government*. Pp.

v, 524. New York: Harper & Row, 1977. $10.95.

SIBLEY, MULFORD Q. *Nature and Civilization: Some Implications for Politics*. Pp vii, 317. Itasca, Ill.: F. E. Peacock, 1977. $10.50.

SIMPSON, RICHARD. *Ooti: A Maidu Legacy* Pp. 118. Millbrae, Calif., Celestial Arts, 1977. $6.95. Paperbound.

SMITH, ANTHONY D., ed. *Nationalist Movements*. Pp. iv, 185. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977 $15.95.

STEINBERG, STEPHEN. *The Academic Melting Pot*. Pp. xiii, 183. New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction Books, 1977. $4.95. Paperbound.

STEINHOFF, PATRICIA G and MILTON DIAMOND. *Abortion Politics: The Hawaii Experience*. Pp. vii, 256 Honolulu University Press of Hawaii, 1977 $10.00. Paperbound, $4 95.

STONE, VICTOR J., ed. *Civil Liberties and Civil Rights* David C Baum Memorial Lectures Pp. vii, 243 Urbana University of Illinois Press, 1977. $6.95.

STROBER, GERALD S *Graham. A Day in Billy's Life* Pp. 206 New York Dell Books, 1977. $1 95 Paperbound

The Study of the Future An Agenda for Research. Pp i, 316 Washington, D.C.. U S. Government Printing Office, 1977. $4.75 Paperbound

The Supreme Court: Justice and the Law 2nd ed. Pp. 207 Washington, D C · Congressional Quarterly, 1977. $5.25. Paperbound

TAEBEL, DELBERT A and JAMES V CORNEHIS. *The Political Economy of Urban Transportation*. Pp vii, 218. Port Washington, N.Y.: Kennikat Press, 1977 $13 95 Paperbound, $8 95.

TAYLOR, JOHN. *Arator* Pp. 394. Indianapolis, Ind . Liberty Classics, 1977. $9.00

THOMPSON, WILLIAM IRWIN. *Darkness and Scattered Light. Four Talks on the Future* Pp. 189 New York: Anchor Press, 1978. $3.95. Paperbound

TINKER, HUGH *Race, Conflict and the International Order. From Empire to United Nations* Pp 157 New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977 $16 95.

TRILATERAL COMMISSION. *Trilateral Commission Series. Task Force Reports 1–7*. Pp. iv, 209 New York. New York University Press, 1977 $12 00

TURCHIN, V. F. *The Phenomenon of Science. A Cybernetic Approach to Human Evolution*. Pp. vii, 348 New York· Columbia University Press, 1977. $17.50.

VETTERLING-BRAGGIN, MARY *et al.*, eds. *Feminism and Philosophy* Pp. v, 452 Totowa, N J: Littlefield, Adams, 1977. $7.95. Paperbound.

WALINSKY, LOUIS J., ed. *Agrarian Reform as Unfinished Business*. Pp. v, 603. New York: Oxford University Press, 1977. $22.00. Paperbound, $10.75.

WALTER, RICHARD J. *The Socialist Party of Argentina 1890–1930*. Pp. 284. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1977. $14.95. Paperbound, $5.95.

WANG, GEORGE C. ed. *Fundamentals of Political Economy*. Pp. xvii, 506. White Plains, N.Y.: M E. Sharpe, 1977 $27.50.

WARREN, W. L. *Henry II*. Pp. 711. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978. $8.95. Paperbound.

WARWICK, DONALD P. *A Theory of Public Bureaucracy: Politics, Personality, and Organization in the State Department*. Pp. vi, 252. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1975 $12.00.

WATT, D. C *Survey of International Affairs 1963*. Pp. vi, 351 New York Oxford University Press, 1977. $55 00

WATT, KENNETH E. F., *et al*. *The Unsteady State: Environmental Problems, Growth, and Culture*. Pp. vii, 287. Honolulu: University Press of Hawaii, 1977. $12.95.

Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Environment. Pp x, 95 New York Crane, Russak, 1977 No price

WEBER, MAX. *Critique of Stammler* Pp. iii, 184. New York The Free Press, 1977. $12.95.

WESSON, ROBERT G *Communism and Communist Systems*. Pp. ix, 227 Englewood Cliffs, N.J.. Prentice-Hall, 1977 $7.95 Paperbound.

WOGAMAN, J. PHILIP. *The Great Economic Debate. An Ethical Analysis*. Pp. ix, 182. Philadelphia, Pa.. Westminster Press, 1977. $10.95 Paperbound, $5.95.

YOUNG, DENNIS R and STEPHEN J. FINCH *Foster Care and Nonprofit Agencies*. Pp. vii, 265. Lexington, Mass . Lexington Books, 1977 $18 00

ZAMORA, MARIO D , J. MICHAEL MAHAR, and HENRY ORENSTEIN, eds. *Themes in Culture. Essays in Honor of Morris E Opler*. Pp. v, 424. Detroit, Mich.. Cellar Book Shop, 1971. No price.

ZANKOV, L V. *et al* *Teaching and Development: A Soviet Investigation*. Edited by Beatrice Beach Szekely. Pp. vi, 292. White Plains, N.Y M. E. Sharpe, 1977. $20.00.

ZINN, HOWARD, ed. *Justice: Eyewitness Accounts*. Pp. iii, 275. Boston, Mass.: Beacon Press, 1977 $4.50. Paperbound.

ZUCKER, NORMAN L. *The Coming Crisis in Israel: Private Faith and Public Policy*. Pp. viii, 282. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1977. $4.95. Paperbound.

INDEX